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Mobilising the Private Sector for Peace: The role of private sector actors in peace and conflict dynamics in Kenya and Somalia

A peace and conflict analysis

Policy report



Government of the Netherlands

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International Alert works with people directly affected by conflict to build lasting peace.

We focus on solving the root causes of conflict with people from across divides. From the grassroots to policy level, we bring people together to build sustainable peace.

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Contents

1. Executive summary	5
Piloting International Alert's PCA guide	5
Findings	5
Recommendations for International Alert	6
Recommendations for the Dutch MoFA in the Horn of Africa	7
2. Section 1: Introduction and overview	8
Overview of the research in the Horn of Africa	8
Context analysis for Horn of Africa and peace and conflict	10
Kenya	10
Somalia	12
Key findings from the Kenya PCA	15
Cross-cutting findings	15
West Pokot County-Specific findings	17
Turkana County-Specific findings	19
Nairobi County-Specific findings	20
Key findings from the Somalia PCA	21
Conclusion and recommendations for the Dutch MoFA for Horn of Africa	24
Recommendations for the Dutch MoFA in the Horn of Africa	25
3. Section 2: Background on the project and methodology	26
Alignment with Dutch MoFA priorities	26
What is Peace and Conflict Analysis?	27
Overview of the approach and methodology	29
4. Annexes	40

Abbreviations

AU	The African Union
CAF	Conflict Assessment Framework
CSBP	Conflict Sensitive Business Practices
CoC	Chamber of Commerce
CSOs	Civil Society Organisations
CSSF	Conflict, Stability and Security Fund of the UK Government
DNH	Do No Harm
DSH	Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs Department for Stabilisation and Humanitarian
EWER	Early Warning and Early Response
FCAS	Fragile and Conflict Affected Situations
FGD	Focus Group Discussions
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
KIIs	Key Informant Interviews
KVDA	Kerio Valley Development Authority
MoFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
PCA	Peace and Conflict Analysis
PAU	Peacebuilding Advisory Unit
MSMEs	Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises
USAID	United States Agency for Development

Executive summary

Piloting International Alert's peace and conflict analysis guide

In 2020, International Alert (henceforth 'Alert') developed a manual titled 'Peace and Conflict Analysis: Step-by-step guide for International Alert's staff and partners.' The manual is intended to help Alert staff and partners to learn from each other's diverse experiences and to provide practical guidance for designing conflict analysis processes informing peacebuilding interventions. In 2021, Alert, with support from the Dutch MoFA, piloted the guide in Kenya and the Horn of Africa. The pilot process aimed to build the capacity of Alert's Kenya/Horn of Africa Programme to design and manage conflict analysis projects and generate evidence to enhance development partners' and governments' understanding of conflict sensitive responses to emerging conflict dynamics and peacebuilding opportunities in the Horn.

Piloting the PCA enabled Kenya and the Horn of Africa team to better understand the importance of examining both peace and conflict factors, and the positive and negative roles of key actors, in any conflict analysis. Understanding these nuances helps the programme not only to reflect upon challenges but also to recognise best practices and opportunities.

The PCA focused on Kenya and Somalia, and on analysing the role of the private/business sector in peacebuilding. It included a total of 46 Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) (16 in/on Somalia and 30 in Kenya) and 15 Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). The FGDs were conducted for Kenya only, due to the use of virtual data collection for Somalia. A total of 196 respondents were reached between August and December 2021 (46 Key Informants plus 150 FGD participants).

This report documents the findings of the PCA and the process of piloting the manual in the field. The intended audience is the staff of Alert and the Dutch MoFA who are engaged in the strategic development of peacebuilding programming that relates to the private sector in the Horn of Africa.

Findings

The private sector in Kenya and Somalia is enormously diverse. Formality and informality, and legal and illegal business activities, all coexist comfortably. Throughout the areas of study, Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises (MSMEs) predominate.

Businesses, business associations, and individual businesspeople in the Horn have made deliberate and effective efforts to contribute to and sustain peace, or to prevent violence. These efforts have included direct participation in the negotiation or mediation of agreements among parties engaged in violent conflict, at local, national, and cross-border levels; public campaigning, advocacy, and diplomacy in direct support of peace or anti-violence efforts; and providing logistical and financial support to negotiation processes among parties to conflict. Some

businesses have engaged in business activities that support or provide stability – particularly in Somalia, where the local private sector provides water and electricity to much of the population, and where some enterprises have hired former militia members to play security and other roles in their companies.

There is abundant evidence that businesses of all sizes also regularly act in ways that drive or fuel conflict, stemming from a range of motives. Some businesses seek to gain economically by engaging in or inciting violence. Some wilfully and knowingly collaborate with conflict actors in the hope of gaining economic advantages. Some occupy market or economic niches that are created by conflict and may have a business interest in the persistence of conflict. Others reluctantly acquiesce to activities that sustain conflict and fragility, such as the payment of extortion to militias or criminal gangs or of bribes to corrupt officials.

There are complex relationships, including overlaps, between political elites and businesspeople at local and national levels. ‘Economic actors’ and ‘political actors’ are sometimes the same actors. Both sets of actors are widely perceived as self-interested and willing to collaborate with each other, or pressure each other, when it suits them. Businesspeople may build relationships with political elites, hoping for favouritism in public procurement, regulation, and policies, while they also often support their own clans and identity groups during elections and make business decisions benefiting the social groups to which they belong. Political elites build relationships with businesspeople to finance political campaigns.

The private sector is dominated by men and reflects the power dynamics of deeply patriarchal local societies in both Kenya and Somalia. Cultural barriers and challenges in raising capital effectively exclude many women from the private sector.

In Kenya, the imposition of curfews to contain the spread of COVID-19 has had significant impacts on the broad business sector and perceptions of security. For example, some respondents observed that the police used force to impose COVID-19 rules and restrictions during curfew periods, and that curfews interfered with routine activities and made businesses more vulnerable to crime. The manner in which COVID 19 rules were implemented by the security forces as observed above only served to create tension between the business people and the police, and thus interfering with the peaceful environment that the business people used to enjoy.

Recommendations for International Alert

1. In view of the varying roles of businesses and businesspeople in both conflict dynamics and efforts to establish peace in the Horn, conflict analyses should always include the private sector. To overlook the private sector in analysis will miss certain key aspects of conflict dynamics, as well as potentially important opportunities or entry points for peace initiatives.
2. Evidence suggests that private sector actors may make meaningful and important contributions to peace efforts, and Alert should consider potential opportunities to include private sector actors in its peacebuilding projects. There may be peacebuilding value in approaches that mobilise the private sector to support peace efforts, and also in approaches that help or encourage the private sector to refrain from actions that sustain or drive conflict. Specific programmatic interventions should be predicated on detailed analysis and actor mapping.
3. Business actors are not conflict experts and may not have the requisite skills or expertise necessary for analyses, such as PCA. Peacebuilders can assist private sector actors to integrate a conflict sensitivity approach into activities. This will enable private sector actors to understand conflict dynamics, as well as their own

impacts – positive and negative – upon conflict, and the opportunities that they may have to engage – as individual businesses or as networks with other groups of actors, such as local governments, security actors, and conflict actors.

4. Alert should also consider building upon the existing body of knowledge to address gaps in the evidence base, which is currently weak, in order to inform future programming. This can be achieved through continuous monitoring and documenting results, impacts and lessons learned from different projects being implemented, as well as through conducting learning workshops.
5. The business sector is not exempt from the patriarchal cultures and attitudes of the societies in which it operates, and can benefit from being assisted to build capacity and understanding in relation to gender and inclusion.
6. Business associations and networks have been effective in mobilising resources and influence to advance a peace agenda. There may be further opportunities for them to develop strategies that support peace efforts. Such actors can play a crucial role in post-conflict reconciliation and development, including by contributing to backdoor diplomacy and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such as mediation. Alert should leverage opportunities to strengthen the capacity of business actors to engage in conflict mediation and reconciliation.

Recommendations for the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Horn of Africa:

1. There is a significant evidence gap when it comes to the private sector, peace, and conflict in the Horn. Yet private sector actors often play significant roles in both peace and conflict. There is a need for a more systematic understanding through research of these roles. Additional insights may be gained through research that disaggregates business actors further, for example by size, sector and industry. In addition, there is a need to better understand the impact of business- and trade-supportive policies and agreements at national, regional and international levels on peace and conflict dynamics of the region.
2. The MoFA should consider experimental and iterative projects with the private sector. Existing evidence demonstrates the sometimes positive role business plays in support of peace. Much less is known about how planned interventions might influence private sector actors to engage in peace-related initiatives. Funding for experimental or iterative initiatives that are substantially adapted in light of changing circumstances or initial, partial failures might help to build evidence about effective approaches. The MoFA should consider developing funding streams that allow for experimentation, targeted pilot projects, iterative project design, and ongoing learning.
3. The MoFA should consider interventions that support the social and economic empowerment of women and youth. Both groups face significant cultural and practical barriers to entry into the private sector. Engagement in business may help women and youth to build relationships, influence, and economic strength that would enable them to exert greater influence on social issues. It may be possible to aid them through awareness-raising and advocacy, targeted network development, providing access to capital, capacity-building support, technical advice, and accompaniment, among others. In doing so, the MoFA should ensure that gender and conflict sensitivity approaches are an integral part of any interventions.
4. In countries where the Dutch Government is providing development support, the MoFA should support policies that enhance transparency and accountability in business practices, and, generally, business and economic policies that favour peace and reduce negative incentives. In addition, they should impose sanctions and/or accountability for Dutch investors that are engaged in harmful practices (unintentional or not).
5. The MoFA should also consider analysing Dutch and European investments and how they may be profiteering from conflict systems – e.g. companies taking advantage of weak tax regulations, importing arms with-

out any real checks as to whether they may end up in the hands of militant groups etc.—and take appropriate action to limit this.

6. Another consideration for the MoFA is to evaluate how Dutch and European economic policies may have unintended consequences on business and peace in fragile and conflict-affected states.

Section 1

Introduction and overview

Overview of the research in the Horn of Africa

The research on which this report is based was conducted by International Alert with financial support from the Dutch MoFA. It includes the use of Alert's 'Peace and Conflict Analysis: Step-by-step guide for International Alert's staff and partners' which was developed in 2020 and published in 2021. The guide was piloted in order to build capacities in Alert's Kenya/Horn of Africa Programme for designing and managing conflict analysis projects and generating evidence and lessons that might inform and support Alert and MoFA's strategic objectives and programming in the region.

The research focused on the role of private sector actors in peace and conflict dynamics in Kenya and Somalia. The role of the private sector in situations of conflict has been explored before in many contexts, focusing particularly on how business actors can perpetuate conflicts and their role in peacebuilding processes.¹ While there is much interest in 'business for peace,' there is often little evidence of how it works in practice.² This report is intended to aid in understanding this set of issues as they exist in Kenya and Somalia.

While the definition of 'private sector' is wide, encompassing micro-entrepreneurs and multinational corporations, our assessment focused primarily on the role of MSMEs. In some research areas, such as Nairobi, the research also considered the role of larger companies. For the purpose of this research, we refer to MSMEs as small businesses, whether formal or informal, that operate in rural and urban areas. 'Large companies' refers to formal enterprises with a relatively wide area of operations.

Geographic focus

In the Republic of Kenya, the study mainly focused on three counties: Nairobi City, Turkana and West Pokot. For Turkana County, the study was conducted in Lodwar, Kalokol, and Lokichar towns. In West Pokot the study was conducted in Kapenguria and Makutano towns.

Nairobi City County is the capital city of Kenya and one of Africa's key hubs for finance, business, transport, communications, non-governmental organisations, and diplomacy. Turkana County is the second largest of the country's 47 counties. It covers an area of 71,597.6km², accounting for 13.5% of the country's total land area. It is located in the northwest and borders Uganda to the west, South Sudan to the north and Ethiopia to the northeast. Internally, it borders West Pokot and Baringo counties to the south, Samburu County to the southeast, and Marsabit County to the east.³ Local communities in Turkana have for ages satisfied their economic, social and cultural needs through nomadic pastoralism.⁴ West Pokot County is situated in the North Rift Valley along Kenya's border with Uganda. It borders Turkana County to the north and northeast, Trans Nzoia County to the south, Elgeyo Marakwet County to the southeast and Baringo County to the east. More than 80% of the population is engaged in farming and related activities.⁵

In Somalia, the study was focused on Mogadishu, with perspectives being gathered that also reflected the wider country. Somalia, officially the Federal Republic of Somalia, borders Ethiopia to the west, Djibouti to the northwest, the Gulf of Aden to the north, the Indian Ocean to the east, and Kenya to the southwest. Somalia has an estimated population of around 15 million,⁶ of which over 2 million live in the capital and largest city Mogadishu. Mogadishu was a major battleground in the Somali civil war which ravaged the country from 1991 until 2012. Since then, the city has experienced a period of rapid reconstruction, including a new international airport, paved roads, new hotels, and embassies which have been financed by diaspora Somalis and the international community.⁷ A quarter of Somalia's population are settled farmers living in the fertile zones of the Juba and Shabelle rivers. Elsewhere, the semi-arid terrain and climate support pastoral and agro-pastoral livelihoods; about 60% of Somalis are nomadic or semi-nomadic pastoralists raising camels, cattle, sheep and goats.

Structure of this report

To make the report easier to read and to use, it has been divided into two large sections. Section I presents the findings of the research, including the literature review. Section II presents a detailed discussion of the methodology, background and context of the report, including a discussion of the Peace and Conflict Analysis methodology and the strategic objectives of the larger project.

Context analysis for Horn of Africa and peace and conflict

The Horn of Africa has witnessed many violent conflicts in recent decades, and conflict and instability trends make it one of the most unstable regions in the world. Many parts of the region face considerable challenges in breaking free of political instability, armed conflicts, violent crime, communal violence, extremism, and state failure. Many of the conflicts are interconnected, posing risks of spill-over transboundary events. Ethnic and religious cleavages, scarcity of resources, and armed conflicts for control of states are key factors responsible for conflicts. Of the two countries identified for this research, Kenya appears to be more stable, but it has experienced ethnic polarisation that has led to violent conflicts, particularly during election seasons. In some regions of Kenya, conflicts over scarce natural resources are persistent and are intensified during crises such as prolonged droughts. The COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated existing risks to health, economic dynamics, and food security and there is a possibility that socio-economic impacts combined with continued elite rivalry and competition might fuel political violence.

Kenya

Colonial British rule in Kenya significantly contributed to an increase in inter-community conflicts, including through the introduction of land policies as part of a broader strategy to develop an export-driven economy. Today, questions of land reform and land rights remain a central driver of conflicts, but are essentially off the table in conversations about business engagement in peacebuilding.⁸ Political competition is also a key driver of conflict, with ethnicity and other identities such as gender, youth, and class often being instrumentalised during election periods to enable political actors to secure offices in government or ascend to political offices in order to access resources and patronage.

Kenya has a vibrant peacebuilding sector and a strong civil society and other organisations that are committed

to conflict prevention and conflict transformation. Various multi-stakeholder peacebuilding efforts have been coordinated by different groups, including government, civil society, private sector, religious institutions, and foreign diplomatic actors, with varying levels of membership, leadership, relevance, and impact.⁹ No unified network or backbone structure exists that might convene or facilitate Kenyan civil society organisations and their respective peacebuilding efforts at large. Among networks and groups, there are varying degrees of trust, suspicion, and at times competition for resources and influence.¹⁰

Private sector actors and peace initiatives

There is increasing recognition of the role of Kenya's private sector in peacebuilding, although this has not been widely documented or understood. The most widely recognised entity in this space is the Kenya Private Sector Alliance (KEPSA), an umbrella body that brings together roughly 200 companies to influence public policy for an enabling business environment.¹¹ Post-election violence in 2007 and 2008 had a considerable impact on businesses, as exports stopped and businesses had to close. This pushed KEPSA¹² to mobilise to mitigate and address electoral violence and political conflict. KEPSA took a much more active role in this space in the lead-in to the 2013 elections,¹³ mobilising the public away from violence.¹⁴ In explaining their rationale for engaging in peacebuilding efforts, KEPSA members stated that "it was no longer a 'wait and see' after the experiences of 2008."¹⁵

The most visible activity carried out by KEPSA was a public communication campaign launched in 2012 called Mkenya Daima (Kenyan Forever). It communicated messages via media and events about the importance of peaceful elections to the public, and trained representatives from partner groups as peace ambassadors.¹⁶ Safaricom, Kenya's largest telecoms operator and a KEPSA member, donated 50 million text messages to the civil society group Sisi Ni Amani (We are Peace), which disseminated messages encouraging the community to support a peaceful election cycle. The Mkenya Diama campaign and other efforts have allowed the private sector to gain influence and contribute to a reconciliation of the political class with Kenyan civil society, as well as illustrating how companies can incorporate peace efforts into the normal framework of business activities.¹⁷

Although KEPSA's contribution to peacebuilding efforts has been lauded, there have also been criticisms. Some Kenyan civil society organisations have perceived KEPSA as being too close to the government and unwilling to share criticisms of government policy in public.¹⁸ CSO representatives have criticised KEPSA as 'consumers of peace,' whose only interest is in maintaining a favourable business environment.¹⁹

Some contend that despite playing a significant role in ensuring violence-free elections in 2013, KEPSA did not address underlying grievances and injustices that lie at the root of conflicts.²⁰ For example, the intensity of the violence of 2007/8 pushed the idea of constitutional reforms onto Kenya's political agenda. A new, devolved constitution was introduced in 2010 and was supported by several business associations, including KEPSA. When street protests erupted in 2011 seeking further changes in relation to devolving power, KEPSA condemned the protests and supported the government position. For many observers, this compromised the role of business as a 'neutral' broker across Kenya's political spectrum. KEPSA was said to have endorsed a 'status quo' that would assure a stable operating environment for business, while missing the opportunity to address some of underlying drivers at the heart of conflict.²¹

Thus, it has been said the business sector may see its interests lying with "the premise of a centralised state, the protection of private property and land rights, and the export-oriented, 'open access' economy. A desire to minimise the uncertainty created by political and institutional change opens the sector to losing credibility as a neutral broker "while at the same time feeding the very conflict dynamics they wish to prevent."²²

Meanwhile, while in general there seems to be a consensus that sustainable peacebuilding in Kenya can only happen with all actors—government, civil society, religious, private sector, international organisations, and donors—working together. However, bringing sustained working collaborations among these actors has been a challenge.

The existing literature on business, peace and conflict in Kenya focuses inordinately on KEPISA and its high profile successes during a specific moment in history. In addition, the literature largely points to the contributions of the private sector actors to forestall violence in the short term. Most peace initiatives supported by private sector actors have ended once violence or the threat of it has stopped. Thus, a comprehensive and critical analysis of how private sector actors have contributed to long-term building efforts is lacking and is needed.

Private sector actors and conflict

In the Kenya context, there are several ways in which private sector actors may exacerbate conflict dynamics. The frequent overlap between business actors and politics is one example. A more specific example is the commercialisation of cattle raiding in the areas of northern Kenya that are dominated economically by pastoralism. The practice of rustling cattle from other communities to restock herds has been longstanding in the area, but there has been an increased role by private sector actors, politicians, and organised criminal groups.²³

A focus in the literature on KEPISA and the formal economy has also obscured the role of MSMEs. As a consequence, the interactions and linkages between MSMEs and peace and conflict issues, such as urban youth employment, and actors, such as police, criminal or illegal gangs, and violent groups mobilised by politicians, are not well understood.

Somalia

Somalia has been in an ongoing process of peacebuilding and state-building since the collapse of the Siad Barre government in 1991. In the absence of significant state authority, Somalia's economy is largely informal and unregulated, and the private sector has assumed responsibility for the provision of the vast majority of goods and services. Some businesses have reaped benefits from the absence of taxes and regulations.²⁴ State absence also has disadvantages. Private sector actors face additional security costs, difficulties in attracting foreign investment, and widespread corruption.²⁵ In responding to these challenges, they have developed trust-based social networks to minimise risk. Despite a degree of effective adaptation to the context, many private sector actors are supportive of a return of a functioning government and have supported peace processes and been involved in them to a limited extent.²⁶

In some ways, the private sector can be understood to have been a key source of stability in the context of state absence. Businesses have provided citizens with essential services like water, power, and telecommunications.²⁷ They also provide jobs. For example, "the Trans-National Industrial Electricity and Gas Company, through its investments in electric and gas infrastructure, created a considerable number of jobs, including for reformed militiamen." Many businesspeople hire clan gunmen as guards and in other positions, using their influence and networks to convince them to give up their purely military activities. Thousands of young men have been diverted from the militias into the workforce as a result.²⁸

In addition, negotiations by business actors with other actors have ensured services continuance. "When the country's national telephone system collapsed, telecommunication companies filled the gap by forging

agreements with local power holders, such as elders or members of armed groups, which facilitated reliable protection of their operations.”²⁹

The private sector has also attempted to fill the governance vacuum. For example, “Somali entrepreneurs compensated for the lack of effective government regulation by ‘importing governance’ from foreign institutions; using clans and other local networks to assist with contract enforcement, payment and fund transmission; and simplifying transactions.”³⁰

In the mid-2000s, business groups provided logistical support to enable elders to meet to de-escalate conflicts.³¹ Several business leaders provided the logistics for talks between the Digil and Mirifle elders in an effort to resolve a conflict in Iidale village. Business actors have also been directly involved in some of the various peace processes at the political level.

Most notably, the business community has, through its participation in high-level meetings, been part of the political process by paving the way for the establishment of the Transitional National Government (TNG).³²

However, all these those proactive efforts have generally been ad-hoc, and “the Somali business community has no coordination or strategic vision for its engagement in the various dimensions of peacebuilding needed in the country.”³³

The political economy of the private sector and its links to conflict dynamics in Somalia

There are also documented examples of businesses and businesspeople contributing to the perpetuation of violent conflict.

Businesspeople rely on their relationships with conflict actors to protect themselves and their businesses, including by arming themselves. In the early phase of the conflict, businesspeople needed warlords’ authority and protection to run their businesses. They therefore became partners of warlords and financiers of conflict.³⁴ Businesses have also hindered efforts at reconciliation by financing warlords and their militias. There is little doubt that businesspeople bankrolled rival warlords in the early 1990s and facilitated the flow of weapons and other war materiel into the country.³⁵ The absence of restrictive government policies, and of state security provision, regulation and control has tended to encourage entrepreneurship and competition that often leads to violence between businesspeople and their respective supporters. Private sector actors can also create sources of grievance and exacerbate conflict by increasing vertical and horizontal inequalities.³⁶ As the state has collapsed, powerful money-oriented businesspeople have carved out profitable spaces to generate illicit income.³⁷

Meanwhile, the biggest complaint of businesses of all sizes concerns the ‘taxes’ they are forced to pay, both to the government and the extremist group Al-Shabaab. Payment is extorted at roadblocks and checkpoints along major transport routes. Al-Shabaab also imposes a regular zakat tax, as well as ad-hoc requests for ‘contributions’. Large companies such as Hormud report that their local offices are regularly closed due to threats by local criminals, government soldiers or Al-Shabaab fighters looking for payment.³⁸

Businesses’ reliance on armed groups for security and operational continuity may also contribute to continued conflict. In addition, some private sector actors may have an interest in preserving the status quo in relation to the absence of regulation.

There are strong connections between business and politics. Politicians are frequently businesspeople and vice versa, while lucrative government contracts are often awarded to supporters, clan-mates and friends in the private sector.

The telecommunications revolution facilitated the rise of remittance companies for diaspora members to send money to family members at home. Those funds are often invested in socio-economic development, particularly in water and electricity, health and education, and real estate construction.³⁹ It has also been argued that remittances may be used to sponsor conflict and promote warlords, particularly when clans are under attack and threat. Such sponsorships are linked to some large businesses operating in Somalia.

However, the Somali diaspora appears increasingly unwilling to finance conflict and consent to having its funds used for nefarious activities. Businesses that depend on diaspora funds are thus unlikely to support warlords and militias financially.

Meanwhile, many powerful businesspeople have enticed militia to stop fighting and instead serve as armed guards.⁴⁰ Diaspora elite and their local partners may not want to support conflict, but many seem content with the privileges accorded to them by the civil war, such as through misappropriation of properties.

The literature review indicates that private sector peace efforts are mainly initiated by individual companies, such as telecommunications companies, in an effort to solve business problems or capitalise on opportunities.

There may be an opportunity to engage Somali business actors for the purpose of encouraging them to look beyond strategic and security interests and addressing conflict from a broader perspective that is more sustainable, and which involves changing people's attitudes.

Key findings from the Kenya peace and conflict analysis

Cross-cutting findings

Peace actors and peace practices were similar across locations

Respondents from all three locations and all demographic groups identified similar actors and practices in relation to peacemaking and peacebuilding. These include CSOs, elders, the national and county governments, peace committee members, media, and religious leaders.

CSOs, either through funding from donors or their own initiatives, have supported various peacebuilding activities. Local traditional structures, including elders, in Turkana and West Pokot have been instrumental in mediating local conflicts, bridging gaps between groups and communities, and binding communities together. For example, the 'Tobong'ulore' is an annual cultural event which brings together communities that speak the same languages within the Karamoja cluster region i.e., the Karamojong in Uganda, the Toposa in South Sudan, the Turkana in Kenya, and the Daasanach in Ethiopia. The event has also become a big tourist attraction, contributing to the local economy and supported by local businesses, making a contribution to peacebuilding. Media not only provide crucial information to communities, including on peace initiatives, but also provide platforms and spaces for all parties for peace dialogues.

The definition of 'business' may vary depending on the local context or region

Understandings of the term 'business' vary. For example, Nairobi is the site of both MSMEs and larger entities, all of which come under the term 'business' for respondents. Respondents in Nairobi mentioned KEPSA when asked about large businesses. For MSMEs, they referenced the Nairobi Business Community, an association of local traders who mostly operate in the Central Business District. In Turkana and West Pokot, where the private sector is mostly MSMEs, the term 'business' was considered to include small businesses and traders, some of whom are members of the local chambers of commerce.

There is a strong general perception that businesses promote peace, with some caveats

The findings indicate that there is a general perception that some individual businesspeople and business associations (i.e., Chambers of Commerce) act as a collective voice of the business sector and promote or demonstrate a desire for peaceful conditions because they perceive that peace is good for business. It is from this understanding that most participants said that businesses are promoting peace.

"If you don't have peace, you don't have business." Turkana KII-T-YL.

Examples cited by respondents from Turkana include the annual Lokiriama Peace Accord celebrations that

local businesses have supported, in partnership with Sustainable Approaches for Community Empowerment (SAPCONE) and local NGOs, the Catholic church, and county and national government. The Lokirama Peace Accord is a peace treaty between the Turkana people of Kenya and the Matheniko of Uganda, signed in December 1973.⁴¹ The annual celebration has brought on board other communities such as the Toposa of South Sudan, the Nyang'atom of South Omo zone of Ethiopia, the Pokot of Kenya, AND the Jie and Dodoth of Uganda,⁴² as well as participation by business people.

In other examples, respondents in the West Pokot County Chamber of Commerce FGD stated that they managed to resolve a conflict between Kenyan and Ugandan businesspeople through their own mediation and negotiation efforts. A KII with a journalist in Nairobi indicated that there had been numerous efforts by KEPSA to promote peace through the Mkenya Daima initiative.⁴³

Such examples may not be the same as negotiating or mediating a peace agreement, but are nevertheless meaningful acts that may influence popular opinion and contribute to sustaining an agreement. Still, there is a clear need to understand that, as a rule, business actors' willingness to promote peace does not equate to direct peacebuilding. Often, local realities beyond their control may play a more significant role in dictating their actions. In the case of MSMEs in particular, engaging in peace efforts may incur unacceptable risk. For example, organising to resist 'taxation' by local militias or armed groups/gangs may incur violent reprisals.

Evidence from the interviews as well as the literature review indicates that some businesses are willing to do things that drive or fuel conflict in order to gain economically, and that some businesses gain advantages from conflict/fragility. For example, many businesses are created or sustained by conflict conditions, e.g. businesses selling goods and services to refugees or Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Some respondents stated that some businesspeople hire young men to steal cattle and then sell them in different locations, thus fuelling the illicit sub-economy while cashing in on the poverty-conflict nexus.

There is a complex relationship between politicians and businesspeople

Respondents stated that there is a complex relationship between politicians and businesspeople, with both sectors driven by money and power. Some business people actively pursue politics and some politicians have wide business interests. Respondents said that they commonly observed each group instrumentalising the other. Politicians use businesspeople to finance campaigns during election periods. Businesspeople use politicians to gain advantages such as tenders and contracts, and beneficial policies.

Respondents referred to several examples of the connection between politicians and businesspeople, notably in relation to the ways cartels are formed and operate to apply for contracts; in how tenders are awarded; and in the way stalls are allocated in markets. Respondents queried whether a business would still be able to operate if it supported a losing candidate. The dynamics of these relationships often involve threats, intimidation, and unethical practices.

COVID-19 has impacted the business sector

COVID-19 has affected the economy and security, including due to curfews. Cases of police brutality were reported, especially in Nairobi, during curfew hours. The government at some point in 2021 relaxed some restrictions, allowing businesses to slowly pick up while adapting to the new pandemic-related dynamics. During this period, President Kenyatta gave an apology around the issue of police brutality affecting innocent Kenyans, including business owners. This, in some way, helped to diffuse tensions. There is historically a poor relationship

between the police, the businesses and local citizens.

Gender and social norms limit women's constructive role in business development and peace efforts

The business sector reflects the power dynamics of a patriarchal society. Women entrepreneurs face social norms/cultural practices that marginalise them and limit their ability to work outside the home. They often face uphill tasks to raise capital. These factors also limit women's capacity to build networks, influence, and leadership skills, greatly impacting their social capital. In Turkana, cases of women missing out on business opportunities offered by the oil industry were attributed to a strict and tedious tendering process which was said to favour men. Women were also vulnerable to sexual exploitation in relation to oil sector security jobs. Domestic disputes were said to have been driven in part by men's reluctance to have their wives work for long hours in the oil zones.

Women play a dual role

In Turkana and West Pokot, women promote peace messages through peace caravans, crusades, and during celebrations such as International Women's Day. However, cultural barriers also prevent women from engaging in many community-level peace-related efforts. For example, the patriarchal cultures of the areas bar women from speaking in meetings where men are present, and their opinions are not usually taken seriously by men.

The dual role of women as those most affected by conflict and as inciters of conflict was indicated for all localities. For example, women are often the most affected by conflict because they may be targets of direct physical and psychosocial abuse, including sexual and gender-based violence, and they suffer from indirect impacts such as being overall responsible for a household's care and management. However, women are also seen as perpetrators of conflict. For Turkana and West Pokot, for example, women compose songs to motivate men to go raiding, and sing heroic songs for them when they return. They also mock men who do not go for raids. In Nairobi, respondents observed that some women have launched political careers as peace advocates, but have later incited unemployed youth to engage in violence during elections for their own political ends.

West Pokot County-specific findings

Respondents stated that there are several core conflict drivers/causes, key actors, and conflict dynamics that are directly related to the private sector.

One example concerned the management of the Turkwel dam at the border of the Turkana and West Pokot Counties. Businesspeople have been championing the proper management of the dam as a way of fostering peace between the communities residing within the Turkwel river ecosystem i.e., the Turkana and the Pokot. The Kerio Valley Development Authority (KVDA) introduced fish farming at the dam in 2019 to diversify the livelihoods of nearby communities. The communities have embraced fishing and attributed the return of peace in the area to it. The resumption of peace has opened a further window for many communities from the warring Pokot and Turkana to invest in meaningful income-generating activities and earn a livelihood.⁴⁴

"Private business entities invest in promoting peace, as a peaceful environment allows their business to prosper." FGD WP BA PSA, Resp 7.

Respondents believed that businesspeople advocate for peace because they need a conducive environment to operate, rather than for altruistic reasons.

Respondents also provided examples of businesspeople sabotaging the businesses of others, based on ethnicity. Specifically, respondents said there was a complex relationship between businesspeople and local authorities, with tensions that may be exacerbated by the electoral period in 2022. Many perceived businesspeople as aligning with potential election political victors.

“During campaigns, everyone needs money. If you are on good terms with a tycoon, that person can fund you. If you are not in a good relationship with someone who can fund you so that once you are elected, you can pay them back, you cannot succeed. For this reason, there is conflict between the two parties if the businesspeople fund politicians and they fail to secure the seats.” FGD WP J, Resp 8.

In relation to electoral periods, respondents additionally said that cases of domestic violence have been known to increase when a husband and a wife do not support the same political candidate. Respondents also said that women were not to be viewed solely as ‘victims.’ They are, at the same time, inciters of violence and/or to act as ‘spies,’ in that they may provide information on upcoming raids to others in their community pre-empt conflict.

For men of the Pokot community, it is a mark of adulthood to take part in raiding another community for cattle. Most women are encouraged to marry men who have participated in or led a raid, and therefore participants perceived that the women indirectly encourage men to continue engaging in cattle raids. Several studies have been conducted in recent years, including by the National Gender and Equality Commission (NGEC)/Kenya National Commission on Human Rights (KNCHR)⁴⁵ and Kenyatta University, on gender norms and their links to cattle rustling.⁴⁶

“In West Pokot...to marry a Pokot girl, you have to give like a hundred cattle to the girl’s parents. Where will one get that amount of cattle? Since the young boys are energetic, the only solution is to go and raid so that he can pay the dowry. And there is pressure for the young men to marry.” FGD WP J Resp 5.

In the modern context, respondents said that some businesspeople hire young men to steal cattle for commercial resale.

“It is all about money. E.g., there are people who buy cattle and transport them to Nairobi or even western Kenya...some middlemen might coordinate with someone who steals, or someone who can bring you a market for the stolen livestock. The trader who has stolen livestock, their price is relatively lower. So sometimes businesses promote conflicts without knowing.” FGD WP J Res 5.

A journalist respondent said that there were potential upcoming windows of instability due to the upcoming dry season.

“We are headed to the dry season, and you see some parts of West Pokot, Baringo... is dry, people are taking their livestock to Laikipia county, and also the government is using force. So, to me, the government should have put some measures to bring...in such a way that when livestock crosses from one county to another nobody quarrels or fights...” FGD WP J Resp 5.

Curfews imposed by the government as a response to COVID-19 were noted by respondents as leaving businesspersons vulnerable to physical attacks by criminals and as affecting livelihoods.

"I am a businessman here, and I was attacked the other day after closing my business premises around 9:00 pm." FGD WP COC Resp 4.

"What I can say is that generally the whole country has been affected with hardships due to curfew hours.... A lot of businesses were negatively affected. Many people used to travel to Nairobi to get goods at night and then they come back during the day, or they come back at night. But right now, it is a little bit hard because you cannot travel overnight, so it has negatively impacted our economy and also the bars are usually closed at night, so getting that night booming economy it's a little bit hard." FGD WP J Resp 1.

Turkana County-specific findings

Respondents said there were several core conflict drivers/causes, key actors, and conflict dynamics that are directly related to the private sector.

In addition to the intricate relationships between businesspeople and politicians, which it was said will be exacerbated by the upcoming electoral period in 2022, respondents also said there was a perception that there was relatively little consultation between businesspeople and the Turkana County government, including on issues such as deciding on licensing rates and on tenders.

I have seen that one of the things that can cause conflict is the issuing of tendering, especially at the county level. It is not transparent. Unless you give some token to the procurement department, you will not be given those tenders. And on the issue of licenses, there is no consultation between the business people and the county government, so the government just decides the rates that they want to issue, and you know these business people they need to make a profit. They all need to be consulted....." KII-T-J.

Respondents also said that the Turkana County Chamber of Commerce (TCoC) has been able to work closely with the Turkana County government on business issues. The TCoC as a collective voice of businesses, was raising the interests and needs of the business community in the policymaking arena and also offering support to the county government's initiatives for peace and stability.

For example, respondents highlighted peacebuilding work by the county government and the business community. They referred to a project called SELAM EKISIL (SEEK) being implemented by Pact with the participation of TCoC members, especially members drawn from Turkana North sub-county. This was a cross-border project which was aimed at providing a 'peace corridor' for business to be conducted between Ethiopia and Kenya. SELAM means 'peace' among the Daasanach people of Ethiopia. EKISIL means 'peace' among the Turkana people of Kenya. Another example provided was the Turkana County Peace Directorate's efforts to spearhead intergovernmental peace agreements between Kenya and Ethiopia. This has fostered good trade relations and sharing of resources between communities at the border/Lake Turkana region. Lastly, respondents stated that the Lokiriyama Peace Accord and its annual celebrations was also contributing to a peaceful environment.

In addition, many respondents stated that business actors directly contributed to peace by bringing people together through specific support to community-driven initiatives, offering employment opportunities, and issuing sub-tenders to micro-enterprises.

"From Turkana and Uganda, the participation of private actors in peace has been commendable because of continuous meetings on trade across border points. It has always been helpful in terms of calming the area,

where you find the traders from both Kenya and Uganda engaging in more dialogue, looking into factors that hamper trade, like non-tariff barriers, infrastructural development, and operationalisation of border points. The participation of the private sector has created sustainable peace because there is appreciation from both ends. The communities have also been able to access certain products at cheaper prices. This enhances peace in itself and manages the conflict because both sides have mutual benefits. There has also been strengthened regional integration in terms of the free trade area, and regional economic zones.” KII-T-CC.

Nairobi County-specific findings

Respondents said there are several core conflict drivers/causes, key actors, and conflict dynamics that are directly related to the private sector and business actors.

Often businesspeople claim that by providing jobs and bringing direct or indirect economic benefits to everyone, they are contributing to peace.

“Business creates employment so that, in itself, encourages peace, and business thrives where there is peace. Businesspeople promote peace because they make a profit because of peace. Businesses often contribute money towards youth initiatives because they understand the impact of unemployment and lack of economic empowerment and the cost of peace.” KII-NBP.

However, respondents also believed that businesses were promoting peace only when it was in their interest, and because anything other than peace would cost them revenue. KEPSA’s active engagement to mitigate violence and sustain peace after the post-election violence in 2007/08 was a direct response to huge losses caused by violence. Having an interest in peace does not always predict a willingness to act on that interest. In the case of MSMEs in particular, engaging in peace efforts may incur unacceptable risk, e.g., organising to resist ‘taxation’ by criminal groups such as Mungiki – an outlawed criminal group, may incur violent reprisals.

Like in Turkana County, the electoral period in Nairobi struck respondents as a window of opportunity for groups, including businesses, to align themselves along ethnic and tribal lines. Further, some respondents alleged that some peace actors are better seen as ‘peace entrepreneurs’ whose motivations are cynical and self-interested.

“There is always a hidden agenda to promote peace. It is mostly a political agenda. You see an individual engaging in peace advocacy work for 2-3 years and then they become an aspirant for a political seat.” FGD NJ Resp. 1.

Respondents also stated that COVID-19 has increased business competition and occasional conflicts.

“Covid-19 made many people jobless. Hence many ran to business as a way of making ends meet. This has led to competition, and therefore conflicts here and there.” FGD NCMRL Resp. 4.

Respondents said that women leaders had played a key role in facilitating peace at the community level. Several women-based groups work to address gender-based violence and help promote peace in the community, and are highly respected by community members. Women in Peace Committees have also spread awareness on peace and act as Early Warning and Early Response (EWER) entities.

Key findings from the Somalia peace and conflict analysis

Respondents referred to a complex and interdependent relationship between politicians and businesspeople, complicating the potential peace-building roles of both sectors. MSMEs and large businesses align themselves with political actors to advance their interests. Business people may actively pursue politics. Some politicians have large business interests.

“Politicians need some backing to achieve their political agenda. This relationship is based on personal interests and affects the general public because when businesspeople are helping politicians, they just have agreements on what they want from them once they get into power.” KII-SM-E.

Respondents said there were perceptions that MSMEs and large businesses promote peace simply because the absence of violence is good for the business sector. There were also examples of businesses willing to do things that drive or fuel conflict in order to gain economically. For example, businesses may pay conflict actors to enforce a market monopoly or ensure their business' security, or align themselves with conflict agendas in order to win contracts or favour from conflict actors later. An end to conflict might mean some businesses lose out.

“The business sector has both a positive and negative contribution. For example, when groups are fighting, they might buy arms... You find businesspeople contributing money and purchasing them. On the other side, they contribute to peace by giving compensation money to afflicted clans in case of death, injury or destruction of property in conflict. They also want to earn profits from their business so they do not focus so much on clans so they can have complete freedom of movement to sell their wares. They then foster good relations with others.” KII-SM-E.

It was also said by respondents that many conflicts are interest- or resource-based and therefore, there are ways in which businesses, primarily larger firms, are directly engaged in conflict/violence.

“There isn't much of a structure as such in Somalia, Different people are fighting for power. We have the Al-Shabaab fighting for power with the government. There is conflict between the central government and the federal member states. Somaliland is not recognised. The conflicts are resource-based, in relation to taxes collection. Everyone taxes at their own rates and it is not centralised with the central government and federal states. Inequitable distribution of resources, government leadership in state departments. Within the states there are also dominant clans. Distance from the central government, Mogadishu, determines your influence and access to resources and power.” KII-SM-RS2.

The absence of state control and oversight for decades has also allowed many large businesses to thrive in the 'grey area' of semi-formality, and they may not have incentives to make that system more functional.

“Most businesses that started since the onset of the conflict in 1991 have enjoyed some level of tax evasion due to the lack of structure in government. They are therefore part of the conflict through the benefits they enjoy.” KII-SM-RS4.

Respondents said that MSMEs often do not have the resources to benefit/function adequately in the chaos of conflict.

Respondents also said that the business environment itself creates or contributes to conflict when it comes to relationships between large businesses and MSMEs and foreign businesses. Given the lack of proper regulation, many large domestic companies play dubious, and at times harmful, roles in maintaining their monopolies. Respondents indicated that often these large domestic businesses threaten MSMEs and international businesses to constrain them, or use their dominant influence to take over or buy out MSMEs to reduce the competition. These actions not only make the business environment less conducive to new entrants but also negatively impact local peace and conflict dynamics.

“...On the negative side of things, businesspersons can threaten foreigners from a specific area, and they may even be evicted and stopped from engaging in business. The locals might feel insecure when their businesses start to thrive better than theirs.” KII-SM-RS2.

Respondents said that MSMEs are only impacted by conflict and do not cause it, unlike large businesses which are likely to both cause it and be impacted by conflict.

“The small businesses offer employment to a number of youths which is helpful in keeping them busy instead of participating in the conflict. Moreover, the MSMEs ensure there is the circulation of money in the economy and all businesses get a share. In a state of lawlessness in some of these regions, the businesses end up paying taxes to both the government and the militia which is very expensive. They, therefore, are a champion for peace in such regions.” KII SM-DR.

“MSMEs are not conflict actors....people in the communication sectors are mostly affected by conflict and not the cause of conflict. Whenever there is conflict, their businesses are looted, there is high inflation, and they are not able to get stock.

....Livestock traders are affected by multiple taxations: they are taxed by the government, and taxed by militia and warlords as they move their livestock for trade. Because of conflict they use longer routes to avoid trouble, and end up spending more resources getting to the market. When carrying perishable products like milk they incur losses. They might also lack markets for their products when people flee from their homes because of conflict.” KII-SM-RS1.

Businesses at times play a crucial role in brokering peace between militias and the community. For example, respondents said that in October 2021, the local business community in Gurel town in Galmudug Federal State brokered a ceasefire between local government forces and the militia group Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamana, ending days of bloodshed.⁴⁷

Respondents said that women in Somalia are excluded from the business sector due to their inability to raise capital, and to cultural practices that stigmatise them and prevent them from working outside the home.

“The situation is limited for women to get business opportunities as they are not able to generate capital, and because of the cultures that hinder them.” KII-SM-CSO3.

However, respondents noted that where women are present, they are able to serve positive roles in facilitating peace.

Lastly, most respondents from all sectors referred to the same peace actors and peace practices, suggesting that in general, people perceive the same actors as being significant in this space.

“When it comes to peace actors we have clan elders, lawmakers/parliamentarians, the government in general, the business community.” KII-SM-RS2;

“For peace, we have religious leaders, elders, CSOs, women groups and elected leaders.” KII-SM-RS2;

“The Somali chamber of commerce organises the businesspeople (MSMEs) and hosts peacebuilding initiative.” KII-SM-BP2.

Conclusion and recommendations

In the context of the incidences of violent conflict experienced across the Horn of Africa in recent decades, this PCA was designed to document recent conflict and instability trends in Kenya and Somalia and to relate them to the private sector. The report has documented several examples of positive and negative private sector roles. It is intended to inform the Dutch MoFA and wider institutional stakeholders with better understandings of conflict dynamics and peace opportunities in the region.

Most of the findings were agreed upon by the various stakeholders who participated in the study, including, for example, those holding very different positions, such as religious leaders and businesspeople. Similarly, the age and location of respondents did not predict greater differences in their responses, suggesting that there are common understandings of the issues that transcend location, age, position, and gender.

Based on the findings, the following recommendations are made for International Alert:

1. In view of the varying roles of businesses and businesspeople in both conflict dynamics and efforts to establish peace in the Horn, conflict analyses should always include the private sector. To overlook the private sector in analyses will miss key aspects of conflict dynamics, as well as potentially important opportunities or entry points for peace initiatives.
2. Evidence suggests that private sector actors may make meaningful and important contributions to peace efforts, and Alert should consider potential opportunities to include private sector actors in its peacebuilding projects. There may be peacebuilding value in approaches that mobilise the private sector to support peace efforts, and also in approaches that help or encourage the private sector to refrain from actions that sustain or drive conflict. Specific programmatic interventions should be predicated on detailed analysis and actor mapping.
3. Business actors are not conflict experts and may not have the requisite skills or expertise necessary for analyses, such as PCA. Peacebuilders can assist private sector actors to integrate a conflict sensitivity approach into activities. This will enable private sector actors to understand conflict dynamics, as well as their own impacts – positive and negative – upon conflict, and the opportunities that they may have to engage – as individual businesses or as networks with other groups of actors, such as local governments, security actors, and conflict actors.
4. Alert should also consider building upon the existing body of knowledge to address gaps in the evidence base, which is currently weak, in order to inform future programming. This can be achieved through continuous monitoring and documenting results, impacts and lessons learned from different projects being implemented, as well as through conducting learning workshops.
5. The business sector is not exempt from the patriarchal cultures and attitudes of the societies in which it operates and can benefit from being assisted to build capacity and understanding in relation to gender and inclusion.
6. Business associations and networks have been effective in mobilising resources and influence to advance a peace agenda. There may be further opportunities for them to develop strategies that support peace

efforts. Such actors can play a crucial role in post-conflict reconciliation and development by contributing to backdoor diplomacy and alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such as mediation. Alert should leverage opportunities to strengthen the capacity of business actors to engage in conflict mediation and reconciliation.

Recommendations for the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Horn of Africa:

1. There is a significant evidence gap when it comes to the private sector, peace, and conflict in the Horn. Yet private sector actors often play significant roles in both peace and conflict. There is a need for a more systematic understanding through research of these roles. Additional insights may be gained through research that dis-aggregates business actors further, for example by size, sector and industry. In addition, there is a need to better understand the impact of business and trade-supportive policies and agreements at national, regional and international levels on peace and conflict dynamics of the region.
2. The MoFA should consider experimental and iterative projects with the private sector. Existing evidence demonstrates the sometimes positive role business plays in support of peace. Much less is known about how planned interventions might influence private sector actors to engage in peace-related initiatives. Funding for experimental or iterative initiatives that are substantially adapted in light of changing circumstances or initial, partial failures might help to build evidence about effective approaches. The MoFA should consider developing funding streams that allow for experimentation, targeted pilot projects, iterative project design, and ongoing learning.
3. The MoFA should consider interventions that support the social and economic empowerment of women and youth. Both groups face significant cultural and practical barriers to entry into the private sector. Engagement in business may help women and youth to build relationships, influence, and economic strength that would enable them to exert greater influence on social issues. It may be possible to aid them through awareness-raising and advocacy, targeted network development, providing access to capital, capacity-building support, technical advice, and accompaniment, among others. In doing so, the MoFA should ensure that gender and conflict sensitivity approaches are an integral part of any interventions.
4. In countries where the Dutch Government is providing development support, the MoFA should support policies that enhance transparency and accountability in business practices, and, generally, business and economic policies that favour peace and reduce negative incentives. In addition, they should impose sanctions and/or accountability for Dutch investors that are engaged in harmful practices (unintentional or not).
5. The MoFA should also consider analysing Dutch and European investments and how they may be profiteering from conflict systems—e.g. companies taking advantage of weak tax regulations, importing arms without any real checks as to whether they may end up in the hands of militant groups etc.—and take appropriate action to limit this.
6. Another consideration for the MoFA is to evaluate how Dutch and European economic policies may have unintended consequences on business and peace in fragile and conflict-affected states.

Section 2

Background on the project and methodology

International Alert undertook this project with support from the MoFA to understand the role of the private sector in peace and conflict in the Horn of Africa, and to build the capacity of Alert's Nairobi/Horn of Africa Office in the use of Alert's 'Peace and Conflict Analysis: Step-by-step guide for International Alert's staff and partners.' Section II of this report presents the approach which Alert took to capacity building in the use of the PCA, research design, as well as the methodology, including the interview guide, which the team utilised. Details relating to focus groups, respondents, and questionnaires are presented as appendices.

This initiative was managed by International Alert's Kenya and Horn of Africa Country Director in cooperation with Alert's Peacebuilding Advisory Unit (PAU) Co-Director (based in London). It was led by the Senior Project Officer in Alert's Nairobi Office, with support from the Senior Regional Programme Officer for the Horn of Africa based in London, and the Kenya Finance and Operations Manager, based in Nairobi. Alert's Peacebuilding Advisory Unit Director and Head of Conflict Sensitivity Hub provided support in piloting the methodology, including providing capacity building and analysis support, and documenting the learning from the pilot.

Alignment with Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs priorities

This research responds to the Dutch MoFA Department for Stabilisation and Humanitarian Affairs (DSH) medium-term outcome 3.1 Peace Processes (Reaching and sustaining peace through inclusive peace agreements, conflict resolution and peacebuilding initiatives).⁴⁸ Specifically, the initiative responds to Output 3.1.4, Expanding the evidence base for Dutch policies on peace processes (e.g., understanding drivers of conflict, studies on conflict dynamics and conflict resolution mechanisms). The initiative responded to the following indicator from the Security & Rule of Law Results Framework.

Indicator	Target
Number of studies on drivers of conflict or political governance perception surveys conducted with NL support	One study on conflict dynamics in the Horn of Africa

The overall goal of this project is to inform the Dutch MoFA and wider institutional stakeholders with a better understanding of conflict dynamics and peace opportunities in the region and provide policy and practice recommendations to support the evidence-based design of policy and programmes supporting peace and stability.

The anticipated outcome included:

1. To enhance the development of partner and government understanding and conflict sensitive responses to emerging conflict dynamics and peacebuilding opportunities in the Horn.

To achieve this outcome, the following activities were implemented:

- Defined the methodology, targets, and research questions, which included the specific geographic and thematic scope of the analysis based on the identification of research gaps and need for action-oriented recommendations on peace and security.
- Established a monitoring process against which to review the PCA as a tool, setting key areas to track during the process to assess usability, appropriateness, and quality of the PCA tool.
- Collected and analysed data in one pilot country.
- Reflection sessions held on the PCA methodology, gathering the results of the monitoring of the PCA tool.
- Data collected and analysed in the remaining pilot country;
- Finalised the report.

What is peace and conflict analysis?

A peace and conflict analysis (PCA) is “a systematic process whereby teams analyse the profile, root causes, actors, and dynamics of conflict or tensions for which organisations or interventions will be or are a part of, as well as peace factors and opportunities. A PCA should look at issues and relationships between conflict, instability, and peace.”⁴⁹

Peace and conflict analysis is the foundational and most critical step in designing any peacebuilding intervention.

From a peacebuilding perspective, any relevant intervention must address one or several of the key conflict factors identified in the analysis. The PCA is therefore the foundational and most critical step in designing any peacebuilding intervention. Without understanding the specific conflict drivers in a given context, it is not possible

to determine – including monitor and evaluate – whether a peacebuilding initiative actually makes a difference, and the intervention is likely to impact negatively the conflict context. A PCA alone does not guarantee peacebuilding ‘success’. It is nevertheless a key building block towards an effective peacebuilding strategy, in that it helps peacebuilding practitioners, including Alert staff and partners, to:

1. **Understand a conflict context**, including identifying the root causes and contributing factors of conflict; determining stakeholders’ motivations and incentives through understanding their positions, interests and needs; assessing the nature of relationships among stakeholders; identifying and understanding the gender drivers of conflict; evaluating the capacity of existing conflict management institutions or practices.

Peace and conflict analysis or conflict analysis?

This step-by-step guide uses the terminology ‘peace and conflict analysis’ to emphasise the need to analyse peace factors in addition to conflict factors.

As defined in Alert’s five-year strategy 2019–2023, peace is not a static condition (absence of conflict/violence), but rather a dynamic process for managing conflict without resorting to violence. This means that peacebuilding interventions must be built on a granular understanding and exploration of the elements that create positive connections within a conflict context in order to be as relevant, effective and sustainable as possible.

2. **Find entry points and effective approaches for the intervention**, through clarifying and prioritising the range of issues that need to be addressed, identifying stakeholders to engage with, and determining relevant responses. This process may also help to establish indicators.
3. **Determine** whether a peacebuilding initiative makes a difference. This process includes formal monitoring and evaluation activities.
4. **Share information on conflict with other actors**, including identifying existing information about the conflict and what further information is needed.
5. **Engage on peace with communities and other actors in dialogue** (peace and conflict analysis as a transformative process), through building understanding and reducing misconceptions among stakeholders where possible.

Peace and conflict analysis as a cornerstone of conflict sensitivity

International Alert, along with peer organisations, has been at the forefront of the global conversation on the need to integrate conflict sensitivity throughout any intervention (peacebuilding, development, humanitarian). Carrying out a structured peace and conflict analysis, and regularly updating and acting on its findings is a fundamental component, and a pre-requisite, to the integration of conflict sensitivity throughout an intervention lifecycle. Peace and conflict analysis enables Alert staff, as well as other peacebuilding, development, and humanitarian practitioners, to identify how an intervention can maximise its positive impacts and minimise negative impacts in a conflict context.

Many guidelines on conflict analysis – developed by Alert and also by others – are embedded into broader conflict sensitivity guidelines, rather than being standalone documents. This has both positive and negative implications. On the one hand, it contributes to the increased recognition that any type of intervention must be informed by a peace and conflict analysis for it to be conflict sensitive, which is a key message and practice Alert, among others, has been advocating for. On the other hand, it may eclipse the fact that as peacebuilders we carry out conflict analyses for multiple purposes, and not only for conflict sensitivity. Carrying out peace and conflict analyses is indeed our core mandate and the foundation to any type of intervention. We have a wide array of methodologies at our disposal, which will vary in depth and focus depending on the purpose of the analysis. An analysis for conflict sensitivity is usually 'lighter' and not structured similarly to an analysis informing a country strategy for instance.

This PCA follows International Alert's PCA guidance framework, which has 6 core steps as illustrated below:



Overview of the approach and methodology

Alert adopted a sequential, 7-step process (starting with 'Step 0') for implementing the pilot. The steps are described in what follows.

Step 0: Capacity building needs assessment (pre and post)

To build the capacity of the International Alert Kenya team, the Conflict Hub implemented a PCA needs Assessment of the Kenya team to understand members' experience in peace and conflict analysis, in late June 2021. A workshop was facilitated to review the findings with the team.

Here are the consolidated findings from the Needs Assessment:

- Overwhelmingly high marks across the entire team with most having a basic or a lot of knowledge of/experience with PCAs (7 respondents)
- Almost no responses in the 'no' or 'never' category, implying that the team was starting with basic knowledge of the concepts within the peace and conflict analysis structure
- Gaps in knowledge about peace and conflict issues across the Horn of Africa existed among the team
- Gaps in knowledge of/experience with the PCA writing process existed among the team
- Gaps in knowledge of/experience with integration of gender in PCAs existed among the team
- Expertise on stakeholder engagement on research existed among the team
- Expertise on research ethics and do no harm (DNH) existed among the team

At the conclusion of the PCA process, a post Assessment was given to the colleagues that participated and the findings are illustrated by several graphics in Annex 1.

Step 1: Planning

The research team held a methodology workshop on September 28, 2021, to design the basic information for the planning of the Horn of Africa PCA. These points are captured in the table below.

<p>Why? Defining the purpose of the analysis</p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Purpose of overall Dutch Research Grant: To help us understand how the resilience and adaptability of local and regional actors play critical roles in determining whether, and to what extent, conflict and instability issues can be successfully managed. • Sub-Purpose for Horn of Africa Research Grant: To examine the contributions of the private sector to peace and conflict dynamics in two countries (Kenya and Somalia or Ethiopia) and give recommendations for best practices of peace-oriented business community actors to the Dutch MoFA. To understand where business for peace is really working. To understand what businesses understand their role in terms of peace to be.
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What? Defining the level of the analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Level of Analysis: Regional/Horn of Africa • Sub-Level of Analysis for Kenya: Nairobi; Turkana; and West Pokot (based on alignment with Kenya Country Strategy Priorities, CSBP previous work; the presence of business communities, and cross border dynamics with Uganda and/or Ethiopia). Will be slightly comparative – Nairobi (vibrant business community); Turkana (developing business community) and West Pokot (nascent business community) • Sub-Level of Analysis for Ethiopia/Somalia: Business/CSOs in Nairobi; Remote Mogadishu or other areas (depending on the location of businesspersons/CSOs)
When? Establishing the timing of the analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Timing: For Kenya, the team set a target for collecting data over a 30-day period with 5 days allocated to setting up meetings, 15 days of collecting in three locations, 5 days of travel and 5 days for transcription. • Entire Research Project to be completed within 12 months
Who? Setting up a team	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Team: Franklin (lead); Miriam and Naomi (data collection team); George and Rabindra (support); plus 2 translators for non-Swahili speakers and 3 note-takers to accompany the process
How much does it cost? Budgeting for peace and conflict analysis	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Budget: Roughly £50,000 (£6,000 dedicated to data collection).

Given that the Horn of Africa PCA was to understand the conflict dynamics and give recommendations, the Horn of Africa team adopted the following research questions:

What are the ways in which the private sector (i.e., business community) is creating/exacerbating conflict/violence and/or mitigating/contributing to peace?

1. What roles are private sector actors playing in overall peace and conflict dynamics?
 - Are the contributions of private sector actors to peace and conflict intentional or unintentional?
2. What are the best practices of private sector actors?
 - What evidence can we gather of their positive/negative contributions to peace and conflict dynamics?
 - What are the peace capacities of private sector actors?

The team agreed to adopt the 'Four Component Model' within the PCA guide (versus the CAF or the Five Peace Factors methodologies for example). As a result, this PCA will explore the profile of the conflict, its causes, main actors, and key dynamics (including trends), each with a set of sub-questions that should be answered by information collected for the analysis. Within this planning session, the team agreed to adopt the following Four Component Questions to the Kenya and Somalia context and narrow the focus to the private/informal economy. The final questions adapted can be found in Step 2: Guiding Questions below.

Profile	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are the historical and political issues that define the overall context?
Causes/Drivers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What are central issues around the distribution of power causing tensions or violence? Are they perceived differently by women, men, and people of other gender identities?
Actors	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How is power distributed among the main actors?
Dynamics, incl. trends	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • What events, actions, and decisions related to power, governance, and politics can be identified as actual or potential trigger factors? What consequences have these trigger factors had or will they have on structural causes and key actors?

Step 2: Guiding questions

As mentioned in Step 1, the Horn of Africa team focused the PCA on the informal/private sector and therefore, after consultation with the Peace Economies team in the Peacebuilding Advisory Unit (PAU), adopted the following questions for all the Key Informant Interviews (KIIs) and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). The research tools/matrix for transcription are included in Annex 2.

Kenya key informant interviews or focus group discussions questions

Section 1: Profile	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What is the political, economic, and socio-cultural context of the County (in general)? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In what ways does this context impact men, women, boys, and girls? In what ways does this impact different sub-groups of women, men and individuals with diverse sexual orientations and non-binary orientations (SOGI) in rural/urban areas for example? • Does gender identity impact their ability to play similar roles for peace and conflict dynamics?
Section 2: Causes	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What are the structural and cultural causes of conflict in the County (in general)? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>Are there social norms and expectations that shape gender norms and conflict? How are these causes disaggregated by gender, age, ethnicity, class, etc?</u> 2. <u>What are the reasons that encourage the private sector/ MSMEs to actively (or indirectly) participate in peace and conflict issues?</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <u>What outcomes have you seen as evidence of the active role of private sector actors in peace and conflict issues?</u>

<p>Section 3: Actors</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Who are the main actors in the County? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who promotes peace at different levels, including locally? What formal, customary and faith networks and structures have been used? 2. Are there women and girls playing key conflict and peace roles? If so, in what way? If not, why not? Are there particular women or girls that are involved in the conflict (i.e., rural, urban, businesswomen, housewives, leaders, etc)? 3. How do the key actors relate to each other and the marginalised and excluded groups? 4. What type of relationships exist between business and political powerholders/elites? In what situation or how has this relationship negatively or positively impacted local peace and security? (Probe for linkages between business interest and political interest on peace) 5. What role do private business actors play in peace and conflict, if any? (spoilers vs. contributors) (Probe for nature/type of interventions; consistency of intervention of businesses; and whether businesses have been engaging singly, as smaller groups, or under the banner of an association/cooperative) 6. Has a positive or negative relationship between different business actors/associations impacted their contribution to peace? If so, give some examples. 7. How do the interests and goals of business actors contribute to conflict or peace? Give some examples.
<p>Section 4: Dynamics</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What forums or platforms exist for peacebuilding within the county? 2. What forums or platforms exist for peacebuilding in the business sector? Are there specific emergent opportunities for businesswomen as opposed to businessmen? 3. If businesses have played a proactive positive role in sustaining peace/negating violence, what enabled/encourages businesses to do so? How did it work in practice? 4. Are there any lessons or best practices that can be drawn from the process? What should be done to ensure businesses play a more proactive and positive role to advance peace?

Somalia key informant interviews questions

<p>Section 1: Profile</p>	<p>1. What is the political, economic, and socio-cultural context of the County (in general)? a. In what ways does this context impact men, women, boys, and girls? In what ways does this impact different sub-groups of women, men and individuals with diverse sexual orientations and non-binary orientations (SOGI) in rural/urban areas for example? b. Does gender identity impact their ability to play similar roles for peace and conflict dynamics?</p>
<p>Section 2: Causes</p>	<p>1. What are the structural and cultural causes of conflict in the County (in general)?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Are there social norms and expectations that shape gender norms and conflict? How are these causes disaggregated by gender, age, ethnicity, class, etc? <p>2. What are the reasons that encourage the private sector/MSMEs to actively (or indirectly) participate in peace and conflict issues? /How does the private sector/MSMEs contribute to conflict dynamics? How does the private sector/MSMEs participate in peace? (Follow on question: What do you mean by the private sector? Focus respondent on MSMEs)</p>

<p>Section 3: Actors</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Who are the main actors in the County? <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Who promotes peace at different levels, including locally? What formal, customary and faith networks and structures have been used? • Are there women and girls playing key conflict and peace roles? If so, in what way? If not, why not? Are there particular women or girls that are involved in the conflict (i.e. rural, urban, businesswomen, housewives, leaders, etc)? 2. How do the key actors relate to each other and marginalised and excluded groups? 3. What type of relationships exist between business and political powerholders/elites? In what situation or how has this relationship negatively or positively impacted local peace and security? (Probe for linkages between business interest and political interest on peace) 4. What role do private business actors play in peace and conflict, if any? {spoilers vs. contributors} (Probe for nature/type of interventions; consistency of intervention of businesses; and whether businesses have been engaging singly, as smaller groups or under the banner of an association/cooperative) /What business sector actors contribute most to conflict? How? What business actors contribute most to peacebuilding? How? 5. Has a positive or negative relationship between different business actors/associations impacted their contribution to peace? If so, give some examples
<p>Section 4: Dynamics</p>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. What forums or platforms exist for peacebuilding within the county? 2. What forums or platforms exist for peacebuilding in the business sector? Are there specific emergent opportunities for businesswomen as opposed to businessmen? 3. If businesses have played a proactive positive role in sustaining peace/negating violence, what enabled/ encourages businesses to do so? How did it work in practice?

Step 3: Data collection

The Horn of Africa Team aimed to collect the following data from respondents for Kenya's PCA. All respondents were identified using a combination of non-random sampling, including purposive, convenience, and snowball, for both Horn of Africa PCAs. Please see Annex 5 for the total respondent list from the Horn of Africa research project; however, the details below provide a snapshot of the respondents in each of the locations in Kenya and Somalia.

The team was able to complete a total of 15 FGDs and 30 KIIs for this PCA in Kenya. Details are presented in the section below.

Turkana County	5 FGDs	10 KIIs
West Pokot	5 FGDs	10 KIIs
Nairobi	5 FGDs	10 KIIs

Turkana County

Location for data collection: Lodwar in Turkana Central

5 Focused Group Discussions (FGDs) comprised of Chamber of Commerce members; Civil Society Representatives; Business Actors including both CoC members as well as other business actors who are not part of CoC; Journalists; Community Members/Religious Leaders. Each FGD had 10 participants.

10 key informant interviews (KIIs)

- Civil Society Actor
- National Government Administration Representative
- Youth Leader
- County Government Representative
- Chamber of Commerce Representative
- Religious Leader
- Peace Actor
- Private Sector Representative
- Journalist
- Business Actor

West Pokot

Location for Data Collection: Kapenguria and Makutano towns in West Pokot

5 Focused Group Discussions (FGDs) comprised of Chamber of Commerce members; Civil Society Representatives; Business Actors including both CoC members as well as other business actors who are not

part of CoC; Journalists; Community Members/Religious Leaders. Each FGD had 10 participants.

10 key informant interviews (KIIs)

- Civil Society Actor
- National Government Administration Representative
- Youth Leader
- County Government Representative
- Chamber of Commerce Representative
- Religious Leader
- Peace Actor
- Private Sector Representative
- Journalist
- Business Actor

Nairobi County

Location for Data Collection: Kawangware, Kibera and Embakasi

5 Focused Group Discussions (FGDs) comprised of Chamber of Commerce members; Civil Society Representatives; Business Actors including both CoC members as well as other business actors who are not part of CoC; Journalists; Community Members/Religious Leaders. Each FGD had 10 participants

10 key informant interviews (KIIs)

- Youth Representative
- National Government Administration Officers
- National Government representative
- Journalist
- Religious Leader
- Private Sector

Somalia

Location for data collection: Nairobi (in-person and virtual) and Mogadishu (virtual)

16 key informant interviews (KIIs)

Coding for respondents

To assure the confidentiality of the respondents, the following codes were used for the Kenya and Somalia PCAs. They will be referenced throughout this report, as the quotes included came directly from respondents to KIIs and FGDs.

Kenya

Investigating code:

- Key Informant Interview: KII
- Focus Group Discussions: FGD

Site code:

- Nairobi: NAI/
- Turkana: TUR/
- West Pokot: WP/

Interviewee code:

- Business Leaders: BUS/
- CSOs: CSO/
- Turkana County and Nairobi National Government Administration Representative: NGAO/
- National Government representative: NG/
- County Government representative: CG/
- Community Member: CM/
- Religious Leader: RL/
- Community Member/Religious Leader: CM/RL/
- Chair of MSMEs: MSMEs/
- Business Actor: BA/
- Chamber of Commerce: CC/
- Private Sector representative: PS/
- Kenya Association of Manufacturers: KAM/
- KEPSA: KEPSA/
- Directorate of Peace Members or Peace Actors: PA/
- Turkana Security Officials: SEC/
- West Pokot Security Actor: SA/
- Journalists: JOUR/
- Youth Leader: YL/

Somalia

Investigating code:

- Key Informant Interview: KII

Site code:

- Somalia: SM/

Interviewee code:

- CSOs: CSO/
- Businessperson: BP/
- Researcher: RS/
- Diaspora: DR/
- Religious Scholar: RSC/
- Elder: E/
- Women Leader: WL

Research challenges for Kenya and Somalia

Several challenges were noted from the process of collecting data in the field during the debrief with the data collection team on the Kenya Data Collection Process:

- Some questions were redundant, making the interviews take over 1 hour
- Some questions needed probing/follow up i.e., FGDs took 2.5 hours which is something that needs to be considered for the future.
- Some respondents were answering questions before they were even asked the question. The understanding of the research team as to why this was the case was that the respondents wanted to prove how much they knew with regard to the subject matter under discussion.
- Some questions on businesses and its role in peace felt repetitive/duplicated in sections 3 and 4
- Some respondents had to be mobilised several times, given their busy schedules
- Challenges with note-takers in West Pokot led the team to re-recruit the note-takers from Nairobi to fix the transcripts
- Purposive sampling was good for targeting the right people in West Pokot County
- Adopting the 4-component model of the PCA was a good choice for this assignment
- While we did pilot the tool in Nairobi, it would have been better to test the tool internally first to measure the time. Therefore, next time, a trial exercise should be carried out to enable the data collection team to determine the amount of time that will be required to conduct each KII and FGD, the challenges that can arise during data collection, as well as the lessons learned.
- The gender questions became extremely tailored because of the context-specific situations (it was a limitation in how certain stakeholders could and could not answer)
- Sampling Method: Went to the partners/stakeholders from work already being done by the team, etc. This is why it was purposive and if that person was not available, they recommended people (hence the snowball method)
- No consultants/everything implemented by the team
- Someone wanted to appear twice because we were giving transport reimbursement, so the online payment system (MPESA) flagged this quickly. This was an isolated incident in West Pokot.
- We should have had the appreciative inquiry approach to this by having the positive peace questions first, and then move to the conflict part
- Training of note-takers and local mobilisers: Walked them through the guide and then in research ethics/confidentiality/privacy etc. and had training with them on how to take the verbatim recording of respondent feedback and a section on their responsibilities. Especially important that they took verbatim notes. ½ to 1-day training.
- Positive: the guide having a dual approach to focus on peace and conflict, because it forced balanced replies from responses.

- Should we have guidance on training for the note-takers? Yes, it would be good to include it in the PCA guide for those teams that are less familiar with conducting analysis.
- If time and budget allow, pilot first and then tailor before rolling out widely. An unofficial pilot after the first interview can be done and then adjusted wherever needed. The team started with Nairobi first to learn from the process (i.e., time issues, and then adjusted it).

There were several challenges noted from the process of collecting data in the field during the debrief with the data collection team on the Somalia Data Collection Process:

1. The team did away with the question on sexual orientation. It was removed for Somalia PCA because of the sensitivity of the question
2. Some respondents challenged the repetitive nature of the questions (team tried to manage that in real-time)

Step 4: Data analysis

The team came together for an online facilitated session to analyse the data gathered from the Kenya PCA data collection process in October using Microsoft Teams and in December for the Somalia PCA data collection process. All transcripts were reviewed, and cross-cutting and location-specific findings were discussed with the data collection team for Kenya and Somalia. A validation workshop was held for Kenya's data on 25 November and the report is enclosed in Annex 4.

Step 5: Documenting

The present report provides the documentation of the PCA process for the Horn of Africa. It will also be adapted into an evidence / learning brief for the Horn of Africa team to use for advocacy purposes.

Step 6: Updating

While this report is designed for the Dutch MoFA through our strategic partnership, it is intended that it will also be used to support the International Alert Horn of Africa team on current programming implementation and future programme development; therefore, there is an intention to update this report annually.

Key reflections on the peace and analysis guide

1. PCA was useful in identifying the actors' interests and relationships both positive and negative with respect to the private sectors role in peace and conflict dynamics.
2. The dual approach to PCA that looked at both the peace and conflict factors in relations to the actions by the private sector actors was an important aspect of the research which moved from the usual way of only looking at one factor i.e. either peace or conflict.
3. The PCA tool did not go further to interrogate the existing policy interventions by the private sector and policy makers and how the policy interventions are either incentivising the private sector to engage in peace initiatives or the existing policy interventions are creating an environment for private sector to contribute to conflict through their actions.
4. The PCA did not clearly define key terms such as the business sector/ private sector leading to generalization of some statements in the analysis of the research findings. To avoid generalization clear definition of the key statements should be made at in the initial stage of the research process.
5. The PCA tended to focus more on the actual contribution of the private sector actors in peacebuilding initiatives. For future consideration PCA need to also look at factors/ actions by the private sector which contribute to peace outcomes (private sector actions such as paying taxes, creating employment, cooperate social responsibility work etc can lead to peace outcomes which PCA did not deeply interrogate).

Annex 1: Key informant interviews and focus group discussions questionnaire – Kenya

Profile – general and county or capital specific

This section is seeking to understand the context that shapes conflict.

1. Is there a history of conflict? (e.g., when? How many people were killed and displaced? Who is targeted? Methods of violence? Where?)
2. What political, economic, social, and environmental institutions and structures have shaped conflict? (e.g., elections, reform processes, economic growth, inequality, employment, social groups and composition, demographics and resource exploitation)
3. What is the political, economic and socio-cultural context of the County (in general)?
4. In what ways does this context impact men, women, boys and girls? In what ways does this impact different sub-groups of women, men and individuals with diverse sexual orientations and non-binary orientations (SOGI) in rural/urban areas for example?
5. FOLLOW-UP QUESTION AS NEEDED – Does gender identity impact their ability to play similar roles for peace and conflict dynamics?

Causes (peace and conflict)

This section seeks to understand the causes of conflict.

1. What are the structural causes of conflict? (e.g., unequal land distribution, political exclusion, poor governance, impunity, lack of state authority)
2. What are the proximate causes of conflict? (e.g., arms proliferation, illicit criminal networks, emergence of self-defence non-state armed actors, overspill of conflict from a neighbouring country, natural resource discoveries)
3. What are the structural and cultural causes of conflict in the County (in general)?
4. Are there social norms and expectations that shape gender norms and conflict? How are these causes disaggregated by gender, age, ethnicity, class, etc?
5. What are the reasons that encourage the private sector/MSMEs to actively (or indirectly) participate in peace and conflict issues? What outcomes have you seen as evidence of the active role of private sector actors in peace and conflict issues?

Actors (peace and conflict)

This section is seeking to understand which actors influence conflict dynamics

1. Who are the main actors? (e.g., the military, leaders, and commanders of non-state armed groups, criminal groups)
2. What are their interests, concerns, goals, hopes, fears, strategies, positions, preferences, worldviews, expectations, and motivations? (e.g., autonomy, inequality between groups ('horizontal inequality'), political power, ethno-nationalist, reparations)
3. What power do they have, how do they exert power, what resources or support do they have, are they vulner-

- able? (e.g., local legitimacy through the provision of security, power over corrupt justice institutions, weapons and capacity to damage infrastructure)
4. What are their incentives and disincentives for conflict and peace? (e.g., benefiting or losing from the war economy, prestige, retribution for historic grievances)
 5. Who are the main actors in the County?
 6. Who promotes peace at different levels, including locally? What formal, customary, and faith networks and structures have been used?
 7. Are there women and girls playing key conflict and peace roles? If so, in what way? If not, why not? Are there particular women or girls that are involved in the conflict (i.e., rural, urban, businesswomen, housewives, leaders, etc)?
 8. How do the key actors relate to each other and to the marginalised and excluded groups?
 9. What type of relationships exists between business and political powerholders/elites? In what situation or how has this relationship negatively or positively impacted the local peace and security? (Probe for linkages between business interest and political interest on peace)
 10. What role do private business actors play in peace and conflict if any? {spoilers vs. contributors} (Probe for nature/type of interventions; consistency of intervention of businesses; and whether businesses have been engaging singly, as smaller groups or under the banner of an association/cooperative)
 11. Has the positive or negative relationship between different business actors/associations impacted their contribution to peace? If so, give some examples.
 12. How do the interests and goals of business actors contribute to conflict or peace? Give some examples.

Dynamics (peace and conflict)

This section seeks to understand the current conflict dynamics and trends.

1. What are the current conflict trends? What are the recent changes in behaviour? (e.g., conflict acts have increased but the number of deaths has decreased; political violence has intensified around local elections; defence spending has increased; paramilitaries have started running in local elections)
2. Which factors of the conflict profile, actors and causes reinforce or undermine each other? Which factors balance or mitigate others? (e.g., horizontal economic and political inequalities can increase the risk of conflict; uncertainty about the succession of the president strengthens party factionalism; cash for disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration fuels small arms proliferation)
3. What triggers conflict? (e.g., elections, economic and environmental shocks, economic crash, an assassination, coup, food price increases, a corruption scandal)
4. What scenarios can be developed? (e.g., best-case scenario: a peace agreement is signed quickly, and the conflict parties implement a ceasefire; worst-case scenario: local politicians mobilise along ethnic lines in the run-up to elections and political violence and riots increase where groups meet)
5. What forums or platforms exist for peacebuilding within the county?
6. Are there specific platforms for men, women, boys, and girls? Are PLWDs included in these forums? Are there specific emergent opportunities for women and girls as opposed to men and boys?
7. What forums or platforms exist for peacebuilding in the business sector? Are there specific emergent opportunities for businesswomen as opposed to businessmen?
8. If businesses have played a proactive positive role in sustaining peace/negating violence, what enabled/encourages businesses to do so? how did it work in practice?
9. Are there any lessons or best practices that can be drawn from the process? What should be done to ensure businesses play a more proactive and positive role to advance peace?

Annex 2: Key information interviews questionnaire – Somalia

Section 1: Profile

This section is seeking to understand the context that shapes conflict.

Questions in this section are seeking to understand:

- Is there a history of conflict? (e.g., when? How many people were killed and displaced? Who is targeted? Methods of violence? Where?)
 - What political, economic, social, and environmental institutions and structures have shaped conflict? (e.g., elections, reform processes, economic growth, inequality, employment, social groups and composition, demographics and resource exploitation)
1. What is the political, economic, and socio-cultural context of the County (in general)?
 - In what ways does this context impact men, women, boys, and girls? In what ways does this impact different sub-groups of women, men, and individuals with diverse sexual orientations and non-binary orientations (SOGI) in rural/urban areas for example?
 - Does gender identity impact their ability to play similar roles for peace and conflict dynamics?

Section 2: Causes

This section seeks to understand the causes of conflict.

- What are the structural causes of conflict? (e.g., unequal land distribution, political exclusion, poor governance, impunity, lack of state authority)
 - What are the proximate causes of conflict? (e.g., arms proliferation, illicit criminal networks, emergence of self-defence non-state armed actors, overspill of conflict from a neighbouring country, natural resource discoveries)
1. What are the structural and cultural causes of conflict in the County (in general)?
 - Are there social norms and expectations that shape gender norms and conflict? How are these causes disaggregated by gender, age, ethnicity, class, etc?
 2. How does the private sector/MSMEs contribute to conflict dynamics? How does the private sector/MSMEs participate in peace? (Follow on question: What do you mean by the private sector? Focus respondent on MSMEs)
 - What evidence have you seen of the active role of the private sector in contributing to conflict? What evidence have you seen of the active role of the private sector in building peace? (Follow on question: What do you mean by the private sector? Focus respondent on MSMEs)

Section 3: Actors

This section is seeking to understand the actors that influence conflict.

1. Who are the main actors? (e.g., the military, leaders and commanders of non-state armed groups, criminal groups) What are their interests, concerns, goals, hopes, fears, strategies, positions, preferences, worldviews, expectations, and motivations? (e.g., autonomy, inequality between groups ('horizontal inequality'), political power, ethno-nationalist, reparations)
2. What power do they have, how do they exert power, what resources or support do they have, are they vulnerable? (e.g. local legitimacy through the provision of security, power over corrupt justice institutions, weapons and capacity to damage infrastructure)
3. What are their incentives and disincentives for conflict and peace? (e.g. benefiting or losing from the war economy, prestige, retribution for historic grievances) Who are the main actors in the County?
 - Who promotes peace at different levels, including locally? What formal, customary, and faith networks and structures have been used?
 - Are there women and girls playing key conflict and peace roles? If so, in what way? If not, why not? Are there particular women or girls that are involved in the conflict (i.e., rural, urban, businesswomen, housewives, leaders, etc.)?
4. How do the key actors relate to each other and the marginalised and excluded groups?
5. What type of relationships exist between business and political powerholders/elites? In what situation or how has this relationship negatively or positively impacted the local peace and security? (Probe for linkages between business interest and political interest on peace)
6. What business sector actors contribute most to conflict? How? What business actors contribute most to peacebuilding? How?
7. Has a positive or negative relationship between different business actors/associations impacted their contribution to peace? If so, give some examples.

Section 4: Dynamics

This section seeks to understand the current conflict dynamics and trends.

- What are the current conflict trends? What are the recent changes in behaviour? (e.g. conflict acts have increased but the number of deaths has decreased; political violence has intensified around local elections; defence spending has increased; paramilitaries have started running in local elections)
 - Which factors of the conflict profile, actors and causes reinforce or undermine each other? Which factors balance or mitigate others? (e.g. horizontal economic and political inequalities can increase the risk of conflict; uncertainty about the succession of the president strengthens the party)
1. What forums or platforms exist for peacebuilding within the county?
 2. What forums or platforms exist for peacebuilding in the business sector? Are there specific emergent opportunities for businesswomen as opposed to businessmen?
 3. If businesses have played a proactive positive role in sustaining peace/negating violence, what enabled/encourages businesses to do so? how did it work in practice?

Annex 3: Respondent lists

Turkana County interviewees

1. KII-T-CSO- Civil Society Actors
2. KII-T-NGAO-National Government Administration representative
3. KII-T-YL- Youth Leader
4. KII-T.CG- County Government representative
5. KII-T-CC-Chamber of Commerce representative
6. KII-T-RL Religious Leader
7. KII-T-PA- Peace Actor B.
8. KII-T-PS- Private Sector representative
9. KII-T-1- Journalist
10. KII-T-BA- Business Actor
11. FGD-T-CC- Chamber of Commerce members
12. FGD-T-CSO- Civil Society Representatives
13. FGD-T-BA- Business Actors
14. FGD-T-1- Journalist
15. FGD-CM/RL- Community Members/ Religious Leaders

West Pokot County interviewees

1. KIMP-1- Journalist
2. KII-WP-RL- Religious Leader
3. KIMP-BA-Business Actor
4. KIWP-CSO-Civil Society Leader
5. KIWP-NG-National Government Representative
6. FGD-WP-CC- Chamber of Commerce
7. FGD-WP-BA/PSA-Business Actors/Private Sector Actors
8. FGD-WP-CSO- Civil Society Organization
9. KII-WP-YL- Youth leader.
10. KII-WP-PA- Directorate of peace
11. KII-WP-SA- Security Actor.
12. KII-WP-CC- Chamber of commerce.
13. KIMP-PS- Private Sector.
14. FGD-WP-.I- Journalists
15. FGD-WP-CWRL-Community Members/Religious Leaders

Nairobi interviewees

1. FGD-NCMRL - FGD/Nairobi/Community members/religious leaders
2. KII-NYR - KII/Nairobi/Youth representative
3. KII-NNGA0 - KO/Nairobi/National Government Administration Officers
4. KII-NNG - KII/Nairobi/National Government (representative)
5. KII-NCG - KII/Nairobi/County Government (representative)
6. KII/Nairobi/Journalist

7. KII-NNGOA- KII/Nairobi/ National Government Administration
8. KII-NCG-KII/Nairobi/County Government
9. FGD-NJ-FGD/Nairobi/Journalist
10. KII-NPS- KII-Nairobi-Private Sector
11. KII-NRL-KII-Nairobi-Religious Leader
12. FGO-NBA-FGO-Nairobi-Business Actor
13. FGD-NBA-FDG- Nairobi-Business Actor(the second business actor)
14. FGD-NMIXE0- Nairobi-FGO with Mixed Group.

Somalia interviewees

1. KII–SM-WL Women Leader
2. KII-SM–E Elder
3. KII SM-RSC 1 Religious Scholar
4. KII SM-RSC 2 Religious Scholar
5. KII SM-RSC 3 Religious Scholar
6. KII SM-RSC 4 Religious Scholar
7. KI SM-RSC 5 Religious Scholar
8. KR-SDACSO I CSO Representative
9. KII-SM-CSO 2 CSO Representative
10. KII-SM-CSO 3 CSO Representative
11. KII-SM-BP 1 Business Person
12. KII-SOMBP 2 Business Person
13. KII-SOMBP 3 Business Person
14. KIISM-DR Diaspora

Endnotes

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- 8 J. Austin and A. Wennmann. March 2017. The Private Sector and Violence Prevention in Kenya, 2007-2013. CDA publication, pp. 12
- 9 Ibid., pp. 4
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