Situational Analysis

Case Study

Kherson region
About International Alert

International Alert works with people directly affected by conflict to build lasting peace. Together, we believe peace is within our power. We focus on solving the root causes of conflict, bringing together people from across divides. From the grassroots to policy level, we come together to build everyday peace.

Peace is just as much about communities living together, side by side, and resolving their differences without resorting to violence as it is about people signing a treaty or laying down their arms. That is why we believe that we all have a role to play in building a more peaceful future.

www.international-alert.org
Situational Analysis Case Study
Kherson region
February 2019
Acknowledgements

This report was written by Marina Nagai, with contributions from Iulia Serbina, Iryna Brunova-Kalisetska, Sergiy Danylov, Maksym Ieligulashvili and Dmytro Tuzhanskiy. Primary field research was conducted by Iryna Brunova-Kalisetska, Sergiy Danylov, Maksym Ieligulashvili and Dmytro Tuzhanskiy.

Special thanks are given to International Alert staff who reviewed the briefing and provided comments.

This research was carried out and published within the framework of the project “Conflict analysis in three potential risk areas in Ukraine”, which is funded by the British Government’s Conflict Security and Stability Fund (CSSF). The project is implemented by International Alert.

The views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) and may not coincide with the official position of the UK Government.
Contents

Abbreviations 3

1. Introduction 4

2. Methodology 5

3. Context Analysis 6

4. Key Conflict Dynamics 8
   4.1 Land- and property-related disputes 8
   4.2 Competing political ideologies and identities 9
   4.3 Ethnic and religious relations 10
   4.4 How other actors contribute to conflict dynamics 13
       4.4.1 The role of civil society 13
       4.4.2 The role of external actors 13

5. Conflict Triggers 15

6. Existing Peacebuilding Capacities 16

Abbreviations

ATO Anti-Terrorist Operation
DUMU Dukhovne upravlinnya musul’man Ukrayiny (Clerical Board of Ukraine’s Muslims)
NGO Non-governmental organisation
TIKA Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon İdaresi Başkanlığı (Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency)
1. Introduction

Five years on after the conflict in the east and the annexation of Crimea, Ukraine continues to face a number of geopolitical and domestic challenges. Against this backdrop, concerns for Ukraine’s integrity feature highly in the national discourse and are echoed by some international observers.

This case study presents a conflict analysis of three hromadas (districts)\(^1\) in the south of Kherson oblast, just north of Crimea: Kalanchak, Chaplynka and Genichesk. The region has a population of just over 1 million, with the three districts comprising just over a tenth (Kalanchak: 21,000; Chaplynka: 35,000; Genichesk: 60,000).\(^2\)

The region was selected for the following reasons: proximity to the administrative boundary line with Crimea (a de facto international border) with a checkpoint in every district; geographical remoteness from Kyiv and thus away from the influence of Russia; high numbers of ethnic and religious minorities; agricultural economy; and a long history of patriarchal traditions.

This case study forms part of an analysis of three regions in Ukraine: Kherson, Odesa and Zakarpattia. The common findings from each region are summarised in a synthesis report, which also proposes peacebuilding recommendations.

---


2. Methodology

In October and November 2018, a series of in-depth interviews and focus group discussions were carried out in three hromadas of the Kherson oblast: Chaplynka, Genichesk and Kalanchak. The qualitative study draws on views and experiences of 54 respondents, of which 25 people (14 men and 11 women) were interviewed individually and 29 (17 women and 12 men) participated in focus group discussions. Depending on the respondents’ preferences, the interviews and focus group discussions were conducted in Ukrainian or Russian.

The respondents were sampled from a wide range of professional and social backgrounds, and included: local government officials and deputies; representatives of education, health, cultural and social services; businesspeople; journalists; and civic activists. They identified with diverse (majority and minority) ethnic and religious groups present in the region and represented different age categories (25–60 years).

Given the sensitivity of the research topic and the pre-election political environment, all participants have been anonymised.

Based on a relational (referring to the social construction of masculinities and femininities) and intersectional (as systems of power shaped by other identities)\(^3\) approach, the methodology included questions on gender dynamics to ensure gender was mainstreamed through the research. This allowed for the most prominent gender issues to be highlighted. However, a more focused methodology is required to uncover deep-rooted gendered drivers and effects and find ways to help to overcome a lack of interest in gender issues among local stakeholders (a fact brought to light during this project).

The study also included desk research and a review of literature, including media reports (including social media); and documents of national and local authorities and statistical bodies.

---

3. Context Analysis

Following the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the south of Kherson oblast became a de facto border region. Russian troops deployed in the north of Crimea close to the border regularly carry out overt displays of military and naval power, which have detrimental effects on business, tourism and the local population’s mental wellbeing.

**Economic** ties with Crimea have been severed and the flow of goods between Crimea and Kherson oblast has dramatically decreased. Local residents who continue to work in Crimea face difficulties and security risks when travelling to the peninsula. The growth of the agricultural sector, however, provides new livelihoods.

The three studied hromadas have different characteristics, but Genichesk is particularly isolated from the regional centre and has poor transport links. Therefore, while Kalanchak and Chaplynka benefit (somewhat) from the economic and educational opportunities afforded by Kherson, Genichesk does not. Speaking to civil society representatives and journalists in Kherson, it was observed that many are not familiar with the situation in Genichesk, a further indicator of its isolation. However, some respondents from Genichesk said they feel that social deprivation has been improving with the decentralisation reform and international assistance programmes.

The region’s information landscape is dominated by Russian media, particularly television and online platforms based in Crimea. These channels target the Kherson oblast, with the content tailored around local and national Ukrainian issues.

The events of 2014 led to an influx of Crimean Tatars into Kherson oblast. Most of them have since moved on to more prosperous regions of Ukraine or abroad due to poverty and unemployment, social deprivation and the fear of Russia’s further advancement into the region. According to a local expert, fewer than 200 families have settled in Kherson oblast, most of whom are concentrated in Genichesk. However, the immediate pressure on social, health and education services, as well as malicious propaganda and lack of conflict-sensitive support, has fuelled xenophobic attitudes and stirred up discontent among the host population. The growth of the Crimean Tatar community has also led to a change in the dynamics with Kherson oblast’s ‘other Muslims’ – the Meskhetian Turks.

**Paramilitary groups**, partly formed of ex-Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) (now known as the Joint Forces Operation) veterans and the private militias of oligarchs, are used widely for settling disputes, mostly over land and harvests. Well-established and -resourced paramilitary groups in Kherson oblast have a significant impact and move easily from one district to another. However, their influence is much weaker in Genichesk due to its remoteness and poor transport links.

**Gender** relations are patriarchal in all communities, resulting in a curtailed freedom of movement for women; for example, women are often not permitted by their husbands to travel to Kherson for training or other activities. The status of women in Meskhetian Turk communities is particularly low, as their integration into wider Ukrainian society is limited – they are traditionally confined to roles within the home. Among Crimean Tatars the status of women is higher than in Meskhetian Turk communities; for example, the deputy head of the state administration of Genichesk was a Crimean Tatar woman.

---

4 By ‘Kherson’ we mean the city of Kherson, the administrative centre of Kherson oblast. ‘Kherson oblast’ is identified by the word ‘oblast’.

As elsewhere in Ukraine, the Euromaidan movement stimulated the development of civil society. Since 2014, even in the least socially active rural areas, volunteer and ex-ATO veterans’ organisations have appeared. However, despite the large number of registered civil associations and organisations, only a small number are active and largely depend on the activism of a single, leading individual. Additionally, there are blurred lines between some local civil society organisations and political and business circles, which creates an unhealthy dynamic due to the lack of civil society’s independence.
4. Key Conflict Dynamics

Mutually reinforcing conflict dynamics can be discerned in three main areas:

- **land-related disputes** between large and medium-sized agricultural producers over lease rights and conditions, as well as harvests;
- **competing politics and identities** of the ‘old’ (post-Soviet, Russia-influenced) and ‘new’ (post-Maidan, pro-European) systems; and
- **confrontational relations with ethnic and religious minorities**, particularly with Muslim communities.

4.1 Land- and property-related disputes

The region is largely agrarian and access to cultivatable land is highly prized. **Agrarian oligarchs** or ‘land barons’ play a significant role in communities. Extremely rich (with private lakes, zoos, as well as militias) and powerful, they have immense control over economic relationships, local politics and security.

Conflicts over land or harvests result from inadequate legislation regulating the land market, the insufficient protection of landownership rights and disposal, and the lack of and improper registration of cultivated land. Cultivation of non-registered land is widespread and used for tax evasion, as harvest from such land is not registered.

The farming of unregistered land often makes it a target of raiders (harvest robbers). In the last three years, there have been dozens of raids. The police has managed to bring this issue under control in recent months – local respondents felt that the number of raids has dropped since its peak in 2016. The most common incidents were attempts to gather someone else’s harvest, often involving paramilitary groups operating under an ATO banner.

Within the black market for land, disputes between agricultural businesses over land leases are commonplace, as are disputes between leaseholders and landlords over rental rates. For the most part, landowners and local communities are indifferent to disputes between large and medium-sized agricultural producers. However, when locals are not only leaseholders of land shares but also employees of the same farms/producers, the situation is different. For example, in a recent (late 2018) case in the village of Nadezhdivka in Chaplynka, neither side had a legal right to the land, however, the winning party was the one that mobilised the local community/shareholders to engage in violent confrontation with the competitor. According to a journalist in Kherson oblast, “both sides used the services of one of the numerous criminal groups”.

Along with other remedies (court, local authorities, protests), disputes over land and property are also solved with the use of force. This has created a market for private security groups (i.e. security guard companies and paramilitary groups formed of ex-ATO veterans). They are closely affiliated with ultra-right political groups and even criminal groups. The market also seems to be an ethnic business niche dominated by Azerbaijani and Chechens. Some of these groups run a protection racket on farmers (for example, the Kordon [Ukrainian for

---

6 Land registration has been a lingering issue since the collapse of the Soviet Union, when members of collective farms (kolkhozes) automatically became landowners. However, as many of them failed to register their plots with the land register, the official status of these plots is still unclear.

7 Journalist, interview by a local researcher, Kherson, November 2018

8 Azerbaijani and Chechen communities have been settled in the region since the 1990s. Studying the roots of the ethnic violence groups, however, was beyond the scope of this research.
Cordon] group in Kalanchak). The National Corps\(^9\) (although under different guises) mobilises its members to participate in land- and property-related confrontations.

Over the last three years, the involvement of former ATO combatants and ‘professional veterans’ in these groups has become widespread. These groups act as the guardians of local elites’ interests. Among other factors, such as the lack of economic opportunities and unemployment, this is a direct result of the poor quality and ineffectiveness of reintegration programmes for ex-combatants. When it had just been formed, the now infamous Torbin's group (led by Sergey Torbin, a former police officer) tried to find its niche in legal markets. However, due to a lack of opportunities, the group turned to criminal services, “specialising in contract killing”, as according to a local expert.\(^10\) Torbin is believed to have taken payment to undertake the fatal acid attack on anti-corruption activist Kateryna Gandzyuk.\(^11\)

However, it is important to note that most Donbas veterans return to ‘normal’ civilian life (although not without challenges)\(^12\) and create organisations that advocate for their rights (including land-related rights), and social and tax benefits. Indeed, such organisations are common in the post-Soviet space and originate from the Second World War veteran groups, later followed by organisations of veterans from the Afghan war, Chernobyl and Chechnya. The social capital of these people has always been high.

### 4.2 Competing political ideologies and identities

Although most people hold strong local identities (village or community level) above all others, tensions around political identity and choices of ‘civilisation’ (crudely described as ‘pro-Russian’ versus ‘pro-Ukrainian’) affect local politics, relationships and even business. Curiously, this is not determined by ethnicity but rather by class, education, and social and economic status. A familiar divide exists between the pro-Ukraine (and pro-European) middle-class (educated, economically stable, middle-aged, socially active) and rural (uneducated, low-income) populations. Genichesk is particularly affected by this dynamic, as a higher percentage of its population leans towards Russia.

Events in the spring of 2014 (a period of pro-Russian unrest in parts of Ukraine) had higher resonance as communities appeared to be divided more starkly. Another controversial case was the Immortal Regiment\(^13\) public initiative, a Russian public movement celebrating the heroes of the Second World War, which was interpreted by local activists as pro-Russian. ‘Pro-Ukraine’ volunteers and activists protested against the initiative, accusing the authorities of sponsoring or at least succumbing to pro-Russian forces. Pro-Ukraine activists organised counter protests that almost ended in clashes. In Chaplyinka, an organisation of Second World War veterans became a semi-legal branch of the forbidden Communist Party, as pro-Communist views are still popular in parts of the region.

Apathy (i.e. political and social passivity) is widespread in the three districts – people define their area of responsibility as limited to their household. As a result, these people are very vulnerable to manipulation by local powerholders and are a target of Russian propaganda. People are constantly barraged with depressing information about how they are suffering under the Ukrainian authorities, the Ukrainian army (that arrived in the

---


\(^10\) Interviewee, interview by a local researcher, Kherson, November 2018.


\(^12\) For more information on the gendered reintegration of former combatants in Ukraine, see Alert’s forthcoming policy brief, developed as part of the ‘Peace Research Partnership’ project.

region with the ‘new border’) and ‘the Muslims’. The contrast between ‘orderly, modern, rich Russia’ and ‘backward, chaotic, poor Ukraine’ presented by the Russian media is demoralising members of the local population and strengthening pro-Russian sentiment.

“The Hungarian dream, Polish dream, Turkish dream are not for me – but I can have a Russian Dream…”

While open confrontation along political identity lines is low (or not very visible), respondents believe that, underneath ostentatious public displays of loyalty to the Ukrainian state, some local politicians harbour pro-Russian views and “might be used [manipulated by Russian interests] at some point”.  

4.3 Ethnic and religious relations

The triangle of tensions between Crimean Tatars, Meskhetian Turks and the Ukrainian majority complicates the already complex local dynamics. The size of the Crimean Tatar and Meskhetian Turk communities is similar, however, there is almost no contact between these Muslim communities (the largest Muslim communities in the region). They do not seem to be united by religion, and their two main representative bodies, Dukhovne upravlinnya musul'man Ukrainy (Clerical Board of Ukraine’s Muslims, DUMU)15 and the Mejlis,16 harbour deep-rooted disagreements with each other. Communities avoid talking about each other, even if they live in close proximity, for example as in Genichesk. They also prefer not to talk about interconfessional disputes.

Locals see the two communities as “competing [against] or ignoring each other”17 and gave numerous examples of mutually undermining activities, such as Meskhetian Turks in one village writing to Sluzhba Bezpeky Ukrainy (Ukraine’s Security Services, SBU) to accuse Crimean Tatars of extremism.

Crimean Tatars

Despite widespread misperceptions, Kherson oblast has not absorbed many Crimean Tatars since 2014 – most of them only passed through the region and are believed to have settled in Lviv. Experts interviewed for the research (and according to some media reports)18 believe that some of those who stayed in Kherson are Muslim dissidents of Salafi and Hizb ut-Tahrir movements.19 Hostile attitudes quickly took root as Russian-sponsored propaganda fuelled Islamophobia, expressed as anti-Tatar sentiment, among the Ukrainian population, while extreme nationalism is also on the rise in wider Ukraine.20

The largest compact settlement of Crimean Tatars in the region is in Genichesk. The community’s high level of self-organisation is deemed efficient, resourceful and self-reliant. There is some inclusion in the local political system; for example, a Crimean Tatar was the head of Genichesk for five years. Nevertheless, the relations with the host communities are riddled with myths and prejudices around Tatars’ involvement in radical Islam.21

14 Interviewee, interview by a local researcher, Kherson, November 2018
15 Although this group is for all Muslims of Ukraine, only a small number of Crimean Tatars are affiliated with it. The main parish is the Chechen community of Ukraine, which is pro-Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov.
16 This is the highest administrative body for Crimean Tatars in Ukraine.
17 Interviewee, interview by a local researcher, Kherson, November 2018
19 Hizb ut-Tahrir is banned in Russia, as well as in some other countries, including Germany.
In this research, the Crimean Tatar community complained about the local authorities and gave numerous examples of hostility. Among the most controversial were: preventing the appointment of a Crimean Tatar to the role of director of a village community centre (the House of Culture, which has been a highly respected position since Soviet times); and problems with allocating new premises in the town centre for regional Mejlis. There is a perceived sense of envy of Crimean Tatars’ ‘special status’ (their high international profile and attention), as well as of funds raised by Crimean Tatar organisations from international donors for community projects, and governmental internally displaced person integration programmes. One example is the renovation of a second school for Crimean Tatar children in Novoolekseevka.

“People still view this assistance with mistrust and suspicion, thinking that Tatars want to buy us with that. Now it’s about the school repairs financed by TIKA [Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon İdaresi Başkanlığı, Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency]. Some people look at this with suspicion: for what reason Turks are doing that for us [Tatars]? We are reproached for not investing our own money, but [using] money allocated by Ukraine ... When construction had started, at the plenary meeting one person asked me with resentment and malice, why was it that the school was constructed for us? We already have a school!”

These attitudes were echoed by respondents on the other side of the argument, who expressed frustration at the “closed” and “alien” nature of Crimean Tatar communities.

“We have problems with Crimean Tatars – they are a separate nation, they will never become Ukrainians, Russians or Soviet people. No, they are Crimean Tatars. That’s why we do not want a Crimean Tatar to take power.”

Respondents emphasised the large role Russian media play in stoking tensions and promoting Islamophobia by, for example, presenting the idea of the Crimean Tatar Autonomy as a threat to ethnic Ukrainian identity.

“The [media] campaign lasted a few months – it had a good effect, people got nervous and angry.”

The lack of an effective response from the regional and central authorities on this sensitive issue only breeds further interethnic tensions and people’s mistrust in the state authority, and increases the sense of vulnerability among the Crimean Tatars.

There is, however, an encouraging minority that holds more nuanced views and highlights the positive role of, for example, Crimean Tatar activists.

“There are Turks and Tatar activists from Genichesk, Rykovo, Novoalekseyevka, from Chongar. They are all European, they want a better life for themselves and their children. Recently, the emphasis has been placed on the offended [those who feel offended by the host community] Tatars, but we understand that this is a constructed picture for European leaders, for the United Nations, that everything is bad here.”

22 Interviewee, interview by a local researcher, Kherson region, November 2018
23 Interviewee, interview by a local researcher, Kherson region, November 2018
24 Interviewee, interview by a local researcher, Kherson region, November 2018
27 Interviewee, interview by a local researcher, Kherson region, November 2018
28 Interviewee, interview by a local researcher, Kherson region, November 2018
Meskhetian Turks

The Meskhetian Turks enjoy less governmental and international attention; they did not suffer directly from the annexation of Crimea and have been settled in the region for nearly three decades. That said, this relatively long-term settlement does not mean better integration, and the post-annexation growth of another Muslim group, the Crimean Tatars, has created a more complicated dynamic.

According to the 2001 national census, the Meskhetian Turk share of Chaplynka’s population was 3,700 people.29 Due to typically high birth rates in this community, local experts estimate that, in 2019, they could now number up to 10% of the hromada’s total population. The vast majority of Meskhetian Turk families are engaged in agriculture, and they are landowners as well as renters. The community is self-organised around two structures – DUMU30 and the Vatan Society,31 the leader of which lives in Chaplynka.

Local residents see the Meskhetian Turk community as conservative, isolated and poorly integrated into Ukrainian culture; this is mostly perceived as being their fault. Lack of political representation was not recognised as an issue, but their loyalty to the Ukrainian state was questioned (just as with the Crimean Tatars). For example, respondents resentfully referred to the fact that, during the initial phase of the conflict in the east, local Meskhetian Turks took a neutral, wait-and-see position, which is perceived as being disloyal to the Ukrainian state.

Conflict occurs between Meskhetian Turks and Ukrainians throughout the region, but it is sporadic. Locals highlighted a few issues that they believe to be the reasons for mistrust and animosity: avoidance of military service (although the Meskhetian Turks do provide regular in-kind support to the army and some of them participated in the ATO in the Donbas); self-isolation and conservatism; the “sabotage”32 of the Ukrainian language in schools; and a “parasitic”33 mentality.

“They try to use all possible social benefits, avoid official employment and paying taxes.”34

On the other hand, respondents from the Meskhetian Turk community complained about racist attitudes (perceived as xenophobia highlighting their ‘foreign’ presence) and difficulties in obtaining Ukrainian citizenship,35 although no one was able to provide the number of people who still face this problem. Examples of the former include insulting graffiti, the ‘bogeyman image’ (many community incidents being immediately attributed to the Meskhetian Turks), and a recent case in which a local Armenian36 publicly called for the deportation of all Turks, which is a particularly sensitive topic given the history of the Meskhetian Turks.37

30 See footnote 15.
31 European minorities, Federal Union of European Nationalities (FUEN) members, FUEN, https://www.fuen.org/european-minorities/members/map/m/single/show/member/international-society-of-meskhetian-turks/, accessed [enter date]
32 Interviewee, interview by a local researcher, Kherson region, November 2018
33 Interviewee, interview by a local researcher, Kherson region, November 2018
34 Interviewee, interview by a local researcher, Kherson region, November 2018
36 This should be considered in the context of the wider and more bitter conflict between Armenians and Turks following the events of 1915, often referred to as ‘the Armenian Genocide’ (see Q&A: Armenian genocide dispute, BBC News, 2 June 2016, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-16352745), in the Ottoman Empire, and the ongoing Nagorno Karabakh conflict (see Nagorno-Karabakh profile, BBC News, 6 April 2016, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world/europe-18270325) involving Armenia and Azerbaijan.
There is a noticeable lack of intercommunal relationships and understanding on all sides. For example, one Meskhetian Turk commented:

“Russians, Ukrainians, Belarusians are all one nation. How can they be divided?”

This type of thinking is part of the Soviet legacy. Indeed, many Meskhetian Turks expressed nostalgia for the Soviet period.

### 4.4 How other actors contribute to local dynamics

#### 4.4.1 The role of civil society

Like elsewhere in Ukraine, civil society is a patchwork of genuine grassroots volunteer groups, established non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with access to funding, and government-organised NGOs. Kalanchak and Chaplynka residents appear to be the most 'progressive' and socially active compared to most other regions in the south of Kherson oblast. Driven by the ‘Maidan promise’ of change, activists formed community-based groups, thereby creating a new civil society. These activist groups identify themselves as Ukrainian (84%) and Europeans (35%), however, many inhabitants of southern Kherson oblast do not identify themselves as Europeans at all.

A distinct feature of local civil society is the ex-ATO veteran organisations – these are regulated by the same law as NGOs. The far-right movement Pravyi Sektor (Right Sector) has instigated conflict, such as participation in the trade blockade of Crimea. 'Civic activism' by some of these groups has evolved into racketeering, bringing 'activists' into conflict with local residents.

Some NGOs are intertwined with the local political community. NGO leaders and activists run for office under political party banners and elected deputies establish their own NGOs. NGOs have been used to protect corporate interests, sometimes even in criminal transactions, as an instrument of pressure on business or government.

Many community groups and NGOs do try to promote positive change. However, their lack of capacity, and experience in and external support for tackling the region’s multiple challenges has created “a feeling of ineffectiveness and frustration”. During interviews, activists expressed the need for systematic support and networking with similar groups elsewhere in the region (and possibly in Ukraine more widely).

#### 4.4.2 The role of external actors

International actors participate in and influence local life, from the Ukrainian diaspora in Canada to Swedish investors. Russia and Turkey, however, are the most significant external actors and hold levers with regard to containing or provoking conflict.

---

38 Interviewee, interview by a local researcher, Kherson region, November 2018
40 Interviewee, interview by a local researcher, Kherson region, November 2018
Russia

Russia continues its efforts to exert influence in the region through a combination of ‘soft power’ and, as some respondents believe, the secret services. ‘Soft’ tools include media – television and radio for the older population (over 60) and social media for youth (for example, rap sub-culture and online communities). Given the role that rumours play in shaping public discourse, spreading ‘fake news’ in public places (public transport, markets, social services, hospitals, schools) is another way of manipulating public sentiment. Media campaigns led by former regional politicians and authoritative figures have had significant impact. An example is the anti-Crimean Tatar smear campaign featuring an exiled Ukrainian ex-member of parliament propagating that “Kherson is now under [the rule of] Islamic State”.

“Russia invests in regional-specific media content, while Kyiv does not.”

Media outlets operating from Crimea seem well informed about local events, as any small incident is picked up and misinterpreted.

“In Chaplynka a drunk soldier fights with some guys – immediately it is reported that people from Kherson are facing genocide at the hands of the Ukrainian army.”

Respondents believe that Russian forces use any community conflict and try to escalate it to extremes.

“They would back both dog protectors [animal rights groups] and dog hunters – all they want is radicalisation on both sides.”

Kherson politicians who fled to Russia in 2014 still have economic influence (semi-legal business, taxi business for crossing the Administrative Line to Crimea and back), as do local corrupt politicians who use intimidation and co-optation.

Turkey

Unlike Russia, which cannot pursue its interests in the region openly, Turkey, in the words of a respondent, is trying to “play [a role like] Hungary [does for ethnic Hungarians in Zakarpattia] for Muslims in Kherson and [wider] Ukraine”. There are Turkish centres, language courses and representative offices of Diyanet (the Directorate of Religious Affairs). Development projects, supported and funded by TiKA, are focused in Kherson oblast as well as in Kyiv. The shift to Kherson happened after Crimea’s annexation, when Turkey had to relocate its projects from there.

Some civil society representatives commented that Turkey was struggling to navigate the context and that its projects often failed. However, there are continuous attempts to unite the two Muslim communities in Kherson oblast. The idea of building a big new mosque is the most controversial issue for locals who do not want to see such a prominent symbol of Islam in their community.

---

42 Interviewee, interview by a local researcher, Kherson region, November 2018
43 Interviewee, interview by a local researcher, Kherson region, November 2018
44 Interviewee, interview by a local researcher, Kherson region, November 2018
45 Interviewee, interview by a local researcher, Kherson region, November 2018
46 In particular, Alexei Zhuravko, a former member of the Rada, and Seytumer Nimetullayev, the former chairman of the state administration of Genichesk and presently the chairman of the Public Council of the Crimean Tatar People; the Council is an alternative to the Ukrainian Mejlis banned in Russia.
47 Respondents mentioned the poppy fields on the Syvash Lake islands in Genichesk that allegedly belong to Nimetullayev.
49 This is also part of Turkey’s wider global strategy to exert influence.
5. Conflict Triggers

The triggers listed below should be considered as conflict triggers in and of themselves, but also as issues that can be exploited by external actors seeking to destabilise Kherson oblast (or Ukraine more broadly).

1. Groups associated (or perceived to be associated) with political forces that gained power post-Maidan have increased their resources and ‘protest potential’. Short-term conflict can erupt between old and new elites in the reorganisation of power after the 2019 presidential and parliamentary elections; in the longer term, conflict could occur as a result of decentralisation and land reform.

2. Identity and related symbols are fuelling tensions between Muslim and non-Muslim communities, such as an attempt by Meskhetian Turks to erect a historical monument or the flying of Crimean Tatar flags. The flag-flying is particularly irritating to locals following the “economic blockade of Crimea” initiated by Crimean Tatars and enforced by paramilitary groups (including Pravyi Sektor) which, according to respondents, “committed a number of wrongful acts under the national Crimean Tatar flag”. Another example is land allocation for new mosques in Genichesk, Schastlivtsevo and elsewhere in the region. In each place the idea has been met by strong resistance from local authorities, as well as community members. In these circumstances, any support to Crimean Tatar/Muslim identity provided by international and/or national actors must be conflict-sensitive to not further aggravate these tense dynamics.

3. Propaganda on Crimean Tatar Autonomy was disseminated widely in Kherson oblast in late 2014, stating that hundreds of thousands of Crimean Tatars would settle there. It created a panic among the local population and spread a wave of Islamophobia and anti-Crimean Tatar sentiment that was also supported by Meskhetian Turks. Most recently (November 2018), President Poroshenko mentioned the need for constitutional amendments to accommodate the Crimean Tatar community. This issue must be approached with the utmost sensitivity given the extremely complex dynamics surrounding it.

4. The desire of Turkey to unite the Crimean Tatars and Meskhetian Turks along religious lines has been discussed in the region with disapproval from local non-Muslims. Plans to build a big mosque with the financial support of the Diyanet are allegedly part of this strategy. Pursuing this strategy – without due consideration of existing divisions, sensitivities and internal politics – could trigger escalation both between the two Muslim communities and with the largely xenophobic and Islamophobic non-Muslim majority. Prior to this strategy being implemented, large-scale minority integration and social cohesion programmes have to be implemented.

5. While military escalation might seem too obvious a trigger to mention, it would most certainly exacerbate all existing tensions. Communities themselves recognise this risk but do not feel sufficiently supported by Kyiv.

“*We are also a ‘border’ region, but all the attention is going to Donetsk and Luhansk [oblasts]*.”

---


52 Interviewee, interview by a local researcher, Kherson region, November 2018


54 Interviewee, interview by a local researcher, Kherson region, November 2018
6. Existing Peacebuilding Capacities

Many respondents believe that conflicts over land will only be finally resolved once all land is legally accounted for and taxes are paid. This indicates the need for significant state intervention. However, apart from the relatively new presence of border guards and state security forces, there is limited presence and capacity of state authorities in the region. What capacity exists is weak and needs strengthening across the board, from conflict management, to policing, legislation and reform implementation, to communications.

Programmes aimed at strengthening active citizenship are deemed to have also had an impact in increasing resilience to propaganda and rumours (although the problem still exists), and in helping citizens to make connections between their own locality and national and global contexts.

Local conflict-resolution practices do exist, but do not appear to be systematic. They are hampered by the weak representation of state authority. Examples range from village councils gathering community support through meetings and petitions, to applying pressure on the regional state administration, to the removal of checkpoints of the civil blockade of Crimea, to local communities documenting illegal vehicle searches and other illegal actions carried out by the Asker group (however, this group no longer seems to exist).

“We have to solve conflicts. Otherwise we wouldn’t be able to [trade] with each other. Therefore, we’re looking for compromises.”

Finally, it is essential to highlight case studies demonstrating the positive role that ethnic and religious minorities are playing. For example, a Meskhetian Turk, also an ATO veteran, became a successful farmer and political activist, and thus offers a positive role model. Respondents stressed that, “it is a new phenomenon for someone from this community to be involved in regional public life in this way”, an encouraging sign of gradual de-isolation. However, the process of de-isolation and deeper integration will still require significant effort on all sides to maintain.

---

55 Interviewee, interview by a local researcher, Kherson region, November 2018
56 Interviewee, interview by a local researcher, Kherson region, November 2018