THE EU SECURITY STRATEGY: IMPLICATIONS FOR EU CONFLICT PREVENTION

International Alert and Saferworld EU Policy Paper
This document was produced by staff of International Alert and Saferworld in early 2004. It forms a part of the organisations joint initiative aimed at enhancing the EU’s impact on conflict prevention. It compliments the annual *Presidencies Paper* on priorities for conflict prevention produced by Saferworld and International Alert in association with the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office.

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<tr>
<td>ACP</td>
<td>Africa, Caribbean and Pacific</td>
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<td>AU</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common, Foreign and Security Policy</td>
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<td>CivCom</td>
<td>Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management</td>
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<td>CSO</td>
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<td>DG DEV</td>
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<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<td>ESDP</td>
<td>European Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>ESS</td>
<td>European Security Strategy</td>
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<td>EU</td>
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<td>EUSR</td>
<td>European Union Special Representative</td>
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<td>EUPM</td>
<td>European Union Police Mission</td>
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<td>HoM</td>
<td>Head of Mission</td>
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<td>IFI</td>
<td>International Financial Institution</td>
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<td>NSA</td>
<td>Non-State Actor</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organisation</td>
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<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<td>PSC</td>
<td>Political and Security Committee</td>
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<td>PSOF</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations Facility</td>
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<td>RRM</td>
<td>Rapid Reaction Mechanism</td>
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<td>South African Development Community</td>
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<td>TNC</td>
<td>Trans-National Corporation</td>
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<td>US</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<td>UN MONUC</td>
<td>United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
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**Saferworld** is an independent non-governmental organization that works with governments and civil society internationally to research, promote and implement new strategies to increase human security and prevent armed violence.

**International Alert** is an independent non-governmental organization which analyses the cause of conflict within countries, enables mediation and dialogue to take place, and assists in the development of capacity to resolve conflict non-violently. International Alert conducts policy-orientated research and advocacy aimed at promoting sustainable peace.

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THE EU SECURITY STRATEGY: IMPLICATIONS FOR EU CONFLICT PREVENTION

INTRODUCTION

The European Security Strategy (ESS) commits the EU to using a wide range of instruments in order to prevent violent conflict. Its comprehensive nature is one of its strengths, however, greater analysis of how the EU’s “hard” and “soft” instruments will be applied during the implementation of the Strategy is needed. There is the risk that Member States will pay increasing attention to developing military aspects of the Common Foreign and Security Policy, rather than civilian, and preventive responses, without which, military engagement is counter-productive.

Saferworld and International Alert, therefore, believe it is important to analyse in more detail how the EU might make use of its soft instruments during the implementation of the Security Strategy, and how existing instruments, such as European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) operations, can be better integrated into longer-term preventive strategies.

The paper begins by assessing the Security Strategy from a conflict prevention perspective, highlighting its relationship with the EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, endorsed by the Goteborg European Council in June 2001, (known hereafter as the Goteborg Programme.) It provides practical recommendations on how conflict prevention can be better implemented via the Security Strategy over the next year and proposes that particular attention be paid to:

- Addressing state failure
- Linking crisis management with conflict prevention
- Improving EU responsiveness
- Developing a regional approach
- Strengthening effective partnerships

A review of the Goteborg Programme since June 2003 is also provided as an additional annex.

3. IMPLICATIONS FOR EU CONFLICT PREVENTION ARISING OUT OF THE EU SECURITY STRATEGY

The ESS outlines a new security environment in which the EU is a global actor seeking to build a ‘fairer, safer and more united world’. Conflict prevention is at the heart of this strategy and is explicitly set out as a strategic objective for the Union and its Member States. While there are different points of focus and gaps still remain, the ESS strongly reinforces the Goteborg Programme which commits the EU to ‘set clear political priorities for preventive actions; improve its early warning, action and policy coherence; enhance its instruments for long- and short-term prevention, and build effective partnerships for prevention’.

A conflict prevention perspective is reflected in the ESS in the following ways:

Part I. ‘Global challenges and key threats’ recognises:
- The nexus between conflict, insecurity and poverty;
- The importance of regional dimensions of conflict;
- The centrality of good governance;
- The factors that fuel violent conflict and weaken state structures (e.g. war economies and organised crime), and
- The need to tackle tools of violence (e.g. WMD).
Part II & III. ‘Strategic objectives and policy implications’ include:

- **Conflict prevention and threat prevention** – ‘Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early’ (p.7). ‘We need to act before countries around us deteriorate, when signs of proliferation are detected, and before humanitarian crises arise’ (p.11). This includes improving the sharing of intelligence about threat assessments among Member States and partners.

- Implementing a **mixture of instruments** to address threats – ‘None of the new threats is purely military; nor can be tackled by purely military means’ (p.7). This necessitates developing military and civilian capabilities, strengthening diplomatic capability and using trade and development policies as ‘powerful tools for promoting reform’ (p.10).

- Pursuing **coherence** through better co-ordination between the EU’s different instruments and capabilities, including: better co-ordination between external action and Justice and Home Affairs; better linking EU instruments with Member State activities, and pursuing coherent regional policies for addressing violent conflict (p13).

- Working with partners to promote **multilateralism** – ‘In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system’ (p. 9).

- Supporting **functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order** under ‘the fundamental framework’ of the United Nations (p.9).

- ‘Contributing to **better governance** through assistance programmes, conditionality and targeted trade’, and having the political strength to act against countries that persistently violate international norms (p.10).

- **EU Enlargement** as a means of conflict prevention.

The ESS, therefore, provides a strong framework for strengthening and implementing the Goteborg Programme. However, challenges still exist both in terms of what the strategy fails to address and in linking the analysis to the policy implications. These limitations are, in part, due to the nature of the ESS document itself, and the limited space available to address how the strategy can be implemented in practice. This paper aims to go some way to recommending practical ways forward to implement the commitments made, based on the following analysis of the ESS.

- **Linkages between the “old” and “new” threats through root cause analysis.** The ESS makes the causal link between “new” threats (terrorism, WMD, state failure, organised crime) and the “older” problems of regional conflicts (p.4). However, it does not place enough emphasis on addressing the root causes of both the new and old threats. Terrorism can, for example, have similar common root causes to violent conflict. As a result, the subsequent focus in the policy implications for countering the threats does not sufficiently address their root causes.

- **Prioritising a human security approach.** Today, violent conflict is most likely to be intra-state, involving non-state actors conducting organised violence and with civilians as the major victims. As a result, notions of security have moved beyond defence of the nation state to encompass wider concepts of human security with greater attention being paid to the security of the individual. While the ESS recognises the changed nature of the security environment, the policy implications still prioritise military responses and enhancing military capabilities over civilian and soft instruments. Where military instruments are employed, these should be consistent with an overall preventive approach, based on the coherent use of long and short-term civilian instruments (see section 3.1).
• **Responsiveness for early action.** The ESS commits to preventive engagement but does not outline how it will be realised. Instead, the ESS continues to adopt a more reactive approach to crisis and post-crisis situations. Civilian engagement, for example, is not mentioned in the context of prevention (p.12). Early warning and early action should be prioritised (see section 3.2).

• **Addressing conventional weapons.** The ESS mentions the ‘privatisation of force’ as a key element in the ‘radical threat’ confronting the EU (p.5) in recognition of the way that the increased role of non-state actors (NSAs) has influenced the changing nature of organised violence. However, the proliferation of conventional weapons, especially small arms and light weapons, which are the main weapons of choice used by NSAs, are not addressed in the policy implications.

• **Working with partners.** Under the objective for increased multilateralism, the ESS commits to strengthening partnerships with International Financial Institutions, the WTO, NATO, OSCE, regional organisations and national governments, ‘good’ and ‘bad’. However, in the policy implications for these commitments, the focus is firmly on strengthening the EU-US relationship. Though the Euro-Atlantic link is essential, it is not sufficient as a means of implementing multilateralism. Furthermore, civil society and the role of business are marginalised as partners (see section 3.4).

• **Addressing the role of natural resources in conflict.** The ESS mentions competition for natural resources and energy dependence as global challenges (p.3) as well as the role of resource revenues in fuelling conflict and weak governance (p.4). However, it fails to mention them at all in the policy implications.

• **The role of gender in conflict prevention.** Aside from one reference to women victims of the world-wide sex trade (p.5), the ESS is gender-blind. It fails to acknowledge the gender dimensions of the impacts of conflict and the needs of those affected, as well as the gendered nature of participation in decision-making in the prevention, management and resolution of conflict, including peace processes and negotiations.

• **Regional approaches to building peace.** It is important that through the ESS, the EU has recognised the regional dimensions of conflict. However, regional approaches to preventing conflict, and strengthening regional security structures and organisations are not captured in the policy implications (see section 3.3).

• **Addressing weak and failing states.** The ESS includes state failure as one of the key threats facing Europe. However, the challenge of failing states is far more complex than providing havens for terrorism. It requires clear policies and commitment for engagement in the long-term, in addition to ‘military instruments to restore order, [and] humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisis’ (p.7). Furthermore, the EU’s own position, policies and practice in relation to failing states often remains incompatible and inconsistent (e.g. on diplomatic engagement, arms brokering, trade and development policies). Therefore, this difficult and complex political challenge that is raised in the ESS needs further attention (see section 2).

Based on this analysis, the following sections aim to expand upon four issues to facilitate the implementation of commitments made in the ESS and the Goteborg Programme. The first is an appeal to expand the Programme’s commitment ‘to set clear political priorities for preventive action’ to include clear political priorities for preventive engagement with weak and failing states. The following three issues are more process-orientated to develop further some of the issues touched on in the ESS and which reflect the three other priorities in the Goteborg Programme: to enhance its instruments for long- and short-term prevention; to improve its early warning, action and policy coherence, and to build effective partnerships for prevention.
2. ADDRESSING STATE FAILURE: STRENGTHENING LAW & LEGITIMACY

The Goteborg Programme limits its commitments in support of democracy to electoral processes; the ESS expands this approach to support the broader concept of good governance and rule of law, critical for effective conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategies:

‘The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order.’

*A SECURE EUROPE IN A BETTER WORLD; EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY, DECEMBER 2003, p.10.

The ESS highlights ‘state failure’ as one of the five key threats facing Europe. This threat is, however, far more complex than the linkages between rogue states, terrorists and WMD, as is often portrayed. Underdevelopment, poverty, insecurity and regional destabilisation are causes and consequences of state failure that have far-reaching impacts on local, national and regional populations, as well as the international community. This section suggests that the EU develops a comprehensive Council Common Position or Common Strategy detailing how the EU can use its comparative advantage as a global player to fulfil its commitment to working with states characterised as ‘difficult partnerships’. Such a Common Position or Strategy should address, inter alia, the following issues:

- **Challenges of defining state failure**

  Characteristics of state failure include: Lack of legitimacy and accountability to all citizens; inequitable distribution of power, justice and resources; violations of human rights; social and economic exclusion and an inability to deliver public services by weak, non-functioning or non-existent state structures. All of these can create, exacerbate and perpetuate violent conflict. Failing states can be predatory on national and local resources at the expense of the population and promote and sustain economies of war. They can provide a haven for, and/or actively participate in, organised crime, corruption, weapons transfers and terrorist activities. They are also unable to implement international and cross-border regulatory systems necessary for the prevention of organised crime, trade in arms, drugs, people and natural resource exploitation revenues – e.g conflict diamonds and timber. Nor are they able to negotiate or deliver sustainable and productive policy agreements with national and international organisations for the benefit of all the population (e.g. private sector investment, development co-operation and trade agreements). Weak or non-functioning state structures are also unable to manage the causes and consequences of violent conflict both domestically and externally resulting in spill-over effects that can destabilise neighbouring countries and regions.

However, the term ‘state failure’ makes simplistic the complexity of the problem and the characteristics and needs of a wide spectrum of countries that are seen as weak, at risk of instability, failing or failed. The Commission Communication on Governance & Development, October 2003, makes the important distinction between ‘weak governance’ (‘where the Government makes efforts and is committed, but capacity is weak and outcomes are limited’) and ‘difficult partnerships’ (‘characterised by a lack
of commitment to good governance) (p.20). Difficult partnerships can also be characterised by state structures that are strong (i.e. repressive political and military institutions that heavily control the media, political opposition and civil society), yet lack political legitimacy. The concept of ‘good governance’, therefore, derives from both legitimacy (i.e. the perception by key segments of society that the governors are exercising state power in ways that are appropriate and just) and the capacity to provide (i.e. to have the institutional structures and processes in place, adequate domestic policies to service the basic security, economic and social needs of all citizens, and the political skills to manage internal and external relationships.)

It is not only the EU that is beginning to address some of the challenges presented by failing states. Many key multilateral institutions including the OSCE and World Bank, as well as EU Member States, such as the UK and the Netherlands, as well as the US, are also attempting to develop strategies for engagement. It is vital therefore, that the EU build upon the initial Governance and Development Communication and the work being carried out at multilateral and bilateral levels to establish a policy framework or Council Common Position/Common Strategy on EU engagement with weak and failing states.

- **Engagement with a wide range of actors.** Identifying key reformers within a failing state and seeking to enlarge their political space is vital. Non-state actors, including women, in political opposition movements, the media, civil society organisations (CSOs), business and religious entities at a sub-national, regional or international level can provide important alternative entry points. The EU should support the mobilisation of these social resources at all levels, including internationally (e.g. through diasporas). Sustained EU diplomatic engagement (e.g. through the presence of an EU Special Representative or Head of Delegation) in a weak or failing state can also help maintain engagement with this broad range of actors.

- **Private sector initiatives.** Business is an important actor that can provide alternative entry points. The EU should work with the private sector to understand and implement conflict-sensitive approaches to engagement in weak and failing states and build this into on-going corporate social responsibility initiatives. It should work with business to ensure transparency and accountability in financial reporting (e.g. through the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative), support conditions that attract greater investment flows and ensure inward investment for the development of sustainable livelihoods for local populations’ (e.g. by ensuring that the local population gains from resource exploitation rather than funding war economies) (see also section 4.3).

- **Working with neighbouring states and regional organisations.** Neighbouring states and regional organisations can have a significant impact in influencing weak and failing states. For example, Nigeria’s strong position in levering Charles Taylor out of Liberia. The EU should support and develop diplomatic relations with neighbouring states and strengthen the capacity of legitimate regional and sub-regional organisations (see section 3.3)

- **Ensuring a coherent EU policy response.** Engagement by EU and Member States with weak and failing states is sometimes inconsistent and contradictory. It is important that the EU also look inwardly on its own position and policies. This should include:
  - Tightening controls over money laundering and corruption. Western companies are sometimes complicit in corrupt practices and wealth from failing and weak states is often found in Western bank accounts.
• Tightening controls over weapons transfers and military equipment to countries in conflict by updating the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports and by strengthening the Common Position on Arms Brokering.
• Regulating European companies operating in weak and failing states, by supporting initiatives such as the Kimberly process to prevent the trade in conflict diamonds and the Commission Communication on Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) on illegal timber.
• Working with key financial institutions to develop fairer trade rules for least developed countries that do not lead to destabilising economic shocks and decline.
• Ensuring that the EU address the underlying causes of state failure by making more effective and conflict-sensitive use of its development, trade, human rights, and environmental policies.
• Ensuring that the EU, Member States and Multilateral organisations engage coherently ‘in the field’ and build local ownership and confidence between actors to ensure sustainability.

3.1. LINKING CRISIS MANAGEMENT WITH CONFLICT PREVENTION

The Goteborg Programme recognises the importance of strengthening long- and short-term prevention; the ESS recognises this and promotes greater linkages between them.

‘The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. All of these can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries.’

*A SECURE EUROPE IN A BETTER WORLD*, EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY, DECEMBER 2003, p.13

Military crisis management alone is unsustainable unless supported by civilian crisis management and linked to a longer-term, conflict prevention approach that addresses the structural causes of conflict. Significant progress has been made by the EU in the field of crisis management (see annex 1). This section aims to outline how the effective implementation the ESS and the Goteborg Programme could support a more effective, longer-term approach.

• **Joint planning and resource allocation.** Cross-pillar institutional barriers and differences in organisational culture create obstacles to joined-up planning. There is, for example, no formal system for ensuring that CivCom ¹ in the Council co-ordinates with the Conflict Prevention Unit or DG Development in the Commission, although this does take place on an informal basis. Co-ordination between institutions should be formalised to ensure that civilian crisis management operations are well informed by conflict analysis and can effectively link into longer-term country strategies and wider social and economic development initiatives. This co-ordination will be particularly important if CivCom is to become more active, as suggested by the Irish Presidency, in the planning of further ESDP operations and the development of existing operations. As important will be ensuring the pooling and sharing of financial resources (e.g. between DG Relex and CivCom) so that a comprehensive approach can be implemented.

• **Support for civilian crisis management missions.** While some 150 EU military staff are engaged in strategic planning for EU military interventions, there are only

¹ The Committee for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CivCom), which feeds into the Political and Security Committee in the Council.
some 15 staff in the Council General Secretariat involved in strategic and operational planning for civilian interventions, including the current European Union Police Mission in Bosnia and the Proxima police operation in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. The imbalance in the political and resource prioritisation of military and civilian crisis management needs to be reassessed to provide greater support for planning the civilian aspects. In addition, more resources should be made available to the Conflict Prevention Unit, in DG Relex, which currently has only two staff responsible for mainstreaming conflict prevention.

- **Joint planning on the ground.** Implementing a joined-up approach on the ground is also problematic due, in part, to the rapidly changing nature of crisis situations. To help address this, the diplomatic role of EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) should better link with crisis management interventions, and senior level civilian advisors should be integrated in military interventions. Delegations should also strengthen cooperation between themselves, and with regional organisations, to develop multi-level approaches to crisis management interventions through addressing regional and cross-border issues, such as organised crime.

- **Early diplomatic engagement.** Lack of awareness of the political sensitivities of some operations can undermine their effectiveness. Though perceived as a relatively ‘straightforward, technical’ mission, the EUPM in Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, faced obstructions a national political establishment that was reluctant to relinquish control over its police force. Early engagement by Delegations, Special Representatives and military and civilian planners with political leaders and key stakeholders in a dialogue process would help mitigate these problems.

- **Inter-institutional co-ordination.** Though the EU has shown great progress in this arena in Bosnia and Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2003, weak inter-institutional co-ordination before and during an intervention (e.g. between the UN, OSCE, AU, sub-regional organisations, and national government) still remains a challenge. Particular concerns were raised, for example, following the hand-over of Operation Artemis to UN MONUC in eastern DRC, which, by causing a temporary security vacuum, raised the risks of renewed violence. A formalised and resourced lessons learned process could support this goal, although, only if working procedures are introduced to feed those learned lessons into guidelines for future missions.

- **Local participation.** The success of a mission depends upon the perceived increase in security and well-being by the affected populations. Limited participation of local stakeholders can undermine the confidence of the local population in EU missions, as well as their longer-term sustainability. Delegations should take greater responsibility for engaging with civil society and local stakeholders for gender-sensitive conflict impact assessments and these must also inform future guidelines for missions.
3.2. ENHANCING EU EARLY WARNING & RESPONSIVENESS

Goteborg commits the EU to ‘improving early warning, action and policy coherence’. The ESS retains this commitment by stating that the EU be more ‘active, capable and coherent’. Emphasis therefore appears to have shifted towards intervention and engagement rather than more specific reference to early warning for preventative actions.

‘We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and where necessary robust intervention’.


The EU has recognised that an increased focus on early warning can help foster early preventive action. However, the EU continues to adopt a more reactive approach, putting greater effort into assisting with crisis situations and post-conflict stabilisation. In order to be more preventive, this section proposes the EU adheres to the Goteborg commitment that the Council pursue ‘coherent and comprehensive preventative strategies’ for countries or regions. This will require increased co-ordination between various parts of the Council and Commission, including the following:

- **Improving early warning analysis.** In order to enhance the Council’s annual ‘watchlist’ of countries of concern, drawn together from Member States intelligence information, the EU should strengthen and make better use of information gathered from the field. It is important that the EU Heads of Mission (HoM) gather information from a broad range of actors, such as field-based staff from the UN or OSCE, and with a broad range of civil society organisations. The EU should consider establishing Civil Society Co-ordinators to ensure that these consultations take place. This information should be used to inform both country strategy papers and the ‘watchlist’. It should also be fed into analysis by the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit (PPEWU) prepared for Council orientation debates.

- **Developing comprehensive preventative strategies.** The Council Secretariat Working Groups could be tasked with developing preventative strategies for countries on the ‘watchlist’, based on early warning information, which should then be considered by the Political and Security Committee (PSC). As appropriate, the strategies would be country specific or regional, and address the potential use of the EU’s full range of policy instruments (diplomatic, development, trade). They could also be informed by input from the Commission by increasing the number of Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM) assessment missions\(^2\) of possible European Community responses to conflict.

- **Enhancing co-ordination between Council working groups.** To ensure that these preventative strategies are comprehensive (i.e. include input from regional working groups, development, trade and crisis management groups), it is important that the working groups develop formal methods of working with each other within the constraints of the pillar system. At present the working groups tend to divide along development and political lines (reflecting the pillar structure with Pillar I dealing with trade, aid and development and the ACP countries and Pillar II, dealing with foreign policy (including Africa) and crisis management.) Discussions between the ACP and Africa working groups are consequently not always mutually reinforcing and confusion can develop over which group takes the lead on certain issues. Formalising this co-ordination between working groups (e.g. holding joint meetings to develop preventative strategies) requires institutional impetus. This might be

\(^2\) Previous Assessment mission have included Nepal, Indonesia South Pacific, Sri Lanka
achieved if the financial resources for these strategies are pooled (e.g. pooling funds from CFSP and Development budget lines - see section 3.1.).

- **Strengthening the RRM’s preventative capacity.** Since becoming operational in 2001, the RRM has played a useful role in helping to improve the EU’s response to countries ‘undergoing crisis or moving towards crisis’. Despite broadening its scope to include conflict prevention and the fight against terrorism, its attentions remain more heavily focused on post-conflict stabilisation. It is also important that the RRM’s role in fighting terrorism does not result in a decrease in spending in other priority areas. In order to strengthen its role in conflict prevention, the RRM should consider expanding its number of assessment missions (in co-ordination with the above-mentioned preventive strategies and the development of country strategy papers). The RRM should also increase efforts to fund specific conflict prevention and mitigation programmes (as happened in Indonesia and Nepal) recognising that whilst rapid funding is necessary to start the programmes, they should be sustained by integration into mainstream development programmes.

### 3.3. DEVELOPING A REGIONAL APPROACH

| The ESS places greater emphasis on the threat posed by regional conflict than Goteborg, however, measures to address regional conflicts are not sufficiently addressed in the ESS’s policy commitments. |
| Problems are rarely solved on a single country basis, or without regional support. |
| ‘A SECURE EUROPE IN A BETTER WORLD’: EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY, p.13. |

Conflicts generally have regional ramifications, which increasingly have a global reach. It is therefore important that the EU addresses how it might best use its instruments to ensure that it develops more effective regional approaches. This section proposes the establishment of a greater number of regional special representatives and developing the conflict prevention capacities of regional and sub-regional organisations as well as the development of better ‘field co-operation’ and co-ordination with multilateral partners such as the UN. The focus is largely on Africa, but could be adapted and applied to other regions as well.

- **Appointing regional EU special representatives.** Too often a lack of political cohesion in regional affairs has acted as a brake on regional solutions to conflict (as demonstrated vividly in the Great Lakes region of Africa). EU special representatives have proven to be valuable actors as regional peacebuilders. The appointment of an EUSR for the Southern Caucasus is welcome, and the establishment of EUSRs for other conflict-prone regions of the world should be encouraged. The appointment of EU special representatives covering wider regions and regional processes such as Sub-Saharan Africa or South Asia could also be considered. These might be based, for example, in the headquarters of the African Union (AU), or at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

- **Enhancing the capacity of regional organisations.** The EU should strengthen its support for the development of conflict prevention mechanisms within regional and sub-regional organisations. This could, for example, include the transfer and absorption of skills and experience within African organisations and the funding of

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3 For example, in 2002 only five out of a total budget of 23 million Euros was spent on peacebuilding and conflict mitigation, with far larger proportions going to stabilisation in Afghanistan and reconstruction in Palestine

4 In 2002, for example, 5.95 million Euros were spent on Afghanistan compared to 2.60 million Euros on peacebuilding in the Horn of Africa (Op cit).
staff training. Currently, the capacities of regional and sub-regional organisations differ hugely and relations between them are complicated by overlapping memberships and duplications in functions and capacities. Efforts being made by the AU to harmonise some of the roles and policies of regional organisations should, therefore, be supported. It should also be noted that regional organisations do not exist in all regions, and, even where they do exist, do not always have the capacity and legitimacy to positively impact on regional peace and development. The EU and regional organisations must, therefore, take a broader regional view that incorporates building constituencies for regional conflict prevention with all stakeholders including civil society, local and multinational business and parliaments.

- **Strengthening regional initiatives.** It is also important that the EU actively continues to strengthen regional initiatives. In the African context, this can be include, amongst others:
  - Continental peace and development institutions (e.g. the Peer Review System in NEPAD and the Africa Union Peace Support Operation Facility),
  - Regional economic, trade and political organisations [e.g. the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), South African Development Community (SADC), or The Inter Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)]
  - Regional parliamentary organisations (e.g. The Great Lakes Parliamentary Forum on Peace, AMANI), and
  - Regional/sub-regional CSO forums (e.g. the Mano River Women's Peace Forum).

- **Enhancing field co-operation with the UN.** The AU has requested the EU support the development of a Peace Support Operations Facility (PSOF) in Africa. It is likely that both the EU and UN will be involved in training the African standby forces and will take part to varying degrees, in some of the initial missions. The EU and UN can also help to ensure that the PSOF becomes more than simply a standby force. The EU could, for example, offer advice to the AU on training for civilian crisis management and in linking crisis interventions with longer-term peacebuilding and development strategies, while ensuring that these are linked with other African regional bodies. It is, therefore, important that the progress being made with EU-UN co-operation at a policy level in Brussels/New York is complemented by developing more joint training exercises and in-field co-operation between the EU and UN (e.g. between EUSRs, Heads of Delegation and UN representatives).
3.4 STRENGTHENING EFFECTIVE PARTNERSHIPS

Goteborg commits the EU to developing co-operation and partnerships; the ESS reinforces this multilateralist approach but places greater emphasis on working with the US and Russia and developing ‘strategic partnerships’ with certain countries, including China, Canada, India and Japan.

‘We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral co-operation in international organisations and through partnerships with key actors’

A SECURE EUROPE IN A BETTER WORLD: EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY, p.13

Whilst the ESS makes explicit mention of the need for multilateral co-operation between international organisations and key actors (e.g. US and Russia), complex international security challenges require much greater co-operation with a wider range of organisations including civil society, international financial institutions and the private sector.

- **Civil society.** The EU has recognised that civil society can play an important role in preventing armed conflict, as stated in the EU-ACP Cotonou Partnership Agreement. However, the EU could play a greater role in supporting the active participation of civil society. It could, for example, enhance consultation with civil society actors through establishing Civil Society Co-ordinators in Delegations (see section 3.2). The EU could also assist with developing civil society networks through political dialogue (e.g. encouraging African governments to recognise the role of civil society) and through the provision of resources to local NGOs via EC Delegations. Northern NGOs also have a role to play in assisting with the development of North-South dialogues.

- **Private sector.** Although the nature and behaviour of foreign investing companies has been identified as a significant factor in many conflicts, little progress has been made by governments or multilateral organisations in systematically engaging companies in conflict prevention. The EU should support existing standards and guidelines for European companies operating in conflict-prone zones, including the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights; the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative; the UN Norms on Responsibilities of Trans National Corporations (TNCs), and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. The European Investment Bank and the EU-ACP PROINVEST programme should incorporate conflict impact assessments on lending decisions. In addition, dialogues should be established between EU bodies, Governments and the private sector to develop longer term plans for conflict-sensitive engagement (see also section 2).

- **International Financial Institutions.** The ESS states that ‘diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies should follow the same agenda’. Greater efforts, therefore, need to be made in co-operation between the EU and international financial institutions, such as the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, as well as the World Trade Organisation, to encourage conflict-sensitive development and trade policies. The EU should, for example, act to ensure a successful completion and implementation of the Doha Development Agenda, and work with the WTO to obtain greater flexibility, and undertake conflict impact assessments for regional trade agreements (such as ACP-EU Economic Partnership Agreements) involving least developed countries.
4. CONCLUSIONS

To be more active the EU should:

- Improve its early warning analysis by ensuring that greater information ‘from the field’ is used to support Member States intelligence gathering and fed into the annual ‘watchlist’ of countries of concern.
- Task the Council working groups with developing ‘preventive country and regional strategies’ based on early warning information (and the annual watchlist) to feed into the Political and Security Committee (PSC). The preventive strategies should also be used to inform country strategy papers.
- Strengthen the RRM’s ability to prevent conflict, rather than respond during and after crisis situations, by increasing the number of RRM Assessment Missions 5, which should be developed in co-ordination with the Council’s preventive strategies.
- Develop a Council Common Position or Common Strategy to establish a policy framework for engagement with weak and failing states.

To be more capable the EU should:

- Develop joined-up planning between military and civilian crisis management institutions for ESDP operations and ensure greater civilian and military co-ordination takes place in the field (e.g. by integrating senior level civilian peacebuilding advisors into military interventions).
- Provide greater mission support for planning the civilian aspects of crisis management and better link up the diplomatic role of EUSRs with crisis management interventions.
- Strengthen inter-institutional co-ordination with multilateral and regional organisations during the planning phase and ‘in the field’ (e.g. by developing joint EU UN training exercises).
- Task Delegations to undertake gender-sensitive conflict impact assessments with civil society and local stakeholders affected by conflict, and ensure that lessons learned inform planning and future guidelines for missions and EU interventions.

To be more coherent the EU should:

- Ensure civilian instruments are prioritised in the prevention and response to crises and that military instruments are consistent with an overall preventive approach, based on the coherent use of short- and long-term EU instruments.
- Operationalise joint planning through ‘pooling’ financial resources for preventative strategies.
- Enhance co-ordination between the different regional (e.g. Africa) and thematic (e.g. crisis management, development) council working groups in order to develop coherent preventative strategies.
- Ensure a coherent EU policy response (e.g. by strengthening and complying with EU arms control treaties, tightening money controls on laundering and setting standards to monitor Western companies involved in natural resource extraction).
- Provide more resources to the Conflict Prevention Unit in the Commission for mainstreaming conflict prevention.

In working with partners the EU should:

- Place particular emphasis on developing a regional approach, enhancing the capacity of regional and sub-regional organisations, and regional initiatives such as regional inter-parliamentary dialogue and peace support operations.
- Develop partnerships with a wide range of actors including the private sector, international financial organisations and civil society (ensuring broad representation, e.g. of different genders, age, ethnicity etc).

5 Previous Assessment Missions have included Nepal, Indonesia South Pacific, Sri Lanka
ANNEX 1. REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EU PROGRAMME FOR THE PREVENTION OF VIOLENT CONFLICTS SINCE JUNE 2003

The EU Programme for the Prevention of Violent Conflicts, endorsed by the Goteborg European Council in June 2001, commits the EU to:

- Set clear political priorities for preventive actions,
- Improve its early warning, action and policy coherence,
- Enhance its instruments for long- and short-term prevention, and
- Build effective partnerships for prevention.

The following review refers to progress made by the EU between June 2003 to January 2004.

Political priorities for preventive actions
Following the seminar on lessons learned on conflict prevention from the Western Balkans in May, the region continued to be the main regional focus of the Greek Presidency, culminating in the EU-Western Balkans summit in June 2003, which resulted in The Thessaloniki Agenda. The Italian Presidency focused attentions on Africa with the seminar on ‘EU conflict prevention, management and resolution in Africa’, July 2003, and the Troika meeting between Africa and the EU in an attempt to reinvigorate the EU-Africa Dialogue. In August 2003, the Commission Communication on the EU-Africa Dialogue was published and in January 2004, a new Common Position on Conflict Prevention Management and Resolution in Africa, was agreed by the Council.

Early warning
The Council continued to draw up its annual watch list of potential conflict areas and tasked the PSC to keep a close watch on situations of concern. Progress has been made in (informally) including Commission regional development experts in some Council regional working group meetings.

Short-term instruments

Crisis management Operations
In 2003, the EU made significant progress with ESDP operations. At the request of the UN, the EU launched operation ‘Artemis’ in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and replaced NATO in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYRoM), with the launch of operation ‘Concordia’. Civilian operations were launched in Bosnia-Herzegovina with the EU Police Mission (EUPM) and in December 2003 a further police mission, ‘Operation Proxima’, replaced Concordia in the FYRoM.

The Commission produced two end-of-programme assessments of tasks undertaken by the RRM in Afghanistan (December 2003) and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (November 2003). The lessons learned report on Operation Artemis from the Council is due before the end of the Irish Presidency.

EU Election Observation Missions took place in Cambodia (July 2003), Rwanda (September 2003) Guatemala (September) and Mozambique (November 2003)

Crisis management training
In October 2003, EU Member States met in Rome to review the Training Project for Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management. They agreed to continue the project with an expanded programme of courses in 2004 and include modules for training civilian personnel in the areas

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7 Other relevant policy documents recently agreed include: Commission Communication on Governance and Development, October 2003 and EU Guidelines on children and armed conflict, December 2003.

In November 2003, the EU and NATO also undertook their first joint crisis management training exercise aimed at assessing how an EU-led operation with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, could operate where NATO, as a whole, is not engaged.

**Long-term instruments**

**Joined-up strategic frameworks**
The implementation of the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)-EU Cotonou Partnership Agreement during 2003, which provides a framework for political, trade and development co-operation, has resulted in conflict prevention activities featuring in National and Regional Indicative Programmes (NIPs/RIPs) and an enhanced role for civil society participation in a number of developing countries.

**Diplomatic engagements**
EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) were deployed in the African Great Lakes, the Middle East (July 2003), Southern Caucasus (June 2003) and FYRoM (January 2004).

Diplomatic engagement with Iran helped secure agreement to allow international inspectors to verify Iran’s compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), codified through its signature of the NPT in December 2003. The EU is now working to develop further relations with Iran since their signing of the Additional Protocol.

As a region prioritised in the ESS, in February 2004, the Irish Presidency, with the Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs and EU Commissioner, led three EU Troika meetings in India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. A series of regional issues related to economic integration, peace and security and political dialogue were discussed, including Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Burma.

**Co-operation and partnerships**
In addition to enhanced co-operation with the UN/NATO and OSCE via ESDP, and policy commitments to strengthen EU-UN engagement the EU also strengthened co-operation with Africa via its support, at the request of the Africa Union, for a Peace Support Operations Facility.

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Other relevant recent publications produced by Saferworld and International Alert:

Strengthening global security through addressing the roots causes of conflict: Priorities for the Irish and Dutch Presidencies, 2004.


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