

# PRACTICE NOTE: CONFLICT-SENSITIVE RESPONSES TO CLIMATE CHANGE IN SOUTH ASIA

Janani Vivekananda

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## AUTHOR PROFILES

**Janani Vivekananda** is Climate Change and Security Adviser in International Alert's Peacebuilding Issues Programme. Currently her work focuses on understanding how aid effectiveness and better governance can build resilience to climate stress and contribute to peacebuilding. Her recent publications include: *Climate Change and Governance: Rethinking adaptation – Lessons from Nepal*, Initiative for Peacebuilding, (London, International Alert, 2010), (with Dan Smith) *Climate Change, Conflict and Fragility: Understanding the linkages. Shaping effective responses* (London, International Alert, 2009), (with Dan Smith) *A Climate of Conflict: The links between climate change, peace and war* (London, International Alert, 2007). Prior to this role, she worked on disaster risk reduction policy and before this her work focused on community level security and aid effectiveness.

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# 1. INTRODUCTION

## **About this note**

This note explains the importance of using a conflict-sensitive approach to respond to climate change in conflict-prone or conflict-affected contexts. It offers guidelines and emerging principles on how climate change and development policymakers and practitioners can promote peace-positive climate change adaptation actions which can yield the double dividend of building resilience to climate change and conflict. Conflict-sensitivity in this context denotes the consideration by policymakers and practitioners of the range of issues that may have fuelled or triggered violence, or may do so in the future. Issues of water, land, energy and food security are highly affected by climate change and variability. At the same time, inappropriate governance and management of these issues lie at the root of violent conflict in many developing countries. Actions in these areas need to be approached in a comprehensive way that maximises the productive capacity of local communities, while also minimising the risk of instability and conflict. Incorporating a conflict-sensitive approach when planning and implementing climate change adaptation actions is thus crucial in order to promote increased socio-economic development, food security, equity and better resource governance as well as to promote peace and stability.

## **Who should read this note**

Policymakers, practitioners and researchers, specifically those that are working in contexts affected by climate change in conflict-prone and conflict-affected states.

## **The note will help you to:**

- Better understand challenges and opportunities to conflict-sensitive responses to climate change adaptation in conflict-prone and conflict-affected contexts;
- Draw on existing good practice for your own climate change adaptation policy and programming in this area;
- Maximise the positive contribution your policy and action can make to resilience and peacebuilding;
- Ensure that your action is peace-positive.

## 2. WHY? TOPIC INTRODUCTION – KEY ISSUES, RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES

Climate change is already affecting the physical security of vulnerable communities in South Asia. These impacts will be especially keenly felt in contexts where governance is already stretched. For many communities across the subcontinent which are insufficiently prepared to cope with the effects of climate change, these impacts can have implications on political instability, food insecurity, economic weakness and large-scale migration. In conflict-prone and conflict-affected states, there is a real risk that climate change will interact with political, social and economic stresses and hamper fragile peace processes or compound existing tensions which could escalate into violence. Violent conflict in turn will leave communities poorer, less resilient and in turn ill-equipped to cope with the consequences of climate change.

Responses to climate change are failing to effectively address the full range of knock-on consequences of climate change – particularly in conflict-prone and conflict-affected contexts. While there is an increasing debate on the trans-boundary security implications of climate change,<sup>1</sup> there is little exploration or understanding of the *community-level* social, economic and political consequences that will determine whether and how social systems can effectively and peacefully adjust to changing environmental conditions.

A productive approach to both understanding the problems and proposing solutions is to focus on the linkages between development, peace and climate *resilience*. However, practical measures so far undertaken to address these linked goals have been limited in quality, scale and effect. Most efforts on climate change adaptation focus on responding to the direct environmental risks of climate change, for example by switching to drought-resistant crops, building flood defences or constructing storm-proof homes. Important as it is to address the direct impacts, it is the resulting social consequences – such as conflicts between displaced flood victims and host communities, loss of livelihoods and disputes over access to increasingly scarce resources – that ultimately require more attention and resources. These knock-on consequences will be the most pervasive, yet remain the least understood.

This practice note looks at how adaptation, development and peacebuilding actions can address the knock-on consequences of climate change in fragile contexts in order to inform policy and programming responses that can respond to climate change in a peaceful manner, in spite of uncertainty and variability.

### 2.1. KEY CONFLICT RISKS

The subtle relationship between climate change and conflict should be viewed in the context of sustainable development issues such as governance, food, water and energy security, and aid effectiveness.

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<sup>1</sup> UN General Assembly (2009). *Climate change and its possible security implications: Report of the Secretary-General*, 11th September 2009, A/64/350, accessed on 9th August 2011. Available at <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4ad5e6380.html>

## PRESSURES ON GOVERNANCE

The basic trajectory by which climate change could combine with other variables and increase the risk of instability or violent conflict is determined by the role of governance. The impact of climate change will challenge and reduce the resilience of people and communities to varying degrees. In some situations, it will cause extreme disruption with which people simply cannot cope, as it overwhelms them and renders their homes and livelihoods unviable. If the governance structures that the community regards as safeguards of their human security are not up to the task, climate change will weaken confidence in the social order and its institutions and damage the glue that holds societies together. In some contexts, this can increase the risk of instability or violence. This is a particular problem in conflict-prone or conflict-affected contexts where governance structures and institutions are often weak, regardless of climate change.

### Box 1. The Terai, Nepal – Unrest Ensues After Flood Response

In the Terai region in southern Nepal, when the Koshi River burst its banks in the summer of 2008, 240 people were killed, crops and infrastructure destroyed and 60,000 people displaced in the worst flooding in five decades. These people were resettled among communities who were themselves struggling to survive. Tensions between the host communities and flood victims quickly escalated and were further fuelled by political groups who used flood victims' unmet expectations for clean water and shelter to feed anti-government sentiments. The situation became violent and 200 policemen were called in to maintain order in the camps.

## RISKS TO WATER, FOOD AND ENERGY SECURITY

Sectors such as water, agriculture, energy and trade will be especially affected by climate change and this could have a destabilising impact on a state's ability to provide people with basic services.

**Water** scarcity will intensify over the next decade, as populations grow and groundwater depletion continues in many regions. Declining water availability is projected to be the most significant impact of climate change over the next decade, to be most acutely felt in regions dependent on glacial meltwater and trans-boundary freshwater resources, such as the Ganges Brahmaputra Basin. And while existing consumption is already beyond sustainable levels, demand for water is predicted to rise by 25 percent by 2025. This is an area of uncertainty and risk with estimates ranging from 120 million to 1.2 billion people predicted to experience increased water stress by the 2020s in South and South East Asia.<sup>2</sup> This could fuel existing internal social conflict and put pressure on unresolved trans-boundary water issues, such as those between India and Nepal over the Koshi River and India and Pakistan over the Indus, which would have unpredictable local and regional consequences.

**Food** prices in 2011 hit an all-time global high. Prices are being driven up both by trends that elevate demand and ones that make it more difficult to increase production. These trends include rapidly expanding population growth, irrigation wells running dry, crop-withering temperature increases, the diversion of land to grow biofuels and the levelling off of productivity gains of the Green Revolution. With demand predicted to increase by 50 percent by 2030, food is rapidly becoming a key driver of world and regional politics. Rising food prices could potentially push millions of people back into poverty. This situation could undermine the economic performance of weak and unstable states, thereby aggravating destabilisation and the collapse of social systems. The 2008 food price spike – which affected the food security of over 150 million people and contributed to political instability in 61 countries and to over 30 countries introducing export bans or restrictions – starkly illustrates some of the consequences of food insecurity.

**Energy** is also an area of rising demand in emerging economies while global supply is facing a crunch. Whether or when global oil production is going to peak is inconclusive, but the need for South Asian economies – particularly India – to move away from reliance on oil in the long run is clear. The development of sustainable energy options is especially important to avoid locking South Asian states into high-carbon technologies, increasing demand for energy and costly energy import dependencies. However, low-carbon energy options can also create

2 Asian Development Bank (2009). *Meeting the climate change and water challenge*. December. Available at <http://www.adb.org/documents/brochures/Water-Climate-Challenge/Water-Climate-Challenge.pdf>



destabilising shifts in local conflict dynamics. For example, India's plans to construct a "High Dam" on the Koshi River in Nepal is the cause of significant community-level unrest in Nepal.<sup>3</sup>

### Box 2. Karachi, Pakistan – Urbanisation, Climate Change and Violence

Karachi, Pakistan's largest city, is projected to have a population of 19.4 million inhabitants by 2015. The city is already affected by political unrest, with high-profile acts of political violence in 2006. Located close to the coast and only eight metres above sea level, it is predicted to be seriously affected by rising sea levels by 2050.

Like most other mega-cities, Karachi has grown rapidly. The speed of its expansion, its weak governance and poor infrastructure mean that it cannot provide basic services to this growing population. For example, provision of sanitation systems in Karachi is meagre: less than 20 percent of the city's population benefit from piped sewage. Life for Karachi's poor is already affected by diseases spread by poor water supply and lack of sanitation, and they also face food insecurity, physical insecurity and limited options for securing their livelihoods. The consequences of rising sea levels, including flooding and disease, will aggravate these problems.

Karachi's social geography makes it a fertile ground for the mobilisation of young men by militant, violent political groups, often connected to the fast-growing number of unregulated *madrasas* (religious schools). As climate change adds to the pressures of urban poverty, Karachi risks a serious increase in lawlessness, with further consequences for political stability in Pakistan and the region, and the risk of regional economic disruption because Karachi is a significant financial centre.

## ILL-INFORMED CLIMATE CHANGE RESPONSES

Another area of potential risk for climate change to contribute to violent conflict is ill-informed climate change interventions. A fundamental problem here is that climate-related financing, policies and programmes have not adequately considered local conflict dynamics and the social and governance context, and as such could produce serious unintended negative consequences. In conflict-affected states, political and economic elites are organised in such a way as to give themselves privileged access and control over resources and opportunities. Climate change impacts could incentivise or even compel elite groups to further tighten their grip on resources and/or manipulate adaptation funding to their own benefit through patronage and clientelism, with contracts for adaptation projects providing both legal and illicit money-making opportunities. Inappropriate actions around climate change by the international community could provide an opportunity for political and economic elites to strengthen their positions in situations which lack equitable governance systems, thus increasing the risk of instability and possibly conflict. Ill-informed climate change adaptation policies and actions that do not take into account the broader socio-political and cultural contextual realities can unwittingly reinforce existing tensions, engendering greater poverty, inequality and conflict, rather than build resilience. In some situations, the implications of mal-adaptation could be worse than the impact of climate change itself.

### Box 3. Raamechchap, Nepal – Failed Community Management

In Raamechchap, a district of Nepal just three hours from the floodplains of the Terai, residents of the drought-affected mountain villages face severe water shortages following the third consecutive year of failed monsoon rains. The villagers had installed a now-defunct water tap in an effort to mitigate the effects of climate variability – without considering the local social, political, conflict or even environmental context. In the end, the effort only fuelled local frustration at the lack of government support for the community's basic requirement of clean water.

3 B. R. Upreti (2007). 'Changing political context, new power relations and hydro-conflict in Nepal'. Paper presented at the Nepal Water Security Forum. Available at [http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/110785/ichaptersection\\_singledocument/fae0c167-5f27-4719-a74a-74f4a4a7e32a/en/1.PDF](http://kms1.isn.ethz.ch/serviceengine/Files/ISN/110785/ichaptersection_singledocument/fae0c167-5f27-4719-a74a-74f4a4a7e32a/en/1.PDF)

The community had requested help from the district government during a period of water stress, and had been given a one-off cash handout to invest themselves just before local elections. The community – largely subsistence farmers – were not in a position to know that ground-water levels were depleting and that uncontrolled surface water extraction would only hasten their water problems, and so they opted to invest in a tap to pump up ground water. Within three months, the tap ran dry, leaving nothing but a daily reminder that the only cash that was injected into the community for development purposes had no impact whatsoever. For the community, this serves as a symbol of a failed social contract – of the government failing in its basic duty to provide the community with water.

As climate change impacts interact with other profound challenges, countries with weak governance systems risk being overwhelmed, to the detriment of fragile peace- and state-building processes and posing a high risk of political instability. This adds to the political, economic and social burdens faced by vulnerable communities, and makes it harder for them to adapt to climate change.

## 2.2. KEY PEACE OPPORTUNITIES

The flip side of these conflict risks is that responding to the root causes of vulnerability to climate change impacts in a context-sensitive way can yield great conflict-prevention and peacebuilding dividends.

### RETHINKING ADAPTATION

Adaptation in conflict-prone or conflict-affected situations needs to be rethought and redefined recognising a number of crucial issues:

- Conflict-prone and conflict-affected states face significant challenges to protecting the lives and livelihoods of all their citizens.
- Most of the conventional development tools used or demanded by the international community cannot be applied in such situations.
- Conflict-prone and conflict-affected contexts challenge the distinction between “normality” and “exceptionality” which have so far guided state-building and social organisation.
- Climate change adaptation plans set very ambitious targets and checklists for what governments “must do”, with little reference to what they “can do” in conflict-prone and conflict-affected contexts.<sup>4</sup>

Two policy requirements should underlie all planning and programming in conflict-prone or conflict-affected situations:

1. Adaptation to climate change needs to be conflict-sensitive. In fragile and conflict-affected contexts, all actions must respond to the needs of the people, involve them in consultation, take account of power distribution and social order, and avoid pitting groups against each other.
2. Peacebuilding needs to be climate-proof. For example, post-conflict reconstruction and the reintegration of ex-combatants into their villages must take account of the long-term viability of the land and natural resources available for lives and jobs.

This requires three fundamental operational shifts: in the way institutions are organised, in the way inter-linkages are addressed, and in the way development is done.

#### ▪ Institutional reform

Institutions responsible for climate change adaptation – whether under the UN climate change framework, international financial institutions, development agencies or peacebuilding organisations – need to ensure that their internal systems and structures promote adaptation even where there is state fragility or conflict

<sup>4</sup> J. Vivekananda (2010). *Climate change and governance: Rethinking adaptation – Lessons from Nepal*. Initiative for Peacebuilding. London: International Alert. Available at <http://www.international-alert.org/sites/default/files/publications/201012IFPClimateChangeNepal.pdf>

risk. In these complex and delicate situations, adaptation must do no harm, and ideally help the goal of peace along its way. For this to be possible, institutions must restructure in such a way as to maximise the participation of ordinary people and build accountable and transparent public institutions.

Design of the instruments under the new climate change architecture needs to ensure an understanding of the social issues and that the political economy of conflict-affected contexts is embedded in all policy and practice. It must also minimise the institutional constraints that impede flexibility or it will be impossible to respond to changing circumstances. And, reflecting the importance of outcomes such as perceptions of security, trust and social cohesion, they should promote qualitative indicators rather than simply relying on assessing quantitative outputs (or, even worse, quantitative inputs such as money spent). Institutions, such as the World Bank and the UN system, which will undoubtedly play a major role in disbursing climate change funds and implementing climate change adaptation projects, urgently need to evolve to better cope with the complexity, uncertainty and variability posed by climate change across all sectors, not just those which explicitly deal with climate change. This requires a move away from inflexible structures grounded in sectoral “silos”, counterproductive incentive systems which advance large-scale and rapid fund disbursement, patchy knowledge bases and inadequate consideration of governance in any meaningful sense.<sup>5</sup>

#### ▪ Addressing inter-linkages: bridging top-down and bottom-up responses

Adaptation in conflict-prone or conflict-affected contexts needs to be planned in ways other than purely top-down, while acknowledging that bottom-up approaches alone will also not suffice. Top-down planning fails to grasp micro-level vulnerabilities, the intricacies of community relations and tensions, and focuses more on national interests. Further, in communities where there is deep mistrust for central government – for example, in Nepal where actors in the current administration were party to the recent conflict – and when there is a history and legacy of government marginalisation of particular identity groups, top-down government-managed adaptation assistance might come across to local communities as an unwanted and potentially harmful imposition.

Community-based adaptation is strongly promoted by many development actors as an effective means of ensuring context-specific actions. This is an attractive approach but it needs to be nuanced. On the one hand, local communities in conflict-prone or conflict-affected contexts often lack the confidence and the capacity to take on the responsibility for providing basic needs and services for themselves, and, on the other hand, even if they could do so, such action by the community would risk usurping the legitimate role of the state. There is a strong correlation between the perception that a state isn't upholding its side of the bargain – i.e. spending taxes on provision of basic needs and services such as security and roads – and the incidence of political instability. It follows then that, if communities take over roles which ought to be done by the government in return for the tax revenue they receive from citizens, the social contract is further weakened and efforts to build resilience actually undermine governance and political stability.

There are arguments to be made for top-down approaches, and also bottom-up approaches, but there also needs to be work to address the middle ground to connect the top with the bottom. Certainly, adaptation should be locally informed through bottom-up processes, but some level of top-down leadership is also required. Dogmatic pursuit of one at the expense of the other could be problematic. What is needed is to find a way to get the two levels to work together.

#### ▪ Revising development norms

Development strategies must adapt to meet the combined challenge of climate change, conflict risk and state fragility. It is wrong to imply that henceforth there will be old-style development with adaptation on top. It may be that there will be a continuum from development activities that are not affected by climate change to development activities whose entire purpose is adaptation,<sup>6</sup> but overall policy and strategy will present a new form of development. That means development assistance will need to adapt too.

5 E. Bell (2008). *The World Bank in fragile and conflict-affected countries: 'How', not 'How Much'*. London: International Alert. Available at <http://www.international-alert.org/publications/pub.php?p=380>

6 H. McGray, A. Hammill and R. Bradley (2008). *Weathering the storm: Options for framing adaptation and development*. Washington, DC: World Resources Institute. pp.18–22. Available at [http://pdf.wri.org/weathering\\_the\\_storm.pdf](http://pdf.wri.org/weathering_the_storm.pdf)

## 3. WHO? MAJOR ACTORS, INSTITUTIONS AND PROCESSES

Promoting resilience to climate change is not a matter to be exclusively addressed by the climate change community. Indeed, effective resilience to climate change involves a variety of actors from local civil society to economic development ministries to the security sector. There are a number of entry points beyond the international climate change process to ensure that all relevant policy is designed in a climate-compatible and conflict-sensitive way. Efforts to build resilience to climate change in South Asia will be most effective and peace-positive if the political will of the government and the funding priorities of climate change donors are aligned with locally informed development and peacebuilding priorities, and take competing interests of different stakeholders into consideration. This section discusses the potential roles and responsibilities of key actors from the community to international development actors.

### 3.1 CIVIL SOCIETY ACTORS

Civil society has an important role to play in the promotion of conflict-sensitive climate change adaptation responses. Such responses have to be locally informed, inclusive and participatory. Civil society actors play three crucial roles here:

- i) representing the concerns and insights of specific interest groups;
- ii) monitoring the implementation of adaptation policies from a conflict-sensitivity perspective, flagging problems and the need to adapt approaches where necessary;
- iii) strengthen social capacity at the community level to understand and manage climate and conflict risks.

### 3.2 HEADS OF STATE AND GOVERNMENTS

If states fulfil their governance mandate to their people, they will be well positioned to adapt their responses to climate change to strengthen capacities for resilience to cope with climate-related change and variability across all sectors – from trade, to health, to development. Nonetheless, the tasks that need to be taken on are complex and challenging. Specifically, well-run states can ensure that line ministries responsible for development should ensure policies are climate-proof and similarly that climate change is addressed in a conflict-sensitive manner.

States also have a responsibility to improve communication to ensure information flow to citizens and key sectoral stakeholders. An improvement in sharing and learning across sectors and between states in the region will improve not just efficiency, but also the conflict-sensitivity of climate change response policies and programmes. Given the complex political contestations among South Asian neighbour states, trans-boundary cooperation will not be an easy task. However, given the urgency of climate change and the mutual gains from sharing knowledge available on the issue in an open and honest manner to enable understanding and response, opportunities for cooperation should be created and exploited.

### 3.3 REGIONAL ORGANISATIONS

The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has a strategic role to play in promoting and emphasising regional approaches for addressing climate and security issues in South Asia through establishing platforms for exchange, sharing and concerted action. However, to date there has been little leadership from SAARC on the matter. Crucially, there is an urgent need for sustained political will from Member States to consider adopting a regional position on climate change and regional security issues. There is also a need for better multilateral cooperation in managing water resources (e.g. trans-boundary river systems). SAARC could look to other regional bodies such as ASEAN which already has in place a multisectoral framework on climate change to address agriculture, forestry and food security.<sup>7</sup>

### 3.4 INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

The international donor and development community has two vital roles to play to promote peace and security in the face of climate change. First, it must provide stronger leadership on addressing the linked dimensions of climate change impacts in developing countries. It is acknowledged that the impacts of climate change range across many sectors.<sup>8</sup> As such, the support for adaptation needs to be correspondingly broad to address the knock-on consequences of climate change on water scarcity, food security and agricultural resilience; the functioning of public health systems; disaster prevention, preparedness and response; and early-warning systems at both the national and regional levels. Specific ways in which the donor community can support the broadening of adaptation responses are:

- i) shifting climate change investment priorities to allow for research and practice to address the social, political and economic consequences of climate change within adaptation strategies;
- ii) through investments in capacity-building on conflict sensitivity at all levels.

Second, the international community must acknowledge the political dimensions of interventions. A major obstacle to building resilience is weak governance, and simply putting climate funding into the coffers of regimes which are either unable or unwilling to address the root causes of vulnerability of their citizens can worsen the problem. For international donors, a key challenge is likely to be the need to recognise that, while they can provide valuable assistance to partner countries on institutional capacity building, they will also have to confront acutely political disputes about winners and losers in natural-resource governance.<sup>9</sup> To address this challenge, all responses must reflect the expressed needs of the people, involve them in consultation, take account of power distribution and social order, and avoid pitting groups against each other. At the same time, they must be integrated into national development strategies. Development actors can promote this aim by avoiding purely technical approaches that fail to take political dynamics into consideration, as this could pose a serious obstacle to peace and stability. This means that conflict-sensitivity should feature prominently in climate change and development actors' actions on climate change adaptation.

<sup>7</sup> ASEAN (2010). *ASEAN Multi-Sectoral Framework On Climate Change: Agriculture and forestry towards food security*, accessed on 9th August 2011. Available at <http://ccmin.aippnet.org/pdfs/ASEANCCFrameworkANNEX%2013AFCCfinal.pdf>

<sup>8</sup> UN General Assembly (2009). Op. cit.

<sup>9</sup> A. Evans (2010). *Resource scarcity, climate change and the risk of violent conflict*. World Development Report 2011: Background Paper. World Bank, 9th September, accessed on 8th August 2011. Available at [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTWDR2011/Resources/6406082-1283882418764/WDR\\_Background\\_Paper\\_Evans.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTWDR2011/Resources/6406082-1283882418764/WDR_Background_Paper_Evans.pdf)

## 4. WHAT? KEY QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER

Climate change-related problems can damage security and stability of states and people, while, at the same time, environmental cooperation can contribute to solving political conflicts and tensions.

### **Questions for consideration when planning, implementing or monitoring actions:**

- Will extreme or variable weather conditions undermine your particular strategy or action? How will this affect the social, economic and political resilience of poor communities?
- How significant have past struggles over climate-dependent resources such as water and land been in the region? Will changes in the natural environment contribute to social, economic and political instability? Which societal groups are particularly vulnerable?
- Will your action affect resource competition between different users of the same resource (water, land, forests, etc.)? Will this competition become more pronounced in the face of climate change? Which societal groups are particularly vulnerable?
- Which pathways are likely to contribute to vulnerability to social unrest (social disparities, weak state structures, corruption, ethnic differences, separatist movements, food insecurity, migration pressure)? Which mechanisms can be strengthened to promote resilient and stable communities (governance, social protection, social capital)?
- Which cooperative strategies and institutional frameworks on a national or regional level are appropriate to promote resilience to climate, resource-related and political insecurity at the local and national level? How effective are these strategies/frameworks? How does your action fit within these mechanisms? How could they be strengthened?

## 5. HOW? EXISTING GOOD PRACTICE AND GUIDANCE

Listed below are some of the key considerations that policymakers and practitioners need to take into account when addressing issues related to climate change adaptation in conflict-prone or conflict-affected contexts:

- 1. Working with uncertainty.** There are multiple levels of uncertainty involved in addressing and building resilience to climate change. This includes fundamental questions such as how much global temperatures will rise, what the knock-on consequences of this will be to crop yields, jobs and human health, and how effective countries will be in implementing adaptation and emissions-reduction plans. Accurate country-specific data on climate impacts in the subcontinent and many other regions are still years away. Even so, significant progress can be made towards building resilience in communities by strengthening governance structures which can better cope with variability and uncertainty. Uncertainty doesn't mean we know nothing, just that we don't know exactly what the future has in store. Many public policy decisions from counter-terrorism planning to setting interest rates are taken under higher levels of uncertainty than those faced in the climate change arena.<sup>10</sup> Policymakers must make decisions with incomplete information and models that predict divergent outcomes. They must also steer clear of the politics of climate change which can obstruct effective responses. A risk-management approach can be drawn upon to account for the full range of possible outcomes and understand the deficiencies of key institutional systems in dealing with them. This requires involving all relevant actors (such as those responsible for areas of economy, security and infrastructure) to bring together the best available data to analyse trade-offs between different strategies to prevent, reduce and respond to risks.<sup>11</sup>
- 2. Focus on resilience.** Working on environmental measures in isolation from their context will not work. An individual's ability to cope with shocks is determined by a set of linked factors which limit or multiply their options. Levels of development, government, equity, trade and the strength of the national economy all affect the ability of an individual or a community to cope. Efforts must be made to build resilience to environmental shocks that take account of all these linked factors – not just ones that are visibly linked to the environment. Resilience is a more flexible and useful concept than adaptation, because the latter tends to focus on technical adjustments to narrowly conceived actual or anticipated physical climate impacts. Initiatives to promote stronger and accountable governance and more responsive and effective service delivery mechanisms – provided they are done in a climate-sensitive way – will go a long way towards building resilient communities.
- 3. Solutions to confront interlinked problems need to be flexible and cross-sectoral.** Even as there is increasing understanding of the links between climate change and security at the policy level, there is an implementation gap in terms of this being translated into practice. Current frameworks being drawn up on climate change will not be able to adequately take account of all the relevant cross-cutting issues that need to be integrated, such as gender, biodiversity, conflict and human rights. Policy responses and institutions responsible must be more reflective and accept this complexity. Rather than attempting to create neat frameworks and then struggling with all the additional issues which need to be “mainstreamed” into these frameworks, more energy should be put into exploring institutional structures which can supersede existing siloed architecture to promote genuinely joined-up working.

10 International Energy Agency (IEA) (2007). *Climate policy uncertainty and investment risk*. France: IEA. Available at <http://www.iea.org/w/bookshop/add.aspx?id=305>

11 N. Mabey, J. Gullede, B. Finel and K. Silverthorne (2011). *Degrees of risk: Defining a risk management framework for climate security*. E3G. February. Available at [http://www.e3g.org/images/uploads/Degrees%20of%20Risk\\_Defining%20a%20Risk%20Management%20Framework%20for%20Climate%20Security\\_Full%20Report.pdf](http://www.e3g.org/images/uploads/Degrees%20of%20Risk_Defining%20a%20Risk%20Management%20Framework%20for%20Climate%20Security_Full%20Report.pdf)

- 4. The benefits of conflict-sensitive adaptation.** Just like any other development actions, responses to climate change have the potential to inadvertently do harm in a fragile context. Such actions could potentially tip a given situation (back) into instability. Given the large sums of money involved, and the complex ethics of responsibility and justice surrounding climate assistance, particular care must be taken to ensure that actions are sensitive to the context in which they operate, and that they do no harm to the often delicate social balance. Lessons from the field of conflict-sensitivity need to be applied to climate change adaptation in fragile contexts to ensure that actions have a positive impact on peace and stability. Carrying out an analysis of the conflict actors, causes, profile and dynamics in a given context can ensure that actions do not inadvertently increase the risk of violent conflict, but rather serve to reduce potential or existing conflict. Planning a conflict-sensitive action requires an understanding of the potential impacts, direct and indirect, of the proposed activity on the actors, causes and dynamics of the context, and the impact of the actors, causes and dynamics on the proposed action.<sup>12</sup> Incorporating a conflict-sensitive approach to climate change adaptation has the potential not only to reduce the chances of mal-adaptation, but also to increase overall stability. However, if climate change policymakers and practitioners ignore the conflict dimension and view climate change adaptation as purely a technical exercise, the possibility of actions contributing to violence becomes very real.
- 5. Pragmatic disbursement mechanisms.** Current funding mechanisms for adaptation pay scant attention to the politics and complexities of adaptation, the need to harmonise adaptation with development, or the dangers of it going astray in conflict-affected states and thereby failing to reduce vulnerability to climate change. Strengthening governance mechanisms can reduce corruption risks and make climate change policy more effective and more successful.<sup>13</sup> Ensuring an accountable and legitimate government is vital not just for climate resilience but also for peace. Actions should thus bolster good governance, taking due care neither to fuel corruption nor to bypass state systems and create a para-state system run by NGOs.

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INITIATIVE FOR  PEACEBUILDING  
EARLY WARNING

c/o International Alert  
205 Rue Belliard, B-1040 Brussels Tel: +32 (0) 2 234 5792 Fax: +32 (0) 2 234 5799  
ifp-ew@international-alert.org www.ifp-ew.eu



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## PARTNERS

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