STRENGTHENING GLOBAL SECURITY THROUGH ADDRESSING THE ROOT CAUSES OF CONFLICT:

PRIORITIES FOR THE IRISH AND DUTCH PRESIDENCIES IN 2004

FEBRUARY 2004
This paper has been written by staff from International Alert and Saferworld, in association with the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO). The paper is written on an annual basis as part of Saferworld and International Alert’s Joint EU Initiative, which aims to enhance the European Unions’ impact on preventing violent conflict through working with the EU Presidencies, key EU officials in the Council, Parliament and Commission and civil society in Europe and areas affected by conflict.

**International Alert** is an independent, non-governmental organisation which analyses the causes of conflict within countries, enables mediation and dialogue to take place, sets standards of conduct that avoid violence and helps to develop the skills necessary to resolve conflict non-violently. International Alert conducts policy-orientated research and advocacy aimed at promoting sustainable peace.

**Saferworld** is an independent non-governmental organisation that works with governments and civil society internationally to research, promote and implement new strategies to increase human security and prevent armed violence.

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FEBRUARY 2004
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<td>ACP</td>
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<td>South East European Co-operation Initiative</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the continued threat posed by terrorist organisations, have presented significant security challenges to the international community. These conflicts have also exposed differences in how best to enhance global security. The US-led approach to the ‘war on terror’ has triggered a resurgence of unilateralist, military responses for promoting security, even at the risk of undermining the international security system developed through the UN. The publication of the EU’s Security Strategy, in December 2003, is an important counterbalance, which acknowledges the changed security environment but remains significantly committed to multilateralism and respect for international law.

The implementation of the European Security Strategy will begin under the Irish and Dutch Presidencies. It is essential that the EU advances a multilateral approach to managing crises. This must be complemented with serious efforts to address the root causes of conflict and to reduce access to the tools of violence by states of concern and terrorist organisations.

The aim of this document is to highlight practical steps that the EU could take to better link the progress being made with its developing European Security and Defence (ESDP) operations and crisis management with longer-term conflict prevention. The paper outlines four key areas for the EU Member States, officials in the Council and the Commission to address to enhance the EU’s capacity to prevent violent conflict.

1. LINKING CRISIS MANAGEMENT WITH CONFLICT PREVENTION

Significant progress is being made by the EU in the field of crisis management. However, military crisis management alone is unsustainable, unless supported by civilian crisis management and linked to a longer-term, conflict prevention approach. Due to the pillar structure of the EU, the ESDP approach to civilian crisis management is limited and is institutionally and practically divorced from conflict prevention, post-conflict reconstruction, and wider instruments supported by the Commission. This report assesses operations Artemis in Ituri, Democratic Republic of Congo, and The European Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia, which have taken place within these institutional constraints. It finds that greater co-ordination between the Commission and Council during the planning phase of operations, and between the EU ‘in-country’ with, for example, political leaders and international institutions, would enable a stronger balance between crisis management operations and longer-term conflict prevention. It suggests that inter-pillar conflict prevention strategies are designed for crisis operations and that a Peacebuilding, Research and Civilian Capabilities Agency is established to ensure this takes place more effectively.

This paper proposes action in the following areas:

- Ensuring that any military or civilian crisis management operation is designed as part of a comprehensive inter-pillar EU strategy for longer-term conflict prevention and peacebuilding and is directly informed by conflict analysis.

- Establishing a European Peacebuilding, Research and Civilian Capabilities Agency to improve coherence in the training and recruitment of civilian personnel for operations; monitor and review implementation of missions; better integrate civilian engagement in military and sector-wide planning, and promote coherent cooperation between the UN and OSCE.
2. ADDRESSING THE ROOT CAUSES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT

Preventing violent conflict reduces the massive human and economic cost of war. Whilst there is no single reason why violent conflicts erupt, experience demonstrates that most wars are fought in countries which are poor and suffer from extreme inequalities of wealth and opportunity. Since the EU is the world's largest public donor of humanitarian aid and has the largest single market in the world, it is well placed to ensure that the impacts of its policies enhance opportunities for peace rather than exacerbate them. The EU has recognised this and begun to mainstream conflict prevention into its development policies. However, much greater conflict sensitivity needs to be applied to other areas of policy, including trade policy, private sector engagement, managing resource exploitation and countering HIV/AIDS.

This paper proposes action in the following areas:

- Ensuring that conflict prevention is integrated as a key priority into the country strategy papers during the mid-term review process;
- Assessing the impact of existing and future trade policies, including how far the implementation of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) might exacerbate conflict;
- Promoting transparency of payments made by European extractive industry companies in conflict-prone countries, and transparency of income among recipient governments;
- Identifying focal points in DG Employment and Social Affairs, DG-Trade and DG Development to increase co-ordination on the role of business in conflict;
- Acknowledging and responding to the security implications of HIV/AIDS, specifically the close relationship between aids and armed conflict.

3. TACKLING WEAPONS TRANSFERS AND ORGANISED CRIME

Weapons proliferation represents a major threat to securing peace and development both in the EU and internationally. Tackling global weapons proliferation requires a multilateral response based in acceptance of international norms and law. To be effective this requires not only well co-ordinated controls to impede the acquisition and development of weapons by States of concern or terrorist groups, but also reducing the incentive of states to try to acquire the tools of violence. As many Member States are large arms exporters, the EU has a particular responsibility to develop effective arms export controls. The challenge of enlargement makes this even more urgent since some accession countries are a source and transit route for weapons. A range of measures are necessary to reduce weapons proliferation, including development of the EU strategy on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), strengthening controls on legal arms exports, reducing the demand for small arms in conflict regions and tackling illicit trafficking and organised crime.

This paper proposes action in the following areas:

- Developing a practical programme of work on WMD to reduce the risk of proliferation that an enlarged EU might bring. This should address a range of issues such as developing export controls, border controls and national legislation;
- Introducing an obligation on all Member States to publish an annual report on their arms exports to an agreed minimum standard;
- Integrating support for measures to combat the spread of small arms into mainstream development and governance assistance programmes;
- Encouraging co-operation agreements between Europol and other Eastern European states which have not yet done so (eg Belarus).
4. ENGAGING CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENT CONFLICT

It is now recognised that the state alone cannot prevent or resolve conflict. Civil society organisations can play a variety of important roles in advancing peace and security at local, national, sub-regional and regional levels. In recognition of their role, the UN Secretary General called for action, and the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict programme was established to enhance the role of civil society in conflict prevention, and to strengthen civil society relationships with the UN and regional organisations, such as the EU.

The EU is beginning to encourage civil society participation through EU frameworks of engagement, including the EU-ACP Cotonou Agreement, the EU-Africa dialogue via the Africa Union and NEPAD and the Stability Pact for South East Europe. However, formal recognition of civil society in political dialogues often remains absent, and engagement ad hoc. The EU could play a greater role in supporting the active participation of civil society (both north and south) in the development and implementation of conflict prevention policy and programmes and in developing civil society networks through its various budget lines.

This paper proposes action in the following areas:

• Consider establishing civil society co-ordinators in EC delegations whose sole responsibility would be to ensure dialogue between civil society, the EU and host government. Information from these meetings would help inform country strategy papers and programming priorities. Delegations should also develop civil society mapping processes such as those undertaken in Sudan and Kenya;

• Supporting regional attempts at institutionalising civil society participation in structures such as the AU institutions and other regional or sub-regional bodies.
INTRODUCTION

‘Our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. We are committed to upholding and developing international law.’


Conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the continued threat posed by terrorist organisations, have presented significant security challenges to the international community. These conflicts have also exposed differences in how best to enhance global security. The US-led approach to the ‘war on terror’ has triggered a resurgence of unilateralist, military responses for promoting security, even at the risk of undermining the international security system developed through the UN. The publication of the EU’s Security Strategy in December 2003, is an important counterbalance, which acknowledges the changed security environment but remains significantly committed to multilateralism and respect for international law.

The implementation of the European Security Strategy will begin under the Irish and Dutch Presidencies. It is essential that the EU advances a multilateral approach to managing crises. This must be complemented with serious efforts to address the root causes of conflict and to reduce access to the tools of violence by states of concern and terrorist organisations.

In tackling the threats identified in the Security Strategy, it is essential that the EU also retains a focus on addressing conflict and development issues in less strategic regions of the world.\(^1\) It is important to note that some 35 countries were involved in violent conflict during 2003, the majority in Africa.\(^2\) Insecurity and terror are already the reality for many millions of the world’s poorest people, and these conflicts have many indirect as well as direct consequences for the EUs and the world’s security.

The aim of this paper is to outline a series of practical steps to advance the EU’s efforts to prevent violent conflict and to ensure that the EU develops a better balance between short-term crisis management and longer-term conflict prevention. It offers recommendations for the Presidencies, Council, Commission and Parliament on how to achieve this.

Progress in 2003

Over the past 10 years the EU has developed mechanisms and a strong policy commitment to the prevention of violent conflict (see Appendix 2 for an inventory of the key EU institutions, policy statements, mechanisms and tools relating to conflict prevention). During 2003 this commitment has been furthered through a variety of policy and institutional developments.

Policy commitments

- Final Guidelines for Delegations on Non-State Actor (NSA) participation in EC Development Policy, as requested by the 2002 communication on NSAs, March 2003.
- Commission Communication on Governance and Development, October 2003.

\(^1\) In the European Security Strategy ‘A Secure Europe in a better world’, December 2003, the key threats are listed as terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, state failure and organised crime.

PRIORITIES FOR THE IRISH AND DUTCH PRESIDENCIES IN 2004

• ‘*A Secure Europe in a Better World*, *The European Security Strategy*, December 2003

**Political instruments**

In 2003, EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) were deployed to the Middle East and Southern Caucasus, in addition to those already in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRoM), Afghanistan, Bosnia-Herzegovina, South Eastern Europe (Stability Pact), West Africa and the Great Lakes region of Africa. Diplomatic engagement with Iran helped secure that country’s agreement to allow international inspectors to verify its compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), codified through its signature of the NPT. The EU is now working to develop further relations with Iran since their signing of the Additional Protocol. Closer to home, EU relations with the Western Balkans were strengthened at the Thessaloniki Summit, and resulted in the launch of a high-level multilateral political forum – the EU-Western Balkans Forum, between the EU and the Stabilisation and Association Process countries.

**European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) Operations**

In 2003, the EU made significant progress with ESDP operations. At the request of the UN, the EU launched operation ‘Artemis’ in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and replaced NATO in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRoM), with the launch of operation ‘Concordia’. Civilian operations were launched in Bosnia-Herzegovina with the EU Police Mission (EUPM) and in December 2003 a further police mission, ‘Operation Proxima’, replaced Concordia in the FYRoM (See Part 1 for analysis of Artemis and the EUPM). Finally, in November 2003, the EU and NATO also undertook their first joint crisis management training exercise aimed at assessing how an EU-led operation with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, could operate where NATO, as a whole, is not engaged.

**Development policy**

The on-going development of Country and Regional Strategy Papers (C/RSPs) and the ‘de-concentration’ of Commission staff to Delegations, have increased the potential to implement conflict prevention commitments. Multi-disciplinary ‘conflict prevention teams’ have also been deployed to some countries to encourage the integration of medium-term conflict prevention strategies into development co-operation activities. For example, in 2003 the Commission’s Conflict Prevention Unit conducted a mission to assess conflict and food security in Nepal. Furthermore, the implementation of the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)-EU Cotonou Partnership Agreement during 2003, which provides a framework for political, trade, and development cooperation, has resulted in conflict prevention activities featuring in National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) and an enhanced role for civil society participation in a number of developing countries (See Part 2.1).

**Presidencies**

The holders of the rotating Presidency in 2003 continued to play an important role in advancing the EU’s conflict prevention agenda including:

• The Greek seminar on ‘EU conflict prevention: lessons learned from the Western Balkans’, May 2003.¹
• The Greek seminar on ‘Gender, Peace and Foreign Policy: the EU Perspective’, May 2003.²

¹ Copy of seminar report: http://www.cdsee.org/conference_report.html
² Outcomes: http://www.peacewomen.org/resources/NGO_reports/AthensForum.html
• The Italian seminar on ‘EU conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa’, July 2003,\(^5\) and
• The Italian conference on ‘Training for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management: the Role of the EU’, October 2003.\(^6\)

CHALLENGES AND FORTHCOMING OPPORTUNITIES IN 2004

Despite all these achievements, further progress is required to ensure coherent EU policy and practices address the complex web of social, economic and political causes of conflict. The Irish and Dutch Governments have both signalled that conflict prevention will be a high priority for their Presidencies. In order to fulfil this, and effectively implement the EU Security Strategy, they will have to ensure that the new threats of terrorism and WMD do not sideline commitments to address the continuing threats of poverty, infectious disease, imbalanced trade agreements and weak governance.

There will be plenty of opportunities in the forthcoming months to pursue a conflict prevention agenda. Furthermore, the development of the Multi-Annual Strategic Programme\(^7\) for the next six Presidencies also offers the prospect of ‘like-minded’ Presidencies installing this approach for a longer period. This is particularly important when taking into account the EU’s enlargement in 2004.

The Irish Presidency will have to produce an update of the Council Common Position Concerning Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution in Africa, a process started by the Italian Presidency, and also collate a progress report on implementation of the EU Programme on Violent Conflict, to be submitted to the June 2004 European Council. The mid-term review of EU Country Strategies, and the assessment of whether to initiate negotiations to amend the Cotonou Agreement in 2004/2005, will also take place. The Irish have already announced plans to hold a Conference in February on ‘HIV/AIDS in Eastern Europe and Central Asia’, in which the role of conflict should be integrated. A conference on ‘The Role of NGOs and Civil Society in the Prevention of Armed Conflicts’ will take place in Dublin from 31 March – 2 April, which will also address the interface between Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), ESDP and EU development assistance. The Dutch are hosting a conference on corporate social responsibility in November 2004, providing a crucial opportunity to address the role of business in conflict.

By building on these initiatives, and others outlined in this report, the EU will be well placed both institutionally and on the international stage, to advance conflict prevention and strengthen human security (see Figure A).

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\(^7\) The Multi-Annual Strategic Programme was agreed by the Council in December 2003. It identifies common goals agreed by the next six Presidencies of Ireland, Netherlands, Luxembourg, UK, Austria, and Finland. These include: Implementing the Security strategy, building security in our neighbourhood, an international order based on multilateralism, assessing the old and new threats, and following up on development committments.
Since 9/11, international relations have been dominated by a narrow security agenda. This perception of security judges very real problems exclusively as ‘threats’ and not as symptoms with real causes. It fights against terrorism, immigration, drugs and organised crime blind to the poverty from which these stem. The primary response of such a security approach is with the use of force to neutralise the threat and keep problems at a distance - an unreal hope in our globalised and interdependent world.

What is needed is a renewed understanding of what security means: Human Security. This is based on human rights and places people at the centre of international relations. It recognises interdependence between rich and poor countries, and by focusing on the causes of problems, not just the symptoms. Human security is aware that by reducing poverty afar, we enhance our own safety.

The EU was built on such a model of peaceful co-operation among states and peoples. It has a strong tradition of offering this model to the wider world and has promoted sustainable, democratic and economic solutions before military answers.

As Ireland assumes the EU Presidency, it has a particular opportunity, and requirement, to ensure that Europe continues this tradition of peaceful cooperation and ensure that the EU’s actions in the wider world promote growth with equity as the best way to ensure peace.

The Irish and Dutch Governments are already committed to a human security perspective and, together with eleven other countries are members of the ‘Human Security Network’. The 2004 Presidencies offer them a joint opportunity to ensure appropriate balance between the EU’s use of ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ powers.
CHAPTER 1.
LINKING CRISIS MANAGEMENT WITH CONFLICT PREVENTION

‘The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. All of these can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries’.

‘In almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by civilian chaos. We need greater clarity to bring all necessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post-crisis situations’.

‘A SECURE EUROPE IN A BETTER WORLD’, EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY, DECEMBER 2003

INTRODUCTION

The significant progress made by the EU in the field of crisis management is welcome (see Introduction). However, military crisis management alone is unsustainable, unless supported by civilian crisis management and linked to a longer-term, conflict prevention approach. There are multiple instruments at the EU’s disposal for managing crises and preventing violent conflict which need co-ordinated, cross-pillar strategies. These are located in pillar one (development co-operation, human rights, humanitarian and trade policies), within pillar two (through CFSP, including ESDP), and pillar three (Justice and Home Affairs).8

Greater attention must be paid to developing the civilian aspects of the EU’s crisis management capabilities, since herein lies the possibility of better linking short-term crisis management to long-term conflict prevention initiatives. Important progress is being made with training of civilian personnel for operations (see Figure 1.1). Targets have also been exceeded by Member States in the four key areas of police, rule of law, civilian administration, and civilian protection. However, there remains a lack of capability, in terms of quality, due to weak linkages between training and a well-designed recruitment process and wide variation in standards, and the numbers of civilian experts actually available for EU operations. Lack of capability in the EU’s provision for planning and mission support, and in linking these commitments to military and longer-term prevention, also remain a challenge.

This chapter aims to assess the institutional challenges that inhibit linking short- and longer-term responses to conflict and to draw lessons learned from two EU missions in 2003 to support stronger linkages between crisis management operations and longer-term peacebuilding.

1.1 THE CROSS-PILLAR CHALLENGE

CATRIONA GOURLAY, ISIS

The EU currently suffers from a ‘strategic deficit’ in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. This is, in part, a result of the challenges presented by the pillar structure, whereby decisions and policies related to external relations and conflict prevention are generated and implemented in all three pillars.

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8 See Appendix 2 for an inventory of the key EU institutions, policy statements, mechanisms and tools relating to conflict prevention.

9 Executive Director, International Security Information Service, Europe (http://www.isis-europe.org)
The EU has developed a number of structures and processes to improve its civilian and military crisis management capabilities within the framework of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) through second pillar mechanisms. Whilst this has advantages for the conduct of short-term, high profile diplomatic or crisis management actions, it also means that these actions are institutionally and practically divorced from conflict prevention, peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction activities supported by the Commission, as well as the wider range of aid and trade policies at the EU’s disposal in the Community budget in pillar one and in pillar three. This institutional disconnect between the Commission and the Council means that complementary conflict prevention programming, often implemented by partners, including other institutional organisations or NGOs, is not integrated into the strategic and operational planning of crisis management operations.

While a number of initiatives have been undertaken to improve the EU’s military capabilities, including the agreements in December 2003 to create an ‘Agency in the field of Defence Capabilities Development, Research, Acquisition and Armaments’ and a European civil-military Planning Cell, less attention has been paid to developing EU civilian capabilities for conflict prevention and crisis management and to strengthening the links between short-term crisis interventions and longer-term post conflict peacebuilding and conflict prevention.

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* ‘Crisis management’: coordinated and timely application of specific political, diplomatic, economic and/or security measures and activities in response to a situation threatening peace. The aim is to reduce tension, prevent escalation and contribute towards an environment in which peaceful settlement of violent or potential conflict is likely to occur. To be effective, crisis management must be planned and implemented with its contribution and transition to longer-term peace and security as a key consideration.

* ‘Conflict prevention’: long-term activities, which aim to reduce the structural tensions or prevent the outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violence (EPLO 2002). The prevention of violent conflict can include the full range of activities applicable to this aim including early warning, crisis management, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation.
The two case studies below aim to review how successful the EU has been at operationalising its ESDP mechanisms within the structural confines outlined. Lessons learned from each operation are highlighted and potential solutions to the structural difficulties are also addressed.

1.2 CASE STUDY: OPERATION ARTEMIS IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO (DRC)

Introduction
In June 2003, the EU sent its first military mission outside Europe and independent of NATO to the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The objective of Operation Artemis was to contribute to the stabilisation of the security conditions in Bunia, the capital of Ituri, to improve the humanitarian situation, and to ensure the protection of the displaced persons in the refugee camps in Bunia. Its mandate was to provide a short-term interim force for three months until the transition to the reinforced UN MONUC contingent on 1 September 2003.12

Javier Solana, the EU High Representative for the CFSP, while acknowledging that the situation in the rest of the province of Ituri and in the other regions of the country remained a cause for concern, declared the French-led Operation a success: “It created the conditions for the deployment of the reinforced MONUC in Bunia and gave renewed impetus to the peace process in the Democratic Republic of Congo”. Doubts do, however, remain due to the operation’s limited mandate (both geographically and in its length of engagement), and the limited efforts to embed the operations within a more comprehensive, long-term peacebuilding strategy.

Security situation
Despite recent developments in the peace process, Eastern DR Congo remains at the epicentre of violence and central to the resolution of conflict in the DRC and Great Lakes region of Africa. Since the start of the latest phase of violent conflict in the DRC in 1998, an estimated 50,000 people have been killed and half a million have been displaced in the north-eastern district of Ituri. Despite repeated peace agreements, the violence intensified in late 2002 and early 2003 due to the exploitation of ethnic divisions, most notably between the Hema and Lendu, and the withdrawal of Ugandan troops. This lead to calls for the international community to strengthen its support of the peace process.

Although difficult to assess, security conditions have, according to some observers, greatly improved since the arrival of the force.13 In addition, the widely felt fear of the creation of a vacuum once the EU force left has not been substantiated. This is largely due to the strength of on-going co-ordination between the EU and UN forces at HQ and local level in facilitating a smooth hand-over. This has created a relatively more stable environment in Bunia and has facilitated the limited opening of space for political dialogue and the move towards the disarmament and cantonment of some militia groups.

Local confidence in and support for the EU and UN missions have by no means been universal, however. Improved security has not necessarily meant improved confidence or freedom from fear or attack. Massacres, both during and after the EU operation, have

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12 United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (UN MONUC)
continued in the areas in and around Ituri.\textsuperscript{14} The majority of the population that fled Bunia during May have yet to return to the town, civilian-dressed militia still circulate freely, and large numbers of weapons remain. Massive human rights violations also continue, including the widespread use of rape and sexual mutilation as instruments of war.\textsuperscript{15}

**Lessons learned**

**Rapid military operability yet opportunities for improved military planning**

From a military perspective, Operation Artemis demonstrated that the EU has the autonomous capacity to react rapidly – that is, troops were deployed on the ground within seven days of a decision being made by the EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC). Military weaknesses were, however, reflected in the operational constraints caused by inadequate strategic lift capabilities and inadequate communications systems between headquarters and staff. In addition, there was no strategic reserve put in place for the extension of engagement or to cope with an unforeseen deterioration of the situation.\textsuperscript{16}

**Strengthened inter-institutional co-ordination**

From an institutional perspective, the Artemis operation has reflected a strengthened inter-institutional operational relationship, particularly with the UN. Over the past year, this has been a strategic priority for both the EU and UN.\textsuperscript{17} The multi-level dialogue between the two institutions and rapid response by the EU to the Secretary General’s appeal to act has helped build confidence between the two institutions. The processes for reporting from Javier Solana to the UN Security Council were also an improvement on previous UN-mandated operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{18} The mission also demonstrated the strength of inter-governmental co-ordination in putting in place a mission with force elements from twelve EU Member States and four non-EU States, under French direction on the ground.

**Better linkages between crisis management and long-term peacebuilding**

Artemis’ narrow humanitarian and security mandate meant that it did not address the wider geographical, security and political issues locally, nationally and regionally. These are related to a complex array of institutional actors connected to conflict and its resolution in the region (for example, the national government in Kinshasa, the Ituri Interim Administration, the district governors, militia leaders – or even Rwanda and Uganda). Artemis, even with its limited mandate, could therefore have better complemented other EU and national and regional initiatives. The failure to better link military crisis management with wider peacebuilding was a missed opportunity.

A specific criticism of Operation Artemis, for example, could be that the Commander of the operation reportedly had no senior civilian working with him to help link the operation to broader civilian activities. In addition, stronger communications could have existed between the Commander and the EUSR for the Great Lakes. The peacebuilding process in the DRC also necessitates a tripartite approach, whereby legitimate and

\textsuperscript{14} Ituri: Stakes, Actors, Dynamics, October 2003 (ibid).
\textsuperscript{16} Catriona Gourlay, ISIS, European Security Review, Number 19, October 2003.
\textsuperscript{17} See the Commission Communication on the European Union and the United Nations: The choice of multilateralism and the Joint Declaration on EU-UN Co-operation in Crisis Management, both agreed in September 2003.
\textsuperscript{18} Catriona Gourlay, ISIS, European Security Review, Number 19, October 2003.
representative grass root perspectives on governance issues are also adequately involved in track I and track II initiatives at the national and regional level.

If a power-sharing government is to be effective and sustainable it needs to be representative and accountable to the local population. Too much focus on the centralised government reinforces the absence of collective accountability, thus emphasising the importance of a multi-track approach. The planning of any military intervention must, therefore, be framed within a country/regional strategic framework that ensures that military engagement is accompanied by complementary local peacebuilding and conflict prevention activities.

Next Steps
A six-month, multi-level review of the Artemis operation has begun and will be followed by the implementation of lessons learned. A number of other follow-up actions are taking place, which reflect a welcome, longer-term approach to EU engagement in the DRC. Javier Solana, in June 2003, proposed a wide package of interventions to link up the Artemis Operation legacy with longer-term prevention, including the deployment of a civilian mission – which has yet to be agreed or implemented. In September 2003, the country strategy paper under 9th EDF was signed, allocating 205 million Euros to the DRC, including support for building the judiciary, supporting transitional institutions and preparing for elections. Since the departure of the EU mission in September 2003, over one million Euros was fast-tracked under the Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) for urgent judicial reform to address inter-ethnic and land disputes through a functioning legal system in Bunia. Human rights budget lines are also supporting rehabilitation projects and providing technical and financial support to the Ituri Interim Administration. There is also a limited EU police mission to assist the establishment of an Integrated Police Unit in Kinshasa to provide security to the transitional government and institutions. Finally, ECHO has adopted a €40 million plan for 2004 to support the vulnerable people of DRC during the transition process.

These developments are welcome; however, they would be more effective if they had been better linked up with a wider DRC EU strategic framework for engagement, before the Artemis intervention. The EU must now ensure that lessons are learned and that the political commitment persists for continued follow-up to Solana’s proposals and to ensure that each intervention (be it humanitarian, political, or military) is linked and complements the wider local, national, regional and international initiatives in the region.

Conclusion
Operation Artemis proved to be a surgical and timely military intervention with political importance for the EU as the first post-Iraq, multilateral, non-strategic EU intervention. As a self-contained operation it achieved its limited aims well, in very difficult circumstances. With these successes it can be said that the EU has passed the first ‘test’ of its ESDP mechanisms in carrying out an autonomous operation in Africa. Nevertheless, this test was a limited one. As stated by ISIS: “It does not necessarily follow from the successful conclusion of operation Artemis that the EU’s capabilities are sufficient to conduct operations with more challenging mandates, requiring more robust use of force. Nor does it follow that the most challenging phase of the EU’s engagement in the DRC is over. Indeed, the EU must now make good on its pledge to remain at the forefront of efforts for stability, peace and reconstruction in the

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19. The fact that European Development Funding has to be agreed with the national government in Kinshasa, who have no jurisdiction or accountability to eastern Congo, re-enforces this challenge of too centralised an approach.
20. See the Conclusions from the July 21 General Affairs and External Relations Council (GAERC).
DRC, using means of action at its disposal’, as Javier Solana indicated on 1 September.” The ultimate success of any crisis management intervention has to be judged by both its short-term and medium-term impact on conflict dynamics in the context in which it is in-acted. Operation Artemis has shown some encouraging signs, however, there are lessons to be learned and much room for improvement.

1.3. CASE STUDY: EUPM IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

DR DOMINIQUE ORSINI, EUPM

Introduction
The European Union Police Mission (EUPM) was the first EU crisis management operation under the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). In January 2003, the EUPM began a three-year deployment, replacing the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF), which had been working on police reform for the previous seven years. The EUPM is part of the international effort to help Bosnia and Herzegovina (hereafter: Bosnia) move from post-conflict reconstruction to pre-EU accession status by establishing “sustainable policing arrangements under Bosnia ownership in accordance with best European and international practice”. 22

From a conflict prevention perspective police reform is important, because otherwise warring parties or incumbent regimes can use security forces to protect their own interests rather than those of the population. Unprofessional and unaccountable police and security forces can create mistrust within communities and increase the demand for weapons. The problems in the security sector are often interlinked, making it important to adopt a sector-wide approach. For example, improving the accountability and capacity of policing will only improve security if it is linked to wider support for the judiciary. In short, reforming the police and the broader justice sectors in pre- and post-conflict situations, can help bring about more positive and accountable security structures and bridge the gap between governments and the public.

In order to improve police performance in Bosnia, especially in the fight against organised crime and human trafficking, the EUPM focuses its efforts on police managers and on the development of policing institutions. This is done through an intensive policy of ‘co-location’ whereby EUPM offices are physically located in the various police administrations. In each co-location, EUPM officers monitor, mentor and inspect police management at middle to senior levels.

Security situation
Bosnia’s security situation is considered stable, albeit still fragile. A resumption of armed hostilities between the country’s Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs is no longer regarded as a credible possibility. The recent adoption of legislation creating joint armed forces and a common Ministry of Defence, successive reductions of SFOR’s 23 presence over the past couple of years, and the near completion of the return process, are but a few indicators that Bosnia is slowly bringing its immediate post-conflict period to a close.

Bosnia’s slow economic recovery is, nonetheless, creating new security risks for the country. Whereas the economy has still not taken over as the main engine of growth, international assistance has already decreased rapidly. This lingering socio-economic problem is creating conditions for corruption, criminality and, possibly, terrorism to develop. Democratic politics

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22 See EUPM’s Mission Statement
23 NATO’s Stabilisation Force (SFOR).
and the establishment of the rule of law are, under these conditions, likely to come under pressure. Hence the prospect of future social unrest cannot be discounted.

**Lessons Learned**

Bosnia will be a “concrete test case” for coherence as “the EU deploys economic, trade, humanitarian, military and civilian instruments in pursuit of a single objective – the stabilisation and transformation of a post-conflict society”,

*Javier Solana on the EU taking over peacekeeping from NATO in Bosnia, January 2004.*

**Inter-institutional Co-operation**

One of the basic tenets of the EUPM is that there is enough domestic political will to proceed with police reform in the context of Bosnia’s possible accession to the EU. EUPM was, therefore, conceived as a relatively ‘straightforward, technical’ mission from a political point of view, expecting to avoid the kind of political resistance that UN IPTF had often encountered. However, after over a year of operations, it has become clear that Bosnia’s political establishment has difficulties relinquishing control over its police force. EUPM has witnessed clear attempts at influencing police operations. Steps have also been taken to reverse institutional and legislative changes, meant to increase the independence of the police, that were made under UN IPTF. In hindsight, more could have been done to prepare for possible political obstruction of EUPM’s mandate even though it seemed unlikely at the outset that Bosnian authorities would risk undermining their progress towards Europe by exerting undue control over the police.

Under these circumstances, it has become essential for EUPM to enhance its co-operation with the Office of the High Representative (OHR) in order to get the necessary political backing and expertise to address political interference in police work. EUPM’s participation in the OHR-led Rule of Law Pillar, which includes all international agencies involved in reforms related to the rule of law, has provided a forum where EUPM and OHR have been able to intensify co-ordination of their policies. In addition, closer links are being forged with OHR’s Political Department.

Relations with the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) have also been developed. As the security of returnees is one of EUPM’s strategic priorities, each EUPM office has now a ‘return co-locator’ who liaises with UNHCR and EUPM’s Headquarters on return-related issues. Finally, co-operation with OSCE, which monitors the implementation of judicial reforms, has been increased in order to ensure that criminals are not only investigated and arrested, but also tried and convicted in accordance with international human rights standards. Effective inter-institutional co-operation has, therefore, been essential in what is a relatively ‘straightforward’ mission, underlining the importance in building this into the planning and implementation of future missions.

**EUPM and Peacebuilding in Bosnia**

While Bosnia has made great progress over the past eight years, much remains to be done to ensure that the peace process becomes irreversible.

More needs to be done at the local level in order to assess the local population’s perception of the police. If levels of trust are to be built between the community and the police, it is essential that the local population begin to view the police as operating on their behalf, rather than a force whose main role is to protect those in power. Whilst EUPM seldom comes into contact with the public, it has assisted the local police in developing
community policing. Measures promoted by EUPM include identifying and developing partnerships with local NGOs and the media; establishing Consultative Committees made up of members of civil society; appointing individual police officers as points of contact for local communities, and organising regular meetings with local communities and Consultative Committees with a view to developing crime prevention strategies.

At the national and regional level, membership of Euro-Atlantic institutions is increasingly seen, both in the international community and domestically, as the best way to embed peace and stability in the young Balkan democracy. Indeed, EU membership is one of the only foreign policy objectives that meets the approval of all Bosnian parties, regardless of ethnicity or political orientation. Whilst painful political and economic reforms will need to take place before Bosnia can join Europe, it is believed that the attraction of the proposition will be sufficient to trigger reforms that will not only bring EU (and NATO) membership, but also long-term peace and stability.

EUPM is part of this strategy to bring Bosnia closer to Europe. By helping Bosnia’s police to tackle organised crime, corruption and human trafficking more effectively through internal reform, EUPM is not only making Europe’s neighbourhood safer, but also creating better conditions for Bosnia’s democratic development, economic and social recovery, and moves towards peace and stability.

**Next Steps for the EU**

In its dealings with local authorities, EUPM should make more use of its direct link to Brussels in its capacity as an instrument of the EU’s foreign policy. Political support from EU institutions, but also from Member States, for the mission’s objectives should be openly expressed in times of difficulty with local political authorities, and EUPM should enhance its ability to call on that support. This would help make the connection between police reform and EU integration clearer to Bosnian authorities. This kind of support will be increasingly needed as the international community’s way of working continues to shift from intrusive peace implementation by the High Representative to pre-accession reform under the aegis of EU institutions.

Co-operation has already greatly increased between OSCE, OHR and EUPM within the Rule of Law Pillar. With the introduction of new Criminal Codes and Criminal Procedure Codes in Bosnia, and the importance now given to Prosecutors in leading investigations, there is a need to ensure that the international community’s strategy with regard to the rule of law leads to a system where crime is investigated, and criminals prosecuted and sentenced, in accordance with European best practice.

At the same time, it is important to view the EUPM within the broader context of increased EU activity in region-wide activities, aimed at tackling organised crime, strengthening the rule of law and supporting post-conflict reconstruction. One such step would be to hold region-wide co-ordination meetings amongst the different agencies involved to share experiences and develop more effective national and regional strategies.

### 1.4. Ways Forward

CATRIONA GOURLAY, ISIS

To meet the operational challenges it will face in future missions, the EU will need to develop its mission support and planning capabilities, especially with regard to its civilian operations. As outlined earlier, the targets for the training of civilian experts in the four
civilian areas of crisis management – police, rule of law, civilian administration, and civilian protection – have been formally met through pledges by Member States, and it is important now to move towards developing qualitative targets. Existing skills need improving and should be utilised in more sector-wide programmes.

Improving the overall planning phase of the missions to involve a broader range of EU institutions and implementers is necessary to ensure that linkages are made with long-term conflict prevention. The EUPM mission has illustrated the importance of ‘in-country’ co-ordination between the OSCE, the UN and the EU. This is important for the implementation of specific missions, but also to enhance synergies between these institutions to enhance prospects for long-term conflict prevention.

A principal challenge in the further development of EU crisis management structures and capabilities will remain that of developing an integrated approach, in which the Council, its Member States, and the Commission work in concert to ensure that short-term crisis management operations complement the EU’s longer-term conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategies and programmes. At present, for example, while the Head of the Conflict Prevention Unit sits in on the Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CivCom) meetings, there is no formal co-ordination of the activities of both bodies.

The structural reforms proposed in the 2003 Intergovernmental Conference, and in particular the potential creation of a position of Foreign Minister and a Joint External Service of the Union, are highly relevant to these debates, and should be exploited to maximise coherence in pursuit of EU conflict prevention objectives. This should include the establishment of an inter-institutional European Peacebuilding, Research and Civilian Capabilities Agency to counterbalance the attention on the military aspects of crisis management, to bridge the gaps between the Commission and the Council and to strengthen the linkages between civilian crisis management and longer-term conflict prevention. Such an agency would: improve coherence in the training and recruitment of civilian personnel for operations; monitor and review implementation of missions; better integrate civilian engagement with military and sector-wide planning, and promote coherent co-operation with other international agencies and NGOs.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The EU should:

• Ensure that any military or civilian crisis management operation is directly informed by comprehensive and on-going conflict analysis and designed as part of an inter-pillar, country/region-specific, EU strategy for longer-term conflict prevention and peacebuilding.
• Implement strategic, multi-track peacebuilding approaches at the local, national and regional levels to accompany military/civilian interventions in conflict (prone) zones.
• Develop criteria for assessing impact and learning from EU crisis management missions that are informed by a variety of representative and legitimate local stakeholders. This is to ensure downward accountability from Brussels to the local stakeholders affected by conflict.
• Ensure that lessons learned from individual EU crisis management operations inform clear strategic choices and operational guidance aimed at integrating crisis management and conflict prevention in future initiatives.

• Support the creation of a European Peacebuilding, Research and Civilian Capabilities Agency (EPA) to complement the proposed European Armaments Agency.
CHAPTER 2.
ADDRESSING THE ROOT CAUSES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT

‘All relevant institutions of the Union will mainstream conflict prevention within their areas of competence’.

INTRODUCTION

A series of European Council and Commission agreements and policy papers have called for the mainstreaming of conflict prevention into all aspects of EU policy (see Appendix 2). This will help both to counteract the potential negative impacts of an intervention on the conflict dynamics in a country or region, and improve the positive impact on peace and development, of each EU instrument. However, much more needs to be done before conflict prevention is effectively integrated into policy and programmes.

The following sections aim to show how conflict prevention can be mainstreamed in practice through: aid and trade policies; the private sector; natural resource management; and responses to HIV/AIDS – using a ‘conflict-sensitive’ approach. Figure 2.1 below provides an introduction to a possible methodology for implementing conflict-sensitive aid programmes. It is also adaptable and relevant to the different sectors within each of the wider EU instruments and institutions.

2.1 DEVELOPMENT AID AND CONFLICT

‘Development policy and other co-operation programmes provide, without doubt, the most powerful instruments at the Community’s disposal for treating the root causes of conflict’.
COMMISSION COMMUNICATION ON CONFLICT PREVENTION, 2001.

EU development assistance can have either a positive or negative impact on the prospects for violent conflict. Development assistance can contribute to stability when states use it to address human security needs, the political economy of conflict, inequality and discrimination, and also for debt servicing. However, if misguided, development assistance can also exacerbate conflict, for example, through inadvertently supporting corruption, helping to perpetuate an unjust status quo, or by actively increasing social tensions (see Figure 2.2). Conversely, conflict and insecurity perpetuate underdevelopment and undermine the sustainability and impact of development assistance.

The EU is in an important position to take forward conflict prevention concerns and to encourage conflict prevention concerns and to ensure that that these are integrated, not only in its own programming, and that of Member States, but also in multilateral forums such as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development - Development Assistance Directorate (OECD-DAC).
FIGURE 2.1.

WHAT IS A CONFLICT-SENSITIVE APPROACH AND HOW IS IT IMPLEMENTED?

What to do:
• Understand the context in which you operate
• Understand the interaction between your intervention and the context
• Use this understanding to avoid negative impacts and maximise positive impacts

How to do it:
• Carry out a conflict analysis, and update it regularly
• Link the conflict analysis with the programming cycle of the intervention
• Strategise, plan, implement, monitor and evaluate your intervention in a conflict-sensitive fashion (including redesign when necessary)
• Apply your conflict analysis beyond the project or intervention level to the wider operating environment, including the rest of your own organisation, partner organisations and other actors, who may not be sensitive to conflict.

Interaction between a project and its context:
1. The outer circle represents a conflict analysis of the pre-existing context, looking at profile, actors, causes and their dynamic interaction.
2. The inner circle represents the project cycle of the proposed intervention, including planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation stages.
3. The connecting arrows represent the assessment of the interaction between the context, and the project.

Definitions and sample questions for conflict analysis:

Profile: A brief characterisation of the context within which the intervention is situated.

Sample question: What are emergent political, economic, ecological and social issues?

e.g. elections, reform processes, decentralisation, new infrastructure, disruption of social networks, mistrust, return of refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs), military and civilian deaths, presence of armed forces, mined areas, HIV/AIDS.

Causes: Factors which contribute to people’s grievances.
Causes may be:
• Structural: pervasive factors that have become built into the policies, structures and fabric of a society and which may create the pre-conditions for violent conflict.
• Proximate: factors contributing to a climate conducive to violent conflict or its further escalation.
• Triggers: single key acts, events, or their anticipation that will set off or escalate violent conflict.

Sample question: What are structural causes of conflict?

e.g. illegitimate government, lack of political participation, lack of equal economic and social opportunities, inequitable access to resource wealth, poor governance.

Actors: Individuals, groups and institutions who or which:
• contribute to conflict; and /or
• are affected by conflict (in a positive or negative manner); and /or
• are engaged in dealing with conflict

Sample question: What institutional capacities for peace can be identified?

e.g. civil society, informal approaches to conflict resolution, traditional authorities, political institutions (e.g. head of state, parliament), judiciary, regional [e.g. AU, IGAD, ASEAN] and multilateral bodies (e.g. International Court of Justice).

Dynamics: The interaction between the conflict profile, the actors and causes.

Sample question: What are current conflict trends?

e.g. escalation or de-escalation.


24. African Union (AU), Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Progress towards advancing a conflict-sensitive approach

The benefits of mainstreaming conflict-sensitive approaches in development aid programmes are now being understood by governments and international organisations as well as by NGOs. Governments and multilateral agencies have developed their own conflict analysis tools for planning and assessing the impact of specific projects on conflict dynamics. For instance, the UK Department for International Development (DfID) is using the Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA) methodology in a wider range of countries.

Since 2001, the EU Conflict Prevention Unit has developed the Checklist for Root Causes of Conflict for desk officers and EC Delegation staff. This aims to increase awareness of conflict risks to encourage prevention measures. The checklist refers to eight political, economic and social conflict indicators and is to be used when country and regional strategy papers are drafted. On the basis of the conflict analysis, attention is then drawn to conflict prevention activities that external aid should target (see Figure 2.3).

However, more training is needed to ensure that staff in the Delegations are able to conduct conflict analysis, and ensure that this analysis takes place at all stages of the programming cycle - from planning through to evaluation (see Figure 2.4). In addition, care needs to be taken to ensure that EC conflict-sensitive policies are coherent with those of Member States, as well as with other macro-level frameworks, such as the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs).

Monitoring Cotonou programming in 2004

The implementation of the EU-ACP Cotonou Partnership Agreement in 2003 offers the possibility of further integrating conflict prevention into all aid and trade co-operation between the EU and ACP countries. The Agreement is largely implemented through Country and Regional Strategy Papers (CSP/RSPs), which will be reviewed during 2004. Some of these CSPs/RSPs have begun to facilitate the development of regional conflict prevention strategies in Africa.

25 Conflict prevention and resolution are explicitly mentioned in a separate article (article 11) and political dialogue between EU and ACP countries on crises and conflicts is seen as central to conflict prevention.

26 For example, in Africa, three of the four Regional Indicative Programmes (the implementing programming documents for the regional strategy programmes) have allocated funds for conflict prevention as a non-focal activity.
This ‘mid-term review’ process is to be carried out jointly by the EC and ACP countries to discuss how the focus of country strategy papers might be adapted to more effectively tackle underdevelopment. This may lead to a change of strategy or focal sector of aid allocations and a revision of allocation by the European Development Fund (EDF) Committee. This process will be based on the conclusions of a joint annual report drafted by the EC Delegation and the National Authorising Officer (NAO)\textsuperscript{27} to be submitted to DG Development in Brussels by March 2004. Taking into account the Cotonou Agreement’s commitment to the involvement of non-state actors (NSAs), the guidelines for the 2004 mid-term review indicate that NSAs should be consulted and encouraged to input into the joint annual report. As yet, however, there has been little engagement with civil society on the mid-term review process. According to a questionnaire carried out with a selection of civil society actors from eight ACP countries prepared by the NGO Eurostep, respondents did not believe they had enough information to participate in the process.\textsuperscript{28}

The Commission guidelines for the 2004 mid-term review of country strategy papers have acknowledged that, at present, conflict prevention is an ‘area not adequately addressed in the initial programming’.\textsuperscript{29} The mid-term review process, therefore, offers a real chance to ensure that conflict prevention is fully integrated, as a cross-cutting issue, into country strategy papers. Where conflict prevention is already highlighted in a CSP/RSPs, the mid-term reviews will assess whether this is being prioritised within the programming and implementation.

### FIGURE 2.3

**ALLOCATIONS OF COUNTRY STRATEGY PAPER RESOURCES IN THE HORN OF AFRICA, BASED ON ASSESSMENTS OF KEY ROOT OR AGGRAVATING CAUSES OF VIOLENT CONFLICT IN EACH COUNTRY.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>CSP focus on specific conflict prevention initiatives</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Djibouti | • Support to implementing the peace agreement and decentralisation.  
          • Support to NSAs.                                    |
| Eritrea | • Rehabilitation.  
          • Demobilisation.  
          • Support to long-term strategies (food security, transport, education). |
| Ethiopia | • Capacity-building for governance and civil society.  
            • Institutional support to NSAs.  
            • Contributions to regional projects. |
| Kenya   | • Support local administrations, parliament, and civil society.  
            • NGOs and UN agencies are implementing partners. |
| Somalia | • Direct support to the peace process and to peace-building initiatives.  
            • Human rights, good governance and the rule of law.  
            • Strengthening civil society (capacity-building and other support). |
| Sudan   | • Capacity-building for NSAs.  
            • Administrative decentralisation process and the judiciary. |
| Uganda  | • Institutional support to NSAs.  
            • Contributions to regional projects. |

Source: Horn countries’ country strategy papers for the Cotonou Agreement

\textsuperscript{27} National Authorising Officers represent ACP governments. They are often Ministers of Finance for their respective governments and responsible for sign-off and monitoring of EDF funding.

\textsuperscript{28} Eurostep (European Solidarity towards Equal Participation of People) is a network of 15 major development NGOs. See ‘The ACP-CSP mid-term reviews: A credible contribution towards the Millennium Development Goals?’, January 2004, Eurostep.

\textsuperscript{29} Guidelines for 2004 mid-term reviews under the ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, p. 6.
2.2. DEVELOPMENT AID AND SECURITY

Preventing violent conflict and creating the space for sustainable development to occur requires an integrated response, particularly between development and security policy. As the OECD notes, ‘security in this context has to go beyond the classic requisites of defence from military attack and extend to the well-being and the protection of persons and property’.

Helping developing countries to effectively demobilise troops and reintegrate rebels into the community, to reduce the availability of small arms, and to build legitimate and accountable systems of governance and security (in the defence, police, judicial, and penal systems) is critical to prevention and resolving conflict, and should be viewed as a necessity for effective sustainable development in many of the world’s poorest countries. However, whilst donors support this principle and provide funds for many of these activities, some are still uncertain of engaging in security sector reform, and believe it should not be funded with development assistance.

Many development agencies also currently have legitimate fears that decisions on the use of EU development funds are being increasingly driven by narrow political foreign and security policies, particularly since the onset of the ‘war against terror’, and over the changing balance of power within the EU institutions, resulting from the Constitutional Treaty negotiations.31

It is vital that poverty reduction remains the central aim of EU development policy and safeguards are put in place to avoid the ‘politicisation of aid’. The establishment of a separate heading for development within the EC community budget, as proposed by the UK Parliament’s International Development Select Committee in 2002,32 and the suggestion by CONCORD,33 that a separate sub-heading for Development Co-operation should be created within Heading 4 in the Financial Perspectives, may go some way towards meeting this concern. It is also important that the EU make progress with increasing the concentration of resources available to low-income countries.

Conflict prevention should, however, be acknowledged as a legitimate use of development funds, particularly if requested by the poorest countries. The request by the African Union (AU) for the EU to support the development of a Peace Support Operations Facility (PSOF) in Africa with European Development Funds (EDF), for which they have shared ownership, is a good example of this.

The PSOF aims to be more than simply a military standby force. It also intends to encompass a wide range of actions from mediation to post-conflict reconstruction. Many have expressed concern that the EU should not use EDF funds to support the PSOF, but the Council has agreed that the use of EDF funds will only be an interim measure and will not be used to fund troops or military equipment. Furthermore, the EDF Committee will be consulted on individual operations and further work is to be undertaken while working out the objectives and implementation as to which activities will be eligible for Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) funding and which will not.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The EU should:

• **Ensure that conflict prevention is integrated as a key priority of the country and regional strategy papers (both as a focal point and informing wider budget lines) during the mid-term review process.**

• **Guarantee broad civil society participation in the mid-term review process, by ensuring that Delegations systematically raise awareness of, and take into consideration, suggestions from civil society.**

• **Develop a training programme for staff in the Delegations and in the Commission to ensure that a conflict-sensitive approach is adopted in all strategic planning, implementation and evaluation stages of an intervention.**

• **Ensure that the EU and its Member States advocate conflict-sensitive development policies in multilateral fora, such as the OECD-DAC.**

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31. According to ‘Global Security and Development Discussion paper’ BOND, October 2003, for example, the decision to increase EU aid to Pakistan in 2001 specifically referred to the country’s decision to support the international coalition against terrorism.

32. In the Second Report ‘The Effectiveness of the Reforms of EC Development Assistance’, April 2002, it states, ‘We would welcome progress towards a separate budget heading for development in order to make it clear which funds are earmarked for the elimination of poverty’. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmintdev/417/41706.htm#a10

33. CONCORD is The European Confederation of NGOs for Relief and Development.
• Provide a greater concentration of resources to low-income countries to ensure that the aim of poverty reduction is met within the EC’s future development budget.
• Ensure that development funds are available for wider conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities including support for good governance initiatives, security sector reform, early warning, disarmament, demobilization and re-integration of ex-soldiers, small arms awareness-raising, and education.

2.3 TRADE AND CONFLICT

‘Trade policy can be identified as a priority area for future work. The Commission is well placed to ensure a proper examination of the relationship between trade integration, political stability and economic progress and make proposals for targeted use of trade policy instruments.’

ONE YEAR ON: THE COMMISSION’S CONFLICT PREVENTION POLICY, MARCH 2002

Introduction

A growing body of research highlights that continuous economic decline contributes significantly to state collapse and conflict, and that economic shocks play an even more exacerbating role.34 A recent study, carried out in 40 Sub-Saharan African countries, found that a five per cent drop in annual economic growth increases the likelihood of civil war by more than one-half.35

The links between economic underdevelopment and poverty have been long recognised, but successive attempts to deliver sustained growth and poverty reduction have generally failed to reduce global economic inequality and may have actually increased it. Furthermore, social instability can be caused by conflict over resources, economic decline and shocks, especially where there is an absence of strong institutions in areas of governance, judiciary and social investment to absorb economic transitions. There is an urgent need, therefore, to better understand and look more closely at the impact of economic policies on the structural and proximate causes, as well as the triggers of violent conflict.

As the world’s largest trading bloc, the EU has huge potential to wield power at the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and encourage a development-led, conflict-sensitive trade agenda, which benefits the poorest and least secure. Attempts to achieve this have usually centred on the Cotonou Agreement, and more recently through negotiations on Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs), which the EU insists are ‘instruments for development’. However, serious concerns are being voiced by ACP members as to the effects these trade agreements will have on their markets and resultant social stability.

Can market forces deliver peace and development?

After the debt and development crisis of the 1980s a new, market-led policy approach was adopted by development and economic institutions, which it was hoped, would end cycles of macro-economic boom and bust. Integration into the world economy through rapid liberalization of trade, finance and investment would enable greater competition and improve resource allocation, by attracting foreign savings and by deepening technological capacities.

34 In ‘Do Ethnic and Non-Ethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes?’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2001, Sambanis points out, ‘economic studies of civil war have successfully identified an empirically robust relationship between poverty, slow growth, and an increased likelihood of civil war and prevalence’. DFID also refer to ‘economic decline and economic shock’ as one of the root causes of violent conflict in Africa, March 2001
through greater inflows of foreign direct investment (FDI). After some initial signs of success during the 1990s, most notably with the East Asian economies and Latin America, analysts have noted that, “growth during this period has been highly uneven and volatile, with polarization more powerful a trend than convergence … industrial activity in many developing countries has stagnated during this period, and in some cases there has been ‘deindustrialization’”. The results of this in Latin America are clear: In Mexico, the closure of Maquiladora (component factories), that have moved to China, has left a quarter of a million more migrants to join the four million rural emigrants already in the US. In Bolivia, protests in October 2003, over the exportation of natural gas and electricity privatisation, left 60 dead and the government overthrown. According to the Secretary General of the United Nations Conference on Trade, Aid, and Development (UNCTAD), “Global economic imbalances have generated such shocks with increasing frequency, and Latin America has endured a ‘lost half decade’, recalling the disappointing developments of the 1980s”.

Whilst liberalization has been aggressively enforced on developing countries by the developed world, the latter has retained protectionist policies to protect its own industries, particularly agriculture. As World Bank Chair, James Wolfenson notes, ‘It is inconsistent to preach the benefits of free trade and then maintain the highest subsidies and barriers for precisely those goods in which poor countries have a comparative advantage’. Two-thirds of the world’s poor people depend on agriculture for their livelihood, which in Africa’s case represents 70 per cent of working adults. Yet, European agriculture is still subsidised by £30 billion a year, through the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). This creates vast surpluses that are dumped on poor countries, rendering their own products worthless. The EU and other industrialised countries made a commitment to phase out agricultural export subsidies in the WTO Doha Declaration, but their failure to do so thus far, has left poor countries frustrated, and was one of the main reasons for the failure of the 5th WTO Ministerial Trade Talks in Cancun.

**FIGURE 2.5**

**THE EFFECT OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC DYNAMICS ON CIVIL CONFLICT**

- In Indonesia, globalisation has led to uneven incomes, especially as a result of oil revenues. An important source of conflict in the four resource-rich provinces (Aceh, Riau, East Kalimantan and Papua) has been the desire to retain these riches rather than share them with the rest of the country (this has been described as “aspiration to inequality” (Tadjoeddin, 2002)). Conflict-sensitive trade conditionalities, in line with wider natural resource regulatory mechanisms, would help reduce these conflict-feeding impacts.

- In Rwanda, the genocidal violence was seldom linked to the economic difficulties Rwanda had faced in the preceding years. However, for some time the largely rural population had been facing shortages due to the disproportionate amount of land devoted to coffee production. This led to a crisis in 1989 when the International Coffee Agreement collapsed and the price of coffee plummeted to well below production costs, with devastating consequences for Rwanda’s economy. As a result, widespread unemployment and social dislocation created a climate of insecurity, which certain Hutu leaders were able to exploit in their campaign of terror against the Tutsi minority and moderate Hutus.

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36. ‘Development Strategies in a globalising world’ 2003 UNCTAD/GDS/MDP/BMisc.15
37. Migration News (http://migration.ucdavis.edu/mn/more.php?id=2947_0_2_0)
38. Oxfam Press Release ‘ EU CAP reforms spell disaster for developing countries’ 27 June 2003
**ACP-EU trade relations**

Of the 34 poorest countries listed in the 2003 UNDP Human Development Report, over half are African members of the ACP group. It is no coincidence that they have weak economies and are often those most likely to be engaged in, or emerging from, conflict. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for Africa to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, growth in Sub-Saharan Africa will need to accelerate substantially to about seven per cent a year; well above the rates enjoyed by even the strongest performers during the past decade (about five per cent).41

The EU-ACP Cotonou Partnership Agreement, signed in June 2000, is currently charged with trying to achieve this level of economic growth. The Agreement aims to fundamentally change the nature of trade relations between the EU and ACP countries from 2008 onwards. The unilateral trade preferences that the EU has been granting ACP countries for decades will cease to exist and the ACP will have to provide reciprocal, virtually unrestricted access to their markets for almost all EU products within 10 years, removing import tariffs and quotas.

This is largely as a result of pressure to be consistent with WTO rules, which do not allow for preferential treatment and instead call for the elimination of duties and restrictive regulations within 10-12 years. Consequently, since 2002 the EU has been negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with 77 ACP countries. According to Article 34 of the Cotonou Agreement, EPAs are meant to ‘foster smooth and gradual integration of ACP states into the world economy, with due regard for their political choices and development priorities, thereby promoting sustainable development and contributing to poverty eradication in ACP countries’. Others are less certain of their potential. The Mauritanian Ambassador to Brussels, for example, commented ‘the Commission seems to argue that the ACP should liberalise, privatise and deregulate and FDI will inevitably flow, markets will be enlarged….In other words put a policy framework in place and everything will be fine. ACP countries on the other hand have already been swallowing these bitter pills for two decades’.42 Negotiations between the EU and ACP have proved particularly difficult after the 5th WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancun, when the EU apportioned some of the blame for the failure of the talks on the ACP’s hardened stance on the so-called ‘Singapore’ issues which include investment, competition policy and trade facilitation.

There are significant reasons for concern, that the EPAs could increase the likelihood of conflict in ACP countries, including the following:43

**Inability to cope with EU competition in these free trade areas.** Fears have been raised that the WTO rules44 offer too little flexibility for ACP countries; that the transition period is too short; coverage too broad; the elimination of tariffs too ambitious, and that not enough consideration has been given to the position of Least Developed Countries (LDCs), land locked or island economies which will struggle even more to compete with import surges of duty-free European goods.

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42. Mr Satiawan Gunessee, Ambassador of Mauritius, quoted in Fraser and Kachingwe, ‘Cotonou and the WTO: Can Europe’s Trade Agenda deliver a just partnership with developing countries,’ BOND publication, ‘Europe in the world’ 2003.
43. These concerns have been raised by the Cotonou Working Group of the European NG Confederation for Relief and Development (CONCORD), founded in October 2003. Its overall objective is to push for the translation of the Cotonou Agreement into actions that advance poverty reduction in the ACP and contribute to the achievement of sustainable development. Further information obtained from Fraser and Kachingwe (Ibid).
44. GATT article XXIV ‘requires the elimination of duties and other restrictive regulations of commerce on essentially all trade within a period of 10-12 years’. 
Poorest ACPs will be forced to open economies to EU. Under WTO rules, LDCs are normally exempt from reciprocity in the WTO. However, if they agree to join a Free Trade Area as defined by Article XXIV of the GATT, they must also commit to maximize the elimination of their trade barriers. Although the EU made a widely published gesture to offer all LDCs duty- and quota-free access to the European market through the so-called ‘Everything but Arms’ initiative of 2001, the current expectation is that LDCs will be compelled to return the favour and open their markets.

ACP countries will face substantial adjustment costs opening markets for EU exports. Competition with EU imports will require significant funds to enable ACP countries to invest in production and supply capacities and for social and other accompanying measures. The EU has yet to suggest the estimated cost of establishing and operating the EU-ACP Free Trade Areas.

Loss of government revenues will severely compromise governments’ ability to support basic social services. The elimination of tariffs will have important implications for government revenue as many ACP countries rely heavily on import taxes for their fiscal income. Removing this source of income will dramatically reduce ACP countries’ ability to provide vital services such as health care and education, and could therefore exacerbate social tensions.

Declines in inter-regional trade and ACP integration initiatives. There is a danger that rather than strengthening regional trade co-operation, there will be increased competition between countries to attract investment from the EU. Existing processes of regional co-operation and integration between ACP countries could be disturbed.

Dumping of cheap EU agricultural surpluses (dairy, cereals, beef etc). This process already threatens agriculture and agri-processing industries, particularly the small-scale farming sector (which employs around 70 per cent of working adults in Africa). Any further reduction of ACP protection against these practices, which take place under the remit of the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) threaten the collapse of rural economies, and increase impoverishment and food insecurity, which often feed negatively into conflict dynamics.

The foreseen changes to the trade rules governing EU-ACP relations, which EPAs might bring, appear, for many LDCs, to be incompatible with other key aspects of the Cotonou Agreement, namely achieving the goals of poverty reduction, sustainable growth and conflict prevention. In addition, it would seem that too little emphasis is being paid to enhancing the political and social systems necessary to fulfil trade liberalisation. As Rodrik (1997) notes, “Societies that benefit the most from integration with the world economy are those that have the complementary institutions at home that manage and contain the conflicts that economic interdependence triggers.” This means strong institutions in the areas of governance, judiciary, civil and political liberties, social insurance and education. Unless the EU provides greater support to ACP countries in these areas and offers the necessary funds to assist with economic structural changes over the next 10 years, ACP countries will be highly vulnerable to economic changes and shocks – thus increasing the likelihood of violent conflict.

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45. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).
46. Speech by Dani Rodrik, professor of international political economy, Harvard University ‘Globalisation, Social Conflict and economic growth’ Revised, December 1997
RECOMMENDATIONS

The EU should:

• Invest in policy-orientated research to better understand the link between trade and the structural, proximate causes and triggers of violent conflict.
• Assess the impact of existing and future trade policies, including how far the implementation of EPAs might exacerbate conflict and undermine structural stability.
• Ensure the Conflict Prevention Unit (CPU), in the Commission, is engaged early on in the planning and negotiation process for EPAs. This process could include the provision of funds by DG Trade for a CPU-led analysis of the conflict impacts of EPAs.
• Urgently press for further CAP reform, before the proposed 2007 negotiations, possibly as part of the EU financial perspectives opportunities arising in 2004.
• Examine alternative trade arrangements, which encompass the Cotonou trade objectives while taking full account of the development needs expressed by ACP countries.
• Work with ACP countries to obtain more WTO flexibility for regional trade agreements which involve developed, developing, and least developed countries.
• Give assurance about future EU resources for necessary adjustment policies following the implementation of EPAs.
2.4 PRIVATE SECTOR ENGAGEMENT IN CONFLICT ZONES

Introduction
International attention has turned in recent years towards understanding the economic dimensions of violent conflict. Although the nature and behaviour of foreign investing companies has been identified as a significant factor in many conflicts, little progress has been made by governments or multilateral organisations in systematically engaging companies in conflict prevention.

FIGURE 2.6

OIL COMPANIES IN SUDAN

Without some form of international supervision, the competitive pursuit of oil income is more of a threat to the stability of a peace agreement than an incentive to sign one. The EU and its Member States are heavily engaged in promoting peace and respect for human rights in Sudan, spending hundreds of millions of Euros each year to alleviate the war-related suffering of the Sudanese people. Despite recent moves towards peace, the role of oil companies and other corporate activity in Sudan remains a cause for concern and a potentially destabilising factor.

Since the completion of an oil pipeline in Sudan’s Western Upper Nile in 1997, oil has become a major focus of military activity. Control over the oilfields became a key military objective for the warring parties. Oil income allowed the government to buy new weapons, such as helicopter gunships, resulting in an escalating level of violence. Thousands of civilians were killed and many tens of thousands were forcibly displaced.

However, the EU has never expressed concern regarding allegations of European industries’ complicity in human rights abuses or their role in exacerbating war in Sudan. A common position by the EU on the role of European business in conflict-prone zones would facilitate taking a political and ethical stand in line with other EU policy objectives.

Progress so far
The Commission’s Communication on Conflict Prevention from 2001 recognises the role of the private sector as an important actor in conflict-prone areas, noting that, on the positive side, foreign businesses can contribute to sustainable development but that they, ‘can also be partly responsible for maintaining, or even creating, structural causes of conflict’. To date, however, the Commission has done little to promote awareness or guidance for European companies on how to avoid such conflict-feeding impacts. This represents a major gap in efforts to mainstream conflict prevention across EU policy-making and should be addressed by the upcoming Presidencies.

European companies will not be able to perform in a socially responsible way in conflict-prone areas unless they are equipped with improved guidance and tools for analysing and designing mitigating strategies with regard to conflict. The Presidencies should take steps to ensure that they do not have negative, conflict-feeding impacts and maximise their potential to contribute to stability. Key instruments that have

47 Written in association with Egbert Weselink, Pax Christi Netherlands.
49 Communication on Conflict Prevention, April 2001, p.20.
emerged or have relevance include the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights and the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (both relating to extractive sector companies) and, for a wider group of companies, the UN Norms on Responsibilities of TNCs and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (see Chapter 2.5). There is also an emerging body of best practice on improved conflict impact assessment as a tool for companies to use in order to mitigate potentially harmful impacts, which is being developed by International Alert under the auspices of the UN Global Compact.

FIGURE 2.7

CONFLICT RISK AND IMPACT ASSESSMENT AS A TOOL FOR EUROPEAN COMPANIES

There are several tools available for business in relation to their impact on society, however, none of these comprehensively address conflict, nor provide a methodology for implementing mitigating strategies. The ‘Business Guide on Conflict Impact Assessment’, published in 2002 by the UN Global Compact, was one of the first steps towards developing such a methodology.

International Alert is now taking this work forward with its Conflict Risk and Impact Assessment (CRIA) toolbox project, through conducting thorough research into existing corporate environmental and social impact assessment and political risk methodologies, and identifying where these fall down in understanding violent conflict and companies’ relationship to violent conflict. CRIA is a ‘conflict-sensitive’ methodology designed to assist extractive sector companies in understanding and addressing the underlying causes of conflict and their relationship to these (‘do no harm’) and contributing to long-term structures of peace (peacebuilding). Ranging from the ‘go’ or ‘no go’ decision through to the form of closure and withdrawal, CRIA tools enable companies to anticipate, monitor and assess the impact of business operations on local, national or regional tensions, triggers and accelerators of conflict, and to develop mitigating strategies that contribute to conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

http://www.international-alert.org/policy/business.htm

In the Communication on Conflict Prevention, the Commission outlines a role for itself as, ‘a facilitator; helping to bring the parties involved together for discussion and debate’ on the role of the private sector in conflict. While various Member States (including Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK) have hosted cross-sectoral dialogue and conferences on business and conflict, the EU has yet to give this issue higher prominence at the EU level among European companies – yet this would be a logical entry-point for more concerted action in this critical area. The Dutch Presidency will oversee a large conference on corporate social responsibility (CSR) during its term, it is vital that a focus on business and conflict is included.

The Commission’s 2002 Communication, CSR: a Business Contribution to Sustainable Development, forms the basis for the EU strategy on CSR. The Communication builds on the Commission’s 2001 Green Paper, Promoting a European Framework for Corporate Social Responsibility. Both the Green Paper and the Communication are unequivocal that CSR must be a voluntary initiative, defined as voluntary social and environmental business practices, linked to their core activities that go beyond companies’ existing legal obligations.

The Commission’s own 2001 Communication on Conflict Prevention also envisaged that the CSR Green Paper was to, ‘address the issue of conflict prevention and the role which business can play in this field’.51 Although section 7.6 of the paper refers to the EU engaging directly with multinational companies (MNCs) to promote human rights, and the EU promoting respect for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, it does not include any explicit reference to companies playing a role in preventing harmful, and maximising positive, impacts on conflict. A resolution was passed by the European Parliament on the CSR paper in May 2002, requesting that the Communication make specific proposals on business and conflict prevention: applying conflict diamonds certification, extending the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, and creating a legally-binding framework with sanctions for companies contributing to conflict. These recommendations, however, were not reflected in the final Communication.

The Communication laid the foundation for the European Multi-stakeholder Forum on CSR, a platform to promote transparency and convergence of CSR policies throughout EU institutions. The Forum, launched in October 2002, will run until mid-2004, when a report will be presented to the Commission, containing results and recommendations for further action. A number of NGOs are working to include specific recommendations as to how the importance of conflict can be recognised, in order that the Commission does all it can to ensure that European companies do not have a negative impact on conflict dynamics abroad. It is vital that these recommendations be implemented during the upcoming Presidencies.

A major obstacle to the EU implementing a comprehensive conflict prevention policy is lack of co-ordination between different agencies. This is most apparent with regard to the discrepancies between trade and investment policy and development/conflict prevention policy. Conflict-blind lending decisions to private sector projects engaged in conflict (prone) zones from the European Investment Bank and the EU-ACP PROINVEST programme can contribute to a worsening of conflict dynamics. This provides just one example of the importance of promoting coherence across different policy areas.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

The EU should:

- **Support existing standards and guidelines for European companies operating in conflict-prone zones**, including the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights; the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative; the UN Norms on Responsibilities of TNCs, and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.

• The Dutch Presidency should include business and conflict in its upcoming CSR conference in order to raise awareness among European companies of the need to adopt conflict-sensitive approaches when operating in conflict-prone zones and promote conflict-sensitive tools and guidelines.
• A supplement to the Green Paper on CSR should be published based on the Multistakeholder Forum findings, and an acknowledgement of the relationship between CSR and conflict. This would reflect earlier statements on this, such as that quoted above in the Communication on Conflict Prevention.
• The Conflict Prevention Unit, in DG Relex, should help raise awareness and identify focal points in the Employment and Social Affairs DG (where responsibility for CSR lies), DG-Trade and DG Development to increase coordination on the role of business in conflict.
• The European Investment Bank and the EU-ACP PROINVEST programme should incorporate conflict impact assessment to lending decisions.

2.5 RESOURCE EXPLOITATION AND CONFLICT

IN ASSOCIATION WITH KIRSTEN HUND, NIZA/FATAL TRANSACTIONS

‘(The EU will) actively work towards finding means to suppress illegal exploitation of natural resources which contributes to the eruption, escalation and continuation of violent conflict.’

COUNCIL COMMON POSITION ON CONFLICT PREVENTION IN AFRICA, MAY 2001.

Introduction
The 30-year war in Angola, conflict in Indonesia, and the seven-nation war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are only a few of the examples where natural resources fuel conflict. Resource revenues sustain autocratic governments and warlords, and quasi- and semi-rebel organisations fight for control over profitable resources. This creates ‘economies of war’ where the parties to the conflict have an economic interest in sustaining instability. The exchange of resources for weapons only aggravates the problem. This section examines the approaches being taken through various EU instruments to break the connection between natural resources and violent conflict, and that seek instead to turn natural resources into a local, national and regional means for peace and development.

EU Progress So Far
The EU has recognised the importance of tackling the issue of conflict commodities as part of its strategy for responding to violent conflict. The Council’s Common Position on Conflict Prevention in Africa, May 2001, lists competition for scarce natural resources among the ‘root causes’ of violent conflict and the illicit trade in natural resources as a priority concern in its Conflict Prevention Programme of 2001.

Diamonds. The EU has from the beginning taken an active stand in the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS) for rough diamonds. However, the monitoring and follow-up process needs persistent political attention. Since July 2003, gems can only be traded when accompanied by a certificate, issued by a state that is a member of the KPCS, stating that the diamonds do not come from a conflict source. If implemented properly, the KPCS can be an instrument for development and reconstruction – by drying up funds for purchasing weapons, by fighting smuggling, raising tax revenues and, as statistics need to be registered, enhancing transparency. However, the major drawback to the KPCS is the lack of independent and impartial external monitoring of national control systems. These have deliberately been excluded from the scheme, despite NGO pressure. Implementing the Kimberley Process also

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52 Written in association with Micha Hollestelle, Pax Christi Netherlands. See the NIZA/Fatal Transactions website at www.niza.nl/fataltransactions and Pax Christi Netherlands’ at www.paxchristinl
demands technical knowledge and investment from participating countries. The EU should, therefore, give priority to providing technical assistance to those countries that are committed to implementing the KPCS. The EU should also review lessons learned one year on from the implementation of the KPCS and draw conclusions on the potential for certifying other commodities, such as timber:

Timber: The Commission Communication on Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT), Proposal for an Action Plan was proposed in May 2003. It commits to agreeing a definition of ‘conflict timber’ and to initiate discussions with Member States on the role of timber in conflict, including in development corporation programmes, particularly in relation to the rights of local and indigenous peoples. These policy proposals are a positive development, but are yet to be fully adopted by the Council. In a committee meeting of the Industry Trade Research and Energy Committee in November 2003, the European Parliament delayed support for the FLEGT and some members tried to undermine achievements detailed in the plan. It is vital that the EU make progress in this area, since it is estimated that approximately 50 per cent of imports of tropical timber and about 20 per cent of timber from boreal forests into the EU is illegally sourced.53

FIGURE 2.9

CONFLICT TIMBER

Burma
Burma’s military regime, the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), is partly sustained by its control over access to minerals and timber. In 2002, logging alone accounted for 9.3 per cent of legal foreign exchange earnings. Huge swathes of Kachin States forests, said to be ‘very possibly the most biodiverse, rich temperate area on earth’, have been destroyed.54 This has increased the risk of conflict arising among ethnic tribes over diminishing resources. Furthermore, many of Burma’s hill tribes have been exposed and attacked since the Burmese military allowed Thai logging firms to harvest teak on the Thai-Burmese border.55

Mexico
The Lacandon jungle, in Chiapas, Mexico, covers 1.8 million hectares and is home to the diverse flora and fauna species that has made Mexico one of the top five ‘mega diverse’ countries on the planet. The jungle is equally rich in natural resources including precious stones, timber, water and petroleum. The region is home to Lacandon Indians and many Zapatista ‘settlers’ who fled to the Lacandon due to the Mexican Government’s intense counter-insurgency strategy against them, which started in 1995. The Mexican Government, prompted by corporate (bio-investigations, logging, hydroelectric dams) and military interests, is looking to relocate, forcibly or otherwise, approximately 28 communities, half of which are Zapatista affiliated, located within the Lacandon. Military presence in the area has increased heavily, and the Mexican Army has been assigned the new role of environmental supervision, causing tensions amongst communities. The relocation effort serves two purposes: weakening Zapatista communities and enabling easier exploitation of the area’s prolific natural resources.56

Transparency and capacity-building of governments and extractive industries
Turning natural resource abundance into a source for peace and prosperity necessitates accountability and transparency of revenue flows. This can be achieved, in part, by extractive industries publishing all payments to governments. This provides civil society with a strong tool to hold governments accountable.

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53 Figures from Fern, The EU Forest Campaign (www.fern.org).
The EU Parliamentary Committee on Development Co-operation and European oil giants, BP and Shell, have declared their support for a mandatory approach to delivering transparency of payments to national governments, provided a level playing field for all companies is established and that companies are not competitively disadvantaged. In support of this, the EU and its Member States should take an active leadership role in supporting such initiatives, including the ‘Publish What You Pay Campaign’ (PWYP) and the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI).

**The ‘Publish What You Pay’ Campaign (PWYP)** aims to help citizens of resource-rich developing countries hold their governments accountable for how revenues from the oil, gas and mining industries are managed and distributed. The campaign, backed by a worldwide coalition of over 170 non-governmental and civil society organisations, calls for international regulation requiring the disclosure of net taxes, fees, royalties and other payments made by companies to developing country governments in all countries where they operate.

The campaign’s objectives are fully consistent with, and a stepping-stone towards, internationally agreed objectives of promoting accountable government, corporate social responsibility, democratic debate over resource management, and energy security through a more sustainable operating environment. PWYP hopes to achieve and implement revenue transparency and accountability by mechanisms, such as Listing Rules, International Accounting Standards, EU company law and The Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI).

The Transparency Obligations Directive (TOD) drafted by the European Commission, will introduce minimum transparency requirements for information that must be provided by companies whose securities are traded on regulated markets, such as stock exchanges, in the European Union.

The EU and its Member States should integrate PWYP amendments into the final version of the Commission’s Transparency Objective Directive, including providing concrete proposals for how to support on-going voluntary initiatives addressing the disclosure of company payments to governments, such as the EITI (see Figure 2.11).

**FIGURE 2.10**

**THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRY TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE (EITI)**

The UK Government-led Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI) calls for transparency over payments by companies in the extractive industries to governments and government-linked entities, as well as transparency over revenues by those host country governments. The initiative encourages government, publicly traded, private and state-owned companies, international organisations, NGOs and others with an interest in the sector to work together voluntarily to develop a framework to promote transparency of payments and revenues (www.dfid.gov.uk).

PWYP, whilst maintaining its stance on the need for a mandatory framework for disclosure, is currently participating in the EITI. Much more work has to be done to ensure that such an international process leads to mandatory solutions, to ensure that the countries that need transparency of natural resource revenues are covered under the scheme.

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57. This support was announced at the public hearing on Publish What You Pay (PWYP) at the European Parliament, held 12 June 2003 in Brussels.
58. Founded by Global Witness, George Soros’ Open Society Institute, CAFOD, Oxfam, Save the Children UK and Transparency International UK.
To enhance transparency, it is also vital that governments in resource-rich countries strengthen and enlarge their auditing capacity, and that accounting systems should be developed for the provinces to ensure fair distribution of revenues and local accountability in the management of public funds. Effective control of the national borders is another pre-requisite if the flow of illegally extracted resources (and arms) is to be stemmed. The EU should assist in upgrading the customs agencies in countries that suffer from resource-funded conflicts. Here, a balance should be achieved between assistance to central government authorities and regional bodies, alongside support for independent monitoring.

**Resource exploitation for sustainable development**

Managing resource exploitation should mean more than preventing the diversion of illicit funds to a corrupt elite or armed group. Local populations can be negatively impacted by resource exploitation, through environmental destruction, the undermining of their livelihoods and markets, the increase in availability of arms, and the financial enrichment of corrupt structures. As part of any peacebuilding and reconstruction strategy, therefore, efforts must be made to promote greater economic security and equity among local populations suffering from the impacts of war economies and violence. This includes promoting good governance for the effective management of regulatory systems and equitable distribution of the benefits of resource exploitation.

Informal and small-scale engagement in resource extraction often constitutes an important form of income-generation for local communities. An estimated 12 million people depend on small-scale and informal mining for their livelihoods, for example, and many more depend on the local production and trade in these and other products, such as timber. Improved access to legal markets, and the mobilisation of conflict-sensitive development aid, would support the diversification of economies away from a strong dependence on primary commodities. More diversified, sustainable economies would provide better economic balance, reduce vulnerability to the ‘resource curse’, and lessen the likelihood that natural resources become pawns in a power struggle among ruling elites.

Any reconstruction process needs, therefore, to be linked in parallel with economic rehabilitation that takes the population’s economic security into account and which will, in turn, increase the potential for sustainable demobilisation, disarmament, reintegration and rehabilitation of militia and criminal groups into society. Furthermore, a wholesale regional perspective needs to be taken on board to encompass what are typically regional conflict dynamics. Building formal regional trade agreements that support sustainable use and management of resources, for example, can make a ‘peace dividend’ more advantageous than a ‘war dividend’.

In addition, ineffectual, compromised or confused regulatory approaches at the national level can provide a veneer of legality to a system of resource exploitation that is wholly exploitative and structurally unstable. The challenges being faced currently in terms of the resource exploitation in the Democratic Republic of Congo are indicative of this. Weak governance of resource exploitation could also facilitate the rapid return of a war economy should hostilities resume, as the structures enabling this would not have been removed. The implementation of regulatory systems, therefore, necessitates governance that is legitimate and representative of the whole population, and that is effective at the local as well as national level. This requires a civil society that has the capacity to hold the governing authorities accountable for their commitments to international regulatory systems.

The EU must, therefore, follow a multi-track approach to addressing harmful resource exploitation by working from the bottom-up, through local capacity-building, in parallel with, and complementary to, the top-down, regulatory approaches. This means that the EU must, on
one level, support the establishment of a range of incentives and disincentives through regulatory systems, aid and trade agreements for the prevention of the type of resource exploitation that fuels violent conflict and contributes to instability. At the same time, it must support combating the constant erosion of the environment and local livelihoods by mining, oil and timber activities. This means empowering local stakeholders to participate in the debate on the economic future of their region and building human capacities to assist the transition from a predominantly mining economy to a more balanced economy. Furthermore, in countries where weak governance exists, strengthening local civil society to monitor and hold government and state structures accountable will support a more equitable and sustainable approach to resource exploitation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The EU should:

- Immediately adopt and implement the Commission Action Plan on Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT).
- Actively support the incorporation of monitoring and verification measures in the KPCS, evaluate the impact of the KPCS one year on, and give priority technical assistance to those countries committed to implementing the KPCS.
- Promote transparency of payments made by European extractive industry companies in conflict-prone countries, and transparency of income among recipient governments and other national authorities.
- Provide technical support for capacity-building for the establishment of legitimate regulatory institutions responsible for the provision and inspection of production, trading and export licenses for resources linked to war-financing.
- Work to promote approaches to resource exploitation that support equitable development and peacebuilding.
- Support sustainable artisan and small-scale mining activities in developing countries and encourage their integration into the formal economy.
- Support civil society organisations in developing countries in order to enhance their capacity to scrutinise government revenue and expenditure figures.

2.6 HIV/AIDS AND VIOLENT CONFLICT

STEFAN ELBE, LECTURER IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT, UNIVERSITY OF ESSEX

‘Few challenges are more profoundly disturbing or more far-reaching in their implications for social and economic development, and ultimately for political stability, than the spread of major communicable diseases, in particular HIV/AIDS, malaria and tuberculosis.’

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION ON CONFLICT PREVENTION, APRIL 2001.

Introduction

HIV/AIDS is rapidly becoming the worst pandemic in human history. In addition to the 25 million people who have already succumbed to the illness, a further 40 million people live with HIV/AIDS throughout the world. The African continent has been hit particularly hard by the pandemic – with some countries now facing HIV prevalence rates close to 40 per cent of their adult population – but the illness is also spreading quickly in Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, China and Latin America. The global reach and severity of the pandemic makes it more than a health and development issue; HIV/AIDS is also becoming an international security issue. The
virus is often spread more rapidly during armed conflicts by armed forces (including peacekeepers) and this then acts as a source of social, economic, and political insecurity.

Unless practical measures are taken to address the relationship between HIV/AIDS and violent conflict, the EU’s strategies for strengthening global security, for enhancing its conflict prevention capabilities, and for promoting global development, will be undermined. The conference on HIV/AIDS in Eastern and Central Europe in February 2004, to be hosted by the Irish Presidency, provides a perfect opportunity to ensure that this link is put firmly on the agenda.

**Armed conflict and the spread of HIV/AIDS**

Armed conflicts contribute to the spread of HIV/AIDS in many ways. HIV prevalence rates in the armed forces are generally higher than amongst comparable civilian populations and they are more likely to spread the disease when they are deployed. According to Human Rights Watch, for example, almost 60 per cent of combatants in the African Great Lakes region are HIV positive. These soldiers, who are of a sexually active age, are geographically mobile and away from home for long periods of time, often valorise violent and risky behaviour, have greater opportunities for casual sexual relations, and often seek relief from the stress of combat.

Armed conflicts also contribute to the spread of HIV/AIDS because of the widespread use of rape as a weapon of war. In the age of AIDS, such practices are not only physically and psychologically traumatic for the victims; they are potentially lethal – not least because the violent nature of the act further facilitates HIV transmission (see Figure 2.13).

Armed conflicts further spread HIV/AIDS by inhibiting the ability of individuals and communities to stem the spread of the virus. Violent conflicts strain medical facilities that are usually scarcely equipped in the first place, and thus inhibit the delivery of preventative and acute care necessary in the treatment of HIV/AIDS. Those facilities that do remain operational during conflicts frequently lack vital resources such as clean water, trained staff, medicines and basic medical equipment. Such health and medical centres have even been singled out and targeted in recent conflicts in Rwanda, Mozambique, Sudan, and Sierra Leone as a way of demoralizing the civilian population and in order to loot whatever resources remain there. On a broader level, the acute dangers posed by armed conflict also divert attention and resources away from dealing with the illness. Although both armed conflicts and AIDS are lethal, the need to deal with the former is often given priority at the expense of the latter, trapping affected countries in a dangerous cycle of conflict and AIDS.

Finally, people are also at greater risk of becoming infected during conflicts because of the demographic disruption they cause. Residents of urban areas, where HIV prevalence rates are generally higher than in rural areas, often flee from the cities and move to relatives in the countryside, thus bringing higher infection and mortality rates to these areas too. In order to stem these developments, HIV/AIDS prevention efforts must be integrated into the EU’s conflict prevention, conflict resolution and post-conflict planning.

**HIV/AIDS as a long-term root cause of conflict**

HIV/AIDS can also contribute to long-term state insecurity. States usually become unstable and collapse as a result of a combined economic down-turn, the dissolution of political institutions, and the implosion of a wide array of social institutions such as the family, the education system, and the health care sector. High rates of HIV/AIDS contribute to all of these processes, making the AIDS pandemic a matter of considerable concern for long-term social and political stability.

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60. Agence France-Presse (AFP) on ReliefWeb, 13 Nov 2003
(http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/5e224df683c1840449256dde0017b91c?OpenDocument)
FIGURE 2.11

GENDER DYNAMICS OF HIV/AIDS AND CONFLICT: THE IMPACT ON WOMEN

The symbiotic relationship between HIV/AIDS and armed conflict is particularly serious for women. A complex combination of biological factors and socially constructed gender roles place women at greater risk of contracting HIV/AIDS during times of armed conflict, and their experience of its impact is gender-specific. The European Union’s response to the security dimensions of HIV/AIDS consequently needs to be sensitive to these gender dynamics.

First, women are at particular risk of contracting HIV/AIDS through rape. Rape is used both as a means of racial genocide and psychological, cultural violation as women are typically viewed as the cultural representatives of a community. In the case of the Rwandan genocide, female rape victims reported to UNAIDS that HIV/AIDS was deliberately used as a weapon of war. Such reports are further corroborated by the fact that the HIV prevalence rate amongst women surviving these rapes is high, with two-thirds of a recent sample of Rwandan genocide widows testing HIV positive. As well as the psychological and physical violence of rape, the possibility of HIV infection causes further anxiety amongst the victims, made worse by the social stigma that frequently accompanies women who have been raped.

Second, women are also more vulnerable to acquiring HIV as they form the majority of refugees and internally displaced people. In many refugee camps, women have little choice but to trade sex in return for vital resources such as food, water, and shelter, thereby increasing their risk of infection. In some cases the structural design of the refugee camps can inadvertently encourage such dangerous sexual practices, in that water taps and latrines are often situated at a considerable distance from the dwellings, meaning that many women and girls are raped or have to perform sexual favours for self-appointed guards out of sight of other witnesses. In times of armed conflict, women may even be sold into sexual slavery by family members or spouses.

Third, women and girls, as carers in the family and community, bear the majority of the long-term effects of armed conflicts. Women can be stigmatised for bearing HIV-positive children, possibly fathered by ‘the enemy’ and sometimes because they are mistakenly identified as being responsible for the illness. This means that they are less likely to seek care and counselling for the effects of rape and the disease. Often it is women and girls who are left to care for the children who are orphaned by HIV/AIDS and armed conflicts. A combination of conflict and AIDS leaves many communities with fewer men, leaving women as the household heads with few survival strategies to care for their families.

HIV/AIDS affects the economically most productive demographic group, undermines the belief in the long-term sustainability of the economy, discourages private as well as foreign investment, and causes mortality amongst the management and highly trained business workforce. In the worst affected countries, the AIDS pandemic is likely to lead to increased domestic competition for scarce resources because of the increased costs of trying to treat the illness. Without a combined increase in foreign aid and reduction in the prices of medicines, it will be difficult to alleviate these economic tensions.

HIV/AIDS also puts strain on both the political and social fabric in the worst affected countries. HIV/AIDS differs from many other illnesses in that it is not confined to poor and weak people, but also affects the economic and political elites. HIV/AIDS impacts negatively on the potential for good governance as it is hollowing out key state institutions in the most seriously affected states, by causing the premature death and rapid turnover of civil servants, economic and scientific experts, police forces, military forces, lawyers, teachers, and even government ministers – making it much more difficult for states to govern themselves effectively or respond to a
population’s security, economic, and social needs. The AIDS pandemic is also creating millions of orphans who, alienated from society, may turn to armed or criminal gangs to satisfy their material and psychological needs. Due to the increased stress on social and political stability, increasing efforts to address HIV/AIDS is, therefore, not only necessary to meet the EU’s health and development objectives, but also its desire to strengthen global security.

**Current EU policy**

To date, the EU’s policy on HIV/AIDS has largely responded to the pandemic as a development issue and has implemented three long-term, holistic strategies for addressing it. Firstly, the European Commission’s *Health and Poverty Communication*, adopted in March 2002, commits itself to protecting the most vulnerable from poverty through support for equitable and fair health financing mechanisms. Secondly, the EU has committed 340 million Euros to the Global Fund for HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria. Thirdly, it has set up the *European Community Framework Programme for Research, Technological Development and Demonstration (FP6)*, the Sixth Framework Programme on Poverty-Related Diseases. The Programme aims to develop vaccines and drugs for treating HIV/AIDS (including funding for clinical trials) and to develop new clinical interventions against HIV/AIDS through long-term partnerships between Europe and developing countries. While these initiatives are vital, they fail to make the link with political instability and conflict as a cause and consequence of the pandemic.

The Commission *Communication on Conflict Prevention*, April 2001, does, however, include the spread of communicable diseases, including HIV/AIDS, as a cross-cutting issue for the prevention of violent conflict. Although making this connection is important, there is no analysis of the implications of this link in policy, nor any evidence in practice. This gap needs to be addressed.

ECHO (the Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office) does acknowledge HIV/AIDS as a key challenge in the context of its work and has financed humanitarian projects that specifically target HIV/AIDS. However, there is no evidence of a systematic policy or guidelines for HIV prevention for either ECHO, or crisis management missions to crisis zones that have a high HIV/AIDS prevalence.

**RECOMMENDATIONS**

The EU Should:

- Use the HIV/AIDS Conference in 2004, hosted by the Irish Presidency, to raise awareness of the crucial link between HIV/AIDS and conflict.
- Press for the implementation of EU commitments made to address HIV/AIDS as a cross-cutting issue in conflict prevention.
- Mainstream HIV/AIDS prevention and care policies into conflict prevention, humanitarian response operations, crisis management, peace support operations and post-conflict reconstruction planning and implementation.
- Develop HIV/AIDS awareness and guidelines for personnel involved in EU humanitarian response, peacekeeping, peace support operations and wider demobilization and security sector reform strategies.
- Ensure that throughout all HIV/AIDS planning, programming, and personnel training in conflict-prone zones that the gender dimensions of HIV/AIDS transmission and response are integrated.
- Include an assessment of levels of HIV prevalence amongst civilian and military populations in the European Commission’s *Check List for Root Causes of Conflict*. 
PART 3.
TACKLING WEAPONS TRANSFERS AND ORGANISED CRIME

‘Large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable. Instead Europe faces new threats which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable ... Taking these different elements together – terrorism committed to maximum violence, the availability of weapons of mass destruction, organised crime, the weakening of the state system and privatisation of force – we could be confronted with a very radical threat indeed.’


INTRODUCTION

This chapter considers how best the EU can tackle the spread of weaponry through addressing both the supply side and demand side of the problem. To be effective this requires not only well co-ordinated controls to impede the acquisition and development of weapons by states of concern or terrorist groups, but also reducing the incentive of states to try to acquire the tools of violence.

3.1. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMD)

In December 2003, the Council of the European Union adopted an EU strategy against the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, drawing on the Basic Principles already established and incorporating a developed version of the Action Plan adopted the previous June.

It concludes that the proliferation of WMD and their means of delivery, such as ballistic missiles, is a growing threat to international peace and security. The decision of Member States to use the EU as a framework for tackling their common concerns across a range of issues on WMD proliferation represents an historic breakthrough.

The key challenge facing the EU is to demonstrate that what Javier Solana refers to as, ‘effective multilateralism’ is sufficiently strong to be able to ensure compliance, and thereby to restore the international community’s confidence in the non-proliferation regime’s continued relevance. This is a necessary response to the new US preparedness to bypass the existing regime because of frustration with its failure to deal with states of concern. Consequently, if the regime is to survive as an effective instrument of non-proliferation and conflict prevention, it needs to show that it has teeth and is prepared to use them.

The new EU Security Strategy affirms the importance of non-proliferation norms through international law and multilateral organisations, such as the UN. It not only calls for the universalisation of non-proliferation agreements, but also demands that once states have become parties to treaties, they then follow through and implement the terms of those treaties through effective national measures.

The EU Security Strategy also affords welcome emphasis to the importance of tackling the demand side of proliferation through diplomacy and other instruments. In line with its similar approach towards conflict prevention, the EU appreciates that if it can reduce the motivation for weapons acquisition through preventing and resolving crises and conflicts, this will enormously ease the task of preventing weapon proliferation. Hence, its commitment to ‘address the root causes of instability including through pursuing and enhancing its efforts in the areas of political conflicts, development assistance, reduction of...
poverty, and promotion of human rights’, and its recognition that ‘the more secure countries feel, the more likely they are to abandon programmes: disarmament measures can lead to a virtuous circle just as weapons programmes can lead to an arms race’.

The EU Security Strategy does acknowledge that there may be circumstances in which the use of force might be necessary. Nevertheless, this is placed firmly in the context of respecting international law and supporting the UN system. This is critical as it delineates between the US unilateralist approach and the more multilateralist approach adopted by many EU governments.

Making multilateralism work effectively boils down to ‘political will’. The Security Strategy highlights the areas where Member States feel they can commit political capital to move the non-proliferation agenda forward in a co-ordinated manner: The challenge for the Irish and Dutch Presidencies in 2004 will be to begin to translate words into action.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The EU should:

- Develop an ‘Internal EU Framework and Strategy on WMD’ to reduce the risk of proliferation that an enlarged EU might bring. This should address a range of issues such as developing dual-use regulations, export controls, peer review mechanisms, border controls, and national legislation, but also build upon cooperative agreements already concluded such as the EURATOM\(^{61}\) model.
- Develop the EU as a force-multiplier in multilateral action that focuses upon analysing existing instruments and regimes and suggesting ways in which an open EU caucus might work as an engine to make these instruments and regimes stronger, universal, and more effective.
- Develop an EU Strategy in External Relations that encourages third states to apply EU internal standards (national legislation, border controls, export controls and so on) for addressing non-proliferation - including linking these efforts to addressing the demand side of the equation - as well as demanding greater calibration with its external support for multilateral regimes. This approach would be incorporated into the EU’s external political dialogue and trade agreements and would be backed up by the full weight of economic and diplomatic sanctions and underwritten by a credible military response.

3.2. EXPORT CONTROLS ON CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS\(^{62}\)

As many of its states are large arms exporters the EU has a particular responsibility to develop effective arms export controls. It is to be welcomed that for a number of years EU Member States have been among the international leaders on conventional arms export controls, both in terms of introducing the ground-breaking EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports (EU Code) and through a series of broader initiatives. Over the last year; EU Member States have continued to be involved in promoting stronger international export controls through a range of activities including: a joint Swiss and French Marking and Tracing initiative; a joint French and Dutch initiative regarding ammunition stockpile security

\(^{61}\) European Atomic Energy Community.

\(^{62}\) All arms on the ‘EU List of Common Military Equipment’.
in the OSCE area; an initiative by the Netherlands (in co-operation with Norway) on developing controls on arms brokering; the UK-led Transfer Controls Initiative on building international consensus on export licensing standards, and a Swedish initiative on strengthening co-operation on export controls between the Nordic and Baltic states.

However, Member States continue to authorise the transfer of arms that are likely to be used in contravention of the criteria of the EU Code, and which may be increasing the risks of conflict. There are also significant discrepancies in the implementation of the export criteria by different Member States. Reasons for this include ambiguities in the criteria that allow for different interpretations and weaknesses in the operative provisions.

It is therefore welcome that, as the EU Code approaches its seventh year of operation, Member States have announced their intention to review the Code. This review will provide the ideal opportunity to tighten the existing provisions of the EU Code and to tackle a number of issues, which outside observers have identified as loopholes and which the EU Code does not address at all.

Effectively controlling European arms brokers is a particularly urgent challenge. Arms brokers often arrange weapons transfers to conflict areas, particularly in Africa, and there is increasing evidence that they play a role in supplying arms to terrorist organisations. Comprehensive controls on brokers should be a vital part of international efforts to prevent violent conflict and to combat organised crime and terrorism. Arms brokering has been high on the political agenda in the EU. In June 2003, the EU Council adopted a Common Position (CP) on the Control of Arms Brokering. This was a welcome step, but the Common Position falls short in a number of areas (see below).

There is a real opportunity to move forward on the issue of brokering during the Irish and Dutch Presidencies. The Irish government has stated its intention to take the review forward and to follow up implementation of the CP on arms brokering. The Dutch government is already considering a number of possible changes to the EU Code including: a commitment only to supply small arms and light weapons (SALW) to governments; broadening the definition of export license to take into account transit and brokering, and looking at the present status of the EU Code.

The potential for future progress on export controls within the EU may be complicated by the Union’s expansion. In addition to the purely procedural complication of requiring consensus among 25, rather than 15 members, there are real concerns about the capacity and inclination of some new Member States to further affect change. Following the end of the Cold War, Central and Eastern Europe gained a reputation as both a key source of, and transit route for, substantial quantities of weapons, particularly SALW, destined for regions of conflict and human rights crisis zones.

Considerable progress had been made among accession countries in recent years in modernising export control regimes, and indeed legislation in some accession countries.

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63 In August 2003, UK citizen Helmant Lakhani was arrested in the USA for allegedly arranging the transfer of a shoulder fired missile into the USA; for use in terrorist activities. Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor notes that 150,000 shoulder fired missiles are in the hands of unauthorised parties. Some are available on the illicit arms market for $1000. Jane’s further estimates that 27 militia groups and terrorist organisations own shoulder fired missiles. ‘Portable missiles: the ultimate terror threat’, AL J.Venter October 2003.


65 Arms export controls in an enlarged EU - An international conference organised by European NGOs in association with the Irish Government, 12 December 2003, Dublin.
Estonia and Poland are, for example, in many respects, in advance of most current Member States. However, more needs to be done to improve enforcement practice and to strengthen the capacity of government agencies to implement the new provisions. There is an urgent need to increase public access to information about arms exports, and there are doubts over the commitment, in some cases, to the criteria of the EU Code, especially where there are issues of economic hardship at stake.

Yet while it might be expected that existing Member States would be at the forefront of efforts to bring accession countries’ practices into line with EU norms, the level of engagement has been disappointing, with a number of accession countries claiming that they have received more assistance from the US than the EU. Member States must increase their efforts among accession and candidate countries to help them to gain a clear understanding of the commitments of the EU Code and to implement the Code’s provisions.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The EU should:

• Clarify the language of the EU Code criteria so as to reduce the latitude for interpretation and thereby increase harmonisation of export licensing decisions across Member States.
• Strengthen the Common Position on Arms Brokering by introducing an obligation for Member States to assert comprehensive extra-territorial jurisdiction over the arms brokering activities of their citizens and through the mandatory setting up of arms brokering registers.
• Improve end-use certification requirements and develop mechanisms for systematic end-use monitoring, with provision for far greater co-operation among Member States in this area.
• Introduce an obligation on all Member States to publish an annual report on their arms exports, to an agreed minimum standard.
• Work with accession countries and other key countries like Russia, to improve information exchange and implement effective controls on arms exports, illicit trafficking and weapons transiting throughout the region.

3.3. SMALL ARMS

While WMD are understandably at the top of the international agenda, small arms and light weapons (SALW) continue to be the main weapons of choice in the vast majority of conflicts around the globe. In order to address the causes of violent conflict and prevent weapons getting into the hands of terrorists, the EU must strengthen action to combat the spread of SALW.

The illicit trafficking, proliferation and misuse of SALW are a major source of insecurity and human suffering. It is widely accepted that the availability of SALW exacerbates violence and conflict and increases their lethality. As well as the humanitarian impact and social and economic costs of the spread of these weapons, the recent threats to civil aviation from shoulder-fired missiles shows that SALW are now important instruments for terrorist activities.

In July 2003, the UN held a review conference of the 2001 UN Programme of Action (PoA) on the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All its Aspects, to look at implementation of the leading global agreement to tackle small arms. One of the main
challenges to effective implementation that was identified, is the lack of capacity to address the small arms problem in many conflict regions. Political and legal regional agreements to tackle small arms are now in place in South Eastern Europe, Latin America, and West, Southern and Eastern Africa. These commit governments to strengthen legislation, increase police co-operation to combat illicit trafficking, control government stockpiles, and address the wider justice and development issues fuelling the demand for arms. Yet much financial and technical assistance is needed to enable the effective implementation of these measures.

A number of EU Member States have now established funds to support programmes to combat the proliferation of small arms. But the co-ordination between donor governments is poor; with EU Member States sometimes supporting overlapping projects in the same region. There is also still a lack of understanding in many development agencies as to why tackling the spread of small arms is a development issue. This problem is being overcome in some agencies, and in a welcome move last year the European Commission agreed to support the implementation of a national action plan for arms management and disarmament in Tanzania. It is hoped that this leads to further EC support for small arms projects.

If donor support for combating the spread of small arms is to be sustainable, however; the real challenge for EU Member States and the Commission is to integrate it into their broader development and governance programmes. The currency of small arms as a ‘stand alone’ issue is likely to fade and it is important that it is now mainstreamed into development assistance. This will require more research to convince sceptics that tackling the spread of small arms can help reduce poverty, and to increase understanding of how development programmes can be targeted to reduce the demand for weapons.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The EU should:

• Co-ordinate assistance to support the implementation of regional and sub-regional arms initiatives through the Council Working Group, CODUN.66
• Target support for the development and implementation of national action plans to reduce the proliferation of small arms and implement the UN PoA.
• Integrate support for measures to combat the spread of small arms into mainstream development and governance-assistance programmes.
• Improve information exchange and co-ordination amongst donor agencies and other institutions that provide assistance to small arms control programmes.

3.4. ORGANISED CRIME

Organised criminal groups have benefited from conflict and post-conflict situations in South East Europe and further afield, presenting serious social, political and economic problems across the EU. The Europol 2002 Annual Report estimates that the number of organised crime networks operating in the present Member States rose from 3,000 to 4,000 in 2002-2003.67 Europol has warned that the trend is likely to continue following the enlargement of the EU, when criminal groups will have the ability to move freely.

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66 Working Party on Global Disarmament and Arms Control (CODUN)
through 25 states in the EU and use cross-border contacts with neighbouring countries to smuggle arms, drugs and people. It is vital, therefore, that the EU works to deepen cooperation to combat organised crime both with accession countries and their neighbours.

The Thessaloniki Agenda, agreed at the EU-Western Balkans summit in June 2003, provides significant impetus for increased collaboration between the regions where it was agreed that the EU Policy of Stabilisation and Association constitutes the framework for eventual accession of the Western Balkans countries. Within this framework, countries will make further progress in consolidating peace and stability, developing their economies, and fighting organised crime and corruption. The EU welcomed the submission of Records of Achievements\(^\text{68}\) by each of the Western Balkan countries, which represent a strong signal of the region's commitment to take ownership of the fight against organised crime. The challenge remains that of implementation, and many of the countries are struggling to strengthen their legal systems, improve police capacity and control border management.

Europol has also made some important steps, including the signing of a number of cooperation agreements to help tackle organised crime, notably with Estonia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and more recently with Russia and Romania. The agreements provide for the exchange of information including personal data in the fields of illicit trafficking, illegal immigration, terrorism and financial crime.

To realise effectively the commitments made to combat organised crime, key challenges still need to be overcome in the areas of co-ordination between law enforcement agencies, harmonisation of legislation and increased resources. In addition, more attention needs to be paid to addressing the links between arms trafficking and organised crime. Weapons enable and protect criminal gangs, and evidence from Member States' intelligence agencies suggests that greater numbers of weapons are entering EU countries, thereby helping to increase levels of gun violence.\(^\text{69}\) Despite this, controlling arms trafficking is not listed in the Europol mandate as one of the key law enforcement activities in the EU. However, both the Stability Pact and the South Eastern Europe Co-operation Initiative (SECI) Regional Centre for Combating Transborder Crime have made small arms and light weapons a priority. Acting as a regional focal point for communication and transmission of cross-border crime, the SECI Centre has co-ordinated information exchanges on seizures of illicit small arms and light weapons in South Eastern Europe.\(^\text{70}\) It is important that the EU works with this type of initiative to help support capacity-building on all aspects of organised crime.

In pursuing law enforcement strategies, care must be taken to avoid the potential threat to civil liberties and human rights that these approaches can bring. Furthermore, law enforcement alone cannot prevent organised crime. The November 2003 conference in Dublin on 'Tackling organised crime in partnership', focused on how public/private partnerships might play their part, emphasising that 'the whole of society has a stake in preventing the advance and infiltration of organised crime'. In order to achieve this, the conference highlighted the need for incorporating preventive aspects and the development of national prevention programmes. The need to identify common priorities in the Union's international and national prevention policies was also raised.

\(^{68}\) A recommendation from the London Conference on 'Defeating organised crime in South East Europe', November 2002.

\(^{69}\) For example, UK National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) threat assessment 2002.

\(^{70}\) For example, an investigation initiated in Hungary in 2003 led to a parallel investigation in four other countries.
RECOMMENDATIONS

The EU should:

- Help further develop the capacity of law enforcement agencies and regional organisations in Eastern Europe – both associate states and neighbouring countries in South Eastern Europe – in order to help states combat criminal activity.
- Encourage co-operation agreements between Europol and those Eastern European states that have not yet done so (e.g., Belarus).
- Increase resources to improve the co-ordination and information exchange between agencies and states involved in efforts to combat organised crime.
- Prioritise the problem and implications of small arms flows as they relate to organised crime.
- Develop national organised crime prevention programmes within EU States by establishing partnerships between law enforcement agencies, the private sector and wider civil society.
CHAPTER 4.

ENGAGING CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENT CONFLICT

‘I urge NGOs with an interest in conflict prevention to organise an international conference of local, national and international NGOs on their role in conflict prevention and future interaction with the United Nations in this field.’


‘Co-operation with other actors and with stakeholders in a conflict situation is needed in order to achieve sustainable processes and a high degree of ownership.’


INTRODUCTION

It is now recognised that the state alone cannot prevent or resolve conflict. As outlined in this paper, the root causes of violent conflict are complex and cross-cutting. They cannot be effectively tackled without developing partnerships among governments, regional organisations and civil society groups.

This chapter addresses what role civil society can play in preventing armed conflict, and assesses how it is achieving this through EU frameworks of engagement, including the EU-ACP Cotonou Agreement, the EU-Africa dialogue process via the Africa Union and NEPAD and the Stability Pact for South East Europe.

FIGURE 4.1

A GLOBAL APPROACH TO THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN CONFLICT PREVENTION

Following the UN Secretary General’s call to action, the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict programme was established to enhance the role of civil society in developing effective action in conflict prevention, and to strengthen civil society relationships with the UN and regional organisations such as the EU.

To do so, the programme aims at developing a common platform involving civil society organisations from the local to the global level. To ensure that the platform is inclusive, the programme is organising regional conferences and developing action agendas that will feed into an international agenda for non-violent solutions to conflict. At the moment, preparatory processes have started in 15 regions. In Europe, a European Regional Conference will be held in March 2004 in Dublin during the Irish presidency of the EU. Civil society organisations from Western Europe will discuss and define the European regional action agenda in which common goals and strategies will be identified to encourage EU Member States to better implement conflict prevention and peacebuilding in their policies.

The European regional stage of the Global Partnership is a welcome opportunity for civil society to enhance its capacity to promote conflict prevention and peacebuilding at the EU level.

The European Centre for Conflict Prevention (ECCP) holds the secretariat of the Global Partnership for the Prevention of Armed Conflict (www.conflict-prevention.net and www.conflictprevention-dialogue.org)
4.1. THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

Civil society organisations are often viewed simply as service delivery agencies, whose role is to act at the grassroots level to supply populations with those basic services that the state is failing to provide. However, the EU and UN have both acknowledged that civil society has a role to play in preventing armed conflict. Civil society can play a variety of roles at the local, national, sub-regional and regional levels including the following.71

- **Holding governments and regional organisations to account by providing oversight and monitoring.** In West Africa, for example, a civil society monitoring mechanism has been established to complement and interface with ECOWAS.72

- **Early warning.** Civil society in unstable, pre-conflict situations can be a valuable source of information. For example, field-based monitoring results in the Caucasus on the root causes of terrorism are being fed into national ‘Strategic Roundtable’ processes in order to formulate response strategies to conflicts at the local, regional and international levels.73

- **Exercising influence on warring parties, and fostering dialogue and confidence-building between them and other actors in the conflict.** Civil society often has more access to these groups, and can avoid diplomatic hurdles faced by governments.

- **Mediating conflicts.** There are many positive examples of civil society organisations playing an important role in encouraging conflicting parties to negotiate. The Mano River Women’s Network was, for example, able to organise the first Heads of State meeting between the three countries involved in the sub-regional conflict.

- **Raising awareness.** The media can play a critical role in both exacerbating and mitigating war. Wider civil society organisations (including conflict-sensitive media) can counteract this by raising awareness of the true nature of a conflict, thereby consolidating peace (eg the success of Burundi’s independent radio).

- **Capacity-building.** Civil society is weak or virtually non-existent in many parts of the world. Areas or regions that have more vibrant civil society organisations can assist others via effective networks, workshops, seminars and training. Civil society can also help build the capacity of government structures. Community-based policing in Kenya, for example, aims to foster a culture of co-operation and trust between the Kenyan police force, local authorities and communities74.

- **Promoting democracy at all levels.** Civil society’s advantage is that it can work towards long-term solutions. It can provide, for example, expertise and advice, and broaden debates to prepare the ground for elections (locally and nationally), and it can support parliamentary assemblies. Civil society can also encourage democratisation by assisting with the implementation of demobilisation and decriminalisation, as is the case in Moldova.

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71 Many of these observations are drawn from the report of the Rome Conference on ‘EU conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa’, 2003, attended by African civil society organisations and key AU and EU officials. http://www.international-alert.org/pdf/pubdev/euafricarome.pdf
73 See http://www.ewfewer.org/regions/caucasus_22.html for more information on early warning in the Caucasus.
74 In Kenya, Saferworld and Security Research Information Centre (SRIC), in association with the Kenya Institute of Administration (KIA) and the Kenyan Police, are developing a pilot community-based policing project in two districts of Kenya (see www.saferworld.org.uk)
• Policy development. Civil society can and has assisted with policy development, nationally, sub-regionally, regionally and internationally. For example, the South African NGO SaferAfrica is playing an important role in the development and implementation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) peace and security priorities.

4.2. CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT IN THE EU-ACP COTONOU AGREEMENT

The EU-ACP Partnership Agreement (Cotonou Agreement) provides a new innovation in the EU’s engagement with African, Caribbean and Pacific civil society organisations on aid and trade issues. This agreement stipulates the importance of prioritising conflict prevention and requires the EU and national governments to consult with non-state actors (including civil society) in all policy development and programming within the Cotonou framework.

Despite positively recognising the role of non-state actors (NSAs), the Cotonou Agreement does not provide mechanisms or structures to ensure participation. However, progress has been made with establishing guidelines and processes for the EU – in particular Commission Delegations, to engage with NSAs. In some countries, such as Kenya and Ethiopia, one member of each delegation has been officially charged with being responsible for NSA relations and civil society organisations have made progress in organising themselves into platforms, committees or networks to maximise consultation opportunities with the EU. Hopefully, this experience will provide some valuable lessons for other delegations on how to ensure consistent engagement with civil society (see Figure 4.2.).

The upcoming mid-term reviews of the implementation of Cotonou to date will present an important opportunity to evaluate the engagement of civil society organisations in the planning and implementation of development programmes.

On the global level, the ACP Civil Society Forum has also been set up with the aim of bringing together all the ACP national and regional networks in order to better coordinate and advocate on Cotonou issues. To date, peace and security issues have not featured prominently on the agenda. However, this forum could be usefully applied to advancing a conflict prevention agenda.

FIGURE 4.2

CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT IN KENYA: AN EXAMPLE OF GOOD PRACTICE

Elizabeth Mutunga, Africa Peace Forum, Kenya

In 2003, the Kenya Civil Society Alliance was formed to effectively co-ordinate civil society engagement in the implementation of the Cotonou Agreement. The body links civil society groups and the key players of the Cotonou Agreement: the Government of Kenya represented by the National Authorising Officer (often a country’s finance Minister), the EU represented by the Head of the Delegation, and the private sector. Whilst the council of the Alliance has yet to be formalised (this is likely to take place after a mapping exercise to ensure Kenya’s wide range of civil society organisations are effectively represented), the interim council of volunteers have already undertaken a number of activities including:

- Awareness-raising workshops on the Cotonou Agreement and mid-term review process for civil society, NAOs and Delegations.
- Developing criteria for the Kenya civil society mapping process, to be shared with the Delegation.
- Regular engagement with the NAO, for example, to discuss mid-term reviews.
- Forming links with parallel alliances in Uganda and Tanzania.
4.3. CIVIL SOCIETY’S ROLE IN THE AFRICA UNION AND NEPAD

On the pan-African level, the ongoing development and institutionalisation of the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) provides many opportunities for the EU to support civil society involvement in peace and security issues. Although the NEPAD framework has, to date, been regarded by African civil society as too focused on heads of state level, the NEPAD Secretariat undertook a consultation process with civil society in 2003. At the first of these consultations, known as the NEPAD Civil Society Forum, peace and conflict resolution was articulated as a particular priority area for civil society involvement. However, these processes still seem to be marginal to the mainstream development of the NEPAD initiatives and the EU. As a key supporting partner on its own, but also through multilateral forums such as the G8 and OECD-DAC, the EU should encourage more broad-based and institutionalised civil society involvement.

The African Union has made substantive progress towards establishing institutions that can serve as interlocutors to the EU. The Peace and Security Council, the Pan African Parliament, and the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights will all be launched in 2004, following the required number of ratifications of the relevant protocols. Together with the AU Peace Fund, to which the EU has already contributed, these institutions should enhance Africa’s capacity to respond to crises on the continent. To realise their full potential and work towards sustained conflict prevention responses, however, these institutions require the full engagement of civil society.

Oversight
Civil society involvement in the AU has the potential to be far-reaching with the further development of the Conference on Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA) and the Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC). The CSSDCA actually came into being in 1990 but has only now been taken up in the main structure of the African Union. It is mandated to serve as a policy development forum; as a bridge with civil society and link with African diaspora, and also to monitor and evaluate the activities of the African Union. This is a very strong mandate, and EU support can prove crucial in ensuring that these aims are implemented. ECOSOCC is intended to be an advisory body, consisting of social and professional groups of the member states of the Union.

Building networks
On the level of regional or sub-regional networks, not much has been done in terms of formalising civil society participation in peace and security issues. Nevertheless, on the sub-regional and national level, civil society has done much to set up networks working on these issues, for instance, the Coalition for Peace in Africa (COPA), the Peace Tree Network, the Peace and Development Network and the Network of African Peacebuilders. A major innovation in the Horn of Africa has been the establishment of the Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism (CEWARN) that is situated within the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and is mainly implemented by civil society. The recently launched West Africa Civil Society Forum also is an important interlocutor and complement to the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
4.4. CIVIL SOCIETY ENGAGEMENT IN SOUTH EASTERN EUROPE: CONTROLLING SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS

The Stability Pact provides a clear framework for civil society engagement in South Eastern Europe. In October 2000, participating states in the Stability Pact and interested parties signed the Stability Pact Declaration on NGO-Government Partnership in South Eastern Europe. This notes that NGOs and civic initiatives play a key role in the process of democratisation, peacebuilding, promotion and protection of human rights, and cross-border co-operation. In addition, civil society is also engaged in the Stability Pact's subgroup on Defence and Security, for example, through the Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) task force.

The South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of SALW (SEESAC) is a joint initiative between UNDP and the Stability Pact. In order to fulfil its mission SEESAC continually liaises and consults with civil society organisations. Civil society organisations can play an important role in key areas, whether as implementers of national SALW surveys, as partners in awareness raising efforts, or as independent monitors of governmental actions (e.g., in weapons collection and destruction, or export controls).

In some thematic areas, the Clearinghouse provides direct support to civil society organisations, offering training on SALW issues to NGOs and journalists working with other specialist NGOs, like Saferworld. However, in a region where civil society itself remains in transition, traditional attitudes often do not favour meaningful involvement in SALW control projects, or in the wider security sector. Much headway has been made in just a few years in changing these attitudes. The initial challenges are gradually being overcome and a more co-operative, yet practical, operationally-based approach to SALW control initiatives has developed within the region.

However, there is not a long tradition of close co-operation between governments and civil society in the region and this needs to be overcome. It is also important that the EU, through the Stability Pact, continues to support capacity-building of local NGOs so that they can more effectively engage in the political processes by developing skills and building networks.

4.5. WAYS FORWARD

The EU has clearly begun to implement its commitments to engaging civil society in peace and security initiatives. The challenge is to implement this in a more coherent manner. One way might be the formal acknowledgement of the role of civil society in political dialogues, for example, the EU-Africa dialogue. The UN Conference in 2005 (see Figure 4.1) may also go some way towards encouraging this, by further raising awareness of the role civil society can play at a global level.

It is clear from the examples given above that civil society is not equally strong in all parts of the world. In parts of Africa, such as areas of the Horn and West Africa, it has developed into a vibrant force, while in other regions, such as parts of the Great Lakes, it is either weak or absent altogether. Similarly, in Eastern Europe civil society remains weak and unco-ordinated. The EU could play a greater role in supporting the active participation of civil society in the development and implementation of conflict prevention policy and programmes and in developing civil society networks through its various budget

75 The Stability Pact was created at the EU’s initiative in 1999, “to foster peace, democracy, respect for human rights, and economic prosperity in order to achieve stability in the whole region” (www.stabilitypact.org).
Northern NGOs have a role to play in assisting with this process. For example, the ‘Trialog Network’ (largely funded by the Commission), aims to raise awareness of development policies in the enlarged EU by developing partnerships between the development NGOs in accession countries, EU NGOs and NGOs in the global South. However, while funding for civil society organisations is available for development-orientated work, civil society organisations working in the field of conflict prevention have greater difficulties accessing funds. One way of improving this would be to ensure that the European Initiative for Human Rights and Democracy (EIDHR) budget line supports specific conflict prevention activities and integrates conflict prevention as a permanent cross-cutting theme.

It is also important to recognise that civil society organisations do not always act ‘in the name of the people’. Sometimes they remain limited to a professional elite. It is important, therefore, that the EU addresses the ‘democratic deficit’, and ensures it consults with a broad range of actors. Undertaking detailed country mappings of civil society organisations is one way of achieving this, and lessons could be learned from the recent Cotonou civil society mapping process carried out in Sudan.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The EU should:

• **Consider establishing civil society co-ordinators in EU Delegations whose sole responsibility would be to ensure dialogue between civil society, the EU and host governments.** Information from these meetings would help inform country strategy papers and programming priorities. Delegations should also develop civil society mapping processes.

• **Provide political and financial support to regional attempts at institutionalising legitimate and representative civil society participation in structures such as the AU institutions and other regional or sub-regional bodies.**

• **Support the work of civil society networks (nationally, regionally or globally) on peace and security issues in order to ensure that their experiences from the ground are fed into EU policies and programming.**

• **Review the linkages between conflict prevention and development with a view to removing constraints that exist on the use of development aid for conflict prevention activities, and guarantee more flexible and transparent funding mechanisms.**

• **Integrate conflict prevention as a permanent, cross-cutting theme in the European Initiative for Human Rights and Democracy (EIDHR) budget line with specific allocated conflict prevention activities.** Ensure it is also mainstreamed so that conflict-sensitive indicators and impact assessments are implemented across different activities of the budget line.
A lack of clarity and shared European Union understanding of the definition and use of terms related to conflict prevention creates obstacles to advancing a culture of conflict sensitivity across all EU institutions, processes and sectors. The use of conflict prevention terminology in the paper does at times differ from the EU’s, often varied, application of the terms. Below are the definitions of terms used in the context of this paper.

**Civil society:** civil society exists outside the family, the market and the state. It represents citizens of society (individuals or organisations) outside the government, public administration or commercial sector who work to promote general or specific issues or interests on a not-for-profit, non-militarised basis. Civil society can include non-governmental and community-based organisations, women’s associations, youth organisations, indigenous people’s representatives, trade unions (workers’ collectives), religious organisations and the media.

**Conflict analysis:** this is the central component of conflict-sensitive practice and supports practitioners in gaining a better understanding of the context they are working in and the role they play in it. Conflict analysis is the systematic study of structures, actors and dynamics of a (potentially) violent conflict. It applies to all types of intervention – project, programme, sectoral and macro-interventions and to every stage of intervention – planning, programming, implementation, monitoring and evaluation. It can be carried out at various levels (eg local, national, regional etc) yet seeks to establish the linkages between these levels.77

**Conflict management:** efforts to contain and reduce the amount of violence used by parties in violent conflict and to engage them in a process to settle the dispute and terminate the violence.78

**Conflict prevention:** long-term activities, which aim to reduce the structural tensions or prevent the outbreak, escalation or recurrence of violence.79 The prevention of violent conflict can include the full range of activities applicable to this aim including early warning, crisis management, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, conflict management, conflict resolution and conflict transformation.

**Conflict resolution (post-conflict peacebuilding):** a process that transforms conflicts in an enduring manner rather than settling disputes or suppressing differences, by addressing basic human needs and building qualities of sustainable relationships between groups through creating structural mechanisms involving equality among identity groups, multi-culturalism and federalism as appropriate to each situation.80 This involves understanding and addressing the root causes of conflict.

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Conflict sensitivity: the ability of an organisation to understand the context in which it operates, and the interaction between the organisation’s intervention and the context in and to act upon this understanding. The objective is to avoid exacerbating violence or the potential for violence, to maximise the potential for the mitigation of violence or potential violence and to increase the effectiveness of the intervention.81

Context: this is a geographic or social environment where conflict exists and is comprised of actors, causes, profile and dynamics. The operating environment can ranges from the micro- to the macro-level (e.g. community, district/province, region(s), country, neighbouring countries).82

Crisis management: the co-ordinated and timely application of specific political, diplomatic, economic and/or security related measures and activities taken in response to a situation threatening peace. The aim of these measures is to defuse tension, prevent escalation and contribute towards an environment in which a peaceful settlement of violent conflict or potential conflict is more likely to occur.83 To be effective crisis management must be planned and implemented with its contribution and transition to longer-term conflict prevention as a key consideration.

Early warning: the systematic collection and analysis of information coming from areas of crises for the purpose of: a) anticipating the escalation of violent conflict; b) the development of strategic responses to these crises; and c) the presentation of options to critical actors for the purpose of decision-making.84

Non-state actors (NSAs): citizens of society (individuals or organisations) outside the government or public administration that work to promote general or specific issues or interests. NSAs include civil society as well as commercial, profit-making businesses and can also include non-state, militarised, rebel groups and other groups, such as mercenaries.

Peacebuilding: the employment of measures to consolidate peaceful relations and create an environment that deters the emergence or escalation of tensions, which may lead to conflict.85 The overarching goal of peacebuilding is to strengthen the capacity of societies to manage conflict without violence, as a means to achieve sustainable human security.86

Peacekeeping: common terms for various types of activity: to resolve conflict; to prevent conflict escalation; to halt or prevent military actions; to uphold law and order in a conflict zone; to conduct humanitarian actions; to restore social and political institutions whose functioning has been disrupted by the conflict; and to restore basic conditions for daily living. The distinctive features of peacekeeping are that they are conducted under a mandate from the UN or regional organisations whose functions include peace support and international security.87 Peacekeeping operations can involve both civilian and military personnel and take place with the consent of the conflicting parties.

83. EPLO, 2002 (op cit).
85. International Alert, 1995 (ibid).
86. CPCC, undated, in A Glossary on Violent Conflict (op cit.)
87. A Glossary on Violent Conflict (ibid)
APPENDIX 2. INVENTORY OF THE KEY EU INSTITUTIONS, POLICY STATEMENTS, MECHANISMS AND TOOLS RELATING TO CONFLICT PREVENTION

**The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)**, outlining the EU’s common voice on international policy came into force in 1993. **The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)**, which forms part of the CFSP, came into force in January 2003 and covers all matters relating to EU security, including the gradual formulation of a common defence policy.

### MAIN INSTITUTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Institution</th>
<th>Tasks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commission:</td>
<td>Conflict Prevention Unit, DG Relex*</td>
<td>Mainstreaming conflict prevention across the Commission (e.g. in DG Trade, DG Development, DG Environment).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>EuropeAid Co-operation Office</td>
<td>Implementing the external aid instruments of the Commission. It does not deal with humanitarian or CFSP activities but does address related issues such as development, good governance and capacity-building of civil society through, for example, the Democracy and Human Rights Unit (EIDHR) and the NGO Co-financing Unit.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council:</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee (PSC)</td>
<td>Formulating CFSP policy proposals and overseeing implementation of policies, including political control and strategic direction over all crisis management and military operations, with support from the Military Committee.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Military Committee (EUMC)</td>
<td>Responsible for military direction of all military activities with in the EU framework.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>European Union Military Staff (EUMS)</td>
<td>Performing early warning, situation assessment, and strategic planning for Petersberg tasks (see below), including identification of European national and multinational forces and implementing policies and decisions directed by the EUMC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Political-Military Group</td>
<td>Examining the politico-military aspects of all proposals within the framework of the CFSP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CiCoM)</td>
<td>Developing civilian instruments and capabilities of the EU by implementing targets and advising on the political aspects of non-military crisis management and conflict prevention.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Council Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU)</td>
<td>Monitoring and analysing political, economic, human rights and security developments and providing early warning of events or situations; producing policy recommendation to the Council and Higher Representative for CFSP.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>European Armaments, Research and Military capabilities Agency</td>
<td>Improving the EU's industrial and technological basis, promoting the re-structuring of the European defence industry, and harmonising armaments planning.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*DG Relex - Directorate General for External Relations*
KEY EU POLICY STATEMENTS

- Commission Communication on Governance and Development, October 2003
- Commission Communication on The EU-Africa Dialogue, August 2003
- Final Guidelines for Delegations on Non-State Actor (NSA) Participation in EC Development Policy, March 2003
- Communication from the Commission on The Participation of Non-State Actors in EC Development Policy, November 2002
- Implementation of the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, Seville European Council, June 2002
- Development Council Conclusions on Countries in Conflict, May 2002
- Council Conclusions on Conflict Prevention, July 2001
- EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, Gotenburg European Council, June 2001
- Development Council Conclusions on Conflict Prevention, May 2001
- Communication from the Commission on Conflict Prevention, April 2001
- Report presented by the High Representative/Commission on Improving the Coherence and Effectiveness of EU Action in the Field of Conflict Prevention, December 2000
- The European Parliament Resolution on Gender Aspects of Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding, November 2000
- Cotonou ACP-EU Aid and Trade Partnership Agreement, June 2000

MECHANISMS AND FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS

- **Political instruments.** The instruments of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) include political dialogue, including through Special Representatives and troika missions, declarations, demarches, joint actions, special envoys, and common positions.

- **Crisis management instruments.** Military personnel can be deployed as the Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) as well as civilian personnel in policing, rule of law, civil administration and civil protection. Under the ESDP, these are known as the Petersberg tasks and include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and combat-force tasks in crisis management, including peacemaking.

- **Trade co-operation.** Regional economic integration and conflict-sensitive trade frameworks are a potential tool for preventing conflicts.

- **Justice and Home Affairs instruments.** New instruments in the Justice and Home Affairs pillar (such as fight against terrorism, migration and asylum policy, etc) impact on conflict prevention.

- **Humanitarian aid.** The European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) provides humanitarian assistance in conflict and post-conflict crisis zones.

- **Development aid and agreements.** Regional aid co-operation frameworks provide funds for development and some peace and security support initiatives. These include the (with African, Caribbean and Pacific states), PHARE (with Eastern European countries Cotonou Agreement), TACIS (with the former Soviet Union and Mongolia), MEDA (with Mediterranean partners) and ALA (with Asian and Latin American countries). The Cotonou Agreement is unique in that it provides a comprehensive framework for political, development and trade co-operation and refers specifically to political dialogue and the role of non-state actors (article 8); human rights, democracy and rule of law (article 9); conflict prevention, management and resolution (article 11) and mechanisms for mediation (article 96). The European Commission also has several budget lines, such as European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), food security, and NGO co-financing, which civil society can access, to complement the Community budget.

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88 The Commission and Council are currently reviewing whether to integrate European Development Funds (EDF), the financial instrument for EU-ACP co-operation, into the broader Community budget.
TOOLS

• **Country and Regional Strategy papers (CSP/RSP).** These are programming documents, designed in collaboration with Delegations, the partner state and civil society, for allocation and implementation of external aid at the country and regional level, in which conflict prevention is systematically integrated as a ‘non-focal’ co-operation area.

• **Conflict prevention teams** can be deployed in a given country or region. A multidisciplinary team of independent experts, with horizontal competence in anthropological/historical, security, governance, development, or regional issues, assess potential conflict issues and propose a medium-term conflict prevention strategy to be integrated into planned co-operation activities (in the framework defined by the CSP/RSP).

• **Check List for Root Causes of Conflict/Early Warning Indicators.** This is a list of indicators that promotes contextual analysis and awareness within the EU decision-making forums of areas affected by potential, continued or re-emerging conflict. Those countries receiving highest scores are drawn to the attention of the General Affairs and External Relations Council through a confidential ‘watchlist’. The watchlist is a snapshot in time and subject to constant revision.

• **Regular reporting** from Delegations as a monitoring and early warning mechanism and by the Presidency, who are encouraged to produce an annual report on the progress in field of conflict prevention.
FURTHER READING

EU GENERAL:

• EU conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa, International Alert & Saferworld, in association with the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, October 2003.
• Regional approaches to conflict prevention in Africa: European support to African processes, In Brief, No. 4, ECDPM & International Alert, October 2003.
• Ensuring progress in the prevention of violent conflict: Priorities for the Greek & Italian EU Presidencies, International Alert & Saferworld, in association with EPLO, April 2003.
• ‘Outlook on Brussels’ produced in the Conflict Prevention Newsletter (twice a year), International Alert & Saferworld, with the European Platform for Conflict Prevention.

CHAPTER 1:

• Philosophy and principles of community-based policing, Saferworld & the South Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons, October 2003.

CHAPTER 2:

• Conflict, humanitarian assistance and peacebuilding: Meeting the challenges, International Alert, December 2003.

CHAPTER 3:

• Macedonia: Guns policing and ethnic division, Saferworld & Bonn International Center for Conversion, October 2003.
• Arms transit trade in the Baltic region, Saferworld, October 2003.
• Small arms control in Central and Eastern Europe, Eurasia series No. 1, Monitoring the Implementation of Small Arms Control (MISAC), International Alert, June 2003.

CHAPTER 4:

• Understanding the EU: A civil society guide to development and conflict prevention policy, Saferworld, Conflict Prevention Network, Africa Peace Forum & InterAfrica Group, June 2002.