

SECURITY AND PEACEBUILDING PROGRAMME  
MONITORING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF  
SMALL ARMS CONTROLS (MISAC)

Small Arms Control in  
**Ghana, Nigeria  
and Senegal**

WEST AFRICA SERIES NO.2 (ENGLISH VERSION)

Christiane Agboton-Johnson, Adedeji Ebo, Laura Mazal  
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International Alert – Security and Peacebuilding Programme

## International Alert

International Alert is an independent non-governmental organisation that is working to help build just and lasting peace in areas of violent conflict. It seeks to identify and address the root causes of violent conflict and contribute to the creation of sustainable peace. International Alert works with partner organisations in the Great Lakes region of Africa, West Africa, Eurasia, South and Southeast Asia and Latin America.

To complement fieldwork IA undertakes research and advocacy to influence policies and practices at the national, regional, and international levels that impact on conflict. The organisation seeks to act as a catalyst for change by bringing the voices and perspectives of those affected by conflict to the international arena and creating spaces for dialogue. The work hence focuses on the following global issues: the role of women in peacebuilding, development assistance in conflict and peacebuilding, the role of business in conflict and peacebuilding, and security and peacebuilding, including the reform of security sector institutions and combating the unregulated proliferation of small arms and light weapons.

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The Security and Peacebuilding (S&PB) Programme is a division of the Global Issues Department at International Alert. Its purpose is to advise on policy development, implementation and assessment with regard to security for those in conflict-torn societies.

The Programme works primarily by facilitating dialogue between stakeholders and policymakers, and by bringing the most informed research and analysis to the attention of decision makers. It endeavours to advise policy that contributes to conflict transformation by working with partners to create locally informed solutions in order to increase policy relevance, efficacy and sustainability. To this end, the Programme develops projects in the area of Small Arms and Light Weapons and Security and Sector Reform.

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## Acronyms

<b>AFL</b>	African Leadership Forum
<b>ASDR</b>	African Security Dialogue and Research (Ghana)
<b>CENCOR</b>	Centre for Conflict Resolution (Ghana)
<b>DICON</b>	Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria
<b>OAU/AU</b>	Organisation of the African Unity/African Union
<b>ECOWAS</b>	Economic Community of West African States
<b>ECOWAS Moratorium</b>	Declaration of a Moratorium on Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa
<b>FECCIWA</b>	Federation of Council of Churches in West Africa (Ghana)
<b>FOSDA</b>	Foundation for Security and Development in Africa (Ghana)
<b>GHANSA</b>	Ghana Action Network on Small Arms
<b>IANSA</b>	International Action Network on Small Arms
<b>IPPNW</b>	International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War
<b>MALAO</b>	Mouvement contre Les Armes Légères en Afrique de l'Ouest (Senegal)
<b>MICA</b>	Ministries of Defence, Internal Affairs and Integration and Cooperation (Nigeria)
<b>MRU</b>	Mano River Union (Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone)
<b>NGO</b>	Non-Governmental Organisation
<b>OSIWA</b>	Open Society Initiative for West Africa
<b>PCASED</b>	Programme for Coordination and Assistance on Security and Development
<b>RAFAL</b>	Réseau Africain Francophone sur les Armes Légères (Francophone African Network on Small Arms)
<b>RESAAL</b>	Réseau d'Action sur les Armes Légères
<b>SALW</b>	Small Arms and Light Weapons
<b>UNDP</b>	United Nations Development Programme
<b>UN Firearms Protocol</b>	United Nations Protocol against the Illicit Manufacture of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime
<b>UNPoA</b>	United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects
<b>UNREC</b>	United Nations Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa
<b>UN Small Arms Conference</b>	United Nations 2001 Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects
<b>WAANSA</b>	West African Action Network on Small Arms
<b>WANEP</b>	West African Network for Peace (Ghana)

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International Alert accepts full responsibility for any error or omission and invites comments and corrections from representatives of governments, agencies, and NGOs by email to [security-peacebuilding@international-alert.org](mailto:security-peacebuilding@international-alert.org)

## Preface

A key issue to improving conflict prevention and management is the challenge of curbing the proliferation and misuse of small arms and light weapons (SALW). The Monitoring and Implementation of Small Arms Controls Project of the Security and Peacebuilding Programme of International Alert is a three-year initiative to aid countries in Latin America, West Africa and Eastern Eurasia to better implement international and national SALW control measures. By working with governments, donors and NGOs, its intention is not only to develop a better level of understanding regarding the scope and nature of international and regional SALW controls but to directly assist stakeholders in working towards the full implementation of SALW controls.

Through process orientated research and direct facilitation with governments, donors and civil society actors the MISAC Project will undertake this work in three phases. The first is a mapping phase that creates a profile of the regional agreements and activities, as well as identifies relevant actors and their capacities. This work is public and is published as a series of reports.

The mapping phase is then followed by regional assessment studies, which detail institutional capacities and challenges with regards to the implementation of SALW controls. These studies are directed towards supporting state institutions and activities as well as enhancing the capacity of civil society actors to deal with SALW issues. In the course of this work comprising of analysis from International Alert and its partners as well as consultations with key stakeholders— state needs are brought to the attention of the international community so that financial and technical support can be provided as applicable.

Finally, the assessments are followed by the targeted assistance phase of the project. In this part of the work International Alert will, with local and international partners and stakeholders, seek to craft and implement supportive and sustainable policies to strengthen SALW control measures within a small number of previously identified states.

This report, *Small Arms Control in Ghana, Nigeria, and Senegal*, is the second in a series of Assessments published by International Alert in English and French to support the exchange of knowledge and information about SALW controls in West Africa.

This document, along with all the others in this series, is available for download on our website in PDF format at <http://www.international-alert.org/publications.htm#security>.

## Summary

This report seeks to document governmental and civil society activity in Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal with regard to the control of SALW. The case studies provide an overview of the main sources of SALW proliferation. The report also aims to assess the current national legislation on SALW, the implementation of SALW control policies, as well as the role of national governmental and non-governmental structures in addressing the issue of SALW proliferation in the three countries.

The research shows that several positive developments have taken place in Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal regarding the implementation of SALW control policies. The adoption of sub-regional and international instruments addressing the proliferation of SALW has given added impetus to the implementation of these measures in these three countries, such as for example the establishment of national structures acting as focal points for the implementation of SALW control policies. This research also finds that, although the three countries have specific problems to address with regard to SALW, such as local production in Ghana, increasing criminality in Nigeria and insecurity in Senegal, there are a number of common challenges which these countries face. The inadequacy of both financial resources and staffing and expertise capacities make it difficult to fully implement SALW control policies. In addition, legislation regarding SALW is not always up to date, and is sometimes inadequate to the country-specific context. Furthermore, although civil society organisations are active in these three countries, their role, in particular with regard to research activities, should be enhanced and collaboration with governmental authorities reinforced.

Based on the findings of the report the authors make the following recommendations:

- National needs assessments should be conducted to direct capacity-building activities and resources to enhance the current capacities to collect and destroy surplus weapons;
- National Commissions should be endowed with the necessary resources to effectively implement policy measures and activities in an autonomous manner;
- National plans of actions for the control of SALW proliferation should be articulated in more details, in order to outline and plan the work of the national actors engaging with SALW issues, in particular the National Commissions;
- Local and regional research activities should be supported and enhanced through linkages with international research and governmental agencies;
- A multidimensional approach jointly addressing human development and human security is crucial to address the proliferation of SALW in Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal; and
- Arms for development programmes should be further developed, in particular to address the problem of local production and to offer economic alternatives to resorting to criminality and violence.



# 1. Introduction

Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal enjoy a relatively peaceful situation in comparison to their West African neighbours, despite instability and growing criminality in some of their regions. The northern region of Ghana, the Niger Delta in Nigeria, the eastern region of Senegal and the southern region of Casamance in Senegal are all areas of latent or low-intensity conflict.

In addition, although there remain substantial challenges in terms of resources, the three countries benefit from the existence of a relatively strong political will to control SALW proliferation. The three countries possess a vibrant civil society working on security and SALW issues through advocacy, awareness-raising and research activities. In Ghana and Senegal in particular, there is also a large degree of collaboration between the Government and civil society, which has actively contributed to national SALW control initiatives.

Despite these similarities, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal are also significantly different. Ghana has an important local underground production, which make it a case in point. Nigeria is the most populous country of the region with over 150 million inhabitants and is therefore a major player in West African politics. Senegal, finally, is a key francophone country in West Africa.

These elements, combined with geographical spread, make Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal appropriate case studies for the monitoring and assessment of the implementation of SALW control at the national level. It is hoped that this study can provide a baseline for future SALW control implementation measures and structures in other West African countries.

The main source of SALW proliferation in these countries originates from illegal SALW trafficking which takes place at the international, regional and national level. The existence of protracted conflicts nexus such as in the Mano River Union (MRU) have had destabilising impacts on Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal, increasing the amount of SALW trafficking, in particular through the activities of mercenaries and criminal networks. The difficulties of these three countries to enforce border controls when faced with significant illegal trafficking have led them to participate and engage actively in international initiatives to control SALW.

## Participation in International SALW Control Mechanisms

The African Union (AU) has started to engage more actively in SALW issues. However, the Peace and Security Council of the AU has not yet been established, as its Protocol has not been ratified by the required number of countries – neither Ghana, Nigeria or Senegal have ratified it. It will therefore not be discussed in this assessment, as a more detailed study has been carried out in International Alert's previous West Africa mapping.<sup>1</sup>

At the global and continental levels, the UN Firearms Protocol and the UN Programme of Action (UNPoA) emerge as the main control instruments. Nevertheless, it is at the regional level that Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal are most engaged, with the ECOWAS Moratorium appearing as the cardinal instrument for the implementation of SALW controls at the national level.

*The Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, Their Parts and Components and Ammunition, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (The UN Firearms Protocol)*

The UN Firearms Protocol, which aims to set up criteria for national and regional systems of commercial shipments and enhance international cooperation and information exchange on arms trade and trafficking, has only been signed by a few West African countries. Nigeria and Senegal signed the Firearms Protocol on 13 November 2001 and 17 January 2001 respectively, but have not yet ratified it. Ghana is not a signatory to the Firearms Protocol. The low degree of ratification of the UN Firearms Protocol is mainly due to the fact that states are reluctant to be legally-bound on what they still consider to be a matter of national sovereignty, i.e. defence and security. However, the UN Firearms Protocol, if ratified, would be an important step towards strengthened cooperation and exchange on SALW trafficking, and might therefore significantly contribute to illegal SALW trafficking control.

*The United Nations Programme of Action and the 2003 Biennial Meeting of States*

Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal have actively participated in the international process leading up to the 2001 United Nations Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms in All Its Aspect (Small Arms Conference). This major international conference significantly contributed to the participation of the three countries in international mechanisms. The subsequent adoption of the UNPoA has given added impetus to advocacy and action by civil society and government and has resulted in an increased political will to address illicit SALW flows. In his address to the conference, the Nigerian Minister of Defence stated the imperative need to develop and establish international norms and standards to combat illicit trafficking on SALW<sup>2</sup> and his President reminded the UN General Assembly of the depth and urgency of this issue. During the 2003 Biennial Meeting of States, Senegal, represented by experts from the National Commission and by its diplomats, committed itself once again to respect and implement the UNPoA, in particular concerning legislation and brokering. The Senegalese delegation also launched an appeal to include the fight against SALW in poverty reduction strategies in developing countries.

Despite the current political discourse, direct action on the ground has been limited in the three countries. Senegal is the only state out of the three to have submitted a report on the implementation of the UNPoA, which only mentions the destruction of 8000 SALW in March 2003. Senegal is also the only country out of the three to have established a National Point of Contact on the UNPoA.

The UN process remains alien to most citizens in the three countries as in the rest of West Africa, and there is a clear need to raise awareness about the UNPoA. Much advocacy work by civil society organisations and awareness-raising activities by the government are needed for the UNPoA to attract the attention and participation of West African citizens. Such a strategy should be devised at both the national and regional level so as to widen ownership of the UNPoA and broader UN processes.

*The Moratorium on Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Light Weapons in West Africa (The ECOWAS Moratorium)*

The ECOWAS Moratorium was adopted in Abuja, Nigeria, in October 1998. Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal have signed it, and it serves as the main reference document and institutional framework for addressing the illicit circulation of SALW at the regional and national levels. The three countries have also participated in the evaluation process of the Moratorium which took place in December 2002 and in the additional protocol to the Moratorium. Under the Moratorium, West African countries are required to set up national commissions to implement SALW control measures at the national level and participate in regional initiatives.

In Ghana, the social and security dimensions of illicit SALW flows have featured increasingly prominently on the agenda of social discourse, and government policies and civil society action are based on the Moratorium's Code of Conduct and Plan of Action. Four exemptions have been granted to the Ghanaian Government under the Moratorium regime.

In Nigeria, practical action – intervention programmes and projects such as disarmament and reintegration, weapons-for-development programmes – remains very thin on the ground, as the institutional capacities to implement the Moratorium are very limited. Eight exemptions have been granted to Nigeria under the Moratorium regime - four for the Nigerian police, including for the importation of AK-47 weapons from Bulgaria<sup>3</sup>, three for the state security services, and one for the Nigeria prisons service.<sup>4</sup>

In Senegal, the Moratorium is considered to have come at the right time. The Senegalese population considers it an appropriate decision to ensure security, control the circulation of SALW and foster peace and the return to a normal life. The Government has benefited from three exemptions under the Moratorium.

However, despite the fact that the Moratorium is far from having achieved its aims in the sub-region, it constitutes an important first step which has started to raise awareness among states of the danger of SALW proliferation. As for the UNPoA, this initiative is not well known by the populations and enhanced awareness-raising strategies are required to widen its ownership by the citizens of West Africa. Its weak degree of implementation is also an obstacle for the subsequent implementation of other declarations which are even less constraining.

## 2. Ghana

Ghana became the first African country to gain independence in 1957, becoming a republic in 1960. Since the first post-colonial government of the Convention People's Party, Ghana's political economy has witnessed several traumatic transformations and transitions, in which SALW have featured in various respects and to various degrees. The first military coup of 24 February 1966 marked the beginning of a turbulent political history. The political see-saw between military and civil rule ended in 1992 with the adoption of a democratic constitution, allowing for multiparty politics. With a population of over 20 million, Ghana is the second (after Nigeria) most populated country in West Africa.

Ghana has enjoyed relative peace and largely escaped civil strife in comparison to most of its regional counterparts, but the country has witnessed a marked increase in firearms-related violence in the last five years.<sup>5</sup> The intensification of SALW-related violence is located within the context of a militarised national psyche, combined with socio-economic deprivation and decline. Moreover, Ghana's relative tranquillity exists in the midst of a restless sub-region with several states either in conflict or in transition from conflict. Ghana's immediate neighbours, Côte d'Ivoire and Togo, are characterised by deep antagonistic political contradictions which threaten the very stability and credibility of the state.

Economically speaking, Ghana is the most successful West African state. In addition, in comparison to the other West African countries, Ghana has the highest human development indicator ranking and the highest life expectancy, coupled with the highest adult literacy rate. Nevertheless, it remains one of the poorest countries in the world, with 44.8% of the population living below the poverty line.<sup>6</sup>

### 2.1 Dimensions of SALW Proliferation

A distinctive element of SALW proliferation in Ghana compared to other West African countries is the existence of an important illegal local production. However, illegal



SALW are also trafficked into the country, as most of its neighbours are or have recently been affected by conflicts. One of the main consequences of the availability of weapons is the high rate of criminal activities, in particular armed robberies.

### *2.1.1 Local production*

Local production is central to any attempt to account for, and explain the proliferation of illicit SALW in Ghana. It represents the main source of proliferation of SALW in the country, in particular for pistols, shotguns and single-barrel guns.<sup>7</sup>

It has been noted that there is indeed a gun culture in rural Ghana.<sup>8</sup> Locally made guns have featured prominently in Ghana's socio-political history and have been used in hunting, farming, chieftaincy rites, funerals and festivals. In addition, Ghana's kingdoms have historically been characterised by a strong military sector.<sup>9</sup> It has also been noted that:

While blacksmiths and locksmiths have been at work for thousands of years since working iron was discovered in Ghana, it was only in the early twentieth century that the capacity of smiths to manufacture cap guns became a problem for the authorities, when such guns could be used to oppose colonialism and the expansion of British influence into the hinterland of Ghana. Then legislation was passed to criminalize certain types of smiting, namely, gun manufacture<sup>10</sup>.

Local manufacturing of guns was consequently driven underground and became more profitable. One striking feature of local gun production in Ghana is its relative sophistication; recent research has shown that gun-making, far from being obsolete, is increasingly elaborated and remains competitive in comparison to those circulating in the region.<sup>11</sup>

The relative low value of the Ghanaian currency (the cedi) means that Ghana enjoys a 'comparative advantage' of sorts in the local manufacture of guns. Ghana has therefore become a net supplier of guns to other parts of the West African sub-region, feeding a criminal sub-regional network. What has indeed minimised local production is the lack of resources to procure the necessary equipment.<sup>12</sup> There are thriving middlemen who export these guns to other parts of West Africa – Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire and Togo. As with most illicit goods, the prices of locally manufactured guns vary depending on the location of purchase, the history of illicit transactions between the parties, the number of middlemen involved, and the specific circumstances surrounding the transaction in question.

**Table 1: Estimated Price of Locally Manufactured Guns in Ghana as of May, 2003<sup>13</sup>**

<b>Gun Type</b>	<b>Estimated Price (Cedis)</b>
Pistol	200,000
Single-barrel	500,000
Double-barrel	700,000

8,500 cedis= US \$1

Ghana is composed of 10 regions. In the region of Brong-Ahafo, there are some 2,500 blacksmiths and locksmiths with the capacity to produce firearms. On average, each blacksmith has the capacity to produce 1.5 guns per week, without counting the 3 or 4 apprentices which are usually attached to each master blacksmith/locksmith who also have the capacity to make guns under supervision.<sup>14</sup> Thus, the widely held notion that there are between 35,000 and 40,000 illegally produced guns in Ghana turns out to be a gross under-estimation. There is little doubt that Ghana's sophisticated local arms production capacity has implications for illicit arms proliferation at the national and sub-regional levels. However, it is important to note that Ghana's relative economic poverty curbs the actual production of SALW, as local producers do not possess the means to produce on an industrial scale.

Aside from the direct threat posed to lives and property from local production, the agricultural sector has also been negatively affected. The redirection of fabrication skills from productive agricultural implements has resulted in increased prices of agricultural inputs and stalled the development of local skills in the fabrication of these tools. Local technical capacity in Ghana extends beyond the fabrication of basic implements such as hoes, cutlasses, forks and pickaxes. Ghanaian blacksmiths are known to have also fabricated ploughs and tractor parts, and at much lower costs than the market rates. They are also known to have constructed spare parts for the Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG).<sup>15</sup>

#### *The Government's policy to tackle local production*

The Ghanaian Government is increasingly concerned about the extent of illicit SALW proliferation. In 1999, the Government suspended the importation of all categories of SALW and ammunition, including by licensed arms dealers. There was a freeze on all existing stocks, pending an inventory. In September 2000, the ban on the sale of existing stocks was lifted.<sup>16</sup> A Weapons-Buy-Back programme was introduced in February 2001, to retrieve a declared 40,000 illicit SALW. This joint police-military exercise only succeeded in retrieving 1,000 weapons.<sup>17</sup> With specific regard to local arms production, it is becoming increasingly evident that the control regime would need to be liberalised, so as to make the blacksmiths and locksmiths available for identification, registration, and assistance. A Weapons-for-Development programme is imperative to redirect skills towards alternative economic inputs, generate employment and sustain Ghana's rich blacksmithing heritage.

### *2.1.2 Other sources of SALW proliferation*

Sources of proliferation of illicit SALW in Ghana also include returning peacekeepers, leakages from official armouries, and illicit flows from, but not limited to, neighbours at war, such as Côte d'Ivoire and the Mano River Union. In these conflicts, peacekeeping forces, refugees, mercenaries are all, to some extent, sources of illicit trafficking into Ghana. Ethnic groups established across Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire are also anonymous vectors of SALW.

SALW are not only illegally trafficked by blacksmiths but also by security agencies personnel stealing arms from the state armoury and selling them to the black market. Developing effective stockpile management and ensuring the security of these stocks is therefore a key element to improving SALW controls in Ghana.

In addition, the actual situation of the operations on licensed armourers in Ghana is not clear and it is problematic to classify any of these as dormant or active importers. Ghana is currently served by 5 major licensed importers: Game Marketing Ltd, Yadco Enterprise, Globart Teslria Enterprise, Bradco Trading and Associates, and Ampoma Ahwene Enterprise. These companies collectively account for the 20,000 firearms which, on average, are imported annually into Ghana.<sup>18</sup>

As with other West African states, illicit SALW proliferation is also the direct result of protracted military rule. During the years of the Provisional National Defence Council in the 1980s, the regime

liberally armed its civilian cadres and functionaries.<sup>19</sup> The militias of the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution often carried arms and there has been no substantial programme to disarm them since the end of the revolution. Many of these arms have illegally filtered into criminal hands and have been recycled for use in criminal networks.

### 2.1.3 Manifestations of SALW violence

#### *Armed robberies and criminality*

Armed robberies have been consistently increasing in Ghana, arguably a consequence of increasingly harsh socio-economic conditions, within the context of the inability of the State to provide basic human needs, including employment and qualitative and affordable health and education services. There is a mutually reinforcing relationship between SALW availability and armed robbery in Ghana. While social deprivation and poverty may have directly led to armed criminality, the easy availability of SALW has also facilitated the process of transforming frustration into crime.

**Table 2: Reported Armed Robbery Cases in Ghana 1999-August, 2002<sup>20</sup>**

	1999	2000	2001	Jan-Aug 2002
<b>No. of Cases</b>	311	396	777	447
<b>Percentage increase</b>	27%	49%		

#### *Ethnic conflicts*

In addition, despite its overall peaceful existence, Ghana, like many of its regional counterparts, has been affected by violent ethnic conflicts. Land disputes in the north resulted in ethnic violence during 1994 and 1995. Over 1,000 people were killed and over 150,000 were internally displaced. In April 2002, a state of emergency was declared in the north when a tribal chief and 30 others were killed as clan violence increased. The Northern Region is currently in the grip of the Dagbon crisis which has resulted in the loss of several lives and property. Consequently, a dusk to dawn curfew has been put in place in the region. Various SALW, both imported and locally-produced, are reported to have been used in most of these ethnic and identity conflicts.<sup>21</sup>

#### *Land guards*

Finally, the prevalence of multiple claims to land in Ghana has resulted in the phenomenon of land guards, youngsters whose function is to enforce the land claim(s) of their employer(s) against all rival claimants. For example, in October 2001, a group of armed civilians led by a police sergeant stormed a building site and, without provocation, started firing indiscriminately ostensibly to scare people and force them to flee from the land. In May 2003, nine people took refuge at the palace of a local chief near Accra (Anyaa), following an attack on the residents of the town by suspected armed land guards and thugs wielding AK-47s and machetes.<sup>22</sup>

There is a need to recognise the existence and consequences of the phenomenon of land guards, and develop strategies for its containment and management, in particular through the registration of land guards and the articulation of operational guidelines which prohibits them from using SALW. Further steps should be taken to address the reasons for multiple claims to land in Ghana, and other related factors which have given rise to the phenomenon of land guards. Law enforcement officials who engage in, or facilitate the illegal use of firearms should be held accountable and punished for their crimes.

## 2.2 Elements of the Ghanaian SALW Control System

Ghana has been relatively active at the national level regarding SALW control policies and initiatives. It has recently renewed its national legislation on SALW and has been involved in all the main

international conferences and initiatives on SALW. However, there remains difficulties, in particular with regard to the control of underground production, one of the main sources of SALW proliferation in the country. In addition, there are significant implementation and enforcement challenges, in particular due to the lack of adequate resources.

### 2.2.1 *Ghanaian laws and regulations*

#### *Current legislation*

Ghana's firearms law is composed of the Arms & Ammunition Act 1962 (Act 118) (Annex 1), as amended by the Arms & Ammunition Decree 1972 (NRCD 9) and the Arms & Ammunition Amendment Act of 1996. According to the provisions of Act 118 of 1962, owners of firearms must have them registered at the nearest police station (Section 1.1). Section 16 of the same Act bans the manufacture and assembling of arms and munitions, except by the Government, while Section 17 stipulates that a licence is required to repair firearms. The 1996 Act raises the stipulated fine from 10,000 cedis<sup>23</sup> to 5 million cedis and/or five years imprisonment and classifies arms dealers into first class and second class.<sup>24</sup> First class arms and ammunitions dealer refers to a person/business whose annual importation of shot guns and ammunition is more than 1000 pieces but not more than 2000 pieces. Second class arms and ammunition dealer is a person or business whose annual importation of arms and ammunition is less than 1000 pieces. Act 480 of 1996 also requires local craftsmen to apply for a licence authorising the manufacture of arms, but due to the culture of underground production, no one has applied.

Added to the increasing visibility of the scourge of illicit SALW proliferation in Ghana, the 2001 SALW Conference further encouraged the Ghanaian Government to review existing laws and administrative regulations. In January 2003, the President announced that a new draft law had been presented to Parliament.<sup>25</sup> The new law, the Arms and Ammunitions Act, was promulgated in August 2003, but is reported not to differ from the previous firearms laws 'in any substantive way'.<sup>26</sup>

#### *Implementation and enforcement challenges*

There seems to be an on-going debate on the legislation of local arms production. Many security personnel privately agree to the liberalisation of legislation, to allow the local arms producers to emerge from the 'underworld' to which they have been led to by the criminalisation which the current legislation sustains. Institutionally, however, the security agencies seek to maintain the prohibition of local arms production, as a means of fighting crime. Many Ghanaians believe that liberalisation would make it easier to control local arms production, and draw analogy from the country's experience with the criminalisation of locally produced gin, popularly known as *akpeteshie*.

Government firearms policy is unclear. It has been observed that Ghana has not yet established its realistic national needs for SALW as well as the maximum number of guns potentially allowed to circulate in the country.<sup>27</sup> This position is further corroborated by other sources:

Although the problem has been highlighted for several years now, the government has been slow to act decisively. Efforts on the part of the government have been disjointed...Currently the policy framework for government is the ECOWAS Moratorium and UN Programme of Action. The extension of this policy is in the form of the draft legislation, which was submitted to Parliament in January 2003.<sup>28</sup>

There can be little doubt however that the Government is increasingly concerned about the extent of illicit SALW proliferation. Within the government, issues relating to SALW come under the office of the National Security Coordinator. In 1999, the Government suspended the importation of all categories of SALW and ammunition, including by licensed arms dealers. There was a freeze on all existing stocks, pending an inventory. In September 2000, the ban on the sale of existing stocks was lifted.<sup>29</sup> A Weapons-Buy-Back programme was introduced in February 2001, to retrieve a declared 40,000 illicit SALW. This joint police-military exercise is known to have succeeded in retrieving only 1,000 weapons.<sup>30</sup>



*Other implementation structures*

The Arms and Ammunition Inventory Committee is responsible for parliamentary oversight of SALW issues, though its institutional capacity to play this role is in need of enhancement. The scale of proliferation and the increasing sophistication and transnationalisation of firearms-related criminality impose challenges on the Committee which are far beyond its present capabilities. The National Firearms Vocational Licensing Authority is responsible for the monitoring of the proliferation, trading and licensing of SALW in Ghana. Regardless, problems persist relating to non-adherence to established procedures for the importation, storage, supervision and distribution of SALW and ammunition.<sup>31</sup>

*2.2.2 Implementation of SALW controls – The Ghanaian Task Force*

As a follow-up to the adoption of the ECOWAS Moratorium, the National Task Force on the Proliferation of Firearms was created in 1998-1999, however, it remained dormant for a couple of years and was only revived in 2001. A formal National Commission is yet to be inaugurated.

*Structure and mandate*

It is composed of governmental representatives, namely from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Interior and Justice. The military, police and other security agencies are also represented, as well as civil society organisations working on security issues.

In August 2003, it was reported that 'the commission is yet to be fully functional as premises, staff and budget are yet to be allocated'.<sup>32</sup> In 2002, the Programme for the Coordination of Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) made available US\$25,000 via the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to offset the initial costs of setting up the National Commission<sup>33</sup> and has also donated two patrol vehicles to support border control with Côte d'Ivoire. However, while it is important to acknowledge the will of the Government to curb SALW proliferation, the Task Force requires additional logistical and operational resources if it is to become a National Commission effectively coordinating the implementation of SALW control measures.

The mandate of the Ghanaian Task Force is based on the implementation of the ECOWAS Moratorium. In particular, arms collection and destruction, training, and updating and harmonising legislation appear to be the key priorities with regard to the implementation of SALW controls.

*SALW control implementation*

Under the auspices of PCASED and as part of its training of trainers programme, Ghanaian officials have participated in the training of West African security officials. However, despite the importance of replicating and sustaining this training at the national level in order to enhance national capacity, there remains a considerable lack of resources.

Given the importance of illegal local production and firearms trafficking, the Ghanaian Task Force has been leading on several measures to tackle this problem. Since the adoption of the Moratorium, the issuing of licences for arms brokering has been stopped. In addition, it is working actively to discover hidden arms caches and to discourage illegal possession of SALW. Finally, it also supports the voluntary surrender of weapons in exchange for amnesty, and is lobbying for the Government to agree to such a policy.

A UNDP team also visited the country in August 2003 as part of its 'Armed Violence and Small Arms Reduction in Ghana Preparatory Assistance Project'. It is hoped that the project will add impetus to the operationalisation of the National Commission. The visiting team is currently at the stage of finalising its report.

## 2.3 Civil Society Role and Participation

The main actors working and engaging with SALW issues are civil society organisations. The main civil society groups involved in SALW work in Ghana include the Foundation for Security and Development in Africa (FOSDA), the African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR), the Federation of Council of Churches in West Africa (FECCIWA), and the Christian Council of Ghana. Their activities revolve around public campaigns, write-ups, collaboration with government agencies, and recently, collaboration with local arms producers to raise awareness of the dangers of arms production. They are also launching campaigns and activities on the importance of conflict prevention, in particular in situations of political and economic transition. There has also been effective and encouraging collaboration between the Ministries of Interior, Justice and Defence and civil society organisations involved in the campaign against illicit SALW proliferation.

On 13 May 2003, the Accra-based ASDR organised a meeting with local producers of arms, senior police officers, the Armed Forces, Members of Parliament, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Justice, civil society groups, and members of the diplomatic corps. The meeting was the result of sustained and painstaking attempts by ASDR to gain the trust of the local producers and could be the start of a process of building mutual trust and confidence between the various stakeholders. The local producers admitted to having the capacity to re-focus their skills into the fabrication of agricultural implements but sought government guarantee of ready markets for these peaceful alternatives.

The Ghana Action Network on Small Arms (GHANSA) was established in March 2002 to coordinate civil society action within the country and to link civil society actors with their regional counterparts. GHANSA has established a national network of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), community-based organisations, and religious organisations to support the work against illicit SALW proliferation. FOSDA, ASDR, the West African Network for Peace (WANEP), the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CENCOR), and Abantu for Development were the cardinal NGOs instrumental to the foundation of GHANSA.

Ghanaian civil society groups have been at the forefront of global and regional attempts to address SALW issues. FOSDA and ASDR jointly organised the Civil Society Consultation on the ECOWAS Moratorium, held in Accra in June 2001. In May 2002, FOSDA hosted the Foundation Conference of the West African Action Network on Small Arms (WAANSA). In addition, during the 2003 Small Arms Week of Action, a prelude to the Biennial Meeting of States held in New York in July 2003, FOSDA was extremely active in awareness-raising activities.

Civil society work in Ghana is mainly supported by UNDP, the UN Children's Fund, the Ford Foundation, and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA). These are typically in the form of funds to organise advocacy programmes such as seminars and other one-off events. However, there is a lack of long-term assistance programmes. To a large extent, the ad hoc nature of external assistance to civil society is perhaps due to a lack of clearly articulated medium term plans by many NGOs in this sector. It is necessary in this regard to expand and direct external financial and technical assistance towards the preparation of well-articulated and viable three year plans which would comprise a series of intervention programmes and projects, informed by the mandate of each organisation, and which can form the basis for discussions with donors and a series of benchmarks for assessing organisational performance.

Civil society organisations operating in Ghana are also constrained by the lack of basic equipment, such as computers, vehicles and conferencing facilities. There is also a need for training with regard to technical equipment and Information Technology systems. In addition, staff knowledge should be enhanced on 'best practices' by exchanging experiences with other civil society organisations from other parts of the world.

Analytic and empirical research combined with the development of an information and data structure should be strongly supported in order to provide up-to-date reliable information on the dimensions and character of illicit SALW proliferation in the country. Currently, SALW-specific epidemiological data are, where available, unreliable. Hospitals do not have data systems recording firearms-related injuries and deaths.

## 2.4 Ghanaian SALW Perspectives and Realities

Ghana has enjoyed relative peace, compared to many of its West African counterparts. However, the country has suffered from the consequences of protracted military rule and economic decline which have resulted in fractured social relations and an upsurge in crime. SALW proliferation manifests itself through armed robbery, ethnic and identity conflicts, and armed disputes featuring land guards. Local arms production is relatively sophisticated, making Ghana an attractive market for criminal networks in the West African sub-region. However, current legislation prohibits local arms production, and the criminalisation of this offence has driven the activity underground, making it difficult to control.

Even though the National Commission is yet to be fully operationalised, there is a clear demonstration of the government's political will to address this issue. The Government has opened up dialogue with civil society organisations and shows encouraging signs of cooperation and collaboration, even though it has not offered direct financial assistance to these organisations. For example, the Ministry of Justice is an active member of GHANSA. In addition, ADSR initiated a meeting between local arms manufacturers and other stakeholders. The government is actively participating in such events and continues to pursue this process. It has also demonstrated positive political will by encouraging and ensuring civil society involvement in preparations for a National Commission. However, the lack of resources continues to hamper the development of a strong civil society and government's actions to control SALW proliferation.

### Recommendations

- Financial and technical support should be provided to enable the present collaboration between the government and civil society regarding the control of local arms production to evolve into a sustainable programme for turning guns into ploughshares and to articulate a national action plan on illicit SALW control. Prior to this, a detailed national mapping exercise should be conducted to establish the number and types of illicit weapons in circulation, their sources, and possible location.
- GHANSA should be provided with technical and financial assistance in the preparation of a medium-term (three year) plan. Such a plan would include training of personnel in research and advocacy, as well as training of trainers workshops. This would enable civil society groups to assist the Ghana Police and other security agencies in methods of weapons control. Optimal use should be made of Ghana's participation in PCASED's training of trainers programme by strengthening efforts by government and civil society to disseminate the knowledge acquired through these regional programmes and to develop such programmes at the national level which would be adapted to the country-specific situation.
- An outreach strategy should be developed in order to extend the projects and activities of civil society and government beyond Accra and into the regions where they are urgently needed. This would necessitate the opening of regional offices and the initiation of intervention programmes and projects which address local realities and conditions.
- Advocacy and lobbying strategies targeting the Government should be devised so that the National Commission becomes operational by the provision of office accommodation and

budgetary allocation as a demonstration of the Government's commitment to fight SALW proliferation. This would enable the future National Commission to become autonomous and effective, through the provision of office equipment, experience-sharing seminars, funding of research and training of staff in the creation and maintenance of regional and national weapons registers. Exposure of National Commission members to global and regional issues of illicit SALW should be further enhanced by supporting their attendance and participation at international meetings.

- Both the UNPoA and the ECOWAS Moratorium remain little known to the citizens of the sub-region. Consequently, awareness-raising strategies and programmes by both the government and civil society should be strengthened. Such campaigns could for example focus on the effects of SALW proliferation and control measures, including the role and rationale of the ECOWAS Moratorium and the UNPoA, and on the role that individuals and communities can play in tackling this issue.
- Efforts at addressing local production of SALW should be expanded and institutionalised to include intervention programmes which would involve a system of incentives to encourage a reorientation of blacksmiths away from arms production and towards 'peaceful' implements for agriculture and other sectors.

## 3. Nigeria

Nigeria occupies a strategic position in Africa, accounting for about half of the population of West Africa. Given its size, population, location and oil wealth, Nigeria is a confluence of criminal flows of SALW from the entire African continent.

Estimates of illicit SALW range from 1 million to 3 million.<sup>34</sup> Nigeria's illicit SALW proliferation can be traced back to the failure of the federal government to implement an arms collection programme after the 1967-1970 civil war, and subsequent numerous internecine violent conflicts which have contributed to the militarisation of Nigerian society. After a second military interregnum which lasted sixteen years – from 1983 to 1999 – Nigeria returned to civil rule on May 29, 1999 with the hand-over of power to a retired military officer. The new civilian administration inherited a myriad of socio-political and economic problems. *In the North, the adherence to Sharia law has caused signs of tensions and religious conflict. The oil-rich Southern states of Nigeria suffered from problems principally related to the unequal resource distribution and problems related to pollution. Tensions also remain in the South from the aftermath of the Biafran war of independence of the 1960s, with lasting hostility towards the federalism of Nigeria.* These problems, coupled with high expectations on the part of the civilian population, traumatised by prolonged military rule, account for the widespread flow of illicit SALW in Nigeria. As noted by a former Minister of Police Affairs,

Our new found democracy became, to some extent, a source of insecurity and lawlessness, as rights were misconstrued and exercised without restraint. The last one year of this government has therefore witnessed an increase in the wave of crimes in various parts of the country.<sup>35</sup>

### 3.1 Dimensions of SALW Proliferation

SALW proliferation in Nigeria is not only due to its strained economic and social situation, but also to the high rate of trafficking and smuggling of SALW into the country. The high rate of criminality, the development of secret cults, the emergence of private security, and the electoral and political violence demonstrate but also feed the culture of violence which is strongly related to SALW. It is worth noting that Nigeria produces SALW. The Defence Industries Corporation of Nigeria (DICON), is the only legal manufacturer in Nigeria. It produces rifles, pistols and ammunition, but these are mainly used by the Nigerian Police, and do not represent a significant source of proliferation.<sup>36</sup>



### 3.1.1 Sources of SALW proliferation

#### *Poverty, criminality and SALW*

At the base of SALW proliferation in Nigeria is widespread poverty, despite Nigeria's status as a major oil exporting country. A sharp contradiction exists between the fact that Nigeria is one of the world's largest exporters of crude oil, and the fact that the standard of living of Nigerians is the 36th lowest in the world in terms of human development indicators.<sup>37</sup> The Niger Delta region is a case in point. The situation in the region is symptomatic of what has been referred to as 'criminal social neglect and ecological degradation'.<sup>38</sup> The consequence of this is that the region of the country which is responsible for some 70% of the country's income displays a degree of penury and poverty which stands in sharp contradiction to the wealth it produces. This has led to a militarised and militant youth population, which has been known to kidnap oil workers and defy security agencies, using their knowledge of the localities and their access to SALW.

#### *SALW trafficking*

Trafficking and smuggling are additional factors substantially contributing to the proliferation of SALW in Nigeria. This is facilitated by the country's long and porous borders with inadequate resources and expertise to effectively patrol and secure them. Nigeria shares a 1,500 kilometres land border with the Republic of Niger and Chad in the North, about 1,000 with Benin Republic in the West, 1,700 with Cameroon in the East and has about 700 kilometres of Atlantic coastline. Each of these entry points, along with the airports, have been used to smuggle arms into the country. The three most notorious entry points for illicit SALW are the South-West (Idi-Iroko and Seme in Ogun state), the port city of Warri in Delta state, and the north-eastern border with Niger and Cameroon (Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states). There are no available official aggregated data on the number of weapons smuggled into Nigeria. Nigeria Customs Service data confirm illicit weapons and ammunition are routinely seized and that illicit weapons enter the countries through land, air and sea.

#### *Protracted military rule, corruption and SALW proliferation*

However, a major dynamic in the proliferation of illicit SALW in Nigeria is the legacy of protracted military rule. Until the return to civilian rule in May 1999, the country had been under military rule during 75% of its existence. This led to the entrenchment of a militarised national psyche and a culture of violence. The widespread use of SALW to take over and maintain a grip on power had its own effects on the attitude and perception of Nigerians regarding the role of violence in society in general, and the use of SALW in particular. Following years of protracted transition programmes and worsening civil-military relations, the military lost control of their monopoly over the means of coercion, as various groups within the society increasingly sought military responses to military oppression. This created the impression that political power flowed from the barrel of the gun. Many civilians sought power either by being allies of the military or by acquiring their own weapons.<sup>39</sup>

Military rule was characterised by wide ranging corruption and politicisation. In the case of the military, it is often acknowledged that corruption destroyed professionalism and set the military

against itself, as the force became dichotomised into political office holders and the others. The military became thoroughly politicised, at times with ethnic undertones. While abuse of political offices and direct theft of public funds took place among the more senior hierarchy, their subordinates within the ranks resorted to criminal activities involving firearms. Corrupt security officials are known to have hired and sold weapons they have seized to robbers and other criminals, and have allegedly directly participated in robberies. The phenomenon has outlived military rule. In December 2002, President Olusegun Obasanjo acknowledged that most of the ammunition circulating illegally had come from state security agencies such as the military and the police. For example, 3,000 rounds of ammunition have been sold in Abuja by the police and in Jos by the military.<sup>40</sup>

SALW were also used by the civilian population to settle personal scores, based on the implicit or expressed threat to use SALW. The militarization of society through protracted military rule provided the essential dynamic for the particularly violent character of criminality in Nigeria.

#### *Insecurity and the privatisation of security*

Failure of the state and its security agencies to guarantee security has transformed security from a public good provided by the government to a private necessity which individuals and groups have to provide for themselves through various means. This largely explains the proliferation of private security companies, vigilante groups, etc. In addition, corruption within the legal system has meant that criminals often escape justice. Out of 12,000 arrests made for illegal possession of firearms between 1990 and 1998, only 500 (4,2%) were successfully prosecuted.<sup>41</sup> A particularly alarming dimension is the involvement of law enforcement agents in the proliferation of SALW, and in criminal activities related to SALW.<sup>42</sup> Many Nigerians have come to view the state (and particularly the police and judicial system) with suspicion and cynicism.<sup>43</sup> In many instances, the citizens have simply decided to provide physical security for and by themselves, by arming themselves with SALW.

### *3.1.2 Manifestations of SALW violence*

A major outcome of this situation is the development of a culture of violence which has manifested itself in significant ways, as demonstrated by ethnic conflicts, armed secret cults in tertiary institutions, armed robberies, and electoral violence. **In addition, the issue of oil related resource distribution is a further casue of tension.**

#### *Ethnic Conflicts*

Since the beginning of the Fourth Republic in May 1999, over 100,000 persons have reportedly been killed in over 50 ethno-religious and religious crises increasingly involving the use of SALW, both imported and locally manufactured.<sup>44</sup> Security agents from conflict areas have also been known to be suppliers of SALW to their related ethnic militias.<sup>45</sup> Finally, the decision by the government to authorise oil companies to import weapons – the Special Shell Police – also contributed to the flow of arms into the Niger Delta.

#### *Secret Cults in Tertiary Institutions*

The proliferation of SALW in Nigeria has also been associated with a phenomenal explosion in the number, spread, and brutality of secret cults (gangsterism) in Nigerian universities and other tertiary institutions.<sup>46</sup> In addition to the terror which they unleash on campuses<sup>47</sup>, secret cults are also known to maintain ties with gangs of armed robbers and other criminals.

#### *Armed Robberies*

Within the larger Nigerian society, armed robberies involving the use of SALW represent a major threat to lives and investment, and a glaring manifestation of the criminal dimensions of SALW proliferation. Armed robbery has even been described as 'the country's most glamorous and fastest growing crime'.<sup>48</sup> Lagos, the commercial capital of the country, usually bears the brunt and reflects the stark

realities of armed robbery in Nigeria. In 2001, there were 196 reported armed robberies, 287 robbers were killed, 372 were arrested, 16 policemen and 70 civilians were killed, while 165 were wounded. In the same year, 337 guns were seized by the police and 3,354 ammunitions recovered.<sup>49</sup>

#### *Vigilante and ethnic groups*

While violence has affected all segments of society, the impact on the poor is the most severe.<sup>50</sup> The wealthier segments of society have turned their homes into fortresses and resorted to the services of private security companies. Research indicates that around 20 private security companies operate in the Northern city of Kaduna.<sup>51</sup> From 1997 to 2001, the number of clients increased by 114% and the number of guards they employ by 188%.<sup>52</sup> Among the poorer segments of society however, there has been a proliferation of vigilante groups, similar to community guards, and usually comprising of young men from the respective communities who form patrol units, provide security for the community and mete out justice as they deem fit.

Particularly concerning is the increase in the number of militant ethnically-based groups since the return to civil rule. Militant groups are often wider in scope than community guards, and often receive tacit support and/or encouragement from states' governments, such as the O'oduwa Peoples Congress, a Yoruba ethnic militia group in South West Nigeria, the Bakassi Boys in the South Eastern region, and the Egbesu Society, a group of Ijaw youths operating in the Delta, Ondo and Bayelsa states.<sup>53</sup> In some parts of Northern Nigeria, various groups (Hisba) have emerged to enforce Islamic Sharia Law. In addition to the flagrant and gross human rights violations which these groups commit, they are not held accountable for their actions.<sup>54</sup> These groups are often assisted by wealthy kinsmen who illegally import SALW. Where they do not import them, they either manufacture them or obtain them from soldiers returning from peacekeeping assignments.

#### *Electoral and Political Violence*

Another legacy of military rule is the lack of an institutionalised peaceful and orderly system of power transfer in Nigeria. Its political history is riddled with assassinations, military coups, and a lack of faith in the impartiality and transparency of the electoral system due to widespread corruption. It has been observed that 'there have been regular 'assassinations' since the (2003) political campaign got under way(...). Political gangsterism appears to be taking root in Nigeria'.<sup>55</sup> Armed gangs comprising mainly of unemployed youths are in some cases hired by politicians for both offensive and defensive purposes, either to intimidate their opponents and/or to protect themselves against attacks by other opponents.<sup>56 57</sup>

## 3.2 Elements of the Nigerian SALW Control System

In Nigeria, the national legislation related to SALW dates from 1959 and has therefore become obsolete, despite considerable participation and involvement in the major international and regional initiatives. The National Committee, the main structure responsible for devising the national strategy on SALW control implementation, remains weak and lacks substantial institutional and structural capacities.

### *3.2.1 Nigerian laws and regulations*

#### *Current legislation*

The Firearms Act (1959) is the main legal instrument governing the production, use, import, and export of SALW in Nigeria. Section 23 of the Firearms Act states that:

subject to the provisions of sections 24 to 26 of this Act, (...) no person shall manufacture, assemble, or repair any firearms or ammunition except at a public armoury or at arsenals established for the purposes of the armed forces with the consent of the President, acting in his discretion.



It also prohibits dealing in firearms except by registered dealers<sup>58</sup> as well as the import and export of firearms and ammunition into Nigeria by sea or by air.<sup>59</sup> In addition, the Act imposes a minimum sentence of 10 years for the importation, exportation, manufacture and repair of firearms.<sup>60</sup>

An amendment to the 1959 Act was adopted in 1966, which increased the punishment for firearms-related offences. Hitherto, the punishment was N400 fine or 12 months imprisonment, or both. However, it is the 1984 Robbery and Firearms Decree<sup>61</sup> which considerably expanded gun-related offences and sanctions. Under this decree, illegal possession of firearms attracts a fine of N20,000 or a minimum of ten years imprisonment, or both.<sup>62</sup> The Act also specifies that armed robberies are punishable by death (hanging or firing squad)<sup>63</sup>, and that offenders charged with attempted robbery involving the use of firearms face life imprisonment/sentence.<sup>64</sup> Given the widespread proliferation of illicit SALW, civil society groups and the Police have argued for a review of the law which would not give an option of fine to anyone found guilty of illegal possession of firearms.<sup>65</sup>

#### *Implementation and enforcement challenges*

Although the provisions of the law are comprehensive in that they clearly spell out what amounts to legal and illegal possession and use of SALW, the penalties for breaching the law have, particularly in relation to fines, become obsolete, while the enforcement of the law has been constrained by corruption and inadequacy of institutional capacity on the part of the law enforcement agents. Consequently, even though the law can be considered adequate in terms of the production, import, and export of SALW, the penalty is often insufficient to ensure deterrence and enforcement in the event of a breach. The Chairman of the National Committee concedes that penalties for SALW-related offences are not strong enough, especially as the accused can easily obtain bail.<sup>66</sup> In addition, the National Committee acknowledges the fact that the current legislation is obsolete and is not adequate for the current situation.<sup>67</sup>

The laws and regulations governing SALW were proposed for revision after the agreement of the UNPoA. In a memo dated 21 September 2001, the Nigerian President requested the drafting of a bill setting out more stringent penalties for contravention of firearms laws. He proposed a 10-year jail term, without an option of fine, for illegal possession of firearms and further proposed a cash reward for information that leads to the arrest and prosecution of anyone in illegal possession of firearms.<sup>68</sup> However, no draft firearms law has yet been presented to the National Assembly.

### *3.2.2 Implementation of SALW controls – the Nigerian National Committee*

The Federal Government of Nigeria inaugurated the National Committee on the ECOWAS Moratorium in 2001.

#### *Structure and mandate*

The Committee, as of August 2003, is composed of representatives of the Ministries of Defence, Internal Affairs and Integration and Cooperation in Africa (MICA), DICON, the National Orientation agency, the Immigration Service, and various security and customs agencies such as the Police, the State Security Services and the National Drug Law Enforcement Agency. However, despite having a wide representation, the National Committee does not satisfy the PCASED guidelines on the composition of National Commissions. Neither the Ministry of Justice nor the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are represented on it. Four civil society organisations are represented on the Commission: the Africa Leadership Forum, the Quench Crisis Initiative, the Nigerian Council of Women Societies and the Shehu Shagari Institute for Peace and Good Government.

The Committee's mandate is to:

- Control the import and manufacture of all SALW;
- Register and control the movement and use of legitimate arms stock;

- Detect and destroy all illicit and surplus weapons; and
- Permit exemptions to the Moratorium only in accordance with strict criteria.

The Committee has devised a 'Framework for the Implementation of the ECOWAS Moratorium' (annexe 2) which contains several priority areas, based on PCASED's Plan of Action.<sup>69</sup> Establishing a culture of peace, enhancing border controls, training, collecting and destroying surplus and illegal weapons are some of the priorities set out by the National Committee. Based on its mandate, the National Committee articulated its first workplan in 2003, which represents a viable basis on which an assessment of the National Committee's operations since inception can be based.<sup>70</sup>

#### *Promotion of a Culture of Peace*

The specific activities geared towards achieving this objective include awareness-raising campaigns involving a variety of organisations such as women's organisations, religious bodies, community groups and business associations. This aspect of the National Committee's programme comprises confidence-building measures which would de-emphasise violence and underscore the peaceful alternatives of resolving issues. It hosted in November 2002 a PCASED-sponsored national workshop on Modern Methods and Techniques of Illicit Small Arms Control through the Promotion of a Culture of Peace. It was broadly agreed that a necessary condition for the reduction of the circulation of illicit SALW is the national determination to tackle the various socio-economic and political issues responsible for widespread social discord and upsurge in crime. Furthermore, it was agreed that the educational curriculum should be revised to incorporate a 'peace module' teaching the benefits of a culture of peace to society at all levels. The introduction of a viable social security mechanism was also highlighted as a potential way of reducing armed criminality. The workshop called for a firearms registry, cross-border collaboration among security officials, and adequate equipment and training for border security officials.

During the April 2003 elections, PCASED supported the National Commission to place sensitisation advertisements on gun-free elections in local newspapers.<sup>71</sup> However, the present capacity of the National Committee is insufficient to carry out the required awareness-raising activities in Nigeria on SALW issues. The National Committee's staff and budget is grossly inadequate to cope with the need to draft a 'peace curriculum' for all levels of the education cadre, and to set up, train, and equip advocacy outposts in the 36 states of Nigeria.

#### *Illicit and Surplus Arms Collection and Destruction*

In July 2001, the Federal Government of Nigeria carried out its first and so far only destruction of arms and ammunition seized by security agencies, which comprised of 428 rifles, 494 imported pistols, 287 locally made pistols and 48 dane guns. It has been unable to conduct further arms destruction programmes due to lack of funds and equipment. In addition, the 2001 arms destruction exercise involved the burial at sea of arms, a destruction method which the government is reluctant to repeat for environmental reasons<sup>72</sup> and which civil society and other stakeholders criticise for its lack of transparency. From January 2002 to June 2003, 1,902 assorted firearms and 13,271 rounds of ammunition have been collected and are now awaiting destruction.<sup>73</sup>

However, the National Committee no longer has direct responsibility for the destruction of arms, as this requires technical and specialised expertise.<sup>74</sup> Ideally, a National Commission (rather than a committee) should have overall and singular responsibility for the control of illicit SALW in Nigeria, including the destruction of seized arms. In the short-term however, there is a need to enhance the capacity of the committee responsible for the collection and destruction of illicit and surplus SALW.

#### *National Research Project on SALW*

The National Commission lacks the information infrastructure on SALW flows and the capacity to serve as a SALW documentation unit. However, the research activities on the themes identified by the

National Committee have yet to witness implementation, due in particular to the lack of financial capacities and technical expertise of the National Committee's staff. As presently conceptualised, the Arms registry is envisaged to be a databank for legally registered arms, surplus stock (outdated and out of use), and local manufacturing capacity.<sup>75</sup> A series of on-going consultations have begun between the National Committee and the Canadian Mission in Nigeria focusing on financial and technical assistance in the arms registry and sensitisation programmes.<sup>76</sup>

#### *Border Security*

The flow of illicit weapons into their respective countries, in particular from conflict areas<sup>77</sup>, is of growing concern to most West African states, including Nigeria, especially in the context of increased regional economic cooperation within ECOWAS.<sup>78</sup> Several border control training workshops have taken place, and Nigeria is receiving technical and financial assistance to curb trafficking.<sup>79</sup> There are also on-going plans to organise a tripartite meeting between Nigeria, Niger and Benin, in Kebbi, where the three countries share a common border.

#### *Implementation challenges*

The fundamental challenge facing the National Committee is its seeming lack of autonomy and funds, which severely hampers its implementation capacities. The following needs have been identified by the National Committee:

- Equipment for destruction of illicit/recovered arms;
- Equipment for arms register and Databank;
- Resources to execute arms for development projects;
- Training of Secretariat staff on arms registration; and
- Institutional support to border operatives to enhance surveillance and detection of SALW trafficking at the border post.<sup>80</sup>

The National Commission displays considerable lack of institutional capacity relative to both the level of illicit SALW proliferation and its planned activities. The plan to transform the National *Committee* into a National *Commission* through legislation has not witnessed any tangible action, due to the lack of political will and the lengthy process of adopting new legislation. The significance of this transformation is that while a Committee is relatively *ad hoc*, and an instrument of administrative exigency, a Commission is set-up by a law which ensures it is allocated a budget by the National Assembly, providing it with institutional and financial autonomy.

Presently, the Department of Collective Defence and Security of the MICA serves as the Secretariat of the National Committee, which comprises of five staff members. Therefore, the National Committee's planned activity of setting up observation bureaux in the 36 states of Nigeria remains stillborn and the National Committee has been unable to pursue its plan to establish an 'Inventory and Registration of Local Arms Producers'. The National Committee's financial constraints are such that it is presently unable to pay transportation and sitting costs of its members. It is estimated that a minimum of N50 million would be needed to implement its workplan annually.<sup>81</sup>

In terms of funding, the National Committee is seeking alternative sources, in particular at the local level. It has for example submitted to the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation a proposal on a youth project in the Niger Delta area.

The major challenges of illicit SALW control in Nigeria reside in addressing the conditions leading to the demand for illicit SALW, and in enhancing the National Committee's capacity to collect, document, destroy, and campaign against SALW proliferation. Adequate financing, staffing, and training of both National Committee and security officials are of particular relevance to this matter.

### 3.3 Civil Society Role and Participation

Civil Society involvement in the security issues generally, and SALW proliferation in particular was uncommon during Nigeria's protracted military rule. The civil society agenda was largely focused on the disengagement of the military from politics, while firearms issues were largely perceived as matters of 'national security'.

The return to civil rule in May 1999 has expanded the political space for civil society involvement in micro-disarmament. Individual NGOs are increasingly integrating SALW proliferation into their agenda, focusing largely on advocacy. In 2002, the African Leadership Forum (ALF) hosted a Roundtable on Mobilisation for the Fight Against Illicit SALW in Otta, Ogun State. The African Strategic and Peace Research Group (AFSTRAG) maintains a Small Arms research unit and participated in the 2001 UN Small Arms Conference in New York. AFSTRAG also organised events to mark the 2003 Week of Action.<sup>82</sup> The Nigerian section of the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) also organised a seminar on 'The Impact of Small Arms Injuries on Health: Kano Case Study' in June 2003. Both AFSTRAG and IPPNW are members of International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), while AFSTRAG and ALF are both members of the National Committee. In spite of individual NGO efforts, a vibrant functional civil society network is yet to crystallise as organisations tend to work largely independently of the others.<sup>83</sup>

Government and civil society partnerships are at their embryonic stages, despite the representation of four NGOs on the National Committee.<sup>84</sup> Collaboration so far can be criticised for its lack of transparency. The process by which the four NGOs became members of the National Committee is not always known to other NGOs. The criteria for their nomination and the length of their mandate remain unclear. Some of the civil society members of the National Committee do not possess any identifiable track-record in SALW issues, thus presenting a legitimacy problem. This leads to many rivalries among Nigerian civil society organisations, which hampers effective cooperation and coordination of activities.

AFSTRAG, a member of the WAANSA Steering Committee was inducted into the National Committee on 26 August 2003 and is in the process of finalising a project proposal on the illicit SALW mapping of Nigeria. However, the lack of coordination remains a major challenge for the implementation of effective and well-coordinated civil society activities. In addition, existing civil society groups face the challenge of resources in implementing advocacy campaigns, training their staff, and for their participation in regional and global events, activities addressing the issue of illicit SALW proliferation.

Civil society involvement in the security sector generally, and SALW in particular, remains a rarity, and there is a strong need to enhance civil society participation in fighting SALW proliferation. In this regard, it is both unnecessary and undesirable to insist on the creation of new civil society organisations for the specific purpose of illicit SALW. Such organisations would be excessively narrow in focus and may not have grassroots membership and support. Perhaps the most viable option is the expansion of the scope of existing NGOs working on other thematic issues – such as human rights, children and youth, law enforcement, gender – to include illicit SALW, and to locate the phenomenon of illicit SALW proliferation within the broader governance agenda in West Africa. This would further the aim of integrating SALW into more comprehensive policies and tackling this issue under various approaches.

### 3.4 Nigerian SALW Perspectives and Realities

Ethno-religious conflicts, armed robbery, secret cults in universities and electoral and political violence are all manifestations of illicit SALW proliferation. These dimensions are the products of widespread poverty and social deprivation despite the presence of economic resources, and are fuelled by protracted and corrupt military rule.

The National Committee, which is the cardinal agency for addressing SALW proliferation, displays a considerable lack of institutional capacity. For the National Committee to actualise its mandate and fulfill its original role, concrete steps need to be taken.

Firstly, it must be transformed from the status of a *Committee* into a *Commission* in order to enhance its financial and institutional autonomy. Secondly, there is a need for a viable programme of collaboration with civil society on SALW. In this regard, the creation of a civil society-based action network on SALW remains imperative. Thirdly, there is inadequate appreciation of the depth and sophistication of local fabrication of SALW. There is a need to redress the problem and, in particular, to find a way of monitoring and controlling these producers, specifically the blacksmiths and locksmiths responsible for local production of firearms.

### Recommendations

- Civil society action should be directed at lobbying the Government – both the Presidency and the National Assembly – to legislate the National Committee into a National Commission. The existence of a commission would enable a programmatic approach whose impact could be felt and measured on the ground;
- The role and activities of civil society organisations need to be strengthened. Awareness-raising of the ECOWAS Moratorium, the UNPoA, and the UN Firearms Protocol is a crucial dimension of civil society's role in the control of SALW. However, this role is currently limited due to the lack of capacities. Civil society activities should be enhanced through the provision of necessary resources, such as equipment, finance and training, especially in advocacy strategies. In particular, the creation of a national action network such as GHANSA would be useful to coordinate and enhance civil society actions;
- Confidence-building measures targeting local arms producers should be developed in order to increase their participation in SALW control measures and to re-orientate their skills. Such a programme could potentially be implemented in several stages. The first stage would be to facilitate and conduct a baseline survey of local production capacity in Nigeria, which could be executed on a regional/state basis. The second stage would involve developing confidence-building mechanisms to encourage local producers to emerge from their production hideouts. The third stage would involve local arms producers in a scheme to refocus their production towards peaceful tools for agriculture and power generation. The proposed programme would assume the existence of a political will to liberalise the enforcement of production regulation in Nigeria;
- The National Committee should further explore possibilities of establishing creative ways of local funding, particularly from the organised private sector. In this regard, resource mobilisation training workshops are recommended for both the National Committee and civil society groups;
- The National Committee should ensure development and implementation of Arms for Development programmes, especially in areas of profuse proliferation and armed criminality, such as the Niger Delta and Lagos; and
- Finally, as a matter of priority, financial and material resources as well as enhanced technical expertise should be directed at the Police, National Committee staff and other security agencies in order to enhance arms destruction programmes, develop an arms register as well as strengthen border control and enforcement measures.

## 4. Senegal

Senegal became independent in 1960, which marked the beginning of a 40 years-period ruled by Senegal's Socialist Party. In 2000, the opposition leader from the Senegalese Democratic Party was elected President. In comparison to most of its neighbouring countries, Senegal has enjoyed relative peace and stability, in particular due to the introduction of political participation and peaceful leadership changes. However, its neighbouring countries – Mali, Mauritania, Gambia, Guinea Bissau, Guinea Conakry – have all recently witnessed violent conflicts, which have had destabilising effects on the country and significantly contributed to the increase in SALW proliferation and trafficking.

In addition, a low-level separatist war has been going on in the southern region of Senegal, Casamance, situated between Gambia and Guinea Bissau. In 1982, the separatists from Casamance formed the Casamance Movement of Democratic Forces, which fought for independence until October 2003, when they officially declared the secessionist war to be over. More recently however, low-level conflict has spread to the eastern parts of the country. These regions have become a hotbed for SALW trafficking and proliferation, in the case of Casamance, partly due to the difficulties of enforcing border control in a situation of conflict.

### 4.1 Dimensions of SALW Proliferation

SALW proliferation does not appear as alarming in Senegal as in other conflict-affected regions such as the MRU. However, illegal SALW have had significant impacts on some of its regions, such as Casamance, and the existence of important trafficking networks in West Africa, combined with instability and conflicts, reinforces the need for effective SALW controls. The easy-availability of firearms has led to a culture of violence and an increased feeling of insecurity related to criminal activities, damaging Senegal's economic and social development.



#### *4.1.1 Sources of SALW proliferation*

##### *Internal instability and SALW proliferation*

The region of Casamance, in particular due to its geographic location, has been a major source of SALW proliferation. The 20 years old armed rebellion has had significant consequences in the region, in particular humanitarian, socio-economic and environmental, although they remain difficult to assess. Thousands of refugees have fled to Guinea-Bissau where refugee camps have been set up along the border. Another important factor is the fact that the region is opened to circulation for refugees and mercenaries coming from the countries of the MRU. Several reports have highlighted the trafficking of arms via Guinea Bissau<sup>85</sup> and Guinea Conakry to the Casamance region. In particular, weapons used by Casamance separatists have been found to have been used in Guinea during the 1998 armed conflict.<sup>86</sup>

##### *External conflicts and SALW trafficking*

Indeed, conflicts and rebellions in neighbouring countries have also strongly contributed to SALW proliferation. Non-state actors, such as mercenaries, ethnic militias and private security companies, operating mainly in conflict areas, are an important source of SALW trafficking, and have directly affected the level of SALW in circulation in Senegal. In addition, the flows of refugees, and among them armed rebel fighters, combined with the difficulties of implementing effective border controls due to the incapacity of conflict-affected states to secure their borders, has led to considerable smuggling and trafficking, in particular of drugs and weapons and other contraband activities. Furthermore, the ECOWAS integration system has also had the effect of making borders increasingly more porous. The eastern region of Senegal, Tambacounda, which borders five countries where illegal SALW circulate, is deeply affected by this issue.

Illegal SALW trafficking takes place along porous borders, but also by sea, weapons being exchanged against drugs, in particular cannabis. Touristy areas such as Mbour and the Petite Côte are also known to be key trafficking locations in relation to drugs, weapons and sex trade. Controlling these illicit trafficking routes remains challenging for the Senegalese Government, as transnational criminal groups operate through informal and underground networks.

##### *Insecurity and the demand for SALW*

Another source of SALW proliferation stems from the difficulties of the Government to solve the endemic problem of insecurity. With 10.6 million habitants, Senegal remains a poor country, though wealthier than its immediate neighbours. The standard of living is one of the lowest in the world, and the illiteracy and unemployment rates are high. However, despite economic reform programmes and economic growth, several challenges remain in order to build a sustainable development environment in which alternatives to violence can be fully functional. Indeed, increasing insecurity and crime combined with the relative degradation of the social situation are significant factors contributing to the demand for SALW. This is especially true in the capital Dakar and its outskirts, where the level of insecurity has been on the increase. The rate of unemployment, coupled with poverty, easily attracts

youth towards illegal criminal activities and armed violence. However, this type of violence is still under control, as the Senegalese security forces have managed so far to prevent its escalation.

There are also endemic sources of residual tensions and insecurity related to past instability in particular in the river region, Boundou, and Velingara. Insecurity is also prevalent in cities and large towns, main roads and territorial border areas, and is largely a result of the difficult socio-economic living conditions.

#### *Local production of SALW*

Finally, although local production is active, in particular in the Southern region of Senegal where pistols and hunting rifles are being produced, the Government has been actively involved in operations to retrieve these weapons. A recent study on the Casamance war economy has underlined the alleged role of blacksmiths in the production of SALW in this region. However, local production does not appear to be a major concern in Senegal.

### *4.1.2 Manifestations of SALW proliferation*

The main weapons are weapons with blades and modern craft firearms. 90% of the weapons seized are craft weapons, but anti-personnel landmines are also an issue, in particular in the Casamance region.

#### *The Casamance region*

This region remains deeply affected by the proliferation of SALW weapons. The violence and the use of firearms has had and continues to have a major impact on the education and health systems in particular, and the arms and drug trafficking are manifestations of the economy of conflict which has developed in the region.<sup>87 88</sup> Anti-personnel landmines constitute one of the main problems in this area, restricting access to public services such as schools, and to fields and orchards, leading to the deterioration of the socio-economic environment. In addition, many Kalashnikov-type weapons have reported to have been found in this region, in particular in the park of Niokolo-Koba. Existing tensions between communities and latent conflicts, such as between the Toucouleur and the Peulh, have become ticking bombs in the region, as an escalation of violence coupled with the availability of illegal SALW could lead to devastating conflicts.

#### *Criminal activities, insecurity and the development of a culture of violence*

In addition, SALW proliferation is particularly significant with regard to banditry, theft of cattle, poaching and robbery along the main roads. Firearms are also widely used in conflicts between farmers and cattle breeders. SALW proliferation, coupled with the increasing feeling of insecurity, is also increasing the feeling of civilians regarding the need to arm themselves. Senegal, similarly to other West African countries, has witnessed the development of a culture of violence, which equates weapons with power. This socio-cultural factor is an important element related to SALW proliferation, in particular among the Peulh and Bassari communities. This is also linked to a high tolerance to blade weapons, increasing indiscipline and the lack of a sense of civil responsibility. It is crucial to stress the harmful influence of pre-existing or emerging cultures of violence, as they are both a cause and an effect of firearms availability.

## 4.2 Elements of the Senegalese SALW Control System

Senegal benefits from a well-structured regulation system with regard to SALW. However, the existing legislation requires revising, in particular to adapt it to the current context of SALW proliferation. In addition, implementation and enforcement capacities are limited, and although the National Commission benefits from the support of the Government and civil society organisations, its activities are hampered by a considerable lack of resources.



### 4.2.1 Senegalese laws and regulations

#### *Current Legislation*

The possession of firearms in Senegal is regulated by the law 66-03 of the 18 January 1966 and its implementation decree.<sup>89</sup> The Senegalese legislation prohibits production, import and export, trade, stockpiling, acquiring, possessing and transporting SALW, their ammunition and other separate parts, as well as any kind of “specialised material” which could be used to produce SALW, and establishes sanctions in the event of a breach. From this point of view, it is much more restrictive than other international initiatives such as the ECOWAS Moratorium and the UNPoA.<sup>90</sup> However, this general prohibition does not cover all weapons, as for example weapons and ammunition for the use of the armed forces and other state security forces are not included in the law.

In addition, the 1966 law establishes seven categories of weapons, and distinguishes for example between military weapons (1<sup>st</sup> category), defence weapons (2<sup>nd</sup> category) and hunting rifles (3<sup>rd</sup> category). In 1986, a new paragraph was voted and added to the law, requiring prior authorisation to acquire alarm pistols as well as any toy which can potentially be transformed into a real weapon.

Most categories of weapons require a licence. The Ministry of Interior is responsible for delivering licences to detain and carry weapons. The delivery of a licence is conditional to the justification for the need for a weapon. Licences for civilians are usually delivered after an investigation and a relatively long procedure. The licence is valid for 3 years, after which the authorities can renew or withdraw the licence. If the justification has disappeared, then the licence will not be renewed and the weapon withdrawn. However, this does not appear to be the case in many situations.<sup>91</sup>

The general policy of the Senegalese Government tends to be restrictive. Only 1/5th of licence requests are granted, first of all due to the restrictive character of the legislation, but also in order to ensure that the number of weapons in circulation remains manageable and to avoid aggravating insecurity issues by having too many armed civilians. On average, a total of 120 licences are granted per year under the Weapons and Ammunitions Division.<sup>92</sup>

It is worth noting that the number of requests for licences to the Ministry of Interior has been on the rise for the past few years, which seems mainly due to the increasing feeling of insecurity and the inadequate number of security forces both in urban and rural areas.

#### *Implementation and enforcement challenges*

One of the key impediments to the effective implementation of the law is the fact that it dates from 1966. The weapons classification has the advantage of being generic and takes into consideration all the categories of existing arms which can be either used in wartime, for self-defence and other purposes. However, this classification does not define precisely the term of SALW, and is not consistent with the general definition provided by the United Nations.<sup>93</sup> In addition, the legislation is not adequate with regard to the current situation of growing insecurity and criminal activities in particular in the cities and in border areas, and as a result of this situation, illegal circulation and proliferation is increasing. For example, the length of the procedure to obtain a licence tends to discourage people who, as a result, will turn towards the black-market and obtain SALW illegally.

There are also additional challenges impeding the effective implementation of the legislation. A major issue is that there has never been any large dissemination of the laws. Few people know about the legislation regulating SALW, in particular amongst the general population. As a recent survey demonstrates, the level of information on SALW regulations and procedures is relatively low, especially in rural areas.<sup>94</sup>

According to the official authorities, the 1966 law on arms and ammunition governing the legal process of acquisition is rigorously enforced in Senegal, however 75% of the Senegalese believe that

the legislation regarding weapon possession is not respected. With increasing insecurity, armed violence and confronted with a long procedure to obtain a licence, many Senegalese people living in border areas obtain weapons from neighbouring countries. Those living further away from the borders tend to obtain weapons from local and international illicit markets, and buy their weapons without prior authorisation.

Additional difficulties relating to enforcement mechanisms stem from the lack of systematic detection of firearms at border and road checkpoints and the fact that firearms can be bought relatively openly in some markets. Efforts are being made to tighten border security, such as the joint patrol project between Mali<sup>95</sup>, Senegal and Mauritania.<sup>96</sup> Similar projects are being developed with the Gambian Government, in particular concerning customs authorities. The Government of Guinea Bissau has also strengthened its efforts to address the circulation and trafficking of SALW from Guinea to Senegal. It has increased control on the refugee camps set up along the Senegalese border of Casamance. However, the lack of a significant disarmament programme following the independence war of Guinea Bissau hampers any sustainable SALW control project. Nevertheless, the main challenge in Senegal stems from the lack of resources for the structures dealing with SALW control policies. The Arms and Ammunitions Division of the Ministry of Interior, which deals with civilian possession of SALW, is not computerised. This accounts for many of the slowness and difficulties in establishing reliable statistics and following-up on individual cases regarding renewal/withdrawal of licence for example. In addition, staffing and working conditions of the police forces, customs and gendarmerie do not enable them to effectively enforce SALW controls, in particular along borders. Finally, the lack of adequate technical and financial capacities, combined with the artificial character of territorial borders make it difficult to control and stop illicit trafficking.

#### *4.2.2 Implementation of SALW controls – the Senegalese National Commission*

Senegal has committed itself to the implementation of the ECOWAS Moratorium, demonstrating the existence of a relatively strong political will. In addition, following the envisaged sub-regional approach and the recommendations of the Moratorium and its Code of Conduct, a National Commission was set up in October 2000 to control the import, export and circulation of illicit SALW.<sup>97</sup>

##### *Structure and mandate of the National Commission*

Presided by the Ministry of the Armed Forces, the National Commission is composed of representatives of the Presidency of the Republic, of the office of the Prime Minister, and of various ministers, such as Economy and Finance, Foreign Affairs, Interior, Environment, Justice, Culture and Communication. Although the decree establishing the National Commission provides for the participation of non-permanent members from state agencies and from civil society organisations, none of the latter are actually represented on the Commission.

Nevertheless, the National Commission benefits from a broad participation of various Governmental departments, widening the scope of SALW issues and potentially increasing cross-sector cooperation. However, the will to implement SALW controls is often hampered by a very poor knowledge of the issue at the official level and by the long and demanding procedures to request and obtain assistance at the national, regional and international level.

The National Commission has a permanent Secretariat located within the Ministry of the Armed Forces, which is responsible for reporting annually to the Prime Minister, PCASED and the UN on its activities. The Commission meets every three months to discuss the progress made in terms of the implementation of its mandate.

The National Commission is responsible for assisting the competent national authorities in the conception and implementation of a national policy to tackle illicit SALW circulation and proliferation.

It is a partner for all awareness raising and campaigning activities, training and research initiated by civil society organisations with a view to developing a culture of peace. In a similar way, the National Commission is responsible for carrying out, in collaboration with the technical departments concerned, research and studies to improve current SALW controls, and for advising on and suggesting specific policies addressing this issue. It is also responsible for training Defence and Security forces on SALW-related issues, and has also trained civil society organisations involved in SALW control proliferation.

Regarding the ECOWAS Moratorium and related structures, the National Commission is in charge of collecting information relating to imports, exports and fabrication of SALW and communicates it to the ECOWAS Secretariat via the relevant zonal observation bureau.<sup>98</sup> It also deals with exemptions requests by individuals, as stipulated under the Moratorium.

Its Secretariat, which also serves as national focal point for the implementation of the UNPoA, is located within the Ministry of the Armed Forces and is in charge of the following tasks:

- Preparation, organisation and administration of the National Commission meetings;
- Drafting of the national action plan with the assistance of PCASED;
- Mobilisation and management of the resources to implement the action plan; and
- Supervision of the activities and projects of the action plan.

To date, it has carried out the following activities:

- organisation of a training workshop for the security forces in partnership with PCASED in November 2001;
- collection and destruction of 8000 stockpiled army weapons in April 2003;
- responsibility for dealing with the exemption procedure for the sale of weapons in Senegal;
- organisation in partnership with civil society organisations of training workshops and awareness raising campaigns.

The Senegalese National Commission has also been active at the regional level. It hosted the 2001 conference creating the network of West African National Commissions and since then regularly participates in the meetings of this new structure (in Conakry in 2002 and in Banjul in 2003). The National Commission has launched a survey to obtain statistics relating to the seizure of weapons in the country and is in the process of compiling them.

### *Challenges*

Despite the determination of the National Commission to fight the problem of SALW proliferation, as with Ghana and Nigeria, many of the challenges which the National Commission faces stem from the lack of resources. Indeed, the Commission lacks an independent secretariat office and a specific budget allocation. This would provide the National Commission with the autonomy required to carry out its work. In particular, these difficulties have hampered the implementation of the Commission's project of computerising two registers: the Interior Ministry's register on civilian weapons and the Army's register on state agencies' weapons. The lack of adequate methods of data management are a key impediment to the Commission's effective work. In spite of these difficulties, the National Commission could be taking advantage and collaborating with other institutions on related projects. It could for example join the International Migrations Office, Ministry of Justice, Interior and Foreign affairs project on the control of the circulation of people.

The lack of regional assistance and cooperation also hampers the effective implementation of SALW control instruments. For example, the assistance of PCASED requires a long procedure, which tends to discourage the National Commissions, and which partly explains their lack of activities: the latest meeting in Banjul (2-4 June 2003) suggested new and faster procedures. The opportunities for

bilateral cooperation and assistance have not yet been explored and structured and there is no dialogue with the countries from the Wassenaar Arrangement.

### 4.3 Civil Society Role and Participation

To this day, there are several international non-governmental organisations and national civil society organisations engaged in SALW control issues and playing a substantial role in terms of awareness-raising, advocacy and research activities. This role is facilitated by the support of the Senegalese Government. Despite the fact that civil society organisations are not represented in the National Commission, the latter has been collaborating with them on training projects to enhance and develop skills and expertise on awareness-raising activities. Civil society organisations in Senegal are particularly active with regard to the campaign for the adoption of an arms control treaty in 2006.

The Mouvement contre les Armes Légères (MALAO) is one of the main organisations which focuses on communication and awareness-raising strategies, education and research. The organisation also works in partnership with the National Commission and has initiated numerous actions of sensitisation, lobbying and training. MALAO is also a member of WAANSA and of the Francophone African Network on Small Arms (RAFAL – Réseau Africain Francophone sur les Armes Légères). Handicap Senegal is another organisation extremely active in the southern part of the country, especially in Casamance, where it engages in particular on the issue of antipersonnel landmines. The Senegalese section of AFTSRAG is also involved in various projects and research activities at the national and regional level. Finally, there are various networks coordinating work on SALW. WAANSA, RAFAL and the Network of Journalists against SALW for peace and security coordinate activities at the regional level, however, there is also a coordinating organisation at the national level. The Senegalese Network of Action on Small Arms (RESAAL – Réseau d'Action sur les Armes Légères) brings together ten NGOs and associations in the field of peace, security and SALW control, and is coordinated by MALAO.

The nature of the SALW issue and the fact that it only appeared relatively recently on the international agenda, combined with the tense situation in the southern part of the country, makes it difficult for civil society to work on the control of SALW. The issue of SALW remains sensitive. Indeed, a survey conducted by MALAO shows that 80% of the Senegalese population state that there are too many weapons in circulation in the country, but simultaneously acknowledge that they do not openly talk about it and that the issue remains taboo.<sup>99</sup> Furthermore, researching and working on SALW issues require a certain expertise, which the country lacks as a whole, and the financial support to develop and implement projects, train staff and carry out research is not always available. Therefore, there are strong needs in terms of staffing, capacity-building to enhance and develop further expertise, and financial support for projects and activities.

### 4.4 Senegalese SALW Perspectives and Realities

SALW proliferation remains relatively under control in Senegal, despite instability in the southern and eastern part of the country which could potentially increase SALW proliferation in the country. This, however, does not mean that SALW proliferation in other parts of the country should not be on the Government's priority in terms of tackling insecurity and increasing violence. Territorial border zones are also trafficking areas of varying intensity, which require increased control in order to tackle smuggling and trafficking, in particular coming from conflict areas. Furthermore, Senegal's commitment to SALW control, through its national legislation and its participation in all the major sub-regional and international SALW control initiatives, is a key element for the effective implementation of SALW control policies.

However, there remain significant challenges, due in particular to the lack of knowledge and ownership of SALW control processes and to the difficulties of developing and implementing

sustainable control policies. The poor knowledge of the issue at the governmental level often translates into a weak assertion of the political will to control SALW proliferation. The absence of a coordinated strategy for the dissemination of knowledge relating to SALW is also a key impediment in effectively implementing and enforcing control policies. As seen above, a substantial part of the population ignores the existence of national legislation and regional structures and initiatives such as the ECOWAS Moratorium and PCASED,<sup>100</sup> which substantially weakens their impact on the population. In addition, there is a clear lack of resources assigned to SALW policies, which results in poor staffing capacities, the absence of financial autonomy for the agencies and organisations working on SALW and a lack of technical capacities and staff expertise.

Despite the presence of several active organisations, the overall national and sub-regional civil society remains weak, and coordination of actions, both at the regional level between these organisations and at the national level with the government, is severely hampered by it.

### **Recommendations**

- To tackle the problem of SALW trafficking, regional networks and structures should be reinforced, not only at the governmental level but also at the regional level. Networks such as the Senegalese Action Network on Small Arms, WAANSA and RAFAL should be reinforced through the provision of additional resources, to enable them to carry out their activities independently and in a sustainable manner. This would enable them to continue raising awareness on and advocating for the ECOWAS Moratorium as well as other initiatives, in order to disseminate knowledge, share experiences and widen ownership of the process;
- The creation and implementation of a clear and coherent national policy on SALW proliferation control should be done through the organisation of national conferences bringing together all different levels of society such as governmental representatives, community-based organisations, NGOs and decision-makers. A broad participation would enable the development of integrated and comprehensive policies, tackling SALW proliferation at various levels and through various approaches. This would also indirectly contribute to raising awareness of SALW issues, through discussions and experience sharing;
- Border control measures and programmes should be reinforced, in order to address the main cause of proliferation in Senegal: arms trafficking. The Senegalese Parliament has underlined the importance of ECOWAS member states to lead joint actions to control the circulation of weapons and transnational criminality, such as mixed-nationality patrols along the borders.<sup>101</sup>
- As a demonstration of political will, the National Commission should be provided with its own office premises and should be allocated a separate budget to ensure its financial and political independence. In addition, its activities and projects should be actively supported by national and regional structures, in particular with regard to the creation of arms registries. Finally, staffing capacities should be increased and expertise enhanced, in order for the National Commission to become fully operational and develop and sustain all its projects.

## 5. Conclusion and recommendations

As seen above, there are different challenges facing each of the three countries, depending on the specific national contexts. However, broader conclusions regarding SALW control policies can be drawn from the common experiences of Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal.

SALW control mechanisms are relatively well developed in Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal, although resource constraints are hampering their effective implementation. In addition, the different levels of commitment from the Governments to address SALW issues is reflected in the varying degrees of autonomy provided to the National Commissions. In Ghana and Nigeria for example, the absence of a formally and legally-established National Commission hinders its independence and autonomy, which impedes the development and implementation of SALW control policies. This is particularly significant with regard to the lack of financial autonomy attributed to these national structures. Even in Senegal, the absence of proper office facilities, staffing and financial capacities remains a challenge for the implementation of the National Commission's mandate.

Furthermore, despite the presence in these three countries of active civil society organisations working on SALW issues, there are also varying degrees of collaboration between these organisations and the governments. Representation on the National Commission is not always the best indicator in terms of assessing collaboration between the Commission and civil society organisations. Indeed, the question of civil society-government collaboration is particularly challenging in Nigeria, where the organisations represented on the National Committee are not considered to have much legitimacy with regard to SALW work and expertise. However, the case of Senegal demonstrates that, although civil society organisations are not represented on the National Commission, they are encouraged by and actively collaborate with the Commission.

From the analysis of SALW controls in the three countries emerges a general pattern which has important implications for the future of the sub-region. Due to the economic and social situation, criminal activities and gangsterism are growing in these three countries, contributing to increased feelings of insecurity. These two elements combined fuel the demand for SALW, which are often readily available. This is due not only to neighbouring conflicts but also to past conflicts in these countries, and the subsequent failure to successfully carry out disarmament programmes. The challenges faced by the National Commissions are strongly linked to these issues, and SALW control policies incorporating responses to these problems need to be developed in Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal.

Based on the above conclusions, the authors have developed the following recommendations:

- All three countries have relatively poor records in collection and, particularly, destruction of surplus and seized weapons. National needs assessments should therefore be conducted in this area to direct capacity-building activities and resources in order to enhance the current capabilities. Although this would not solve the problem of trafficking and smuggling from neighbouring countries, this would address the current situation of internal SALW proliferation;
- Despite the political will to tackle SALW proliferation, the National Commissions of the three countries are not endowed with the necessary resources to effectively implement policy measures and activities in an autonomous manner. Although they remain key structures for the control of SALW, the levels of staffing, expertise and financial resources are often inadequate in relation to their role and tasks. This has for example hampered the setting-up of documentation units and computerised SALW registries, which represents a major step in the implementation and subsequent enforcement of SALW controls. In particular, the provision of computer equipment appears an essential step forward in enhancing information sharing and communication between police forces and other security sector agencies at both the national and regional levels.
- National plan of actions for the control of SALW proliferation should be articulated in more details, specifying the role of all the actors engaged in SALW issues. This would have the advantage of outlining and planning the work of the National Commissions and would enhance coordination between civil society and government activities. It would also provide a framework against which the National Commission's work can be assessed and would therefore increase transparency and accountability;
- There is a need for a more specific and comprehensive understanding of SALW proliferation. Local and regional research activities should be supported and enhanced through linkages with international research and governmental agencies. Specific areas of research should be delineated, in particular to develop information and data infrastructure by supporting the creation of SALW related databanks in universities, institutes, and hospitals for examples;
- The case studies also demonstrate the importance of taking a multidimensional approach to SALW control policies, based on the participation of local populations. An approach jointly addressing human development and human security would therefore contribute to the reduction of insecurity through minimising the attraction of resorting to armed violence.
- More specifically, arms for development programmes addressing the problem of local production in Ghana, Nigeria and Casamance should be implemented in order to offer economic alternatives to SALW production and trafficking. Governments need to engage more with producers of arms, which are much more attracted to financial benefits than to any kind of political motivation. Such programmes would also indirectly contribute to the reduction of firearms-related violence and criminality, by reducing the attractiveness of economic benefits linked to joining criminal networks.

## 6. Endnotes

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2. Address by (then) Minister of Defence, Gen. T.Y Danjuma (rtd) to the 2001 UN Conference on Small Arms, New York, 9 July, 2001.
3. Interview with Commissioner of Police Lawrence Alobi (Chair of NatCom), at Force Headquarters, Abuja, 8 August, 2003.
4. NatCom Secretariat, MICA, Abuja – Data as of July 2003.
5. Biting the Bullet/International Action Network on Small Arms, 'Implementing the Programme of Action 2003: Report of Action States and Civil Society', July 2003. p.59.
6. UNDP, 2002 *Human Development Report*, Geneva, 2002.
7. Wisdom Awuku, as cited in Nnamdi Obasi, 2002, *Small Arms Proliferation and Disarmament in West Africa*, Apophyl Productions, Abuja. P.66.
8. According to the Ghana Living Standard Survey (GLASS 4), some 60% of Ghana is classified as rural.
9. Interview with Emmanuel Sowatey, Accra, 20 May, 2003.
10. Kwesi Aning, 'Home Made and Imported Guns' *West Africa*, 7-13 July, 2003, p17, London.
11. Ibid.
12. Interview with Dr Kwesi Aning, Accra, 20 May, 2003.
13. It is possible to obtain an estimated average, calculated from interviews with individuals within the civil society familiar with and conducting research on SALW (Interviews with anonymous respondents).
14. Interview with Dr Kwesi Aning, Accra, 20 May, 2003.
15. Interview with Emmanuel Sowatey, Accra, 20 May, 2003.
16. Nnamdi Obasi, op cit. pp. 67-68.
17. Email response from Dr Kwesi Aning, 18 August, 2003.
18. Kwesi Aning, 'Home Made and Imported Guns' *West Africa*, 7-13 July, 2003, p18, London.
19. Nnamdi Obasi, op cit, p. 66.
20. Meeting between Inspector-General of Police and the UN Conflict Resolution Team, Sept 2002. Courtesy of Dr Kwesi Aning.
21. Email response from FOSDA, 14 August, 2003.
22. See (respectively), Arthur Edwin, *The Independent*, 4 October, 2001, 'Shooting Scare at Pokuase: Cop leads landguards' and Edmund Mingle, *Ghanaian Times*, 15 May 2001, p.3 'Anyaa Residents attacked by Thugs'.
23. This is the amount established under Section 11.1 of the 1962 Act.
24. Section 3 of the 1996 Arms & Ammunition Amendment Act of 1996.
25. Biting the Bullet/International Action Network on Small Arms, 'Implementing the Programme of Action 2003: Report of Action States and Civil Society', July 2003. p. 60.
26. SMS message from Dr Kwesi Aning, at 21.05 hrs, 22 August, 2003.
27. Kwesi Aning, 'Small Arms and Crime in Africa: The Ghana Case', forthcoming paper being prepared for *Small Arms Survey*, Geneva. Draft is cited here with the permission of the author.
28. Email response from FOSDA, 14 August, 2003.
29. Nnamdi Obasi, op cit. pp. 67-68.
30. Email response from Dr Kwesi Aning, 18 August, 2003.
31. Biting the Bullet/International Action Network on Small Arms, 'Implementing the Programme of Action 2003: Report of Action States and Civil Society', July 2003. p. 60.
32. Email response from FOSDA, 14 August, 2003.
33. Ibid.
34. In a speech to UN Conference on Small Arms and Light weapons in July 2001, the former Minister of Defence, Gen T.Y Danjuma (rtd), stated that there are 1 million illicit SALW in Nigeria. The Nigerian Press and popular discourse put the figure much higher. See, for example, See *Vanguard* (Newspaper), 12 July, 2000, Lagos. p.8.
35. Jemibewon, cited in Chukwuma, Innocent, 2000, 'Vigilantes and Policing in Nigeria' in *Law Enforcement Review*, Lagos, July-September, pp.15-19.
36. Norwegian Initiative for Small Arms Transfers – Small Arms database. See <http://www.nisat.org> (consulted on 26 January 2004).
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38. Musa, Abdel-Fatau, 1999, 'The Sorrows of War: Small Arms, Conflict and Poverty in West Africa' *Democracy and Development*, Vol 2 No. 3, September-December, London: Center for Democracy and Development. See page 12.
39. In 1992, a civilian Great Ogboru allegedly imported enough arms and ammunition to carry out a military coup while in 2000, a lecturer at Obafemi Awolowo University, Ile-Ife was caught with firearms as part of his role in the communal Ife-Modakeke clashes.
40. Presidential (monthly) chat with the Press, presented on Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) 2 December, 2001. As cited in Obasi, Nnamdi, 2002, *Small Arms Proliferation and Disarmament in West Africa*, Abuja: Apophyl Productions, p.78.
41. Agekameh, D, 'Guns, Guns Everywhere', *TELL Magazine*, 6 August 2001 (Lagos), p.33.
42. In 1987, a notorious armed robber, Lawrence Anini, confessed that his gang was armed by Deputy Superintendent of Police (DSP) Iyamu, who was the head of the State Anti-Robbery Squad. In another reported case (1999), ten (10) soldiers of the 82 Division, Nigerian Army, Enugu were sentenced to death by the Akwa Ibom State Robbery and Firearms Tribunal for armed robbery and stealing. In another incident, three mobile police constables who robbed and killed five Katsina-bound traders at Obehira Junction, Okene, in February 2001, were sentenced to death by hanging. See John Adama, 2001, 'Three MOPOLS to die for Okene Robbery', *New Nigerian*, 3 April, Kaduna p.1.
43. Alemika, E.E.O. 1993, 'The Nigerian Police Force: A Preliminary Assessment of Functional Performance' *International Journal Of Sociology Of Law*, Vol. 7 Pp.61 – 83.
44. Centre for Law Enforcement Education (CLEEN)/World Organization Against Torture (OMCT), 2002, *Hope Betrayed?: A Report On Impunity and State-Sponsored Violence In Nigeria*, Lagos:CLEEN/OMCT.
45. For example, in 1992, a customs official gave out 16 G-3 rifles to youths as his own contribution to the Niger Delta cause - Akparanta, Ben, 1999, 'Illegal Guns And Violent Crime In Nigeria' *Law Enforcement Review*, Vol.7 July – September 1999.
46. Some of the most notorious of these cults/gangs include Eiyee, Buccaneer, Vikings, Mafia, K.K, Black Nationalists, Black Axe, Black Beret, Daughters of Jezebel, among others.
47. In June 2002, fifteen students of the University of Nigeria, Nsuka, were killed in violent clashes involving rival cult groups. In September 2001, three students died in a shootout between rival gangs at the University of Jos, where seventeen different cult groups are reported to exist. Within the first quarter of 2002, ten students of the Rivers State Polytechnic were killed in gun battles between different rival cult groups. - Adekeye, Fola, 2002, 'Killers On Campus' *NewsWatch*, Lagos, July 29, pp. 20-33.
48. Adisa, Jinmi, (1994), *Urban Violence In Lagos* IFRA, Institute Of African Studies, University Of Ibadan. Vol.2 Ibadan: Nigeria.
49. Figures obtained from the Lagos State Police Command.
50. See Adisa, op cit..
51. Small Arms Survey research findings.
52. Ebo, Adedeji, 'Small Arms and Criminality in Nigeria: Focus on Kaduna State (Rural and Urban)', Study conducted for Small Arms Survey, Geneva, October, 2002, p.20.
53. The term 'Bakassi Boys' refers to the main vigilante groups operating in the south-eastern cities of Nigeria since 1998. In the three main cities where they currently operate, the Bakassi Boys are now officially called the Abia Vigilante Services, Anambra Vigilante Services, and Imo Vigilante Services, but commonly referred to as the *Bakassi Boys*.
54. Centre for Law Enforcement Education/Human Rights Watch, 2002, *The Bakassi Boys: The Legitimaization of Murder and Torture*, Lagos:CLEEN/HRW.
55. Quoted in *West Africa* magazine, 2003, 'Political Killings in Nigeria: the Government Must Act', 17-23 March, London, p.4. Examples of this violence include the assassination of the incumbent Minister of Justice and Attorney General was killed on 21 December, 2001 and that of perhaps the most influential politician in the south-south zone on March 5 2003. In the period preceding the 2003 elections, Nigeria was bedevilled by widespread acquisition of small arms by various politicians and political groups, as a means of guaranteeing their political fortunes in the 2003 elections.
56. The police in Ondo state confirmed that a politician was stockpiling arms. In a search of his residence, the police recovered 13 single barrel guns, 6 empty shells, and 206 cartridges. Information cited in Chigbo, op. cit..



- <sup>57</sup> In one of Nigeria's 36 states (Cross River state), the police recovered 54 guns in the first half of 2002. Of these, 16 were recovered from politicians, and another 8 from politically-motivated murders. About 40 people have been killed in election related violence in the area during the same period. In Edo state, a gubernatorial aspirant was arrested with arms. Information cited in Chigbo, Maureen, 2002, 'Danger: Politicians Stockpile Arms to Fight Their Ways Into Political Offices in 2003', in *Newswatch*, Lagos, August 12, pp. 20-27.
- <sup>58</sup> 1959 Firearms Act, Section 10: 'No person shall by way of trade or business buy or sell or transfer or expose for sale or transfer or have in his possession for sale or transfer any firearms unless registered as a firearms dealer'.
- <sup>59</sup> Section 18 of the Nigerian Firearms Act of 1959.
- <sup>60</sup> Section 28 of the Nigerian Firearms Act of 1959.
- <sup>61</sup> Special Provision Decree No. 5 of 1984.
- <sup>62</sup> Special Provision Decree, *op.cit.*, Section 3(1).
- <sup>63</sup> Section 1(2) of the Nigerian Firearms Act of 1959.
- <sup>64</sup> Section 2(2) of the Nigerian Firearms Act of 1959.
- <sup>65</sup> Deputy Commissioner of Police Nana-Kumo, 'Issues of the Moment', Nigerian Television Authority (NTA) recorded on 2 October, 2003, at 11am.
- <sup>66</sup> Interview with Commissioner of Police Lawrence Alobi, at Force Headquarters, Abuja, 8 August, 2003.
- <sup>67</sup> See *Thisday* newspaper, 8 July, 2003, p.5, 'Panel Seek Amendment of Firearms Act'.
- <sup>68</sup> As reported in *Vanguard* (newspaper), Lagos, 12 October, 2001. p3.
- <sup>69</sup> See Ebo, A. with Mazal, L., *op.cit.*, Annexe 4, p.51.
- <sup>70</sup> See Annex 2 for Nigeria NatCom Workplan 2003.
- <sup>71</sup> See *Guardian, Punch, Thisday* of Saturday 12 April and Sunday 13 April, 2003. Same on 17-18 April 2003.
- <sup>72</sup> Interview with Commissioner of Police Lawrence Alobi (Chair of NatCom), at Force Headquarters, Abuja, 8 August, 2003.
- <sup>73</sup> Letter by NatCom Chairman (ref CQ:2400/B' DEPT/FHQ/ABJ/VOL. T/1) to the Permanent Mission of Nigeria to the United Nations, New York, dated 3 July, 2003.
- <sup>74</sup> Interview with Desk Officers at the NatCom, 7 August, 2003.
- <sup>75</sup> Interview with Commissioner of Police Lawrence Alobi (Chair of NatCom), at Force Headquarters, Abuja, 8 August, 2003.
- <sup>76</sup> Interview with Gerald Okafor, NatCom Secretariat, 8 August, 2003.
- <sup>77</sup> See for example, *Thisday* Newspaper, 10 August, 2003, p. 4, 'Arms From Liberia Worries Me, says Turaki'. Saminu Turaki is Governor of Nigeria's north western state of Jigawa.
- <sup>78</sup> Ebo, A. with Mazal, L., *op.cit.*.
- <sup>79</sup> Currently, the NatCom is receiving technical and financial assistance from the US Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) and the US Customs Service. Under the Enhanced Border Security Against Illicit Small Arms and other Contrabands project, training workshops have been held in Katsina (September 2002) and Lagos (March 2003). Two more trainings are planned for Benin/Port Harcourt and Maiduguri/Yola.
- <sup>80</sup> With regard to border control, the Natcom has contacted and is in negotiations with the French and Japanese missions in Nigeria.
- <sup>81</sup> Statement of the Director of the Department of Collective Defence and Security who oversees the Natcom Secretariat.
- <sup>82</sup> Two Roundtables were held. The first was on 'Small Arms Proliferation and Violent Crime in the Niger Delta Area' (10 June, 2003 in Benin City, Edo State). The second on 'Small Arms, Communal Conflicts and Crime' was held at Arewa House, Kaduna on 12 June, 2003. A seminar was also held at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Nigerian Defence Academy on 18 June, 2003, at which a paper titled 'The Political Economy of Illicit Small Arms Proliferation in Nigeria: Issues for a Human Security Agenda' was presented.
- <sup>83</sup> In a departure from this norm, AFSTRAG in March 2003 co-sponsored the 5th African regional Conference of the IPPNW, with the theme 'War, A Preventive Evil in Africa'.
- <sup>84</sup> The four NGOs on the NatCom are Africa Leadership Forum, Quench Crisis Initiative, Nigerian Council of Women Societies (NCWS), Shehu Shagari Institute for Peace and Good Government.
- <sup>85</sup> UNREC Report, Roads and Caches for Illicit Weapons in Africa, June 2001.
- <sup>86</sup> Comment from Hélène Cissé in her review of the Small Arms Controls in Africa report, October 2003. This comment refers to the content of two reports: The Experts Committee of the UN on violations of the arms embargo in Liberia and Sierra Leone (2000) (following Security Council Resolution 1306 adopted on the 20 December 2000) and a report from UNREC entitled "Roads and Caches for Illicit Weapons in Africa" (June 2001).
- <sup>87</sup> Report from the International Drugs Observatory, 2000.
- <sup>88</sup> M. Evans, The War Economy in Casamance, HPG Background Paper, Overseas Development Institute, p.9-12.
- <sup>89</sup> Implementation decree no. 66-887 of the 17 November 1996 relating to the general regulation of arms and ammunitions.
- <sup>90</sup> Presentation by Capitaine Dieng, Permanent Secretary of the Senegalese National Commission – Accra, Ghana, 14 of October 2003.
- <sup>91</sup> MALAO, *Ginaar Ak y Neman - Les armes légères au Sénégal*, rapport d'enquête, publié par le, Dakar, Septembre 2003, Imprimerie Saint Paul.
- <sup>92</sup> MALAO, *op.cit.*.
- <sup>93</sup> For a precise definition of the categories of small arms and light weapons, see: <http://www.bicc.de/helpdesk/definition/types.html>
- <sup>94</sup> Survey conducted by MALAO: 81.2% of the people in urban areas are aware of the necessity of having a licence, whereas only 62.9% people living in rural areas are aware of this. In addition, over 50% of the population are unaware of the procedure to obtain a licence. This figure reaches 60.7% in rural areas.
- <sup>95</sup> Researchers have highlighted the importance of smuggling between Mali and Senegal, see M.C.Diop, *Le Senegal et ses voisins*, p.323-325.
- <sup>96</sup> AFP newsbrief – 1st November 1997.
- <sup>97</sup> The National Commission was set up by the primatorial decree of the 20/11/2000.
- <sup>98</sup> For information relating to Zonal Information Bureaux please refer to: Edo, A with Mazal, L., *op.cit.*, p.25.
- <sup>99</sup> MALAO, *op.cit.*.
- <sup>100</sup> MALAO, *op.cit.*.
- <sup>101</sup> Communiqué PANA in the Senegalese newspaper *Le Matin*, 4 February 2004.

## 7. Appendixes

### ANNEXE 1:

#### ANALYSIS OF GHANA'S FIREARMS LAWS, 1962-1996.

LEGISLATION	MAJOR PROVISION	MAJOR EFFECT/ IMPLICATIONS
Arms & Ammunition Act 1962 (Act 118) as amended by the Arms & Ammunition Decree 1972 (NRCD 9) and the Arms & Ammunition (Amendment Act 1996)	Constitute the legislation governing possession & control of arms/ ammunition/explosives.	Provide the framework for possession & control.
1962 Act (S1(1))	Every person who owns possesses/control any arms/ammunition must have them registered at the nearest police station.	All guns/ammunition (including explosives) must be licensed.
S1 (4)	This section shall not apply so as to require the registration of arms or ammunition forming part of the regular equipment of the Armed forces or the police service.	Exempts the regular equipment of the force from registration. Herein the provision covers equipment acquired by the forces & police other than as part of such regular equipment
S10 (1)	A person shall not keep a private warehouse for storing of firearms, arms of war, ammunition... without a license granted by the prescribed authority.	Warehousing of arms require license.
S10 (2)	The premises must be ..... "enclosed... reserved for that special purpose, having only one entry which shall be provided with two locks, one of which can be opened only by a public officer.	The law provides the framework for control of such warehouses.
S11	The person in charge of a private warehouse shall be responsible for all firearms, arms, and ammunition deposited therein and shall account for them on demand by the prescribed authority .... All withdrawals shall be entered in a special register, numbered & initiated by the person in charge...	Control, checks & balances.
S12 (1)	No arms, firearms or ammunition shall be withdrawn ----- except under a license.	Control.
S15	A person shall not transfer .... Except under a license granted by the prescribed authority.	The section provides the requisite authority with the power to keep track of the movement of arms in private hands.
S16	Both the manufacture & assembling of firearms, arms of war, munitions of war or of ammunition are hereby prohibited except at arsenals established by the government.	Complete ban on the manufacture & assembling of arms & munitions by all except government.
S17	A person shall not open or carry on an establishment for the repair of firearms without a license issued by the prescribed authority.	A license to repair such firearms could be obtained. An establishment for the repairs of firearms can operate only under a license.
S19	A person shall not as of right be entitled to the grant of any license.... Same may be refused by the prescribed authority without any reason.....	The grant of a license is a privilege, thus it is not automatic.
S22 (1)	Any person who: - a) contravenes any provision of this Act,..... b) does any act with intent to contravene this Act.... c) Does any act which is... declared to be an offence.	shall be guilty of a misdemeanour.
S22 (3)	On convicting any person of any offence against this Act, the Court may be order, suspend or revoke any license, permit, or authorization which he may hold under this Act, or under regulations made hereunder.	Confers on the courts the power to revoke any license...
S23	The provisions, restrictions and prohibitions in this Act shall not apply to any firearms, arms or ammunition intended for use by the Armed forces or the police service.	Exempts arsenals meant for the armed forces or police. Thus, it is an act of limited application as it is confined to those outside the armed forces & police.

LEGISLATION	MAJOR PROVISION	MAJOR EFFECT/ IMPLICATIONS
<b>Arms &amp; Ammunition Decree 1972</b>		
S1 (1)	Every person who owns, possesses or controls any arms of ammunition (including explosives) shall forthwith register those arms or ammunition at the nearest police station.	All arms & ammunitions in private hands must be registered.
S1 (4)	This section shall not apply so as to require registration of arms or ammunition forming part of the regular equipment of the armed forces or the police service, but shall apply in respect of all arms & ammunition acquired by the Armed forces or the police service otherwise than as part of such regular equipment.	Arms & ammunitions acquired outside the regular equipment of the armed forces & police are subject to the provision of the act.
S2 (2)	No application for registration shall be accepted until the arms/ ammunition are produced for inspection by the police.	All arms & ammunitions must be inspected before granting of license – the act pre-supposes that one will acquire the gun, then seek registration.
S4 (1)	A permit may be renewed for further periods not exceeding six months at a time or such other period as the inspector-General of police may determine. . .	The validity of the license is usually 6 months.
S10 (1)	The Inspector-General of Police shall maintain a Central Arms & Ammunition Register of all arms & ammunition (including explosives) registered in accordance with this Decree.	The responsibility of keeping a central register lies with the Inspector General.
S11 (1)	Any person found. . . guilty of an offence under the Act shall be liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding C10,000.00 or to imprisonment not exceeding five years or both.	Sets out the prescribed punishment on conviction under the Act.
<b>Arms &amp; Ammunition (Amendment) Act 1996</b>		
S2	Any person found guilty shall be guilty of an offence & liable on summary conviction to a fine not exceeding C5 million or to imprisonment not exceeding five years or to both.	Raises the stipulated fine of C10,000 hitherto contained in the 1972 Act.
S3	The principal enactment is amended by the insertion after the meaning of the word “firearms” in S13.  “first class arms and ammunition dealer” means a person whose annual importation of shot guns and ammunition is more than 1000 pieces but not more than 2000 pieces;  “second class arms and ammunition dealer” means a person whose annual importation of arms and ammunition is less than 1000 pieces;  “magazine” means a store for arms, ammunition, cartridges and explosives.	Redefines first & second class ammunition dealers.
	<b>Fees Payable</b> i) First Class private arms and ammunition magazine dealer (first licensing) .. C1,000,000.00  ii) Renewal fee for first class private arms and ammunition magazine dealer (renewal license) .. C 500,000.00  iii) Second class private arms and ammunition magazine dealer (first licensing) .. C 500,000.00  iv) Renewal fee for second class private arms and ammunition magazine dealer (renewal license) .. C 300,000.00	

LEGISLATION	MAJOR PROVISION	MAJOR EFFECT/ IMPLICATIONS
	v) Revolvers and pistols (first licence) (individuals) (annually) .. C 250,000.00	
	vi) Renewal for revolver and pistol licence (individuals) (annually) .. C100,000.00	
	vii) Air pistol, air rifle, air gun and gas diffusing arms licensing for life. .. C 50,000.00	
	viii) Other arms e.g. cap guns and flint lock guns licensing for life. .. C 10,000.00	
	ix) Fee for private magazine withdrawals permit for explosives (Form C) (annually). .. C100,000.00	
	x) Fee for private magazine withdrawals permit for arms and ammunition (Forms C) annually: 1st Class .. C100,000.00 2nd Class .. C 50,000.00	
	xi) Commercial magazine dealer in explosives (first license) .. C5,000,000.00	
	xii) Commercial magazine dealer (annual renewal) fee .. C1,000,000.00	

## Annexe 2: FRAMEWORK FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ECOWAS MORATORIUM ON SMALL ARM IN NIGERIA

### 1.0 Introduction:

Increasingly, the illegal transfer of Small arms and light weapons is recognized as a security-related humanitarian problem that needs to be tackled by states on a national, regional and international levels. The uncontrolled accumulation and proliferation of small arms is a major threat to national, sub-regional and regional security. Apart from causing destruction of lives and serious human rights violation, the phenomenon undermines development efforts. This has resulted, among others, in the increase in criminality and banditry, and the emergence of child soldiers with its attendant consequences. Convinced of the linkage between small arms, security, conflict and economic development, the ECOWAS member states signed a moratorium on the importation, exportation and manufacture of light weapons in West Africa in 1998. This programme aims to build peace in support of activities that promote a secure and stable climate for socio-economic development. It will seek the active collaboration of inter-governmental and civil society organizations.

### 2.0 Objectives and Priority Areas

- It will build a culture of peace through appropriate programmes to counter the growing culture of violence;
- It will strengthen the present structure and improve the capacity of the military, security and police forces through training and improved access to modern arms control methods;
- It will enhance and develop effective capacity to monitor arms flow and transfer at border posts;
- It will establish national registry and filing system on weapon flows. It will create a light weapon information management system (LWIM), a database reflecting compilation of national filing system;
- It will assist in collection and destruction of surplus and unauthorized weapons that are not needed for national security.
- It will open up channel of interactions and dialogue with the producers and suppliers in order to control light weapons diffusion;
- It will assist in creating an adequate system of national laws, regulations and administrative procedures that will permit effective control of import, export and management of light weapons;

- It will enhance on resource mobilization for the implementation of the programme.

### 3.0 Establishing a Culture of Peace

The Moratorium is a confidence building measure that is needed to establish a culture of peace. This will be achieved through an awareness campaign involving women organizations, religious bodies, community groups, business associations, professional organizations, academics, traditional groups, elders and non-governmental organizations. They will inform the general public about the effects of armed violence and the concerted efforts by the government to reduce them. The approach for establishing this culture of peace is at the following levels:

#### Local Level

*Programmes such as those listed below will be adopted*

- Essays and opinion pieces/papers will be published in local newspapers as regards the Moratorium.
- Talk shows in local radio networks discussing the government's effort to curb illicit small arms trafficking.
- The local television stations will air documentaries on the issue of small arms proliferation and control.
- Community meetings will be organised to inform the grass-root on the dangers of small arms.

#### National Level

*Government will facilitate the following:*

- Mobilization of resources at inter-ministerial level to promote education in favour of the culture of peace.
- Educating the school children on the culture of peace by de-glamourizing violence and emphasizing on the African traditions of negotiation and dialogue in conflict situations.
- Through video tapes and documentaries, child soldiering will be de-glamourized. Danger ahead of a child entangled in the situation will be properly emphasized.

- 3.1** These organizations involved in the establishment of culture of peace will solicit for assistance from government to ensure the sustainability of their political will to control small arms proliferation. Efforts will be made to translate into native languages these programmes to facilitate proper comprehension by the people.

**International Level:**

- a) Need to establish a network of West African NGOs working to promote peace in the sub-region. This will be in collaboration with Programme for Coordination and Assistance on Security Development (PCASED).
  - b) Need to increase sub-regional and international collaboration.
  - c) Each member state of ECOWAS will celebrate a week against the proliferation of small arms.
- 3.2** Considering the level of decadence in the security and the relative absence of peace, the government will stand up to its responsibility of punishing crimes and effectively practicing democratic governance. This will help in establishing the culture of peace.
- 3.3** In fact, to establish the culture of peace, efforts will be intensified to organize community education programmes to assist the local constituencies acquire knowledge about the dangers associated with small arms. This will help in the evolution of norms and ethics against the possession of small arms among them. In this direction, Peace education materials on the over-all consequences of the accumulation, proliferation and the use of small arms will be developed to suit all the segments of the society.
- 3.4** Capacity building seminars and workshops will be organized to expose the dangers associated with small arms. Youth initiatives on the potential hazards of child soldier will be developed through **essay writing, debates at schools and visit to rehabilitation homes of the affected children.**

**4.0 Training for Military, Para-military Forces and Users of arms**

To usher in the culture of peace, military, security, police, custom forces and all users of small arms will be properly trained to enforce the rules of law. The necessary techniques and skills needed to address the associated issues of small arms will be acquired. Such issues are as follows:

- a) Easy access of civilian to small arms
  - b) Possibility of concealing small arms.
  - c) Porous borders which boost the proliferation of small arms.
  - d) Uncontrolled spread of cheap and unregistered firearms
  - e) High wave of crimes.
- 4.1** There is an important need to train all users of small arms/weapons to combat illicit use and transfer of small arms in West Africa. For this reason, the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat, PCASED and Lome Centre will assist in providing training materials on the following issues:
- i. Modern techniques for maintaining law and order
  - ii. Proper small arms collection methods
  - iii. Dealing with drug trafficking and cross border crimes
  - iv. Maintenance of natural weapons arsenal
  - v. Demobilization of soldiers and disarmament
  - vi. Re-integration of ex-combatants into civil society
  - vii. Cross-border collaboration between forces and leaders of local communities.

- 4.2** These educational materials will assist in the training of national trainers on the issue of combating the proliferation of small arms. These national trainers will assist in the training of users of small arms/weapons on the modern methods of arms and ammunition control and law enforcement. The Civil Society Organizations will be involved in the training process in order to identify the sensitive areas where the uniformed forces could be trained.

- 4.3** To build confidence and cooperation between the local community and the uniformed forces, channels of communication will be established. This will improve on the government's ability to protect and defend civilians. Intensive efforts will be made to promote professionalism and anti-corruption practices among the uniformed forces to enhance national security and curtail the proliferation of small arms.

**6.0 ENHANCING WEAPONS CONTROL AT BORDER POSTS**

Nigeria in collaboration with ECOWAS Executive Secretariat, PCASED, the Civil Society Organisation and neighbouring countries find ways of enhancing weapons control at Border posts. These measures will be adopted:

- a) Increase control and verification at frontiers to curtail the flow of small arms;
- b) Develop a system for detecting and apprehending perpetrators;
- c) Effective legal structures should be put in place at identifiable points of entry or exit;
- d) Applying strict control of imports and exports of small arms components;
- e) Issue visitors, upon arrival, with an entry permit for arms brought into the country, as well as exit certificate upon departure from the country.

**6.1 Establishing a Small Arms and Light Weapons Register**

Smuggling small arms and light weapons are very hard to trace because of the absence of proper registration or licensing system in Nigeria. The Ministry in collaboration with the Nigerian Police Force will open or strengthen national registry of weapons to help prevent excessive unplanned accumulation of small arms. Therefore, Nigeria in collaboration with ECOWAS Executive Secretariat, PCASED and Lome Centre will implement these measures:

- a) Set up or enhance national filing system, taking particular notice of captured illegal weapons;
- b) Improving on the storage facilities
- c) Compile information on small arms transfer issues and potential policy options to stop illicit proliferation of light weapons
- d) Organize workshops on operational modalities for a database and arms register.

**14.0**

The information from small arms and light weapons register will be made readily available for military, security, police and custom forces, other government officials, Civil society and other bodies that work towards the project.

**7.0 Collection and Destruction of Surplus and Unauthorized Weapons**

All weapons that are no longer needed for national security will be collected and immediately destroyed. Collecting and storing surplus weapons has the potential of being used during conflicts thus its destruction is conducive to establish a proper climate for post-conflict reconstruction. Nigeria will organize a Comprehensive Voluntary Weapons Collection Programmes (VWCP). The government in collaboration with the ECOWAS Executive Secretariat and PCASED will:

- i. Develop an awareness campaigns about VWCP
- ii. Develop and promote inexpensive weapon destruction methods
- iii. Avoid "buy-back" programmes which encourage flows of weapons for sale
- iv. Develop strategies to effectively control the flows of weapons during post conflict peace processes.

**8.0 Facilitating Dialogue with Producers/Suppliers**

For successful implementation of the moratorium close collaboration with arms producers and suppliers has to be established. This will assist in

providing sufficient awareness of the moratorium to the producers and suppliers. The government in collaboration with PCASED and ECOWAS Executive Secretariat should adopt these measures:

- a) Encourage dialogue among small arms producers/suppliers and between small arms producers/suppliers and potential buyers.
- b) Encourage small arms producers/suppliers to devise common export controls.
- c) Encourage small arms producers/suppliers to mark light weapons in order to ease tracing.
- d) Encourage small arms producers/suppliers to establish a database.
- e) Encourage small arms producers/suppliers jointly to develop codes of conduct in order to ensure transparency in arms trade.
- f) Devise and promote reorganization programmes for artisan producers of guns in Nigeria to encourage them to produce other goods in place of firearms.

**8.1** It is pertinent to discuss the technical provisions of the Moratorium with international small arms producers and suppliers to enhance the chances of its successful implementation. Therefore, ECOWAS Executive Secretariat and PCASED will adopt the following measures:

- a) Establish dialogue with other groups engaged in discussions promoting small arms supplier restraints;
- b) Collaborate with European Union and other regional organizations to establish a common arms export controls

**9.0 Reviewing and Harmonizing National Legislation And Administrative Procedures**

To implement the Moratorium effectively, adequate system of national and regional laws, regulations and administrative procedures to exercise control over arms ownership and arms importation and exportation in the West Africa sub-region should be established. Nigeria with the assistance of PCASED, ECOWAS Executive Secretariat and the civil society will enhance on the following:

- i. Review, update and harmonize all national legislation and administrative procedures regarding civilian possession, use and transfer of light weapons;
- ii. Develop standardized exportation and importation permits and

- end-user certificate to limit fraudulent transfers;
- iii. Establish National Commission on Small Arms and light weapons. The Commission will develop strategies and policies relating to small arms and its proliferation.

**9.1** The Civil Society organizations will conduct studies on the existing national legislative and administrative instrument with regards to small arms, identifying the areas that need improvement. Awareness campaign will be launched on the existing coordinating mechanisms such as:

- a) Declaration of principles in the context of firearms control and transnational organized crime;
- b) European Union programme on preventing and combating illicit trafficking in Conventional Arms (1997);
- c) OAS Inter-American Convention Against the illicit manufacturing and trafficking in firearms, ammunition, explosive and other related materials (1997);
- d) Ottawa Convention on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling production and transfer of Anti-personnel mines and on their destruction (1997).

**10.0 Mobilizing Resources for the Programme**

This is a very ambitious programme. Executing it will require sustained funding and adequate moral and political support. The Federal, State and Local Governments will be involved in the funding. Others are ECOWAS, PCASED, United Nations, Regional Centre for Peace and Disarmament in Africa (Lome Centre), Multinational Corporations, Multilateral and Bilateral partners and exclusive awareness campaign will be launched to attract funding.

**11.0 Conclusion:**

In view of the elaborate exposition made above, the implementation of Moratorium on Small Arms and Light Weapons in Nigeria will assist in addressing the crucial issue of proliferation of small arms and its consequences. This will assist in managing and preventing the incessant conflict or curtailing the level of destruction from crisis whenever it occurs. The implementation of the programme is phased in three parts to enable proper coordination and maximum out-put as tabulated below.

**TABLE OF ACTIVITIES  
PHASE I**

<b>ACTIVITIES</b>	<b>RESPONSIBILITIES</b>	<b>EXPECTED SPONSORS</b>	<b>METHODS OF ACHIEVEMENT</b>
Establishing a culture of Peace (long term process)	States, Local Government, NGOs, Federal Government, Civil Society Organisations, Traditional institutions, Organised Youth organizations, Religious bodies	Federal Government, ECOWAS, PCASED, NGOs, MNC	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1 Inauguration of inter-ministerial Committee;</li> <li>2 Sensitization visits to the State governments;</li> <li>3 Enlightenment campaigns at local and state levels,</li> <li>4 Organisation of seminars, workshops, lectures, essays in schools at the local and state levels involving religious bodies.</li> <li>5 Local Programme in native languages in each state and some designated local governments</li> <li>6 Drama in State Television of NTA.</li> <li>7 Constituting Committee at state levels to coordinate activities at state and local government levels and liaise with the Ministry.</li> </ol>
Facilitating dialogue with Producers and Suppliers (Permanent Activities)	Local Governments, States, Federal Government, National Commission, ECOWAS, PCASED.	Federal Government, Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Integrating the Producers/suppliers in the Programme, campaigns.</li> <li>2. Establishing cordial relationship with them.</li> <li>3. Identifying and registering them</li> </ol>

<b>ACTIVITIES</b>	<b>RESPONSIBILITIES</b>	<b>EXPECTED SPONSORS</b>	<b>METHODS OF ACHIEVEMENT</b>
Mobilization of resources for the programme's objectives and activities	Federal, State, Local Government, ECOWAS, PCASED, UN	Federal govt. Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation, MNCs	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Extensive enlightenment campaigns.</li> <li>2. Sensitization visits to MNCs that will be affected by the consequences of Conflicts</li> </ol>

**PHASE II**

<b>ACTIVITIES</b>	<b>RESPONSIBILITIES</b>	<b>EXPECTED SPONSORS</b>	<b>METHODS OF ACHIEVEMENT</b>
Training programmes for military, Para-military forces and Users of arms (Permanent Activities)	Uniformed officers, users of small arms at National, State and Local Government levels, National trainers.	Federal Government, ECOWAS, OAU, UN, Bilateral and multinational cooperation.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Seminars for Uniformed officers.</li> <li>2. Workshops for Uniformed officers involved in peace keeping</li> <li>3. Training to improve their capacity to detect illegal weapons.</li> </ol>
Establishing Database and national arms register (Permanent Activities)	National Commission, States, 6 Geo-political zones, ECOWAS, PSCASED, UN	Federal Government, Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Establishment of Database at 6 zonal levels.</li> <li>2. Establishment of arms registry at state levels.</li> <li>3. Establishment of Database and registry at National level.</li> </ol>
Collection and destruction of surplus and unauthorized weapons (to commence as soon as possible)	Local Government Areas, States, Federal Government, neighbouring countries, ECOWAS, PCASED	Federal Government Bilateral and Multilateral Cooperation.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Collaborating with producers/suppliers</li> <li>2. Collaborating with organized Youth organisations.</li> <li>3. Introducing inducements incentives to enable them relinquish the arms</li> </ol>

**PHASE III**

<b>ACTIVITIES</b>	<b>RESPONSIBILITIES</b>	<b>EXPECTED SPONSORS</b>	<b>METHODS OF ACHIEVEMENT</b>
Review and harmonization of national legislations and administrative procedures	Local Governments, States and Federal Government	Federal Government, Bilateral and Multilateral cooperation	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Bills to review the legislations on small arms at state and federal levels</li> <li>2. Enlightening the Ministries concerned to reduce administrative bottlenecks.</li> </ol>
Enhancing weapons control at border posts.	Nigeria, neighbouring countries – Chad, Niger, Benin and Cameroon	Federal Government, Bilateral and multilateral cooperation	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Training uniformed officers at the border posts.</li> <li>2. Provision of modern equipment to enhance their performance.</li> <li>3. Motivating the uniformed officers at the border posts to avoid corrupt practice</li> </ol>





## 8. Notes

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