PEACE AUDIT
KENYA

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WHAT IS A PEACE AUDIT?

This is the first in a series of ‘Peace Audits’, in which we assess the opportunities and challenges of building sustainable peace around the world.

Too often people look at the causes of conflict without looking at the reasons for peace. But conflict occurs in all societies; it is not always negative. It can bring about change and progress. We therefore want to understand how conflict can be managed peacefully. To do this, we have developed the Peace Audit.

The Peace Audit goes beyond just looking at risks and drivers of conflict. It looks at the possibilities for peace as well – the strengths in a society that make it possible to find a path to peace. The Peace Audit approaches the situation by seeking opportunities for peaceful change. Of course, it entails looking at the risks, but it goes further.

This report therefore offers an insight into not only the challenges that communities face in Kenya, but also the opportunities that lie ahead. In doing so, we share some of the stories from those for whom peace and conflict is a day-to-day reality – from the population of the informal settlement of Kibera to the pastoralist villagers of Turkana, and the rose growers of Lake Naivasha to their Maasai neighbours.

Safeguarding peace in Kenya will require a strong awareness of the realities and a careful consideration of the risks, but also a dedicated conviction to move beyond the current conflict risks and embrace the many opportunities for peace.
Despite being the biggest economy in east Africa, with a peacefully elected government and a world-renowned tourist industry, Kenya faces a number of severe conflict risks and its prospects for a peaceful future are by no means assured.

Recent events such as the post-election violence in late 2007 and early 2008, and the terrorist attack on Westgate shopping centre in Nairobi in 2013, reveal undercurrents that seriously threaten peace and stability in the country. Further risks include violent conflict between pastoralist tribes as well as frequent public protests over corruption and other issues, often met by harsh policing. These events have unfolded against a background that includes high unemployment, widespread poverty, a slowdown in economic growth, and the detrimental impact of climate change, which is harming both food production and livelihoods.

In Kenya today, therefore, safeguarding peace requires a strong awareness of the context and careful consideration and understanding of not only the risks, but also the interlinked opportunities for building peace.

In this Peace Audit, we will assess these risks and opportunities by looking at how Kenya measures up to what we call ‘peace factors’ – five conditions that we believe underpin sustainable peace in countries and regions across the world (see page 6).

To do so, we have selected three different areas that we feel reflect Kenya’s diverse social, economic, topographical and climatic contexts:

- **KIBERA**: A vast urban informal settlement alongside a river in Kenya’s capital;
- **NAIVASHA**: A semi-urban community in southwest Kenya dependent on a lake; and
- **TURKANA**: A pastoral community in northwest Kenya dependent on arid dry lands and limited water resources.
PEACE FACTORS

1. **Power and governance:** Everyone is able to participate in shaping political decisions and the government is accountable to the people.

2. **Income and assets:** Everyone has an equal opportunity to work and make a living, regardless of gender, ethnicity or any other aspect of identity.

3. **Law and justice:** Everyone is equal before the law, the systems for justice are trusted and fair, and effective laws protect people’s rights.

4. **Safety and security:** Everyone lives in safety, without fear or threat of violence, and no form of violence is tolerated in law or in practice.

5. **Wellbeing:** Everyone has fair and equal access to the basic needs for their wellbeing – such as food, clean water, shelter, education, healthcare and a decent living environment.
A Peace Audit differs from ordinary conflict assessments because it goes beyond identifying the problems – conflict risks and drivers – and the assumption that addressing those will result in peace. While these are important, they are only part of the story and this approach can overlook the peace possibilities – the strengths in a society that make it possible to find a path to peace. The Peace Audit approaches the situation by seeking opportunities for peaceful change. This involves looking at the risks, but it goes further. A key feature of the Peace Audit – in common with the best conflict analyses – is that it involves local communities in identifying risks and opportunities, and in verifying and validating the conclusions.

The Peace Audit methodology uses a sampling method. For this Peace Audit, this consisted of three field sites. The selection of these sites was guided by a background analysis using Alert’s peace assessment methodology. This analysis assesses risks to and opportunities for positive peace. Acknowledging that Kenya is highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate and environmental change, the analysis considers the various ways in which these impacts could affect peace and security. Primary data is then disaggregated by gender, with the analysis considering the different impacts of peace risks and opportunities for men, women, boys and girls.

The methodology therefore consists of four parts:

1. The preliminary risk assessment uses the Peace Assessment Methodology, drawing on desk research and interviews to review risks relating to the five peace factors.

2. Based on the preliminary assessment, the analysis stage involves selecting three areas of the country to look at more closely – the audit ‘sample’.

3. The testing component of the Peace Audit verifies the risk assessment information for accuracy and validity based on local perceptions, expertise and experiences in these three areas, and identifies local peacebuilding opportunities.

4. Finally, in the validation phase the findings are reviewed and discussed with a variety of stakeholders, including people in the communities in the selected sites.

The audit does not make predictions. Rather it identifies strengths and weaknesses in current approaches to peacebuilding, indicating sign-posts towards greater peacebuilding opportunities in the country.
“Most problems are concealed through political sloganeering; however, the underlying factors are injustices and inequalities that haven’t been addressed.”

JAMALDIN, RELIGIOUS LEADER, KIBERA

The role of ethnicity in politics, the tendency of the governing elite to not only dominate political and economic positions of power but also control economic wealth, including natural resources, and the marginalisation of some tribal groups all contribute towards an inherently unstable political environment in Kenya.

In contrast to the ethnic violence that marred the 2007 elections, when over 1,000 people were killed and more than 300,000 displaced, the 2013 general elections were relatively peaceful. Yet Kenya is still deeply politically divided and ethnically polarised, and any efforts to address this polarisation are widely deemed by civil society to be too sensitive. A key reason for the lack of violence around the 2013 election was widespread ‘conflict fatigue’ following the riots of late 2007 and early 2008. According to one community respondent in Naivasha, “people realised they had more to lose than to gain from the violence”. This view was echoed by the majority of those we interviewed in Naivasha and Kibera, two of the hotspots of the violence. Media self-censorship, restrictions on freedom of assembly, and the deployment of security forces to potential hotspots also helped to avoid a repeat of the 2007/8 unrest.

However, the conflict drivers that fuelled the situation in 2007 – poverty, high unemployment, incomplete resettling of internally displaced peoples (IDPs), land grievances, corruption, impunity and ethnic tensions – have still not been adequately addressed. Indeed, the political culture and systems in Kenya have often tended to reinforce them.

The current Jubilee Coalition government is trying to restore confidence in the electoral process. To this end, it will need to show robust commitment to implementing the 2010 constitution (for more on the constitution, see page 16).
Especially important are the articles on devolution, land reform, corruption and national reconciliation. One of the big issues has been the lack of accountability for the 2007/8 violence. The issue now rests with the International Criminal Court in the Hague, where charges of crimes against humanity are still pending against three (of the original six) suspects, among whom are the newly elected president, Uhuru Kenyatta, and deputy president, William Ruto. There is a real dilemma here: on the one hand, not taking the charges to trial risks further cleaving the country along ethnic lines, while on the other, pressing the charges home poses an equal risk of fuelling instability. While justice is a key principle for a peaceful state, opinions on the ground are highly divided about indicting the president and deputy president. Based on our research, many of those most affected by the unrest would prefer to live with the injustice rather than risk future instability. “The ICC case will only anger the Kikuyu further and bring more conflict,” said Patience, an internally displaced widow who lost her husband, job and all her assets when her home was burned to the ground during the violence in Naivasha in 2008. “We will instead look to God to provide justice.”

The constitution also enshrined a devolution of power from the central to county government (see Box 1). This could offer major gains for peace, but again there are conflict risks attached. There are 47 newly created counties, with their own elected governors and assemblies. In principle, they could help reduce socio-economic inequalities, because the poorer counties should be receiving a more equitable share of national economic resources than in the past. That, at least, is the widely held hope, but the process is already causing friction, precisely because it involves changes in how resources are distributed. Part of this comes down to how the administrative boundaries have been drawn, and therefore how and to whom economic resources are allocated.

Disparities in power and resources in Kenya have long fallen along ethnic lines. Though the country has dozens of ethnic groups, only a handful have dominated the political landscape. According to the constitution, Parliament has discretion on budgetary allocations to county governments, so in any conflict between the two levels the central government can override the county. Government favour, political alliances and policy priorities could make some counties ‘more equal than others’. While devolution is the object of great hope, many people fear and believe that power is nonetheless still concentrated in the hands of a few particular elite groups that come from a small number of tribes. These groups do not necessarily represent a whole tribe or community, but ethnic ties are strong. In ethnically homogenous communities, a local youth leader explained, “people will close their eyes or look the other way” if a leader from their ethnic community misuses his or her power.
The process of devolution is still young and it is too early to tell whether it will promote peace or not. Any substantive changes will take time to take root, with some experts estimating that it could take at least a generation. However, the public are eager for tangible change. Unless the process brings about some immediate benefits that materially improve people’s lives in the short term, it risks being written off as merely an additional layer of bureaucracy – and taxation – to a nation dogged by bureaucratic corruption.

Together with the desire of ordinary people to live in a peaceful environment, devolution does at least provide the seeds of the solution. The issue now is whether the country and its leaders can live up to the words and intent of the constitution, and therefore avoid repeating the violence of 2007/8.

**BOX 1**
**KEY FACTS ON DEVOLUTION IN KENYA**

Devolution is a major pillar of the 2010 constitution. The constitution divided Kenya into 47 counties, each with its own executive and legislative branch of local government, which will be responsible for agriculture, transportation, trade licences, sanitation, pre-primary education, village post-secondary education and most health facilities. While overall policy in these areas may still be drawn up by the national government, counties will be in charge of implementation and service delivery. At least 15% of the national budget will now go to these county governments, with provisions for additional funds under certain circumstances. The national government retains responsibility for security, foreign policy, national economic policy and planning, as well as many areas of education.

**INCOME AND ASSETS**

“Ethnic lines and connections determine access to good jobs.”
MAASAI HERDER, NAIVASHA

“If you are a Kenyan, you are always insecure unless you own land.”
IBRA, YOUTH WORKER, KIBERA

Kenya is the biggest economy in east Africa and economic growth is a key driver of the government’s development strategy, *Kenya Vision 2030: A globally competitive and prosperous Kenya*, launched in 2008 (see Box 2). While robust and equitable economic development can certainly yield peace dividends, economic growth and development themselves are currently sources of dispute and conflict in the country.
Kenya’s economic growth slowed in 2013, reaching only 5% rather than the predicted 5.7%. Taking into account the country’s rapid population increase, this translates to 2% growth in gross domestic product (GDP) per capita. The costs of climate change – namely on economic productivity, such as through diminished agricultural yields – are already growing and are expected to reach almost 3% of GDP by 2030. Despite government intentions, economic growth is forecast to continue at the same levels or slower, leaving Kenya lagging behind other economies in the region. All this makes it progressively harder to make major inroads into reducing poverty in the country.

Total annual foreign and local investments fell from US$1.84 billion in 2011 to US$712 million in 2012, a 61 percentage point drop. This was partly due to the global financial crisis, which hit two key sectors of Kenya’s economy, tourism and exports, particularly badly. Analysts also blamed the decline on security lapses in the country’s coastal region linked to Kenya’s incursion into Somalia, plus the concentration of political activity in 2011 and 2012 on the trials at the ICC and preparations for the March 2013 general elections. As Vision 2030 recognises, this means that peace and stability are crucial for the country’s economic development.

Land is also central to peace and conflict in Kenya. Land ownership is a highly sensitive issue, one that many donors of development aid avoid tackling. It was a major factor in the post-election violence. The issue is underpinned by the Kenyan cultural attitude about the importance of owning land. According to an experienced Kenyan youth worker, “You are always insecure unless you own some land”. With the country’s population growing, the difficult imperative arises of eroding this cultural association between success, security and land ownership. In addition, public and private policies adopted in net food-importing nations in the wake of the food crises of 2007–8 and 2010–11 have encouraged large-scale land acquisitions in Kenya by investors. This seems to have had a negative effect on the rural poor, who are dependent on tribal or common land for their livelihoods. Getting the consent of land users and also adequately compensating them is often complicated by a mosaic of land tenure systems in which tribal land rights, customary practices and private ownership and leases overlap or are unrecorded.

**BOX 2  
KEY FACTS ON KENYA VISION 2030**

Kenya Vision 2030: A globally competitive and prosperous Kenya was launched by then President Mwai Kibaki on 10 June 2008 to set out Kenya’s development programme to 2030. Its objective is to help transform Kenya into a “newly industrialising, middle-income country providing a high quality of life to all its citizens by 2030 in a clean and secure environment”. Developed through a consultative process, involving Kenyan stakeholders from all parts of the country, Vision 2030 is based around three ‘pillars’; economic, social and political. It is being implemented in successive five-year medium-term plans, starting from 2008. While some development gains have been made in the first and second periods, concerns remain around corruption and state capture of resources hindering the achievement of its goals.
Women’s rights to land and property in particular are highly at risk. Women’s rights to property were enshrined in the 2010 constitution but were undermined by a new Matrimonial Property Act passed in early 2014, which strips women of their right to family property, including the homes where they and their children live, if they are unable to prove they make a financial contribution. The recently established National Land Commission and forthcoming National and County Land Acts are seen as an opportunity for greater equity and consistency in the law. However, given that there are already turf conflicts between the new commission and the Ministry of Land, it does not bode well.

Although tourism is still Kenya’s most profitable economic sector, exports of flowers, tea and coffee are not far behind, together with other agricultural products. This means the economy is highly sensitive to climate change. The balance of trade in Kenya already fluctuates widely, due in large part to weather patterns. Continued changes in the climate will mean more variable and unpredictable temperature and rainfall patterns, causing problems for the temperature-sensitive tea and coffee plantations and the water-dependent flower farms. This varying rainfall is already compounding local grievances related to water allocation around Lake Naivasha. According to a representative of the local water association, “There’s always trouble when water table falls”. Earnings from exports of flowers, tea and coffee are also heavily influenced by fluctuations in world prices. Given that agriculture contributes 29% of Kenya’s GDP and employs over 75% of the workforce,

The combination of these economic, political and environmental issues increases Kenya’s risk profile. A major concern is that this could discourage foreign firms from investing in the country and significantly impact on employment and national revenue. The implications of the continued weak growth will first and foremost affect public spending, such as public sector wages and interest rate payments. Any cuts here could play into existing grievances relating to unemployment, poverty and lack of attention to social welfare.

There are as yet no political efforts to address these complex, linked risks in a joined-up way at the national level. For example, while acknowledging that “Kenya’s economy and, by extension, its population, could be classified as highly vulnerable to natural and man-made disaster risks”, the 2009 Draft National Policy for Disaster Management admits that Kenya does not have a comprehensive disaster management framework or strategies guided by appropriate policy and legislative provisions. “[The] country is lucky to have been able to sort of manage from one
emergency to another, without an effective disaster management system, albeit with a very high level of support from the international community,” reads the policy. At the micro-level, however, small schemes are emerging to address the risks posed to the agro-pastoral (or primary) sector, such as livestock insurance to both increase climate resilience and dis-incentivise cattle raiding.

While not a significant contributor to the formal economy, pastoralism is another important source of income in Kenya, with livestock often the main asset of the country’s pastoral tribes such as the Turkana, Maasai, Pokot and Samburu peoples. Pastoralists feel that their livelihoods are marginalised by politicians, who prefer to promote modern livelihoods that contribute to the national government’s vision of a ‘digital generation’.

The Kikuyu, for example, make up just under a quarter of Kenya’s population, but are widely seen by other tribes as benefiting from preferential treatment, concentrating in positions of power, and dominating economic resources and skilled jobs. Pastoral tribes such as the Maasai and Turkana on the other hand experience pervasive discrimination in the formal job market. According to one Maasai pastoralist:

“The government sees pastoralism as backwards, holding back progress, but they do not provide us with support in terms of education or alternative skills. The Maasai started to introduce their children into formal education in the 1990s, so now the next generation is coming out of university ready to take professional jobs. However, we are hindered by barriers – ethnic lines and the connections that determine access to good jobs. We are highly affected by ethnic discrimination – we are still perceived as only knowing about herding, so it is difficult to get jobs.”

Similarly, herders in Turkana county expressed frustration that most skilled jobs in the burgeoning oil sector go to incoming, predominantly Kikuyu, workers. If the Turkana people get any work at all, we heard, it is unskilled or day labour. Of course, given a wider context of social marginalisation, they may not have the qualifications, skills or experience required for more rewarding jobs.
This whole issue can be hard to pin down. The Maasai we spoke to gave two different narratives that could be taken as contradictory. One account is that their traditional, pastoralist way of life is being undermined. The second is that Maasai university graduates don’t get good jobs because of discrimination and thus only have one option – to revert to the traditional living, i.e. herding. In one narrative, traditionalism is sabotaged; in the other, modernisation is. But these two accounts are only contradictory if the Maasai are regarded as purely and exclusively a pastoralist group. If instead they are thought of as a group of people who would like to do more than survive; as a group that would like to prosper; a group with different individuals and families adopting different strategies towards this end – some involving traditional measures of wealth (e.g. number and type of livestock) and ways of life, others new ways of earning a living that may affect their social status – then this makes a great deal of sense.

Notwithstanding the difficulty of sorting out what is really happening from what is generally thought to be going on, these issues are important and potentially explosive. These tribes often have little political leverage to address their marginalisation but they are often well armed, and violence is a frequent first response to perceived injustices. Decentralisation provides a possible opportunity for greater political voice and economic engagement for pastoralists at the county level. For example, the MP for Turkana South, James Lomenen, vocally advocated for the Turkana people to benefit equitably from the job opportunities provided by an oil company in the region. Yet, national and local economic priorities may not always align. In this case, the MP was subsequently summoned by the national courts for inciting protests against the oil company. While political and economic inclusion of pastoralists is important for ‘peace-positive’ economic growth, in the face of climate change and changes to land allocation in Kenya (for example, there are fewer areas of common land available for grazing), and the long march to modernisation, the long-term viability of pastoralism as a way of life is being thrown into question. Despite it being a key part of their cultural heritage, many pastoralists themselves acknowledge that their traditional preference for large herds is not sustainable in the long term.

The discovery of oil for potential extraction in Turkana county in March 2012 provides an economic opportunity for the country. If well managed, the income from this resource could make a significant contribution to Kenyans’ wellbeing. It could also improve the conditions of the marginalised Turkana people and the other tribes, helping them to gain a greater political voice. But many conditions have to be met to realise this appealing prospect. Firstly, the deposits need to be commercially viable. Secondly, Kenya needs a pipeline and a harbour to export its oil. Thirdly, the economic benefits – jobs and revenues – have to be distributed in a way that people recognise as equitable. And finally, the potential negative impacts on access to water and land need to be considered and taken into account. (To find out more, read our case study on Turkana on page 56.)
Kenya’s current constitution was approved by 67% of Kenyan voters in a referendum in 2010. Replacing the 1969 constitution, it contains a number of peace-positive amendments, including:

- A Bill of Rights that among other things recognises the socio-economic rights of Kenyan citizens (Chapter 4);
- A Human Rights and Equality Commission with the power to investigate and summon people involved in human rights abuses within the government and public (Article 252);
- Equitable sharing of resources between the national government and the county government (Chapter 12, Part 4);
- An Equalization Fund to better meet basic needs in marginalised communities (Article 204); and
- An Independent National Land Commission to maintain oversight and manage all land belonging to national and county government, and advise the national government on ways of improving national and county land management, planning and dispute resolution (Article 67).

The road to the new constitution was difficult. Deadlocked negotiations were only brought to successful conclusion by the intervention of the African Union through a mediation team headed by former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, formed following the 2007 election violence.

Even with the constitution in place, problems persist. The constitution enshrines new socio-economic rights, but implementation is patchy. For example, in January 2014 the government ordered the eviction of the Sengwer people from the Embobut Forest in the Cherangani Hills in the name of conservation. Yet Article 63(d) of the constitution recognises the rights of communities to own ancestral lands traditionally occupied by hunter-gatherers. The eviction was enforced by the police, riot police and Kenyan Forest Service rangers and elicited widespread national and international condemnation, including from the World Bank.
Many people perceive access to justice as strongly skewed along tribal lines. Examples of abuses of power and state interference in the judicial system are frequently reported in the press, contributing to low levels of trust in the formal justice system among the general public. The consensus among individuals interviewed for this audit was that the formal courts would be their last resort if they had to resolve a dispute. Youth in particular reported very low levels of trust in the formal justice system. In Kibera, Nairobi’s largest ‘informal urban settlement’, or slum, ex-members of youth gangs described their experiences of a lack of due process/habeas corpus or trials when arrested, as well as incidents of extra-judicial killings by the police.

Informal tribal or religious justice mechanisms, or in some cases vigilante justice, are more common. While vigilantism needs to be categorically quashed and some types of traditional mechanisms go against norms of justice, equality and accountability, there are clear peace opportunities in fostering equitable and accountable informal justice through traditional mechanisms. For example, religious elders led an effective peace dialogue process in Kibera following the 2007/8 riots.

SAFETY AND SECURITY

“You can’t fight crime with guns, but you can with jobs.”
CHARLES NEWMAN, PROJECT MANAGER, ENGINEERS WITHOUT BORDERS, KIBERA

Kenya’s Vision 2030 recognises safety and security as key determinants in the direction and pattern of human settlement and investment. The unfortunate reality, however, is that the provision of security is inconsistent in both quality and effectiveness. There are pockets of lawlessness in urban centres, such as in Kibera in Nairobi, and vast swathes of the country – mainly pastoral regions – that are largely neglected by the state security sector altogether. For example, Turkana county was described by the county governor as the ‘wild west’. There is an estimated one member of police staff to 3,300 citizens in some areas of Turkana, which is significantly below the UN recommended police–public ratio of 1:450.16

As a result, socio-economically marginalised communities have taken their security into their own hands by arming themselves with rifles. The government see the community police – the Kenya Police Reservists (KPR) – as a cost-effective solution to addressing gaps in security provision. However, according to a local MP, James Lomenen, they are often poorly trained – in most cases “simply given a gun, uniform and small allowance”. The lack of training and civilian oversight of the community
police is problematic, but on the plus side they are predominantly recruited from the same ethnic groups as the communities they are policing. This means they are present in the community and understand the local context. With adequate resourcing and supervision they could therefore provide security for even remote communities.

Reported cases of excessive use of force by the police and other government forces, combined with their limited capacity to investigate and prosecute crimes, has undermined public trust in government authorities. In many regions, vigilantism is rife. For example, in parts of Nairobi and Naivasha vigilante groups are viewed as the primary provider of security rather than the official police. According to one young person we spoke to in Naivasha, the local police, acknowledging their limited capacity, “turn a blind eye” to vigilante lynchings. Youth in particular often experience the rough side of security provision, facing a prevalent negative reputation of being ‘idle’ and ‘problematic’.

Small arms are widespread in Kenya and their proliferation poses a significant risk to peace. Numerous disarmament initiatives in the northern counties have had limited success. According to a key informant in Lodwar, Turkana, who has worked on disarmament, the country needs a holistic approach to peace, reconciliation and disarmament – one that involves improved security and alternative livelihood sources. The use of force will not resolve conflicts in this region, nor will simply taking away people’s guns. “It is important to understand the reasons why community members acquire guns and tackle these.”

Most conflicts since 2000 were not large-scale insurrections but either localised acts of violence between civilians or riots and protests between civilians and the security forces. Particular spikes can be noted around the presidential elections of December 2007 and, albeit to a much lesser extent, March 2013. In 2007/8, supporters of the
Party of National Unity (PNU) and the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) were reported to be involved in violent attacks against the supporters of the opposing party and civilians. After Mwai Kibaki of the PNU was declared president, his opponent Raila Odinga alleged electoral manipulation. Demonstrations escalated into violence between demonstrators and the police in major cities, including the capital Nairobi, together with targeted killings of members of the president’s Kikuyu ethnic group, mostly in the Rift Valley province. Retaliatory violence against Odinga supporters, mainly of Luo and Kalenjin ethnicity, followed, particularly in and around Nakuru and Naivasha. In the end, a total of 1,300 people had lost their lives and over 650,000 had been displaced as a result of the violence. With heavily armed pastoralist tribes and an evolving culture of increasingly lethal raiding, security risks from cattle raiding and natural resource conflicts also pose a major risk to peace. As tribal hostility remains unaddressed and protracted drought, desertification and ‘modernisation’ put an increased strain on pastoral livelihoods, these conflicts are likely to become more frequent and bloody.

While promotion of unity across ethnic groups is widely agreed to be too sensitive and thus unworkable at present, opportunities exist around promoting inter-religious cooperation. There were some positive experiences of inter-religious dialogue and peacebuilding following the 2007/8 violence, for example. Our research in Nairobi found high levels of trust and respect among youth from various faiths for religious leaders of different denominations and religions. In Kibera, for example, young Christian ex-gang members respected and upheld the peace-promoting messages of a Nubian Muslim elder, despite their different faiths and the fact that Nubians are receiving land titles and Christians are not. Religious leaders therefore have the potential to bridge identity divides and provide leadership in times of increased social grievances, be it over political misbehaviour, access to resources or ethnic differences.

Religiously divisive terrorist attacks have increased in recent years, however, mainly in the northeast of the country, but also in urban centres such as Nairobi and Mombasa. They mostly take the form of bomb and gun attacks on civilians at bus stops or in churches, and are described as retaliation by the militant Islamist group al-Shabaab to Kenya's deployment of troops to neighbouring Somalia in October 2011 to fight the group. The deadliest attack was on Nairobi’s Westgate shopping centre in September 2013, when 61 civilians and six security officers were killed after four days of fighting between al-Shabaab militants and Kenyan and Israeli security forces.

The government response to the Westgate attack included rounding up and detaining large numbers of Somalis in Nairobi, starting at the end of March 2014. This has
served to conflate immigration issues with terrorism and has further widened communal divides in the country, fuelling fear and distrust – thus accomplishing what the Westgate attack aimed to do. The response from Kenyan citizens on social media has revealed widespread anti-Somali prejudices. Within 10 days, Kenyan Somalis, who number almost two million, along with half a million Somali refugees and migrants, found themselves targets of suspicion and even violence. The political classes have been quick to pander to public opinion and use the situation to score political points, while the police have been profiteering by extorting bribes from lawful Somali residents – 5,000 Kenyan shillings (KES) (around £35/US$55) was apparently the going rate for a bribe to avoid being taken into detention. Their experience resonates all too well with the sermons and speeches of radical preachers (a number of whom have been victims of extrajudicial killings), who capitalise on Muslim marginalisation to promote support for al-Shabaab and other radical groups.

The threat of terrorism is indeed real and urgent in Kenya, and the issue of illegal Somali migrants also poses pressing political and social challenges. However, unless there is a wholesale revision of current response measures to detentions and deportations, the poor handling of these issues is likely to fuel a backlash. Mass detentions of Somalis threaten to create a greater constituency for al-Shabaab, uniting grievances that are specific to the Somali community with those of the wider Muslim population.
This includes the largely Muslim coastal counties, whose social indicators are among the worst in Kenya. Excesses by the security forces also undermine the anti-Shabaab messages of Salafist and Wahhabi clerics – especially those of Somali heritage – who turned against al-Shabaab in 2009 and later went public with comprehensive theological condemnations of the Westgate attack.

In the last two decades, Kenya has also continued to face a rising degree of vulnerability to natural disaster risk – specifically recurring and protracted droughts, and more frequent and intense flooding during rainy seasons. These environmental changes affect the physical safety of households and communities, seriously disrupting their lives and livelihoods beyond their capacity to cope or withstand it using their own resources. For example, women in drought-affected villages in Turkana county described feeling more vulnerable to attacks from enemy tribes, as the men from the village were away for longer periods of time to find pasture and water for their animals. The result is that affected populations suffer serious widespread human, material, economic or environmental losses. The Turkana women explained that they now keep back some of their sons from going with the animals in order to guard the women and children, which in turn puts their animals at risk.

Certain communities are particularly vulnerable to environmental risk due to a combination of factors, such as poverty, aridity, settlement in areas prone to perennial flooding or areas with poor infrastructure and services, such as the informal urban settlements, or even living in poorly constructed buildings. Unsurprisingly, it is predominantly the poor and marginalised who are least resilient to avoid, cope with or adapt to these risks. For example, those living in poorly constructed shelters in Kibera along the flood-prone river that flows through it, and internally displaced households reliant on arid, degraded soil in the plains surrounding Naivasha.

**WELLBEING**

“If you force me to live with you, I will do so because I am poor and weak. But as soon as I have some power, I will retaliate.”

**JAMALDIN**, RELIGIOUS LEADER, KIBERA

One of the three pillars of Vision 2030 is a social pillar, which is intended to build “a just and cohesive society with social equity”. The lack of social justice lies
at the heart of public dissatisfaction in Kenya, manifest in frequent and increasingly violent public protests across the country. Protests in Nairobi in February 2014 were fuelled by the prevailing public perception of poor governance by the ruling Jubilee Coalition. Fifty years on from independence, expectations of equitable development have not been met. Specific shortcomings relate to corruption, insecurity, unemployment, poverty, constitutional breaches and poor leadership. Despite decentralisation, there are significant disparities in the provision of basic services such as security across the country.

In particular, there is a strong urban bias in government priorities. The flip-side of prioritising boosting economic growth through investing in technology and infrastructure under Vision 2030 is that rural dimensions of wellbeing can be neglected or even denigrated through national narratives perpetuated by the media. Simply sidelining rural communities does little to offer alternatives to their traditional way of life. One Maasai pastoralist explained that, despite prosperous economic growth in Kenya’s horticulture hub town of Naivasha, “if you speak to a pastoralist, he will tell you the development in Naivasha has not been good, as it does not benefit him”.

One persisting historical trend is the marginalisation of northern Kenya. In the early years of independence, the government focused resources on areas with a high potential for economic returns, i.e. big cities such as Nairobi, Mombasa and Naivasha, leaving to one side communities in the arid north and rural areas of Kenya. This exclusion and marginalisation continues today. Residents of Turkana county said they felt disconnected from the state and had low expectations in the national government regarding the provision of health, education, jobs and roads. Speaking about the government’s failure to address the insecurity caused by raiding between rival Turkana and Pokot tribes, one elder stated that: “[The] government is powerful. If they decide to take action today they could, but they choose not to.”

Despite the focus on urban development, there are major disparities in income within cities such as Nairobi and Naivasha, and significant gaps in the urban social safety net. This is most pronounced in urban informal settlements, or slums. Almost half of Nairobi’s three million people live in informal settlements, with inadequate access to safe water and sanitation. The United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) predicts that the number of inhabitants of informal settlements in Nairobi will more than double in the next 10 years.²⁰

It is important to note, however, that while there is no formal social welfare provision of any kind in these informal settlements, there are numerous informal dimensions of resilience that present opportunities for peacebuilding. In Kibera, social networks and social capital are strong, and basic services such as rubbish collection are carried out by entrepreneurial youth. Faced with the option of
moving to alternative accommodation with sanitation facilities, people we interviewed expressed a preference to stay put, due to the loss of social capital if they moved.

Since 2010 there have been efforts to tackle Kenya's growing informal settlement populations, but the government's attempts at resettlement and at managing migration and displacement have been fraught with challenges. For example, Nairobi's upgrading and resettlement programme lacked sufficient consultation with local residents. In fact, it was widely rumoured to be a manoeuvre to evict informal settlement dwellers in order to build high-end accommodation for Nairobi's growing middle class. Supposed beneficiaries of the scheme in Kibera spoke of the failure of planners to consider adequate livelihood options in the areas they were supposed to move to, the high costs of rent, and the prevalence of sale of deeds to affluent Nairobi professionals. Residents of the numerous IDP camps (most of which are due to the 2007/8 unrest) also described the lack of livelihood options as the main challenges to moving.

Among pastoralists, many claim that their migration patterns and routes are changing because of oil exploration. This is not because of the land being taken by oil installations, but because the machinery makes the ground vibrate, which the animals do not like, and the oil exploration activities use water. Herders must therefore find new routes with new water sources. This increased pressure on water supply comes alongside the effects of climate change, and it may be hard to distinguish one from the other. In any given location, drilling for oil may be only temporary, so the dislocation and any displacement of people may be only short-lived. But it is yet another challenge that, when added to the others, is creating growing tension in some communities.

Given the lower levels of social capital among the dislocated and marginalised groups, any attempts to safeguard their wellbeing through the provision of basic services could yield significant peace dividends. This could further help to establish a stronger, more positive social contract between the people and the state. Otherwise, in the current governance vacuum people might be easily manipulated for short-term political gain, radicalised (as is alleged in the infamous Dabaab camp on the Kenya–Somali border) or turn to criminality.

Women face particular challenges to their wellbeing. As discussed earlier, despite having land rights for wives and dependants enshrined in the 2010 constitution, an amendment passed in early 2014 (the Matrimonial Property Act) revoked these rights. A further challenge to women's rights occurred in March 2014 when a new Marriage Bill was enacted that formally permits polygamy, but omits the cultural custom that allows the first wife to veto a husband's choice of wife.
There are plenty of conflict risks in Kenya, ranging from the unsettled issues left over from the post-election violence in 2007/8, through land access and ethnic tensions, to terrorism, all against a background of widespread poverty, high unemployment and the impact of climate change. At the same time, there are a number of promising peace opportunities that can and should be exploited.

Our research found three key areas for building positive and sustainable peace in Kenya:

- Increasing equitable access to natural resources;
- Enhancing livelihood opportunities – especially for young men; and
- Bolstering the resilience of Kenya’s agriculture and infrastructure sectors against climate and environmental change.

One of the main challenges for a peace strategy based on this approach will be the patronage-based governance system, which will need to be addressed for any long-term sustainable peace in Kenya to take hold. However, this political culture is so deep-rooted that facing it head-on would most likely be over-ambitious and even counter-productive to peacebuilding. Our approach is therefore to identify opportunities to work in ways that will not undermine the existing political elites and yet create incentives for more open and inclusive approaches to governance and access to resources.

Three-quarters of the Kenyan population are non-Kikuyu. Non-Kikuyus often say that the levers of state power have been captured by a Kikuyu-dominated elite that has successfully instrumentalised core state functions such as justice and security for its own benefit. Regardless of the accuracy of this view, the perception itself generates significant conflict risks. And the perception is strengthened...
by the way the state attempts to restrict political opposition and quash public protest. Nonetheless, there are at least two avenues along which it should be possible for the reform-minded to work within the status quo in a way that will be positive for the country’s peace prospects. These two avenues are natural resource management and devolution.

Equitable management of natural resources, especially land, is of critical relevance to peace in Kenya. The 2010 constitution sets out a number of provisions that present opportunities for more even-handed management of land and other key resources such as oil and water. In particular, Chapter 12, Part 4 sets out the “Equitable sharing of resources between the national government and the county government through a resolution of Parliament”. Under Article 67, an independent National Land Commission was established to maintain oversight and manage all land (public) belonging to national and county government, recommend policies on addressing complaints from the public, advise the national government on ways of improving national and county land management, planning and dispute resolution. Implementation of these policies will be challenging, but the National Land Commission and the pending land reform act present opportunities for progress (for more information, see Box 4).

Devolution also promises a better balance of power and allocation of resources across the country. The success of devolution, however, will depend on mutual cooperation between the National Assembly, Senate, county governors and assemblies, and Transitional Authority mandated to oversee the devolution process. County governments, with civil society support and buy-in, will also have to work alongside central government to ensure effective management and equitable allocation of national and local resources.

One note of caution, however: while corruption is endemic, expectations of finding viable entry points for external actors to address corruption are unrealistic. In areas where governance is weak, informal networks of patronage supersede the government as the major service provider. Ironically, maintaining this status quo can be the least disruptive course of action in a fragile community because informal chains of redistribution assist in meeting the needs of the people. The patron within this chain – whether a village elder, gang leader or government official – will naturally find it profitable, so there is a social expectation that a percentage of the profits will be redistributed along kinship or ethnic lines. These relationships and arrangements are therefore seen by many, including participants and observers alike, as mutually beneficial – the client’s needs are met and the patron’s prestige is upheld. Within such a relationship, public opinion legitimises the right kind of personalised exchange, with a failure to distribute being met with contempt within the community.

This “disorder as political instrument” has been the workable modus operandi for states such as Kenya for over a decade. Yet it remains difficult for international donors to accept, as it challenges western norms and values of equity and legitimacy.
Yet, since this is the reality of how a large proportion of resources are allocated in Kenya – from the informal settlement of Kibera, to the villages of Turkana county – effective peacebuilding and development aid policies need to respect it.

Better understanding the neo-patrimonial systems and power dynamics at play could help identify ways to incentivise greater equity in how assets are redistributed though. One way would be through the devolution process, which, while not being without corruption, is nevertheless proving an effective way to manage resources in some counties. For example, rather than focusing on eradicating corruption, one positive step would be to increase community consultation. Whether this can be done while working within the patronage system has not yet been proven, but it would be worth at least testing the idea, and it would at least allow more transparency in the decision-making process.

There are some reasons to think it could work. The main grievance of the community members we interviewed in Kibera and Turkana was the lack of consultation prior to both the resettlement schemes and the granting of oil licensing. Clearer lines of communication and a sense of engagement in local decisions would meet those grievances and not challenge patronage-based arrangements. Indeed, there would almost certainly be some patrons in these systems who would identify benefits for themselves and their beneficiaries by doing so. The process could start to build links with the central government among communities who have historically felt ignored by it. There is also scope for increased community participation in centralised national processes, such as the inclusion of civil society in the National Land Commission in order to increase accountability of the commission’s work.

**INCOME AND ASSETS**

Despite its growth being slower than that of its neighbours, Kenya has a fairly balanced and diversified economy. If economic growth is balanced and not dependent on just oil and minerals, it could be a driver of peace. The risk is around equitable wealth distribution. If managed well, Kenya’s current 5% economic growth trajectory, plus the benefits that oil could bring to areas that are marginalised, could increase security provision and livelihood options in deprived areas such as the northern and eastern provinces. However, if the benefits of growth are captured by the elites and/or restricted to only some regions of the country, this will both increase inequality and exacerbate resentment and consequently conflict risks. One clear priority is ensuring that exploitation of oil and other natural resources is done in a ‘conflict-sensitive’ way. This is not the responsibility
of the private sector alone, nor indeed the government or civil society, but rather
the shared responsibility of all working together. Local government officials we
spoke to expressed the desire to follow the example of Ghana, where gold mining
companies are working with communities to ensure peace.

Closely linked to this is the issue of employment. Addressing unemployment underpins any prospects for
peace. This is especially pertinent given Kenya's youth bulge and the well-documented risks to peace posed
by young unemployed men with limited opportunities. As one of our respondents noted, “If we don't have
youth employment, youth can be easily manipulated by politicians to fuel violence.” With the focus of national
development on technological and infrastructure growth, employment opportunities should increase. As we have seen, however,
there is a widespread perception that access to these jobs is limited along tribal
lines. According to one Maasai herder, “Ethnic lines and connections determine access to good jobs.” As always, even if the reality is less harsh and more nuanced,
and even if part of the problem is the lack of the right qualifications, skills and experience (although these deficiencies themselves may also be to do with job
discrimination), the perception is a key part of understanding the problem. The
2010 constitution recognises the reality of the issue by requiring employers to
ensure ethnic diversity within their workforces. Experience in certain sectors
such as flower farms, where predominantly international buyers can enforce
the upholding of national and international ethical standards such as the Ethical
Trading Initiative, show that this is possible. Employment and operating standards
in all sectors, including oil and gas, should seek to do the same.

Shifts in cultural norms in pastoral tribes promise more viable and sustainable
livelihoods and assets for the next generation. Some herders recognise that the
herding they are used to, with herds of up to ten thousand heads of cattle, is no
longer feasible with less and less grazing land and access to common land and
watering holes. The idea of valuing smaller, healthier herds over vast herds of
unhealthy, undernourished animals has begun to take hold. It could help ensure
the sustainable and peaceful management of this traditional way of life. And with
some herders preferring to leave the land, this could help to ensure the viability of
the pastoralist traditions for those who retain the older ways of life.

Similar to employment, land – given its monetary and cultural value – is a key
focus for the prospects of peace in Kenya. It is as important as employment in
underpinning the prospects for peace. With population growth, climate change,
and the extraction of the country's oil and mineral resources, pressures on land
are increasing daily, creating greater conflict risks. The need for clearer and more
equitable land governance is therefore urgent. The tools are in place to do this – the
Land Commission, for example. Using them to support the common good is essential.
Kenya is on a path of increasing urbanisation, along with the rest of Africa. Agriculture will remain important, however. Not only are 75% of Kenyan jobs in agriculture, but the United Nations Environment Programme has also found that increasing agricultural output by 1 percentage point per capita is five times more effective in reducing poverty than increasing output by the same amount in any other sector.23 Research shows that the best way to achieve this is through smallholder farming rather than the big industrial-scale farms large investors prefer. Efforts under the new National Land Commission and the Land Policy Initiative (see Box 4) offer potential pathways to promote an equitable balance between smallholder rights and national growth priorities, provided there is accompanying political will.

Urbanisation poses great risks but also offers great opportunities in Kenya. Kenya is less urbanised than many other African countries, but it is urbanising quickly. Today a quarter of Kenyans live in an urban area; on current trends, by 2030 half will. In other words, Kenya will be predominantly urban in less than a generation. A pathway to peace can be found by planning around this demographic trend. Some of the risks that need to be addressed are the pressure on infrastructure and the dislocation of communities resulting from such fast-paced change. One opportunity afforded by this risk is the possibility of developing new and better

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**BOX 4**
**THE LAND POLICY INITIATIVE**

The Land Policy Initiative (LPI) is a joint programme between the African Union Commission, the African Development Bank and UN Economic Commission for Africa. Its mission is "to enable the use of land to lend impetus to the process of African development". In 2011, African governments, parliamentarians, civil society and traditional leaders met at a high-level land policy forum in Nairobi to discuss the growing investment opportunities in agriculture as well as the challenges encountered by African states in their efforts to promote land-based investments. The meeting culminated in the Nairobi Action Plan on large-scale land-based investments. The main elements of the plan are to:

1. Undertake assessments of large-scale land investments, including their impact on poverty and within that their differential impact on women and men, so as to draw out ideas for the best ways to achieve sustainable development of land;

2. Develop principles that encourage sound and sustainable investments in land and guide fiscal policy;

3. Implement policies and land-use plans that facilitate equitable access and secure land rights for communities – including women – and investors;

4. Support governments, traditional leaders, civil society organisations and communities to facilitate fair and transparent negotiations that lead to equitable land-related investments; and

5. Establish a monitoring and reporting mechanism for tracking large-scale land-based investments, with a view to ensuring that these ventures are beneficial to national economic development and local communities, including women.
services, which will be able to support more people more quickly because they will not be so dispersed. A key element of this is to build new houses fast enough and make them available for housing not only the middle class but also the urban poor. Consulting local people about services and living conditions is also critical in ensuring that Kenya’s rapidly growing cities can cope with the population, resource and environmental pressures peacefully.

Given the high sensitivity of Kenya’s economy to environmental change, efforts to ensure that the horticulture, agriculture and infrastructure sectors are climate resilient will also ensure that sudden environmental shocks will not be destabilising. Initiatives such as cattle and crop insurance are examples of ways to support the resilience of individual farmers. Use of climate forecasts in longer-term planning and comprehensive risk assessments would also be a step in the right direction. Importantly, emerging sectors such as oil need to ensure that, in the face of environmental changes such as drought, their engagement in and use of natural resources (e.g. water and grazing land) do not threaten the livelihoods and wellbeing of local communities who are reliant on them.

**LAW AND JUSTICE**

Kenya has policies and laws in place to regulate the sharing of revenues from natural resources between local communities, companies and different levels of government. For these laws to be implemented equitably and in a peace-positive way, the devolution process needs to attend to ethnic power disparities. In particular, there needs to be independent oversight over the control of devolved budget allocations to the 47 counties, and over the balance of local and national priorities when determining whether national laws should take precedence over county ones. Fair and equitable decentralisation of power is a foundation for sustainable peace. This will require safeguards for local concerns about the often self-promoting interests of national elites. Building capacity at the county government level and ensuring adequate and timely resource allocation is an urgent priority. At the same time, this also means addressing conflicts relating to difficult trade-offs between national and local development priorities (such as using scarce water for geothermal energy at the expense of pastoralism) in a way that does not result in violence.

Kenya’s media is well established, relatively free and reaches most of the population. This is important, as journalists have the power to place issues firmly on the national agenda and keep them there. During the anti-graft protests in
March 2014, for instance, bold media coverage enabled protesters to continue their demonstrations, despite heavy-handed attempts by Kenyan security forces to curb them. However, on some issues, such as the complex links between climate change, natural resources and security, journalists’ capacity to report on and analyse them could do with being strengthened.

Another structural way in which equity across different parts of the country could be promoted is through greater freedom of movement of people and goods. Increased investment in transport infrastructure, particularly railways, will connect remote regions of Kenya to cities and ports, which will yield a peace dividend in the form of livelihood opportunities, access to markets and resources, and easier movement of people and goods. To ensure the investment in transport infrastructure does no harm, and has some chance of promoting peace, transport planning and infrastructure work needs to be conflict-sensitive.

**SAFETY AND SECURITY**

The highest profile risk to the safety and security of ordinary Kenyans is the threat of terrorism. A key priority for peacebuilding in Kenya is therefore addressing the root causes of this terrorism, but equally important is ensuring that efforts to contain terror threats do not entrench the marginalisation of Somalis and Muslims in the country. The Kenyan government can and must do better in countering the terrorist threat, as well as addressing illegal migration. But undiscerning blanket actions by the security forces are perceived as collective punishment of Somalis and Muslims. This will only serve to marginalise – and thus radicalise – these communities further. Political and security elites would do far better to focus on building a sense of unity and national cohesion, as they did after Westgate.

It is important to maintain and uphold the messages of those Salafist and Wahhabi clerics – especially those of Somali heritage, such as Sheikh Umal and Sheikh Shibli – who turned against al-Shabaab in 2009. The government’s recent actions threaten to undermine these messages, uniting Somali grievances with those of the broader Muslim community and potentially creating a greater constituency for al-Shabaab. Efforts to counter Muslim marginalisation and promote inter-religious unity showed some promise in the wake of the Westgate shopping centre attack in September 2013, and should be favoured over hard-line counter-terror measures. This is especially a priority in the largely Muslim coastal counties, which are among the poorest and least developed in Kenya. Another priority is to reassure and maintain the confidence of the lucrative Somali business community. Predominantly based out of
the Eastleigh suburb of Nairobi, the Somalis have a broad network of trade, transport and manufacturing links across Africa, in the Gulf and southeast Asia, bringing in an estimated US$780 million per annum to the Kenyan economy. Instability and fear of reprisals have caused many Somali business owners to move their savings to safe havens outside Kenya – which could devalue the Kenyan shilling and add to inflation. Policy measures to allay these fears and ensure a safe business climate for Somalis could not only shore against currency devaluation and inflationary pressures caused by currency flight, but also help to rebuild trust between the government and Somalis through business channels.

The plight of Kenyan Somalis also reveals more general security sector shortcomings, most particularly with regard to the police. Police reform has been very slow, despite the promises that followed the post-election violence of 2007/8 and the rights enshrined in Kenya’s 2010 constitution. Adequate training of the police and other security sector personnel is critical for long-term peace in the country. As a start, negative perceptions about security personnel need to be transformed by cracking down on the illegitimate use of police force against young people and in public protests, putting an end to vigilantism, and providing adequate numbers of properly trained and equipped security personnel in the cattle-raiding hotspots in northern Kenya.

The easy availability of small arms is a major security risk that needs to be addressed, particularly in light of the increased number of violent raids in pastoral areas. Disarmament initiatives will be of little value, however, unless the root causes of why pastoral tribes take up arms are addressed. Peacebuilding opportunities lie in promoting education and alternative livelihoods to pastoralism, and addressing the perceptions of masculinity, which are currently attached to killing and raiding. Women could play a positive role here in culturally shifting attitudes of masculinity away from conflict and killing towards peace.

In the short term, efforts to promote informal safety mechanisms such as inter-religious dialogues and peace committees headed by village elders will help plug existing gaps in formal security provision and thus play an important community-level peacebuilding role. However, while informal mechanisms can be cost-effective and practical, they are not the whole answer. Moreover, care must be taken that supporting them does not entrench inequitable practices, such as exclusion of women or discrimination against certain ethnic groups.

A wholly different dimension of safety and security is protection against natural disasters. Better information and early warning systems are needed to enhance community resilience to extreme weather events and slow-onset disasters such as drought. However, it bears emphasising that if information is coming from
state authorities that are distrusted for a range of reasons, including arbitrary behaviour by security personnel and a sense of exclusion and discrimination, it is unlikely that the information will be trusted. For example, a warning that people should vacate an area may be interpreted simply as a plot to steal their land. These different components of safety and security are therefore linked more tightly than a first glance would suggest. The key is trust in the state authorities and, for that, the authorities have to behave in ways that ordinary people can learn to trust.

**WELLBEING**

People’s wellbeing is under pressure from many different sources in Kenya. Taking up the peacebuilding opportunities already outlined above will improve wellbeing. A key element not yet discussed is education. This needs to be both affordable and safe. In nomadic pastoral communities, schools need boarding facilities, as adults often travel for months on end during the dry season. Having a formal education will mean that children, particularly from agrarian and pastoralist communities, will have alternative options to the highly climate-sensitive ones of their farmer and herder parents. Provided that there are employment opportunities open to them, having qualifications and skills will also increase the chances of young people finding work. It is well established that, while unemployment is a major driver of conflict, young employed people have a strong vested interest in peace. As a young ex-herder from Turkana county explained:

“My neighbours are armed with guns; everybody is armed here. But times are changing. Now pastoralism is neglected, because young people are going for education. They like to work for [the local extractive] company. Some of our people are doing business now. They are opening a shop in Lokichar. They are selling commodities to [the company]. There is a change of lifestyle. Young people want jobs and peace.”

For the last 50 years, people in the arid north of the country have mostly been excluded from political and economic developments. Building better transport links in the northern corridor could address this problem. This, together with the discovery of oil in Turkana county, possible gas deposits off the Lamu coast and massive underground water reserves in northern Kenya, could give Vision 2030 a
much-needed boost. All these natural resources also mean that Kenya now has extra bargaining power when it looks for overseas investment. Yet it remains to be seen whether Vision 2030 will change the path of Kenya’s development until now.

Peace is also contingent on upholding best practices in resettlement, in line with constitutional rights and international safeguard policies, to improve or restore the living standards of people affected by involuntary resettlement.

One particular opportunity highlighted by dislocated communities, including the IDPs in Naivasha and women in Turkana villages, is the social protection opportunities offered by mobile telephone banking, which could create the potential for community wellbeing through increased telecommunications infrastructure. Villagers in Turkana county explained how, with more satellite masts in Turkana, they are connected to family and friends in other remote villages, have quick and affordable access to information, and can receive money transfers, thus enhancing both their social capital and their ability to deal with shocks like drought or raids.
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE FLOWER FARMERS AND THE PASTORALISTS
IS ONE OF THE MANY CONFLICTS THAT RISK ERUPTING INTO VIOLENCE IN KENYA.
CHAPTER FIVE
LOCAL VOICES

CASE STUDY 1: KIBERA
RESETTLING OPPORTUNITIES AND RISKS FOR PEACE

This case study explores the opportunities and risks for peace in Kibera, Nairobi, specifically in relation to the government’s resettlement efforts.

Kibera is one of the largest informal urban settlements in Africa. Its population is estimated at anywhere between 170,000 and one million. In 2007/8 Kibera was one of the hotspots of the post-election violence. It has a high population density, poor infrastructure, environmental problems and widespread crime.

To improve living conditions in the informal settlements, the Kenyan Ministry of Housing, supported by UN-Habitat, has started a ‘slum upgrading programme’. One of the programme’s elements is to move people – especially those affected by development activities such as road constructions – out of Kibera to new multi-storey concrete buildings located at the edge of the informal settlement.

In this case study we particularly focus on three peace factors: wellbeing, income and assets, and power and governance, which have been identified – both by academics and local communities – as central to local peace and conflict dynamics.

To capture local perspectives, we interviewed residents, religious leaders and young people in the villages of Silanga, Soweto and Lindi, as well as the resettlement areas.

FINDINGS

Kibera is characterised by poor provision of formal basic services such as housing, sanitation and water, road and security infrastructure. Most of the homes are built with mud walls and corrugated sheet iron roofs. Sanitation facilities consist of pit latrines, which are shared by several households and frequently not connected to existing sewage lines. There are poor sanitation and sewage systems. Together with a lack of waste collection, this results in chronic pollution of the river. Drinking water is either bought in or taken from a few water points, as most of Kibera isn’t connected to the public water grid.
KIBERA

Resettlement area

Informal settlement

Uncollected waste

Flooding

Washing in river

Shared water pump

Shared pit latrine
Because of the high building and population density, and the lack of a road network, most people travel by foot, with goods transported by bicycle or cart.

These conditions pose a number of health and safety risks to residents of Kibera. Due to the nature of their construction and proximity to the river, homes are prone to flooding after heavy rains and when the river overflows its banks. Residents also referenced the risk of fires, which spread quickly because of a lack of space between the buildings and (illegal) electricity lines spreading the fires from roof to roof. And water for hygiene and washing is usually taken from polluted rivers.

In theory Kibera has access to the same police services as the rest of Nairobi, but several youth members we spoke to stressed that they do not trust the police. When a crime is committed, especially when it is gang related, they do not call the police. Instead, they call vigilante groups to “solve the issue”. Other youth members reported violent confrontations with the police. The distrust towards official security authorities and the existence of vigilante groups pose risks for peace, as the armed groups can be exploited by political and powerful actors to cause larger-scale violence, as seen after the 2007 election. Residents said that, during the post-election violence, the ‘Toy market’ was burned down and more than 15,000 traders lost their livelihoods. In an attempt to improve cooperation between the community and the government security authorities, the Usalama
Community Safety Forums were formed to “give groups most at risk of crime and violence a platform through which their voices would be heard and their priorities articulated”. As a member of an Usalama youth group stated: “we try to make the community more secure”.

This poor provision of basic services in Kibera negatively affects the health and prospects of residents in Kibera. In contrast, residents in resettlement areas have access to improved sanitation facilities and the public water grid. Because of their location and building material, the resettlement houses also face a significantly lower risk of being affected by flooding or fire. Moreover, as the resettlement areas are connected to the wider road network of Nairobi, access for official vehicles such as police, fire brigade and refuse collection is easier than in Kibera. The provision of basic services and health conditions in the resettlement areas therefore provide scope for improving the lives of Kibera's residents.

However, according to residents in both Kibera and the resettlement areas, accommodation in the new buildings is prioritised for those who have to move because of development projects, such as the widening of a road. The resettlement efforts do not target those along the riverbanks who are most prone to flooding. Because rent rates are higher in the resettlement houses than in flood-prone areas, the poorest and most vulnerable people in Kibera are unable to move.
“JUST GOOD HOUSES ARE NOT ENOUGH. UNLESS PEOPLE ARE GIVEN AN INCOME AND LIVELIHOOD OPTION, THEY WILL NOT REMAIN IN THERE.”

JAMALDIN
Poverty is high in Kibera, but there is a great demand for products, services and trading that can provide local residents with income opportunities.

“Jobs are critical and are largely based on networks and social capital in Kibera. People rely on the social capital of living in community X for loans, bartering, security and cooperation in hard times ... [T]he slum resettlement plan doesn’t take account of this. Just good houses are not enough. Unless people are given an income and livelihood option, they will not remain in there.”

JAMALDIN, RELIGIOUS LEADER AND TREASURER OF THE KENYA MUSLIM YOUTH ALLIANCE

This concern is shared by Steven, a resident of a resettlement building. Steven used to work as a carpenter in Kibera's Soweto East area, but since moving to the edge of the informal settlement he cannot sustain his profession, as he is removed from his business networks. He now mainly produces handicrafts, but the demand for them is limited. This lack of income opportunities in the resettlement areas is an incentive for residents to move back to Kibera. “It is safe and clean here, but I may go back to Kibera instead of starving in this place,” said Steven.

Unemployment in Kibera, especially among young people, contributes to high levels of crime and insecurity in the informal settlement. “My friends and I used to do a lot of bad things,” said one youth member we spoke to, “shooting people and using drugs, simply because we were not busy.”

Land and legal land titles are another important but scarce resource in Kibera. The majority of the rental accommodation is owned by Kikuyus, but the Nubians, a small minority, own about 15% of the rental houses. According to a Nubian religious leader and non-Nubian youth members, the government plans to give land titles to Nubians, as they are seen as the historical settlers of the Kibera area. This is causing concern among Nubians and others alike because of how non-Nubians may react to this situation. “Nubians do not live alone; they live amongst others, so this move will cause conflict between us,” said a religious leader. Inter-religious forums can and do serve as a dialogue platform to discuss such concerns across religious and ethnic boundaries.

“IT IS SAFE AND CLEAN HERE, BUT I MAY GO BACK TO KIBERA INSTEAD OF STARVING IN THIS PLACE.”

STEVEN, CARPENTER, KIBERA
Some residents feel they are being left behind and are not understood or heard. These perceptions are related to the provision of security by the police, the resettlement efforts and the distribution of land titles. “The government demolished my house and put houses for slum upgrading there,” said one young person. “My money had vanished.” Other community members we interviewed said the negative image of the politicians was tied to the 2007 post-election violence and the failure thereafter to solve problems in Kibera. “Most problems are manifested through political sloganeering,” said Jamaldin. “However, the underlying factors are injustices and inequalities that haven’t been addressed.” One person involved in a small community project to build sanitation facilities claimed “politicians don’t like development in Kibera. If you are doing some good, the politicians will want to bring you down or take it over.” Dissatisfaction with and anger towards the government like this poses a real risk to peace, as such feelings can be exploited to mobilise groups against certain political or ethnic groups.

**CONCLUSIONS**

The resettlement efforts of the government bring peace opportunities and risks for Kibera. Residents of the resettlement houses enjoy a much higher provision of basic services and a much lower exposure to flooding and fire risks compared to most residents of Kibera. However, the improved access to basic services can mean a loss of social networks and customer bases, which in turn poses a risk to income and assets.

The perceived unfair distribution of land titles is another risk for the asset base of community members and a potential mobiliser for violence, particularly along ethnic lines. General dissatisfaction with politicians and the feeling of being ‘misunderstood’ or ‘unheard’ pose further risks. It may be unavoidable that, as one Kibera resident remarked to us, “Conflict and development go together.”

Nonetheless, the government’s resettlement programme would benefit from a strategy that aims to support income opportunities in the resettlement areas. This could either be done through better economic integration of the resettlement areas into their surroundings, especially Kibera, or through creating business opportunities nearby.
CASE STUDY 2: NAIVASHA

CHANNELLING LAKE RESOURCES FOR PEACE

This case study explores the opportunities and risks for peace associated with the management and use of water resources from Lake Naivasha in southwest Kenya, specifically in relation to the competing demands of different lake users.

Naivasha is a market town in Nakuru county, Kenya, north-west of Nairobi. It is located on the shore of Lake Naivasha, the only fresh water lake among a string of Rift Valley lakes. Lake Naivasha is an important source of water in the semi-arid Rift Valley environment, and supports export-oriented horticulture and floriculture businesses, tourism, pastoralists and residents of informal settlements. The lake basin generates 10% of foreign exchange to Kenya and supplies one-fifth of all roses on the EU market.26

While approximately two million Kenyans derive livelihoods from the basin and incomes in the area are on average higher than in the rest of the country,27 there are considerable environmental pressures on the lake due to changes in land use, population growth and the activities of upstream users. The situation is complex because there are different users from different locations in different economic sectors. For example, land-use changes upstream (namely deforestation and the use of wood to provide energy) affect the availability of water downstream, where the production of geothermal energy requires water and affects land use, flower farms withdraw water and require energy services, and tourism depends on quality water resources.28 The water quality of the Malewa River, the main tributary to Lake Naivasha, has deteriorated because of deforestation and over-farming in the upper water catchment (the area of land through which precipitation drains into the lake). This, along with changing rainfall patterns, has caused increased and unpredictable fluctuations in ground water levels and the lake water table, with knock-on consequences on the diverse range of water users.

Robust economic growth in Naivasha linked to the horticulture sector makes it a hub for migrant workers from across Kenya. Naivasha, which was historically a Maasai grazing region, is now, according to the Secretary of Lake Naivasha Water Resource Users Association (LANAWRUA), a “very cosmopolitan area with lots of different tribes with different needs to be balanced”. This rapid population growth and the diverse tribal mix meant that Naivasha was hard hit by the 2007/8 post-election violence.

While things are currently calm on the surface, the unaddressed ethnic grievances and injustices from the 2007/8 violence continue to bubble below the surface of
NAIVASHA TOWN

Malewa River

Over-farming

Deforestation

Illegal logging

Game ranch for tourists

Endangered wildlife

Fishing industry

Lake Naivasha

FLOWER FARMS

NAIVASHA

Informal settlements

Labour migrants

Maasai pastoralists

NATIONAL PARK

Illegal fishing

Over-farming

Illegal logging

Endangered wildlife

Fishing industry
this town. Grievances are particularly strong among young men from different opposing tribes that clashed during the violence. A small trigger – perhaps a criminal act or an unpopular political decision – could be sufficient for the risk of conflict to be reignited. Thus, efforts to promote equitable and peaceful management of land or water resources and allocation of jobs would be a strategy for pre-emptive peacebuilding.

Against this backdrop, this case study looks at the way in which the jobs generated through exploitation of the lake resources have led to new opportunities in Naivasha, while also presenting a range of risks to peace and security. Particular focus is placed on the community’s perspective of the five peace factors: power and governance, income and assets, safety and security, law and justice, and wellbeing.

The study was conducted around Lake Naivasha, in informal settlements at Karagita and Kameri, and at an internally displaced people’s camp in Limuru.

**FINDINGS**

Governance of the lake resources is presided over by LANAWRUA, which was created in 1929 as an arbitration body and now functions as an environmental body. It currently has 120-150 members – each riparian landowner (i.e. someone whose land adjoins the lake or its tributaries) is automatically a member. The body monitors sustainable use of the lake and makes decisions based on one member, one vote (from big flower farms to small landowners). Local groups under LANAWRUA, such as the Lake Naivasha Growers Group (LNGG) and Lake Naivasha Riparian Association (LNRA), have developed management plans to control human activity in the basin. However, these bodies have no actual authority, so can only ask the government to deal with the issue. LANAWRUA respondents noted that in the 1960s and 1970s, agricultural officers were feared and respected by people and had authority. Now agricultural and fisheries officers are underpaid and have limited transport, office and communication capacities. Presently, the most pertinent role of LANAWRUA is to monitor lake use and act as a whistleblower.
Security is a key community concern in Naivasha, with high rates of crime in the area. The town’s diversity is a catalyst for numerous social problems, including poverty, violent crime, theft, drug and alcohol abuse, and sexual and gender-based violence. Many respondents linked the high crime rates in Naivasha to “new incomers and their lack of employment”. According to representatives from a Kameri youth group, “youth unemployment is the biggest challenge the community faces”. The lack of opportunities, coupled with the high expectations of young migrants, who according to one youth respondent believed like many that “the streets of Naivasha are paved with gold”, poses a risk to the fragile stability achieved after the unrest in 2007/8. However, according to other respondents, including residents of the IDP camp at Limuru, there is less risk of major political violence reigniting again because, after the last unrest in 2008, “people realise they have more to lose than to gain”.

Community perceptions of security provision are negative. The police are not seen to be very efficient and vigilante mechanisms to ‘help the police’ are rife. According to youth sources and local media, lynchings are a common and accepted informal security provision mechanism. Poaching and petty theft are the main causes. At the time of research, there were allegedly 14 to 16 vigilante lynchings per month, though authorities are trying to deter this practice.

Tribal habits and practices can also play a role in providing security. The Maasai have been involved in resolving conflict stalemates among other tribes, such as when groups fleeing the post-election violence in 2007/8 were prevented from crossing tribal borders. The Maasai held a big meeting in informal settlements and threatened to get involved unless passage was allowed. According to one respondent, agreement was reached because “nobody wants to cross the Maasai”.

Additional risks to peace relate to use of lake water during dry periods. During the 2009 drought, the lake was low and flower farms began to construct canals between their farms and the lake to use the water. Two children died from falling into these canals, which also injured Maasai herders’ camels and cows. The result was fighting between pastoralists and flower farms. There were also clashes between the police, during which three people died. The media, which is predominantly anti-flower farm, put a spotlight on the issue, focusing on the faults of flower farms. Since the drought, LANAWRUA is drafting a quota system for managing water abstraction during dry spells.
Fresh water, subsistence-farmed food and most livelihoods in Naivasha are dependent on the lake’s water resources, which in turn are determined by rainfall and inflow from Malewa River and aquifers.

Naivasha’s water-dependent horticulture industry attracts people from all parts of the country, including Nairobi. The majority of migrants come from Central, Western, Nyanza and Eastern provinces, and are predominantly from poor backgrounds, coming in search of unskilled work in the flower farms. Most live in extensive informal settlements such as Karagita (the largest informal settlement in Naivasha) close to the lake shores. Those in the outer zone are predominantly farmers in the upper catchment and use ground water through pumps.

This population growth is leading to numerous challenges, including the increasing and unsustainable demand for land for small-scale farming and food, increased illegal water abstraction from informal settlements such as Karagita, and contamination of lake water due to inadequate sanitation provision and garbage collection in informal settlements. “The garbage goes into Lake Naivasha,” said a woman from a youth group in Karagita.

Land in the area is therefore at a premium. With laws prohibiting any permanent construction in floodplains, illegal land sales are increasing. The sub-county administrator has raised concerns about the trend, but the government does not compensate people when they have been mis-sold, the message being ‘buyer beware’.

Increased water abstraction upstream (from the northern catchment) is leading to less water flow into the lake. Water yield within the catchment is also decreasing due to deforestation upstream for charcoal and land clearance for small-scale cultivation.

The main industry in Naivasha is agriculture, especially horticulture, making Naivasha the centre of a multi-billion-dollar flower industry in Kenya. According to our respondents, it has around 60 farms that employ over 50,000 workers. Livelihoods in this sector have proved a draw for workers across the country since the late 1980s, when the flower farms started. Attitudes towards the flower industry are mixed, though lean towards the negative. Many people who work at the flower farms admitted that they found the work hard and underpaid. “It was good working at

“MOST YOUTH DON’T HAVE OPPORTUNITIES FOR EDUCATION. THEY NEED JOBS, THEY NEED TO BE EMPOWERED AND MOTIVATED THAT LIFE CAN BE WHAT YOU WANT IT TO BE.”

BYRON, ACTOR AND ACTIVIST, NAIVASHA
the flower company, but they were paying low,” said one former employee of a rose farm. When asked how it is compared to their previous situations though, all respondents acknowledged that it was better and that they would rather stay than return home.

Contrary to local community and media perceptions, research shows that most pollution of the lake is not from fertilisers from the flower farms but from soap and detergents from village people washing or untreated effluent from villages flowing into the lake. Although there are a number of farms that do not adhere to international standards, 27 have come together to form the Lake Naivasha Growers Group (LNGG), which has developed a code of conduct. To join LNGG, members have to fulfil requirements around environment, workers’ welfare and conservation.
Population growth in the area, driven predominantly by labour in-migration, is leading to increasing (unsustainable) demand for plots of land for small-scale farming and food. Increases in water abstraction upstream (from the northern catchment) is leading to less water flow into the lake. The catchment is also decreasing due to deforestation upstream for charcoal and land clearance for small-scale cultivation. Reduced ground water also limits subsistence and larger-scale farming.

Herding, the key livelihood source of the Maasai, is also increasingly under threat as water and land become less easily available. According to one non-governmental organisation (NGO), “Pastoralism is not sustainable at all. There is no more land available for grazing such huge herds and they cannot graze in the forests. If Maasai culture doesn’t change with the times, they will get a shock, as others are changing. Pastoralism has been caught out by time.” A Maasai

BOX 6
TESTIMONY OF A MAASAI PASTORALIST: ENOK

“Due to development in Naivasha, there is now less grazing land and less access to the lake, so pastoralists cannot sustain their tens of thousands of cattle. After the recent land reform, we can’t move north, south, east or west – we have nowhere to graze our animals. Ninety-five percent of pastoralists’ needs come from their livestock, so they depend on their animals for everything. If you speak to a pastoralist, he will tell you the development in Naivasha has not been good, as it does not benefit him. I’d give pastoralism 10 more years before it becomes extinct. I see this as a bad thing – we don’t have any other things to fall back on or any other lifestyle.

Alternative farming is not suitable in semi-arid lands and climate change makes it harder to farm, as we don’t know when the rains are coming. Pastoralists need to be educated that this lifestyle is not sustainable. However, they also need hard visible evidence of the dangers to the environment posed by huge herds of animals that they can see and believe – not just words. This should be done by the government. The government does not provide us with support in terms of education or alternative skills. Large herds of animals are not the answer. You can still have animals, but not so many – smaller healthier and more productive animals are the only possible future.”
herder corroborated this view, saying: “The cultural value of pastoralism brings assets, but also poses barriers to progress. You can’t practise pastoralism without land and now there is not enough.” One possible solution is to promote smaller, healthier and more productive herd sizes among pastoralists, but this will require a major cultural shift.

Fishing is a smaller but still significant livelihood source in Naivasha. There are 50 licensed fishing boats (each with 10 nets) with permits to fish Lake Naivasha, but there are many illegal fishermen who use illegal nets to fish with smaller mesh sizes along the shores. This practice endangers fish populations, as juvenile fish are caught as well. Migrants who fail to find work in flower farms turn to illegal fishing and poaching rather than returning home, because they have to save face. It is not just the very poor who turn to illegal fishing, but also the lower middle class. Fishermen wade into shallow water and fish with nets so no capital costs – no need for a boat.

Increases in population and rising unemployment have contributed to higher demand for fish in Naivasha. There are also more people turning to illegal fishing. This is a lucrative and growing trade, and “illegal fishermen are armed and willing to kill”, said one young person.

The land around Naivasha was originally Maasai grazing land. The arrival of flower farms in the 1980s started to restrict the Maasai’s access to the lake and, when the Ministry of Land gave out titles, they did not mark out corridors for livestock to access the lake waters. Now there are officially 11 corridors for pastoralists, but only two are operational (Karagita and Kameri landing beach). As a result, grievances continue to simmer and periodically flair up during dry seasons. According to the president of LANAWRUA, “there’s always trouble when water table falls”.

In-migration has created a highly diverse ethnic mix in the county. However, there remain distinct ethnic identities and cultures, markedly the Maasai pastoralists, who live largely on the outskirts of the townships around the lake, and the Kikuyu, due to their large population size and political leverage, who dominate both the urban centre and semi-urban upper catchment area, including small-, medium- and large-scale farming and other economic activities.

Naivasha was significantly affected by the post-election violence in 2007/8, which led to mass displacement and even the exodus of some communities from the region. The workforce of the major flower farms are ethnically diverse and, as
such, were highly affected by the violence. When Kikuyu youth were bussed in to retaliate against western tribes, a number of the bigger flower growers, along with the Red Cross, helped to provide safety to Abagusii, Abaluhya and Luo workers – either offering shelter in premises or using flower trucks to transport workers to safe areas. While ethnic tensions between Kikuyus and other tribes still remain, there are also tensions between a large number of other tribes, including Luos, Somalis and Abaluhya. Following the Westgate attack, Somali communities, who already live in separate settlements and do not interact as actively with other tribes, risk being further ghettoised. The risk here is that increased marginalisation and segregation of Somalis by other communities could further foster and incubate ethnic tensions, which, in certain situations, such as another terror attack, could become violent.

The Maasai perceive themselves as being the most affected by ethnic discrimination, believing that people still think they only know about herding, without skills for the regular job market. A typical comment from one Maasai herder that we heard was: “Ethnic lines and connections determine access to good jobs.” However, the Maasai have been receiving formal education since the 1990s, including at university level. Now that the next generation is coming out of university to take professional jobs, it is hoped attitudes and opportunities may finally shift.

Respondents noted numerous challenges faced by the Maasai’s traditional pastoralist way of life by the horticulture and geothermal energy industries – the former restricting herd access to the lake waters in the dry season and the latter over land use.

Since the flower farms arrived in Naivasha in the 1980s, there has been a reported increase in crime and prostitution. Respondents also spoke of problems with HIV/AIDS and early marriage, because girls and young women migrate alone and cannot return to their home without a job.

Most workers in flower farms are women, because employers believe they work harder than men. Women are mainly pickers and packers, while men work in cold stores and spraying. Some bigger farms have crèches and offer women three months’ maternity leave, after which they can return to their roles. However, many of the smaller farms offer no such benefits. Even in the larger farms, workers complained of low payment and health problems due to exposure to chemicals (workers say they suffer from skin rashes and that women suffer miscarriages). At one major farm, workers went on strike after not being paid for three months.

The future wellbeing of pastoralists, who depend on land and water in Naivasha, is likely to be significantly affected by environmental and political changes in
Kenya. According to one respondent from a conservation NGO, “pastoralism is not sustainable at all. There is no more land available for grazing such huge herds and they cannot graze in the forests.” One possible solution identified by NGOs and pastoralist respondents was smaller herd sizes. While some accept the cultural value of pastoralism as an asset to a community, it is also seen to pose barriers to progress. “They can still retain many forms of their culture, such as how they live and what they eat, but you can’t do pastoralism without land and now there is simply not enough,” said the respondent.

CONCLUSIONS

Naivasha offers an insight into how water, land and peace dynamics interact. Naivasha's flower industry offers employment, support to local infrastructure, work benefits to the employees through corporate social responsibility activities such as health clinics and free primary education, and foreign investment. The farms also generate taxes for the national government. However, as the secretary of LANAWRUA noted, “with the farms came the people”, and this presents challenges to sustaining peace in the ethnic melting pot. The flow and expectations of immigrants seeking work will need careful management to ensure that informal settlements do not become a breeding ground for ethnic grievances, criminality, violence and even terrorism.

There are also difficulties in the performance of national and local government authorities. Flower farm representatives expressed frustration at having to plug a gap in the basic services and infrastructure that the local administration should provide. They also expressed concerns that, with decentralisation, they will need to pay extra taxes to the new county government, yet see no improvements in formal governance provision.

Management of the use of lake water is theoretically shared equitably for commercial, domestic and environmental uses, but the lack of adequate oversight means that problems in the dry seasons are likely to increase. It is encouraging that various initiatives by flower farms, local government and small farmers do exist to improve the management of the basin, which should be strengthened. In the absence of clear political leadership, the flower farms, through various business bodies such as the Kenya Flower Council and the Fresh Produce Export Association, show promise for some voluntary principles emerging around sustainable usage of lake resources within the private sector. However, this needs to be bolstered to include small farmers and other lake users, and overseen by an appropriate neutral oversight body.

More and more flower farms are also adhering to stricter international regulations on health and safety and worker’s rights, and have signed up to codes of practice based on the Global Good Agricultural Practices, which require compliance with international audited standards on inclusive and sustainable growth. There are
thus clear opportunities for sustainable livelihoods in Naivasha to provide a bedrock for peace.

The future of pastoralism in the region is likely to become increasingly challenging. Diminishing prospects for pastoralists might be mitigated through livelihood opportunities presented by the horticulture sector, though it is presently unclear whether the supply of jobs will meet the demand. It also remains to be seen whether the competing demands for water can be managed sustainably to preserve the long-term health of the lake.

While Naivasha is therefore calm on the surface, there are some serious underlying problems for peace in the area. Yet none of these challenges is necessarily overwhelming.
This case study explores the opportunities and risks for peace associated with the management of natural resources in Turkana county in northwest Kenya, specifically in relation to the arrival of oil exploration in this fragile and conflict-affected part of the country.

Turkana is the largest and poorest county in Kenya. It is also highly vulnerable to climate change – especially drought. Most of the county’s roughly 850,000 people are pastoralists whose culture and livelihoods are adapted to harsh arid and semi-arid conditions, but who nevertheless experience chronic poverty. Historically, the area has been marked by frequent armed raiding between pastoralist groups over water, land and livestock, and by a justified perception of neglect by central government. Indeed, there is a sense that relations between central government and local communities are typified more by disagreement and conflict than by good governance.

Increased rainfall variability and the frequency of droughts, as well as altered – and reportedly more violent – patterns of raiding, pose significant challenges to livelihoods and peace in the county. While it is hard to see any major alternative to livestock rearing as a livelihood strategy for most people in this arid part of Kenya, both local people and technical experts say that new, more intensive approaches are needed to overcome the problems of persistent poverty, conflict and underdevelopment.

Into this tinderbox are being added two potentially significant sources of either conflict or peace: underground resources of oil and water. Significant oil reserves in Turkana are currently being explored through test drilling by UK oil company Tullow Oil, bringing hope of infrastructure, jobs, business opportunities and development. In addition to the oil, in 2013 two underground aquifers were discovered in the county – in the Turkana and Lotikipi basins. Although the volume of water contained in the aquifers remains unclear, water in an arid area can be even more of an economic game changer than oil. Moreover, as with oil exploration, the existence of the aquifers raises expectations. Yet, as has been shown in other countries, natural resources such as oil and water can also create and exacerbate conflicts.

This case study explores some of the peace and conflict dynamics in Turkana arising from these resources. In assessing the implications of how natural resources are managed in the county, we focus on three peace factors: income and assets,
wellbeing, and power and governance. We look in particular at how community perceptions are already illustrating the potential for conflicts linked to oil. The study was conducted in three villages in southern Turkana: Nakukulas, where oil exploration has already started, and Lokwamosing and Lopii, where it is planned to start in the near future.

It is worth noting that oil exploration is still at a very early stage in Turkana. The first actual discovery was in 2012. Estimates of oil reserves have been put at around 600 million barrels, but production is not expected to start before 2016 at the earliest, as it relies on the construction of a new pipeline to the coast. As shown in Figure 1, an oil project can take up to 10 years from exploration drilling to production. Meanwhile, the viability of extraction and use of the newly discovered aquifer water has yet to be determined.

**FIGURE 1: TYPICAL TIMEFRAME OF AN OIL PROJECT**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ESTIMATED TIMEFRAME</th>
<th>LICENCE AWARD</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3-5 years</td>
<td>Due diligence, Pre-qualification</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4-10 years</td>
<td>Exploration seismic, Site surveys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1-7 years</td>
<td>Exploration drilling</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-30 years</td>
<td>Appraisal drilling, Development, Production</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**FINDINGS**

The Kenyan government’s policy is that 70% of jobs from external investors should go to local people. Implementing this presents some difficulties, however. Oil is a capital-intensive industry that creates relatively few jobs, and even less so during the exploration phase. Most of these jobs are skilled or semi-skilled. Yet education levels in Turkana are low – only 39% of 15–18-year-olds attend school, compared to a national average of 71%.31

Nevertheless, there has already been an economic injection into the county due to oil exploration. In the six months between our research visits, the town of Lokichar, for example, had been transformed from a dusty collection of ramshackle buildings to a bustling hub, and a new high-end hotel had been built in the county.
capital of Lodwar. Oil projects have also generated increased demand for food, lodgings and other goods and services. The link between this transformation and oil is neatly symbolised by the name of one local shop in Lodwar: Ngamia-1 Mobile Phone Repair Shop, named after Tullow’s first oil well.

Yet this is also symbolic of the fact that many people’s expectations linked to oil are unrealistic. The discovery of oil in Turkana brings with it hope of greater investment, new jobs and more security from cattle raiding. As the county Governor Josphat Nanok commented: “With new jobs, you can pull idle youth from cattle rustling into other jobs.” Local leaders and communities have high hopes as well as well-founded reservations around this. “The discovery of oil is wonderful because it will boost the economy of the country,” said Turkana South MP James Lomenen, “but only if an amicable agreement is made between the community and government.”

“WITH NEW JOBS, YOU CAN PULL IDLE YOUTH FROM CATTLE RUSTLING INTO OTHER JOBS.”
As of December 2014, Tullow reports an employment ratio of around 60% Turkana, 30% greater Kenya and 10% international. However, community members in Nakukulas, Lokwamosing and Lopi have complained about limited employment of local people. The issue of who is benefiting from economic opportunities, and jobs in particular, is one of the biggest sources of tension around oil, with very high expectations unlikely to be met. Further complications arise due to perceptions of who is ‘local’, i.e. employees working in Turkana South cannot necessarily be transferred to Turkana North because they would no longer be perceived as local to the community there. Moreover, due to the low education level of many Turkana youth, current job opportunities for the Turkana people within the oil sector are predominantly limited to lower-skilled jobs such as cleaners, cooks and security guards, as well as drivers and community liaison officers.

In October 2013, roadblocks and demonstrations against the hiring of ‘outsiders’ for skilled jobs induced Tullow to temporarily cease its operations, at significant cost and delay. This was followed by further roadblocks and community demonstrations, as well as the storming of one site, leading to looting and the destruction of property, suggesting a trend of escalating violence.

Indirectly, the oil sector could increase economic opportunities for Turkana locals, even if they are not directly employed by the oil company. The new workforce has created a demand for food, accommodation and other supplies. However, as is often the case in such situations, this rapid rate of growth is a problem as well as a boon. Youth from across the county flock to Lokichar in hope of employment. Yet, non-Turkana people who gain work report a clear sense of resentment by locals at their relative success. There are also many complaints of an increase in crime.

Turkana informants told us that they feel stereotyped as illiterate and ignorant pastoralists. We were told that the most senior positions local people hold at Tullow are community liaison officers and security guards. According to some villagers, there are no Turkana tribe members in management positions and Tullow fly in personnel, including drivers, from Nairobi. Tullow reports training over 130 Turkana drivers up to industry standards, but the concerns of some villagers indicate that, despite these efforts, the low number of employment opportunities as well as the type and distribution of jobs remain a major source of resentment: “Employment from Tullow goes to people from Kitale (mainly Kikuyu and Luo). Leadership is not proactive to help us get work. They say we are not educated enough to get jobs; that we have not been to school. We don’t know what kind of school these people in Kitale have. If we are not learned, can we not be given casual jobs?” So seriously and deeply held are these perceptions – whether right or wrong – that some community members told us that if things do not change, conflict is inevitable.
Yet local villagers who want skilled jobs genuinely do lack skills and capacity. Villagers acknowledge that many locals are not qualified. According to the Tullow website, up to six post-graduate degrees will be awarded to Kenyans for the 2013/14 academic year. Furthermore, Tullow reports that Tullow Kenya BV has to date disbursed KES49 million (£354k/US$537k) for education bursaries, benefiting over 4,600 students, KES63 million (£455k/US$690k) to support 55 students for full four-year secondary scholarships in Turkana county, and KES70 million (£506k/US$767k) for education infrastructure (e.g. classrooms, dormitories, science laboratories, solar lighting systems and equipment). Tullow has also invested KES100 million (£723k/US$1.1m) to support 20 scholars from Turkana through post-graduate studies in oil- and gas-related courses since 2012. The difficulty for Tullow is that these investments in education are made against a backdrop of great educational need, so their benefits may fuel the appetite for more. In the end, while an incoming investor can undoubtedly contribute to the wellbeing of people living in the area of its investment, it is the primary responsibility of the government to provide education.

Although oil makes the headlines, the central assets on which pastoral communities rely are water, pasture and land for their livestock. According to MP Lomenen, “The biggest problem is not oil, or pasture, it is water. Climate change is already contributing to a lack of pasture, so people have to move to more insecure areas in search of pasture.” Oil exploration also uses a substantial amount of water, and Tullow has started to drill boreholes to supply this.

Tullow’s use of its technology, knowledge and financial resources to provide access to more water not only for the company’s use but also for the benefit of the communities is an opportunity to contribute to peace. Indeed, Tullow is providing borehole water to some nearby communities. But, as with jobs, expectations can be hard to manage: members of the Nakukulas community told us they felt Tullow’s supply of water was insufficient, and Tullow seems unlikely to be able to meet their growing expectations. One elder in Nakukulas asserted that, “We have only [seen] very small positive changes from Tullow since 2011. The water pump they gave us is not enough, as it serves both livestock and community – one water source can’t support everyone.” Herders would previously take their livestock to watering holes, which they claim are now either depleted or perceived to be dangerous for the animals due to the machinery and disturbance from oil-related construction – though we were unable to substantiate this.

Beyond unmet expectations for additional water, community members mentioned several knock-on consequences of the oil exploitation that they believe negatively affect their pastoral livelihoods. These range from loss of pasture and disruption of migration routes by the oil operations to disturbance of livestock as a result of the oil drilling and sound pollution. Again, we do not have independent evidence
of this, nor quantification, and we were unable to verify this with Tullow’s field office due to time constraints. Yet the conflict risk here does not necessarily lie in the veracity of the claims. Rather it lies in the fact that these perceptions exist and are strongly held within the villages visited, and probably also in the need to improve lines of communication between villagers, the oil company and government authorities to clarify the facts and discuss concerns.

Contestations are growing not only over water, but also over land. Violent clashes between the neighbouring Pokot tribe and Turkana peoples have been common for many years, and are increasingly lethal due to the high prevalence of small arms. In the media, episodes of violence following the discovery of oil have been attributed to disputes over boundaries and claims to land. While the exact relationship of these clashes with the oil discovery remains unclear, and is likely to be complex, this points to a concern that new and significant economic activities can interact with existing conflicts and act as triggers for violence. With new grievances linked to oil, the pressure may rise.

Increased migration into Turkana by people seeking jobs is also deepening competition over land – with large plots of land being purchased by non-residents in expectation of an increase in value following oil discoveries. Where non-resident purchasers have obtained land titles for the acquisitions, there has been friction with local people, who have major difficulties in securing legal rights to the customary land they use. (One recent report quoted one young man in Lokichar as asking: “How can you sell soil?”)

While the viability of the newly discovered major water aquifers has yet to be determined, it is worth noting here that this holds the potential to create even more mistrust, misperceptions and conflict. Water has the potential to transform extensive pastoral production into a more productive and intensive livelihoods system, but this would be a highly risky process. While oil exploration and production brings improved incomes, tax revenues and some development, it has very little impact on most land. Water, on the other hand, can increase the value of land enormously, and thus create new conflicts, potentially between local people, between them and their traditional pastoralist rivals, and with wealthy and well-connected investors from other parts of Kenya or beyond, who would be attracted by the economic potential of irrigation or improved livestock water provision.

From an economic perspective, oil and water should both be beneficial to the people of Turkana and the rest of Kenya. But this will not happen without careful management of expectations, and regular and accurate flows of communication between local people, the government and companies.
Turkana county is characterised by high levels of insecurity and poor health, education, electricity and road infrastructure. Though education levels in Turkana county are far lower than the national average, there are recent signs of improvement – some of them linked to the oil sector. In Nakukulas, for example, as part of its corporate social responsibility package, Tullow has built two classrooms and bought textbooks for the local primary school, and the company has given scholarships to a few students to attend secondary school. Its presence has also brought better transport links. Existing roads have been improved, new ones have been built, and the local airport has been rehabilitated. However, most roads connect Tullow operations to the major road, and the airport is mainly used by the oil company and government officials. Despite this, the assistant chief of Nakukulas acknowledged that this provision of services was both more than the state was offering and better than nothing: “If it was left to me, I couldn’t have brought this much development to my village.”

It is important, however, to avoid creating an unrealistic expectation of service provision by Tullow. The government is responsible for public services, and any assistance provided by Tullow should be seen as a contribution, not the fulfilment of a duty.

More complex is the question of security. Low levels of security have led to Turkana county gaining a reputation for being the lawless ‘wild west’ of Kenya. According to MP Lomenen, the gaps in formal security provision by the state constitute a
major risk to peace. He explained, “The prime role of government is to protect life and the property of people. If government fails to fulfil its functions, you go back to the state of nature. This is why pastoralists own guns – to protect themselves, their people and their property. This leads to cultural hatred, resource conflicts and politics that lead to conflict.”

People in the area say the arrival of oil operations is having an impact on their safety, and some expressed the opinion that the national government prioritises the security of oil projects over that of its people. For example, MP Lomenen told us that, while the county as a whole has too few security personnel, 1,000 Kenya Police Reserve (KPR) officers have been assigned to guard oil operations. This contradicts the information provided by Tullow that 200 KPRs support its operations, with the company aiming for a 33% split in deployment between each arm of the police. In addition, Tullow says there is pressure from some local politicians to use more KPRs to provide security for its operations. All this indicates that the issue of KPRs is sensitive and politicised and, like other aspects of how local needs and reactions are expressed, beset by the problem of high expectations. For example, one criticism from community members in Nakukulas concerns Tullow’s perceived lack of interest in local conflicts. “Tullow is not concentrating on conflict between Turkana and Pokot,” one elder told us. “Pokot always come and raid us. Tullow does not even want to mitigate or to respond.”

It is worth noting that the increased presence of KPRs has improved the security situation where the oil operations are taking place. For example, community members in Lokwamosing reported that raiding by the Pokot had decreased when “the home guards are patrolling”. Security in other areas, such as the raiding hotspots along the Turkana–Pokot border, has decreased as a result of KPRs being relocated to the oil operations. Thus, communities have real grounds for concerns about security provision and it is not surprising if, as with jobs, water and land, people look to a well-resourced new arrival on the scene – an oil company – to claim services that should normally be provided by government. Regardless of community expectations, Tullow has neither a mandate nor a capacity to take on security provision. This is a need that should be met by improved government services.

There is a general perception among the population of Turkana county of being ‘forgotten’ and ‘left alone’ by the central government. The discovery of oil draws significant national and international attention to Turkana, which in turn is an opportunity to give the county and its population a stronger voice and improved representation. According to the constitution, the profits from oil are meant to be shared: 80% to the national government; 20% to the county, three-quarters of which goes to the county government and a quarter to the community. How these resources are used by the county and communities once oil production begins will
“WE DON’T KNOW FULLY OF THE OIL COMPANY’S BENEFITS TO US. MAYBE IT WILL BE OF BENEFIT TO OUR CHILDREN. BUT NOW WE HAVE NO POWER TO CHANGE ANYTHING. THIS IS SOMETHING THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS BROUGHT TO US.”

EWOI, TURKANA
be a key determinant of peace and stability. The degree of voice and participation of different community members will be critical to this.

So far, however, the community members interviewed – particularly the women – felt they were underrepresented, uninformed and voiceless. One woman summed it up by saying, “We don’t know fully of the oil company’s benefits to us. Maybe it will be of benefit to our children. But now we have no power to change anything. This is something that the government has brought to us.”

There have been consultations between communities and the oil company. However, community members felt that these consultations were insufficient or that the demands the community raised were not acted upon. Communities interviewed said they felt inadequately compensated by oil company contractors for the use of their land and water sources. In return for Nakukulas village land used, we were told by villagers that the community had received KES2.2 million (£15k/US$24k). In response to a roadblock over community grievances over the laying of oil lines, we were told that Tullow distributed one-off cash payments to families in the village of Lopii. Community members in Lopii expressed satisfaction with this at the time, with one villager stating, “Today is like a festival.” But later statements from community members indicated that this only leads to greater demands, and many agreed it would be difficult or even impossible for Tullow to ever pay an acceptable sum for land because the community values it so highly.

Drinking water and schools are being provided, and Tullow fills the water tanks it has provided to communities every two days. But one woman from Nakukulas expressed a more or less typical view when she said, “[These] are good but too small to address the negative impacts of the companies. They are not enough for us. We cannot consider the small gestures as compensation for the amount of land and animals they have taken from us.” It is clear that, for some residents of Turkana county, the visible investment and jobs brought by oil are potentially outweighed by perceptions of injustice and heightened insecurity. Their high and largely unrealistic expectations of development assistance from the oil companies are not being met. These grievances have already led to numerous protests – some peaceful, some violent – and people told us these may well escalate unless something is done to address them.

Tullow has a social performance team consisting of 52 individuals. Twenty-six are deployed at any given time to visit villages across Turkana county where oil exploration is planned or underway. These are mostly local Turkana people who are employed to listen to and report back on the communities’ needs, concerns and complaints. They also have village support officers who are generally well-respected members of the community, employed to bring the community together to discuss issues relevant to Tullow and share feedback with the company (see Box 7).

The village support officers also inform the communities about the company’s actions and plans. However, community members we spoke with in Lokwamosing
and Lopii had not interacted much with Tullow, and the communication between Tullow and Nakukulas community had ceased, according to the assistant chief. He said that now if community members have a complaint, for example over the cutting of trees that animals need for shade, or about water, the elders come together to talk to the village chief, who then takes the issue to the district commissioner and finally to Tullow. In Nakukulas, community members we met expressed discontent with Tullow’s response to some of their requests. Tullow has established its own mechanism of advisory boards for collective bargaining with the community, but local civil society leaders said these are not representative and are easily manipulated by community leaders, though we were unable to find evidence of this.

From the communities’ perspective, there is room for improved two-way communication with Tullow. This is not to say that Tullow is necessarily at fault, as community expectations are also a factor here. In our experience with oil and mining projects elsewhere, it is common for communities to blame poor company communications when their real grievance or disappointment is about something more specific. Indeed, some respondents felt the responsibility for communications lies firmly with the government.

The arrival of oil can therefore be seen as an important opportunity to improve the voice and representation of people in Turkana county more generally. As mentioned earlier, people in the area have long seen themselves as neglected by the government, and the need for communication and consultation over issues linked to oil can be seized by the government, community leaders and the company as an opportunity to improve communication and participation on other issues too.

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**BOX 7**

**TESTIMONY OF ITONGO, VILLAGE SUPPORT OFFICER, LOPII**

Itongo is 64 and an elder within the village of Lopii. He has been a village support officer for Tullow for over a year. Among his tasks is to encourage the community not to damage Tullow’s oil pipelines. He explains that young men are the hardest to convince because they are angry that they have not received jobs. But he talks to the mothers, who are better able to influence their sons. Itongo noted that it was difficult to gain the communities’ trust when he took on the job with Tullow. He estimated that one to three young people get jobs with Tullow per week for casual labour, while one young person from the village managed to secure a long-term position. There have also been opportunities for women and disabled community members to get unskilled work as road wardens, presenting income opportunities that were previously not available to these groups.
CONCLUSIONS

The risk of increased violent conflict linked to oil in Turkana county is fundamentally due to the insertion of new and significant economic activities into a context characterised by poverty and underdevelopment, conflict over scarce livelihood opportunities, historic rivalry between ethnic groups, inadequate governance, and a justified sense of neglect by central government.

In principle, the plans to start oil production in Turkana could bring increased opportunities for peace. Already some benefits are visible in the form of economic opportunities and infrastructure. But the potential for peace will only be realised if access to the benefits is equitable, if local perceptions and expectations are carefully managed, if communication about oil is open and accurate, and if human security is improved. As MP Lomenen articulated: “Oil is not the problem – it is how it is done that is the issue.”

Perceptions of oil range from cautiously hopeful to hostile. In Lokwamosing and Lopii, people expressed their hopes for jobs, water and education, while others, like the chief of Lokwamosing, have heard “where there is oil, there are conflicts”. In Nakukulas, Tullow was described by some people as a stressor – or even an enemy. There is a concern that oil is increasing the Pokot’s interest in Turkana land and contributing to increased insecurity along the border. One woman described the situation as being caught between two camps: “On one side is the enemy [Pokot] and on the other is the oil company.” Another said: “Of our two enemies [Pokot and Tullow], we fear the Pokot the most. Tullow will only take our land, but the Pokot will take everything and kill us.” But it is important to note that anger towards Tullow appears to be driven less by the realities of oil exploration than by people’s unrealistic expectations. As a local elder noted, it is not simply a problem of oil: “Oil brings new challenges on top of existing ones.” Many of these expectations are grounded in the absence of basic service provision from the government.

The government has not historically provided Turkana county with adequate basic services, including roads, schools and, above all, security. People in the county now see a new actor entering the region that appears to have the capability to drill for water, build roads and employ numerous security personnel. But, instead of benefiting from the oil exploitation to the extent that they anticipated, many Turkana people feel excluded, seeing people from outside Turkana county getting some of the jobs.

The validity of community allegations requires further research, but in reality, it is people’s perceptions that will shape political and security outcomes. Part of the problem is that people are displacing the target of their expectations from the government, which has the duty to provide basic services, and to mediate relations between outside investors and citizens, onto Tullow. This is understandable, but it puts Tullow in a difficult position. It is understandable that an oil company in this situation ends up funding local services to a limited degree, since they cannot wait for the government to do so. But this is
unsustainable and may fuel further unrealistic expectations, which can lead to tensions when these expectations cease to be met.

There is a strong current of feeling locally that already meagre state security provision is being diverted from safeguarding the community from raids to protecting oil operations. To prevent conflict between KPR forces operating around Tullow’s installations and a well-armed community, and to reverse the negative spiral of dissatisfaction, demonstrations and disruptions to oil operations, it is important to ensure good communication between Tullow and the communities. A major challenge is to manage community expectations, particularly when it comes to employment and provision of water – and avoid allowing these to be manipulated by politicians for political gain.

The discovery of water aquifers hasn’t yet created many ripples locally. Though awareness in Turkana is low, the national media discuss the aquifers as having the potential to transform Turkana county from being the dustbowl to the breadbasket of Kenya. The county governor, on the other hand, sees scope to use the aquifers for water-intensive but highly profitable oil refineries, to enable processing in Turkana county itself rather than having to pipe out the oil to alternative refining sites such as coastal Mombasa. The pastoralist community would also have high expectations for water allocation and use for their herds and domestic needs. All of these needs and expectations will need very careful management, especially given the uncertainty around the purity and extractability of the aquifers, to ensure that water contributes to building peace among communities that traditionally fight over water scarcity.

With the challenges and opportunities of these new natural resources, five components are critical for a peaceful and prosperous future for Turkana county: i) the government should provide better security, decent services and infrastructure, especially when revenues from oil start to accrue; ii) three-way communications about oil between the government, communities and the oil company need to be as regular, accurate and consultative as possible; iii) economic opportunities arising from the oil industry need to be accessed equitably; iv) local people should receive support to improve their skills and employability; and v) other, non-oil-related livelihoods support needs to be provided, to reduce the reliance on extensive pastoralism.

As the county governor noted, if Turkana county is to transition from a lawless ‘wild west’ to a booming yet peaceful economy akin to the path of Texas in the early 20th century, the Turkana people need to be brought along with the journey. As he rightly surmised: “We have oil and water but we need social involvement so that we can move along that path to peace.” However, as another local leader noted, “it takes a long time for a river to change its course”.

A MAJOR CHALLENGE IS TO MANAGE COMMUNITY EXPECTATIONS, PARTICULARLY WHEN IT COMES TO EMPLOYMENT AND PROVISION OF WATER.
CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION

FINDINGS: TRAJECTORIES FOR PEACE

Kenya has long been considered impervious to the kind of major violent conflicts blighting its regional neighbours such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Somalia, South Sudan and Uganda. Peacebuilding has therefore not been acknowledged as a priority. However, the 2007/8 post-election violence clearly illustrated how easily deep-rooted grievances can be sparked to fuel conflict and instability across the country. Kenya’s recovery from the unrest has been hindered by the slow pace of governance reforms, the global economic downturn, unpredictable rainfall – leading to incidents of protracted drought and flooding – and the increased number of terrorist attacks across the country. The risk of political instability is high and peacebuilding is therefore an urgent priority.

Yet there is no clear peace discourse in Kenya. While there are peacebuilding NGOs engaged in local-level peace work, there is no comprehensive discussion about the main risks and opportunities, nor is there a common analytical framework to bring the disparate peacebuilding efforts together. International development donors have also been guilty of this short-sightedness, overlooking peacebuilding needs in Kenya in favour of its more visibly conflict-riven neighbours such as DRC and Somalia. But as terror threats proliferate, citizens are increasingly resorting to public protests against government corruption and political and environmental changes, disrupting access to natural resources. All round, conflict risks are becoming more visible and peacebuilding ever more necessary. There is a critical space and value for increased discussion of the complex and linked factors that underpin sustainable peace in Kenya. Strong leadership and concerted action from government, civil society and support from the international community are all needed if the risks are to be hedged and peace opportunities utilised.

This peace audit has set out the risks to peace and identified a number of opportunities for peacebuilding. At times, the risks and opportunities are two sides of the same coin; the difference is in how the issue is addressed. The discovery of oil in a highly volatile region, the prioritisation of lake waters for private flower companies over pastoralists and informal security provision in informal settlements may all appear to be conflict risks. Yet, on closer inspection, they all also hold prospects for peacebuilding. Action is needed and the how is just as important as the what.
CONCLUSIONS AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR ENGAGEMENT

Based on the analysis in this Peace Audit, we can set out the following six main opportunities for peacebuilding in Kenya:

1. **CLIMATE-PROOF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT**

Vision 2030 sets out an economic roadmap for Kenya’s development. Yet horticulture and agriculture, which are responsible for most Kenyan jobs, a third of the country’s output and a significant portion of its exports, are highly vulnerable to the impact of climate change. While GDP appears to be growing at 5%, the costs of climate change to the country through floods and droughts are estimated at 2.6% of GDP by 2030. This alone is not an insurmountable risk to economic growth but, taken with the other factors of insecurity we have discussed, it is likely to increase the inequitable distribution of economic gains across an already economically fragmented country. While Kenya’s natural resources — especially oil — may seem to provide a way out, experiences in other countries underline the importance both of resisting the temptation to exploit the resources at maximum speed and of ensuring that oil income funds productive investment and does not simply get spent meeting current demands. Against the backdrop of continued instability among Kenya’s neighbours, ensuring equitable and sustained economic growth is one of the biggest priorities for peacebuilding.

2. **CONFLICT-SENSITIVE MANAGEMENT OF OIL AND OTHER EXTRACTIVE RESOURCES**

The discovery of oil in Kenya presents something of a double-edged sword for peace and development in the country. On the one hand, it could provide potential livelihood opportunities to communities dependent on pastoralism, which is likely to become less or even unviable due to climate change and changes to land use within the next 20 years. On the other, the record so far shows considerable risks for long-term peace. At the heart of the issue is the lack of jobs going to the affected communities, who are on the whole unskilled pastoralists who require a lot of training and skill-building. The practice of companies offering hand-outs to the affected communities so as to allay tensions or secure influence is unsustainable, inefficient and potentially counter-productive in the long term. Community frustrations with a company’s behaviour are often based on unrealistic expectations for jobs, compensation and services, which are not necessarily the responsibility of the company but of the state. The companies are part of and affected by the problem, but cannot solve the problem. This leaves them in a tough place, where short-term palliative measures are certainly understandable but no solution.
The solution lies with the state, the company and the communities working together. Peace opportunities lie in promoting effective lines of communication between the various stakeholders in order to address some of the perceptions and misperceptions held by the community with facts, and establishing incentives for the oil companies to better engage communities from the outset by implementing processes such as the Voluntary Principles (VPs). They have strong economic incentives to do so. A stable operating environment where community rights are respected is good for business, and local communities affected by extractive industry projects play an important role in determining whether this stability will be achieved.

3. INTER-RELIGIOUS UNITY

Civil society in Kenya is well established and has repeatedly demonstrated its strength around anti-corruption and human rights issues. They also played an invaluable role in preventing or reducing inter-communal or inter-tribal violence, particularly around rural clashes and during election times. However, most of this activity has been reactive rather than proactive. Few efforts have been made to address the root causes or wider risks of conflict linked to ethnicity and identity. This is because ethnicity and identity are, as one Kenyan expert we spoke to explained, “too highly intense and complex to even consider tackling”.

Faith and religious groups tend to cross ethnic and tribal lines, although there are correlations between some ethnic groups and certain religions or denominations. Inter-religious cooperation is perhaps a more approachable angle, given the high levels of religious adherence in Kenya and the high regard and influence of religious leaders across all faiths and socio-economic divides – from urban elites to the rural poor. This could be a way to shift the focus of reconciliation and cooperation from the inter-religious to the inter-ethnic divide.

There is currently a risk that some of the gains made to promote inter-religious cooperation are being undermined by the actions of al-Shabaab and related groups, and by the government and security sector’s responses to terror threats. In the short term, it is therefore vital that efforts are made to undo the damage already done and limit further erosion of Christian–Muslim relations, so as to enable efforts in the medium term to develop the roles of faith leaders in peacebuilding and peace advocacy.

4. SECURITY REFORM

Security provision across the country lacks discipline and is patchy. Large rural swaths such as Turkana and Marsabit counties, as well as informal urban settlements such as Kibera, receive protection only through informal security mechanisms. Banditry and violent conflict over cattle have become more deadly
since herding communities became more heavily armed, mainly with weapons inherited from the Sudanese and Ugandan wars, but also with rifles procured and misused by reservists in the Kenyan police. Yet, while raiding receives prominent billing in conflict research on Kenya, new challenges in pastoral areas pertain to ethnic distribution of alternative jobs. It is important that security actors understand ethnic norms and speak the relevant languages of where they are stationed, but it is also important that ethnic monopolies within the security forces are not able to marginalise minority ethnic groups in ethnically heterogeneous counties.

The problem of arms proliferation cannot be ignored, but disarmament is unrealistic as long as there continue to be gaps in the state's formal provision of security. Previous attempts at disarmament have not achieved much. Any real chance to curb the armed violence, particularly in pastoralist regions and informal urban settings, is contingent on efficient and responsive security provided by the state. This is not a question of traditional security sector reform, focused on training the police, but rather security reform. That means addressing the demand for arms (rather than the supply) through ensuring adequate security provision. This provision would need to be sensitive to the ethnic and socio-economic differences across the country, and balance the interests of diverse groups, for example ethnic groups or commercial interests.

5. CONSTITUTION IMPLEMENTED IN FULL, FAIRLY, PROMPTLY AND WITHIN BUDGET

The implementation of the 2010 constitution perhaps presents both the biggest conflict risks and peace opportunities. The constitution itself contains many peace-positive measures, such as clearer land rights (including more equitable land rights for women), more safeguards of human rights, and the redistribution of power and resources to the counties through devolution. However, the current government is already implementing laws that undermine the constitution – such as the recent amendment to the Matrimonial Property Act discussed earlier. Public expectations for the implementation of the constitution – particularly around devolution – are high and fuelled by the media. Whether there is progress on this front therefore provides an unequivocal way of measuring the efficacy of the current administration – a litmus test of governance success or failure. And citizens are already clamouring to see the benefits.

Implementation of the constitution needs to be understood as a core component of the social glue required to hold the fragile Kenyan social contract in place. Even if other gains appear more attractive to political elites in the short run, the government must understand that the long-term implications of failing to make sufficient progress on their watch will weaken the state–citizen ties and potentially be more costly.
6. CONFLICT-SENSITIVE DEVOLUTION

Within the new constitution, devolution presents the most challenges and opportunities for peace. Devolving decision-making power, budget and resources from central to local government will entail significant shifts in the structures and systems of power in Kenya. This will undoubtedly cause conflict; judicious peacebuilding efforts are required to avoid this conflict escalating into violence. Particular sensitivity is required in managing tensions or conflicts around the interaction between the old provisional and district administrative and policing structures and personnel and the new county structures, systems and staff – especially with regard to the opposing patronage networks they may bring. Distribution of revenues from underground natural resources such as water and oil must also be handled with care. Under the current constitution, the national government can claim the lion’s share, with just 15% left for distribution between local administration and communities. But peace prospects in impoverished and conflict-ridden regions, and newly resource-rich counties such as Turkana, could be significantly improved by efforts to promote economic growth and reduce political marginalisation through more equitable profit sharing between the national government and counties. Against the broader backdrop of implementing the constitution, getting devolution right is therefore a key priority.
## CHAPTER SEVEN
### THE AUDIT

### PEACE PROSPECTS WILL

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<th>IMPROVE IF</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>THE ECONOMY:</strong></td>
<td>Grows at more than 5% a year in a well-balanced way, drawing strength from several sectors.</td>
<td>Stagnates, staggers along below 5% a year and/or becomes over-reliant on one high-income sector such as oil.</td>
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<td><strong>NATURAL RESOURCES:</strong></td>
<td>Are well managed on the basis of consultation with local communities and in a way in which they are able to have confidence, and exploited as part of a rounded, multi-sector economic development plan.</td>
<td>Are exploited without consultation and in a way in which local communities do not have confidence, or are exploited quickly, dominating economic output, with the resultant income covering current costs in the national budget rather than investment.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>RELIGIOUS GROUPS:</strong></td>
<td>Talk with each other across the faith divides, build dialogue across inter-ethnic divides and work together with a responsive state to isolate violent extremism.</td>
<td>Cannot work together, or are marginalised by the state in its response to terrorism.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>THE SECURITY SECTOR:</strong></td>
<td>Gets to be better equipped, better trained and less confrontational in its approach to social and political problems.</td>
<td>Continues to be under-equipped, under-manned, and both arbitrary and confrontational in approach.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM:</strong></td>
<td>Is implemented in full.</td>
<td>Is delayed/undermined by government actions and new laws that contradict key articles, or by turf wars between government agencies.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>DEVOLUTION:</strong></td>
<td>Becomes a means of reducing inequalities of access to economic resources.</td>
<td>Becomes a means of lining the pockets of corrupt local elites.</td>
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ENDNOTES

2 All interviews conducted in October 2013.
3 Based on expert consultations in Nairobi, Naivasha and Turkana, October 2013.
4 Not her real name. She did not wish her name to be used for fear of discrimination or retaliation.
5 On 7 April 2014, Alert convened an expert meeting in Nairobi to validate the Peace Audit findings. The event was attended by community members from Kibera and Naivasha, two community-based organisations (the Interreligious Council of Kenya and the Kounkuey Design Initiative), and participants from four international organisations (the Danish Demining Group, Comitato Internazionale per lo Sviluppo dei Popoli (International Committee for the Development of Peoples, CISP), United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-Habitat) and US Agency for International Development (USAID)).
9 Stockholm Environment Institute, The Economy of Climate Change in Kenya, 2009, SEI, Stockholm
10 Ibid.
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24 Myth shattered: Kibera numbers fail to add up, Daily Nation, 3 September 2010, http://disq.us/8lo0ht, accessed 4 December 2013
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