


# Development in Conflict: A Seven Step Tool for Planners

Version 1



David Nyheim, Manuela Leonhardt, Cynthia Gaigals

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FEWER ■ International Alert ■ Saferworld



FEWER (Forum on Early Warning and Early Response) is an independent, global network of organisations committed to preventing conflict by providing early warning and informing peacebuilding efforts.

FEWER's activities are led by its members. The network is composed of Non-Governmental Organisations, inter-governmental agencies and academic institutions.

FEWER is engaged in early warning and response activities in the Caucasus, the Great Lakes region of Africa, West Africa, Central Asia and Southeast Asia.

FEWER's motivation is strictly humanitarian. FEWER provides local perspectives on the causes and dynamics of violent conflict to different policy-making communities.



International Alert is an independent non-governmental organisation which analyses the causes of conflict within countries, enables mediation and dialogue to take place, sets standards of conduct that avoid violence and helps to develop the skills necessary to resolve conflict non-violently. International Alert conducts policy orientated research and advocacy aimed at promoting sustainable peace.

The Development and Peacebuilding programme examines the relationship between violent conflict and the agents and processes of development. Its aim is to provide development and humanitarian actors with knowledge based gender sensitive policy prescriptions, best practice and tools. Drawing on action research methodologies International Alert aims to increase understanding in this area, as well as producing resources to aid in the formulation of proactive responses. In our work we engage with, and help to build the capacity of partner NGOs, governments, bilateral agencies, and intergovernmental organisations.



Saferworld is an independent foreign affairs think tank working to identify, develop and publicise more effective approaches to tackling and preventing armed conflicts. Saferworld promotes conflict prevention and peacebuilding through its programme which aims to:

- Enhance the EU's capacity to prevent violent conflict;
- Contribute to policy objectives for security sector reform;
- Develop a conflict assessment methodology and practical working tools for analysing conflict and defining objectives in development cooperation;
- Tackle the proliferation of small arms

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This tool should be used in conjunction with the document *Conflict Impact Assessment of EU Development Co-operation with ACP Countries. A Review of Literature and Practice* by Manuela Leonhardt (London: International Alert/Saferworld, 2000), which provides additional information on conflict analysis, conflict indicators and building capacities for peace.

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# Introduction and methodology

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**Introduction** Development agencies can make important contributions to conflict prevention and peacebuilding in politically unstable situations. They have the capacity to address root causes of conflict with a long-term perspective and so contribute to structural stability. Structural stability links economic aspects of aid to structures for more equitable opportunity, good governance, human rights and positive engagement with representative civil society.

But how do we know what is the “right thing” to do in a volatile and complex environment, and how do we know that we are getting it right? This question is becoming increasingly important as more and more agencies are committing themselves to conflict prevention. In the past, this issue was discussed under the framework of “do no harm”. This framework aimed to reduce the sometimes negative unintended effects of development and humanitarian assistance on conflict. However, there is a vast potential for development beyond “do no harm” and for assistance to assume a more proactive role. Many efforts are being undertaken in this direction, and there is an increasing awareness that a range of activities can have an impact on conflict or peace in deeply divided societies.

Developing a strategic response to conflict-prone situations, choosing the right type of activities, and monitoring their impact on the dynamics of conflict and peace requires a conscious effort to understand the ever-changing conflict environment in which an organisation is operating. Many development agencies are already undertaking this work on a daily basis, drawing on a range of reporting frameworks, analytical tools (e.g. Logframe, stakeholder analysis) and - importantly - the personal contacts they have been able to establish. However, it is worth systematising these practices and developing a more comprehensive and strategic way of analysing and monitoring conflict and feeding this information into planning and management decisions.

*Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (PCIA)* is a planning and management tool that can assist development and humanitarian organisations in analysing situations of (potential) conflict and identifying strategic opportunities for conflict prevention and peace-building. It can also be adapted for monitoring the impact of these activities. It thus provides an integrated approach to the main stages and levels of a development programme.

The Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment methodology outlined below is based on good development practice and related approaches to conflict analysis such as Early Warning. The methodology is premised on the principles of stakeholder consultation, commitment to indigenous visions for peace and local ownership of the peace process. At the same time, it allows the users to consider regional dynamics influencing the conflict.

This Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment tool has the potential to be used in all interventions including trade and investment, emergency relief and development assistance. It should assist in ensuring coherence between different policy interventions on a micro and macro level and between international and local interventions.

**Principles** A comprehensive working tool provides a framework for looking at dilemmas and critical choices and provides direction for practical implementation. The tool itself, however, cannot provide guidance with difficult questions such as how to include former, often abusive or criminal, combatants into reconciliation processes. Fragile political situations will present dilemmas and challenges where simple choices will be difficult to make and which will require a sound knowledge of local conditions and power relationships.

Therefore, the working tool should be supported by principles of working such as expressed in Humanitarian Law or international Human Rights Law. Many development and humanitarian agencies are currently developing their own codes of conduct. These principles should inform the planning, implementation and evaluation of programmes and be reflected in ways of working and best practice.

International Alert has identified the following **guiding principles for conflict transformation work**, which provide a useful example:

- Primacy of people in transforming conflict
- Humanitarian concern
- Human rights and humanitarian laws and principles
- Respect for gender and cultural diversity
- Impartiality
- Independence
- Accountability
- Confidentiality
- Partnership
- Institutional learning<sup>1</sup>

Such principles should guide the conflict analysis and strategic decisions which need to be made.

**Methodology** The Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment tool provides a framework for:  
 (a) assessing the peace-building environment (situation analysis and trends);  
 (b) identifying conflict parties and peace-builders (stakeholder analysis);  
 (c) defining objectives and activities; and (d) inputting analyses into a planning framework (logical framework).

To support the user in the optimal application of the tool, the appendices provide information on conflict indicators and measures for conflict prevention.

The methodology itself does not guarantee the quality of the final strategy or programme. As with any planning tool, the quality of the plan is determined by the quality of the information and analysis upon which it is based. The same is true for ownership of the final result. The tool provides for a process, in which a wide range of stakeholders can participate and whose outcomes they can shape. This process supports local ownership.

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<sup>1</sup> *International Alert, Guiding Principles for Conflict Transformation Work (1998)*

The tool outlined below is oriented towards macro-level planning, and would need to be further developed to assist in monitoring and evaluation. Separate systems and methods are required for this. It does, however, provide a processual and analytical framework as well as indicators which can be monitored. This allows for easy adaptation of the steps outlined, which may be used for monitoring and evaluation.

The suggested Conflict Impact Assessment methodology is based on the Project Management Cycle and contains three broad sections: a) analysis, b) strategy, and c) implementation for use in the project management cycle framework. It addresses three basic questions:

### 1. **Analysis**

What are the characteristics of the present conflict, where are windows of opportunity for peace?

- Understanding the historical and spatial dynamic of the conflict, interlinking regional, national and local events.
- Identifying the root causes of the conflict (economic, political, socio-cultural, and security-related). Consider those which triggered the conflict originally and those which sustain it today.
- Stakeholder analysis and peace agendas. Include both those who promote the conflict and those who support peace.
- Mapping recent trends and initiatives (military, political, economic) with relevance for the peace process. Identify windows of opportunity to prevent violence and support peace.

### 2. **Strategy**

What strategic choices have to be made, what objectives should the programme adopt?


- Making choices and objectives explicit sets a clear marker in terms of what a programme is supposed to achieve.
- Having identified strategic opportunities for peace, assessing priorities in relation to these issues. The outcome of this process should be an agenda for action, which is locally owned.
- Choosing peacebuilding objectives needs to be informed by actual capacities and measures available.
- At this stage, it is also crucial to ensure coherence in overall engagement with the country in question and to work towards complementarity with the efforts of others.

### 3. **Implementation**

What key assumptions are made in relation to the operating environment, what are the risks to the operation?

- Operating in unstable environments is challenging for any programme, but there are some types of activity which are more likely to succeed than others. Therefore, it is critical to determine the sustainability of a chosen initiative in relation to conflict.
- This includes assessing the implications of location and timing of the initiative, its flexibility and capacity to evolve in a changing environment, level of investment and quality of staff, as well as the degree of local support for the initiative.

The last section of this tool leads to the project management cycle and identifies where the results of steps taken should be incorporated.





## A. Analysis: Conflict and peace

It is important to understand the conflict, its root causes and dynamics, in order to devise activities that can mitigate the conflict potential or promote peace.

### Step 1 Identifying the conflict factors and key indicators

This step maps the broader context of the conflict, and identifies conflict factors and indicators to monitor the conflict. Key conclusions help in the identification of strategic issues, and the emerging indicators can subsequently be used to understand dynamics between the conflict factors for a trends (prediction) analysis.

To map the conflict, we need to answer the following questions: (a) *what* factors contribute to conflict and peace (e.g. land distribution, availability of light weapons); (b) *where* is the conflict located (e.g. national, regional); and (c) *when and how* has the conflict developed over time (its history).

We can link the *what, where, and when* of the conflict to the issues governance, security, economics, and socio-cultural aspects and use indicators to facilitate the subsequent analysis. Taking account of the historical and spatial dimension of the conflict shall help to deepen understanding of the role of different conflict factors as well as assist in drawing an up-to-date picture of the conflict situation. For the purpose of planning, it is important to draw linkages between the local, national, and regional manifestations of the conflict.

**Table 1: Issue-based conflict analysis**

	Governance	Economics	Socio-cultural	Security
<b>Descriptive analysis (what)</b>	Narrative	Narrative	Narrative	Narrative
<b>Geographic linkages (where)</b>	Narrative	Narrative	Narrative	Narrative
<b>Historical factors (when)</b>	Narrative	Narrative	Narrative	Narrative
<b>CONCLUSIONS</b>				
<b>INDICATORS</b>	Indicators	Indicators	Indicators	Indicators

Key indicators include:

- **Governance:** human rights violations (arbitrary arrests, failure of rule of law, in particular, lack of independence of the judiciary and the police; weakness of state institutions and repression of civil society organisations); military intervention in political affairs.
- **Economics:** unemployment and social insecurity; prevalence of poverty, income disparities and land distribution; environmental degradation.
- **Socio-Cultural:** lack of access to mass media, discrimination on racial or ethnic grounds.
- **Security:** political killings, disappearances; availability of arms; crime rates, inter-personal violence.

Appendix 1 provides a more comprehensive list of conflict and peace indicators. The process of choosing indicators should be a shared one, that is the indicators should be agreed upon by stakeholders to reflect their view of and priorities within the conflict. It is critical to keep in mind that the selected indicators will inform a wide range of possible programmatic responses to conflict.


*Example*

	<b>Governance</b>	
<b>Descriptive analysis (what)</b>	<p>Restricted political rights</p> <p>Where government decisions are held in the hands of a few, or when dominant groups are able to assert their power in ways which reduce access and the rights of others, then the conditions for violent competition can emerge.</p>	<p><i>Indicator:</i></p> <p>Government legitimacy (constitutional abuses, electoral fraud, discrimination against ethnic groups)</p>
<b>CONCLUSION</b>	<p><i>National</i></p> <p>The government does not have a process for including diverse political opinions and this is now of critical importance.</p> <p><i>Regional</i></p> <p>Regional governments also pursue policies of exclusion.</p>	

There is no single cause of a conflict, nor is there any single precondition for sustainable peace. Different factors vary in importance and can reinforce each other. Conflict analysis must involve assessing the relative importance of the different conflict factors and their interrelationship.

The diagram below provides for drawing relationships between different conflict factors/issues. The result is a simplified model depicting the most prominent and powerful conflict factor/issues and synergistic effects.

**Fig. 1: Assessing importance and interrelations between conflict factors**



This diagram also helps recognise the interrelation between different issues. The results of this diagram can be summarised in the following table.

**Table 2: Assessing importance and synergies between conflict factors**

	Conflict factors	Synergy
Very important		
Important		
Less important		

**Step 2 Stakeholder analysis**

The stakeholder analysis comprises a mapping of the conflict actors and their agendas, peace constituencies and relevant external efforts. This will enable us to target initiatives towards locally identified priorities, support local initiatives and openings, and address the issues of those who are building their stakes on violence.

“Stakeholders” are those groups, who share a common interest towards the conflict or are affected by it in a similar way. They are also the central actors for peace. Stakeholder analysis can help identify the main conflict stakeholders, understand their interests, interfaces, and peace agendas, assess their capacities towards peace and conflict, and draw strategic conclusions about their position in conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities. The purpose is to identify “peace constituencies”, to clarify assumptions and to show potential risks and “spoilors”. The results of this analysis answer important questions in the objectives, assumptions and risks sections of the Project Management Cycle framework.

### Conflict stakeholders

"Key stakeholders" are those who can significantly influence the conflict or are most vulnerable to it. Among them, we can distinguish: (a) "*primary stakeholders*", whose lives are directly affected by the conflict (e.g. refugees, peasants, women, children, ex-combatants); (b) "*secondary stakeholders*", who play an intermediary role and have the potential to affect the conflict itself (e.g. government, non-state actors, political parties, civil society, religious leaders); and (c) "*external stakeholders*", who are not directly involved, but are an interested party to the conflict (e.g. donor agencies, international private sector).

**Table 3: Stakeholder analysis**

	Interests	Relations between stakeholders	Peace agendas	Capacities	Implications for peace- building
<b>Primary stakeholders</b>					
<b>Secondary stakeholders</b>					
<b>External stakeholders</b>					

### Key questions:

- *Interests.* What interests does each stakeholder group have towards the conflict (refer to the conflict factors)? How is it affecting the conflict ?
- *Relation between stakeholders.* What are the interfaces between the key stakeholders (on national, local and regional level)? What are the relations between them (consider power, conflicting interests etc.)?
- *Peace agendas.* What visions of peace do the stakeholders have? What kind of peace do they want? What are the main elements of their peace agendas (e.g. land reform, national autonomy)?
- *Capacities.* What capacities do the key stakeholders have to support conflict prevention and peacebuilding or otherwise affect it ?
- *Implications for peace-building.* Strategic conclusions: What implications does this analysis have for pursuing structural stability and peacebuilding ?

### The international community

To prepare strategic choices for engagement, it is important to examine the capacities and comparative advantages of the own agency and others in the field. Such an analysis can enhance effectiveness, coordination and synergies between the different actors. It includes a review of agencies' agendas and roles, management and resource capacities, and implementing partners. The result of this step is an overview over the comparative advantages of the main agencies and an outline of the areas, where consultation and co-operation would be useful.

Table 4: Agendas and capacities of international actors

Agency	Agenda	Resources and instruments	Implementing partners	Comparative advantage

## B. Strategy: strategic choices and objectives

### Step 3 Identifying strategic issues

This analysis can be further enhanced by spelling out the opportunities for peace emerging both from the issue-based conflict analysis and from the analysis of the conflict stakeholders.

Opportunities of a short-term and a long-term character may usefully be distinguished. In a pre-conflict situation, they will probably include efforts to address the main grievances of disaffected groups and the creation of channels for the non-violent resolution of conflict issues. In conflict and post-conflict situations, they will comprise measures to initiate or strengthen a peace process, economic and political reform, reconstruction as well as providing a peace dividend to the general population. They can be linked back to the four main areas of conflict factors: governance, security, economics, and culture and society.

The following table supports this analysis. It could additionally include:

- windows of opportunity for conflict prevention and peacebuilding, and possible *key events* or *processes* that would promote peace;
- the *key actors* in this process;
- possible *options and agenda items* to be considered essential in bringing about a just and lasting peace.

**Table 5: Opportunities for peace**

	Short-term	Long-term
Governance		
Economics		
Socio-cultural		
Security		

For targeting aid at the right issues, a trends analysis is important. Trends can be identified by holistically looking at the relationship between conflict factors, the agendas of key stakeholders, and existing efforts for peace. From this trends analysis will also emerge *strategic issues* requiring consideration for an assessment of programme objectives, purpose, and activities. The timeframe to be adopted for the trend analysis should at least be in the range of three to five years.

*The trends also help us identify critical areas for monitoring and evaluation.*

**Table 6: Strategic issues**

	Conflict Issues	Stakeholders	Peace efforts	Trends	Strategic issues
Summary and conclusions					

*Example*

<b>Summary and conclusions</b>	<b>Conflict issues</b>	<b>Stakeholders</b>	<b>Peace efforts</b>	<b>Trends</b>	<b>Strategic issues</b>
	<p>The national government is not implementing policies which support inclusion.</p> <p>Disturbing unrest amongst armed forces due to lack of payment of wages.</p>	<p>There are officials in ministries of planning and finance who are aware of the critical situation and are prepared to work to develop more inclusive mechanisms if pressure could be brought to bear on IMF to look at debt relief.</p>	<p>Officials in ministries of planning and finance.</p> <p>Strong local co-operation between local government and traditional leadership on increasing political participation.</p>	<p>Increased unrest among groups opposed to the government, although this might be balanced with inclusion of opposition into government planning efforts.</p> <p>Military likely to support efforts of toppling the government, although this can be countered with payment of wages.</p>	<p>Critical timing if opportunity for building peace at this level</p> <p>Country X and large umbrella group NGO are well placed to work with government on influencing IMF.</p> <p>Local dialogue efforts can be supported effectively.</p> <p>Disbursement of funds to pay wages of military should be considered.</p>

**Step 4 Making strategic choices and setting objectives**

The definition of objectives is derived from choices made in relation to the strategic issues identified above. What are the most critical issues given the conclusions, capacities and strategic issues which have been defined?

These choices need to be made explicit. A prioritising exercise should allow the refining of choices and defining what objectives should be pursued in a given specific context. This is the critical phase of a process that leads from the interpretation of problems to appropriate realistic choices.

**For example:**

- Should the agency advocate and implement policies and practices which allow for the development of more inclusive government?
- Is there a need to assist in budget reform in order that civil servants are paid a living wage and that tensions are reduced, especially in the security forces ?

In order to make these choices, we need to assess the strategic issues identified, the initiatives of other agencies and the capacity of our own agency. Specifically, we are looking to shed light on how donor activities and our capacities in different fields (governance, economics, socio-cultural, and security) can be mobilised to impact on a strategic issue. The table below offers a way to organise this information and make informed decisions. It is important not to lose sight of the interlinkages between the strategic issues.

**Table 7: Strategic choices for action**

	<b>Strategic issue</b>	<b>Donor activities</b>	<b>Own capacity</b>	<b>Strategic choice/ overall objective</b>
<b>Summary and conclusions</b>				

The strategic choices will become the guiding objectives for our engagement in the country. Therefore, it is important to have a clear idea of how they can be matched by our capacity and the measures available to us (see also Appendix 2).



## C. Implementation: programmes, activities and sustainability

### Step 5 Defining programme purpose and activities

Having identified the overall objectives for conflict prevention and peacebuilding, we can now proceed to identify the purpose and activities of specific programmes, which can then be used in the project cycle management framework.

The table below prompts thinking towards a range of integrated measures which may address the situation reflected in the strategic choice. It is only such an integrated set of measures which will enable us comprehensively to define overall objectives for structural stability.

**Table 8: Defining programmes and activities**

	Overall objectives	Programme/project purpose	Activities
Governance			
Economics			
Socio-cultural			
Security			

### Step 6 Risk assessment and sustainability

The sustainability of any country strategy and related programmes is determined by the type of initiative, the quality of the programme design and the agency's degree of professionalism, its local relevance, as well as choices regarding timing and location. These critical questions should be answered – and the answers can be partly drawn from the work done above. These questions can help us identify our key assumptions regarding risks to the programme.

- Is the programme clearly aimed at addressing/counter-acting specific conflict factors and/or supporting peace efforts ?
- Does the programme have explicit objectives and is backed by capacities that support local agendas and efforts for peace ?
- Is the programme appropriately owned by local stakeholders, well-designed, delivered by a professional and flexible agency with established safety procedures for its staff, and complementary to other efforts ?
- Are the timing and location of the programme appropriate?

Further useful criteria for assessing the sustainability of a programme include connectedness, cost-effectiveness, coverage, accountability, transparency, trust, and commitment (Spencer 1998).

## Step 7 Using the Project Management Cycle Framework

We are now in a position to summarise our findings using the Project Management Cycle Framework. The different categories of the framework make reference to specific steps of this tool which provide the required information.

The identification of verifiable indicators will be programme specific as will sources of verification.

**Table 9: Project Management Cycle Framework**

	<b>Intervention logic</b>	<b>Verifiable indicators</b>	<b>Sources of verification</b>	<b>Assumptions</b>
<b>Overall objectives</b>	<i>Step 4</i>	<i>Step 1</i>		<i>Steps 2 and 6</i>
<b>Programme/ project purpose</b>	<i>Step 5</i>	<i>Step 1</i>		<i>Steps 2 and 6</i>
<b>Results</b>	<i>Step 3 and 5</i>	<i>Step 1</i>		<i>Steps 2 and 6</i>
<b>Activities</b>	<i>Step 5</i>	Means	Costs	<i>Steps 2 and 6</i>

# Appendix 1: Conflict and peace indicators

## Caucasus and Great Lakes Regions - October 2000

Based on Early Warning reporting by FEWER lead agencies in the Caucasus: Russian Academy of Sciences/EAWARN (Russia) and the Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development (Georgia); and Early Warning reporting by the FEWER lead agency in the Great Lakes, the Africa Peace Forum (APFO – Kenya), and the APFO Great Lakes Early Warning Network (GLEWN) member organisations.

Researched and compiled by Chrissie Hirst and Matenia P Sirseloudi,  
(Research Associates, FEWER Secretariat)

### 1. Introduction

In 1998, FEWER members launched pilot early warning systems in the Caucasus and the Great Lakes. These efforts were led by EAWARN/Russian Academy of Sciences (Russia) and the Caucasian Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development (Georgia) for the Caucasus, and the Africa Peace Forum (Kenya) for the Great Lakes. Following an eighteen month pilot in each region, this review of indicators is drawn from reports produced by the Caucasus and Great Lakes networks. It forms part of work on "lessons learned" undertaken by the FEWER network.

An understanding of conflict as well as peace generating factors is critical for early warning analysis. Further, it is now clear that a factual approach to early warning is flawed. Different indicators could be interpreted in a number of ways by people in conflict affected areas. Perceptions, therefore, are as important as facts. The value of FEWER's emphasis on locally led and managed early warning networks has been underscored.

Three directions can be seen in the practice of early warning: (i) unstructured qualitative and context specific situation assessments; (ii) generic indicator-based analyses; and (iii) quantitative model-based studies. All three directions have value, and inform the approach which FEWER member organisations take in their early warning efforts. This overview of indicators from the Caucasus and the Great Lakes aims to serve as a resource for practitioners seeking to understand conflict dynamics in the regions. It provides perspectives on the types of indicators to draw on for qualitative, generic and quantitative analyses of conflicts in the region.

Some gaps in the early warning field, however, have become visible through the preparation of this resource document. First, indicators need to be measured in quantitative terms, be policy relevant, and have associated information sources. The indicators listed below do not necessarily meet these criteria. Secondly, we need to find ways of ensuring that we adequately understand the perceptual nature of indicators used for analysis. This part of our work remains underdeveloped. Thirdly, conflict early warning has by and large focused on "conflict indicators". However, an analytical approach to peace, the other side of the coin, remains elusive. Hence, the peace indicators listed below are not as numerous as the conflict indicators. Fourthly, early warning has emerged from the international relations discipline. However, both conflict and peace take on a broader meaning for people than what can be contained within a given discipline. Gender perspectives on early warning can provide useful insights to our understanding of conflict/peace indicators, but are only now beginning to be applied.

FEWER members will continue to re-assess and draw lessons from their practice of early warning. Hence, this document should be viewed as a dynamic product. It will be revised and change as we continue to learn how to engage in early warning more effectively.

## 2. Note on Methodology

The conflict and peace indicators for the Great Lakes region in Africa and the Caucasus region have been developed by applying qualitative content analysis on regional reports. The data set covered forty regional reports between 1998-1999 for the Great Lakes including Country Reports, Region Reports, Thematic Reports and Policy Briefs. The data set for the Caucasus covered twenty-six reports between 1998-2000 including Early Warning reports, Thematic Early Warning reports and Policy Briefs.

The indicators used in the early warning reports produced by both these regional networks were analysed with the objective of determining a more region-specific list of indicators for the network.

Qualitative content analysis is a classical method for structuring and categorising written material of any origin. This method is particularly useful when we have to work with a largely unstructured and narrative text.

We have chosen qualitative analysis as the most open method for reducing the complexity in the content of these reports available in different formats and languages. The current classification includes as much detail as possible. We have avoided using a constructed code as in the case of model-derived categories used earlier in similar case studies. Instead, we have extracted our categories using the *in-vivo* code. Use of this code has meant a reduction in the material used in favour of more abstract generalisations. Such an open categorisation helps combine inductive with deductive thinking. The categories used are being developed and refined until a clear and unambiguous cluster pattern can be defined.

We have tried to uncover the underlying peace and conflict indicators, as perceived by local information-gathering sources. Our intention was not to quantify the data, though some of the indicators (eg, crime rates, external support) could be seen as quantifiable.

Information gathering and the construction of indicators should be viewed as a reflexive process. This assumption means that the indicators are dynamic and need to be revised. Structural changes in situations of conflict are unavoidable. As a result, early warning capacities are adapted through employing local empirical findings as a basis for more inductive methodologies for developing indicators. Such inductive methodologies can then be used in creating models for forecasting trends as the conflict develops. The focus remains on local reality rather than on theoretical models about conflict-generating variables.

FEWER reports are able to retain their credibility by using this applied method of indicator building. Our aim is to provide greater transparency in information processing in order to facilitate greater objectivity and value in the reporting process.

### 3a. Conflict Indicators: Caucasus

MAIN INDICATOR CATEGORIES	Indicator Examples
<p><i>REGIONAL / INTER-STATE INDICATORS</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Problematic relations with Federal centre</li> <li>• External support for opposition groups (or perception of)</li> <li>• Historical rivalries</li> <li>• Antagonistic behaviour</li> <li>• Territorial disputes</li> <li>• Exploitation of divisions/tensions (political / media propaganda)</li> <li>• Persecution of or discrimination against state nationals in neighbouring states or Russia</li> <li>• Inability to maintain territorial control</li> <li>• Threat of external intervention</li> <li>• Recent history of or ongoing violent (ethno-) territorial conflict in state or region</li> <li>• Presence or involvement of external or Federal troops (in peace-keeping role, to maintain security, to maintain border control etc.)</li> <li>• Deterioration of relations between state and external actors</li> <li>• State or region in the process of political or economic transition</li> <li>• Rivalries over control of region's resources</li> <li>• Dissatisfaction or resentment relating to the activities or legitimacy of the Federal government</li> <li>• Recent history of changes in territorial borders and status</li> <li>• Arms trafficking</li> <li>• Demographic changes</li> <li>• Mistrust of major mediating powers, including Federal centre</li> <li>• Uncertain stance of major external powers / stakeholders on key issues</li> </ul>
<p><i>STRATEGIC AND MILITARY INDICATORS</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Presence or involvement of external or Federal troops (in peace-keeping role, to maintain security, to maintain border control etc.)</li> <li>• Negotiations on key security issues deadlocked or failing to produce results (missing deadlines, superficial results only)</li> <li>• Public support for military resolution of existing conflicts</li> <li>• Deterioration of relations between state and external actors</li> <li>• Insufficient control over the military</li> <li>• Authorities sanction arming of civilians in border areas</li> <li>• Arms trafficking</li> <li>• Forced conscription into non-state security forces</li> <li>• Government legitimacy tied to conclusive military victory</li> </ul>

<p><i>STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND MONOPOLY OF POWER</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inability, on the part of the state, to deliver security and stability, and / or public perception of this inability</li> <li>• Systemic instability</li> <li>• Unconsolidated power</li> <li>• Human rights abuses</li> <li>• Territorial disputes</li> <li>• Increase in number of private security firms, clan-, family- or politically-based security systems, or semi-legal security forces, in competition with or opposition to the state security forces</li> <li>• Recent history of or ongoing violent (ethno-) territorial conflict in state or region</li> <li>• Presence or involvement of external or Federal troops (in peace-keeping role, to maintain security, to maintain border control etc.)</li> <li>• Increase in non-state military / security forces</li> <li>• Increase in terrorism</li> <li>• Perception that terrorist activities are related to / supported by elements in neighbouring states</li> <li>• Perception that Federal government encourages and manipulates internal conflicts</li> <li>• Uncertain distribution of powers between the centre or Federal government and 'autonomous' regions</li> <li>• Linguistic isolation from centre of power</li> <li>• Weak sense of citizenship</li> <li>• Weakness of state institutions</li> <li>• Weakness of political institutions</li> <li>• Weak state legitimacy</li> <li>• Non-state actors taking traditional state roles</li> <li>• Insufficient control over the military</li> <li>• State or region in the process of political or economic transition</li> <li>• Recent history of changes in territorial borders and status</li> <li>• Authorities sanction arming of civilians in border areas</li> <li>• Unresolved ethnic / territorial conflicts</li> <li>• Uncertain period of political transition (upcoming elections, newly autonomous region establishing self-government etc.)</li> <li>• Recurring violence in border areas (external support for resistance groups, increased likelihood of 'spillover' etc.)</li> <li>• Open combat (in some areas, re-escalation of, etc.)</li> </ul>
<p><i>POLITICAL OPPOSITION</i></p>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Disillusionment with security apparatus</li> <li>• Dissatisfaction with the management of state affairs</li> <li>• Dysfunctional judiciary or lack of respect for judicial system (due to corruption, mal-administration, politicisation etc.)</li> <li>• Censorship</li> <li>• Recent history of successful (ethno-nationalist) irredentist movement in the region</li> <li>• Corruption, (institutional, commercial, political)</li> <li>• Increased tension between regime supporters and opposition groups</li> <li>• Political violence (assassinations, coups, hostage-taking etc.)</li> <li>• Constitutional abuses</li> <li>• Dissatisfaction with the management of state affairs</li> <li>• Radicalisation of traditional institutions ( eg, radicalisation of mainstream religious institutions as a result of activities of extremist religious movements)</li> <li>• Ethnic tension/violence</li> <li>• Historical rivalries</li> <li>• Antagonistic behaviour</li> <li>• Institutionalised persecution, or perception of (economic, political etc.)</li> <li>• General despair (linked to justice, economic welfare, personal/family security)</li> <li>• Abuses of power</li> <li>• Increased opposition activity</li> <li>• Increase in size and cohesion of opposition groups</li> <li>• Repression of political opposition</li> <li>• Radicalisation of opposition ( militarisation, rise in ethno-nationalism, increasingly irredentist agenda, more violent or conflict-generating activities undertaken etc.)</li> <li>• Protest action (strikes, picketing etc.)</li> <li>• Militarisation (of society or political groups)</li> <li>• Recent history of political instability and violence (coups, assassinations etc.)</li> <li>• Uncertain period of political transition (upcoming elections, newly autonomous region establishing self-government etc.)</li> </ul>

<i>FRAGMENTATION AND BEHAVIOUR OF MAIN ACTORS</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Governing elite has no coherent policy on key conflict-generating issues</li> <li>• Factionalism within opposition</li> </ul>
<i>IDEOLOGICAL FACTORS</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Conflicting ideological systems (European vs. Islamic norms and values)</li> <li>• Recent history of successful (ethno-nationalist) irredentist movement in the region</li> </ul>
<i>SOCIAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL SPREAD OF CONFLICT</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Civilian movement across border</li> <li>• Restriction of movement into and out of the state</li> <li>• Recent history of or ongoing violent (ethno-) territorial conflict in state or region</li> <li>• Unresolved ethnic / territorial conflicts</li> <li>• Obstructive border regime (contributing to economic recession, ethnic secessionist movements)</li> </ul>
<i>DISPLACED POPULATION / REFUGEES</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Territorial disputes</li> <li>• Influx of refugees / IDPs (conflict over the return of displaced people or influx of refugees)</li> <li>• Emigration, particularly of minorities or elites</li> </ul>
<i>VIOLENCE</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increase in terrorism</li> <li>• Human rights abuses</li> <li>• Increase in organised crime</li> <li>• High or increasing crime rate</li> <li>• Authorities sanction arming of civilians in border areas</li> <li>• Arms trafficking</li> <li>• Militarisation (of society or political groups)</li> <li>• Proliferation of arms</li> <li>• High numbers of suicides</li> </ul>
<i>EXCLUSION / ETHNIC TENSION</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Institutionalised persecution, or perception of (economic, political etc.)</li> <li>• Exploitation of divisions/tensions (political / media propaganda)</li> <li>• Emigration, particularly of minorities or elites</li> <li>• Political institutionalisation of ethnicity or religion</li> <li>• Political under-representation (minority groups, regions)</li> <li>• Growing economic disparity perceived to be related to ethnicity</li> <li>• Recent history of minority group forced migration / expulsion (due to inter-ethnic conflict or political resettlement)</li> <li>• Lack of clear legislation governing distribution / ownership of land</li> <li>• Conflict or competition over land (land distribution, scarcity of arable land, competing claims etc.)</li> <li>• Artificial population movement (resettled groups demanding return, proposed resettlement of ethnic minority, etc.)</li> <li>• Persecution of or discrimination against state nationals in neighbouring states or Russia</li> <li>• Demographic changes</li> <li>• Unresolved ethnic / territorial conflicts</li> <li>• Obstructive border regime (contributing to economic recession, ethnic secessionist movements)</li> <li>• Non-inclusion of all actors in negotiations / agreement</li> <li>• Language related disputes</li> <li>• Increase in influence or majority of dominant ethnic group (due to migration, deportation of ethnic minorities etc.)</li> </ul>
<i>ECONOMIC FACTORS</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Increasing poverty/ economic disparity</li> <li>• Agricultural stagnation or failure</li> <li>• Economic collapse</li> <li>• High or increasing unemployment (particularly in rural areas, among youth)</li> <li>• State not meeting basic health care needs</li> <li>• Economic dependence on Federal centre</li> <li>• Economic isolation</li> <li>• Large budget deficit</li> <li>• Increase in or strong shadow economy</li> <li>• Population movement (labour migration, urban migration, 'brain drain' etc.)</li> <li>• Obstructive border regime (contributing to economic recession, ethnic secessionist movements)</li> <li>• Economic recession</li> <li>• Economic support from Federal centre not delivered (due to economic recession in Russian Federation, aid absorbed by intermediaries etc.)</li> <li>• Lack of post-conflict reconstruction</li> </ul>

### 3b. Peace Indicators: Caucasus

MAIN INDICATOR CATEGORIES	<i>Indicator Examples</i>
<i>STRATEGIC INDICATORS / SECURITY / STABILITY</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Some agreement on key issues (territorial status, refugees) reached between conflicting parties</li> <li>• Economic contacts between conflicting parties strengthening</li> <li>• Recent history of violent conflict means public reluctant to jeopardise peace</li> <li>• Improvement in regional relations (co-operation on economic development, resources etc.)</li> <li>• Initiatives to address conflict (or the consequences of conflict)</li> <li>• Progress in negotiations</li> <li>• Negotiation and contacts between conflicting parties</li> <li>• One or all parties want to prevent violent conflict</li> <li>• Little public support for military solution</li> <li>• Economic improvement a political and public priority</li> <li>• Limited mobilisation on ethnic issues</li> <li>• Decreasing numbers of refugees / IDPs</li> </ul>
<i>INCLUSIVE AND GOOD GOVERNANCE</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Return of Refugees</li> <li>• Ruling party has support of some opposition groups from both left and right</li> <li>• Decrease in radical opposition</li> <li>• Decrease in conflict within political / economic elite</li> <li>• Small political-ethnic groups forming alliances</li> <li>• Progress towards democratisation (establishment of democratic institutions, adherence to international norms on human rights etc.)</li> <li>• Election in accordance with international standards</li> <li>• Reduction in demands of opposition groups ( eg, previously separatist groups now demanding autonomy)</li> <li>• Minority languages used by state institutions (government, education system, civil service etc.)</li> <li>• Institutionalised religious freedom</li> <li>• Ethnic minority representation in government institutions</li> <li>• Efforts to deal with refugee / IDP problems</li> <li>• Decrease in support for nationalist irredentist groups</li> <li>• Decrease in inter-denominational tension</li> <li>• Increase in legitimacy / popularity of government</li> <li>• Increase in social cohesion (external threat)</li> </ul>
<i>CO-OPERATION OF EXTERNAL ACTORS WITH LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Regional power / IGO involved as mediator</li> <li>• Humanitarian assistance</li> <li>• Economic support from Federal centre or neighbouring countries</li> </ul>
<i>PROMISING ECONOMIC FACTORS</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Signs of economic regeneration</li> <li>• Development of infrastructure</li> <li>• Economic contacts between conflicting parties strengthening</li> <li>• Measures taken to encourage economic regeneration</li> <li>• Efforts at post-conflict reconstruction</li> </ul>



## 4a. Conflict Indicators: Great Lakes

MAIN INDICATOR CATEGORIES	Indicator Examples
REGIONAL / INTER-STATE INDICATORS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Shifting inter-African alliances;</li> <li>• Tensions of one state transferred across borders;</li> <li>• Division of ethnic communities across borders (in time of crisis people tend to join their ethnic group; in times of crisis ethnicity has continued to play a major role);</li> <li>• Resurgence of ethnic relations between borders (money flows, reference to each other, people movements, arms flows);</li> <li>• External support of rebels (because of national interest, such as border security, religious/ethnic solidarity or economic interest);</li> <li>• Tit for tat strategies (interdependent rebel support, eg, Ugandan rebels receiving support from DRC/Sudan, as Museveni continues rebel support in these countries);</li> <li>• Changes in the power "balance" ( eg, withdrawal of Angolan troops);</li> <li>• Splitting in international alliances (such as SADC: Mugabe versus Mandela); and</li> <li>• Rebel bases outside country borders.</li> </ul>
STRATEGIC AND MILITARY INDICATORS	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Threats of attacks;</li> <li>• Low morale or disorganisation or receiving inadequate training in the government's army;</li> <li>• Soldiers and/ or rebels changing sides;</li> <li>• Hiring of mercenaries to guard commercial installations ( eg, mines);</li> <li>• Distribution of arms to civilians;</li> <li>• Military training given to citizens;</li> <li>• Presence of foreign troops and/ or soldiers and/ or mercenaries;</li> <li>• Licit and/ or illicit arms transfers;</li> <li>• Ineffective arms embargoes ( eg, lax customs and border control and/ or rent seeking opportunities);</li> <li>• Weapons stocks;</li> <li>• Laying of mines;</li> <li>• Coups ousting governments, forcing defeated armies to retreat to regions with ethnic support;</li> <li>• Rebels acquiring arms by raiding military posts, prisons, police stations;</li> <li>• Call in the media for population to defend their homes;</li> <li>• Expanding army recruitment ( eg, among the youth);</li> <li>• Forceful conscription of people into the army;</li> <li>• Increase in numbers in rebel groups;</li> <li>• Increasing use of children (former child soldiers easily turn to activities of armed gangs);</li> <li>• Rebels lacking funds ( ie, rebels fight over resources);</li> <li>• Popular support to rebel groups;</li> <li>• No side being strong enough to win a decisive military victory;</li> <li>• Use of international aid to fuel conflict; and</li> <li>• External military assistance enabling intensified military campaigns.</li> </ul>
STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND MONOPOLY OF POWER	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Weak police and/ or state control, ie, insufficient security guarantee;</li> <li>• High crime rate;</li> <li>• Low border security;</li> <li>• Jurisdiction not in hands of the state;</li> <li>• No law enforcement capability of the state;</li> <li>• Rebels undertaking social and administrative tasks;</li> <li>• Impunity for crimes against humanity, especially genocide;</li> <li>• Individuals guilty of atrocities and criminal activities remaining in power ( ie, weakening the state's legitimacy and authority);</li> <li>• Illegitimate government and subsequent regional revolts;</li> <li>• Army disloyal to the state (when a shift in power occurs, there is a problem of loyalty and unemployed soldiers);</li> <li>• Unconstitutional state and lack of common laws/ rules (anomie);</li> <li>• Unresolved border questions;</li> <li>• Incoherent government behaviour ( eg,, Kabila allowing political parties but dissolving government);</li> <li>• Poorly planned changes in Constitution and/ or the political system; and</li> <li>• Large numbers of prisoners.</li> </ul>

<i>FRAGMENTATION AND BEHAVIOUR OF MAIN ACTORS</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Changing alliances of military actors;</li> <li>• Political splitting;</li> <li>• Political and personal rivalry (disputes among key personalities);</li> <li>• Party political exclusion of groups;</li> <li>• Public accusation of conspiracies;</li> <li>• Mutual mistrust;</li> <li>• Partisan army joining a coalition;</li> <li>• Loyalty of soldiers to persons (strong men) rather than to the state;</li> <li>• Divisions internally over power struggles/ leadership wrangles;</li> <li>• Lack of transparency in internal organisation of parties/ main actors' organisations;</li> <li>• Dissent within and about administration; and</li> <li>• Power struggles among charismatic leaders without institutionalised power sharing options.</li> </ul>
<i>IDEOLOGICAL FACTORS</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Ethnic and/ or national polarisation (at all levels: from families up to political parties);</li> <li>• Local traditional leaders and/ or media and/ or opinion-makers fuelling ethnic and/ or racial and/ or national discourse;</li> <li>• Minority groups promoting hatred;</li> <li>• Media used for national propaganda ( eg, Kabila's ethnic hate campaign against the Tutsis)</li> <li>• Introduction of ethnic and/ or national symbols and/ or myths referring to past-oriented collective identity;</li> <li>• Increasing religious intolerance;</li> <li>• Clashes between two or more communities;</li> <li>• Government exploiting ethnic differences;</li> <li>• Leaders referring to non-democratic ideals and/ or authors, and/ or historical persons; and</li> <li>• Genocide as a slogan and/ or political weapon.</li> </ul>
<i>SOCIAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL SPREAD OF CONFLICT</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Civil versus military elite, with the option of a military solution ( militarization of political conflicts);</li> <li>• Collectivisation of elite conflict;</li> <li>• Call to population in media to defend their homes;</li> <li>• Integration of new actors ( ie, expansion of conflict);</li> <li>• Rebels using existing resistance structures ( eg, ADF using the ethnic liberation movement);</li> <li>• Neighbouring conflicts enabling spread of arms and/ or refugees (often in collusion with rebels in the camps) and/ or ideologies (religion is often used as an ideology); and</li> <li>• Arresting people for "their own safety".</li> </ul>
<i>DISPLACED POPULATION/ REFUGEES</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Indicator for already existing conflicts;</li> <li>• Indicator for forthcoming tensions (a. Among the refugees because of poverty, hunger, diseases; b. Between refugees and the local population); and</li> <li>• Rebels using camps to hide, recruit, train, raise funds (corruption), and/ or secure aid.</li> </ul>
<i>VIOLENCE</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mistreatment and/ or torture and/ or killing of non-combatants;</li> <li>• Battles;</li> <li>• Revenge and anticipated revenge ( eg, ousted soldiers of a regime may retain their weapons, fearing revenge for their former atrocities);</li> <li>• Increasing violence in society (not only by military actors, but including criminals and others); and</li> <li>• Fear of increasing violence (increasing need for self defence).</li> </ul>
<i>EXCLUSION/ ETHNIC TENSION</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Exclusion of important actors in mediation forums;</li> <li>• Unequal power distribution among ethnic groups ( eg, Tutsi overrepresentation in power structures);</li> <li>• Lack of charismatic leaders for the moderate majority (but charismatic leaders for extremists); and</li> <li>• Dissatisfaction and/ or grievance in population about unequal distribution.</li> </ul>
<i>ECONOMIC FACTORS</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Questions around land resource and distribution;</li> <li>• Unclear property rights ( eg, a problematic situation is arising in Rwanda as many men have been killed, but women lack property and inheritance rights);</li> <li>• Decline in foreign investments;</li> <li>• Foreign capital flows encourages rent-seeking;</li> <li>• Poverty after genocide creates new conflicts (between survivors, refugees, repatriated, prisoners);</li> <li>• Open and unresolved questions about heritage and/ or succession;</li> <li>• Disrupted agricultural activity;</li> <li>• Increase in food prices;</li> <li>• Contested mineral resources; and</li> <li>• Strong shadow economy.</li> </ul>

## 4b. Peace Indicators: Great Lakes

<i>MAIN INDICATOR CATEGORIES</i>	<i>Indicator Examples</i>
<i>STRATEGIC INDICATORS/ SECURITY</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Withdrawal of foreign forces;</li> <li>• Peacekeeping forces;</li> <li>• Overwhelming strength of one party that leads the opposing group to withdraw or negotiate;</li> <li>• Climate of social peace and security over the whole territory;</li> <li>• UN arms embargo;</li> <li>• Laws and recommendations about disarmament; and</li> <li>• Reduction of external rebel support.</li> </ul>
<i>INCLUSIVE AND GOOD GOVERNANCE</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Inclusive national debates and/ or Roundtables (communication between different actors, stakeholders);</li> <li>• Peace talks ( eg, Arusha, Lusaka);</li> <li>• Inclusion of rebel groups in peace talks;</li> <li>• The emergence and strengthening of political parties not based on ethnicity or religion;</li> <li>• Democratic institutions (such as parties);</li> <li>• Integrated services for refugees and local population;</li> <li>• Media coverage of peace efforts;</li> <li>• Government response in setting up commissions to investigate religious clashes (impartiality);</li> <li>• Creation of ministries responsible for areas in conflict;</li> <li>• Amnesty to all rebels who surrender;</li> <li>• Emphasis on universal primary education;</li> <li>• Assurance of social peace and security over the whole territory;</li> <li>• Fighting against impunity ( ie, justice and condemnation of the guilty); and</li> <li>• Implementation of reform programmes (army, police, justice, education, work, economy, administration).</li> </ul>
<i>STRONG CIVIL SOCIETY</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Preparation of reform programmes (army, police, justice, administration, etc.);</li> <li>• Population forcing the government to abandon the support of rebels in other countries;</li> <li>• Population not supporting military solutions; and</li> <li>• Reintegration of returning rebels (NGOs/ religious groups helping the local population to reintegrate returning combatants).</li> </ul>
<i>CO-OPERATION OF EXTERNAL ACTORS WITH LOCAL STAKEHOLDERS</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• International attention;</li> <li>• Effective campaigns against human rights abuses;</li> <li>• NGOs promoting dialogue and/ or supporting ongoing negotiation process;</li> <li>• Removal of economic sanctions (while the threat of re-imposition remains);</li> <li>• Creation of human rights commissions; and</li> <li>• Foreign aid linked to progress in peacebuilding (G7 summit).</li> </ul>

## Appendix 2: Measures for conflict prevention and peace building

Table 1: Peace-building approaches in pre- and post-conflict situations

Thematic Issue	Situation of submerged or rising tensions	Post-conflict transition
<i>1. Structural sources of conflict</i>		
<b>Problems in managing transition and rapid change</b>	<p><u>Economic stability and economic reform</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• support trade agreements and financial mechanisms stabilising the national economy, particularly through diversification</li> <li>• strengthen government's capacity to regulate foreign investment in accordance with national development priorities</li> <li>• monitor and support transformation of economy to avert undesired outcomes</li> </ul> <p><u>Migration and resettlement</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• assist development of legal framework for rapid social and economic integration of migrants</li> <li>• support social cohesion and cultural identity within migrant community</li> <li>• promote economic and cultural exchange between migrants and host society</li> </ul>	<p><u>Social cohesion</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• support broad participation in political process, labour market and national civil society</li> <li>• encourage political power-sharing arrangements to avoid brisk shifts of political balance</li> <li>• strengthen customary structures that can play positive role in peace process</li> </ul> <p><u>Reintegration of refugees and displaced persons</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• support area-based rehabilitation and reintegration schemes to avoid undue exclusion of certain groups</li> <li>• make return areas safe (e.g. demining)</li> <li>• assist in clarifying land rights situation</li> <li>• develop basic infrastructure (e.g. water, roads, tools)</li> <li>• provide agricultural inputs for food production</li> <li>• offer special education and employment programmes for potentially destabilising groups (e.g. youth)</li> </ul>
<b>Widening socio-economic disparities</b>	<p><u>Equitable economic development</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• use development resources to redress regional inequalities</li> <li>• mitigate ethnic/social inequalities in benefiting from growth and vulnerability to decline</li> <li>• prioritise social investment (health, education, water/sanitation)</li> </ul> <p><u>Meet basic human needs</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• food security</li> <li>• safety nets for the vulnerable</li> <li>• access to housing and infrastructure</li> </ul> <p><u>Reduce social exclusion</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• create better opportunities for the disadvantaged</li> <li>• enhance education and professional training</li> <li>• facilitate access to land, capital and credit</li> </ul>	<p><u>Equal participation in "peace dividend"</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• legal frameworks and instruments against profiteering and speculation</li> <li>• good governance to convert economic growth into tangible benefits for whole population</li> <li>• debt relief under condition of clear commitments to use freed resources for poverty reduction</li> </ul> <p><u>Conversion of war economy</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• reduce profits from war economy through strict controls and drying up markets (e.g. arms, drugs trade)</li> <li>• support legitimate economic activities and trade</li> <li>• education and employment, particularly for youth</li> <li>• peace-oriented infrastructure (transport, communications, health, education, formal markets)</li> </ul>

<b>Competition over natural resources</b>	<u>Enhance environmental security</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• reduce pressure on natural resources (e.g. alternative fuels)</li> <li>• reduce pollution</li> <li>• optimise use of existing resources</li> </ul> <u>Sustainable resource management systems</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• monitor changes in resource management, e.g. logging and community forestry programmes</li> <li>• support viable customary land tenure and resource management systems</li> <li>• support developments of sustainable local, national and cross-border arrangements on resource use (e.g. water)</li> <li>• create appropriate legal frameworks</li> </ul>	<u>Agreement on sustainable resource management systems as central part of peace process</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• facilitate negotiations</li> <li>• provide technological and financial support to resource management agreements</li> </ul> <u>Environmental rehabilitation</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• demining</li> <li>• reforestation</li> <li>• soil rehabilitation</li> </ul>
<b>Political exploitation of cultural and other differences</b>	<u>Constructive social dialogue and co-operation</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• economic integration and exchange</li> <li>• residential desegregation</li> <li>• projects promoting common interests and collaboration of divided groups</li> <li>• promotion of existing areas of unity, consensus, and mutual interest</li> <li>• cross-cutting cultural, youth, sport etc. initiatives</li> <li>• peace education and cross-cultural training</li> <li>• training for communicators (journalists, teachers)</li> </ul>	<u>Culture of peace and reconciliation</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• bringing people together out of common interest ("functional accommodation")</li> <li>• education and exchange programmes for overcoming negative stereotypes</li> <li>• confidence building, particularly for youth</li> <li>• religious/spiritual reconciliation</li> </ul>
<b>2. Capacity to deal with conflict constructively</b>		
<b>Legitimate government and good governance</b>	<u>Democratic processes</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• encourage constitutional reform if overly undemocratic or discriminatory</li> <li>• assist and monitor democratic institutions (e.g. courts, legislative bodies, executive)</li> <li>• assist representative political institutions (e.g. political parties)</li> </ul> <u>Public institutions</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• support establishment of a clear division of tasks between central, regional and local government based on comparative advantage and maximum civil participation</li> <li>• strengthen public administration and effective delivery of government services</li> <li>• civil service reform for more impartiality and accessibility, strengthen representation of marginalised groups in civil service</li> <li>• encourage transparency and accountability of state organs, anti-corruption measures</li> </ul> <u>Political reform and stability</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• strengthen legitimate and reasonably democratic government through acknowledgement of its development priorities and support for implementing them</li> <li>• allow time for evolutionary processes and provide space for local solutions</li> </ul>	<u>Establishing a legitimate and participative political system</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• support restoration of government functions and attraction of specialists into government</li> <li>• strengthen legislature</li> <li>• support and monitor elections and referenda, informing the electorate about their rights</li> <li>• support legitimate local authorities</li> <li>• support civilian control over political and economic affairs</li> </ul>

<b>Pluralism and participation</b>	<p><u>Popular participation in political process</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• encourage administrative decentralisation</li> <li>• strengthening intermediary bodies (e.g. regional parliaments, local councils)</li> <li>• support civic/religious organisations, encompassing political divisions</li> <li>• promote political human rights</li> </ul> <p><u>Protection of minority groups</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• assist development and implementation of a legal framework for minority protection (e.g. cultural autonomy)</li> <li>• promote power-sharing and other forms of minority political participation</li> </ul> <p><u>Freedom of information</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• strengthen commitment of media to objective information</li> <li>• assist elaboration of a legal framework for independent and free media</li> <li>• strengthen independent national and local media institutions</li> <li>• organise professional training for local journalists and editors</li> <li>• dialogue with state and other actors to increase understanding of free media and encourage material, financial and legal assistance</li> </ul> <p><u>Civil society</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• strengthen local arbitration and mediation skills</li> <li>• build political space for local processes and solutions</li> </ul>	<p><u>Strengthen civil control of political processes</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• strengthen structures of participation and decision-making, from local to regional level</li> <li>• aid agencies to adopt measures to entrench the rights of local people to participate in discussions and decisions that affect their lives</li> <li>• strengthen the voices of the marginalised and vulnerable</li> </ul> <p><u>Civil society for conflict resolution and reconciliation</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• support moderate civic fora and organisations</li> <li>• strengthen non-exclusive social networks</li> <li>• support local mediation efforts</li> <li>• help establish “safe spaces” for non-confrontational dialogue</li> <li>• offer facilitation and mediation training</li> <li>• promote culture of dispute resolution</li> </ul>
<b>Channels for conflict management</b>	<p><u>Systems of justice</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• advocate reform of law and justice institutions (e.g. courts, ombudsman, civilian police forces, prison services)</li> <li>• strengthen legitimate customary dispute resolution systems</li> <li>• facilitate access to legal system, especially for the marginalised</li> </ul> <p><u>Rule of law and human rights</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• monitor impartiality of judiciary</li> <li>• assist human-rights monitoring and reporting</li> <li>• offer human-rights training and advocacy</li> <li>• support for human rights groups</li> </ul>	<p><u>Judicial and legal reform</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• promote systematised and fair dispute settlement</li> <li>• strengthen equal application of law for all</li> </ul> <p><u>Justice for victims of war and violence</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• advocate International Criminal Tribunal to end impunity of war criminals</li> <li>• support truth commissions</li> <li>• encourage public dialogue on the past</li> <li>• support the victims of violence</li> </ul>
<b>Positive and negative international engagement</b>	<p><u>Reduce external support for conflict</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• facilitate political dialogue with third countries</li> <li>• incentives and sanctions to discourage conflict-promoting involvement</li> </ul> <p><u>Prevent conflict spilling over into neighbouring countries</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• address root causes of potential conflict in neighbouring states</li> <li>• reduce cross-border mobility</li> <li>• alleviate impact of refugee populations on host countries</li> </ul>	<p><u>Regional security initiatives</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• support regional initiatives for arms control</li> <li>• strengthen regional mechanisms for conflict prevention and peace-building</li> <li>• assist regional management of shared natural resources</li> <li>• enhance capacities and skills of regional organisations</li> <li>• strengthen links between civil society in the region</li> </ul>

<b>3. Security risks</b>		
<b>Legacy of violence</b>	<u>Individual and collective security</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>strengthen control of criminal violence</li> <li>protection against banditry and organised crime</li> <li>delegitimise political violence</li> </ul> <u>Transform the "culture of violence"</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>delegitimise glorification of violence in public discourse and the media (e.g. training, regulations)</li> <li>promote idea of peaceful conflict resolution</li> <li>transform gender stereotypes (e.g. violent masculinity)</li> </ul>	<u>Healing the wounds of war</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>health services</li> <li>rehabilitation programmes for the disabled</li> <li>psycho-social counselling for war trauma</li> <li>reuniting families and communities</li> </ul>
<b>Arms proliferation and irregular fighters</b>	<u>Control of (small) arms proliferation</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>implementation of strict national licensing system</li> <li>control of internal and cross-border arms trade</li> <li>EU countries to uphold and strengthen existing agreements for preventing and combating illicit trafficking in conventional arms</li> </ul> <u>Monitor private and opposition armed formations</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>legal frameworks and codes of conduct for private security companies</li> <li>encourage dialogue with radical opposition groups</li> <li>support efforts against terrorism</li> </ul>	<u>Clearing of land mines</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>creating local capacity for demining</li> <li>mine-awareness programmes</li> <li>care for the victims of land mines</li> </ul> <u>Disarmament</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>practical support for weapons decommissioning (e.g. weapon-for-job programme)</li> </ul> offer amnesty and economic alternatives to violence <u>Demobilisation and social reintegration of former combatants</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>cantonment, discharge, re-insertion and reintegration (social benefits, vocational training, employment schemes, counselling)</li> <li>disband paramilitary organisations</li> </ul>
<b>Uncontrolled state armed forces</b>	<u>Security sector reform</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>help reduce excessive military expenditure through objective risk assessments and more effective organisation of armed forces</li> <li>redefine doctrine of security forces towards constructive role in democratic society, reform education of military and police forces</li> <li>strengthen public accountability and civilian control over armed forces, e.g. ombudsman, civilian review boards</li> </ul>	<u>Define new role for military in post-war society</u> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>support building of national, accountable and professional armies ensuring security of all citizens</li> <li>evaluate officers of former security forces/armed opposition before induction into new forces</li> <li>train police and military forces for role in democratic society, including respect for human rights and standards of professional conduct</li> </ul>

compiled from Anderson 1999, Ball/Halevy 1996, Bush 1998, DFAIT/CIDA 1998, DFID 1999, Goodhand/Hulme 1997, OECD 1998, Oxfam 1997, Stiefel 1998, DFID/Warner 1999



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