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WHAT PEACE AND WHOSE?

Envisioning a more comprehensive, more stable peace in South Sudan and Sudan

Richard Bartrop

February 2012

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Layout by D. R. ink

Front cover image: © Richard Bartrop

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Author's Profile

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Acknowledgments

This paper has been shaped and informed by conversations and observations in South Sudan and Sudan, and within International Alert. I would like to thank those in Sudan and South Sudan who gave generously of their time to discuss questions about peace and peacebuilding, and who facilitated visits during 2010 and 2011. To discuss future peace without being distracted by apparently important events in the present is not always easy. At International Alert my thanks in particular go to Judy El Bushra, Richard Reeve, Marco Simonetti, Chandani Thapa and Phil Vernon.


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Acronyms

CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
NCP	National Congress Party
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SAF	Sudan Armed Forces
SPLA	Sudan People's Liberation Army

Map



Executive summary

This paper explores some profound questions about peace and peacebuilding in South Sudan and Sudan, with the aim of fostering debate about what can be done to build a more comprehensive and more stable peace within and between the two Sudans.

Underpinning the paper is the concept of *positive* peace as understood by International Alert. This is a concept of peace as a dynamic state within which conflicts and differences are managed peacefully, without violence, rather than neglected or suppressed. In line with this concept, the paper uses a framework of five fundamental factors of conflict and peace in order to explore the present nature of peace in South Sudan and Sudan and future possibilities. These factors are:

- *Power*: how power is held and used;
- *Economy*: how the economy is structured and who benefits;
- *Fairness*: how fair and effective are the law and its implementation;
- *Safety*: the degree to which people feel or are safe;
- *Well-being*: the quality of people's lives.

Peace past and present

Since Sudan became independent in 1956, peace or the absence of civil war has been the exception rather than the rule. The most obvious shortcoming of the first peace, after the Addis Ababa Agreement in 1972, was that it failed to prevent the return to civil war; an obvious shortcoming of the second peace, after 2005, was its failure to prevent the continuation of the conflict in Darfur or to help resolve it. However, below the national level, alongside their positive effects and impact, there were many other shortcomings to each peace and people's experience of peace. These included:

- Discontent about political representation and power being used in a predatory and exploitative way;
- Regional economic inequalities remaining large, and unemployed youth being easily mobilised in militias;
- Little being done to advance reconciliation, truth-telling or justice, and opportunity still being closely tied to patronage and identity;
- Public suspicion and fear of the security forces, and violence and insecurity still common (e.g. in Blue Nile, Darfur and South Kordofan, and Jonglei, Lakes, Unity and Warrap);
- Access to basic services remaining poor, and some minorities and groups feeling marginalised.

These shortcomings of peace in the past are essentially still the shortcomings of peace in the present in South Sudan and Sudan. This comes despite the changes in context, of one country becoming two.

By the same token, however, the context for peace and peacebuilding has potentially improved. With the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) having passed its formal end, the two countries have an opportunity to look forwards and consider what could be done to build a fuller, more positive peace. What kind of peace do the leaders and people of South Sudan and Sudan want to build for themselves now, and how can they best do this?

Future peace

A key step, and a change from the way about which peace has traditionally been thought in both Sudan and South Sudan, would be to develop a process of discussion, or “visioning”, about visions for future peace in each country and what a shared vision of peace would be. A visioning process can give people an opportunity to overcome the political factors which constrain their ability to find peaceful solutions to today’s problems. It can also help to build consensus about and support for addressing underlying issues and factors of conflict which otherwise may continue to go unaddressed. In developing a shared vision for peace, it can be helpful to ask questions and to identify some principles for peacebuilding; for example, who is responsible for peace in South Sudan and Sudan, and who needs to be involved for a deeper, more stable peace to be built?

Answers to these questions should come first and foremost from within South Sudan and Sudan, for example as part of dialogue and discussion which leads to a statement of principles for peacebuilding. Considering the history and recent experience of peace in South Sudan and Sudan – and the shortcomings of peace today – some principles for future peace in the two countries are surely key. Firstly, peace in each country should be for all, not just a minority or a majority. Secondly, peace and peacebuilding are important not only within each country, but also between the two. Lastly, peacebuilding should encourage change. This may be the most difficult principle or idea for parties in South Sudan and Sudan to accept, and still more difficult to put into practice. However, to build a more comprehensive and more stable peace entails changes: changes in goals, changes in how the issues which cause conflict and prevent a more complete peace are addressed, and changes in behaviour and action.

Conclusions and recommendations

The paper concludes by making three broad recommendations to those in South Sudan and Sudan who are concerned to build a more comprehensive and more stable peace, and to those in the international community who are concerned to support their efforts. These are:

- **Use a positive peace framework to define goals and measure progress.** To be successful, peacebuilding should use a framework of positive peace, which will highlight what changes in institutions, attitudes and behaviours will bring about a stronger and more comprehensive peace, rather than simply containing the conflicts of today.
- **Promote a visioning and sustained dialogue process about peace.** A sustained and inclusive process of dialogue, framed around developing a broadly shared vision or set of visions for long-term peace, could build consensus and support for addressing the factors of conflict which otherwise go unaddressed.
- **Dialogue and advocacy to identify how the economy can best support long-term peace.** The economic dimension of peace has long been neglected. By combining research, discussion and advocacy on key economic sectors such as infrastructure, land and oil, or cross-cutting issues such as corruption, equity, and cross-border trade, it should be possible to develop a process which leads to positive change in economic governance in South Sudan and Sudan – change which is beneficial to all parties and which reduces the risk and incidence of conflict.

1. Introduction

What is peace in South Sudan and Sudan? What peace is there, and whom does it serve? How might it be made better; for example, be made more comprehensive, more stable and more lasting? Such questions are fundamental to the future of the two Sudans, and there are strong reasons for asking those questions. Despite the six-year Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) and the secession of South Sudan in 2011, peace in South Sudan and Sudan remains fragile. Violence and violent conflict have continued to occur, and risks and fears of future conflict have not faded. This is true in each country, and it is true about present and future relations between the two countries.

With the belief that a more stable and more comprehensive peace is possible, this paper explores some profound questions about peace and peacebuilding in South Sudan and Sudan. The paper does not prescribe answers, nor does it aim to be exhaustive: building peace is a process, and ultimately it is the people of South Sudan and Sudan who will or will not build a more peaceful future for their countries, their children and future generations. However, by asking questions and looking at some ways in which peace and peacebuilding can be understood and pursued, this paper hopes to foster and contribute to debate within and between South Sudan and Sudan about what can and should be done to reduce the risk and incidence of violent conflict, and to strengthen peace.

Underpinning the paper's aims, and the analysis and arguments it contains, is the concept of *positive* peace as understood by International Alert. This is a concept of peace as a dynamic state within which conflicts and differences are managed peacefully, without violence, rather than neglected or suppressed. In line with this concept, the paper uses a framework of five fundamental factors of conflict and peace in order to explore the present nature of peace in South Sudan and Sudan and future possibilities. These factors are:

- *Power*: how power is held and used;
- *Economy*: how the economy is structured and who benefits;
- *Fairness*: how fair and effective are the law and its implementation;
- *Safety*: the degree to which people feel or are safe;
- *Well-being*: the quality of people's lives.

These factors are interconnected and, in one guise or another, they underlie most violent conflicts and examples of peace around the world. Considering these factors can help in answering questions about how peace should be defined and what kind of peace should be aimed for.

International Alert (hereafter Alert), an international peacebuilding organisation, has been researching South Sudan and Sudan from a peacebuilding perspective since 2006. During this time Alert has observed that peacemaking and peacebuilding efforts in the now two countries have recurrently suffered from the lack of a consistent peacebuilding framework. This shortcoming has in part been because those involved in peacemaking and peacebuilding have tended to be constrained by political circumstances and mandate, and take a too-narrow view. Alert has therefore published this short paper to illustrate how a coherent peace and peacebuilding framework might be used.

Conflict and peace in South Sudan and Sudan

Conflict in South Sudan and Sudan occurs at national, sub-national and local levels. After the formal end of the civil war in 2005, Sudanese and international concern about peace in Sudan was concentrated on the CPA and the technicalities of its implementation and, to a lesser extent,

on the Darfur conflict and the various unsuccessful attempts to formally end the conflict. As a landmark peace agreement which brought formal peace, the CPA needed close attention, both domestically and internationally. However, the focus on the CPA also led to a preoccupation with short-term targets and deadlines, and a lack of attention to deeper, longer-term issues and problems which are themselves underlying drivers of discontent and conflict within each country as well as between them. Essentially the CPA was a high-level political and military agreement, which did little to mitigate feelings among many people about issues such as inequality, discrimination, injustice, impunity and corruption – issues connected to the five main factors of conflict listed above. Thus, although the CPA brought some peace, it is also true that it did not build peace comprehensively. It was comprehensive neither geographically nor in which factors of conflict it addressed.

Since the end of the CPA in July 2011 and the secession of South Sudan, peace in the two Sudans has not suddenly become stronger or deeper. On the contrary, regardless of the arrangements which are meant to provide for peace between the two countries in this post-CPA period, those factors of conflict which have not been addressed since 2005 (and before) remain present and continue to pose a threat to future peace and stability in and between both countries. The list of factors is long, but however they are categorised or discussed, many of them are familiar to people from across the two countries, as Table 1 shows.

Table 1: Some factors blocking progress in peace in South Sudan and Sudan

Issue	Example or illustration
Democracy	Elections are not seen to be free and fair, contributing to perceptions that governments are not representative, and encouraging rebellions against them
Discrimination	People feel that there is ethnic favouritism in government, in private sector employment opportunities and in access to services; minority ethnic groups feel marginalised and disadvantaged
Impunity	Perpetrators of violence and abuses are seen to go unpunished, encouraging people to pursue retributive and retaliatory violence, and encouraging cynicism about the political and judicial systems
Inequality	Gap between rich and poor is seen to have widened and access to wealth is seen as linked to aspects of identity such as tribe, geographic location and gender
Economic discontent	Discontent about unequal regional economic and infrastructure development, which can encourage demands for regional self-determination
Lack of reconciliation	Historical grievances, suspicions and mistrust between communities are not addressed, contributing to ongoing animosity
Oil	Communities feel that the negative impact of oil exploration and production is insufficiently addressed and local benefits are too few
Corruption	Perceptions that corruption goes unpunished undermine public confidence in and support for central and local government
Patronage	Expectations of patronage conflict with expectations of equity and equal opportunity
Identity	Competing claims about local or regional identity lead to conflict and violence, for example over land rights and ownership
Ideology	Perceived attempts to implement a particular ideology (for example related to national or religious identity) are sometimes inflammatory and opposed by sections of the population

Leadership	Lack of democratic leadership leads to factionalism and discontent with political parties and governments
Mistrust	Opposing groups and parties at all levels distrust each other's willingness and intent to honour agreements
Political exclusion	Opposition parties and civil society groups feel unfairly excluded from political processes and government
Religion	Religious minorities experience marginalisation and persecution; religious differences are used to divide people
Role of military and police	People feel the military has too much power over civilian affairs and government, and distrust some of the military and security forces
Role of international community	People see international organisations and foreign powers as destabilising or threatening forces
Tribalism	People are pressured or choose to identify along tribal lines in official contexts and social settings, where previously they would not have done so strongly

Such factors are not unique to South Sudan and Sudan: indeed, many are present in other conflicts, even if the combinations of factors, history and circumstances in the two Sudans are unique. However, what is being done about them? What needs to be done to make peace in South Sudan and Sudan more stable, more comprehensive, more lasting? What can be learned from peacebuilding in conflicts in other countries?

'[W]e will not be able to establish peace and defeat war unless we fight against the ideologies that create war.'

Khatim Adlan,
'Peace in Sudan' essay,
January 2005

Box 1: Concepts of conflict and peace

Conflicts are not necessarily inherently bad. Conflicts are an inevitable part of living in society and a result of the differences and tensions between people and between groups. A certain degree of conflict is essential for progress, because progress requires change, and change can itself generate conflict. However, it is violent conflict, rather than conflict itself, which is a problem. Therefore, it is violent conflict with which peacebuilding is typically concerned, as well as this paper. Relative to violent conflict, peace is usually understood to be the sustained absence of such conflict. However, in positive terms (rather than in terms only of absence), what does this mean peace is?

International Alert's broad vision of peace is that it is a state or condition in which people are anticipating and managing conflicts without violence, and are engaging in processes of social change which are inclusive and improve the quality of life. Peace is when people manage conflict without violence and without compromising the possibility of continuing to do so in the future, or the possibility for others to do so. This is the idea of inter-dependent, positive peace.

Peace, however, is not a fixed or necessarily self-sustaining condition: there is always the possibility that people will find ways to turn conflict into violence, however peaceful things may seem for a given group, time or place. Thus, after violent conflict, peace has to be purposefully gained and constantly maintained through vigilance and effort. Given the pressures on society to adapt to changes, societies seeking to end violent internal conflict need strength and resilience – built on willingness, culture, systems and structures – to manage conflict peacefully. In societies where peace is more stable and comprehensive, it is socially less legitimate to resort to violence.

2. Peace past and present

A balanced assessment of peace in South Sudan and Sudan must recognise both the merits and benefits of what has been achieved, as well as shortcomings and failures, in the past and up to the present. Understanding the past and the present is vital for understanding and shaping the future. Furthermore, a review of peace in the past and the present can illuminate how peace factors have and have not been addressed, and what the shortcomings have been in peacebuilding. It can help answer the question of what can be done differently in the future to build a stronger and fuller peace.

Peace past

Since Sudan became independent in 1956, peace or the absence of civil war has been the exception rather than the rule. After 17 years of civil war, the Addis Ababa Agreement brought peace in 1972, but this peace collapsed after only 11 years, when the agreement was abrogated and the second civil war broke out in 1983. This second round of civil war ended with the CPA in 2005.

What kind of peace did Sudan experience during these two periods – 1972 to 1983, and from 2005 to the present? How did the peace measure up against common concepts of peace, and the factors and parameters discussed above?

As Table 2 shows, there were many shortcomings in the peace which Sudan and South Sudan (before and after independence) experienced in the two periods. The most obvious shortcoming of the first peace was that it failed to prevent the return to civil war; an obvious shortcoming of the second peace, after 2005, was its failure to prevent the continuation of the conflict in Darfur or to help resolve it. However, below the national level, alongside their positive effects and impact, there were many other shortcomings to each peace and people's lived experience of peace.

Table 2: Some strengths and weaknesses of past peace in South Sudan and Sudan

Factor of conflict and peace	1972-1983 peace	2005-present peace
Power	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Addis Ababa Agreement provides for the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement (the former rebel movement) to be integrated into government • <i>Exclusion of opposition parties from government leads to coup attempts and contributes to end of Addis Ababa Agreement and resumption of civil war</i> • <i>Power is used in a predatory and exploitative way (for example to unfairly advantage some groups)</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CPA provides for power-sharing between two ruling parties (NCP and SPLM) • Aspiration of Southern Sudanese for self-determination is met • <i>Discontent among opposition parties about terms of representation and participation in government and elections</i> • <i>Power is used in a predatory and exploitative way (for example to unfairly advantage some groups)</i>

Economy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rise in foreign investment in Sudan and oil is discovered in South Sudan • <i>Regional economic inequalities remain large, with growth and productive investment concentrated in Khartoum region</i> • <i>Jonglei Canal project causes suspicion and resentment</i> • <i>Unemployed youth are easily mobilised in militias</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Wealth-sharing between governments under terms of CPA • <i>Discontent among public about use of wealth and lack of tangible peace dividends</i> • <i>Regional economic inequalities remain large, and disparities grow between the national capitals and the regions or peripheries</i> • <i>Unemployed youth are easily mobilised in militias</i>
Fairness, equality and justice	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Addis Ababa Agreement provides amnesty for criminal and civil acts committed during the war • <i>Little done to advance truth-telling and reconciliation</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • South Sudan and southerners are exempted from sharia law • <i>Little done to advance reconciliation, truth-telling or justice for victims of crimes and violence in conflict</i> • <i>Opportunity is closely tied to patronage and identity, causing many to feel disadvantaged or excluded (e.g. in access to jobs, land and justice)</i>
Safety	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>The State Security Organisation is widely feared</i> • <i>Repeated mutinies and armed clashes mar the peace in the south</i> • <i>Inter-communal violence is common in rural areas, for example in Darfur, the Kordofans and the south</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>The public still regard the security forces with fear and suspicion</i> • <i>Violence and insecurity remain common and at times severe, for example in Blue Nile, Darfur and South Kordofan, and Jonglei, Lakes, Unity and Warrap</i> • <i>Levels of small arms ownership remain high because of weak rule of law in rural areas</i>
Well-being	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Access to basic services (especially education and health) remains poor for many</i> • <i>Some minorities and groups feel marginalised</i> • <i>People seek more freedom and respect for dignity</i> 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Access to basic services (especially education and health) remains poor for many</i> • <i>Some minorities and groups feel marginalised</i> • <i>People seek more freedom and respect for dignity</i>

The fact that each peace had such shortcomings was in part the result of contrasting shortcomings in the approaches to peacemaking and to the implementation of the peace agreements. In the first civil war, peacemaking efforts were sporadic and largely domestic, until a short and partly internationalised process was successfully mediated by the Ethiopian emperor, Haile Selassie, and the World Council of Churches. The lack of international guarantees and monitoring of the Addis Ababa Agreement made it easy for its implementation to be gradually undermined. More critically, however, implementation of the peace agreement was not accompanied by concerted efforts to address the causes of discontent within the country at large which had shaped the conflict, or to develop the readiness and will to address these causes.

In contrast, in the second civil war it was not because of a lack of peace talks, or even a lack of peace agreements, that the conflict continued for so long. Many domestic and internationally-mediated talks were held, and numerous ineffective agreements were made before the CPA was reached. Given the difficulty of the peace process, it is understandable that the subsequent period of peace implementation (between 2005 and 2011) was characterised by a preoccupation with the technical implementation of the CPA. This meant a focus on implementing the many modalities and arrangements prescribed by the CPA. However, as had happened before, efforts to address underlying factors of conflict were few and of little impact, because the CPA itself had been designed in a way which allowed them to be ignored.

The great achievement of the CPA was the formal cessation of hostilities and the formal co-operation which it brought between the National Congress Party (NCP) and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM). Within the framework of the CPA an unprecedented level of oil income was shared between northern and southern Sudan, contributing to the growth of the overall economy. Despite delays and shortcomings in how they were conducted, elections were held in 2010 more comprehensively than ever before in Sudan, across north and south. In 2011 the CPA led to the largely peaceful conduct of the self-determination referendum for South Sudan and then its secession to form an independent country. By entailing the withdrawal of the SPLA from eastern Sudan, the CPA also contributed to the conclusion of the Eastern Sudan Peace Agreement in 2006, which formally ended the low-level conflict in that region.

In other respects, however, the peace brought by the CPA was neither comprehensive nor complete, and people did not experience a comprehensive peace. The Darfur conflict, which had escalated so sharply in 2003-2004, continued and remained unresolved through the six years following the signing of the CPA. Although the intensity of the conflict subsided sometimes to low levels, its overall human impact (however it was measured and contested) was great. Away from Darfur, violence and fighting intermittently escalated in many areas, for example in Abyei and South Kordofan, in Omdurman when it was attacked in 2008, and in southern states such as Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile. In other words, below the formal peace at the high level of national politics and the capitals, and outside the formal peace in the centres of most state capitals, violent conflict still occurred frequently and was at risk of escalating. Many Sudanese were still vulnerable to violence or suffered it with no redress. This was despite some limited grassroots or bottom-up peace and reconciliation initiatives being undertaken, for example under the banners "Darfur-Darfur dialogue" and "South-South dialogue".

'[We] resolve to roll out once again the people-to-people peace process in our communities to the effect that peace will prevail truly at all levels.'

Sudan Council of Churches,
General Assembly communiqué,
May 2011

Box 2: The long and varied road to peace

The search for and path to a lasting peace is never easy. Often, the peace processes and peace of another country look better from a distance than they do close up. When we look more closely, the shortcomings and troubles of many a peace process and peace become more apparent. However, by the same token, comparison shows how much is shared across countries, and how people in one country may draw lessons from the story of conflict and peace in another country.

As numerous countries show, long and protracted peace processes are not unusual. Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo, for example, both went through protracted peace processes from the late 1990s through the first decade of the 2000s, reaching one agreement after another in a slow journey towards a more inclusive peace. In Burundi, political peace and security grew incrementally as one rebel group after another signed agreements with the government; however, even after what appeared to be a final agreement was signed in 2008, fears of a return to civil war persisted. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, the process of ceasefires and agreements still left large parts

of the country struggling with violence and conflict. In Liberia the civil war which started in 1989 passed through several unsuccessful agreements, notably in 1995, before a final peace agreement was reached in 2003. Two years later a Truth and Reconciliation Commission was set up which then undertook a four-year process, culminating in a final report of findings and recommendations. This report was then shelved, illustrating that the peace process still had far to go. In Northern Ireland, the breakthrough Good Friday Agreement was reached in 1998, some seven years after talks began. More than a decade later, the agreement still held, but violence had not entirely disappeared.

Other peace processes and agreements also illustrate the need for patience and the reality that steps forward are often followed by apparent steps back. In the countries of the former Yugoslavia, the making and building of peace was done during and after the violent break-up of Yugoslavia. The most prominent peace agreement, the 1994 Dayton Peace Accords, was only one part of this process and did not anticipate or prevent further conflict and the later secession of Kosovo from Serbia. In 2000 the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians collapsed after nine years of disputed progress, during which political agreements were not matched by realities on the ground and improvements in trust and confidence. In more than a decade since then, an effective Israeli-Palestinian peace process has still not been created. In Somalia, the region of Somaliland unilaterally declared independence in 1991. More than two decades later, the border between Somaliland and the neighbouring region of Puntland is still disputed and intermittently fought over. Meanwhile, the central and southern parts of Somalia have remained riven by civil war, despite repeated peace processes and peace agreements.

Together, such examples – and the variation between them – give a brief reminder of how varied and uncertain peace and peacebuilding can be. Moreover, they show how important it is for those who want peace to keep working for it, long after the ceasefire or the peace agreement has been implemented.

Peace present

Today, peace in South Sudan and Sudan remains incomplete and will likely remain so, in the near future. The evidence for this is the persistent occurrence and risk of violent conflict, mostly outside and away from the capitals, main cities and towns. The patterns, types and locations of conflict are quite well known. The conflict can be sporadic, intense or prolonged. In Sudan, violent conflict is present or at risk of occurring particularly in Abyei, Blue Nile, Darfur and South Kordofan. In South Sudan, violent conflict is present or at risk of occurring particularly in Eastern Equatoria, Jonglei, Lakes, Unity, Upper Nile and Warrap. Within each country there is a risk of widening conflict, as well as escalation to direct or indirect war between the two countries, despite desires and efforts to avoid this happening.

Since the formal end of the CPA in July 2011 the pattern of conflict and violence has been much the same as before and people's experience of peace has changed little. In Darfur the conflict between rebel groups and the government has remained unresolved, despite the government's attempt to implement an agreement with one group. The future status of Abyei has continued to be contested by the inhabitants of the area and by the two governments, whose armed forces have clashed in Abyei before. In Blue Nile and South Kordofan civilians have been killed and displaced by fighting between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Sudan People's Liberation Army-North (SPLA-N). In South Sudan civilians have been affected by rebellions led by renegade SPLA commanders, southern soldiers demobilised from the SAF, and others. The violence has been concentrated in rural areas in Jonglei, Unity, Upper Nile and Warrap states. Overlapping with this violence has been inter-communal violence, for example between the Lou Nuer and Murle in Jonglei.

To a large extent, therefore, the challenges of the peace which exists today in each country reflect the challenges of the peace which existed under the CPA between 2005 and 2011. The underlying causes of conflict are not new, as Table 3 shows.

Table 3: Some challenges to the present peace in South Sudan and Sudan

<i>Factor</i>				
Power	Economy	Fairness, equality and justice	Safety	Well-being
Main opposition parties and movements do not participate in central and state governments and legislatures	Transparency and reporting on oil production and revenues is still low, contributing to mistrust, misinformation and resentment	Little is being done to advance reconciliation, truth-telling or justice for victims of crime and violence	Violent conflict and insecurity remain common and widespread, for example in Blue Nile, Darfur and South Kordofan, and in Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile	Gap between level of basic services and infrastructure in central areas and in rural/provincial areas is wide and resented
Feelings of regional political marginalisation encourage aspirations for greater autonomy or self-determination (e.g. in Darfur), which are not satisfied	Government budget spending is heavily concentrated on salaries, and capital expenditure and investment is concentrated around the national capitals	Perceived inequality and injustice motivates some armed opposition to the governments	Levels of small arms ownership remain high because of weak rule of law in rural areas	Some minorities and tribal groups feel marginalised or discriminated against
Constitutional review processes are seen as giving more power to the ruling party, rather than benefiting multiparty democracy	Unemployed youth are easily mobilised in militias	Impunity for crime and violence leads to revenge attacks between rival communities	Uniformed forces are seen by some as a cause of insecurity and are feared	People seek more freedom and respect for dignity

If the underlying causes of conflict in South Sudan and Sudan today are largely as they were in the recent past, the context, however, has partially changed. It has changed by virtue of one country becoming two, and by virtue of a new post-CPA political dispensation between the NCP and the SPLM. That dispensation (formal and informal) and the limited guarantees for it (such as international monitoring and pressure) may or may not amount to a post-CPA peace agreement. The ripples of the uprisings in the neighbouring Arab world have also introduced the possibility of further change or pressure for change in the relationship between governments and citizens. As the secession of South Sudan recedes and the existence of the two Sudans becomes normalised, the willingness of the populations of each country to challenge their government may increase. Escalating conflict, civil war and fragmentation are possible within each country.

By the same token, however, the context for peace and peacebuilding has potentially improved. With the CPA having passed its formal end, the two countries have an opportunity to look forwards and consider what could be done to build a fuller, more positive peace. What kind of peace do the leaders and people of South Sudan and Sudan want to build for themselves now, and how can they best do this?

'If we lost unity, at least we should win the peace.'

President Omar al-Bashir,
speech when receiving
President Kiir in Khartoum,
October 2011

Box 3: The Philippines: In search of comprehensive peace

Looked at from Africa and the Middle East, the Philippines is not commonly seen as a country suffering from violent conflict. Although still poor, in rankings of human development and by basic economic measures (such as GDP per capita), the country ranks among countries of "medium human development", ahead of South Sudan and Sudan. However, beneath the overall peace, the Philippines suffers from two ongoing internal conflicts which successive governments have for decades failed to resolve and whose underlying causes they have failed to address adequately. Undeterred by this failure, and not complacent in the national government's relative prosperity and distance from where violence has been concentrated, efforts have continued to be made to build a full and inclusive peace.

In the southern island of Mindanao, secessionist rebels have been fighting government forces since 1971. Although rich in natural resources, the development of the island has been held back by violent conflict and insecurity. Lawlessness and impunity in areas dominated by locally powerful figures have also allowed repeated outbreaks of intra-communal clan violence. Meanwhile, elsewhere in the Philippines, primarily in the countryside, Maoist communist rebels have fought an armed struggle since 1969, ostensibly fighting on ideological grounds. In the north of the country Maoist rebels have attacked construction projects, mines, plantations and other assets.

Although the Philippines has lived with these conflicts, and the national government has sometimes turned its back on the search for a negotiated settlement, the conflicts and their underlying causes cannot be ignored. The conflicts have carried a high human cost, with more than 120,000 people estimated to have been killed in the conflict in Mindanao. The conflicts have constrained the wider development of the country and also influenced the nature and behaviour of the national governments, for better and for worse. Among the underlying factors of conflict have been political exclusion, ideology, inequality, injustice and ethnically-based marginalisation and exploitation. National government has not been stable: popular uprisings have twice overthrown the incumbent government.

Following the formation of a new government in mid-2010, new efforts have been made to restart peace talks. This has entailed negotiations between the government and the rebel National Democratic Front of the Philippines and between the government and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front. These efforts have been somewhat positive. However, it has also been clear that peace agreements on their own, even if implemented, will not bring full peace: agreements have repeatedly been reached in the past, but have neither lasted nor resolved underlying issues. Calls have therefore been made for a larger peace process with a more comprehensive approach, which aims to build a more inclusive peace for the entire country.

3. Future peace

Against this background of incomplete peace in the past and today, what peace do South Sudan and Sudan want to build for themselves now, for the future? What is the vision of peace, and how can it be realised? After the six years of the CPA, Sudanese of all backgrounds and both countries can surely aspire and aim to build a fuller and stronger peace. For their part, the governments in Juba and Khartoum, and other parties interested in peace, have been pursuing their own strategies and plans for peace, subject to their own priorities and (as in the past) focused on political agreements. The Government of Sudan, for example, has concentrated on trying to reach a final political settlement or peace agreement for Darfur. The Government of South Sudan has concentrated its efforts on trying to win over rebel commanders through offers of amnesties and positions in government and the army. Outside government, Sudanese civil society and non-governmental organisations such as the Sudan Council of Churches and the Collaborative for Peace in Sudan are pursuing peacebuilding initiatives focused on particular issues, such as community reconciliation and the human impact of the oil industry.

These plans and initiatives should have some positive results. However, by themselves they will not produce a transformation in the strength and depth of peace in the two countries. Is something else possible? The answer must surely be yes.

Envisioning future peace

A key step, and a change from the way about which peace has traditionally been thought in both South Sudan and Sudan, would be to develop a process of discussion, or “visioning”, about visions for future peace in each country and what a shared vision of peace would be. Using the same framework of five core factors of conflict and peace used above, some of the possible elements in a future peace are shown in Table 4. Searching for a shared vision of peace in each country will not avoid disagreements about aspects of the peace towards which the country should aim. A visioning process is also likely to evolve as circumstances change. However, a visioning process (and a broadly shared vision, if it can be reached) can help to build consensus about and support for addressing broadly underlying issues and factors of conflict which otherwise may continue to go unaddressed. It can also help to identify ways of addressing those issues.

Table 4: Elements of a vision for future peace?

Illustrating what might emerge from peace visioning processes in South Sudan and Sudan

Shared vision of peace					
<i>Factor</i>					
	Power	Economy	Fairness, equality and justice	Safety	Well-being
<i>Possible future goals (2012-2016 and beyond)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Opposition parties and other groups do not feel unjustly excluded from power • Elections are becoming more rooted in the political system • Women are playing a stronger role in politics locally and nationally • Government and political parties propose and implement policies which serve wider national interests, rather than the interests of narrow groups 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Investment and economic growth are more evenly distributed, and infrastructure in poorer regions is improving • Economic development and growth strengthen peace, rather than causing or exacerbating economic and political tensions which may lead to violent conflict 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Public needs or wishes for truth and reconciliation are being met • Greater public confidence in the law and formal justice system • Property rights are clearer and are upheld in a just and equitable manner 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Violent conflict between government and anti-government forces, and inter-communal violence are declining especially in Darfur, South Kordofan and key states in South Sudan, and between the two countries • The public has more trust and confidence in the security forces and rule of law, and private ownership of guns is declining 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Basic services are provided more equitably across geographic, ethnic and gender lines • Marginalisation and discrimination are declining • People feel that their freedom and dignity are respected
<i>Underlying issues where changes are likely to be needed</i>					
Discrimination, inequality, injustice Corruption, economy, oil Distrust, patronage, reconciliation Ideology, identity, tribalism Leadership, political parties, religion Role of the military, armed groups and international actors					

Finding new approaches

As peacebuilding theories and practice indicate, and as Alert has found in its experience in different countries, the approach or process by which a shared vision of peace is developed is as important as the vision itself, or even more so. In all cases, dialogue is central to developing a shared vision, but there are many forms which dialogue can take. One approach is sustained dialogue, for example through a process of mid- to high-level dialogue bringing together people from government, politics, the opposition, religious and traditional authorities, civil society organisations, business, and other walks of life. Such dialogue may be replicated in different parts of a country and may be organised so that ideas and recommendations are brought together into a

subsequent dialogue forum, such as a national reconciliation conference or a constitutional review conference. Another approach can be dialogue among narrower groups, focusing on the peace vision for a particular part of the country or a particular theme or issue, such as the economy or truth and reconciliation.

In all cases, peacebuilding dialogue is an opportunity for participants to move away from current positions or short-term concerns – about which they may be in disagreement – and to discuss longer-term ideas and issues about which they may not have a fixed position. Conducted well, such dialogue can:

- Bring people together who would otherwise not come together, and discuss issues which might otherwise seem off-limits;
- Allow those who think they know what others think and stand for (what their positions are) to discover that they have more interests in common with each other than they had thought;
- Provide an opportunity for participants to look at issues afresh, as free-thinking individuals, because they participate as individuals, rather than representatives;
- Stimulate participants to take the insights gained during the dialogue away with them into their normal everyday roles, and to continue the dialogue with others and to initiate new actions they would not otherwise have done.

‘It is incumbent on the leaderships of the north and the south to work together to avoid hostilities and to bring benefits to the people of the north and the south.’

Lazaro Sumbeiywo, chief mediator and chair of CPA peace talks, speech, May 2011

Box 4: What is peacebuilding?

“Peacebuilding” covers a broad set of processes and actions by any party with the capacity to influence the prospects for peace. What sets peacebuilding aside from other processes (such as development, economic growth, and humanitarian aid) is simply that it is done with the express purpose of building *lasting* peace, and is based on as complete an understanding as possible of the factors that contribute to or prevent peace.

In short, peacebuilding is the set of processes whose purpose is to gain, maintain and strengthen peace. This means activities and interventions which are designed to influence events, processes and actors to create new outcomes, so that peaceful conditions are gained and/or maintained. This is a larger goal than simply preventing or stopping violence, or resolving conflicts.

Peacebuilding in South Sudan and Sudan

In developing a shared vision for peace in South Sudan and Sudan, and finding approaches and methods which will be effective, it can be helpful to ask questions and to identify some principles for peacebuilding. For example:

- Who is responsible for peace in South Sudan and Sudan?
- Who needs to be involved for a deeper, more stable peace to be built?
- What needs to change in existing attitudes and approaches to peacebuilding?
- If the same approaches are taken as before, why and how will the results be different?
- What can be learned from examples elsewhere?
- If different approaches are taken, what approaches and actions are best?

Answers to these questions should come first and foremost from within South Sudan and Sudan, for example as part of dialogue and discussion which leads to a statement of principles for peacebuilding. (In a similar way, declarations of principles emerged from Sudan’s many peace talks in the past and became foundations of peace processes.) However, considering the history and

‘Let me say this again: we cannot prosper as a nation without the unity and harmony of our people. We must accept our diversity and use our difficult past experiences to grow.’

President Salva Kiir, speech to the first joint sitting of the South Sudan National Legislature, August 2011

recent experience of peace in South Sudan and Sudan – and the shortcomings of peace today – some principles for building future peace in the two countries are surely crucial. Firstly, peace in each country should be for all, not just a minority or a majority. To achieve this, the needs and voices for a peace which belongs to more people within the two countries must be better heard. Secondly, peace and peacebuilding are important not only within each country, but also between the two. South Sudan and Sudan have much in common, as well as divisions; longer-term peace within each will depend in part on maintaining peaceful relations between the two. In this respect, international organisations and donors need to be aware of the risk that uneven engagement with the two countries may unwittingly reinforce divisions between them.

Lastly, peacebuilding should encourage change. This may be the most difficult principle or idea for parties in South Sudan and Sudan to accept, and still more difficult to put into practice. However, to build a more comprehensive and more stable peace entails changes: changes in goals, changes in how the issues which cause conflict and prevent a more complete peace are addressed, and changes in behaviour and action. Encouraging change and making it happen require bypassing or overcoming resistance to change, including doubts about the possibility of change. As the past has shown, change can happen in South Sudan and Sudan incrementally or suddenly. The space and the freedom to advocate for change may be limited, but they can be enlarged by building confidence, alliances and receptivity, and by stimulating discussion about future peace goals or vision. Sustained dialogue among appropriate groups of participants, with influence over policy and decision makers, is just one way in which Sudanese can develop momentum to address the factors of longer-term peace without destabilising the present situation.

The end of the CPA and the division of Sudan into two countries have of course been major changes in themselves. However, viewed from another angle they have not brought as large a change as many may have expected or hoped. For most Sudanese and South Sudanese – from north and south, east and west – life remains much as it did before with little change: the security and insecurity of daily life, the experience of peace and conflict, of government and economic opportunity. The present, therefore, is as much as ever an opportunity for Sudanese to discuss future stability and the ways in which they can try to build a more stable and lasting peace than they have known in the past.

Box 5: Different approaches for different challenges

What is best done in peacebuilding, and what can be done, depends especially on the nature of the context, the capacities of actors involved in peacebuilding, and what is being aimed for. As a peacebuilding organisation which has worked in more than 20 countries over 25 years, International Alert has used many different approaches to support peacebuilding.

In Uganda, for example, Alert has supported a set of initiatives aimed at harnessing economic development to support peace. One initiative has been to conduct research and advocacy on the conflict and peace dimensions of economic development, including oil exploration and anticipated production. In parallel, Alert has supported the development of a civil society coalition on oil in Uganda, which has provided a forum for the government, oil companies and local communities to meet, build trust and confidence, and develop mutually beneficial plans concerning oil and how to make it into a force for peace, rather than a cause of division and conflict.

In Guinea, Alert has, with other partners, facilitated a process of sustained dialogue aimed at building stronger support for peace. Over two years, a series of dialogues was convened in different locations around Guinea and with Guineans abroad, bringing together people from government, politics, business and civil society. Using the banner "The Guinea we want", the dialogue has allowed participants to build mutual understanding about sensitive issues which need to be addressed if their longer-term aspirations for Guinea are to be achieved.

In Nepal, Alert leads a group of national and international partners in an initiative to improve justice and security, bringing voices from the village level to the district and national level. The initiative also supports the broadcasting of radio programmes to raise awareness across the country about security and justice reform debates happening in Kathmandu. In Lebanon, Alert has been working with youth leaders from political parties to build trust and broader perspectives on peace and conflict in their country, and to strengthen engagement across sectarian divides.

4. Conclusions and recommendations

This report began by asking what peace in South Sudan and Sudan is, and how might it be made better – in particular, be made more comprehensive, more stable and more lasting. Another way of putting these questions is to ask what it means to build peace in South Sudan and Sudan.

Evidently, as things are in South Sudan and Sudan today, a better peace is possible. For any Sudanese who today or in the recent past has been living with the reality of violence and fighting – in Abyei, Blue Nile, Darfur, South Kordofan, Jonglei, Lakes, Unity, Warrap and elsewhere – a more comprehensive, more inclusive peace still needs to be built. For any Sudanese who is living with an ongoing and embittering experience of discrimination, injustice, inequality or other factors of conflict, a stronger peace needs to be built.

One starting point for people in each country to address this reality and challenge is to start discussing what kind of peace they experience at present and what kind of peace they want for the future. To start a process of discussion about this does not require jettisoning current priorities, although it may challenge individual groups' priorities and short-term aims. However, it does require initiative and action, in particular, to:

- Listen to a wider range of fellow citizens;
- Recognise the shortcomings of the current peace;
- Learn from what has been done elsewhere;
- Nurture the belief that another kind of peace is possible – a more comprehensive, more inclusive and more stable peace.

Given the aspirations which leaders in South Sudan and Sudan have sometimes voiced about peace, and the ongoing threats and risks to future peace in the two countries, it is surely now time for people in each country to work together towards a more inclusive and more stable peace.

Based on Alert's research in South Sudan and Sudan, and on our experience in other peacebuilding contexts, we make three broad recommendations to those in South Sudan and Sudan who are concerned to build a more comprehensive, more stable peace, and to those in the international community who are concerned to support their efforts.

- **Use a positive peace framework to define goals and measure progress.** Peacebuilding initiatives in South Sudan and Sudan have in the past tended to focus on issues connected with the implementation and sustenance of formal peace agreements, or on grassroots inter-communal dialogue. However, peace agreements tend to skate around difficult issues underlying conflict, and grassroots initiatives, though highly important, are too small to make a wider impact on those issues. Therefore peacebuilding in both countries needs to be framed much more broadly, connecting the national with the local and aiming for a fuller, more positive and inclusive peace. To be successful, peacebuilding should use a framework of positive peace, which will highlight what changes in institutions, attitudes and behaviours will bring about a stronger and more comprehensive peace, rather than simply containing the conflicts of today.
- **Promote a visioning and sustained dialogue process about peace.** A sustained dialogue between the state and the citizen, and between citizens – between power, politics and society – can help to bring about changes and progress towards a more comprehensive peace. Such a process is possible if initiated and developed with due care. An inclusive process of dialogue,

framed around developing a broadly shared vision or set of visions for long-term peace, could build consensus and support for addressing the factors of conflict which otherwise go unaddressed. Such dialogue could be conducted independently of current and short-term political and conflict priorities, but could also contribute to a constitution-making or review process. Dialogue could be conducted nationally and regionally within each country, and between the two countries.

- **Dialogue and advocacy to identify how the economy can best support long-term peace.** By combining research, discussion and advocacy, it should be possible to develop a process which leads to positive change in economic governance in South Sudan and Sudan – change which is beneficial to *all* parties, and which reduces the risk and incidence of violent conflict. In essence, such a process would examine how the economic development which all parties seek can be harnessed to support peace. The research, discussion and advocacy could focus in turn on key economic sectors such as infrastructure, land and oil, or cross-cutting issues such as corruption, equity, and cross-border trade.

It is our submission that political struggle in the Sudan shall henceforth translate into competing visions of peace, progress and development and never into the use of force or the threat of the use of force.'

John Garang, speech at signing of CPA, Nairobi, 9th January 2005

Resources

The following is a small selection of resources useful for thinking about future peacebuilding in South Sudan and Sudan:

A. Alier (2003). *Southern Sudan: Too many agreements dishonoured*. 3rd edition. Reading: Ithaca Press.

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Sudan Council of Churches (2011). 'An urgent call to rebuild'. Communiqué of the 18th General Assembly, Juba 18th May 2011.

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ISBN: 978-1-906677-17-6