Towards a Coherent EU Conflict Prevention Policy in Africa: Challenges for the Belgian Presidency

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Organisation

The conference was organised by a task-force of the members of the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) and was co-hosted by the Development Committee of the European Parliament. EPLO was set up in 2001 by a network of 17 European NGOs active in peacebuilding and conflict prevention. With this office the EPLO members seek to promote peacetbuilding policies among the decision-makers in Europe. EPLO also aims to enhance information exchange and co-operation among its members and between them and the EU institutions dealing with conflict prevention.

The International Security Information Service, Europe (ISIS Europe) acted as the conference coordinator and was responsible for the plenary sessions. Saferworld organised the Horn of Africa workshop. World Vision was responsible for the Great Lakes workshop and the European Centre for Common Ground (ECCG) together with the Group for Research and Information on Peace and Security (GRIP) organised the West Africa Workshop. Other EPLO members provided valuable advice and support to the organisers.

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The report of the conference proceedings was written by: Lorraine Mullally, ISIS Europe (opening plenary session); Sarah Bayne, Saferworld (Horn of Africa workshop); Sarah Collen, World Vision (Great Lakes workshop); Lydia van de Fliert, ECCG and Felix Nkundabagenzi, GRIP (West Africa workshop); and Natalie Pauwels, ISIS Europe (final plenary session).

The policy recommendations section was written by Heike Schneider at EPLO, Sarah Bayne at Saferworld and Andrew Sherriff at International Alert. Saferworld (www.saferworld.co.uk) is an independent foreign affairs think tank, based in London, UK, working to identify, develop and publicise more effective approaches to tackling and preventing armed conflicts. International Alert (www.international-alert.org) is a UK-based NGO whose objective is to identify and address the root causes of violence and contribute to the just and peaceful transformation of violent conflicts.

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1 The European Peacebuilding Liaison Office aims to assist EU-NGO information-sharing and co-operation in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Its members include: Action Aid; The Berghof Research Center for Constructive Conflict Management; European Centre for Common Ground; European Network on Civil Peace Services; European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation; Field Diplomacy Initiative; Forum for Early Warning and Early Response; International Alert; International Fellowship of Reconciliation; International Security Information Service, Europe; Oxfam International; Pax Christi International; Quaker Council for European Affairs; Quaker Peace and Service; Saferworld; Swiss Peace Foundation Institute for Conflict Resolution; and World Vision.
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**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

**The Conference**

The Belgian Presidency aims to continue the work on EU conflict prevention undertaken during the Swedish Presidency by focusing on how the EU can effectively address conflicts in Africa. This conference sought to identify some of the challenges facing the Belgian Presidency and suggest concrete steps that the EU could take to ensure coherence in its development co-operation, trade, and common foreign and security policies. The conference specifically aimed to explore how the conflict prevention potential of the new EU-ACP ‘Cotonou’ Agreement could be realised by developing its provisions for political dialogue and the modalities for engaging civil society in conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

The opening session identified the factors causing and sustaining conflicts in Africa and the shortcomings of current EU responses. While poor governance was identified as one of the principal causes of conflict, it was noted that effective responses required multi-level engagement by the EU, including consultation with and support for local civil society.

Three regional workshops met in the afternoon. The workshop on the Horn of Africa looked specifically at the issue of resource-based conflict and noted that EU policy towards the region requires an integrated approach to resource management. The workshop on the Great Lakes region focused on the shortcomings of EU intervention in the protracted and endemic conflicts of the region and the workshop on West Africa examined the lessons learned from Mali and Sierra Leone. In all workshops it was noted that civil society, including women’s and youth groups, were key actors in attempts to improve governance, uphold human rights, mediate and engage in weapons collection. It was argued that the EU should be willing to support such ‘risky’ initiatives in addition to tackling the trans-national and macro-economic causes of conflict.

The final session introduced the policy priorities of the Belgian Presidency concerning Africa: focusing on the Great Lakes region; developing the Europe-Africa dialogue; tackling conflict prevention as a horizontal issue; and making development and humanitarian assistance more conflict sensitive. In conclusion, NGO representatives summarised the principle findings of the regional working groups and identified common concerns and opportunities for the EU. They stressed the importance of support for and engagement of civil society in the development of policy and the operationalisation of the Cotonou Agreement as well as the need for building capacity and political will within the EU.

**Recommendations**

The first set of policy recommendations focus on how the EU could improve the coherence of EU external policies by bridging the gap between its development co-operation policies and its Common Foreign and Security Policies (CFSP). The paper notes that the fragmentation of EU external policy is rooted in the institutional complexity of the EU and the distinct procedures and competencies of the Commission (development co-operation, trade and Cotonou) and Council (CFSP). The paper gives four concrete recommendations for mechanisms to build policy bridges:

1) Establish crisis task forces on regions at risk of violent conflict, involving regional experts from the Commission, Council and member states.
2) Hold bi-annual early warning meetings between the Council, Commission and civil society to define priority areas for conflict prevention.
3) Produce a conflict prevention report outlining EU policies towards various crises and assessing their impact on conflicts.
4) Establish mechanisms for tracking the impact of EU policy on conflicts using the European Parliament to compile feedback from civil society and ACP representatives.

The second set of policy recommendations deal with implementing the conflict prevention elements of the Cotonou Agreement. The paper notes that peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution policies are explicitly dealt with in Article 11 of the Agreement and that it also provides for the involvement of civil society in political dialogue as well as in broader policy-making processes. The paper identifies three areas which require further work:
1) Political dialogue
   This should be inclusive and multi-level (i.e. involving regional, national and local authorities as well as non-state actors) and, where possible it should be backed-up with concrete assistance in the areas targeted by the dialogue, such as human rights, democratisation or security sector reform.

2) Strategies, programming and financial instruments
   Recommendations stress the need to mainstream conflict prevention in country (and regional) support strategies, programming and implementation across all sectors by implementing conflict impact assessment frameworks, strengthening structures to facilitate regional programming and developing mechanisms for institutional learning. Non-state actors should also be involved throughout the programming cycle, from the development of country/ regional strategy papers to the implementation of programmes. With regard to financial arrangements, the EU should strengthen mechanisms for ensuring complementarity with other donors and ensure that small-scale interventions are not overlooked.

3) Political will
   The trend of decreasing development assistance towards Africa and the complications of working in conflict-affected countries does not bode well for the EU’s constructive engagement in conflict-affected regions of Africa. Yet the EU should prioritise the need for constructive support and long-term engagement with these regions and increase the proportion of development assistance towards Africa, particularly within the frame of the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights.

The third set of policy recommendations are concerned with enhancing the EU’s capacity to respond to violent conflicts in Africa. This paper notes that the EU’s capacities do not yet match its policy ambitions in the area of conflict prevention or the instruments that can be used to deliver them. Three areas are identified as requiring further improvements:

1) EU human resource capacity
   The EU should enhance the capacity of its delegations by revising human resource procedures to ensure that those most appropriately qualified to work in conflict settings are recruited and retained. EU staff working on conflict-affected regions should be offered region-specific training in conflict and context issues, based on existing good practice and experiences.

2) Partners and partner institutions
   The conflict prevention capacity of most partner and possible partner institutions remains exceptionally weak. The EU can seek to address this by engaging in activities, including the establishment of local outreach offices, designed to inform a wide range of organisations in any given country about the opportunities for partnership and support. Political and financial support should also be given to African government officials to enhance their capacity to work in conflict prevention and resolution.

3) Operational guidance and resources
   The EU has not made use of peace and conflict impact assessments (PCIA) despite their practical utility. Resources need to be invested in developing and piloting PCIA methodologies that are user-friendly and adapted to the EU. To support the regional dimension of its work, the EU needs to develop integrated regional information systems drawing on the collective expert knowledge of staff on the ground. It could support this in conflict zones with a strong regional dynamic by appointing regional advisers and convening meetings between key EU officials from the region.
Opening Remarks

Sandra Melone, European Centre for Common Ground

"...the EU has set itself the ambitious goal of intervening on both a civilian and military level to prevent and manage conflicts. Yet it is still unclear how the EU plans to achieve these goals.”

This conference aims to help bridge the gap between the European Union’s (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and development co-operation policy to prevent the conflicts that continue to devastate the African continent. With the adoption under the Swedish Presidency of the EU conflict prevention programme and the emerging crisis management structures of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), the Union has clear ambitions to play a more proactive role in military and civilian crisis management and conflict prevention. Yet some question the political will of the member states to realise these ambitions, while others feel the conflict prevention instruments at the EU’s disposal are inadequate. There is also disagreement among critics about the approach that the EU should take to conflicts in Africa.

The Cotonou Agreement, signed in June 2000, goes a long way towards trying to create solid and equal partnerships based on the shared ambition to further economic development, political stability and peace in Africa. The aim now is to make use of all the available policy instruments and also to address the structural obstacles to making EU policy coherent. The EU also faces the problem of how to make sure it has full access to, and is truly working with civil society in African countries. Continuing the work of the Swedish Presidency, the Belgian government has kept conflict prevention high on the political agenda, focusing its efforts on Africa. How it intends to strengthen the mechanisms currently in place and to establish new ones will be a main focus of this conference.

Session 1:

Bridging the gap between CFSP and development co-operation to prevent conflicts in Africa

The opening session aimed to identify the factors causing and sustaining conflicts in Africa and the shortcomings of current EU responses. While poor governance was identified as one of the principal causes of conflict, it was noted that effective responses required multi-level engagement by the EU, including consultation with and support for local civil society.

Part 1

Chair and introductory remarks

Pa’o H. Luteru, ACP Secretariat

If collective efforts to eradicate poverty are to be successful, we must have peace, political stability and security in all our countries since conflict prevention and sustainable development are mutually reinforcing. The conflict prevention elements of the Cotonou Agreement are therefore a promising start on the part of the EU and ACP countries to addressing this crucial link.

The challenges of addressing root causes of conflict in Africa

Bethuel Kiplagat, Africa Peace Forum

“The Cotonou Agreement signifies a new beginning in the EU-ACP approach to preventing and resolving conflicts”

Since the dawn of independence in Africa in 1957 the continent has been ravaged by inter- and intra-state conflicts. At least 28 African countries have experienced violent conflict of some sort, some lasting over 30 years. In the Horn region alone there has not been a single day of peace for 50 years. There have been 28 successful coups throughout the continent, and the political leaders or heads of state of 15 African countries have been assassinated. In short, violence has been the order of the day for most Africans.

Examining governance structures

African conflicts are most frequently internal rebellions against the state. This was the case in 26 of the 28 countries that have experienced violent conflict, and almost all were successful in their objectives. The governance structures established in Africa must therefore be called into question. Since independence the trend has been towards the
establishment of single party systems and military rule, which has aggravated existing problems of injustice and the violation of human rights. This in turn has contributed to the violent conflicts we see in Africa today. But what sustains these conflicts? Firstly, governments often deny the existence of internal rifts and rebellions for fear of discouraging foreign investment and donors. Secondly, the single-party states and military governments have generally discouraged citizens from discussing politics, let alone participating in them. This has largely hindered the development of healthy civil societies. Thirdly, a former agreement of mutual non-interference within the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) prevented members from interfering in the affairs of other members, even in the interest of preventing or resolving violent conflict. Although this has now changed, intervening in the conflict management process of an African neighbour remains difficult. There are no instruments, mechanisms or structures for dealing with conflicts in this way.

New Openings

We are now entering a new era. African countries have begun to acknowledge that something must be done about conflicts. The OAU has for instance established an Early Response Mechanism, and the Cotonou Agreement signifies a new beginning in the EU-ACP approach to preventing and resolving conflicts. There is also evidence that great progress is being made in the work of the European Community Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO). Peace processes are beginning to take shape in Angola, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Sierra Leone and Sudan. Yet despite these efforts, there are still weaknesses at the national level. The only instrument available to governments in the face of protests remains the use of force. Governments need to learn to involve dissenters rather than talking at them or excluding them entirely. Finally, it is necessary to review the effectiveness of mechanisms already in place, and to implement the new instruments provided for in the Cotonou Agreement. It is particularly important to focus on the legal instruments that will enable national governments and regional organisations to implement the conflict prevention elements of the Cotonou Agreement.

Realising the potential of the EU’s CFSP in Africa

Andreas Strub, Africa Advisor, Policy Unit of the Council of the European Union

"The EU must be physically represented on the ground and have a very concrete political purpose, not merely the intention to exchange views on the basis of agreed agendas."

The EU has a tradition of conflict prevention and management. Indeed, the European common agenda is in itself a means to overcome conflicts among EU member states. Working together in a regional context creates links between people that quash the very motives and interests that often form the basis for conflict.

EU intervention

The EU has made a great deal of progress in conflict analysis over the last few years. Greater coherence in EU external action can be achieved through a deeper diplomatic presence on the ground. For instance Javier Solana recently led an important dialogue in the Balkans that has helped to reach a coalition agreement between the Macedonian government and the Albanian minority. This is the type of activity that the EU should seek to repeat in other regions, including Africa. The EU should pay regular visits to the regions concerned in order to get a feel for how the security situation is developing and to determine the course of action that it should take. The implications for EU development aid can only be determined on the basis of a clear assessment of what is happening in a given country or region.

Challenges for the EU

The Council has an important role to play in ensuring coherence, since it has a significant impact on political decisions taken within the context of CFSP. Over the past few years the Council has been increasingly active with regard to Africa. The efforts of the Swedish Presidency were particularly impressive, especially in West Africa where the importance of political dialogue was underscored by sending a high level mission to take part in intensive discussions with the different actors there. This provided a good basis for the Belgian Presidency’s work in the Great Lakes region. The EU must respond to many challenges, but can only do so with a clear idea of what is happening and by engaging all actors – right down to the troops on the ground. Finally, it is important that those engaged in analysing conflicts from a theoretical point of view help identify certain contradictions, such as reconciling the principle of ownership with that of external engagement. We must address the responsibility we have not only to the people of Africa, but also to the citizens of the EU who are increasingly inquisitive of the aims and achievements of EU development aid.

Discussion

The discussion largely revolved around the EU’s responsibility with regard to African conflicts. Specific questions included the role of EU business interests in financing and sustaining wars in Africa.
through their involvement in the trade in illicit commodities, such as diamonds and coltan. Here it was suggested that the EU must look beyond its foreign policy to other policy areas that have an external element, such as trade, agriculture and environmental policy, which may be counter-productive to conflict prevention measures. It was noted that the EU is currently treating the illicit trade in diamonds as a trade issue rather than a security issue. This has contributed to an incoherent response by the EU. More generally, the role of the West in initiating, financing and thus fuelling war in Africa was questioned. In response Mr Kiplagat noted that although the West has played a significant role, the primary responsibility for change ultimately rested with Africans themselves. Furthermore, it was suggested that more emphasis should be placed on redressing economic injustice and investing in conflict prevention, and correspondingly less on relief and the military. Andreas Strub responded that poor conflict prevention could be as expensive as military action.

Part 2

Chair and introductory remarks
Glenys Kinnock, Member of the European Parliament and Vice-President of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly

Now that conflict prevention is firmly on the EU agenda, we can begin to develop more concrete mechanisms and commitments to ensure that objectives are translated into action. In particular we should look at Articles 7 and 11 of Cotonou with a view to mainstreaming conflict prevention across the EU policy spectrum.

Building civil society into EU conflict prevention mechanisms
Bizuwork Ketete, Saferworld/ Africa Peace Forum/ Inter Africa Group

“Solutions cannot be imposed from outside. Peacebuilding must come from within, while understanding the external causes of conflict and the various parties to it.”

The initial pressure for democratisation in Africa came from within civil society, and it has become increasingly empowered with the gradual replacement of repressive regimes with more democratic governments.

One of the root causes of conflict in Africa is that governments pursue policies that are not beneficial to society, and there are problems with political parties and systems in general. Governance structures and the capacity of states to deliver basic services to their people must therefore be assessed, along with the political space permitted to civil society and other non-state actors in the process. The history and evolution of civil societies and the space allocated to them differs from one country to the next, and civil society actors should be assessed individually and on their own merits.

Engaging Civil Society
The Cotonou Agreement is a major new instrument for structural co-operation between the EU and ACP countries. It marks a break from previous conventions such as Lomé in its full recognition of the range of important non-state actors in this co-operation. Cotonou includes a formal political commitment to involve civil society and other non-state actors, such as local authorities and the private sector. This involvement is essential if the EU is to accurately address the needs and priorities of beneficiary communities.

Article 7 of Cotonou provides several opportunities for engaging civil society. Firstly, it allows for participation in the planning and design of national development strategies for ACP countries. It also provides the opportunity to take part in the implementation and review of these programmes. It provides civil society with access to financial resources and offers capacity-building support. Article 11 focuses on mainstreaming conflict prevention and outlines a new focus for consultation and political dialogue. Despite these provisions, however, modalities or tools for operationalising Article 11, such as principles for dialogue and co-operation, have not been provided for in the Agreement. This is an important oversight that needs to be addressed.

There is a need for community-based early warning systems that understand and address root causes of conflict. Local roles in conflict resolution must be identified and assessed, as well as how conflicts affect civil society. Strategic alliances should be formed with civil society organisations in the south and North/South links between organisations committed to peacebuilding and conflict management should be supported. Lastly, supporting the engagement of civil society organisations in key forums where issues related to peacebuilding and conflict resolution are negotiated is crucial.
Moreover, there is little indication that the EU’s country assessments are sensitive to conflict or that the EU draws on Country Strategy Papers in its analysis. For example in the Horn region, Uganda and Ethiopia are the only countries that have actually developed Country Strategy Papers. Yet despite the recent major conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea, the Ethiopian Paper includes no provisions for peacebuilding or conflict management. More transparency in the consultation process is also required, as it is not clear at present exactly who is available for consultation.

EU delegations
The role of EU delegations has evolved from a more traditional (government-to-government) role to one that includes political dialogue, interfacing with civil society and enhancing local ownership. Human resources need to be aligned with overall objectives, however. Some delegations face significant staffing constraints, both qualitative and quantitative. These need to be overcome if delegations are to play a significant role in conflict prevention and peacebuilding processes in Africa.

The private sector
One of the key challenges for Africa is dealing with the clash between commercial and social imperatives. Civil society should play a role in enhancing the private sector so that there is a more judicious and responsible treatment of existing resources. The role of the private sector should be focused on poverty reduction capacity-building for all stakeholders, including the EU, the state and civil society.

The conflict prevention elements of the Cotonou Agreement
Athanassios Theodorakis, Deputy Director-General, DG Development, European Commission

“The Cotonou Agreement offers us the tools we need, but our capacity for action is ultimately dependent on the political will to act”

The Cotonou Agreement has established a new cooperative partnership between the EU and its ACP partners that emphasises systematic political dialogue and the importance of non-state actors. The EU is thus committed to pursuing an active policy of peacebuilding and to considerably enhancing its conflict prevention capacity in Africa. Cotonou has placed significant importance on regional mechanisms and the need to address root causes of violent conflict at an early stage.

The EU has considerable political means at its disposal for conflict prevention. These include development co-operation, external assistance, trade policy instruments, humanitarian aid, social and environmental policies, diplomatic instruments and political dialogue, co-operation with international partners and NGOs, as well as the new crisis management instruments. With plans to commit around €15 billion for external assistance over the next five years, it is clear that the financial capacity for conflict prevention is also substantial. The lack of political will remains the only restriction to using these instruments.

While the EU is already heavily engaged in conflict prevention, it must be more active in all areas. With this in mind, the Commission adopted a Communication on conflict prevention in April 2001 that reviews the main existing instruments and recommends specific actions. This year has also seen the adoption of a Rapid Reaction Mechanism in an effort to improve the Community’s ability to respond to crisis situations. The Mechanism will allow the EU to take quick initiatives in peacebuilding, reconstruction and development.

Respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law are the essential elements of the Cotonou Agreement and are crucial to preventing conflicts. The EU therefore intends to place increased emphasis on strengthening the basic institutions of the democratic state, particularly those of ‘fragile’ African countries.

Regional co-operation
The EU must also seek to improve regional economic and trade co-operation between the countries concerned. Regional co-operation can play an important role in reducing political tension, developing interdependence and creating greater mutual trust between conflict-prone countries. Increasing support to regional integration and in particular regional organisations that have a clear mandate for conflict prevention is therefore a priority of the EU. It is in this spirit that the European Commission has supported the Burundi peace negotiations and the Lusaka Peace Process in DRC, for instance. Another major priority is to better integrate conflict prevention in the Commission’s co-operation programmes. The ongoing programming exercise is crucial in this regard. The challenge here is to make more systematic and coordinated use of co-operation programmes to address root causes of conflicts.

Post-conflict situations
Post-conflict situations are also critically important. The EU continues to play an active role in helping countries emerging from conflicts, but it must work to become more effective. The Commission is currently readjusting and streamlining its
instruments, methods and internal institutional mechanisms in an effort to improve the links between relief and development aid as foreseen by the Cotonou Agreement. For instance, the Commission is already engaged in rehabilitation, demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration programmes in Ethiopia, Eritrea and Sierra Leone, and plans to do the same in the DRC. It must also address issues such as refugee return, de-mining and reconciliation.

Political dialogue
The political dialogue foreseen in Article 8 of Cotonou should include an exchange of views on crises and conflict situations, mediation and negotiation efforts and support for peace processes. This should help integrate the objectives of peace and democratic stability into EU assistance programmes. The dialogue will address certain economic and social phenomena, including the growth of criminal trade interests, whether in arms, drugs, diamonds or other high-value commodities, the exploitation of children as soldiers and trafficking in human beings. This political dialogue must also prevent, as far as possible, political disagreements or tensions from degenerating into armed conflict. The challenge is to intensify dialogue and transmit clear and strong messages so that our partners are informed of EU concerns and positions from the outset. This implies that the EU must speak with one voice.

International co-operation
Conflict prevention is too big a task for a single organisation. Effective coordination with international partners is vital. The Commission has just established a new framework for enhanced co-operation with the UN on conflict prevention and crisis management, which includes an exchange of analyses of actual or potential crises, co-operation in research, field co-ordination and training. The Commission recently participated in a United Nations Development Programme/Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDP/DPKO) fact-finding mission to the Great Lakes region in order to prepare for possible action on disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. Similar frameworks will have to be developed with other organisations active in the field of conflict prevention, such as the OAU/African Union. Finally, recognising that the initiative and ultimate responsibility rests with the national actors of the countries concerned, the EU is especially keen to support the principle of local ownership enshrined in the Cotonou Agreement.

Discussion
Glenys Kinnock concurred with Mr Theodorakis that more political will is needed on the part of the EU, as well as more consistency in its policy approach to Africa. She noted that there are significant differences in the way that Cotonou is implemented from one country to the next. She also said that the development committee of the European Parliament is prepared to allot far more funding for EU staff given that many problems are caused by the lack of capacity, both in terms of expertise and numbers on the ground. More people should also be working on Africa in the Council’s Policy Unit. She deplored the fact that the EU failed to send delegates to monitor the elections in Fiji.

Participants expressed concern about the possibility that the ACP rehabilitation line may be withdrawn completely from next year’s budget and argued that this would seriously jeopardise timely post-conflict efforts. Concern was also voiced about the fact that there is no specific mechanism for funding post-conflict rehabilitation from the European Development Fund. In response Mr Theodorakis explained that Cotonou allows for a more flexible use of funds and as such they should be available for all kinds of activities, including rehabilitation.

One participant addressed the role of oil in fuelling the conflict in Sudan and questioned if and how the EU was addressing this problem through the framework of the Cotonou Agreement’s political dialogue provisions? Mr Theodorakis noted that although the EU had established political dialogue with the Sudanese government last year, it has not yet included the sensitive issue of oil.
This workshop addressed the issue of how the EU can more effectively support peacebuilding and conflict prevention in the Horn of Africa, looking specifically at the issue of resource-based conflict and the challenges and opportunities for engaging civil society in policy and programme development.

**Conflict Prevention in the Horn of Africa**

Timnit Abraha, InterAfrica Group

The potential for conflict over access to and control of resources is becoming an increasingly important issue in the Horn of Africa. The lack of adequate land and water management policies, increasing scarcity of resources coupled with increased competition and regional insecurity all point to increasing levels of tension in the region, and risks which the EU will have to address if it is to contribute to the achievement of long-term stability.

Past and present experience suggests that when development, trade, aid and investment projects fail to adequately address root causes of conflict and vulnerability, inequality becomes increasingly entrenched and the potential for violence escalates.

Resource-based conflict risks

- **Regional perspective: the Nile basin**

One of the issues for the Horn that has led to mounting tensions over the last three decades is the equitable use and utilization of Nile water resources. The 1959 treaty between Sudan and Egypt addressed water sharing, but excluded Ethiopia which supplies 80% of Nile water flows. Ethiopia has therefore refused to accept the treaty. Partly as a result, Ethiopia has not been able to exploit Nile waters for large scale irrigation or for power supply development, which in turn has implications for poverty, conflict and development in a region characterised by food insecurity.

While it is now generally acknowledged that the risks of large scale inter-state conflict are reducing, the tensions over the Nile could conceivably lead to more localized internal and cross border strife, especially where competition between different users is not adequately managed. The need for regional solutions that address conflicting transboundary needs is therefore critical.

- **Local perspective: Laikipia District, Northern Kenya**

Laikipia is a district in the Rift Valley region in Kenya. It is a multi-ethnic tribal district that pastoralist communities share with others. Pressure on water and land resources have intensified with increased farming activities, rapid population growth, and periodic drought. Although violent conflicts in Laikipia have not reached the scale or intensity of those in many parts of the Horn of Africa, conflicts involving pastoralists associated with resource competition, cattle rustling, and extensive availability of small arms are nevertheless widespread and of increasing concern.

Efforts to prevent and reduce violent conflicts involving pastoralists in Laikipia and similar districts need to address conflict risks including land, governance and equitable access to resources. The development of effective action to tackle such causes of conflict is clearly challenging in the context of Laikipia or similar regions in Kenya and the Horn of Africa. It is bound to take years. However, serious attempts to address these problems can contribute substantially to conflict prevention and management if they are recognised as such by the communities involved, by the state and major donors.

and the competition between small-scale agriculturalists, commercial farmers and pastoralists is increasing. The elaboration of integrated water development programmes that support a range of livelihood systems is therefore imperative. Unfortunately, the EU has often been engaged in supporting national water projects that have largely targeted commercial and state interests at the expense of projects that would lead to enhanced food security and poverty alleviation. In Ethiopia, for instance, the EU has supported large-scale infrastructure projects that have largely overlooked the specific needs of poor and vulnerable communities and/or failed to address conflict risks. Indeed, EU engagement in Ethiopia's Awash Valley actually exacerbated the risk of violent conflict. Large scale EU-funded water resource development projects reduced Afar pastoralists' access to grazing land, giving rise to conflict between neighbouring pastoralist groups, between pastoralists and the regional government, and between the region and the state.

- **National perspective: Ethiopia's Awash Valley**

The potential for conflict over land and water resources is evident in most Horn countries. The region has vast areas of arid and semi-arid land

- **Local perspective: Laikipia District, Northern Kenya**

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Challenges and opportunities for engaging civil society in policy and programme development and implementation
Bizuwork Ketete, Inter-Africa Group/ Saferworld/ Africa Peace Forum

Civil society is fast developing in Africa, enabling increased popular participation. Where it is independent of the state and government, the engagement and empowerment of civil society can act as a bulwark for safeguarding democracy and ensuring transparency and accountability. While the term ‘civil society’ encompasses a range of non-state actors from trade unions and professional associations to non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the latter remain the driving force for peace and development in Africa.

In the Horn of Africa civil society groups are emerging as important actors and represent an enormous human resource base, which, if judiciously managed, could lead to profound political, social and economic progress. Their presence and role is however not uniform across the region. In some countries civil society is in its infancy, such as in Djibouti where the number of NGOs and civil society organizations is small but on the increase. In others, such as Ethiopia and Sudan, they have mainly been active in service delivery and are now moving into development. Finally, in Kenya and Uganda they have traditionally been active in development and are also engaged in public policy dialogue.

While in some states the power of civil society has progressively increased with the disappearance of repressive regimes, a lot more needs to be done to increase the accountability of the state to civil society. This situation has led to the development of a new generation of NGOs and civil society organizations dealing with issues of good governance, policy analysis, monitoring and evaluation, human rights and democracy that have the potential to act as a powerful force for change.

The Cotonou Agreement represents a significant opportunity to harness this force by providing for the engagement of civil society in policy and programme development and implementation. However, following an assessment of 96 organisations in 6 countries of the Horn region conducted by Saferworld in co-operation with Africa Peace Forum and InterAfrica Group, it is clear that the majority of these organisations were unaware of the existence of the ACP-EU partnership agreement. Thus, as a first step the EU needs to increase awareness among organisations of the opportunities available for involvement within the framework of Cotonou. Likewise, it will be important for civil society groups to organise themselves for this purpose.

The Cotonou Agreement also provides for support to the development of an active and organised civil society. However, when seeking to strengthen the role of civil society in the Horn of Africa in national and international policy and programme development, a number of key challenges will need to be addressed, including:

- The development of political space and democratic structures/legal frameworks for civil society participation within national and local governments, including enhanced information and access to decision-makers;
- Effective decentralisation and local government reform will be essential for empowering civil society and enhancing its involvement in decision-making processes. Civil society does not begin and end in capital cities;
- Building the capacity of governments to engage with civil society;
- Ensuring the independence of civil society from the state and government;
- Developing a culture of tolerance between groups, particularly where there is an ethnic base;
- Developing modalities of funding for civil society groups, particularly for advocacy work;
- Building and reinforcing the capacity of civil society groups with respect to policy analysis and research;
- Increasing awareness of the size, scope, strength and spread of civil society groups and NGOs;
- Supporting the developments of networks of civil society groups.

Discussion
The discussion explored some of the resource based conflict risks in the region that were not raised in the presentations. It was argued that it is vital that these risks be addressed within the framework of EU engagement in the region if it is to contribute to conflict prevention. Regarding Somalia, concerns were raised about the instability created by the export of charcoal and the depletion of marine resources through illegal fishing by fleets (including those of EU member states) off the Somali coast. Access to trade infrastructure such as ports and markets was highlighted as a problem for land-locked Ethiopia and Somalia, whose economies are negatively impacted by livestock bans from Saudi Arabia.
Workshop 2: The Great Lakes
Chair: Nelly Maes, Member of the European Parliament
Co-chair: Jane Backhurst, World Vision EU Liaison Office

This workshop focused on the shortcomings of EU intervention in the conflicts of the Great Lakes region. It emphasised the need for the EU to engage with and empower civil society actors to become more involved in peacebuilding and conflict prevention efforts.

The impact of EU policy on the conflicts of the region
Pastor Mukambu Ya Namwisi
Executive Secretary, Council for Peace and Reconciliation, Democratic Republic of Congo

The Great Lakes region suffers from multi-dimensional conflict. Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are countries where numerous rebel movements and military groups are involved in conflict each day. This tragedy in the Great Lakes has been underway for a decade and the terrifying figures of casualties attest to its gravity. There have been two million deaths in the DRC since 1998 alone and hundreds of thousands have been killed in Burundi. Bujumbura has been cleaved in half and there is a great deal of political confusion. The Great Lakes region therefore suffers from endemic conflict that has sucked in many neighbouring countries, thus presenting grave problems for the wider region.

It is difficult for people from the region to understand the concept of conflict prevention because many of them have known nothing but war. The EU needs to realise that hatred, often instigated by government propaganda, pervades the lives of Congolese, Rwandans and Burundians today. There are those however who wish to create a space for reconciliation and several private organisations, both secular and religious, are working to promote peace in their communities. The Council for Peace and Reconciliation, Democratic Republic of Congo (CPRC) and other civil society groups are trying to empower and encourage local people to enhance initiatives for peace. This must start by breaking down the extreme prejudices that exist in the Great Lakes region.

One important issue that needs to be addressed is the alarming number of widows, orphans and child soldiers in the region. In the DRC, local efforts - particularly those of civil society groups - are beginning to respond to these problems, even in the context of war. The EU must develop ways to identify these social and religious actors and work with them, enabling them to communicate issues to governments.

The general feeling among civil society actors in the Great Lakes working to facilitate peace in their respective communities is that the EU has failed to draw on their knowledge and experience. Formal dialogue is already underway in most cases, but EC delegations need to increase contacts with grassroots civil society groups. The EU should for instance facilitate round-table discussions with the main stakeholders in the conflict. It should look to the example of Rwanda, where people are beginning to engage in a process of reconciliation due in part to the fact that there has been proper consultation with civil society.

Developing a coherent regional policy and mechanisms for political dialogue with civil society
Jan Vanhaekelom, Advisor to the Belgian State Secretary for Development Co-operation

Donor Consensus

The high-level meeting of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development agreed two sets of policy recommendations in 1997 and 2001 that call on donors and other development actors to improve coherence and integrate actions to prevent conflicts and build peace. This coherence should extend to all areas of foreign policy, including trade, finance, diplomacy, military and development co-operation. A better understanding of the political economy of violent conflict and greater coordination of decision-making in conflict prevention is also required.

There are certain principles for peacebuilding that the donor community should be aware of and try to apply in conflict-prone or conflict-ridden countries. Firstly, constructive engagement and creative approaches to peacebuilding initiatives should be adopted. Although sanctions should not be excluded, these should be carefully considered and well targeted. There is also a need for greater transparency and to actively engage women, men and youth in dialogue at all levels in order to ensure ownership of development and peacebuilding processes.
The evolution of the EU’s role in the region

Bruno Hanses, Foreign Relations Division, Africa Desk, Council of the European Union

The Council is currently assessing its possible role in conflict prevention in the Great Lakes region in preparation for the Council of Ministers meeting in October. Mr Hanses offered some insights into how these preparations are evolving.

Democratic Republic of Congo

In July the General Affairs Council agreed on a gradual resumption of assistance to the DRC. This aid should be progressive and balanced, and should extend to all regions in the DRC that are able to absorb it. A balanced approach should mean providing more direct support to the Congolese population rather than the Kabila regime. Specifically, the disarmament, demobilisation, réintegration and relocation (DDRR) of former combatants is both the greatest priority and the greatest challenge facing the EU in the DRC. The EU needs to coordinate with the Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank and IMF) and other donor organisations to ensure a parallel and coherent approach. The EU will support and facilitate the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, due to start up again on 15 October in Addis Ababa, and plans to co-finance this process. It should also be prepared to support actions falling within the dialogue’s framework. For instance, the EU could consider renewed financial support for the joint military commission engaged in facilitating the retreat of foreign troops from the DRC. Finally, humanitarian aid should be increased.

Burundi

The EU has already committed a significant amount of money to Burundi. The priority is to support the transitional government and also to encourage Nelson Mandela’s mediation efforts in the peace negotiations. November 1st (the target date for ushering in a three-year transition government) will be an important deadline for the dialogue on a ceasefire between the transitional government and the opposition army. The EU plans to contribute to the DDRR programme, and also to provide support to the Arusha Summit follow-up committee. The EU may support an inter-regional force to protect returned politicians once the idea has reached greater maturity. Humanitarian aid will be necessary, especially in facilitating the repatriation of Burundian refugees from Tanzania.

Rwanda

The EU adopted a National Indicative Programme for Rwanda amounting to 110 million euro in March 2001. This will be earmarked for the establishment of a judiciary system, reconciliation, human rights, the enabling of a census for elections and economic reform. The EU will support the “gacaca” traditional courts system in Rwanda and will assist the demobilisation of armed forces and rebel ex-combatants who did not take part in the genocide. The EU has offered political and financial support to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and plans to facilitate regional co-operation programmes.

The EU needs to concentrate on developing policies that facilitate regional peacebuilding. To do so it must work with governments and civil society actors at a local level. The EU should also develop a common response to the United Nations report on the exploitation of natural resources in the DRC. Support for the Kimberley Process to regulate the illicit trade in conflict diamonds should provide an example for tackling similar trades in other natural resources associated with armed conflicts. It should also support international efforts to combat the proliferation of small arms. Finally, it is recommended that the EU pursue the idea of an international conference on peace, stability and development in the region, so long as this complements the existing Lusaka and Arusha Peace Processes.

Response by Cyril Musila and discussion

Cyril Musila of the Centre de Recherche sur la Paix (Paris) opened the discussion by asking those present to consider how the EU could encourage a perspective for peace among populations caught up in day-to-day conflict. Among the points raised
were the importance of focusing on capacity-building for regional and local civil society groups and the need to address specifically those countries in which governments have little or no precedent of working with civil society. Other comments concerned the lack of cohesion in the EU’s response in conflict areas of the Great Lakes region. One participant noted that conflicts have been dealt with on a case-by-case basis and out of self-interest, with disregard for the long-term perspective.

Concerning the DRC, clarification was sought as to how the EU intends to support the population as a whole without lending support to the government. The response was that the EU neither opposes nor overtly supports the government, but is looking to fund projects run by local groups and organisations in regions not controlled by the government. The chair also highlighted the importance of having a credible and valid opposition to the government, and commented that local elections should be made more of a priority. If a country is not able to conduct democratic elections at local level, then it will be unable to successfully carry them out at a national level.

**Workshop 3: West Africa**

Chair: Bob Van den Bos, Member of the European Parliament

This workshop examined the lessons learned from Mali and Sierra Leone. In both cases it was noted that civil society, including women's and youth groups, were key actors in attempts to improve governance, uphold human rights, mediate and engage in weapons collection. It was argued that the EU should be willing to support such ‘risky’ initiatives in addition to tackling the transnational and macro-economic causes of conflict.

**Civil Society examples of good practice and an assessment of EU conflict prevention policies and programmes in the region: the case of Mali and Sierra Leone**

**Mali**

Fatoumata Maiga, President, Association des Femmes pour les initiatives de Paix, Mali

Civil Society in Mali

The role of civil society, and in particular the role of women, has proved itself crucial in the consolidation of peace in Mali following the civil war. Ninety per cent of war victims are civilians, mainly women, children and the elderly. Civil society in Mali is primarily representative of these vulnerable groups. They know that a durable peace will only come if they assume their own responsibility in the fight against belligerents. Malinese civil society has made a collective step towards integrating all the security dimensions of conflict: the effective collection of weapons, respect for human rights, mediation, supporting good governance, and bolstering human and socio-economic rights. The mediation role of civil society associations was decisive in bringing about peace since it mobilised people and compensated for the failures of the state.

Civil society in action

As an important actor for peace, civil society has in turn contributed to the reinforcement of good governance in Mali. It has provided a counterweight to the power of the state, while at the same time providing important initiatives of its own. In particular, mobilising the population for peace has supported the process of appropriating public security in Mali. Traditional culture has a very large role to play in this process, since customs and traditions are fundamental resources for the development and resolution of conflicts. Because of its proximity to the population and its capacity to listen to their needs, civil society has been able to prioritise questions concerning conflicts over natural resources on the peace agenda in Mali.

The role of women

The important role of women in achieving peace must not be underestimated. They are the ‘centre of gravity’ in Malinese society, as elsewhere in Africa. In their roles as the wives or mothers of combatants they have an enormous responsibility in the pursuit of peace. In Mali, the government has astutely called on these natural ‘allies’. Women have participated, through both spectacular and less palpable actions, in the restoration of relations between the government and the Touareg resistance. Today, women work in disarmament by encouraging civilians to surrender their small arms, which continue to circulate in great quantities throughout the country.

Transnational dimension

There is a clear regional dimension to peace. Weapons used in the civil wars of Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea have ended up in Mali, in Senegal (supplying the conflict in Casamance) and in Ivory Coast. The response to war must therefore be transnational, as must the fight against all its manifestations including arms trafficking, population shifts, and humanitarian catastrophes.
Sierra Leone
Dr James D. Rogers
Deputy Minister of Development and Economic Planning, Sierra Leone

Conflicts, instability and social disintegration are a direct result of poverty, inequity, marginalisation and exclusion, poor governance, and the violation of human rights and the rule of law. The Sierra Leone experience is but one example of this. The Lomé Peace Accord, brokered with the help of the international community, provides a framework for the sustainable resolution of the conflict.

Current political and economic context
The dire economic situation in Sierra Leone has been an important source of conflict and will be an equally key factor in resolving it. Current economic and social indicators such as GDP per capita, infant mortality rates and access to safe water are unacceptable and destabilising. These are being addressed in part through the work of the National Commission for Reconstruction, Resettlement and Reintegration (NCRRR), which is now reaching a greater proportion of the country than before. Furthermore, access by humanitarian agencies to former Revolutionary United Front (RUF) strongholds in the north and east of the country is finally bringing much-needed basic goods and services to a population that had been isolated for a prolonged period.

Challenges facing Sierra Leone and its partners
The main challenge lies in the provision of increased and sustained support to the country’s efforts to achieve sustainable peace, macroeconomic recovery, poverty eradication, good governance and sustainable human development. One example is the provision of housing. This was meagre even before the war, but is now almost completely destroyed. Unfortunately, international partners have proven very reticent about intervening in problems such as housing, possibly because they do not see the use in it or they do not have the necessary mandates.

A peaceful resolution of the conflict, and a return to normalcy has been singled out as a primary policy objective of the government of Sierra Leone. The European Commission and other donors should focus their efforts on macroeconomic renovation, and on development programmes. An action programme for Sierra Leone for 2001-2010 details 4 goals:

- Achieving a more equitable distribution of income and wealth;
- Attaining a higher degree of self-sustaining economic growth.

These goals will be implemented through a so-called Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (IPRSP), which is in the process of being developed. As the peace process takes hold, humanitarian needs will be reduced. An exit strategy must be found, particularly over the transition phase of the IPRSP. For example a bridge must be built between emergency activities in the health sector financed by the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) and the recently approved Health Sector Support Project, which, due to bureaucracy, may not become operational until the end of 2002. These bureaucratic issues must be addressed urgently to maximise the use of aid resources.

If past performance is something to go by, the prospects for the future of the EC-Sierra Leone partnership are encouraging. Projects that were disrupted or delayed as a result of the conflict are currently being reactivated, and others are being prepared, for instance in the areas of power, roads, water and rehabilitation. Projects supported by the EC have been on the whole successful. A recent success involved the provision of ad hoc assistance to the Accountant General’s Department in the Ministry of Finance. Support was mainly in the form of technical assistance and complementary equipment and software, and has resulted in improvements in budget control and expenditure discipline. The programme has also been helpful in re-establishing the confidence of the IMF and World Bank in Sierra Leone.

Much more can be done, however. The EC, like other development partners, must become more innovative in delivering assistance to countries in conflict. The partners should brace themselves to go into areas that have hitherto been considered very sensitive or ‘no-go’ areas, such as the sensitisation and education of civil society, and support to women and youth through training.

Nearly three decades of poor political and economic government has led Sierra Leone to where it is today. This must be stopped by investing more in conflict prevention, and represents a challenge not merely for the government and civil society of the country itself, but also for development partners such as the EC. These must invest resources in conflict prevention programmes, particularly in areas such as civic education, information and communication technology and youth development.
Response by Peter Beck Christiansen
Mr Christiansen addressed some of the problems associated with conflict prevention, particularly how to integrate it into the Commission's Country Strategy Papers. While acknowledging the shortcomings of EU development assistance, he attributed this to the lack of training provided for delegates, the problem of understaffing, and the fact that the notion of conflict prevention is a relatively new one. Mr Christiansen spoke briefly of the work achieved by the European Commission in various West African countries, such as the successful prevention of conflict in the Ivory Coast. He also voiced his concerns about the alarming situation in Nigeria and Togo, briefly detailing the financial and other assistance offered by the EU.

Concluding Plenary Session
Challenges for the Belgian Presidency: Conclusions and Follow-up
Chair: Max van den Berg, Member of the European Parliament and Vice Chair of the Committee on Development and Co-operation

This final session introduced the Belgian Presidency’s policy priorities concerning Africa: focusing on the Great Lakes region; developing the Europe-Africa dialogue; tackling conflict prevention as a horizontal issue; and making development and humanitarian assistance more conflict sensitive. In conclusion, NGO representatives summarised the principle findings of the regional working groups and identified common concerns and opportunities for the EU. They stressed the importance of support for and engagement of civil society in the development of policy and the operationalisation of the Cotonou Agreement as well as the need for building capacity and political will within the EU.

Introductory remarks from the Belgian Presidency
Frank De Coninck, Director General ad interim for bilateral relations and international economics and Africa Desk Director, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

In his presentation Ambassador De Coninck outlined three policy priorities concerning Africa that the Belgian Presidency plans to emphasise.

The first involves the regional dimension. The Belgian Presidency has chosen to focus on the Great Lakes region of Africa, specifically Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Rwanda. There is a need for the EU and its African partners to adopt a more coherent approach towards the region. The General Affairs Council of 14 May mandated the Belgian Presidency to develop a conflict prevention concept focused specifically on the Great Lakes. The Presidency also aims to ensure that international attention remains focused on the humanitarian needs of the region and to continue to support ongoing initiatives such as the Inter-Congolese Dialogue and the Arusha and Lusaka Agreements.

The second priority area concerns dialogue between Europe and Africa. The focus here is on pursuing and furthering the various aspects of the existing Europe-Africa dialogue. Specifically, on 11 October 2001 there will be a mid-term ministerial review to follow up the first Africa-Europe Summit held in Cairo on 34 April 2000. The meeting will focus on eight main themes of particular concern, including conflict prevention. There is also a need to develop more structured contacts between the EU and sub-regional organisations in Africa, such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and with the New African Initiative adopted at the OAU Summit on 11 July 2001. The EU plans to hold a preliminary exchange of views with the steering committee of this new initiative on the conclusions of the Organisation of African Unity’s summit in Lusaka and the G7/G8 framework in Genoa, both of which took place in July 2001.

The third priority of the Belgian Presidency is that of promoting horizontal themes relevant to Africa (such as conflict prevention and resolution, food security, pandemics, debt relief, etc.) within the framework of various EU working groups. The Belgian Presidency is expected to follow up the work of the Swedish Presidency in ensuring that

2 SADC member-states are Angola, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
3 ECOWAS members include Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo.
4 This is the result of the merger of the Millennium Action Plan inspired by South Africa, Nigeria and Algeria and the Omega Plan for Africa: an African strategy for globalisation developed by Senegal.
Conflict prevention receives continued attention and emphasis. Belgium also plans to engage African partners in exploring the potential of the political dialogue mechanism enshrined in Article 8 of the Cotonou Agreement, as well as other mechanisms such as Article 96 concerning human rights violations and respect for democratic principles and the rule of law.

Common themes arising from the regional workshops: Horn of Africa, Great Lakes and West Africa

The following section provides an overview of the main issues and recommendations that emerged from the reports of the three regional workshops. The workshop rapporteurs were Josephine Odera (Horn of Africa), Ladislas Bizimana (Great Lakes) and Christiane Agboton-Johnson (West Africa).

Distinguishing between policy and programme levels to achieve greater coherence

It was felt that the policy level should focus on member state coordination in their approach to countries in Africa, whereas the programme level should concentrate on improving civil society access to EU funding and developing partnerships to meet the common objective of preventing conflicts in Africa.

Addressing resource-based conflicts

More work is required to mainstream resource-based conflict prevention through an integrated approach to resource management. This involves addressing a range of conflict risks by looking at aspects such as income diversification, gender, land reform, animal and human health, governance, education and cross border security issues.

A regional, integrated approach

Many, if not most conflicts in Africa are of a regional nature. As such any conflict prevention strategy must be informed by and developed based on broader regional perspectives. In particular, the EU could offer greater support for the conflict prevention strategies of regional and sub-regional organisations and institutions in Africa, such as ECOWAS and SADC.

The need for transparent dialogue

It is important that a tripartite dialogue take place between states, civil society and donors to identify problems and respond to the actual needs and dynamics of conflicts in Africa, while keeping a long-term perspective. This dialogue must be transparent and inclusive. Likewise, civil society should ensure that it is transparent in its operations.

Engaging civil society

All three workshops highlighted the challenges and opportunities for engaging civil society actors in the development and implementation of such a policy. They underscored the importance of ensuring that this engagement was broad and inclusive. Civil society should be involved across the board, from decision-making to policy implementation and evaluation, and should include actors from across the political and socio-economic spectrum. The importance of generating local ownership of activities by supporting a range of small-scale community projects that work directly with civil society actors, in addition to large-scale sectoral support, was underscored.

Capacity-building is crucial

All of the workshops stressed the importance of EU support for capacity-building initiatives focusing on organisations and institutions at both regional and national level that address conflict. This includes the need to develop transparent modalities for the funding and capacity-building of civil society groups. This involves ensuring complementarity and coherence with the activities of EU member states and other donors. It was suggested that endowment funds could be set up to ensure ongoing support for initiatives of well established and trusted NGOs. Capacity-building should also extend to the EU itself by ensuring that appropriately qualified staff are engaged in formulating regional policies that are sensitive to conflict-related issues.

Informing citizens in African countries

More information needs to be provided to citizens of ACP countries. There is evidence that the vast majority of people are unaware of the Cotonou Agreement, let alone its provisions relating to conflict prevention and peacebuilding. The EU should consider supporting initiatives aimed at informing and generating greater awareness among civil society actors in ACP countries as well as the broader public so as to encourage involvement.

Conclusions: Common concerns and opportunities for improvement

Paul Eavis, Saferworld and Andrew Sherriff, International Alert

The speakers coordinated their presentations and divided them into several broad, crosscutting themes. These included:
1. Ensuring progress on key overarching policy issues and priorities in the EU;
2. Operationalising frameworks for engagement on identified priority areas;
3. The need for capacity-building; and  
4. Ensuring political will.

Andrew Sherriff began with a discussion of the key overarching policy issues and priorities in the EU in this field and how progress can be ensured. He cited the need to promote a coherent approach to conflict prevention in Africa among member states and between member states and the Commission. This must mean more than simply operationalising the Cotonou Agreement; it must encompass the various factors that make up a coherent conflict prevention policy, extending beyond development assistance. As noted in the three workshops, a coherent policy approach requires the support for and engagement of civil society.

The second theme involved operationalising frameworks for engagement on these identified priority areas. Mr Sherriff cited the need for a profound awareness of the situation “on the ground” for engagement to be effective. This requires sound and thorough analysis and a critical dialogue involving the whole range of stakeholders. Of relevance here is the implementation of specific provisions in the Cotonou Agreement that call for the integration of civil society actors in political dialogue, such as Article 8. This dialogue should include issues such as arms proliferation, military expenditures, the role of security forces, etc., which affect conflict-ridden countries. Moreover, this cannot be treated as a one-off process; it must be sustainable. The EU needs to adopt an open, all-embracing consultation process defined by a set of established guidelines. Consultations must include marginalized groups, which generally requires that EU representatives in third countries are aware of the situation beyond the national capitals.

Paul Eavis went on to discuss how capacity-building is essential to ensuring that conflict prevention and peacebuilding strategies are fruitful. There is a clear need for capacity-building at all levels, from regional organisations in Africa to the national and sub-national level within specific ACP countries. Capacity-building could involve training programmes in conflict prevention and peacebuilding for central government officials and district administrators. The EU has proven reluctant to support NGOs in Africa. This reluctance needs to be overcome if civil society is to play an effective role in the EU’s conflict prevention policy towards Africa. Finally, capacity-building should also target EU delegations in ACP countries, which tend to be under-staffed and lack specific conflict prevention and peacebuilding skills.

The final issue concerned the need to ensure political will among member states and the EU to keep conflict prevention in Africa on the agenda. Specifically, this should involve following up on the work of the Swedish and Belgian Presidencies at the institutional level, for instance in the Council’s annual orientation debate. Mr Eavis pointed out that to date only one staff member has been assigned to work on Africa in the Council’s Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, whereas an entire unit is devoted to the Western Balkans alone. This reflects the low priority currently given to Africa despite the numerous conflicts underway on that continent. Again, the need for dedicated resources was mentioned. While development assistance to Africa is on the decline, donors operating in the same country could work together to determine how they could optimise their combined resources and allocate funds to conflict prevention and peacebuilding programmes.

**Follow-up: How the Belgian Presidency plans to build a more coherent EU conflict prevention policy in Africa**

Eddy Boutmans, Belgian Secretary of State for Development Co-operation

Mr Boutmans noted that over the past few years the EU has been developing conflict prevention and peacebuilding instruments within the different pillars of the Union and at various levels. His speech addressed several issues of priority for the Belgian Presidency to illustrate how the EU has been active in this realm and how the Belgian Presidency plans to improve on the record to date.

**Development assistance**

Any starting point for a more serious commitment to conflict prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding in Africa must involve first and foremost the commitment of collective resources and joint know-how on the part of the EU and its member states. In the field of development cooperation, the link between poverty and violent conflict was long overlooked, and as a result the instruments and tools of development cooperation were not well adapted to conflicts and their dynamics. As a response, the development committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) developed recommendations on how to integrate conflict prevention and peacebuilding into development assistance.
Cotonou Agreement
The Cotonou Agreement between the EU and ACP countries signed in June 2000 offers the potential to develop an integrated approach aimed at prevention, management and resolution of conflicts. The Agreement contains specific conflict-related provisions, such as Article 11 on Peacebuilding policies, conflict prevention and resolution, and integrates principles such as partnership, programming and regional cooperation. Cotonou is about developing new inclusive forms of partnership. It underlines the concept of ownership, stressing that external assistance must build on and not substitute for national capacities, resources and initiatives. Cotonou is also based on a concept of inclusive partnership involving dialogue with all layers of society. It therefore offers the possibility of broadening political dialogue and developing strategic partnerships with those segments of civil society that can act as building blocks for peace.

As such, the Belgian Presidency began with a large conference that included civil society representatives, EU member state and ACP country representatives. This was an opportunity to bring together all actors – both governmental and non-governmental – including from countries that have little or no tradition of working with civil society.

Humanitarian assistance and development
Mr Boutmans noted that violent conflicts seldom follow a linear logic from crisis to post-crisis stabilisation, and that the EU’s development programming instruments have been inflexible in this regard. In theory the Cotonou Agreement will allow for greater flexibility in programming, for instance by combining structural co-operation and humanitarian assistance. Programming instruments need to be adapted in order for this flexibility to apply in practice, however. The Belgian government has developed a step-by-step approach in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) that seeks to rehabilitate vital functions of the state and critical areas of governance, while also developing a strategic partnership with non-state actors.

The regional dimension of violent conflicts is also important to consider, given cross-border ramifications such as the proliferation of arms, refugees, rebel groups, militias and soldiers, diseases and trafficking in natural resources, to name but a few. The connection between actors in the region and beyond and their contribution to the dynamics of conflict must be made in order to tackle these problems effectively. These same concerns should inform aid programmes in countries involved in regional conflicts.

The Belgian, Swedish and Portuguese presidencies commissioned case studies of six conflict-ridden ACP countries (Somalia, Sudan, Guinea-Bissau, Rwanda, DRC and Burundi) in order to ascertain the conflict prevention and peacebuilding potential of the Cotonou Agreement. The results offered a basis for dialogue concerning the potential adaptation and improvement of existing instruments and the approach that Europe should take towards ACP countries in conflict. As a follow-up, the Belgian Presidency will bring together 200 experts and practitioners to examine and compare the major findings and recommendations of the case studies on 1-2 October 2001. Furthermore, the Belgian Presidency plans to feed in the operational conclusions of this conference to the Development Ministers’ Council meeting on 8 November.

Improving coherence in EU policies towards conflict-ridden ACP countries means more than improving its development co-operation response. Coordination with other policy sectors such as trade, finance and foreign affairs is essential to ensuring a more integrated approach towards conflict prevention, management, resolution and peacebuilding. An integrated approach will not simply fall into place, however. Policies need to be implemented in the field in order to ascertain their relevance and efficacy. Belgium has opted to put the Great Lakes region at the fore of its foreign and development policies to provide a test-bed for these new approaches.

While Mr Boutmans concentrated on these specific priorities, he noted that the Belgian Presidency is aware that there are other issues that will require attention in order to ensure greater coherence. These include the reinforcement of EC delegations, the effective decentralisation of management and decision-making mechanisms, and increased inter-institutional co-operation with the United Nations and other regional and international organisations.
IMPROVING COHERENCE IN EU EXTERNAL POLICY
Héike Schneider, European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO)

The need for more coherence

The EU disposes of a whole range of instruments to prevent conflicts: development co-operation and external assistance, trade policy, humanitarian aid, social and environmental policies. With regard to Africa most of these instruments are grouped under the Cotonou Agreement, the comprehensive co-operation agreement concluded between the EU and 77 countries from Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP countries).

Another policy area that is very important for conflict prevention is the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). In recent years the EU has developed several instruments in the CFSP framework, which it might use to prevent conflicts in Africa. This year the EU created the Rapid Reaction Mechanism, which allows the Commission to quickly disburse funds in the event of a crisis and support a wide range of short-term actions such as fact-finding missions and mediation activities. The external relations capacity of the Council has been strengthened through the establishment of the Policy Planning and Early Warning Unit, which provides analysis and strategic options for the High Representative of CFSP. Another potentially important conflict prevention tool is the deployment of special representatives. Examples include the special representative for the Great Lakes, Mr Ajello, and for the Middle East, Mr Moratinos. Taken together, the different instruments of the CFSP and Cotonou put the EU in an excellent position to tackle the various root causes and aggravating factors that can lead to outbreaks of violent conflict.

The difficulty the EU faces is that to be effective all these instruments need to be employed in a coherent way. Whereas the Commission has begun to mainstream conflict prevention into its development co-operation policies and the Cotonou agreement and whereas the EU has developed instruments to prevent conflicts under its CFSP, the EU still needs to link these policies more closely. Conflict prevention provisions in the Cotonou Agreement and the CFSP are important. But it is equally important to bridge the gap between these two policy areas. The full potential of EU conflict prevention policy can only be realised once the CFSP and development co-operation instruments are employed in a more coherent way. This is not just a matter of common sense, it is also a legal requirement. Article 3 of the Treaty of the EU requires the Union to ‘ensure the consistency of its external activities as a whole in the context of external relations, security, economic and development policies.’

Linking CFSP with Cotonou

The need for strong links between Cotonou and CFSP has been stressed in many official documents and decisions of the Commission and the Council. However, few concrete recommendations have been made on how to bridge the gap between the two policy areas. This can in part be explained by the complex institutional context of the EU and the challenge of forging links between a number of institutional actors. The Commission needs to ensure policy coherence across its Directorate Generals for Development and External Relations (DG Relex), as well as DG Trade and the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) and furthermore to ensure that these policies complement the Council’s CFSP policies, as designed and implemented by the member states.

So far the Commission has been trying to achieve coherence through the college of Commissioners, the highest decision-making body of the Commission. The Council tries to achieve coherence through the COREPER, which brings together the permanent representatives of the member states and through the General Affairs Council. The problem, however, is that no ‘body’ is in a position to bridge the gap between the Commission and the Council. Without this link it will be difficult to deliver institutional co-ordination in the face of any crisis. There are however at least four possible ways of constructing the necessary bridging infrastructure.

1. Crisis task forces

EU officials working on the same crisis are often part of different Directorate Generals (DGs) or even different institutions. For example, there are desk officers for the Balkans in DG Relex, ECHO and in the Council. This can lead to incoherent EU policy and action.

Sarah Bayne explores this in more depth in the next section.
In its communication on conflict prevention the Commission suggests that a pilot system be set up in close co-operation with the Council Policy Unit. This would encourage a regular exchange of information between Commission, Council Policy Unit and the member state desk officers, for two unstable areas: the Balkans and the Great Lakes. This system could be extended to other areas where there is a risk of a violent conflict.

**Recommendation:**

- Establish crisis task forces when conflict indicators and early warning analysis suggest that a country or a region is at risk of descending into violent conflict. Such task forces would foster coherence insofar as they would bring together all the relevant staff working on a particular region or country from DG Development, DG Relex, ECHO, DG Trade, the Council and member states. These groups should report to the General Affairs Council if the situation in a country or region deteriorates and give input to the orientation debate in the Council at the beginning of each Presidency. The meetings of these groups could be co-ordinated by the crisis management unit in DG Relex.

### 2. Preventive action meetings

The Göteborg European Council asked the Council to schedule a broad consideration of potential conflict issues at the outset of each Presidency, including at the time of the yearly orientation debate. These meetings should be prepared with assistance from the High Representative of CFSP, relevant Council bodies, including the Political and Security Committee (PSC), and the Commission. Their objective would be to identify priority areas and regions for EU preventive actions. The Policy Unit in the Council has already started to hold consultation meetings with NGOs in advance of the orientation debates. So far however, the Commission has not been involved in these meetings.

**Recommendation:**

- Hold bi-annual early warning meetings between the Council, the Commission and civil society to define priority areas for conflict prevention.

### 3. A conflict prevention report

The EU can only achieve a more coherent conflict prevention policy once it has an overview of how its different policies impact on conflicts and once it knows which conflict prevention measures work under what circumstances. While the country task forces would develop this knowledge for the specific region they are working on, it is also important to bring this knowledge together and to document it. To provide such an overview the EU could draft an annual conflict prevention report.

Such a conflict prevention report would serve two principal purposes. First, it would increase the visibility of the Union's conflict prevention work. Raising the profile of the EU’s engagement in conflict prevention would in turn help stimulate public support for this work and keep it high on the political agenda. Secondly, the report would allow the EU to learn from past experience and to examine how and why certain measures have reduced tensions while others have not or have even exacerbated them.

**Recommendation:**

- Produce a conflict prevention report outlining EU policy towards various crises and give an overview of the measures supported by the EU as well as an evaluation of their impact on the crisis.

### 4. Mechanisms for institutional learning

While it is inevitable that EU policy will always be incoherent to some degree it is important to reduce incoherence to the absolute minimum and to make sure that the EU is at least aware of any policy incoherence. As it is difficult for the EU to track the impact of all its policy decisions, mechanisms need to be established that allow other actors to report to the EU on possibly unintended consequences of EU policies.

**Recommendation:**

- Establish a mechanism for complaints about EU aid and other external policies with particular reference to how they impact conflict-affected regions. Such a mechanism for compiling complaints should be open to contributions from civil society actors as well as ACP representatives and possibly be managed by the European Parliament. The Commission should then be obliged to investigate complaints and report back to the European Parliament.
The recently signed Cotonou Agreement sets out the parameters for the EU’s trade and development co-operation with 77 African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries. In contrast to earlier agreements the Cotonou Agreement now provides a solid institutional and legal framework to address conflict prevention, management and resolution. This is not only a reflection of the increasing importance given to these issues within the broader EU framework and growing recognition of the relationship between development and conflict, but also a reflection of the increasingly political nature of the ACP-EU partnership.

Peace building, conflict prevention and resolution policies are explicitly dealt with in a separate article of the Agreement (Article 11) which outlines undertakings to address the root causes of conflicts, strengthen the democratic legitimacy of governments, support the demobilisation and reintegration of former combatants, tackle the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and provide support for an active and organised civil society. The Cotonou Agreement also acknowledges the importance of allowing civil society to contribute to the development process. Experience within ACP countries has shown that the inclusion of non-state actors within policy-making processes is a major issue in enabling both the EU and ACP partners to better tackle the root causes of conflict.

In addition to the articles on conflict prevention and the inclusion of non-state actors, Cotonou seeks to deepen and widen the present political dialogue between the ACP states and the EU, to work out more flexible and diversified institutional arrangements for dialogue and to involve non-state actors in this process. This dialogue will allow partners to assess progress on human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law (the so-called essential elements of the partnership) and can address issues such as peace, conflict prevention and the arms trade. Promoting constructive engagement may help to avoid recourse to measures of last resort, such as the suspension of aid.

The real test of this joint commitment to long-term conflict prevention policies within ACP states will be the extent to which the EU is able to implement the conflict prevention elements of Cotonou in practice. Unfortunately, experience to date is not all positive. The EU has largely failed to effectively mainstream conflict prevention in programmes and projects and ensure coherence of its activities. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that poorly designed and implemented EU development and trade policies have in the past exacerbated tensions in society and increased the risk of violent conflict.

The following sections will identify a number of opportunities and challenges for the effective implementation of the conflict prevention elements of the Cotonou Agreement and put forward a number of recommendations for improved action.

**Implementing the conflict prevention elements of the Cotonou Agreement: Challenges and recommendations**

1. **Political dialogue**

The effective implementation of a deeper and wider political dialogue within the framework of the Cotonou Agreement represents a real challenge for the actors involved, most significantly in countries where there is conflict, or the threat of conflict. In the past, where dialogue has occurred it has been based on a narrow set of issues, primarily linked to political conditionalities. An example of this was when the EU invoked the suspension clause of the previous Lomé Agreement (Article 366a) following evidence of violations of the essential elements of the agreement. Furthermore, this dialogue was organised in a rigid and formalised manner, such as via high-level ministerial meetings. The key for the implementation of Cotonou will be to move towards a more flexible and multi-level dialogue that can facilitate the management of the partnership arrangement and as an instrument of conflict prevention.

**Recommendations:**

- Political dialogue should be informed by a sound understanding of the political situation and conflict risks. It should be inclusive and multi-level (i.e. involving regional, national and local authorities as well as non-state actors) and conducted as transparently as possible.
• Where possible, political dialogue should be backed up with concrete assistance in the areas targeted by the dialogue, such as human rights, democratisation or security sector reform. This would involve a close linkage between the political dialogue and the process of strategic planning and programming of assistance.

2. Strategies, programming and financial instruments

The Cotonou Agreement signals the introduction of a number of important innovations with regard to the development of strategies and programming. These include country and regional strategy papers, the introduction of new programming guidelines and rolling programming, and the involvement of non-state actors throughout the programming cycle. The successful introduction of these innovations will have a direct bearing on the effective implementation of the conflict prevention elements of the agreement.

2a) Mainstreaming conflict prevention in country (and regional) support strategies, programming and implementation

Country and regional strategy papers and the programming exercise represent key opportunities to ensure that conflict prevention elements are integrated into long-term development policies in ACP countries, and that the regional nature of conflicts is addressed. Experience to date however suggests that EC delegations lack the analytical capacity, operational tools and management set up to capitalise on these opportunities and ensure that the conflict prevention elements of Cotonou are fully integrated into country strategies and programmes, and that they are coherent and complimentary to the activities of member states. Furthermore, assistance in areas such as governance (including institutional development and capacity-building, and security sector reform) has not been prioritised. This has undermined the EC’s ability to mainstream conflict prevention effectively within projects and sector support in order to address root causes of conflict. Member states often fail to prioritise these politically sensitive issues, which has in turn contributed to the Commission’s reluctance to engage in areas where it lacks significant experience.

Evidence also suggests that whilst the EC has recognised the importance of a regional approach for some time, there is not commensurate evidence in terms of concrete actions. An integrated approach to conflict prevention at a regional level is vital if issues such as cross border arms trafficking and regional conflict risks and dynamics are to be addressed. The EC needs therefore to strengthen its capacity to strategically plan, programme and monitor the impact of its development co-operation not only at a national but also a regional level. In particular, structures that facilitate regional programming, implementation and dialogue need to be developed and strengthened.

Recommendations:

• Implement conflict impact assessment frameworks and recruit specialised staff with cross-cutting roles in order to facilitate the mainstreaming of conflict prevention in the development of strategies, programming, implementation and the evaluation process across all sectors.

• Develop and strengthen structures and mechanisms that facilitate regional programming, implementation and dialogue.

• Increase the proportion of assistance allocated to activities that enhance conflict prevention, such as governance and security sector reform. Ensure that these activities are integrated across sectors (for example integrating support to governance structures within resource management activities).

• Develop systems to monitor and learn from EC funded activities in conflict-affected countries that cover all programme sectors (eg. water and food security, trade and investment). Ensure that lessons are mainstreamed across all external assistance programmes via the Quality Support Group.

2b) Ensuring the involvement of non-state actors throughout the programming cycle

The Cotonou Agreement recognises the role of non-state actors in the development process and the need to provide support for an active and organised civil society in dealing with conflict situations. Along with the Commission programming guidelines that allow for involvement of non-state actors at all stages of the programming exercise, this is a positive and innovative development. Current co-operation strategies, however, tend to view non-state actors solely as “implementing agents” rather than partners that have a key role to play in preventing and managing conflict.

If the role of non-state actors in conflict prevention is to be fully realised, it is vital that they are involved at all stages of the programming cycle.
and receive capacity-building support for this process. It is also important that non-state actors are understood as a broad group, which goes beyond modern NGOs to include pastoralists and other marginalised communities and traditional community structures.

Supporting non-state actors does however raise a number of significant challenges for the EU, not least the challenge of identifying legitimate and credible actors who can contribute to conflict prevention. In some countries non-state actors are viewed with suspicion by governments and opening the space for their involvement can be problematic. A priority task for the Commission and member states is to develop coherent responses to these challenges.

**Recommendations:**

- Establish mechanisms to enable regular consultation and frank exchange with both state and non-state actors. Broaden the process of national consultations by ensuring that some of the consultations take place outside national capitals and involve a broad range of community organisations, including marginalised groups, such as pastoralist communities and representatives of traditional community structures.

- Ensure that non-state actors are engaged at all stages of the programming cycle and that support to non-state actors is an integral part of country/regional support strategies and programmes.

- Enhance the capacity of delegations to undertake political analysis and consult with reliable expertise in order to inform the process of developing creative strategies for identifying and engaging with non-state actors in a way that contributes to conflict prevention.

- Develop modalities for channelling funds to non-state actors and providing support for capacity-building. Ensure that such support is coherent and coordinated with the actions of other donors, including member states.

- Prioritise strategies and actions for opening space for dialogue between civil society and state entities within country strategies and programmes.

**2c) Financial instruments – budgetary and sectoral support**

The implementation of the Cotonou Agreement has been accompanied by a rationalisation of co-operation instruments, delegation of authority and deconcentration of staff to delegations. In theory this will allow for more flexible and efficient use of instruments that can respond to challenges of working in situations of conflict or risk of conflict. In practice however a number of significant constraints remain, including a number of counter-productive trends.

The move to concentrate European Development Fund (EDF) support on a limited number of sectors can lead to interventions failing to address the full range of conflict risks within a country or region. At the same time, the parallel trend towards increasing the scale of interventions mitigates against the implementation of small-scale activities that build local ownership and can positively influence local initiatives and dynamics in support of peacebuilding and conflict prevention. Furthermore, whilst the increased emphasis on budgetary aid has potential for securing country ownership and building state capacity, it risks the diversion of funds for belligerent purposes or in favour of particular regions (which can entrench inequalities). It also may not be sufficiently targeted at addressing the root causes of conflict.

**Recommendations:**

- Ensure that solid and transparent accountability systems are in place to prevent the diversion of funds where budgetary support is provided and encourage strategies that address root causes of conflict within Sector Wide Approaches.

- Strengthen mechanisms for ensuring complementarity with other donors, in particular EU member states to ensure that even where interventions focus on a limited number of sectors the full range of conflict risks are addressed (eg. poor governance, security etc.) through cross sectoral approaches.

- Ensure that small-scale interventions are not overlooked and that a proportion of EDF and budgetary support is allocated towards such interventions. Consider co-funding small-scale activities with member states, and ensure coherence and complementarity of sectoral and budgetary support with these activities.

**3. Building political will to address conflict prevention within the framework of Cotonou**

One of the key factors which will determine whether the implementation of the conflict prevention elements of the Cotonou Agreement is successful will be the degree of political will
behind such actions. This political will is particularly important in a climate of co-operation where allocation of funds is increasingly based on performance criteria. Poorly performing states and regions, which are often those suffering from conflict or protracted instability, risk losing out on support at a time when constructive engagement and long-term commitment from the EU is most needed. Furthermore, the trend of decreasing development assistance towards Africa does not bode well in this respect. The Commission has a role to play in defending the needs and interests of marginalised countries within Council discussions (such as has been the case for Somalia). The Parliament can also play a key role in generating awareness of the need for ongoing and constructive engagement.

Recommendations:

- Prioritise the need for constructive support and long-term engagement with countries suffering from conflict and protracted instability.
- Increase the proportion of development assistance towards Africa, in particular assistance for conflict prevention within the frame of the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights.
- Agree, in the Development Council, on how to implement the member states’ commitment to spend 0.7% of their GNP on development co-operation.

ENHANCING THE EU’S CAPACITY TO RESPOND TO VIOLENT CONFLICTS IN AFRICA

Andrew Sherriff, International Alert

There have been a number of recent developments at the policy and instruments level within the European Union (EU) designed to improve its response to violent conflict. These cannot, however, be effectively implemented without addressing the deficiencies in capacity manifest both within the EU (particularly the European Commission), its partners and potential partners (governments, regional organisations, civil society and the commercial sector) in conflict-affected countries. Unless resources are targeted and reallocated to meet these deficits then the well-intentioned and appropriate innovations in EU policies and instruments will either be partially implemented or not implemented at all.

Addressing conflict efficiently requires significant and sustained attention and action to address why policies and instruments, often more flexible and appropriate than they might first seem, have not been implemented effectively. This will require both fundamental changes in current capacity development initiatives, as well as some refocusing and full utilisation of existing capacities. Initiatives that pool, rationalise, and share existing resources between member states, and also between member states and the Commission are not yet occurring at a level that would optimise impact. While the EU is already addressing a number of the issues and recommendations listed below, unless they are addressed in a sustained fashion it will be difficult for EU conflict prevention to move from the theoretical to the operational realm.

1. EU human resource capacity

The effective implementation of EU policy and programmes in conflict-affected countries requires appropriately qualified, experienced and skilled staff at every level of the decision-making process. Amongst the most effective human resources are a sound knowledge of conflict issues, good understanding of the regional context gained from experience on the ground, and a willingness to work in a challenging environment. Current EU recruitment processes need to ensure that appropriately qualified staff are recruited, retained, trained and rewarded at every level.

A full introduction to issues such as conflict prevention and awareness of the regional context should form the core of any induction process for EU field and Brussels-based staff. Training should draw on appropriate external and in-house expertise and should be continually developed and updated. The member states’ bilateral officials including embassy and capital-based staff could pool their expertise with that of the Commission to facilitate training and cut costs. Emphasis in the training processes should be placed on understanding conflict and the impact (positive and negative) of EU decisions on these conflicts. These activities should include: analysis of root causes and dynamics driving conflicts (i.e. economic, political, social, ethnic) at the local, regional and international level; the goals and interests of all the actors; and the identification of possible key partners. Resources should be put into developing region-specific induction trainings.
on context and conflict issues for all relevant EU staff. Training that emphasises the implementation of learning and best practice in everyday decision-making must back up a sound grounding in theoretical issues.

In the past, strategies and programmes were too often formulated and drawn up by staff who did not fully understand the context, constraints and opportunities for conflict prevention and resolution in any particular setting. This capacity could for instance be developed through short-term exchanges and visits between field and headquarters staff, and also within and between EU member states and the Commission.

Commission delegations in many conflict-affected countries remain extremely short-staffed. Existing staff are weighed down with the bureaucratic day-to-day activities necessary for the functioning of the delegation. Consequently, they are too overloaded to take on key conflict resolution and prevention issues such as analysis of the environment, support for key partners and impact assessments of policies and programmes on the dynamics of conflict. To undertake these activities requires both time and flexibility - two commodities in short supply in understaffed country delegations.

**Recommendations:**

- That the EU revise where necessary its human resource procedures to ensure that those most appropriately qualified for working in conflict settings are recruited, retained and rewarded.

- That the EU ensure that opportunities exist for field and headquarters staff to visit each other’s locations to better understand the constraints and opportunities for advancing conflict prevention and resolution.

- That all staff working within EU institutions undergo region-specific training in conflict and context issues. That opportunities to run joint trainings between agencies be fully explored, and that trainings provide a good grounding in practical advice as well as theoretical issues. Trainings should be based on existing good practice and experiences, and should be developed in collaboration with those whose capacity they are designed to enhance.

- That the human resource capacity of country delegations be reinforced so more proactive and effective responses to conflict prevention can be operationalised.

## 2. Partners and partner institutions

The conflict prevention capacity of most partner and possible partner institutions remains exceptionally weak given the enormity of the challenge of conflict in Africa. Past EU activities have not significantly enhanced the capacity of partner institutions in this area. This needs to be made a specific future priority in order to ensure effective impact, sustainability and local ownership. Indigenous conflict prevention capacity across the range of partners is one of the most critical factors in avoiding and resolving conflict. Just as new thinking in development policy has extended the number and diversity of appropriate partners for the EU, so should it be the same for conflict prevention and resolution.

The EU can best identify and support partners by having qualified staff on the ground with a thorough understanding of the security environment in which they operate. Different partners have different needs, and genuine partnership with the EU is more than simply providing funds. There is evidence that effective actors in the field are not engaging the EU because they are unaware of the EU as a potential partner, or because they lack even the very limited resources needed to engage the EU. Capacity-building of civil society actors requires close to the ground engagement in conflict areas, including outside the capital cities. In the past, local civil society actors have often only been able to access funds in partnership with international non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Indeed another common problem is that locally accessible in-country funds tend to be obtained by international NGOs and UN agencies that have the experience, contacts and capacity, rather than local organisations.

Capacity-building in conflict prevention and resolution for African government officials also urgently needs to be addressed. Awareness and training in these fields remains almost non-existent, despite the fact that governments are the most influential and also the largest actors in the process. The EU should financially support initiatives targeted towards this goal.

While Track One peace processes are often well funded by the EU, the ability of Track Two (mainly civil society) to monitor and compliment these processes is either extremely limited or non-existent. Ensuring that civil society actors impacted by the conflict are involved and consulted is crucial to the success of any conflict resolution process.
Indigenous conflict prevention and resolution methods and capacity-building also need to be supported by the EU. Research into conflict issues and appropriate responses undertaken by academic and related institutions in-country, as well as traditional methods for conflict resolution, need to be both financially supported and drawn upon by the EU.

**Recommendations:**

- The EU should engage in activities designed to inform as wide a cross-section of organisations as possible in any given country about the opportunities for partnership and support. This should extend beyond the capital city, with an emphasis placed on areas affected by conflict.

- The EU should politically and financially support initiatives aimed at enhancing the capacity of African government officials (including provincial and local governments) to gain skills in conflict prevention and resolution.

- The EU should ensure that there is sufficient capacity within civil society groups to monitor, input and compliment Track One peace processes.

- The EU should ensure that there are flexible funds only accessible by local civil society and academic institutions working on conflict-related issues (rather than by international institutions/NGOs).

- Given that complicated EC funding procedures cannot be overcome immediately, in the short-term a civil society liaison office should be set up with both local and expatriate staff. It would have an outreach, funding and capacity-building role.

### 3. Operational guidance and resources

The need for operational resources and guidance in the form of peace and conflict impact assessment (PCIA) resources has been noted in this document and elsewhere. However, it is not only important that conflict impact assessment methodologies are developed, but that they are appropriate, effective and user-friendly. Conflict impact assessment methodologies have not been used by the EU primarily because of four inter-related factors. Firstly, no emphasis has been placed on using them at an operational level. Secondly, policy pronouncements on the importance of PCIA methodologies have not been matched with resources to develop the practical tools themselves. Thirdly, the tools that do exist are not user friendly or relevant to the particular setting or organisational procedures of the EC and member states. Finally, there is suspicion about their practical utility and effectiveness. The EU needs to work to address each of these four issues.

As most conflicts in Africa have a regional dynamic, it is imperative that the EU develop the capacity to address issues from a regional perspective. The EU needs to draw on its collective resources to ensure that decisions are well informed by the reality on the ground. While some developments in this regard have occurred in recent years, such as the appointment of regional advisers, much work remains to be done. Regional meetings on the ground between EC officials in neighbouring delegations to develop joint strategies do not occur at present. Larger meetings between EU officials would go some way towards creating and promoting coherence and complementarity. Resources need to be made available to organise such sessions and enable staff to attend them.

**Recommendations:**

- That significant resources be invested in developing and piloting PCIA methodologies that are user-friendly and context specific. That these tools be developed by experts in close collaboration with those who will be using them, and that appropriate training, induction and piloting of tools is undertaken.

- That the EU develop integrated regional information systems drawing on the collective expert knowledge of staff on the ground and at the regional level to guide and inform decisions.

- The EU must ensure that more regional advisers are appointed, and that these advisers have the resources to regularly consult on the ground in the countries that they cover.

- Where a strong regional conflict dynamic exists, the EU should support regional meetings between key EU officials to share information and develop strategy.

Because of the paucity of capacity in relation to the scale of the challenge, the areas of change posited in this document are neither a definitive listing of the problems, nor the complete solution. Furthermore, many of the recommendations have been made repeatedly before. Yet for the most part they have not been addressed, and so continue to be relevant. With the increased recognition that building capacity is the crucial component of enhancing EU conflict prevention and resolution, it is hoped that resources will be targeted and re-targeted at the areas mentioned above.
Biographies of Speakers and Contributors

Christiane Agboton-Johnson is President of the Movement contre les armes légères en Afrique de l'Ouest/ Sénégal (MALAO), a network of 14 Senegalese NGOs and individual members working in the field of human rights. MALAO is active in countering the illegal proliferation of small arms and light weapons in West Africa and in Senegal in particular, as per the Abuja Moratorium signed in October 1998.

Timnit Abraha, Project Coordinator for Inter Africa Group, has a long experience in the Horn region having worked in Ethiopia and Sudan. The Inter Africa Group is an independent regional organisation based in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia which focuses on advancing peace, justice and respect for humanitarian law in the region.

Sarah Bayne is project coordinator for EU and Conflict Prevention with Saferworld, an independent think tank working to develop and publicise more effective approaches to preventing armed conflict. She previously worked within the Governance Department of DFID, the Horn of Africa Unit at the European Commission and was coordinator of a Somali NGO, Scottish Somali Action. She has also undertaken research on development and conflict issues for ECDPM.

Ladislas Bizimana is a pre-doctoral fellow for the ESDP Democracy Project at the Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford. His doctoral thesis focuses on Rwanda's genocide doctrines and mechanisms of peacekeeping and conflict resolution with special reference to sub-Saharan Africa. He was previously a research fellow and assistant to the Co-ordinator of the Humanitarian Studies Unit at the Pedro Arrupe Institute of Human Rights, University of Deusto, Spain, and worked as a full-time reporter at the National Television of Rwanda (1992-1993) and with the Reporters Without Borders-founded 'RADIO AGATASHYA' in the African Great Lakes Region (1994-1995). He is the author of Conflict in the African Great Lakes region: a critical analysis of regional and international involvement.

Eddy Boutmans is Belgian State Secretary for Development Co-operation, a post he has held since 1999. From June 1995 to 1999 he held a seat in the Senate for Agalev (the Flemish Green Party) and was member of the Agalev executive committee. He is a trained lawyer and member of the bar of Antwerp since 1970.

Peter Beck Christiansen joined the European Community’s overseas service in 1977 where he held posts as Economic Advisor in Fiji and Zimbabwe, Agricultural Project Official and Desk Officer in Brussels, Senior Loan Officer in Luxembourg and Head of the EU Delegations in Malawi and Tanzania. He is now Head of Unit West Africa II (Nigeria, Benin, Togo, Ghana, Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone and Guinea).

Ambassador Frank De Coninck (Belgium) has a Masters degree in literature and philosophy and started his career as a diplomat in 1975. He was Ambassador of Belgium in Kigali and Kinshasa from 1994 until the end of 2000 and presently works as the special envoy and vice director general of the Belgian Ministry of Foreign Economic and Bilateral Relations.

Paul Eavis has been the Director, since 1995, of Saferworld – the independent think tank working to develop and publicise more effective approaches to preventing armed conflict. Between 1990-95 he was Research Director of Saferworld. Over the past 10 years, Mr Eavis has written and/ or edited numerous reports and briefings on European arms export controls, small arms proliferation and security sector reform. He is on the management committee of the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA) and the Steering Group of the European NGO Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation.

Bruno Hanses is Head of the Africa Desk of the Council of the European Union.

Bizuwork Ketete is a Regional Networker employed by the Horn of Africa Project - an initiative of Saferworld, Inter-Africa Group and Africa Peace Forum. She previously spent four years as ActionAid’s Director in Rwanda and has a long history of experience in the voluntary sector.
Glenys Kinnock is a Member of the European Parliament, Group of the Party of European Socialists. She is a member of the Committee on Development and Co-operation and Vice-Chairman of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly and UK Labour Party Spokesperson for International Development in the European Parliament. She is also President of One World Action, Patron of Saferworld and Chair of the Forum on Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER).

Ambassador Bethuel Kiplagat is Head of the Africa Peace Forum. He served as Permanent Secretary to the Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the 1980s and held posts as Ambassador to France and High Commissioner to the United Kingdom from 1981-83. He was also personally involved in the peace negotiations in Mozambique in the late 1980s/ early 1990s.

Dr Pa'o Luteru is Assistant Secretary-General of the ACP Group with specific responsibility for Political Affairs and Human Development. In this capacity, one of his primary responsibilities is in the area of conflict prevention, management and resolution within the framework of the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement. Dr Luteru was previously Director of the Pacific ACP-EU Bureau from 1993-1996 responsible for assisting Pacific ACP States in the implementation of their regional indicative programme.

Nelly Maes is a Member of the European Parliament, Vice-Chair of the Group of the Greens/ European Free Alliance. She is a Member of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, a member of the parliamentary support group for the Sahrawis, the support group for the Kurds, the support group for Palestine and the parliamentary club for development co-operation.

Fatoumata Maiga is the founder and President of the NGO Association des femmes pour les initiatives de paix (AFIP), Mali. AFIP is active in raising awareness about armed conflict-related problems and conflict resolution. It seeks to establish the link between peace and development, to promote the organisational capacity of women in particular and reinforce the solidarity among national, regional and international women's organisations. She is also President of the NGO Réseau National d’Action Contre les Armes Légères (RANCPAL) [National network of action against small arms and light weapons].

Sandra Melone is the Executive Director of the European Centre for Common Ground (ECCG), an international non-governmental organisation based in Brussels. ECCG and their partner organisation, Search for Common Ground, of Washington, D.C., are leaders in the field of applied international conflict transformation. Ms. Melone has been the Executive Director of ECCG since 1996. Prior to this she worked for Common Ground's project in Bujumbura, Burundi, where she founded the Women's Peace Centre.

Cyril Musila is a consultant and researcher at the Centre de Recherche sur la Paix, and l'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales (EHESS), Paris. His research focuses on informal economies and development; risk management and armed conflict in Central Africa; AIDS and conflict; solidarity and international action.

Josephine Odera is Programme Coordinator at the Africa Peace Forum (APFO) based in Nairobi. APFO; aims to encourage and engage non-state actors within the Great Lakes and the Horn of Africa regions to explore collaborative approaches to the pursuit of peace and security. It aims to support the development of research capacity for early warning, conflict management and peacebuilding. Josephine has a wealth of experience in peacebuilding in the region.

Dr. James D. Rogers is Deputy Minister of Development and Economic Planning for the Government of Sierra Leone. His recent work has focused on the EU-ACP Cotonou Accord. Dr. Rogers previously worked as a senior manager with CUSO, a Canadian NGO, and conducted fieldwork on literacy and empowerment for many years. He then worked as a senior planner for the UNDP in Sierra Leone. He was posted with the UN in Kosovo before returning to Sierra Leone to take up his current position with the government.

Heike Schneider has headed the European Peacebuilding Liaison Office (EPLO) since its establishment in January 2001. EPLO brings together sixteen conflict prevention NGOs based in Europe. Its mission is to enhance information exchange between its members and EU institutions dealing with conflict prevention. Before joining EPLO Heike Schneider worked as a policy officer for APRODEV, a network of development NGOs, and in the European Parliament.
Andrew Sherriff is Programme Leader in Development & Peacebuilding at International Alert. He is also a Member of the Board of the Conflict, Peace and Development Network (CODEP) of the UK. He has conducted research and policy work on development and conflict prevention issues in Africa and in the Balkans. In addition he has worked on development and conflict issues with the United Nations Department for Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA) and the European Centre for Development Policy Management (ECDPM).

Andreas Strub has been Principal Administrator for Africa/ Gulf/ Mediterranean/ Middle East at the Policy Unit of the Council since October 1999. He previously worked as a diplomatic adviser in the Private Office of the Secretary General of the Council, where he dealt with issues concerning European Foreign and Security Policy, Balkans, and the former Soviet Union.

Athanasios Theodorakis is Deputy Director-General, DG Development, the European Commission and Chairman of the European Development Fund Committee, a post he has held since 1995. He was Secretary General in the Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with responsibility for Community Affairs, Interministerial coordination of EC policy, the Schengen Executive Committee and Coordination for the Intergovernmental Conference.

Max van den Berg has been a Member of the European Parliament and Vice-Chairman of the Group of the Party of European Socialists since 1999. He is also Vice-Chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Development and Co-operation, Member of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly and Vice-Chairman of the Working Group for Common Foreign and Security Policy. Prior to his election as MEP, Mr van den Berg was Director General (1989-99) and Director of Education (1986-89) of NOVIB/ Oxfam Netherlands and Chairman of the Dutch Labour Party from 1979-86.

Bob Van den Bos (Netherlands) is a Member of the European Parliament, Group of the European Liberal, Democrat and Reform Party. He is a Member of the Parliamentary Committee on Development and Co-operation and the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly. He has served on numerous parliamentary assemblies including the Council of Europe, WEU and the Benelux Interparliamentary Council. Mr Van den Bos is also a Member of the executive of the Dutch European Movement and Ambassador for the Dutch Animal Protection Association.

Jan Vanheukelom is Advisor to the Belgian State Secretary for Development Co-operation.

Pastor Mukambu Ya'Namwisi is a Mennonite leader and Executive Secretary of the Council for Peace and Reconciliation in the Congo, a network of Congolese Christian peace activists working to achieve peace in the Great Lakes region. Pastor Ya'Namwisi holds a certificate in peacebuilding and conflict transformation from the Eastern Mennonite University (Virginia, USA). He has been involved in numerous peace initiatives across Africa and has organised meetings on issues of concern in the Great Lakes region, such as conscientious objection and child soldiers.
List of Participants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name/Nom</th>
<th>Organisation</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Timnit Abraha</td>
<td>Inter Africa Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Idriss Adjideye</td>
<td>Ambassade de la Republique du Tchad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christiane Agboton-Johnson</td>
<td>Mouvement contre les armes legères en Afrique de l’ouest (MALAO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adelaide Agliette</td>
<td>Member of the European Parliament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guido Ambroso</td>
<td>UNHCR</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ragnar Angeby</td>
<td>Swedish Foreign Ministry</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rein Antonissen</td>
<td>Coalition of the Flemish North-South Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>David C. Atwood</td>
<td>Quaker UN Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naimi S. Aziz</td>
<td>Tanzanian Embassy</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jane Backhurst</td>
<td>World Vision EU Liaison Office</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rosie Bairwal</td>
<td>Department for International Development (DFID)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lewis D. Balinda</td>
<td>Embassy of Uganda</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pierre Barampenda</td>
<td>Action Aid UK</td>
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<tr>
<td>Brita Bastogi</td>
<td>Eurostep</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sarah Bayne</td>
<td>Saferworld</td>
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<td>Frederik Becher</td>
<td>United Nations Info Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>Andreas Bengtsson</td>
<td>Swedish Foreign Ministry</td>
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<tr>
<td>Timothy Beyer Helm</td>
<td>European Parliament Development and Co-operation Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lorenzo Bianchi Carnevale</td>
<td>COOPI - Cooperazione Internazionale</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sam Biesemans</td>
<td>Ministère des Affaires Etrangères belge</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ladiilas Bizimana</td>
<td>University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natalie Bormann</td>
<td>Centre for European Security and Disarmament (CESD)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mieke Bos</td>
<td>Canadian Embassy Brussels</td>
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<td>Eddy Boutmans</td>
<td>Belgian State Secretary for Development Co-operation</td>
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<td>Abu A. Brima</td>
<td>Action Aid Sierra Leone</td>
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<td>Cecilia Bruhn</td>
<td>INTERMON Oxfam Spain</td>
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<td>Rui Carimo</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<tr>
<td>Peter Beck Christiansen</td>
<td>European Commission, Unit for West Africa</td>
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<td>Anne Colmant</td>
<td>Oxfam-Solidarity</td>
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<td>Luc Coppejans</td>
<td>AEFJN</td>
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<td>John Corrie</td>
<td>Member of the European Parliament</td>
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<td>John Coughlan</td>
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<td>Sophie da Camara</td>
<td>ECDPM</td>
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<td>Catherine Day</td>
<td>Defence and Overseas Secretariat, UK</td>
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<td>Frank De Coninck</td>
<td>Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs</td>
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<td>Jules Devos</td>
<td>Réseau Européen Congo (REC)</td>
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<td>François Janne D’Otheé</td>
<td>CCAC</td>
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<tr>
<td>Natasha Jolob</td>
<td>Forum for Early Warning and Response (FEWER)</td>
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<td>Femmy de Jong</td>
<td>European Parliament</td>
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<td>Etienne de Jonghe</td>
<td>Pax Christi International</td>
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<td>Fabienne Haie</td>
<td>ICG</td>
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<td>Jos de la Haye</td>
<td>FDI</td>
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<td>Hubert de Maere</td>
<td>Caritas Secours International</td>
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<td>Michael Docherty</td>
<td>European Commission, Europeaid</td>
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<tr>
<td>Patrick Dupont</td>
<td>Belgian Foreign Ministry, DG International Co-operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Paul Eavis</td>
<td>Saferworld</td>
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<td>C. D. Falleowski</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<tr>
<td>David Ferrard</td>
<td>Quaker Council for European Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>Annette Frick</td>
<td>ADRA</td>
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<tr>
<td>Michael Gahler</td>
<td>Member of the European Parliament</td>
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</table>
Abdulhamid Gared Jama  Minister of Foreign Affairs Hargeisa-Somaliland
Valeria Garibaldi  COOPE – Cooperazione Internazionale
Emmanuel Gignac  UNHCR
Konstantinos Georgiou  Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Catriona Gourlay  International Security Information Service, Europe
Ernst Guelcher  Green Group of the European Parliament
Dr Hildegard Hagemann  Zentralstelle Weltkirche der Dt. Bischofskonferenz
Tobias Hagmann  Peacebuilding Center (KOFF) Swiss Peace Foundation
Vanessa Haines  Saferworld
Bruno Hanses  Secretariat Général du Conseil de l’UE
Fabienne Hara  International Crisis Group
Ria Heremans  United Nations Info Center Brussels
Bart Horemans  Pax Christi Vlaanderen
Richard Howitt  Member of the European Parliament
Linda Scott Idhenga  Embassy of Namibia
Lydia Indrianjafy  Ambassade de Madagascar
Tony Jackson  International Alert
Natasha Jolob  Forum for Early Warning and Response (FEWER)
Julius Kagamba  Ambassade d’Ouganda
Libertine Kautwima  Embassy of Namibia
Ambassador Kelleher  Delegation of Ireland to the PSC of the EU
Margot Kessler  Member of the European Parliament
Bizuwork Ketete  Inter Africa Group
Glens Kinnock  Member of the European Parliament
Amb. Bethuel Kiplagat  Africa Peace Forum
Stéphane Kolanowski  Comité International de la Croix-Rouge
Clément Kone  World Vision, Mali
Grace Kwinjeh  Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Cinzia Laurelli  Cooperazione Italiana Nord-Sud
Terhi Lehtinen  ECDPM
Bernard Leroup  Centre for the Study of the Great Lakes Region of Africa/ Medecins du Monde
Dr Pa’o Luteru  ACP Group
Nelly Maes  Member of the European Parliament
Fatoumata Maiga  Association des Femmes pour les Initiatives de Paix
Marta Martinelli  International Security Information Service, Europe/ COPRI
Frank Meeussen  Cabinet of the Minister of Consumers, Health and Environment, Belgium
Andreas Mehler  Conflict Prevention Network
Monique Mekenkamp  European Centre for Conflict Prevention
Sandrine Melone  European Centre for Common Ground (ECCG)
Raymond Mideulaire  Belgian Foreign Office
Kennedy Mkutu  University of Bradford
Annalisa Monaco  International Security Information Service, Europe
Peter F. Mulrean  US Mission to the EU
Cyril Musila  Centre de Recherche sur la Paix
Dr Zedekia Ngavirue  Ambassador, Embassy of Namibia
Aminata Niang  Agence EUROPE
Ch. Niang  OUA – Bureau de Bruxelles
Thérèse Nikoyagize  European Centre for Common Ground
Félix Nkundabagenzi  GRIP
Alexandra Noll  European Parliament
Josephine Odera  Africa Peace Forum
Philip Odida  Embassy of Uganda
Dr. Thania Paffenholz  Swiss Peace Foundation
Please contact the organisers at ISIS Europe (info@isis-europe.org) for contact details of any of the above participants.