

ENSURING PROGRESS IN THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENT CONFLICT:

PRIORITIES FOR THE GREEK & ITALIAN EU PRESIDENCIES 2003

THIS PAPER HAS BEEN WRITTEN BY STAFF FROM INTERNATIONAL ALERT AND SAFERWORLD, IN ASSOCIATION WITH THE EUROPEAN PEACE-BUILDING LIAISON OFFICE (EPLO). The paper is written on an annual basis as part of International Alert and Saferworld's Joint EU Initiative, which aims to enhance the European Unions' impact on preventing violent conflict through working with the EU Presidencies, Member States, key officials in the European Council, Parliament and Commission, and civil society in Europe and areas affected by conflict.

The following organisations have endorsed the paper (the organisation marked * support its aims):

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APRIL 2003



ACRONYMS

ACP Africa, Caribbean and Pacific

AU African Union

CPS Country Strategy Papers

CFSP Common Foreign and Security Policy

CPU Conflict Prevention Unit

DG Development Directorate General
DG Enlargement Enlargement Directorate General
DG Relex External Relations Directorate General

DG Trade Trade Directorate General

DFID Department for International Development

EC European Council

ECHO European Conflict and Humanitarian Office
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

ECDPM European Centre for Development Policy Management

ECPC European Civilian Peace Corps
EDF European Development Fund

EIDHR European Initiative for Human Rights and Democracy

EPLO European Peace Liaison Office

EU European Union

EUPM European Security and Defence Policy
EUPM European Union Police Mission

GAC General Affairs Council

HIPC Heavily Indebted Poor Countries

IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development

IPTF International Police Task Force
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NEPAD New Partnership for Africa's Development

NGO Non-governmental Organisation

OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe

PPEWU Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit PSC Political and Security Committee

RRF Rapid Reaction Force
RRM Rapid Reaction Mechanism
RSP Regional Strategy Papers

SADC Southern African Development Community

SALW Small Arms Light and Weapons

SECI South East European Co-operation Initiative

UN United Nations

UNDP United Nations Development Programme UN PoA United Nations Programme of Action

US United States

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Violent conflict causes massive humanitarian suffering, undermines development and human rights and stifles economic growth. In situations of conflict, political democracies are unable to mature and conflict creates conditions where terrorism and organised crime thrive.

The European Union (EU) has made a number of commitments to prioritise the prevention of violent conflict and has developed a series of key policy statements and institutional changes. Significant progress has been made to advance the conflict prevention agenda during the Spanish and Danish Presidencies in 2002, building on the work undertaken by the Belgium and Swedish Presidencies.¹

The aim of this document is to highlight practical steps that the EU could take during the Greek and Italian Presidencies in 2003 to better implement and monitor the progress of the commitments made on conflict prevention. The paper is aimed to provide support to the Presidencies, to member states, the Commission, the Council, parliamentarians and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in furthering the role of the EU in preventing violent conflict.

This paper outlines five key issues for EU member states and the Commission to address during the Greek and Italian Presidencies to enhance the EU's capacity to prevent violent conflict.

MAINSTREAMING CONFLICT PREVENTION POLICY AND PRACTICE WITHIN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY POLICY

Armed conflict has become one of the most prevalent causes of poverty in many parts of the world. In turn, poverty, social and economic exclusion increase the risks of violent conflict. The EU has recognised the linkages between development, poverty, and conflict and the role of development co-operation in conflict prevention. However, to ensure that conflict prevention and peace-building form a central part of development policy, it is important that the issue is further 'mainstreamed' within European Community policy. It is essential that all areas covered by the Community policy, such as trade and actions by the private sector, also address the root causes of violent conflict. EU conflict prevention policy and practice must also integrate and be informed by legitimate and representative civil society actors as part of a participatory, mainstreamed approach.

The paper proposes action in the following areas:

- Strengthening the capacity of EU institutions to integrate conflict sensitivity in the EU programming cycle of development co-operation and across all EU policy and sectors, through, for example, the development of comprehensive training programmes.
- Developing more effective peace and conflict impact assessments, which extend beyond those used in development programmes to all sectors, including the trade sector.
- Providing capacity building support to governments and civil society in the developing world to engage effectively in EU policy and programming e.g. through the ACP-EU Cotonou Partnership Agreement.

See Preventing violent conflict: Opportunities for the Swedish and Belgium Presidencies of the European Union in 2001 and Putting conflict prevention into practice: Priorities for the Spanish and Danish EU Presidencies 2002. International Alert & Saferworld

• Put pressure on exporting countries to accept independent experts to monitor for the illegal trade in conflict commodities.

STRENGTHENING EU-AFRICA ENGAGEMENT IN CONFLICT PREVENTION

It is important that the EU not only focuses on areas of obvious strategic interest, but also on countries and regions beset by chronic under-development and conflict in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (i.e. countries covered by the ACP-EU Cotonou Partnership Agreement). It is important that the development of an EU-Africa dialogue on the prevention of violent conflict remains high on the agenda, despite the likely 'indefinite postponement' of the EU African Lisbon summit due to take place in April 2003.

The paper proposes action in the following areas:

- Reviewing the EU-Africa dialogue on conflict prevention to ensure it is fully complementary with ongoing activities in African initiatives [e.g. African Union (AU), New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) and international institutions and frameworks (e.g. ACP-EU Cotonou Partnership, G8 plan of action for Africa)].
- Monitoring the impact of existing ACP-EU trade co-operation on social and economic exclusion and the risks of violent conflict.
- Making resources available to ensure the active participation of civil society in the development of EU-African conflict prevention strategies.

INTEGRATING CRISIS MANAGEMENT WITH CONFLICT PREVENTION

The EU is well placed to develop and integrate a civilian crisis management capacity and a number of key policy developments have taken place over the past year. However, from a peace-building perspective, more attention needs to be given to linking crisis management with longer-term conflict prevention strategies. In order to improve the functioning of civilian crisis management capabilities, the institutional structures of the EU and its relationship with other organisations need to be made more compatible.

The paper proposes action in the following areas:

- Integrating crisis management with conflict prevention capacities to strenghen their short, medium and long term impact.
- Establishing clear definitions and practice with other institutions participating in crisis management (the UN, OSCE and Council of Europe) to ensure responses are complementary.
- Working beyond the quantitative targets for civilian personnel in the four areas of crisis management (police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection) and developing qualitative targets.

TACKLING TERRORISM. ORGANISED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFICKING

Criminal and terrorist activities, including the illicit trafficking of humans, money, drugs and arms, pose a major security challenge in an enlarged EU. While terrorists themselves do not always come from deprived backgrounds, poverty and cultural dislocation provide a fertile ground for terrorists to recruit and gain sympathy and support. The root causes of terrorism and conflict are often the same. Tackling organised crime is a key concern, not least because EU countries are directly affected by the trafficking of people, drugs and weapons. Terrorist and criminal networks establish mutually beneficial working relationships that further destabilise vulnerable



communities, in some cases leading to conflict.

The paper proposes action in the following areas:

- Developing and enhancing long-term conflict prevention and peace-building initiatives as an effective response to addressing and responding to terrorist threats.
- Ensuring that the 'war on terrorism' is not used as a pretext to impinge on human rights, or that resources are directed away from long-term conflict prevention policies.
- Improving co-ordination and information exchange between all agencies and states involved in efforts to combat organised crime and placing greater priority on the implications of small arms flows as they relate to organised crime.

ENHANCING CO-ORDINATION ACROSS EU INSTITUTIONS

Implementing a comprehensive conflict prevention policy through all the mechanisms and instruments available to the EU requires effective co-ordination. It is essential that the EU addresses the structural framework and cultural attitudes towards conflict prevention. The enlargement of the EU towards Central and Eastern Europe increases the need for the EU to fully commit to and mainstream conflict prevention across all EU policy and institutions. Many new members will have their own priorities and agendas and it is essential that the EU engages with candidate countries to raise awareness and promote understanding of the EU's role in conflict prevention. Better co-ordination is also needed between the EU and other international institutions [OSCE, NATO, UN, the European Community of West African States (ECOWAS)] in pooling conflict prevention capabilities.

The paper proposes action in the following areas:

- Institutionalising a liaison body to monitor and link decision-making and implementation between the three pillars.
- Building co-operation between the EU and other international institutions through joint representation and information exchange on the implementation of CFSP and ESDP.
- Enhancing the role of the European Parliament and national parliaments in scrutinising CFSP and ESDP and how they have contributed to the stated objective of conflict prevention.
- Engaging with candidate countries to raise awareness and promote understanding of the EU's role in conflict prevention, under the Convention on the Future of Europe.

INTRODUCTION

Violent conflict causes massive humanitarian suffering, undermines development and human rights and stifles economic growth. In situations of conflict, political democracies are unable to mature and conflict creates conditions where terrorism and organised crime thrive. Failing to prevent violent conflict both within the European Union (EU) and in its neighbouring countries (e.g. Cyprus, Northern Ireland, South-Eastern Europe), and further a-field (e.g. the Great Lakes Region and Horn of Africa, Eurasia and the Middle East), also incurs moral, political, financial and security costs for the EU. Today's global political climate further underlines the need for conflict prevention to be given greater political priority.

The EU is one of the leading international bodies affirming the importance of and enhancing capacity for peace-building and conflict prevention. The EU was itself founded as an institution for preventing future violent conflict in Europe. Part of the EU's potential to play a significant role in this field is the range of measures at its disposal such as external assistance, diplomacy, human rights policy, trade policy, humanitarian aid, social and environment policies, the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP).

The EU has made a commitment to prioritise the prevention of violent conflict and has developed a series of key policy statements and commitments (see figure a). The establishment of the Conflict Prevention Unit (CPU) and the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) in 1999 were important institutional steps forward. Significant progress was made under the Spanish and Danish Presidencies in 2002, building on the work undertaken by the Belgium and Swedish Presidencies.² In the past few years, country and regional strategy papers have been informed by conflict analysis, conflict impact assessment and early warning tools have been developed, targets were met for civilian personnel for crisis management and the first civilian police mission was prepared to be sent to Bosnia in January 2003. While these developments are all welcome, significant gaps between policy and practice remain and structural and cultural institutional reform is still necessary if the potential capacity of the EU to prevent conflict is to be fully realised.

The aim of this document is to highlight practical steps that the EU could take during the Greek and Italian Presidencies in 2003 to better implement and monitor the progress of the commitments made on conflict prevention. The paper is aimed to provide useful direction and policy recommendations to the Presidencies, to member states, the Commission, the Council, parliamentarians and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in furthering the role and impact of the EU in preventing violent conflict.

ENSURING PROGRESS

At the EU Conference on Conflict Prevention in Helsingborg in August 2002, the Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Georgios Papandreou, commented, "the only way to deal with conflict is to address effectively the root causes through a long-term structural prevention policy". This is welcome. This paper supports the development of a long-term, holistic approach whereby short-term crisis management is intrinsically linked with long-term

² See Preventing violent conflict: Opportunities for the Swedish and Belgium Presidencies of the European Union in 2001 and Putting conflict prevention into practice: Priorities for the Spanish and Danish EU Presidencies 2002, International Alert & Saferworld.



conflict prevention and peace building. Root causes of conflict (poverty, crime, marginalisation, political suppression etc.) must be addressed and conflict prevention effectively mainstreamed across all sectors and activities of the EU. Enlargement of the EU towards Central and Eastern Europe, a conflict prevention measure in itself, will also serve to increase the need for the EU to commit itself to wider conflict prevention measures, taking into account that new members will have their own, priorities and agendas. Strong political will and leadership, will be necessary to ensure that a common understanding of conflict prevention across the EU and candidate countries is sought and policy commitments are effectively implemented.

FORTHCOMING OPPORTUNITIES

A number of key events and activities are planned for 2003. These include the submission of a progress report on the implementation of the Gothenburg Programme of Action and, potentially, a EU 'Brahimi report' by the Greek Presidency. The Greek Presidency is also organising a conference on conflict prevention and lessons learned in South East Europe with the aim of planning a joint strategy for the region.

The EU relationship with Africa also looks likely to remain high on the agenda despite the 'indefinite postponement' of the April EU-Africa Summit. The Italian Presidency is organising an EU-Africa Seminar to address and prioritise the challenges of sustainable peace and development in Africa. The report of the CFSP Common Position on conflicts in Africa is due in June 2003. An important development will be the negotiation of the Convention on the Future of Europe due to be finalised at the Intergovernmental Conference during the Italian Presidency before the entry of new members in 2004. These activities provide an important opportunity and could have significant impact on moving forward the implementation of the EU conflict prevention agenda.

FIGURE A:

KEY EU POLICY STATEMENTS RELATED TO CONFLICT PREVENTION

- Communication from the Commission on The Participation of Non-State Actors in EC Development Policy, November 2002
- Implementation of the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, Seville European Council, June 2002
- Development Council Conclusions on Countries in Conflict, May 2002
- Council Conclusions on Conflict Prevention, July 2001
- EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, Gothenburg European Council, June 2001
- Development Council Conclusions on Conflict Prevention, May 2001
- Council Common Position Concerning Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution in Africa, May 2001
- Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention, April 2001
- European Parliament Resolution on Conflict Prevention and Crisis Management, March 2001
- Report presented by the High Representative/Commission on *Improving the Coherence and Effectiveness of EU Action in the Field of Conflict Prevention*, December 2000
- The European Parliament Resolution on Gender Aspects of Conflict Resolution and Peace-building, November 2000
- Cotonou ACP-EU Aid and Trade Partnership Agreement, June 2000

CHAPTER 1:

MAINSTREAMING CONFLICT PREVENTION POLICY AND PRACTICE WITHIN EUROPEAN COMMUNITY POLICY

All relevant institutions of the Union will mainstream conflict prevention within their areas of competence.

EU PROGRAMME FOR THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENT CONFLICTS, 2001

In keeping with the decision to mainstream conflict prevention, the council and its hodies will, in cooperation with the Commission, continue to evaluate preventative measures as outlined in the {Gothenburg} programme.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU PROGRAMME FOR THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENT CONFLICTS, JUNE 2002

Development policy and other co-operation provide the most powerful instruments at the Community's disposal for treating root causes of conflict.

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION ON CONFLICT PREVENTION, 2001

Co-operation with other actors and with stakeholders in a conflict situation is needed in order to achieve sustainable processes and a high degree of ownership.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU PROGRAMME FOR THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENT CONFLICTS, JUNE 2002

The EU has moved beyond 'why' conflict prevention should be mainstreamed across EU policy and practice, to 'how' it can be effectively mainstreamed. There has been considerable success in this field so far including institutional reform through the establishment of the Conflict Prevention Unit (CPU), the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) and the Inter-Service Quality Support Group, and programmatic reform in the delegation of authority and personnel to delegations and the development of Country and Regional Strategy Papers (CSPs and RSPs) and practical conflict-related methodologies (e.g. the checklist for the root causes of conflict). These developments are commendable, however, these advancements now need to be monitored, strengthened and expanded upon whereby conflict prevention is mainstreamed across wider development instruments and approaches, and across sectoral (or cross-cutting) issues, such as trade, small arms, security sector reform and the private sector. This necessitates continued institutional and programmatic reform, and sustained political will.

As well as developing horizontal linkages across the different sectors and structures of the EU, effective conflict prevention mainstreaming also requires the fostering of vertical linkages between EU representatives and civil society on the ground. Conflict prevention policy and practice, if it is to be grounded and legitimate, must also therefore inform, and be informed by, a representative civil society.

A) CONFLICT PREVENTION AND DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION

Poverty reduction now forms a central objective of European Community development policy. Prevention and management of armed conflict is central to this objective and is a key element of poverty reduction strategies. Armed conflict has become one of the most prevalent causes of poverty in many parts on the world, in particular the regions of Sub-Saharan Africa. In these areas, the costs of conflict are disproportionately borne by the poor and marginalised. Conflict denies populations (particularly those which are displaced) their basic rights through weakened safety nets and loss of livelihoods. At a macro level, conflicts undermine the development prospects of states through a decline in state



capacity in areas affected by conflict, a shrinking revenue base and diversion of funds to the security sector. Destruction of infrastructure through conflict further undermines economic performance and access to markets.³ Furthermore, conflict and poverty can become mutually reinforcing, whereby the existence of poverty can present a key conflict risk. This is most likely to happen where poverty is combined with social and political factors such as unequal wealth distribution and access to resources, the marginalisation of one sector of the population and the availability of small arms. To ensure the root causes of conflict are addressed, conflict prevention and peace-building must therefore form a central part of development policy, and is mainstreamed within development co-operation strategies, implementation and review processes. Development strategies must also complement other external instruments, such as trade, political dialogue and CFSP (see section B).

The EU has recognised the linkages between development and poverty, and the role of development co-operation in conflict prevention, in a number of policy statements.⁴ It is also reflected within regional co-operation agreements such as the ACP-EU Cotonou Partnership Agreement and in the development of Community budget lines, for example, the European Initiative for Human Rights and Democracy. Practical steps have also been taken to 'mainstream' conflict prevention in EU development policy and ensure coherence between external policies. Evidence suggests, nonetheless, that mainstreaming takes time and requires constant monitoring if it is to be translated into a deep-rooted and operational culture across all EU institutions and capable of overcoming bureaucratic constraints.

There is a need within the EU to move away from viewing conflict prevention as a distinct 'sector' requiring special projects (or linked solely to specific areas of intervention such as the security sector). The EU should develop specific guidance on integrating conflict- sensitive development approaches across wider EU policy and support, including transport, education, water, environment, and into the key institutional instruments of development policy, including budgetary and macro-economic support. From an institutional perspective, the split in responsibilities for the development of country strategies and the programming and implementation processes between EuropeAid, DG Relex, DG Development and EU delegations can hinder the translation of conflict prevention objectives at a strategic level into practical action within development programmes developed and implemented both within EuropeAid and at a delegation level. Special attention is also needed to sensitise officials who are unfamiliar with conflict issues, particularly those who come from a technical or purely economic background.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Strengthen the mainstreaming capacity of the Conflict Prevention Unit in DG Relex by increasing its resources and personnel numbers and ensuring that EuropeAid and Commission delegations have staff capacity with expertise in conflict sensitive development.
- Continue the production of an annual conflict prevention report by the Conflict Prevention Unit, in order to monitor the mainstreaming process. The focus of this report could be shifted from assessing inputs (e.g.

³ For an inventory of the effects of conflict on poverty see, The Causes of Conflict in Sub-Saharan Africa, appendix 4, Department for International Development (DflD), October 2001.

⁴ See Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention, April 2001 and the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, June 2001.

deployment of conflict prevention teams) to assessing outputs (i.e. linking it to the evaluation/ review of development assistance with particular emphasis on its impact on conflict risks).

- Develop guidance for integrating conflict sensitivity throughout the EU programming cycle of development co-operation across the full range of sectors e.g. integrating a conflict perspective into the existing transport and water guidelines.
- Consider assessing the potential conflict impact of the use of macroeconomic instruments such as budgetary support.
- Provide staff with training on the principles of conflict prevention and use of existing guidance and approaches to integrating conflict sensitivity into development cooperation.

FIGURE 1.1

CASE STUDY: DEVELOPING GUIDANCE FOR INTEGRATING CONFLICT SENSITIVITY INTO DEVELOPMENT CO-OPERATION

Understanding the relationship between development co-operation and peace and conflict impact dynamics is difficult for policy makers and implementing agencies, and it is vital that they have effective tools and training to make the right decisions.

A consortium of northern and southern organisations is implementing a two-year programme in several regions to integrate conflict-sensitive practice into development, humanitarian and peace-building activities.

The programme is managed by the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER), International Alert and Saferworld, in direct partnership with the Africa Peace Forum (APFO) in Kenya, the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CECORE) in Uganda and the Consortium on Humanitarian Agencies (CHA) in Sri Lanka.

The project will:

- Produce a resource pack that brings together existing approaches, tools and guidelines in relation to conflict sensitive planning, implementation, management and evaluation.
- Implement national applications and field-testing to ensure the applicability of the resource pack on the ground in relation to specific projects currently being designed, implemented or evaluated by donors, governments and/or local and international NGOs.
- Conduct a series of awareness raising and training activities for a wide-ranging constituency, to enable the resource pack to be used effectively, thereby spreading the practice of conflict-sensitive development.

To reach these objectives the project will:

- Document and assess a range of available approaches and tools used by practitioners.
- Test the resource pack with practitioners and piloting some of these tools in Kenya, Uganda and Sri Lanka.
- Draw lessons-learned from the application of conflict-sensitive tools and making these lessons available to a wide community.



B) MAINSTREAMING CONFLICT PREVENTION INTO TRADE AND PRIVATE SECTOR POLICY

To effectively mainstream conflict prevention, it is essential that all areas covered by EU policy, such as trade and actions by the private sector, also address the root causes of violent conflict. As with development assistance, these policies can have a significant impact on the dynamics of development and conflict and have the potential to contribute to long-term sustainable development, conflict prevention and structural stability or, conversely, increase conflict risks.

Further efforts need to be made to understand this relationship between trade integration, development and conflict prevention. Particular emphasis should be paid to the potential political and conflict impacts of economic adjustment and liberalisation as well as the perverse dynamic the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has on the access of developing countries' agricultural products to the EU market.

The Commission could better utilise its engagement with the private sector as an avenue for promoting conflict prevention. European companies operate in conflict-stricken countries all over the world. The importance of their adopting a more conflict-sensitive approach to their operations has been underlined in recent cases such as the Elf-Aquitaine scandal, conflict diamonds, and the role of oil companies in civil conflict in the Niger Delta.

The Commission has sought to enhance the ability of European corporations to contribute voluntarily to sustainable development through its Strategy on Corporate Social Responsibility (June 2002). Although the White Paper refers to the EU engaging multinational companies to promote human rights, there is no explicit reference to companies playing a role in reducing conflict. Natural resources are recognised by the Commission as a 'cross-cutting issue' for conflict prevention. With regard to conflict diamonds, the EU has taken an active role in the Kimberley Process during 2002 and is finalising legislation that will call on member countries to establish control mechanisms and comply with the Process, although it is behind schedule. Progress made with regard to conflict diamonds must also be extended to other areas of private sector engagement, including the role of timber and oil extracting companies in conflict.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Develop and integrate effective peace and conflict impact assessments that extend beyond development programmes to facilitate the mainstreaming of conflict prevention activities across all sectors including the trade sector. This should include training of desk officers and officials in delegations on their use.
- Ensure that the implementation process for the EU Strategy on Corporate Social Responsibility includes a focus on the linkage between business and conflict prevention.
- Apply political pressure to ensure the Kimberley Process legislation is put back on track, including provision for a formal monitoring mechanism. Prepare private sector actors to follow-through on their commitments under the Process.
- Adopt the forthcoming draft Communication to regulate the trade in timber products, including a comprehensive definition of, and specific provisions for, "conflict timber".
- Put pressure on exporting countries to accept independent experts to monitor for the illegal trade in conflict commodities.

FIGURE 1.2

CASE STUDY: MEMBER STATE INITIATIVES IN ADDRESSING THE ROLE OF BUSINESS IN CONFLICT ZONES

During 2002, several member states gave increased attention to the role of the private sector in conflict prevention. Both the German and Belgian Ministries for Foreign Affairs organised high-level policy dialogues involving government representatives, companies and NGOs. These meetings explored the practical and policy issues relating to companies operating in conflict zones, and began the process of identifying practical steps that their governments could take to push the issue forward. Sweden ran a smaller learning seminar for Swedish companies, facilitated by International Alert, on business and conflict, and has plans for a follow-up event. The UK Department for International Development (DflD) brought together representatives of four other countries in order to discuss the policy dimensions of the issue at a working meeting in July 2002. Recognising the interest of member states in deepening understanding of these issues among different actors, the Commission could usefully host a larger dialogue on companies operating in conflict zones during 2003, focusing on action at the EU level.

C) ENGAGING WITH CIVIL SOCIETY

Civil society organisations that are legitimate and representative have an important role in preventing violent conflict, crisis management and peace-building. NGOs, grass-root organisations, women's associations, youth organisations, indigenous people's representatives, trade unions, religious organisations and the media can ensure that national and international policies are designed and implemented in ways that reduce the risk of conflict. The signing of the EU-ACP Cotonou Partnership Agreement was an important step forward in this respect, as it requires the EU and ACP governments to consult civil society organisations when developing policy and implementation programmes. More attention needs to be paid to understanding the role of non-state actors in conflict prevention. This is especially important when engaging non-state actors in ACP-EU programming and policy dialogue in politically fragile environments.

The Commission's Communication on the Participation of Non-State Actors in EC Development Policy (November 2002) goes some way to understand and address the role of non-state actors in conflict prevention. Budget lines under the EU Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights and the Rapid Reaction Mechanism have been assigned and funded for this end including, for example, support of non-state actors in the peace process in the Democratic Republic of Congo. While the report should be commended, the Communication falls short of explicitly addressing EU non-state actors joint participation in conflict prevention.

Ultimately, capacity hinders more effective EU-civil society engagement. Civil society groups in conflict-affected regions need support to increase their understanding of the EU, improve advocacy, research and policy analysis skills, strengthen their organisations and build networks. Greater political and financial support is also needed for the protection of civil society actors working in conflict-affected regions. The EU itself also needs to improve its capacity to engage effectively with civil society. EC delegations often have, for example, insufficient personnel resources and some lack experience in engaging with non-state actors.



RECOMMENDATIONS

The EU should:

- Explicitly incorporate conflict prevention and peace-building into the Commission's Communication on the Participation of Non-State Actors in EC Development Policy. Similar communications related to the role of non-state actors in other policy sectors (such as trade and natural resources), and their links and impact on conflict prevention should also be addressed. This should be undertaken in consultation with civil society representatives with expertise and experience in the conflict prevention field.
- Provide support to governments in the developing world to enhance their capacity to develop successful partnerships with civil society and, where necessary, undertake an assessment of, and provide support for, the development of transparent legal frameworks for state/ civil society relations.
- Support capacity building of civil society actors to undertake policy research, advocacy and conflict resolution, in order that they can effectively engage with their own governments and the EU on a range of conflict prevention and peace-building issues.
- Explicitly mainstream security protection of civil society actors through all EU security, humanitarian, development and conflict prevention policy and practice (e.g. international accompaniment, training on security protection).

FIGURE 1.3

CASE STUDY: HELPING CIVIL SOCIETY TO UNDERSTAND THE EU IN THE HORN OF AFRICA

To many working towards the prevention of violent conflict in both affected regions and at the EU level, understanding how the EU operates can be a complex process.

Saferworld and partners, the Inter-Africa Group (IAG) in Ethiopia and the Africa Peace Forum (APFO), in collaboration with the Conflict Prevention Network, produced a comprehensive guide for civil society, Understanding the EU – a civil society guide to development and conflict prevention policies. The guide is split into five sections, one of which focuses specifically on EU engagement in the Horn of Africa:

Part I Background to the EU

Part II The EU and conflict prevention

Part III The ACP-EU Cotonou Partnership Agreement

Part IV The EU in the Horn of Africa

Part V Practical Information

The Guide was published in July 2002 with the aim that it will be updated regularly in light of feedback from the region. The guide has been distributed directly to civil society organisations and also through a series of awareness-raising meetings at a local level, to allow organisations to raise questions and provide feedback. Further editions are planned for other ACP regions.

CHAPTER 2:

STRENGTHENING EU AFRICA ENGAGEMENT IN CONFLICT PREVENTION

We underline that further efforts are needed to prevent violent conflict at the earliest stages by addressing their root-causes in a targeted manner and with an adequate combination of all available instruments.

EU-AFRICA CAIRO DECLARATION. APRIL 2000

Through its regional co-operation frameworks and developing the CFSP, the EU is in a strong position to promote conflict prevention and peace-building in various regions of the world. The Greek government, in particular, has been involved in South-Eastern Europe, as well as the Mediterranean. While gains in these regions should be strengthened, it is also paramount that the EU not only focuses on areas of obvious strategic interest, but also on areas beset by chronic under-development and conflict in the African, Caribbean and Pacific covered by the ACP-EU Cotonou Partnership Agreement. It is within these regions that poverty, protracted conflict and state failure are providing a fertile breeding ground for the negative aspects of globalisation, including support for international terrorism, organised crime, drugs trafficking and the proliferation and trafficking of small arms and light weapons.

Africa has suffered a total of one third of global armed conflicts over the past decade. The bottom 27 countries in the UNDP's human development index are African and there are an estimated 6.1 million refugees and 20 million internally displaced persons across the continent. The first ever African Union (AU) Summit (February 2003), was dedicated to the resolution of conflict in Africa, resulting in the agreement for African-led peace measures in seven African countries. With the likely 'indefinite postponement' of the Lisbon Summit, key opportunities have been lost to support this. It is important, therefore, that the key issues related to supporting the EU-Africa dialogue on the prevention of violent conflict are maintained high on the agenda. Hopes are therefore raised for the Italian Presidency plans to host an EU-Africa seminar at the beginning of their term.

A) BUILDING PEACE, SECURITY & DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA: TAKING FORWARD EU COMMITMENTS TO CONFLICT PREVENTION

The EU has the unique capacity as a regional union to have significant and positive impact on promoting structural stability in Africa. Member states have strong historical ties with Africa, there is broad diplomatic engagement on the ground. The ACP-EU Cotonou Partnership Agreement, and others, facilitate relations between the regional blocs and the EU represents the largest aid provider for the African region. The commitments to peace-building, conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa made at the EU-Africa summit in Cairo in 2000 and set out in the resulting Cairo Declaration also signal a willingness on the part of the Heads of State of both regions to give priority to these issues. The agreed areas of action and progress, outlined at the Follow up to Cairo summit in Ouagadougo (November 2002) on the prevention and settlement of conflicts, are also encouraging.

These commitments reflect a growing recognition of the importance of peace building, conflict prevention, management and resolution both for the long-term development and stability of the African continent, and for the interests of the EU.



However, if the commitments laid out in the Cairo Declaration are to be translated into long-term, substantive progress, a number of issues will need to be addressed.

To guarantee relevance and validity, the EU-Africa dialogue process should complement and support NEPAD. In doing so, the process should provide formal diplomatic and financial support for the principle of NEPAD and for its processes and activities. It is necessary for the credibility of the EU-Africa dialogue to address common, critical issues, such as trade and agricultural subsidies, however, it is also important to guard against any unnecessary duplication of endeavour or contradictory policies that might undermine both processes.

Affecting long-term stability on the ground in Africa requires commitments made at the highest level, such as through the EU-Africa dialogue, to be translated into practical action. All parties should monitor and follow-up on the agreed areas of action from the Ougadougou follow-up meeting and identify a number of new focal areas of action and avenues for implementation. This requires further attention to be paid to solidifying institutional relationships, such as with the AU, ECOWAS, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), and to the implementation of existing action- orientated frameworks, such as the Euro-Mediterranean partnership and ACP-EU Cotonou Agreement. There is a need to define and monitor a number of mutually agreed indicators of progress amongst all the parties to the Cairo Declaration. Peace-building, conflict prevention, management and resolution must also be prioritised as a central objective of processes such as the development of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers within the Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative.

This necessitates, however, a common EU voice in relation to African priorities. Contradictory positions and foreign policy actions among EU member states within Africa are, at present, providing barriers to advancing EU-African dialogue and engagement. The European Council Common Position Concerning Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa (May 2001), has not achieved the degree of consensus necessary to successfully address conflict. The position will be reviewed in June 2003 when these issues should be addressed.

It is important that civil society's voice is heard both in the on-going process of prioritising areas of action within the framework of the EU-Africa dialogue, as well as the process of translating commitments into effective action. For civil society to play an effective role it is vital that they have access to information on the dialogue process and related activities, and that space and resources are made available for them to reflect on the issues. This could take the form of a complementary civil society forum (or fora) in association with the next EU-Africa meeting.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Review the 2001 Common Position on Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution in Africa to ensure harmony between EU member state positions and engagement in relation to conflict in Africa for a long term, unified EU strategy.
- Review the EU-Africa dialogue process to ensure that it is taken forward in a way that is fully complementary with ongoing activities in African institutions and frameworks (such as the AU and NEPAD) and

international frameworks of co-operation (such as the ACP-EU Cotonou Agreement and the G8 plan of action for Africa).

- Strengthen complementarity between the EU-Africa dialogue process and NEPAD by:
- i. Providing formal political and diplomatic support for the principle of NEPAD;
- ii. Ensuring financial support for the development of NEPAD processes and activities;
- iii. Strengthening and developing the peer review mechanism of NEPAD:
- iv. Addressing common, critical issues, such as trade and agricultural subsidies;
- v. Ensuring and promoting vertical linkages within societies, as well as horizontal, diplomatic linkages across African states.
- Support the establishment of an EU-Africa civil society forum. This could involve both a complementary forum established in conjunction with the formal EU Africa meeting as well as separate national or regional fora hosted by African and EU networks as a mechanism for feeding into and following up on commitments made. These should be linked with civil society forums established under the ACP-EU Cotonou Agreement. This would establish an important precedent for future civil society engagement in the EU-Africa dialogue.
- Assess commitments across all aspects of the Cairo Declaration (e.g. on trade and development) from the perspective of their potential to contribute to good governance, peace building, conflict prevention, management and resolution.
- Prioritise shared areas for action on peace building, conflict prevention, management and resolution. This should include commitments to:
- Implement key development priorities, as outlined in the Millennium Targets;
- ii. Fulfil trade commitments made in the Cairo Declaration relating to duty free market access for products from developing countries;
- iii. Implement measures to stop the illegal exploitation and trade of natural resources, through the Kimberley Process and other mechanisms;
- iv. Operationalise the AU Early Warning System, as outlined in the Cairo Declaration, and link these up with EU early warning structures.
- Develop clear timelines and shared, measurable benchmarks for these conflict prevention initiatives through the EU-Africa dialogue process.

B) ADVANCING CONFLICT PREVENTION WITHIN THE ACP-EU COTONOU PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT

A great deal of progress has been made in developing a framework for conflict prevention in the ACP region through the provisions of the ACP-EU Cotonou Partnership Agreement. EU Country Strategy Papers, increased political dialogue and the use of CFSP instruments have aided this process, as have efforts to support non-state actor engagement in positively influencing peace and conflict dynamics through Cotonou (see figure 1.3). The Development Council Conclusions on ACP countries in armed conflict in May 2002 also provide a useful guide for the elaboration of these policies. However, it will be important to ensure that these policy frameworks are further translated into practical



action, that important emerging lessons are learned and that the impacts of engagement are carefully monitored.

Particular emphasis, therefore, needs to be placed on providing technical assistance to ACP governments and civil society to increase their capacity to address conflict prevention in national development strategies, poverty reduction strategy papers, sectoral strategies and national expenditure programmes. Yearly and mid-term review processes should be used as a key vehicle for monitoring the implementation of the conflict prevention elements of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement as well as the coherence of EU policies towards ACP countries from a conflict prevention perspective. For this process to be effective, performance indicators which reflect conflict prevention and peace-building aspects of cooperation need to be further refined and the process informed by an in-depth knowledge of the situation gathered through methods such as EU Heads of Mission reports, conflict analysis, peace and conflict impact assessments and non-state actor consultation.

The review process provides an excellent opportunity to link development assistance with policy and political dialogue processes at a national and regional level, whereby issues that emerge through the review process on conflict prevention and peace-building can be used as a basis of discussion between the parties to the agreement (along with non-state actors). Key findings can feed into the process of reviewing Country Strategy Papers with a view to further addressing conflict prevention and peace-building through cooperation strategies. Targeted support can be given to areas covered by the dialogue (e.g. human rights) or covered by CFSP instruments (e.g. declarations).

As outlined in the previous chapter it is important to also assess the impact of trade policy on conflict prevention efforts in the ACP region. Conflict prevention needs to be considered as a cross-cutting issue within the current ACP-EU Cotonou trade discussions and there is an urgent need for an analysis of the potential political and conflict impacts of the proposals currently under discussion, in particular the impact of economic adjustment and liberalisation. Capacity-building support on these issues is required for the parties to the negotiations and civil society organisations.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Capitalise on the annual and mid-term review of ACP-EU assistance as a vehicle for monitoring the implementation of the conflict prevention elements of the Cotonou Agreement and assessing the impact of ACP-EU co-operation on conflict situations.
- Make further use of political dialogue as an avenue for raising issues related to conflict prevention and peace-building between the parties to the agreement, ensuring that legitimate, representative civil society are engaged in this process.
- Provide capacity-building support, including technical assistance, to ACP governments and non-state actors to enhance their ability to integrate conflict prevention as an objective within national development strategies, poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSP), sectoral strategies and public expenditure programmes.
- Urgently address the linkages between trade policy and conflict prevention within the framework of the ongoing ACP-EU trade negotiations, including analysing the potential political and conflict impacts of economic adjustment and liberalisation.

FIGURE 2.1

CASE STUDY: EU CO-OPERATION WITH SUDAN - LINKING POLITICAL DIALOGUE, DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE AND CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT

In 1990, formal co-operation between the EU and Sudan under the Lomé agreement was suspended in reaction to a prevailing lack of human rights, democracy and satisfactory efforts to negotiate an end to the civil war. Since 2000, however, the EU has been engaged in a process of constructive engagement towards Sudan through a process of political dialogue on issues such as human rights, democratisation and the peace-process. On the basis of progress in this dialogue, the EU is currently exploring the possibility of opening up consultations under Article 96 of Cotonou in order to re-examine the suspension and initiate the programming of the 9th European Development Fund (EDF). Linked to this dialogue has been the development of a 'humanitarian plus' programme using unspent EDF funds as a possible pre-cursor to a longer-term framework for development cooperation. Sudan has also become a focus country of the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR) in 2002, whereby actions funded through this budget line will be aimed at reinforcing those areas covered by the political dialogue.

At the request of the European Commission and the Government of Sudan, the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM) has also facilitated a process of capacity-building for civil society to enhance their ability to engage in future political dialogue and development programming and implementation. This process has included awareness-raising and mapping of non-state actors.



CHAPTER 3:

INTEGRATING CRISIS MANAGEMENT WITH CONFLICT PREVENTION

More reflection is needed on the use of crisis management capabilities, particularly in the civilian field, for preventive purposes.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU PROGRAMME FOR THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENT CONFLICTS, JUNE 2002

The EU's commitment to deploy military personnel in crises has been firmly established by the creation of the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF). However, military operations alone will achieve little beyond temporary containment of a situation unless the conditions for the pursuit of broader objectives by civil actors are created. A coherent civil-military response would maximise the potential to defuse conflict, provide security and build peace capacities with local populations. While civil and military joint operational responses are an essential aspect of crisis management, care must be taken, however, to ensure that any civil-humanitarian response maintains its political independence from that of the military.

The EU has recognised the key role of civilians in crisis management and important progress has been made in the development of civilian personnel deployment for crisis management over the past year.⁵ The targets for civilian personnel in the four civilian areas of crisis management identified by the Feira European Council (police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection) due to be met by 2003, have been exceeded through voluntary commitments of member states. The EU Police Mission (EUPM) has taken over from the UN International Police Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina in January 2003. The Commission has also established a network of national civilian training institutions with the aim of developing common training modules for civilian personnel in the areas of rule of law and civilian administration. The Council has welcomed the creation of an Action Plan for the further strengthening of civil-military co-ordination in EU crisis management to be completed before the end of the Greek Presidency.

The EU is well placed to develop and integrate a civilian crisis management capacity and these developments are welcome. However, from a peace-building perspective not enough attention is being paid to linking crisis management with longer-term conflict prevention strategies. Crisis management alone cannot bring about sustainable solutions to violent conflict, yet in the short term, it can provide the stability for long-term conflict prevention work to take root and, in turn, prevent the recurrence of conflict. A clear, coherent and integrated framework for crisis management as part of a broader conflict prevention goal must be established if the EU is to deliver on its commitments.

Similarly, while quantitative commitments to meet the targets for civilian personnel in the four civilian areas of crisis management have been fulfilled, more attention needs to be paid to qualitative aspects, such as how police from different member states will work together in the field. Different member states have different policing styles and doctrines and it is important that an effective common model is developed and promoted. In addition the EU should develop and work beyond the four priority areas, to include preventative diplomacy, eg special representatives and mediators. More funds should be provided to increase and enhance the

⁵ At the General Affairs Council (GAC) conclusions November 2002 the Council agreed "an appropriate EU planning and mission support capability for civilian crisis management operations other than police operations should be established within the General Secretary of the Council as a matter of priority".

numbers of special representatives. They should be afforded greater flexibility and be better integrated into Political Security Committee (PSC) policy.

In order to improve the functioning of civilian crisis management capabilities, the institutional structures of the EU should be made more compatible. The pillar structure hampers the ability of the EU to link its civilian crisis management instruments with its conflict prevention instruments effectively (see Chapter 5.A). Crisis management essentially falls within the remit of the second pillar, however, many of the civilian aspects of crisis management are the competency of the first pillar. This division of labour and responsibility across the pillars and between institutions and corresponding departments (e.g. the PSC, PPEWU, RRM and the RRF) can lead to a lack of co-ordination. This impedes progress on issues related to financing, developing decision-making and implementation procedures, developing and maintaining rosters and issues related to training. The absence of clear terminology and practices between other institutions can also be problematic, for example, the EU, NATO, OSCE and UN all participate in crisis management in different ways.

The EUPM took over from the UN International Police Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina in January 2003 (see figure 3.1). This represents the first civilian crisis management operation in the context of the ESDP and will be an important test of both the EU's capability and how it works with the other institutions engaged in crisis management. To be effective, however, the EU should ensure that its activities promote a long-term reform programme that covers all areas of the security sector, of which the police is just one part.

FIGURE 3.1

CASE STUDY: THE EU POLICE MISSION (EUPM) TO BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

In January 2003, the EUPM took over from the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The mission is to create 'a professional, politically neutral and ethnically unbiased law enforcement agency, by 2005'. Of the four priority areas for civilian crisis management, set out in the Feria European Council, the EUPM will aim to address all the aspects related to Rule of Law, including institution building programmes, and policing.

The main tasks of the EUPM will be to monitor, mentor, inspect and strengthen: the delegation of power; quality-oriented management principles; operational planning capacities; and the level of professionalism within ministries and senior police. The EUPM will also monitor the exercise of appropriate political control over the police. This management- based approach will not require an armed policing component.

EUPM precedent for the future?

The EUPM is relatively small, inexpensive and enjoys broad political support. There has been a long lead-in time to prepare for the IPTF handover and member states have successfully established new command structures, internal coordination measures the involvement of third parties and financing. Member states made it clear, however, that the arrangements used to establish this mission do not provide a template for future operations. Bearing in mind that potentially larger, more complicated operations will likely encounter greater logistical, political and financial obstacles, it will be important to draw out clear principles to guide future operations. Such guidelines could build on lessons learned from other police reform missions.⁶



⁶ See forthcoming publication, Policing the Peace, Gordon Peake, Saferworld, due April 2003.

Taking a more global perspective, the EU has tended to concentrate on reacting to conflict in strategic, visible locations (e.g. in South East Europe) at the expense of the poorest countries where most violent conflict takes place and where unaccountable security sectors jeopardise long-term stability and increase the risk of conflict. For example, there are no EU civilian crisis management missions planned anywhere in Africa, although the Franco-British proposal to develop ESDP in this direction is a welcome development.⁷ The EU has recognised the importance of security sector reform (SSR),⁸ and is engaging in SSR within the intergovernmental framework of ESDP in the Balkans, most notably in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, member states appear reluctant to grant the Commission the authority to actively engage in this kind of work in other regions.

Whilst it is important to work with and strengthen the capacity of governments to provide security, it is also important that citizens themselves are involved. The EU should support civil society efforts in developing countries that are strengthening participatory approaches to security, such as community-based policing programmes (see figure 3.2). It should also encourage civilian missions to build local capacities in order to prevent violent conflict at an earlier stage. This could be encouraged through, for example, a European Civilian Peace Corps (see figure 3.3).

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Further integrate crisis management with conflict prevention capacities to serve and strengthen their short, medium and long-term impact. To this end, civilian and military planning in the EU should be more integrated and the Commission should be an equal partner in the planning process so that civilian actions in crisis situations are coordinated, swift and flexible.
- Work to establish clear definitions and practice with other institutions participating in crisis management (the UN, OSCE and Council of Europe) to ensure responses are complementary.
- Develop a conceptual and practical framework for civil-military coordination including action plans and detailed cross-pillar, crossinstitution and cross-mission lines of decision making, responsibility and information-sharing to ensure effectiveness and transparency.
- Dedicate responsibility to one body to take charge of monitoring and evaluating civilian crisis management operations. Such a body could, for example, take advantage of experience gained and lessons learned from the police mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina to inform future missions.
- Develop a common model, and set targets to improve the quality and co-ordination of the civilian personnel involved in the four priority areas of civilian crisis management.
- Move beyond the four priority areas of civilian crisis management to include preventative diplomacy, e.g. increasing and enhancing the role of special representatives and mediators.

⁷ See the Le Touquet Summit conclusions, February 2003.

⁸The 6th priority of the EU's development policy includes "institutional capacity building, good governance and rule of law".

FIGURE 3.2

CASE STUDY: COMMUNITY-BASED POLICING IN KENYA - TACKLING SMALL ARMS AND REFORMING THE SECURITY SECTOR.

Unprofessional and unaccountable police and security forces can create mistrust within communities. This makes it difficult to pursue strategies to foster peace and to secure the co-operation of the public to stem the flow of small arms and can actually increase the demand for weapons.

In Kenya, the Kenya Institute of Administration (KIA) and the Kenyan Police, in association with Saferworld and the Security Research and Information Centre (SRIC), are developing a pilot community-based policing project in two districts in Kenya. Key aspects of the project include developing a national community-based policing policy, training police and civil society organisations, and media awareness training.

An important focus of the project has been to alert communities to the dangers of small arms and to develop levels of trust so that individuals feel confident in reporting armed crime. Police reform brings together core aspects of conflict prevention and security policy and this type of model can be extended to other regions.

What is community based policing?

- Policing by consent not coercion.
- Partnerships between the police, NGOs, community groups, and donor organisations.
- Building on existing local structures (including traditional authorities, religious networks and business structures).
- Attitudinal and behavioural change of the police and the public.
- Respect for international human rights standards.
- Victim support, empowerment and gender awareness.
- Targeting activities to benefit the poorest and most vulnerable groups in society

FIGURE 3.3

CASE STUDY: ESTABLISHING A EUROPEAN CIVILIAN PEACE CORPS (ECPC)

In February 2003, the EU Contact Group on CFSP (MEPs, European Commissioners, and Brussels-based NGOs) met at the European Parliament in Brussels to revive plans for a European Civilian Peace Corps, which has been under discussion since 1994.

Since then, much progress has been made within the field of civilian crisis management. The targets for civilian personnel in the four priority areas (Rule of Law, Civil Administration, Civil Protection and Civilian Police) have been met and civilian crisis management pilot training projects are currently being implemented in several member states.

Similar to efforts within the OSCE, in terms of standardising training and recruitment processes across member states, the ECPC could build on existing EU concepts and develop a coherent system of training, recruiting and deploying civilian experts for work in conflict areas. It could build on the work started in the EU priority areas and develop further areas of civilian expertise, such as mediation.

A clear concept for a ECPC has yet to be developed, but it has the potential to move beyond targets and pilot projects to create a professional, operational institution which would increase the EU's capacity for civilian crisis management.



CHAPTER 4:

TACKLING TERRORISM, ORGANISED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFICKING

The EU in the aftermath of the 11 September attacks has carried out a considerable effort in deploying a comprehensive and coherent strategy against terrorism, addressing multiple aspects. A number of elements of this strategy are closely related to Conflict Prevention. Actions undertaken in the fight against terrorism and the EU-Africa dialogue can be considered coherent strategies. Nevertheless, difficulties of acquiring a comprehensive perspective on Conflict Prevention remain.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU PROGRAMME FOR THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENT CONFLICTS, JUNE 2002

Organised crime is a common threat. It demands a co-ordinated and enduring response.

JAVIER SOLANA, LONDON CONFERENCE ON ORGANISED CRIME, NOVEMBER 2002

EU expansion will lead to a number of opportunities that will benefit Europe. However, criminal and terrorist activities, including the illicit trafficking of humans, money, drugs and arms, will be a major security challenge. Terrorist and criminal networks can easily establish mutually beneficial working relationships that further destabilise vulnerable communities, states and regions, in some cases leading to conflict.

Organised criminal groups have benefited from conflict and post-conflict situations in South East Europe and further a-field, presenting serious social, political and economic problems across Europe. Organised crime can involve all sectors of society, it is often politically accepted and even assisted and it deprives states of much needed revenue as funds disappear into a 'grey' economy. Nearly every European country is affected by the trafficking of people and weapons, by corruption and racketeering, in some form.

A) COMBATING TERRORISM THROUGH A CONFLICT PREVENTION APPROACH

Since II September, the 'war against terror' has dominated the international debate. Terrorist groups pose a significant threat to international security as shown by the attacks in Bali, Kenya, Russia, Tunisia and other countries. There is a danger, however, that international responses focus primarily on emergency policing and military measures and do not adequately address the need to develop effective strategies for conflict prevention and peace-building.

While terrorism is generally understood to be a product of poverty and deprivation, often the terrorists themselves do not always come from a particularly deprived background. However, poverty and cultural dislocation, as well as unaddressed, legitimate political grievances, can provide a fertile ground for terrorists to recruit and garner sympathy and support. People often turn to terrorism when they feel marginalised and unable to promote their views by legitimate means, therefore, it is important to separate what may be legitimate beliefs or grievances, from the violent expression of frustration that terrorists exploit. The root causes of terrorism are, therefore, often the same as the root causes of conflict and it is essential that EU trade and economic policies do not inadvertently exacerbate the conditions in which terrorism can thrive (see Chapter I). The OECD paper, which discusses the role of development cooperation in preventing terrorism and the joint EU African declaration

⁹ A Development Co-operation Lens on Terrorism Prevention, Note by the OECD Secretariat, November 2002.

on terrorism made at the 'Follow up to Cairo summit' meeting in Ouagadougou in November 2002 are welcome additions to the international discussion, particularly on the root causes of terrorism.

Frequently, terrorists come from societies where dissent is suppressed and human rights are violated. By developing responsive and legitimate forms of governance in developing countries (especially 'failed' or 'failing' states), the EU could reduce a key source and haven for terrorism (see figure 4.1). Poverty alleviation and the promotion of democratic processes should therefore be two of the principal long-term tools in preventing terrorism for the EU.

The EU's political and diplomatic engagement with issues fuelling terrorist acts should also be addressed. Developing a more effective strategy to resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict is fundamental to this. The disaffection of many in the Arab world is fuelled by the perceived injustices of the West's handling of the Middle East peace process. The conflict in Iraq is also a significant factor. Taking military action against Iraq without launching a new diplomatic effort to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and create an effective Palestinian state would risk increasing support for fundamentalism.

In seeking to address terrorism, the role of the UN is paramount. The EU needs to ensure that the role of the UN is strengthened. Despite its shortcomings the UN still remains the most effective and legitimate international tool for conflict management. Existing international treaties, international human rights and humanitarian law also provide a framework in which some of the worst excesses of violent conflict can be somewhat ameliorated.

In dealing with the domestic terrorist threat, the EU response has been understandably dominated by strengthening law enforcement responses. The rapid expansion in the remit and powers of Europol, should be carefully monitored given the potential threat to civil liberties and human rights that anti-terrorism legislation can represent. The 2000-2001 Europol threat assessment stated that Islamic terrorism represents "the greatest threat" to the European Union. It is important, however, not to over simplify the problem and focus on Al-Q'aida at the expense of other threats such as indigenous terrorist groups and organised crime.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Recognise that developing and enhancing the EU's long-term conflict prevention and peace-building role (and utilising all its instruments towards this end) is one of the most effective responses to addressing and responding to the root causes of terrorism.
- Continue to work with the Quartet (US, EU, UN and Russian Federation) to develop the 'Roadmap for Middle East peace', setting a timeframe for implementation
- Ensure that at an international level the 'war on terrorism' is pursued in full respect of the United Nations charter and in accordance with existing international treaties, and international humanitarian and human rights law.
- Ensure that member states and third countries do not use the 'war on terrorism' as a pretext to impinge on and restrict political space, judicial process and human rights, or redirect resources away from long-term conflict prevention policies.



FIGURE 4.1

TERRORISM AND THE HORN OF AFRICA

Whilst recognising the importance of eliminating the threats posed by international terrorist organisations, the current US military build-up in the Horn of Africa carries significant risks to long-term prospects for peace and stability. US or allied attacks on countries in the region could risk exacerbating existing tensions and radicalising local populations.

Previous anti-terrorist interventions in the region – such as the closure of the Barakaat telecommunications and money transfer system in Somalia, accused of skimming funds to Al-Q'aida – have rebounded on the civilian population and created destabilising economic shocks.

Another important area that requires urgent attention in the Horn of Africa is support for the demobilisation and reintegration into society of former combatants in Djibouti, Eritrea and Ethiopia. Reintegration and the creation of viable economic opportunities for these people is often neglected, but is vital, to reduce the potential number of individuals who could be recruited into terrorist organisations (The origins of Al-Q'aida lie in the foreign volunteers who fought against Soviet forces in Afghanistan and were not ever successfully demobilised.)

Finding sustainable solutions to protracted conflicts, such as in Somalia, is another key element of the fight against terror in the region. Areas of protracted conflict and state failure have the potential to harbour terrorist cells. The ongoing EU supported peace process for Somalia, which is taking place within the framework of IGAD, hosted by Kenya and supported by the international community, provides an opportunity for progress towards a political settlement.

B) DEALING WITH ORGANISED CRIME

Tackling organised crime is a major concern for the EU. Javier Solana said in November 2002, "the fight against organised crime is one of the key challenges we face today" and it is welcome that the Greek Presidency has prioritised this issue, since it is geographically linked with the countries of South East Europe, where organised crime and arms proliferation is of great concern. The Zagreb Process to tackle organised crime (November 2000), involving EU member states, the European Commission and the Stabilisation and Association Process countries was an important step forward. A further summit due to be held in June 2003 in Thessalonica will focus on how far concrete actions have been taken against organised crime (see figure 4.2).

To effectively realise the commitments made to combat organised crime, key challenges need overcoming in the areas of co-ordination, legislation and financing. Improved co-ordination of agencies and states involved in efforts to combat organised crime is necessary to ensure efforts achieve optimal success through a clear delineation of responsibilities and roles. Similarly, there should be much greater information-exchange between states and agencies working to combat organised crime. Legislative reform is required to harmonise laws, penal codes and judicial procedure of different countries to more effectively co-ordinate actions against organised crime. This needs to include commitments to banking transparency between states. Unfortunately, many of the

¹⁰ London Conference on organised crime in South East Europe, 25 November 2002.

resources needed to undertake these initiatives are lacking. For example, Interpol, one of the most advanced bodies involved in tackling illicit arms trafficking and host to the only database for stolen and recovered weapons has only one analyst working solely on firearms trafficking.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The EU should:

- Increase resources to improve the co-ordination and information exchange between agencies and states involved in efforts to combat organised crime and place greater priority on the problem and implications of small arms flows as they relate to organised crime.
- Develop the capacity of the Southeast European Co-operation Initiative (SECI) regional centre for combating trans-border crime, based in Bucharest, and complete the formal training (to Europol standards) of the Centre's crime experts as well as increasing the number of formal operational exchanges with Europol on organised crime investigations.
- Implement the London Statement commitment for countries to have new legislation by 2003 drafted in full, ready for tabling to parliaments, which will deliver workable laws on tracing bank transactions and lifting undue banking secrecy and ensure that drafts are consistent with Financial Action Task Force standards.

FIGURE 4.2

THE LONDON CONFERENCE ON DEFEATING ORGANISED CRIME IN SOUTH EAST EUROPE, NOVEMBER 2002

Fifty-six delegations signed a joint commitment to tackle crime at source, in transit and at its destination at the London Conference.

A joint, co-ordinated effort will devote attention to technical and operational efforts against the most important aspects of organised crime:

- Illegal immigration and trafficking in human beings
- Trafficking in drugs and weapons
- Major trans-border crime of other kinds
- Corruption

Priority actions are:

- Working to meet European crime fighting standards
- Building public support for action against crime
- Improving regional co-operation.

Progress will be monitored at the Conference in Thessalonica in June 2003



C) COMBATING ILLICIT TRAFFICKING IN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS

The illicit trade in small arms and light weapons (SALW) plays a key role in fuelling conflict, organised crime and corruption within the EU and internationally (see Figure 4.3). Over the past 50 years the overwhelming majority of casualties in conflicts have been from these type of weapons. Much of the current international focus is on denying terrorist groups and states access to weapons of mass destruction, but greater attention to controlling the conventional weapons trade, including small arms and light weapons would complement and strengthen these efforts. Arms brokers often arrange weapons transfers to conflict areas, particularly in Africa. Comprehensive controls on arms brokers should therefore be a vital part of international efforts to prevent violent conflict and combat organised crime and terrorism.

At the Cairo Summit, EU and African governments agreed to "Intensify efforts to fully co-operate at international fora to combat the problem of illicit trafficking in small arms and light weapons, including reducing the flow of arms to conflict regions, and support relevant African and European initiatives." They also agreed to "Endeavour to ensure the success of the UN Conference on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects in 2001."The UN Conference was, in many ways a missed opportunity, since no legally binding measures were enforced. But states did agree on a fairly comprehensive Programme of Action (PoA) which, if fully implemented would go a long way to combat illicit trafficking of SALW. The biennial review conference in July 2003 provides an important opportunity to review progress and for the EU to encourage further action to implement the UN PoA.

The EU has taken a positive step forward, agreeing controls on arms brokering in November 2001. However, member states are not obliged to include the measures in their national legislations, the controls are not extra-territorial and Central and East European Countries have yet to sign up to the brokering controls.

It is not only illicit trafficking, which presents a problem. Government licensed sales continue to find their way to conflict and human rights crisis zones. The EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports was adopted in 1998, yet there remain a number of areas that need to be addressed in order to prevent the flow of arms to these regions. These include the need to improve the system of annual reporting, to develop the denial and consultation mechanisms and to introduce effective measures to control arms brokering and end-use controls.

The enlargement of the EU provides an invaluable opportunity to strengthen control on arms across the wider European region. Although countries in Central and Eastern Europe have made significant improvements to their arms export control policies in recent years, the region continues to be an important source and transit route for transfers of weapons as evidenced by recent shipments to Iraq from some countries. Whilst many of the countries have made political commitments to abide by the EU Code, illicit shipments are still slipping through and much remains to be done to tighten up both arms export control legislation and practice. Candidate countries require particular assistance with implementing controls. It is welcome that in April 2003 candidate countries will take part in CFSP working group meetings with COARM (conventional arms exports) and CODUN (global disarmament and arms control) as this will improve, for example, information exchanges.

The EU should:

- Establish a joint EU-African position which prioritises international agreements on export controls, arms brokering and supplies to nonstate actors, ahead of the July 2003 UN Small Arms Conference Biennial Meeting.
- Agree a Joint Action or Common Position with Central-Eastern
 European governments on arms brokers and adopt strict legislation and
 monitoring systems for any movement of arms and associated materials
 throughout their territory.
- Prioritise better co-ordination with associate countries to help candidate countries to implement the EU Code of Conduct.
- Develop an information-exchange mechanism whereby knowledge of end-user problems or diversion are communicated between member states.
- Ensure that those candidate countries closest to joining the EU are more closely involved in the information-exchange and consultation mechanisms.
- Provide financial and technical support for sub regional initiatives, such as the South-Eastern Europe Regional Implementation Plan, the Nairobi Declaration and the SADC Protocol.

FIGURE 4.3

CASE STUDY: EU GUN CRIME

The availability of firearms is part of a global phenomenon. In 2002, 638 million small arms and light weapons were in worldwide circulation, representing a 16 per cent increase on 2001 figures. Although figures fluctuate, gun crime is an issue facing every EU country. For example, the UK saw a 35 per cent rise in gun crime in 2002, while in France armed robbery increased 9.8 per cent in 2001. Italy saw a 15 per cent reduction in murders in 2001, but anxiety over violent crime remains high."

Increasingly, South East, Central and Eastern Europe are the source of the firearms on European streets. These countries are also the main sources of guns entering African war zones. Throughout the region there are large stocks left after the Cold War, a lack of capacity to control trafficking and a desperate need for hard currency. For example, over 350,000 weapons are still unaccounted for after the collapse of state authority in Albania in 1997.

EU member states should enhance efforts to reduce the spread and availability of weapons at source in Eastern and South East Europe and increase their work with EU applicant countries to tighten their controls before they are admitted to the EU. More resources are needed to tackle proliferation in South-Eastern Europe, while seized and surplus stocks should be destroyed.



[&]quot;Figures from The Guardian Newspaper, 10/01/03.

CHAPTER 5:

ENHANCING CO-ORDINATION ACROSS EU INSTITUTIONS

It is necessary to strive for greater coherence within the European Union when undertaking preventive actions.

Difficulties of acquiring a comprehensive perspective on conflict prevention remain.

While the involvement of different organisations can pose a challenge for co-ordination and co-operation, each can provide an added value and co-operating closely they can further effectively the cause of conflict prevention.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU PROGRAMME FOR THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENT CONFLICTS, JUNE 2002

The European Parliament calls on the Commission to gender-sensitise its peace and security related activities.

The European Parliament calls on the Member States to promote equal participation of women in diplomatic conflict resolution and reconstruction initiatives at all levels.

THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION ON GENDER ASPECTS OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION AND
PEACE-BUILDING, NOVEMBER 2000

Implementing a comprehensive, mainstreamed conflict prevention policy through all the mechanisms available to the EU necessitates co-ordination. The expansion of Europe in 2004 increases the need even further to focus attention on strengthening coherence and co-ordination for a shared EU-wide conflict prevention approach. Stronger linkages need to be built between the three pillars, the Directorate Generals, the Council Working Groups, the Council and Commission and between the EU and other international institutions. To address this challenge, the structural framework and the cultural attitude towards conflict prevention and the availability of resources to aid effective implementation must be prioritised. This also includes the mainstreaming of gender analysis as an integral part of the conflict prevention approach.

A) INSTITUTIONAL CO-ORDINATION AND CULTURAL UNDERSTANDING OF CONFLICT PREVENTION

As decisions and policies related to external relations and conflict prevention are generated and implemented in all three pillars, the pillar structure of the EU presents particular challenges. ¹² Similarly the division of responsibilities for programming and implementation between the Directorate Generals of the Commission (e.g. EuropeAid, DG Relex, DG Development, DG Trade, DG Enlargement and ECHO) can hinder the process of mainstreaming conflict prevention within sectoral and geographical units and at delegation level, where programme development and implementation takes place. Coordination between the Council and Commission can also be problematic and the fast rotation of the Presidency system can be detrimental to coherence and continuity. A concrete framework therefore needs to be created to achieve co-ordination in the implementation of conflict prevention, building on commitments made [e.g. the resolution on Coherence (section Peace-building, Conflict Prevention and Resolution) adopted by the Development Council in 1997].

¹² The instruments of conflict prevention within the EU are located in pillar one (development co-operation, humanitarian and trade policies), within pillar two (through the CFSP), and pillar three (Justice and Home Affairs).

The EU must also work to establish a culture of conflict prevention across all EU institutions and activities. Changing attitudes and behaviours is a long-term process, however, it is a process that must begin first and foremost by establishing a common understanding and discourse on what conflict prevention means within the EU. It is welcome that the EU has constructed a set of working definitions for terms such as conflict prevention and peace-building. These definitions are essential for effective policy making. In practice, however, there is still some misunderstanding of terminology and appropriate responses, for example, between crisis management, conflict management and conflict prevention.

The process of establishing a common language and culture across the EU should mean a systematic mainstreaming of gender-sensitive conflict prevention. Unfortunately, however, this cannot always be assumed. Women are civilians and victims in war, as well as combatants, agents (in logistics and intelligence), leaders and peace-builders. Nevertheless, women are persistently excluded from formal conflict prevention, peace-building and post-reconstruction processes and their unique needs and concerns (both as victims and agents) are often not addressed. Their peace-building knowledge and practical experience remains an untapped resource in formal peace negotiations and in community-based conflict prevention.

Gender analysis has been recognised as an important tool in formulating conflict prevention policy and practice in the EU through the European Parliament Resolution on Gender Aspects of Conflict Resolution and Peace-building (November 2000) and the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Resolution on Gender Issues (March 2002). However, there still remains a gap between recognising the importance of gender analysis, and mainstreaming gender in conflict prevention in practice at all levels of the EU. The implementation of gender mainstreaming has not been co-ordinated across the different sectors and levels of the EU and continues to be led by the individual priorities of the implementers. If conflict prevention initiatives are to have meaningful and sustainable impact, the fragmented and often gender-blind nature of the EU conflict prevention approach must therefore be addressed. (see figure 5.1. for a brief description on tools for mainstreaming gender across EU institutions).

Now is the time to build on the success of the adoption of the European Parliament Resolution to open up new spaces for women's voices on peace and security at all levels. This must be done by encouraging the EU institutions and member states to implement the recommendations made in a concrete, coherent and effective manner, and by making the necessary resources available to do so. This necessitates strong political will to support the implementation and monitoring of the process and is a role in which the European Parliament and EU Presidencies can play an important part.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Institutionalise a liason body to link up decision-making with implementation between pillars in order to build consensus, share information and monitor co-operation.
- Set up joint planning and progress meetings between regional working groups, the PSC and the DGs from the Commission to facilitate mainstreaming and effective co-ordination.
- The posts of High Representative for CFSP and Commissioner for External Relations should be merged, with the new High Representative holding the office of Vice President of the Commission and made responsible for the co-ordination of all EU external actions.



- Ensure that country or regional taskforces are used more in the formulation and implementation of the strategy papers, particularly in bringing together relevant staff from DG Relex, DG Development, the Council, DG Trade, ECHO and relevant member states.
- To increase the level of CFSP and ESDP transparency, the Presidency, in co-operation with the Commission, should produce public annual reports on the implementation of CFSP and ESDP on a regional basis, outlining annual priorities for future action.
- Develop working documents and a training programme to develop a shared understanding of conflict prevention and its associated terminology and train staff on how to adapt this knowledge to their work across all relevant sectors and levels of the Union.
- Institutionally mainstream gender analysis across all sectors and levels of the EU including the CPU and the PPEWU, delegations, desk officers, all civilian and military personnel in peacekeeping, peace support operations and fact finding missions, and throughout all cross-cutting sectors such as development, human rights, small arms and trade, and ensure the necessary resources to do so.¹⁴

FIGURE 5.1

TOOLS FOR MAINSTREAMING GENDER ACROSS EU INSTITUTIONS

The Gender & Peacebuilding Programme at International Alert, in partnership with the EU NGO Coalition on Women, Peace and Conflict Prevention, ¹³ advocates for the full implementation of the European Parliament Resolution. Based on on-going experience gained through advocating for gender mainstreaming at the UN level, the Gender & Peacebuilding Programme have developed a series of tools to assist in mainstreaming gender at the various institutional levels of multi-lateral organisations. These include:

- The Gender & Conflict Early Warning Framework: applicable both for the PPEWU and EU desk officers.
- The Women's Peacebuilding Know-How Analysis Framework: aimed at systematising analysis of women as a resource in conflict prevention.
- A Template for Profiling the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security: a tool for the design of workshops on the UNSC Resolution. This tool could be adapted to the European Parliament Resolution.

Under development:

- A Gender Check List for UN Security Council missions
- A Gender Check List for EU Country Strategy Papers
- Gender-sensitive Indicators for Early Warning
- A Toolkit/Manual on Women, Peace and Security: an advocacy tool for raising awareness of the issues and designing/implementing gender-sensitive initiatives.
- A Resource Pack with case studies on Gender and Post-Conflict Reconstruction: an advocacy tool for raising awareness of the issues and designing/implementing gender-sensitive post-conflict reconstruction programmes.

The application of tools for gender analysis at every stage of the project cycle and indicators for monitoring the impacts of their implementation are key to developing a gender-sensitive, conflict prevention approach. However, tools and benchmarks can only be effective if EU staff are sensitive to the issues and are trained in their application. This necessitates both political will and resources to ensure this process takes place.

B) EU CO-ORDINATION WITH INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

In August 2002, foreign ministers, senior officials and heads of European institutions met from the EU, NATO, the UN and the OSCE, as well the AU, ECOWAS and SADC at the Helsingborg Conference. The conference marked the first time that senior officials from all European regional organisations and UN institutions had met to review the collective challenges they face in conflict prevention. Future meetings such as these would represent a fundamental development in the establishment of a new regional and global paradigm, which places human security and co-operative solutions at its heart. Operationally, in December 2002, the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO in crisis management was established, enabling the EU access to use certain NATO facilities. These initiatives are welcome, however, the opportunities for pooling the capabilities of the EU with the OSCE, NATO and the UN for conflict prevention have yet to be optimised. This includes collaboration in use of staff, facilities and information exchange in early warning, diplomacy, civil and military crisis management, development, humanitarian and trade policy.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Enhance co-operation between the European Parliament and the OSCE, the Council of Europe and NATO parliamentary assemblies through joint-representation and information exchange on the implementation of CFSP and ESDP.
- Organise a follow-up conference to the Helsingborg meeting to develop a comprehensive, operational strategy to promote coherence and complementarity with other multi-lateral conflict prevention actors, including the OSCE and UN.



¹³ Members of the EU NGO Coalition on Women, Peace and Conflict Prevention include the European Centre for Common Ground (ECCG), Aprodev, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), Kvinna Till Kvinna and International Alert.

¹⁴ See the Women Building Peace website for more information (http://www.international-alert.org/women/eu.html)

C) CONFLICT PREVENTION IN THE CONVENTION ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPE¹⁵

The enlargement of the EU towards Central and Eastern Europe increases the need for the EU to fully commit to and mainstream conflict prevention across all EU policies and institutions. Many new members will have their own priorities and agendas that may impede on these efforts so it is vital that the process is firmly co-ordinated. The Convention on the Future of Europe offers a valuable opportunity to define Europe's vision of peace and security for itself and the rest of the world and could be a useful tool for consolidating co-ordination across EU institutions and activities. The Convention also provides an opportunity to remedy the lack of democratic accountability of EU actions. In addition to improving the scrutinising role of the European Parliament and national parliaments, the transparency of conflict prevention policies (including both CFSP and the ESDP) could be improved.

A more effective method of decision-making in the Council is needed, however, to ensure that an enlarged EU is able to act decisively in CFSP matters. There are also fears that the Convention process may subordinate human rights, anti-poverty and development policies to further a new EU foreign policy agenda, particularly the 'war on terror'. Since II September 2001, security issues and anti-immigration sentiments have taken centre stage at the expense of a commitment to human rights-based development and conflict prevention. The prevention of violent conflicts must therefore be made a stated objective of the CFSP and the institutional reforms outlined above should be implemented under the Convention.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- Engage with candidate countries to raise awareness and promote understanding of the EU's role in conflict prevention.
- Extend qualified majority voting in the Council to all non-military areas of CFSP, to facilitate effective decision-making in an enlarged Europe.
- Adopt conflict prevention as a stated CFSP objective, in accordance with international law, including humanitarian law and through poverty elimination.
- Enhance the role of the European Parliament and national parliaments in scrutinising CFSP and ESDP by assessing how CFSP and ESDP have contributed to the stated objective of conflict prevention.

¹⁵ See Building conflict prevention into the Future of Europe EPLO position paper on the European Convention and Conflict Prevention. Adopted by the EPLO General Assembly, November 2002.

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- Tackling Violent Conflict: The Case for a UK Civilian Peace Service, Peaceworkers UK, International Alert, Saferworld, ERIS, RedR, April 2002.
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NOTES







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