

**MONITORING  
THE IMPACT OF THE  
PEACE, RECOVERY AND  
DEVELOPMENT PLAN ON  
PEACE AND CONFLICT  
IN NORTHERN  
UGANDA**

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Front cover graphic: D. R. ink

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2014

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## Abbreviations

ADF	Allied Democratic Forces
CBO	Community-based organisation
CCO	Certificate of customary ownership
CSO	Civil society organisation
DFID	Department for International Development
DRM	Dispute-resolution mechanism
FDC	Forum for Democratic Change
FIDA	Uganda Association of Women Lawyers
IDP	Internally displaced persons
LC	Local council
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
NAADS	National Agricultural Advisory Services
NFA	National Forestry Authority
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
NRM	National Resistance Movement
NUSAF	Northern Uganda Social Action Fund
OPM	Office of the Prime Minister
PCDP	Post-Conflict Development Programme
PCI	Peace and conflict indicator
PRDP	Peace, Recovery and Development Plan
RDC	Resident District Commissioner
SACCO	Savings and credit cooperative
SGBV	Sexual and gender-based violence
UBOS	Uganda Bureau of Statistics
UNRA	Uganda National Roads Authority
UPDF	Uganda People's Defence Force
UPE	Universal primary education
UWA	Uganda Wildlife Authority
VSLA	Village savings and loan association

## Executive summary

This report presents results from the fourth round of research concerning the peace and conflict indicators (PCIs) in northern Uganda. Analysis of the 2014 PCIs made use of the 2011, 2012 and 2013 data. The study used four data-collection approaches: the perceptions survey, the leadership rapid appraisal, the key informant interviews and the consensus panels. A total of 4,233 respondents were interviewed in the nine regions grouped into four broader categories: namely, the control region (587), the severely affected region (1,385), the sporadically affected region (1,198) and the spillover region (1,061). By gender, the majority of the respondents were female (2,203 or 52%).<sup>1</sup>

### Key findings

Over time (2012–2014), the percentage of respondents who felt safe in their communities increased in all regions. The average annual increase was highest in the control region, at 3 percentage points. This was followed by the sporadically affected region, with an average annual increase of 2 percentage points. The spillover region had the lowest average annual increase of 1.5 percentage points.

In the same period, the percentage of respondents who had confidence in sustained peace and security also increased in all regions, with the severely affected region having the highest average annual increase of 9 percentage points and with borderline significance ( $p=0.081$ ). This was followed by the control region, which had an average annual increase of 8.5 percentage points, although this was not statistically significant ( $p=0.394$ ). The sporadically affected and spillover regions had the lowest average annual increase of 5.5 percentage points each ( $p=0.212$  and  $p=0.099$ , respectively).

Personal involvement in conflicts between 2012 and 2014 fell in all four regions, but with varying rates. The severely affected and spillover regions had the highest average annual decline over the three-year period in the percentage of respondents who had been involved in personal conflicts in the previous two years – decreasing at an average rate of 6.5 percentage points per year. In both regions, however, the decreases were not statistically significant. The spillover region had an average annual decline of 2 percentage points in respondents with personal involvement in conflicts in the previous two years – a rate that was lower than that observed in the control region (4.5 percentage points). Similar to the changes observed in the spillover and severely affected regions, the rates of decline in the control and sporadically affected regions were also not statistically significant.

Access to justice at community level increased in all regions, with the control region having the highest average annual increase, followed by the severely affected region. The sporadically affected region had the lowest average annual increase (7 percentage points) in the percentage of respondents reporting that people in their communities had access to justice. By 2014, the percentage of respondents who reported that people in their communities had better access to justice ranged between 75.6% and 79.6%.

<sup>1</sup> The severely affected study areas comprise Acholi (Amuru, Gulu, Kitgum and Lamwo) and Karamoja (Abim, Kotido and Moroto). The sporadically affected study areas comprise Lango (Lira, Otuke) and West Nile (Adjumani, Arua, Yumbe and Zombo). The spillover study areas consist of Bukedi (Tororo), Bunyoro (Kiryandongo), Elgon (Mbale) and Teso (Amuria and Soroti). The control region comprises Kasese, Masaka and Mbarara districts.

Over time, the percentage of victims of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) dropped in each of the four regions. The control region had the highest average annual decline of 27 percentage points. This was followed by an average annual decline of 11.5 percentage points each in the sporadically affected and spillover regions. Results show that the declining trends in the percentage of SGBV victims reporting their cases had borderline statistical significance in the spillover and sporadically affected regions ( $p=0.048$  and  $p=0.079$ , respectively). In the severely affected region, the average annual decline in the percentage of SGBV cases reported was 8 percentage points and was not statistically significant ( $p=0.136$ ).

While the results show a decline in the percentage of SGBV victims who reported satisfactory resolution of their cases by dispute-resolution mechanisms (DRMs) in 2014 when compared with 2013 in all regions, there has been a general upward trend since 2012, especially in the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) regions. Among the three PRDP regions, the spillover region had the highest average annual increase (12.5 percentage points) in the percentage of SGBV victims reporting satisfactory resolution of their cases, followed by the sporadically affected region (8.5 percentage points). The severely affected region had the lowest average annual increase (5 percentage points) in the percentage of SGBV victims reporting satisfactory resolution of their cases. While there were positive trends in the percentage of SGBV victims reporting satisfactory resolution of their cases, the trends were not statistically significant (spillover region,  $p=0.498$ ; sporadically affected region,  $p=0.472$ ; and severely affected region,  $p=0.433$ ). In the control region, the percentage of SGBV victims reporting satisfactory resolution of their cases declined with time, although the decline was not statistically significant (7.5 percentage points,  $p=0.512$ ).

Since 2012, the percentage of respondents not attending local government planning activities increased. The spillover region had the highest average annual increase in the percentage of respondents who had not attended local government planning meetings, followed by the sporadically affected region. The control region, followed by the severely affected region, had the lowest average annual increase in the percentage of respondents not participating in local government planning activities. Minimal or no changes were observed in the percentage of respondents not attending local government planning activities between 2013 and 2014 – particularly in the sporadically affected, control and spillover regions.

Overall, the percentage of respondents who reported that local government was responsive to community needs stagnated between 2012 and 2014 – dropping from 48% in 2012 to 36% in 2013, but rising again to 48% in 2014. However, the spillover region experienced a downward trend, with an average change of -3.5 percentage points per year. The severely and sporadically affected regions generally experienced positive changes in this regard over the three-year period, although the average change in the sporadically affected region was less than 1 percentage point, while the severely affected region experienced an average change of 6 percentage points annually.

Survey results show that, over time, the percentage of respondents with employable skills declined, except in the spillover region. In the control region, the average annual decline in the percentage of respondents with employable skills was 2 percentage points. In the severely affected region, the average annual decline was 1 percentage point, thereby differing from that of the control region by 1 percentage point. The sporadically affected region had the largest average annual decline of 3.5 percentage points, although this was not statistically significant ( $p=0.469$ ). The spillover region was the only region with an average annual increment of 4.5 percentage points; however, this was not statistically significant ( $p=0.593$ ).

Respondents' access to increased economic activities rose over time in two out of the four regions – namely, the control and the severely affected regions. However, the rate of increase was higher in the control region than in the severely affected region. The observed average annual increment of 3.5 percentage points in the control region had borderline statistical significance ( $p=0.052$ ).

On the other hand, the average annual increase in the severely affected region was not statistically significant at 1 percentage point. A decline was registered in the sporadically affected and spillover regions, with the latter having a higher average annual decrease compared with the former. Neither of these regions had a statistically significant decline ( $p=0.593$  and  $p=0.454$ , respectively).

The percentage of respondents with sufficient income to sustain their households remained largely the same in the three PRDP regions over time. The spillover and sporadically affected regions had an average annual increase of 1 percentage point each, while the severely affected region recorded an average annual increment of half a percentage point. A higher average annual increase was found in the control region at 4 percentage points, although this was not statistically significant ( $p=0.398$ ).

Over the three-year period, the percentage of respondents who were satisfied with government efforts to respond to people's economic needs increased in each of the regions. The severely affected region had the highest average annual increase (8.5 percentage points) in the percentage of respondents expressing satisfaction with government efforts to respond to people's economic needs, followed by the control region (7 percentage points). The rate of increase in the severely affected region had borderline significance ( $p=0.65$ ), but in the control region the observed average annual increase was not statistically significant ( $p=0.249$ ). In the sporadically affected region, the percentage of respondents satisfied with government efforts to respond to people's economic needs steadily increased by an average of 5 percentage points annually. In the spillover region, the average annual increment was 5.5 percentage points but was not statistically significant ( $p=0.099$ ).

Between 2012 and 2014, the percentage of respondents reporting a decrease in competition and grievance among the PRDP regions varied considerably by region. In the spillover region, there was an average annual increase of 3 percentage points in the proportion of respondents reporting a decline in the level of competition and grievance between the PRDP regions. On the other hand, the sporadically affected region had an average annual decline of 6.5 percentage points, while the percentage remained stable in the severely affected region at 33%.

Regarding the level of competition and grievance between the north and the south of Uganda, the percentage of respondents who reported a decline in levels of competition and grievance increased in three regions – particularly the control region, at an average of 8 percentage points per year. Other regions registering an average annual increase included the spillover region (3 percentage points) and the sporadically affected region (1.5 percentage points). Unlike the control region, where the average annual increase was statistically significant ( $p=0.043$ ), in the spillover and sporadically affected regions the increase was not statistically significant ( $p=0.74$  and  $p=0.846$ , respectively). Conversely, in the severely affected region, there was a slight average annual decline (0.5 percentage point) in the percentage of respondents reporting a fall in the level of competition and grievance between the north and south of the country.

Results from the survey show that, over time, the percentage of respondents reporting that the government was doing enough to bridge the gap between the north and the south increased in all regions, although the increments in the PRDP regions were not as high as that in the control region. In the PRDP regions, the average annual increase in the percentage of respondents reporting that the government was doing enough to bridge the gap between the north and the south ranged between 2.5 percentage points in the spillover and sporadically affected regions and 1 percentage point in the severely affected region. In the control region, the average increase was 11.5 percentage points, although it was not statistically significant ( $p=0.357$ ).

## Recommendations

The following recommendations were derived from engagements with respondents in the surveyed regions (as specified in the footnotes accompanying each of the recommendations).

### On sustained peace and security

#### To government and government agencies:

- Government, through programmes such as the PRDP, should invest in research on land conflicts and then make progressive and informed decisions to curb them. Trained local and cultural leaders could be vital in mitigating and solving land wrangles.<sup>2</sup>
- Government should equip the police deployed in various parts of the country, particularly in post-war northern Uganda, in terms of mobility and accommodation so that police presence in the community continues to be felt on a sustained basis.<sup>3</sup>
- Government should support the training of police, probation officers, prison staff and the judiciary in social justice to equip them with skills of alternative justice. This can be done at district level through capacity building. Similarly, the capacity of local council (LC) courts should be strengthened to help bring about social justice.<sup>4</sup>

### On SGBV

#### To government and government agencies:

- Government should complement and share information with civil society organisations (CSOs), so that they can identify gaps in handling SGBV cases.<sup>5</sup> Government should also facilitate and train agencies such as cultural institutions in how to respond to SGBV cases.<sup>6</sup>
- The investigative arm of the police that handles SGBV cases should be strengthened to avoid unnecessary circumstances such as ‘lost’ cases and mismanaged evidence.<sup>7</sup>

#### To CSOs and communities:

- At the community level, CSOs should invest in a mechanism of first responders when SGBV occurs. They should also consider paying for the legal services of poor SGBV victims.<sup>8</sup>
- CSOs and community members should be vigilant and report cases of SGBV, as not all cases qualify to be handled at the family level. In this regard, CSOs may use church and traditional leaders to sensitise people about SGBV.<sup>9</sup>

### On access to economic opportunities

#### To government and government agencies:

- Greater thought should be put into the manner in which vocational training is managed in the country. There is a mismatch between what the institutions are producing and what the communities need. Vocational training should be market driven.<sup>10</sup>
- Government should invest in region-relevant and suitable industries – for example, a starch factory in Lango or a citrus fruits factory in Teso would be good.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Consensus panel, Zombo, May 2014; Key informant, Kitgum, April 2014.

<sup>3</sup> Consensus panel, Kiryandongo, May 2014; Consensus panel, Abim, April 2014.

<sup>4</sup> District community development officer, Zombo, May 2014.

<sup>5</sup> Consensus panel, Mbarara, April 2014.

<sup>6</sup> Key informant, Mbale, May 2014.

<sup>7</sup> Key informant, Kasese, Otuke and Kitgum, April 2014.

<sup>8</sup> Key informant, Otuke, May 2014.

<sup>9</sup> Key informant, Amuria and Masaka.

<sup>10</sup> Key informant, Soroti and Amuria, May 2014; Consensus panel, Mbale, May 2014.

<sup>11</sup> Consensus panel, Lira, May 2014.

- Government should reach out to savings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs) with more financial support to increase access to economic opportunities. It should also help farmers to form primary societies so they can sell in bulk and take measures such as revitalising cooperative societies for better markets.<sup>12</sup>

#### To CSOs and communities:

- CSOs should invest in project seed financing and the provision of start-up capital for increased economic opportunities.<sup>13</sup>
- CSOs and communities should collaboratively aim to change attitudes towards investment financing. Specifically, people should be taught to plan and pay back money even if it is provided by the government.<sup>14</sup>

### On competition and grievance

#### To government and government agencies:

- Government should balance appointments in ministries, the army, the police and other departments to ensure equal representation between the south and the north of Uganda as one of the practical demonstrations of bridging the gap between these two regions.<sup>15</sup>
- Government should work hand-in-hand with CSOs and cultural institutions to ensure that civic education is imparted to citizens in order to encourage good governance. A shared heritage and an inclusive country should be fostered. Instead of leaving it to election time, this should be a continuous process.<sup>16</sup>
- Both central and local governments should publicise the criteria used to allocate funds for government programmes such as the PRDP, avoiding unnecessary speculation from the beneficiaries.<sup>17</sup>

### On local government responsiveness to community needs

#### To government and government agencies:

- Guidelines for conditional grants do not allow for flexibility. Therefore, they should be revised to allow for flexibility in addressing needs. Planning should involve local community members as beneficiaries of government programming.<sup>18</sup>
- Government should put in place a clear budget line for supervision of government programme contracts. This has been a problem, especially in the construction sector, leading to shoddy work due to shortage of money to facilitate supervision. There should also be focus on community mobilisation, so that communities where projects are implemented know, embrace and own these projects.<sup>19</sup>
- Government programmes should have regional centres to oversee how funds are disbursed and absorbed. They should also promote the practice of districts learning lessons from each other.<sup>20</sup>

12 Consensus panel, Zombo, May 2014.

13 Key informant, Amuru, May 2014.

14 Key informant, Masaka and Mbarara, April 2014.

15 Key informant, Kitgum, April 2014.

16 Key informant, Mbale, May 2014.

17 Key informant, Lira, May 2014.

18 Consensus panel, Amuria, May 2014.

19 Key informant, Lira, May 2014.

20 Key informant, Lira, May 2014.

## Additional recommendations from the research team

### To central government:

- To achieve durable solutions in northern Uganda, government should increase efforts to address the needs and challenges affecting the returnee and resettling populations in the northern and Karamoja regions. These efforts should include increased investment to improve service delivery in areas of return or resettlement and targeted policies for the most vulnerable populations.<sup>21</sup>
- Government should support internally displaced persons (IDPs) to either integrate into their current locations or to relocate to other parts of the county if they so wish.
- Government should ensure an enabling environment for civil society. Accountable, responsive, inclusive and transparent governance and rule of law are prerequisites for dealing with the underlying human rights violations that often drive conflict and fragility. In the vacuum of the state, non-state actors – such as non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and CSOs, faith-based organisations and social movements – assume many of its responsibilities. Therefore, enabling environments for civil society need to be supported.

### To local government:

- Local government should focus on governance issues, including peacebuilding in post-war contexts. This requires marrying support to local government capacity and the development of a strategic framework with central government authorities that can foster a sustainable, long-term relationship.
- A simple emphasis on service provision without also supporting the institutional capacity development of local authorities and sectoral ministries should be avoided. Holistic approaches are needed.

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21 United Nations Country Team in Uganda [2013]. Submission to the Universal Periodic Review, available at <http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/session12/UG/UNCT-eng.pdf>



# 1. Introduction

After 20 years of civil war, northern Uganda has recently embarked on the road towards recovery. The government of Uganda's Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP) is the overarching framework for addressing northern Uganda's post-war needs. The programme covers eight sub-regions, encompassing 55 districts in the northern half of the country. The first PRDP phase ran from 2009 to 2012; its successor, PRDP 2, is running from 2012 until 2015.<sup>22</sup> While Uganda currently enjoys relative stability, it is still in many respects a divided country, both politically and economically. The country has a legacy of multiple and cyclical conflicts and grave human rights violations, as well as a weak sense of national identity, which may lay the foundations for future conflicts if left unaddressed.<sup>23</sup>

Conflict sensitivity is most relevant and applicable in fragile and conflict-affected states – that is, in 21 out of 28 focus countries of the UK Department for International Development (DFID). It is critical in situations where open violence is present or a very real threat. It can be useful too in situations where there are high levels of political tension, such as when elections are impending in a context where elections are often tense or violent.

Sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) in conflict and post-conflict areas can take many forms,<sup>24</sup> and is exacerbated by a lack of services or access to services due to insecurity. Post-conflict peacebuilding processes present major opportunities for advancing women's rights and gender equality. Well-intentioned gender mainstreaming objectives are undermined by the post-conflict political economy context, which reinforces structural gender inequalities between men and women; this is a major setback for peace, reconciliation and long-term recovery of societies. Domestic violence was present in Uganda before the war; in particular, intimate partner violence was prevalent in Uganda from the 1940s to the 1960s. The primary drivers of SGBV today have changed little from those cited over 50 years ago: namely, sexual infidelity, financial disputes, chronic drunkenness and suspicion of witchcraft.<sup>25</sup> What distinguishes the present context is the manner in which SGBV erodes the psychosocial and physical health of war-affected people, and its centrality to resolving other problems that undermine post-conflict development and peacebuilding.

In their Common African Position (CAP) for the preparation of the post-2015 development agenda, African heads of state and government have stressed the need to address the root causes of conflict, to strengthen good and inclusive governance, to combat all forms of discrimination and to forge unity in diversity. They have also agreed to strengthen cross-border cooperation to prevent the outbreak of armed conflict and to implement comprehensive post-conflict reconstruction programmes.<sup>26</sup> Development organisations working to address conflicts need to prioritise effective approaches, disaggregating statistics to show the differences between regions and groups within countries. As the peacebuilding agendas of international development organisations tend to focus on fragile states, typically playing a nominal role in sub-national conflict areas, they should

22 P.C. Mugisa and M. Marzouk (2013). *Embedding Conflict Sensitivity: The Ability of Uganda's Peace, Recovery and Development Plan Districts to Adopt a Conflict-sensitive Approach to Development*. London: Saferworld.

23 C. Dolan (2006). *Uganda Strategic Conflict Analysis*. Kampala: Swedish International Development Agency.

24 E. Rehn and E.J. Sirleaf (2002). *Women, War, Peace: The Independent Experts' Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women's Role in Peace-Building*. New York: United Nations Development Fund for Women.

25 T.M. Mushanga (1983). 'Wife victimization in East and Central Africa', in R.J. Gelles and C.P. Cornell (eds.) *International Perspectives on Family Violence*. Lexington, MA: DC Health & Company. pp.139–145.

26 E. Kashambuzi (2014). 'Conflict resolution is a prerequisite to development and poverty eradication', 8 April. Available at <http://kashambuzi.com/conflict-resolution-is-a-prerequisite-to-development-and-poverty-eradication/>

recognise that they will only make a lasting impact by supporting domestic institutions rather than acting alone. They also need to remain neutral while at the same time securing government approval to operate.<sup>27</sup>

## Distribution of respondents

A total of 4,233 respondents were interviewed for the research in nine regions of northern Uganda. These regions were grouped into four broader categories depending on the intensity of the armed conflict: namely, the severely affected, sporadically affected, spillover and control regions. The severely affected region comprised Acholi (Amuru, Gulu, Kitgum and Lamwo) and Karamoja (Abim, Kotido and Moroto). The sporadically affected region consisted of Lango (Lira and Otuke) and West Nile (Adjumani, Arua, Yumbe and Zombo). The spillover region comprised Bukedi (Tororo), Bunyoro (Kiryandongo), Elgon (Mbale) and Teso (Amuria and Soroti). The control region consisted of the districts of Kasese, Masaka and Mbarara.<sup>28</sup>

The three broad PRDP regions were fairly balanced, accounting for between 25% and 33% of the total study population, as shown in Table 1 below.

**Table 1: Regional distribution of respondents**

Regional categories	Region	No.	%
Control	(Kasese, Masaka, Mbarara)	589	13.9*
Severely affected region	Acholi (Amuru, Gulu, Kitgum, Lamwo)	802	57.9
	Karamoja (Abim, Kotido, Moroto)	583	42.1
<b>Total</b>		<b>1,385</b>	<b>32.7*</b>
Sporadically affected region	Lango (Lira, Otuke)	404	33.7
	West Nile (Adjumani, Arua, Yumbe, Zombo)	794	66.3
<b>Total</b>		<b>1,198</b>	<b>28.3*</b>
Spillover region	Bukedi (Tororo)	196	18.5
	Bunyoro (Kiryandongo)	206	19.4
	Elgon (Mbale)	201	18.9
	Teso (Amuria, Soroti)	458	43.2
<b>Total</b>		<b>1,061</b>	<b>25.1*</b>
<b>All</b>		<b>4,233</b>	<b>100.0</b>

\* Denominator = 4,233

Table 2 below shows the age and gender distribution of the respondents by region. Overall, 60.8% of the respondents were aged 18–35, while 10.8% were aged 55 or older. The age distribution of respondents within each region was similar, except in the spillover region where 57.1% of the respondents were aged 18–35. By gender, the majority of respondents were women (2,203 or 52%) and within each region, as shown below.

27 Danish Demining Group (2013). *Displacement, Disharmony and Disillusion: Understanding Host-Refugee Tensions in Maban County, South Sudan*.

28 P.C. Mugisa and M. Marzouk (2013). Op. cit.

Table 2: Age and gender distribution of respondents by region

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>Age</b>										
18-35 years	392	66.6	841	60.7	734	61.3	606	57.1	2,573	60.8
36-54 years	149	25.3	374	27.0	339	28.3	339	32.0	1,201	28.4
55+ years	48	8.1	170	12.3	125	10.4	116	10.9	459	10.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>589</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,385</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,198</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,061</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>4,233</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Gender</b>										
Male	287	48.7	664	47.9	567	47.3	512	48.3	2,030	48.0
Female	302	51.3	721	52.1	631	52.7	549	51.7	2,203	52.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>589</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,385</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,198</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,061</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>4,233</b>	<b>100.0</b>

## 2. Peace and security

### 2.1 Feeling safe

Results from the survey show that overall 3,606 (85.2%) of the respondents described the peace and security situation in their communities as stable (see Table 3). By region, the sporadically affected region had the highest percentage of respondents (92.2%) who described the peace and security situation in their community as stable, followed by the severely affected region (84.8%). The control region had the lowest percentage of respondents (78.4%) who described the peace and security situation of their community as stable. Compared with the control region, the higher percentages found in the sporadically and severely affected regions were significant (13.8 percentage points,  $p < 0.0001$  and 6.4 percentage points,  $p = 0.0006$ , respectively). The difference in the percentage of respondents who described the peace and security situation in their community as stable between the spillover and control regions of 3.1 percentage points was not statistically significant ( $p = 0.1286$ ).


**Table 3: Description of peace and security situation in communities**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>In your opinion, how do you describe the peace and security situation in your community?</b>										
Stable	462	78.4	1,175	84.8	1,104	92.2	865	81.5	3,606	85.2
Unstable	126	21.4	210	15.2	94	7.8	196	18.5	626	14.8
N/R	1	0.2	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.0
<b>Do you feel safe in your community?</b>										
Yes	465	78.9	1,212	87.5	1,105	92.2	887	83.6	3,669	86.7
No	119	20.2	172	12.4	92	7.7	172	16.2	555	13.1
N/R	5	0.8	1	0.1	1	0.1	2	0.2	9	0.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>589</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,385</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,198</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,061</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>4,233</b>	<b>100.0</b>

N/R = no response

Respondents felt safe in communities if occurrences of events disrupting peace and security were non-existent or minimal or if there were no mechanisms to address such disruptions if they occurred. Such events included crimes like theft, cattle rustling, SGBV and the presence of rebels in the area. Overall, 3,669 (86.7%) of the respondents felt safe in their communities. Slightly more respondents in the severely affected and spillover regions said they felt safe in their communities compared with the proportion of respondents who described the peace and security situation in their community as stable (see Figure 1). Over time, the percentage of respondents in all regions who felt safe in their communities increased, with the average rate of increase being highest in the control region (3 percentage points) compared with other regions. The spillover region had the lowest average annual change (1.5 percentage points), followed by the sporadically affected region (2 percentage points), as shown in Figure 1.

Figure 1: Percentage of respondents feeling safe in their communities over time



When the 555 (13.1%) respondents who felt unsafe were asked why this was so, the results showed that 33.2% overall cited persistent crimes such as theft and murder, followed by alcohol and drug abuse (18.3%) and poverty and famine causing people to steal (14.8%) (see Table 4). The control region had the highest percentage (39.3%) of respondents who cited persistent crimes as the reason for feeling unsafe in their communities, followed by respondents from the severely affected region (35.7%). In the sporadically affected and spillover regions, the percentages of respondents citing persistent crimes were 26.7% and 30.4%, respectively. Respondents in the control region cited other reasons for feeling unsafe such as the unresponsiveness of security agencies (4.9%) when called to address security concerns and the government's non-commitment to security (4.1%), whereas in the severely and sporadically affected regions, less than 3% of the respondents cited these as reasons for feeling unsafe.


Table 4: Reasons for feeling unsafe in the community

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>If no, why don't you feel safe?</b>										
Persistent crimes (theft, murder, cattle rustling)	105	39.3	125	35.7	58	26.7	121	30.4	409	33.2
Alcohol and drug abuse	52	19.5	57	16.3	44	20.3	73	18.3	226	18.3
Poverty and famine causing people to steal (food, animals)	36	13.5	49	14.0	40	18.4	57	14.3	182	14.8
Increase in domestic violence crimes	27	10.1	32	9.1	18	8.3	39	9.8	116	9.4
Security agencies not responding appropriately when called	13	4.9	10	2.9	5	2.3	26	6.5	54	4.4
Existing conflict with person(s) in the community	3	1.1	17	4.9	11	5.1	21	5.3	52	4.2
Absence of dispute-resolution mechanisms (police, court)	8	3.0	3	0.9	5	2.3	14	3.5	30	2.4
Government not committed to security	11	4.1	3	0.9	4	1.8	11	2.8	29	2.4
Community not involved in peacebuilding activities	8	3.0	2	0.6	5	2.3	14	3.5	29	2.4
Existing border conflicts with neighbouring district, country, etc.	0	0.0	18	5.1	8	3.7	2	0.5	28	2.3
Presence of refugees from other countries	0	0.0	19	5.4	5	2.3	2	0.5	26	2.1
Scattered homesteads	2	0.7	5	1.4	4	1.8	10	2.5	21	1.7
Rumours of existence of rebels – Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), Allied Democratic Forces (ADF)	1	0.4	4	1.1	3	1.4	5	1.3	13	1.1
Possession of guns, abandoned guns in the community	1	0.4	6	1.7	3	1.4	2	0.5	12	1.0
Presence of armed personnel in the community police or Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF)	0	0.0	0	0.0	4	1.8	1	0.3	5	0.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>267</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>350</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>217</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>398</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,232</b>	<b>100.0</b>

## 2.2 Improvement in peace and security

Over the two years in question, 83.3% of the respondents overall noticed an improvement in the peace and security situation in their communities (see Figure 2). The percentage of respondents who noticed an improvement in the peace and security situation in their communities was significantly higher in the severely affected and sporadically affected regions compared with that of the control region (18.1 percentage points,  $p < 0.001$  and 13.4 percentage points,  $p < 0.001$ , respectively). The difference of 0.4 percentage point between the spillover and control regions in the proportion of respondents noticing an improvement in peace and security in the past two years was not statistically significant. Results indicate that the noticeable improvement in peace and security in the severely and sporadically affected regions was mainly as a result of government commitment to security, not having experienced war for some time and reduced rumours of rebel presence. Results further show that, in the control and spillover regions, the presence of police posts in communities was the leading cause of improvement in the peace and security situation.

Figure 2: Percentage of respondents noticing an improvement in peace and security situation



Overall, among the 698 respondents who had not noticed an improvement in the peace and security situation of their community, 33% cited persistent crimes as the reason (see Table 5). At regional level, persistent crimes was also the most commonly cited reason – although the percentage of respondents citing this threat varied from 28% in the sporadically affected regions to 38.2% in the control region. Alcohol and drug abuse were viewed as significant threats to peace and security in the severely affected and sporadically affected regions, at just over 20% for both, but less so in the spillover and control regions. Poverty and famine causing people to steal food or animals was also viewed as a common threat to peace and security in the sporadically affected (17%) and severely affected (15%) regions, whereas, in the control and spillover regions, less than 13% cited this as a threat to the peace and security situation in the community.

Table 5: Reasons for no improvement in peace and security situation

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>If no, what is threatening the peace and security situation in your community?</b>										
Persistent crimes (theft, murder, cattle rustling)	118	38.2	78	29.9	90	28.0	178	34.6	464	33.0
Alcohol and drug abuse	54	17.5	53	20.3	66	20.5	97	18.9	270	19.2
Poverty and famine causing people to steal (food, animals)	30	9.7	39	14.9	55	17.1	62	12.1	186	13.2
Increase in domestic violence crimes	31	10.0	31	11.9	23	7.1	58	11.3	143	10.2
Security agencies not responding appropriately when called	18	5.8	10	3.8	11	3.4	18	3.5	57	4.1
Community not involved in peacebuilding activities	16	5.2	3	1.1	10	3.1	18	3.5	47	3.3
Absence of dispute-resolution mechanisms (police, court)	13	4.2	0	0.0	13	4.0	15	2.9	41	2.9
Existing conflict with person(s) in the community, SGBV	1	0.3	9	3.4	11	3.4	14	2.7	35	2.5
Government not committed to security	15	4.9	4	1.5	2	0.6	7	1.4	28	2.0
Existing border conflicts with neighbouring district, country, etc.	0	0.0	11	4.2	11	3.4	5	1.0	27	1.9
Scattered homesteads	2	0.6	2	0.8	8	2.5	9	1.8	21	1.5
Possession of guns, abandoned guns in the community	1	0.3	5	1.9	2	0.6	6	1.2	14	1.0
Presence of refugees from other countries	0	0.0	2	0.8	7	2.2	3	0.6	12	0.9
Rumours of existence of rebels (LRA, ADF)	0	0.0	1	0.4	1	0.3	8	1.6	10	0.7
Presence of armed personnel in the community police, UPDF	0	0.0	2	0.8	2	0.6	3	0.6	7	0.5
Other	10	3.2	11	4.2	10	3.1	13	2.5	44	3.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>309</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>261</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>322</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>514</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,406</b>	<b>100.0</b>

## 2.3 Confidence in sustained peace and security


Peace and conflict indicator (PCI) 1 establishes the proportion of the population and/or sample with confidence in sustained peace and security. Results presented under this PCI seek to measure confidence in sustained peace and security through monitoring proportional change in the number of respondents who have testified to it between 2012 and 2014. It also analyses the key issues driving perceptions of peace and security.

Respondents were confident in sustained peace and security if there were initiatives in their communities that sought to ensure that peace and security prevails. Such initiatives included community sensitisation about peace and security-related issues, de-mining of communities, patrols by security agencies as well as community policing initiatives, among others. Personal involvement in such initiatives was also considered to contribute to confidence in sustained peace and security.

Overall, 3,480 (82.2%) of the respondents said they had confidence in sustained peace and security in their communities (see Table 6). The severely affected region had the highest percentage of respondents (86%) who had confidence in sustained peace and security in their communities, followed by respondents in the sporadically affected region (85%) (see Figure 3). This was significantly higher than the percentage in the control region (77%) and in the spillover region (76%) – although the difference was not statistically significant. The observed higher percentage of respondents in the severely and sporadically affected regions who were confident in sustained peace and security compared with the control region was mainly as a result of the presence of initiatives to ensure peace and security as well as personal involvement in them. The most common peace initiative in all the regions was community sensitisation, followed by community policing initiatives. The mediation initiative was more prevalent in the PRDP regions but not in the control region.

Over time, the percentage of respondents who were confident in sustained peace and security increased in all regions – with the severely affected regions having the highest average annual change (9 percentage points) and with borderline significance ( $p=0.081$ ). This was followed by the control region, which had an average annual change of 8.5 percentage points, although this was not statistically significant ( $p=0.394$ ). The sporadically affected and spillover regions had the lowest average annual percentage change of 5.5 percentage points ( $p=0.212$ ) and 5.5 percentage points ( $p=0.099$ ), respectively. The observed increase in the percentage of respondents with confidence in sustained peace and security, especially in the severely affected region, further points to the fact that there has been increased establishment of peace and security initiatives as well as greater participation in such initiatives by the respondents.

**Figure 3: Percentage of respondents with confidence in sustained peace and security over time**





Among the respondents who had confidence in sustained peace and security in their community, 3,375 (97%) rated their confidence as high or average (see Table 6). It is important to note that, across all four regions, similar percentages of individuals mentioned the presence of key peace and security initiatives in their communities.

**Table 6: Confidence in sustained peace and security**


	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>Do you have confidence in sustained peace and security in your community?</b>										
Yes	455	77.2	1,192	86.1	1,026	85.6	807	76.1	3,480	82.2
No	132	22.4	187	13.5	170	14.2	251	23.7	740	17.5
N/R	2	0.3	6	0.4	2	0.2	3	0.3	13	0.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>589</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,385</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,198</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,061</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>4,233</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>How do you rate your confidence in sustained peace and security in your community?</b>										
High	224	49.2	669	56.1	462	45.0	277	34.3	1,632	46.9
Average	218	47.9	489	41.0	537	52.3	499	61.8	1,743	50.1
Low	9	2.0	29	2.4	17	1.7	25	3.1	80	2.3
N/R	4	0.8	5	0.5	10	1.0	6	0.7	25	0.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>455</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,192</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,026</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>807</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>3,480</b>	<b>100.0</b>

N/R = no response

The presence of initiatives to ensure peace and security in communities was cited by 3,121 (73.7%) respondents overall (see Figure 4). This ranged from 66.9% in the spillover region to 79.5% in the severely affected region. Compared with the control region, the percentage in the severely affected region was significantly higher ( $p=0.0021$ ). The difference in the percentage of respondents citing the presence of initiatives between the spillover region and the control region was statistically significant at 6.3 percentage points ( $p=0.0079$ ). This further explains the increased confidence in sustained peace and security in the PRDP regions.

Personal involvement in any peacebuilding activities in the communities was a less common occurrence among the respondents at 37% or 1,567 respondents (see Figure 4). The control region had the lowest percentage (25.5%) of respondents who were personally involved in any peacebuilding activities in their communities. Compared with the control region, all PRDP regions had significantly higher percentages of respondents who had personally been involved in peacebuilding activities in their communities – with the sporadically affected regions having the highest difference of 14.8 percentage points ( $p<0.0001$ ). These results are indicative of the fact that the actors behind peace and security initiatives predict the likelihood of community participation. For example, in the control region, the percentage of respondents citing political leaders as the actors behind the initiatives was higher than in the PRDP regions. Conversely, in the PRDP regions, more respondents cited non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and civil society organisations (CSOs) as the actors behind the peace and security initiatives – particularly, in the severely affected region.

**Figure 4: Percentage of respondents reporting presence of and personal involvement in peace and security initiatives in their communities**



When asked who the main actors were in providing the initiatives to ensure peace and security within the communities, more than 25% of the respondents from all regions cited government, followed by community initiatives (20%) (see Table 7). In the control region, security agencies such as the police and the Uganda People's Defence Force (UPDF) were cited as the second most common actor behind peace and security initiatives. Moreover, political leaders were cited by nearly 16% in the control region as actors behind peace and security initiatives in their communities, while in the PRDP regions clan or traditional leaders were cited by at least 10% as the actors. In the severely affected region, a significantly higher percentage (10.7%) of respondents cited NGOs and CSOs as the actors behind peace and security initiatives in their communities. In the sporadically affected and spillover regions, it is important to note that about 10% cited religious leaders as the actors behind such initiatives in their communities. The observed differences in the actors behind peace and security initiatives play a key role in what effect such initiatives will have on the community as well as the level of community participation in such initiatives.

**Table 7: Main actors behind peace and security initiatives**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>Who are the actors behind these peace and security initiatives?</b>										
Government	206	26.7	613	27.0	507	26.8	335	22.5	1,661	25.9
Community initiative	155	20.1	421	18.5	421	22.3	296	19.9	1,293	20.1
Security agencies (police, UPDF, ISO, etc.)	190	24.6	412	18.1	332	17.6	276	18.6	1,210	18.8
Political leaders	128	16.6	200	8.8	209	11.1	225	15.1	762	11.9
Clan/traditional leaders	35	4.5	242	10.6	187	9.9	168	11.3	632	9.8
Religious leaders	46	6.0	142	6.2	185	9.8	153	10.3	526	8.2
NGOs and CSOs	11	1.4	243	10.7	50	2.6	34	2.3	338	5.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>771</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>2,273</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,891</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,487</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>6,422</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Of the 2,650 respondents who had never been involved in peacebuilding activities personally, 1,117 (33.6%) said they had never been invited to participate (see Table 8). The severely affected region had the highest percentage (42%) of respondents citing this reason, followed by the spillover region (31.6%). Lack of such activities in the community was cited as another reason for non-participation in peacebuilding activities – particularly in the severely affected and sporadically affected regions. In the control region, 23% of the respondents said they had no time to participate in peacebuilding activities, while in the severely affected region only 13.4% cited this reason. The perception of participation in peacebuilding activities as being a male role was particularly evident in the spillover region, where 12.8% of the respondents cited this reason. Lack of interest in participation was almost equally as common in the control region (13.4%) but not as much in the PRDP regions. The differences in the

reasons given for failure to participate in peacebuilding activities point to the fact that many such activities are conducted by government, security agencies as well as political leaders, who may not engage with the communities as much as clan or traditional leaders as well as NGOs and CSOs.

**Table 8: Reasons for non-involvement in peace and security initiatives**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>If no, why are you not involved in any peacebuilding activities taking place in your community?</b>										
Never been chosen to participate	153	27.0	420	42.0	281	30.5	263	31.6	1,117	33.6
No time	130	23.0	134	13.4	158	17.1	157	18.8	579	17.4
No peacebuilding activities in the community	49	8.7	126	12.6	126	13.7	64	7.7	365	11.0
I'm a woman; that is work for men	64	11.3	62	6.2	85	9.2	107	12.8	318	9.6
Not interested and never thought of it	76	13.4	64	6.4	81	8.8	80	9.6	301	9.1
(Too) old, cannot participate	24	4.2	62	6.2	53	5.7	65	7.8	204	6.1
Still (too) young	15	2.7	47	4.7	39	4.2	35	4.2	136	4.1
Still a student	14	2.5	38	3.8	36	3.9	38	4.6	126	3.8
Non-existent in our community	35	6.2	35	3.5	38	4.1	17	2.0	125	3.8
Disabled	6	1.1	13	1.3	25	2.7	7	0.8	51	1.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>566</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1001</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>922</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>833</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>3,322</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Overall, engagement with NGOs and community-based organisations (CBOs) with regard to peacebuilding activities was unusual, with 9.5% of the respondents citing such engagements (see Table 9). However, in the severely affected region, nearly 15% of the respondents had engaged with NGOs and CBOs with regard to peacebuilding activities. The control region had the lowest percentage (6.1%) of respondents citing such engagement. The low percentage of respondents engaging with NGOs and CBOs in peacebuilding activities in the control, sporadically affected and spillover regions points to the limited involvement of these organisations in such activities in the areas concerned.

**Table 9: Respondents engaging with NGOs or CBOs in peacebuilding activities**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>Have you engaged with any NGO or CBO with regard to peacebuilding activities?</b>										
Yes	36	6.1	205	14.8	93	7.8	68	6.4	402	9.5
No	553	93.9	1,179	85.1	1,100	91.8	990	93.3	3,822	90.3
N/R	0	0.0	1	0.1	5	0.4	3	0.3	9	0.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>589</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,385</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,198</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,061</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>4,233</b>	<b>100.0</b>

N/R = no response

Among the interactions that respondents had with NGOs and CBOs, provision of information on where to report crimes was cited by 170 (20%) overall (see Table 10), and was most common in the control region (23 respondents or 31%). Training on human rights and the need to respect them ranked second overall (18.2%), but had the highest percentage (21.9%) in the severely affected region.

Table 10: Forms of peacebuilding interactions with NGOs and CBOs

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
What kinds of interactions have you had with NGOs or CBOs regarding peacebuilding?										
Providing information on where to report crimes	23	31.1	70	15.2	50	26.7	27	21.1	170	20.0
Training on human rights and the need to respect them	8	10.8	101	21.9	21	11.2	25	19.5	155	18.2
Collecting information on issues threatening peace	13	17.6	83	18.0	26	13.9	14	10.9	136	16.0
Community training on signs that disrupt peace	9	12.2	81	17.6	23	12.3	22	17.2	135	15.9
Providing mediation services	9	12.2	56	12.1	32	17.1	14	10.9	111	13.1
Providing life skills to youth to reduce idleness	7	9.5	39	8.5	23	12.3	15	11.7	84	9.9
Providing income-generating activities	5	6.8	31	6.7	12	6.4	11	8.6	59	6.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>74</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>461</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>187</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>128</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>850</b>	<b>100.0</b>

## 2.4 Government commitment to restoring peace and security

When asked if they believed the government of Uganda was committed to restoring peace and spurring development, 3,075 (72.6%) respondents said the government was committed (see Table 11). The PRDP regions had significantly higher percentages of respondents who believed that the Ugandan government was committed to restoring peace and spurring development in northern Uganda. In the control region, 40.1% of the respondents did not know whether the government was committed to restoring peace and spurring development in the region.

Whereas the majority of respondents believed that the government of Uganda was committed to restoring peace and spurring development, only 20.8% of the respondents agreed that implementation of programmes and projects under the PRDP helped increase confidence in sustained peace and security (see Table 11). Since the PRDP is not implemented in the control region, respondents in this region may not be aware of the project's contribution to peace and security as in the PRDP regions. Respondents' ignorance of the PRDP's contribution to peace and security is an indication that they are not informed about the objectives of this programme and what it has achieved. In the severely and sporadically affected regions, 35.5% and 20.2% of the respondents, respectively, said that implementation of programmes and projects under the PRDP helped increase confidence in sustained peace and security, compared with only 3.6% in the control region.


**Table 11: Government's commitment and contribution of PRDP programmes to peace and security**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>To what extent do you believe that the government of Uganda is committed to restoring peace and spurring development in northern Uganda?</b>										
Committed	304	51.6	1,204	86.9	874	73.0	693	65.3	3,075	72.6
Not at all committed	45	7.6	95	6.9	153	12.8	83	7.8	376	8.9
Don't know	236	40.1	80	5.8	161	13.4	275	25.9	752	17.8
N/R	4	0.7	6	0.4	10	0.8	10	0.9	30	0.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>589</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,385</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,198</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,061</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>4,233</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Has the implementation of programmes and projects under the PRDP helped increase confidence in sustained peace and security?</b>										
Yes	21	3.6	492	35.5	242	20.2	125	11.8	880	20.8
No	12	2.0	154	11.1	120	10.0	57	5.4	343	8.1
Don't know	554	94.1	731	52.8	831	69.4	868	81.8	2,984	70.5
N/R	2	0.3	8	0.6	5	0.4	11	1.0	26	0.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>589</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,385</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,198</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,061</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>4,233</b>	<b>100.0</b>

N/R = no response

## 2.5 Description and causes of community-level security disruptions

Across the different regions, the security situation within communities varied significantly. In the severely and sporadically affected regions, about 84% of the respondents described the security situation as more peaceful in their communities (see Figure 5). In the spillover and control regions, a lower proportion of about 66% in each region had a similar response. Compared with the control region, the percentage of respondents who described the security situation in their community as somewhat violent was slightly higher (0.5 percentage point) in the severely affected region, while the percentage in the sporadically affected region was significantly lower (7.9%). In the spillover region, the percentage of respondents who described the security situation in their community as somewhat violent was significantly higher than that in the control region, at a difference of 8.6 percentage points ( $p < 0.0001$ ). Respondents perceived their communities as more peaceful if there were no occurrences of community-level security disruptions. For example, in the control region, where only two-thirds of respondents reported that their communities were peaceful, the prevalence of community-level disruptions was highest at 46%.

**Figure 5: Descriptions of community-level security situation (%)**

Among the incidents of security disruptions that occurred, theft was the most commonly cited (30.1%), followed by physical fighting (15.7%) (see Table 12). The highest percentages of respondents citing theft incidents were found in the sporadically affected (32.7%) and control regions (32.4%), followed by the severely affected region (29.5%). Physical fighting as a form of security disruption was more prevalent in the control region (18.2%), followed by the sporadically affected region (17.2%). Land conflicts were also responsible for security disruptions in communities, especially in the severely affected and spillover regions (about 13% in both), followed by the sporadically affected region (12.4%). Incidents of murder were common causes of security disruptions too in the past year, particularly in the spillover, control and severely affected regions, where about 10% of the respondents reported the occurrence of these incidents.

**Table 12: Security disruptions that occurred within communities**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
If yes, what incidents of security disruptions have occurred in your community in the last one year?										
Theft	228	32.4	315	29.5	179	32.7	238	27.4	960	30.1
Physical fighting	128	18.2	181	16.9	94	17.2	98	11.3	501	15.7
Land conflicts	44	6.3	139	13.0	68	12.4	114	13.1	365	11.4
Verbal argument (quarrelling)	77	10.9	98	9.2	54	9.9	82	9.4	311	9.8
Killing people	71	10.1	104	9.7	27	4.9	91	10.5	293	9.2
Disagreements between spouses or domestic violence	47	6.7	71	6.6	45	8.2	62	7.1	225	7.1
Defilement	31	4.4	19	1.8	18	3.3	52	6.0	120	3.8
Cattle rustling	9	1.3	82	7.7	5	0.9	18	2.1	114	3.6
Child abuse (neglect, forced early marriages, denial of education)	24	3.4	16	1.5	24	4.4	47	5.4	111	3.5
Rape	25	3.6	14	1.3	19	3.5	35	4.0	93	2.9
Power struggle between political leaders	19	2.7	5	0.5	5	0.9	22	2.5	51	1.6
Broader conflicts (sub-county, district, country)	1	0.1	25	2.3	10	1.8	9	1.0	45	1.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>704</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,069</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>548</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>868</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>3,189</b>	<b>100.0</b>

The majority of respondents (1,017 or 35.9%) who reported the occurrence of security disruption incidents in their communities in the past year attributed the incidents to poverty (see Table 13). This was followed by alcohol and drug abuse (686 or 24%).

At regional level, poverty was most cited in the control region (43.8%). Across all regions, the percentage of respondents who attributed incidents of security disruptions to alcohol and drug abuse did not vary substantially, ranging from 22.2% in the sporadically affected region to 26.8% in the control region. Alcohol and drug abuse, therefore, affects all regions equally in terms of security disruptions. It is also important to note that alcohol and drug abuse are key risk factors for domestic violence.

Table 13: Causes of security disruptions in communities

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>What causes these conflicts and crimes?</b>										
Poverty (famine, unemployment)	253	43.8	324	34.7	198	35.5	242	31.6	1,017	35.9
Alcohol or drug abuse	155	26.8	234	25.0	124	22.2	173	22.6	686	24.2
Polygamy	38	6.6	73	7.8	71	12.7	56	7.3	238	8.4
Land grabbing, destroying or shifting boundary marks	6	1.0	83	8.9	32	5.7	65	8.5	186	6.6
Destruction of land boundary marks	20	3.5	60	6.4	45	8.1	54	7.1	179	6.3
Failure or refusal to provide basic necessities	45	7.8	29	3.1	19	3.4	48	6.3	141	5.0
Lack of police posts in the community	29	5.0	43	4.6	11	2.0	35	4.6	118	4.2
Destruction of crops by animals	16	2.8	14	1.5	26	4.7	39	5.1	95	3.3
Death of spouse, parent or elder resulting in land conflict	5	0.9	33	3.5	18	3.2	22	2.9	78	2.8
People belonging to different political parties	11	1.9	7	0.7	6	1.1	26	3.4	50	1.8
Influx of refugees	0	0.0	35	3.7	8	1.4	5	0.7	48	1.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>578</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>935</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>558</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>765</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>2,836</b>	<b>100.0</b>

### 2.5.1 Personal involvement in conflict and/or crime not related to land

Personal involvement in any conflict or crime not related to land, in the past two years, was less prevalent at 330 respondents overall (7.8%) (see Table 14). The control region had the lowest percentage (4.8%) of respondents who reported personal involvement in any conflict or crime not related to land. In the PRDP regions, the percentage of respondents citing personal involvement in such conflicts was about 8% in each of the regions.

Table 14: Personal involvement in conflicts not related to land

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>Have you been personally involved in any conflicts or crimes which are not related to land in the past 2 years?</b>										
Yes	28	4.8	119	8.6	96	8.0	87	8.2	330	7.8
No	561	95.2	1,266	91.4	1,102	92.0	972	91.6	3,901	92.2
N/R	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	0.2	2	0.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>589</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,385</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,198</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,061</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>4,233</b>	<b>100.0</b>

N/R = no response

When asked which conflict or crime they were involved in, the majority of respondents overall (31%) cited verbal arguments, followed by physical fighting (26.5%) (see Table 15). Results show that the percentage of respondents involved in each of these incidents was higher in the PRDP regions compared with the control region. For example, in the control region, 28.2% of the respondents reported personal involvement in verbal arguments compared with 32.6% in the severely affected region, 30.8% in the spillover region and 30% in the sporadically affected region. Physical fighting was also less prevalent in the control region than in the PRDP regions at 10% compared with as high as 30.9% in the severely affected region. However, the control region had the highest proportions of disagreements between spouses or domestic violence (20.5%) and theft (17.9%).

Table 15: Types of conflict experienced

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>What conflicts or crimes have you been personally involved in or experienced in the past two years?</b>										
Verbal argument (quarrelling)	11	28.2	58	32.6	48	30.0	36	30.8	153	31.0
Physical fighting	4	10.3	55	30.9	37	23.1	35	29.9	131	26.5
Disagreements between spouses or domestic violence	8	20.5	30	16.9	23	14.4	18	15.4	79	16.0
Theft	7	17.9	22	12.4	25	15.6	6	5.1	60	12.1
Child abuse (neglect, forced early marriages, denial of education)	4	10.3	5	2.8	8	5.0	6	5.1	23	4.7
Border conflicts (sub-county, district, country)	0	0.0	2	1.1	5	3.1	4	3.4	11	2.2
Defilement	0	0.0	2	1.1	6	3.8	2	1.7	10	2.0
Land conflicts	1	2.6	1	0.6	4	2.5	1	0.9	7	1.4
Power struggle between political leaders	0	0.0	1	0.6	1	0.6	3	2.6	5	1.0
Rape	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.6	2	1.7	3	0.6
Murder	0	0.0	1	0.6	1	0.6	1	0.9	3	0.6
Cattle rustling	0	0.0	1	0.6	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.2
Other	4	10.3	0	0.0	1	0.6	3	2.6	8	1.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>178</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>160</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>494</b>	<b>100.0</b>

The leading cause of conflicts and crime in which respondents were personally involved in the past two years was alcohol or drug abuse, as reported by 140 (32.6%) of respondents overall (see Table 16). Regional disparities existed in this respect, especially between the control and PRDP regions. For example, in the control region only 13% of the respondents attributed personal involvement in conflict or crime to alcohol and drugs, whereas in the PRDP regions the percentage of respondents ranged from 25.4% in the spillover region to as high as 46.9% in the severely affected region. Poverty was the second leading contributor to personal involvement in conflict and crime as cited by 26.3% of the respondents overall; and most common in the control region (43.5%) followed by the sporadically affected region (27.4%).

When asked about the other party to the conflict, nearly half (41.9%) of the respondents reported that the conflict was with a neighbour (see Table 16). While the PRDP regions cited conflict with a neighbour as the most common factor, in the control region conflict with a spouse accounted for the highest proportion of respondents. This further points to the fact that disagreements between spouses and domestic violence as well as child neglect, which were more prevalent in the control region, are mainly caused by poverty.




Table 16: Causes of conflict or crimes and other parties involved

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>What was the cause of the conflicts or crimes in which you were personally involved over the past 2 years?</b>										
Alcohol or drug abuse	3	13.0	69	46.9	39	26.7	29	25.4	140	32.6
Poverty (famine, unemployment)	10	43.5	32	21.8	40	27.4	31	27.2	113	26.3
Failure or refusal to provide basic necessities	3	13.0	18	12.2	22	15.1	21	18.4	64	14.9
Polygamy	5	21.7	18	12.2	23	15.8	13	11.4	59	13.7
Destruction of crops by animals	0	0.0	3	2.0	14	9.6	14	12.3	31	7.2
Destruction of land boundary marks	1	4.3	3	2.0	4	2.7	0	0.0	8	1.9
People belonging to different political parties	1	4.3	1	0.7	1	0.7	5	4.4	8	1.9
Lack of police posts in the community	0	0.0	3	2.0	2	1.4	1	0.9	6	1.4
Influx of refugees	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.7	0	0.0	1	0.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>23</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>147</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>114</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>430</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>With whom was the conflict(s) or crime(s)?</b>										
Neighbour	11	37.9	57	40.7	53	45.3	39	40.6	160	41.9
Spouse	12	41.4	57	40.7	35	29.9	32	33.3	136	35.6
Other family members (brother, uncle, father, sister...)	2	6.9	7	5.0	9	7.7	9	9.4	27	7.1
Co-wife	1	3.4	9	6.4	6	5.1	5	5.2	21	5.5
Clan member	0	0.0	6	4.3	9	7.7	5	5.2	20	5.2
In-laws	2	6.9	3	2.1	5	4.3	5	5.2	15	3.9
Institution	1	3.4	1	0.7	0	0.0	1	1.0	3	0.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>382</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Results from the survey show that only half of the respondents who were personally involved in a conflict or crime reported the incident (see Figure 6). The spillover region had the highest percentage of victims (60.9%) who reported the conflict or crime, followed by victims in the control region (57.1%). About two-fifths (39.5%) of the victims in the severely affected region reported the crime or conflict.

Figure 6: Percentage of conflict/crime victims who reported the incident



Results further show that the local council (LC) system was the most common type of dispute-resolution mechanism (DRM) approached to resolve a conflict, at 45.2% (see Table 17). This was followed by the police and courts of law (29.5%). Whereas the majority of victims in the PRDP regions approached the LC system, in the control region a higher proportion of victims approached the police and courts (50%). The clan or traditional system was also approached by more than 19% of victims in the PRDP regions, whereas none of the victims in the control region approached this type of DRM.

Among all victims who approached a DRM, the most commonly cited reason (18.4%) for using this mechanism was that it had the right authority to handle such cases. The close proximity of the DRM was the next most commonly cited reason, at 16.8%. In the sporadically affected region, the highest proportion of victims (21.8%) cited its closeness as the reason for approaching a DRM, while in the other regions the most common reason for approaching a DRM was because it was the right authority to handle such cases. Expeditious handling of the victims' cases was also cited as a reason why a specific DRM was chosen, especially in the spillover region (16.8%) and among all the victims who approached a DRM (14.6%).

**Table 17: DRM approached and reason for approaching**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>To which conflict-resolution mechanism did you report?</b>										
LC system	8	40.0	23	39.0	38	53.5	29	43.3	98	45.2
Police and courts	10	50.0	18	30.5	16	22.5	20	29.9	64	29.5
Clan or traditional system	0	0.0	15	25.4	14	19.7	13	19.4	42	19.4
Mediation options (religious leaders, resident district commissioner (RDC), etc.)	0	0.0	2	3.4	2	2.8	4	6.0	8	3.7
Legal aid service provider (Uganda Association of Women Lawyers (FIDA), Legal Aid Project, etc.)	2	10.0	1	1.7	1	1.4	0	0.0	4	1.8
Probation and welfare office	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	1.5	1	0.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>71</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>217</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Why did you choose to report these conflicts or crimes to the conflict-resolution channels selected above?</b>										
It is the right authority to handle such cases	8	32.0	11	16.2	18	16.4	21	18.6	58	18.4
It is near	4	16.0	10	14.7	24	21.8	15	13.3	53	16.8
They attend to victims faster	3	12.0	11	16.2	13	11.8	19	16.8	46	14.6
It is cheap	1	4.0	4	5.9	14	12.7	11	9.7	30	9.5
I trust this institution	1	4.0	5	7.4	12	10.9	11	9.7	29	9.2
I understand how it works	3	12.0	6	8.8	9	8.2	9	8.0	27	8.5
The law says that is where such cases should be reported	2	8.0	8	11.8	6	5.5	10	8.8	26	8.2
Cases are handled in a restorative way (mediation)	0	0.0	7	10.3	7	6.4	4	3.5	18	5.7
Cases are handled privately	0	0.0	2	2.9	3	2.7	10	8.8	15	4.7
Cases are handled in a retributive way (prosecution)	2	8.0	2	2.9	3	2.7	3	2.7	10	3.2
It is the only institution available in our community	1	4.0	2	2.9	1	0.9	0	0.0	4	1.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>110</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>113</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>316</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Satisfactory resolution of the conflict or crime was reported by 110 (66.3%) of all victims who reported their cases to DRMs (see Table 18). The sporadically affected region had the highest percentage (76%) of victims who reported satisfactory resolution by DRMs, followed by victims in the spillover region (64.2%). The control region had the lowest percentage (56.3%) of victims who reported satisfactory resolution of the conflict or crime. Slightly more respondents overall (113 or 68.3%) reported that their conflict had been resolved. Once again, the percentage of victims who reported resolution of the conflict was highest in the sporadically affected region (78%), although it was lowest in the spillover region (62.3%).

Among the victims who reported that their conflict or crime had been resolved, 50 (44.2%) stated that it had been resolved by the LC system. The clan or traditional system ranked second (27 or 23.9%) as a conflict-resolution channel that successfully resolved a conflict or crime. The sporadically affected region had the highest percentage (61.5%) of victims whose conflicts were resolved by the LC system, whereas, in the control region, the highest percentage (54.5%) of victims reported that their conflict or crime was resolved by the police or courts.

Table 18: Satisfactory resolution of conflict or crime by DRMs

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>Did the dispute-resolution mechanisms to which you reported address or respond satisfactorily?</b>										
Yes	9	56.3	29	61.7	38	76.0	34	64.2	110	66.3
No	7	43.8	18	38.3	12	24.0	18	34.0	55	33.1
N/R	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	1.9	1	0.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>166</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Has the conflict(s) or crime been resolved?</b>										
Yes	11	68.8	30	63.8	39	78.0	33	62.3	113	68.1
No	5	31.3	17	36.2	11	22.0	19	35.8	52	31.3
N/R	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	1.9	1	0.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>166</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Which conflict-resolution channel actually resolved the conflict or crime?</b>										
LC system	4	36.4	10	33.3	24	61.5	12	36.4	50	44.2
Clan or traditional system	0	0.0	10	33.3	6	15.4	11	33.3	27	23.9
Police and courts	6	54.5	9	30.0	8	20.5	7	21.2	30	26.5
Mediation options (religious leaders, RDC, etc.)	0	0.0	1	3.3	0	0.0	2	6.1	3	2.7
Probation and welfare office	1	9.1	0	0.0	1	2.6	1	3.0	3	2.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>30</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>113</b>	<b>100.0</b>

N/R = no response

Among the respondents whose conflict was still ongoing, 20.3% attributed this to the slow court process, a factor that was particularly evident (32%) in the spillover region (see Table 19). The other commonly cited reason was that the perpetrator had run away. This reason was more common in the control region, as reported by 50% of the victims, followed by those in the sporadically affected region (23.1%). The perpetrator's refusal to respect the judgement or decision passed was a particularly prevalent reason in the severely affected region, with 20.8% of victims whose conflicts were still ongoing citing this reason.

Table 19: Reasons why conflict was still ongoing

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>If conflict is still ongoing, why has this conflict or crime not been resolved?</b>										
Slow court process	0	0.0	2	8.3	3	23.1	8	32.0	13	20.3
Perpetrator ran away	1	50.0	5	20.8	3	23.1	2	8.0	11	17.2
Perpetrator never identified	0	0.0	6	25.0	3	23.1	1	4.0	10	15.6
Lack of money to facilitate process	1	50.0	1	4.2	0	0.0	7	28.0	9	14.1
Perpetrator's refusal to respect judgement or decision passed	0	0.0	5	20.8	0	0.0	2	8.0	7	10.9
Perpetrator an LC, relative of LC or person in authority	0	0.0	2	8.3	1	7.7	1	4.0	4	6.3
Prohibitive distance to the conflict-resolution centre	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	7.7	2	8.0	3	4.7
Lack of witnesses	0	0.0	1	4.2	1	7.7	1	4.0	3	4.7
Failure by respondent to show up	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	7.7	1	4.0	2	3.1
Perpetrator paid money to influence decision	0	0.0	2	8.3	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	3.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>24</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>100.0</b>

In terms of reasons for not reporting the conflict or crime, the victims' choice not to involve the authorities was the most commonly cited reason, with 48.4% of victims stating this as the reason (see Table 20). The percentage of victims who chose not to involve authorities was highest (61.9%) in the severely affected region, followed by the control region (50%). Victims' lack of awareness that what had happened to them was a crime was also a common reason for not


reporting the incident, as reported by 17.6% of the respondents overall. The spillover region had the highest percentage (31%) of victims who cited this reason, followed by the severely affected region (15.9%).

**Table 20: Reasons why conflict or crime was not reported**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>Why did you choose not to report the conflict or crime?</b>										
I did not want to involve legal authorities – I preferred to move on from the dispute	5	50.0	39	61.9	20	39.2	10	34.5	74	48.4
I did not know that what had happened to me was a crime	1	10.0	10	15.9	7	13.7	9	31.0	27	17.6
I did not believe that anyone would help me	1	10.0	6	9.5	9	17.6	1	3.4	17	11.1
I did not have the money to report – I thought the authorities would ask me for bribes	3	30.0	1	1.6	2	3.9	4	13.8	10	6.5
I am a woman	0	0.0	2	3.2	6	11.8	0	0.0	8	5.2
I did not know to whom I should report the crime	0	0.0	2	3.2	3	5.9	2	6.9	7	4.6
I was afraid that the perpetrator would hurt me if I reported him/her	0	0.0	2	3.2	1	2.0	3	10.3	6	3.9
I failed to identify the perpetrator	0	0.0	1	1.6	3	5.9	0	0.0	4	2.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>51</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>153</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Respect for the judgement or decision passed by DRMs proved to be high, with 82% of the respondents overall stating that people in their communities respected such judgements (see Figure 7). However, the percentage of respondents reporting respect for judgements or decisions passed by DRMs was slightly lower in the control (79.3%) and spillover (79.4%) regions compared with the percentage in the severely affected (83.5%) and sporadically affected (83.4%) regions.

**Figure 7: Percentage of respondents reporting respect for judgement or decision passed by DRM**



Among the types of crimes for which people respect judgements passed by DRMs, physical fighting was cited by the highest percentage (21.6%) of respondents overall, followed by theft (20.2%), domestic violence (18.3%) and land conflicts (15.4%) (see Table 21). In the PRDP regions, physical fighting ranked first as the type of case for which people would respect judgements, whereas in the control region theft cases ranked higher (23.4%) in terms of cases for which people would respect judgements passed by DRMs.

Across all regions, the majority of respondents reported that judgements or decisions passed by LC systems were more likely to be respected or implemented, as reported by 75.8% of the respondents overall. Judgements or decisions passed by the police and courts were also more likely to be respected, with 20.3% of the respondents overall citing this type of DRM. Although about 20% of victims reported their cases to clan or traditional leaders in the PRDP regions (see Table 17), less than 4% of the respondents in these regions said that the decisions or judgements passed by these DRMs were likely to be respected. This could be due to the failure of these DRMs to identify or apprehend the perpetrators, among other reasons.

**Table 21: Cases and mechanisms whose judgement or decision is respected in communities**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>If yes, for what types of cases will people respect the judgement passed by the DRM?</b>										
Physical fighting	244	18.7	705	25.2	506	21.0	462	19.7	1,917	21.6
Theft cases	306	23.4	600	21.4	505	21.0	384	16.3	1,795	20.2
Domestic violence	230	17.6	514	18.3	422	17.5	459	19.5	1,625	18.3
Land conflict	136	10.4	472	16.8	407	16.9	354	15.1	1,369	15.4
Sexual abuse	103	7.9	190	6.8	168	7.0	246	10.5	707	8.0
Child support cases	100	7.7	138	4.9	128	5.3	208	8.8	574	6.5
Failure to provide necessities	109	8.4	59	2.1	75	3.1	87	3.7	330	3.7
Inheritance cases	46	3.5	43	1.5	112	4.7	90	3.8	291	3.3
Forced early marriage	23	1.8	46	1.6	49	2.0	51	2.2	169	1.9
Other	8	0.6	36	1.3	36	1.5	10	0.4	90	1.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,305</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>2,803</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>2,408</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>2,351</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>8,867</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>If yes, which DRM is more likely to have its judgement or decision respected or implemented?</b>										
LC system	360	77.1	848	73.3	776	77.3	646	76.7	2,630	75.8
Police and courts	90	19.3	260	22.5	189	18.8	164	19.5	703	20.3
Clan or traditional system	15	3.2	42	3.6	36	3.6	25	3.0	118	3.4
Probation and welfare office	2	0.4	6	0.5	1	0.1	5	0.6	14	0.4
Mediation options (religious leaders, RDC, etc.)	0	0.0	1	0.1	2	0.2	0	0.0	3	0.1
Legal aid service provider (FIDA, Legal Aid Project, etc.)	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	0.2	2	0.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>467</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,157</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,004</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>842</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>3,470</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Results from the survey indicate that, if the perpetrator is a man, the judgement or decision passed by the DRM is more likely to be implemented or respected, as indicated by 662 (19.1%) of the respondents overall (see Table 22). If the perpetrator is a woman, less than 10% of the respondents reported that the judgement or decision passed would be respected. However, it is important to note that the majority of respondents (52.3%) reported that, irrespective of the type of perpetrator, judgements or decisions passed were likely to be respected, especially in the spillover region (60%). Similarly, the majority of respondents (88.7%) reported that the judgement or decision passed would be respected regardless of who is favoured. In the control region, 12% of the respondents reported that the judgement or decision was likely to be respected or implemented if it was in favour of a woman, whereas in the other regions less than 2% had a similar opinion. This is most likely due to the differences in the preferred DRMs across the regions and how these DRMs handle cases. For instance, it was found that, in the control region, the majority of victims preferred to report their cases to the police or courts of law, while in the PRDP regions more cases were reported to the LC system (see Table 17).

Table 22: Respect of judgements by perpetrators

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Which type of perpetrator is more likely to respect or implement the ruling, judgement or decision, once passed by the local council, traditional leader, court or other person or institution?										
A man	94	20.1	238	20.6	195	19.4	135	16.0	662	19.1
A woman	58	12.4	119	10.3	80	8	71	8.4	328	9.5
A widow	36	7.7	157	13.6	108	10.8	82	9.7	383	11.0
An orphan	12	2.6	67	5.8	90	9	31	3.7	200	5.8
All the above	262	56.1	536	46.3	513	51.1	505	60.0	1,816	52.3
N/R	5	1.1	40	3.5	18	1.8	18	2.1	81	2.3
Which type of perpetrator in favour of whom the ruling, judgement or decision is made is more likely to respect or implement that ruling, judgement or decision, once passed by the local council, traditional leader, court or other person or institution?										
A man	32	6.9	5	0.4	13	1.3	9	1.1	59	1.7
A woman	56	12.0	21	1.8	14	1.4	15	1.8	106	3.1
A widow	7	1.5	19	1.6	14	1.4	3	0.4	43	1.2
An orphan	15	3.2	70	6.1	41	4.1	44	5.2	170	4.9
All the above	356	76.2	1,035	89.5	918	91.4	769	91.3	3,078	88.7
N/R	1	0.2	7	0.6	4	0.4	2	0.2	14	0.4
Total	467	100.0	1,157	100.0	1,004	100.0	842	100.0	3,470	100.0


N/R = no response

### 2.5.2 Personal involvement in land-related conflicts and crime

Personal involvement in land-related conflicts or crime in the past two years was reported by 387 (9.1%) of the respondents overall (see Figure 8). The severely affected region had the highest percentage (11.6%) of respondents who were personally involved in land-related conflicts or crime in the past two years, while the control region had the lowest percentage (6.3%) of respondents citing such involvement.

Results from the survey further show that the majority (80.1%) of victims of land-related conflicts or crime reported their cases, especially in the control (89.2%) and spillover (81.1%) regions (see Figure 9). The sporadically affected region had the lowest percentage (76.8%) of victims of land-related conflicts or crime who reported their cases. It should be noted that, as shown earlier (see Table 20), the sporadically affected region had a considerable proportion (39.2%) of victims who did not report their cases because they did not want to involve legal authorities and chose to move on. It was also found that the sporadically affected region had the highest percentage of victims who had been evicted (see Table 23).

Figure 8: Percentage of respondents citing personal involvement in and reporting of land-related conflict and crime



The most common form of land-related conflicts were ownership disputes, as reported by 32% of the respondents involved (see Table 23). This was closely followed by boundary disputes, cited by 31.2% of the respondents overall. The severely affected region had the highest percentage (43.8%) of respondents citing ownership disputes as the most common form of land-related conflict, while in the other regions boundary disputes were the most prevalent form, especially in the sporadically affected (34.8%) and spillover (34.1%) regions. Fraudulent land sales as well as succession disputes were common in the control and spillover regions.

**Table 23: Forms of land-related conflicts in which respondents were involved**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>What type of land conflicts have you been personally involved in over the past two years?</b>										
Ownership disputes	12	26.7	84	43.8	36	32.1	22	16.7	154	32.0
Boundary disputes	14	31.1	52	27.1	39	34.8	45	34.1	150	31.2
Eviction	2	4.4	22	11.5	15	13.4	11	8.3	50	10.4
Restriction on the amount of land to use	3	6.7	15	7.8	7	6.3	18	13.6	43	8.9
Succession disputes	6	13.3	9	4.7	6	5.4	18	13.6	39	8.1
Land taken without adequate compensation	1	2.2	6	3.1	9	8.0	7	5.3	23	4.8
Illegal or fraudulent land sale	7	15.6	4	2.1	0	0.0	11	8.3	22	4.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>192</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>112</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>132</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>481</b>	<b>100.0</b>

The leading cause of land conflicts was the destruction of boundary marks, as cited by 25.7% of the respondents who had experienced land-related disputes in the past two years (see Table 24). This was followed by absence from the land, which was reported by 20.3% of the respondents and was the leading cause of land-related conflict in the severely affected region. In the other regions, destruction of boundary marks was the leading cause of land-related disputes.

Land conflicts were mainly with neighbours, as reported by 47.8% of all respondents who experienced a land-related dispute. Relatives of the respondent's father were mentioned by 22.2% of the victims overall involved in land-related disputes, with victims in the control region having the highest percentage (32.4%) followed by those in the spillover region (22.8%). In-laws were also cited as a party to the conflict, particularly in the PRDP regions (about 12% to 15% in each region), but less so in the control region (5.4%). It is important to note that ownership disputes were more commonly cited in the PRDP regions (see Table 23), especially the severely affected and sporadically affected regions, which also had the highest percentages of victims reporting conflicts with their in-laws. Therefore, sensitising communities about land rights in such regions should be an important priority.



Table 24: Causes of and other parties with whom respondents had land-related conflicts

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>What caused the land conflict(s)?</b>										
Destruction of land boundary marks	12	27.3	55	24.7	41	31.8	29	21.2	137	25.7
Absence from the land	5	11.4	66	29.6	26	20.2	11	8.0	108	20.3
Limited land available	3	6.8	28	12.6	18	14.0	18	13.1	67	12.6
Death of father	5	11.4	27	12.1	8	6.2	21	15.3	61	11.4
Unfair plot allocation	5	11.4	23	10.3	10	7.8	13	9.5	51	9.6
Lack of land transaction agreements	7	15.9	8	3.6	10	7.8	23	16.8	48	9.0
Death of spouse	4	9.1	9	4.0	5	3.9	11	8.0	29	5.4
Government needed land (road, school, camp)	1	2.3	3	1.3	7	5.4	3	2.2	14	2.6
Husband married another wife	2	4.5	2	0.9	3	2.3	5	3.6	12	2.3
I am a daughter in this family or clan	0	0.0	2	0.9	1	0.8	2	1.5	5	0.9
My husband is a nephew in this clan	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.7	1	0.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>223</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>129</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>137</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>533</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>With whom was the land conflict(s)?</b>										
Neighbour	15	40.5	90	52.3	49	47.1	44	43.6	198	47.8
My father's relatives	12	32.4	36	20.9	21	20.2	23	22.8	92	22.2
In-laws	2	5.4	26	15.1	15	14.4	13	12.9	56	13.5
My mother's relatives	0	0.0	9	5.2	1	1.0	4	4.0	14	3.4
My husband's children or step-children	1	2.7	1	0.6	6	5.8	5	5.0	13	3.1
Land owner or landlord	2	5.4	2	1.2	2	1.9	4	4.0	10	2.4
Government institution (NFA, UWA, UNRA)	0	0.0	2	1.2	5	4.8	2	2.0	9	2.2
Spouse	3	8.1	1	0.6	1	1.0	3	3.0	8	1.9
Co-wife	1	2.7	1	0.6	3	2.9	1	1.0	6	1.4
Local government – schools, hospital, sub-county, district	1	2.7	1	0.6	1	1.0	1	1.0	4	1.0
Religious institution	0	0.0	2	1.2	0	0.0	1	1.0	3	0.7
NGO or CSO	0	0.0	1	0.6	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>172</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>101</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>414</b>	<b>100.0</b>

In terms of the dispute-resolution channels used to help resolve land-related disputes, the LC system was most commonly cited, with 193 (41.3%) of the victims overall citing this system (see Table 25). The clan or traditional system was the next most commonly cited system, but mostly by those in the severely affected (38.2%) and sporadically affected (35.7%) regions. The police and courts were the channels mainly used in the spillover (34.3%) and control (33.3%) regions, while fewer victims in the severely affected and sporadically affected regions used this channel. Channels such as the probation and welfare office or a legal aid service provider proved very unpopular.

Asked why a specific DRM was chosen, the primary reason cited was that it was a legal requirement, as reported by 127 (23%) of the victims overall. This was closely followed by fairness of (21.2%) and familiarity with (19.6%) the institution as other reasons for choosing the particular DRM. Unlike in the PRDP regions, especially in the severely affected region. In the control region, the largest percentage (25%) of the respondents selected a specific channel because of its proximity, whereas this factor was less commonly cited in the PRDP regions. The cost of handling conflict was also mentioned as a reason for choosing a specific DRM, especially in the spillover (15.2%) and sporadically affected (14%) regions.



Table 25: Choice of DRM approached and reasons for choosing this DRM to resolve land conflicts

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>Which conflict-resolution channels did you use in trying to resolve the land conflict(s)?</b>										
LC system	21	58.3	83	39.2	48	41.7	41	41.4	193	41.8
Clan or traditional system	1	2.8	81	38.2	41	35.7	21	21.2	144	31.2
Police and courts	12	33.3	42	19.8	22	19.1	34	34.3	110	23.8
Mediation options (religious leaders, RDC, etc.)	2	5.6	6	2.8	4	3.5	2	2.0	14	3.0
Probation and welfare office	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	1.0	1	0.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>212</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>115</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>99</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>462</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Why did you choose to use the conflict-resolution channels mentioned above?</b>										
Legal requirement – stipulated in the procedure	10	18.2	62	27.1	36	25.2	19	15.2	127	23.0
Fairness – trust this institution	13	23.6	49	21.4	28	19.6	27	21.6	117	21.2
Familiarity – understand how it works	6	10.9	53	23.1	29	20.3	20	16.0	108	19.6
Distance – close proximity	14	25.5	23	10.0	24	16.8	24	19.2	85	15.4
Cost – cheap	4	7.3	24	10.5	20	14.0	19	15.2	67	12.1
Availability – the only available option	8	14.5	18	7.9	6	4.2	16	12.8	48	8.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>55</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>229</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>125</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>552</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Among the victims who reported their cases to a DRM, 57.4% overall indicated that the conflict had been resolved (see Table 26). However, in the severely affected region, a greater proportion (51.6%) of victims said the case had not been resolved, unlike the other regions where more victims had their cases resolved than not resolved. In terms of the conflict-resolution channel that resolved the conflict, the LC system ranked first, with 40.4% of the respondents citing this mechanism. However, in the sporadically affected region, the clan or traditional system ranked first, at 39.6%. Police and courts of law were also cited by 41 (23%) of the land victims overall as successfully resolving land conflicts, with the highest percentages being found in the spillover (31%) and control (28.6%) regions. The results further show that the LC system was approached mainly because it was considered to be a legal requirement before other DRMs could be accessed.

Table 26: Resolution status of land conflict and DRM that resolved the conflict

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>Has the land conflict(s) been resolved?</b>										
Yes	21	63.6	62	48.4	53	69.7	42	57.5	178	57.4
No	12	36.4	66	51.6	23	30.3	31	42.5	132	42.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>128</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>310</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>If yes, which conflict-resolution channel actually resolved the land conflict?</b>										
LC system	11	52.4	25	40.3	20	37.7	16	38.1	72	40.4
Clan or traditional system	1	4.8	24	38.7	21	39.6	12	28.6	58	32.6
Police and courts	6	28.6	11	17.7	11	20.8	13	31.0	41	23.0
Mediation options (religious leaders, RDC, etc.)	3	14.3	2	3.2	1	1.9	0	0.0	6	3.4
Probation and welfare office	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	2.4	1	0.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>53</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>178</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Out of the 132 respondents who reported that their land conflict was still ongoing, 67 (38.5%) attributed this to the slow court process (see Table 27). This reason was mostly cited by victims in the sporadically affected (44%) and severely affected (40.7%) regions. The perpetrator's refusal to respect a court or mediation decision was also a common reason cited by victims whose cases were still ongoing, as reported by 27.6% of the victims overall. However, lack of money to facilitate the process was a more common reason cited for delayed conflict resolution in the control region, at 23.1%.

Table 27: Reasons why land conflict was still ongoing

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>If conflict is still ongoing, why has this conflict not been resolved?</b>										
Slow court process	4	30.8	37	40.7	11	44.0	15	33.3	67	38.5
Perpetrator refused to respect court or mediation decision	2	15.4	27	29.7	8	32.0	11	24.4	48	27.6
Lack of money to facilitate the process	3	23.1	10	11.0	3	12.0	9	20.0	25	14.4
Perpetrator paid money to influence decision	2	15.4	7	7.7	3	12.0	2	4.4	14	8.0
Long distance to the conflict-resolution centre	0	0.0	6	6.6	0	0.0	3	6.7	9	5.2
Failure by respondent to show up	1	7.7	2	2.2	0	0.0	3	6.7	6	3.4
Perpetrator an LC, relative of LC or person in authority	1	7.7	2	2.2	0	0.0	0	0.0	3	1.7
Failure to determine the perpetrator	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	4.4	2	1.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>174</b>	<b>100.0</b>

The victims of land conflicts were further asked what type of coping strategy they had used regarding the dispute. The majority (45.2%) of respondents stated that they had not used any coping strategy (see Table 28). The spillover region had the highest percentage (52.6%) of land victims who said they did not have a coping strategy, while the severely affected region had the lowest percentage (42.4%). Temporarily abandoning work on the land was a coping strategy mainly used by victims in the severely affected (25.9%) and sporadically affected (24.5%) regions.

When the victims were asked what would help them feel safe and secure on their land, 29.4% overall cited having a land title. This was mainly reported by victims in the control region (46%) and spillover region (32.7%). In the severely and sporadically affected regions, the majority of victims reported that having locally recognised boundaries would help them feel safe and secure on their land. Land purchase agreements as well as wills showing the victim's share of land were also cited as measures that would help victims feel safe, especially in the control region, where 20.6% and 14.3%, respectively, of land victims cited these measures. The proposed solutions in the different regions are indicative of the type of land-related conflicts that are more specific to each region and with whom victims had such conflicts. For example, more of the land conflict victims in the control region had conflicts related to fraudulent land sales (see Table 23).


Table 28: Coping strategies and methods used to feel safe and secure on land by the victims

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>What coping strategy did you use when you experienced the land conflict(s)?</b>										
Nothing	16	44.4	72	42.4	44	43.1	51	52.6	183	45.2
Abandoned work on land temporarily	5	13.9	44	25.9	25	24.5	15	15.5	89	22.0
Rented land	2	5.6	16	9.4	12	11.8	8	8.2	38	9.4
Started sharecropping	1	2.8	15	8.8	3	2.9	8	8.2	27	6.7
Abandoned work on land permanently	3	8.3	10	5.9	5	4.9	6	6.2	24	5.9
Started an income activity not requiring land	4	11.1	6	3.5	6	5.9	3	3.1	19	4.7
Bought land elsewhere	2	5.6	4	2.4	5	4.9	2	2.1	13	3.2
Went back to my father's home	3	8.3	3	1.8	2	2.0	4	4.1	12	3.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>170</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>102</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>405</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>In general, what would help you feel safe and secure on your land?</b>										
Land title	29	46.0	82	27.2	44	24.6	48	32.7	203	29.4
Locally recognised boundary marking	4	6.3	94	31.2	60	33.5	42	28.6	200	29.0
Legal marriage – customary or religious	1	1.6	31	10.3	26	14.5	14	9.5	72	10.4
Written document showing allocation	1	1.6	20	6.6	9	5.0	17	11.6	47	6.8
Land purchase agreement	13	20.6	16	5.3	8	4.5	9	6.1	46	6.7
Certificate of customary ownership	1	1.6	29	9.6	10	5.6	6	4.1	46	6.7
Will showing share of land	9	14.3	12	4.0	13	7.3	8	5.4	42	6.1
Ability to cultivate it or use it all	5	7.9	17	5.6	9	5.0	3	2.0	34	4.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>301</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>179</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>147</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>690</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Overall, the survey results show that 78% of all respondents reported that everyone in the community is able to get justice from the DRMs (see Figure 9). Across the regions, no significant differences were observed; the sporadically affected region had the highest percentage (79.6%) of respondents stating this to be the case, while the control region had the lowest percentage (75.7%).

When asked whether implementation of programmes and projects under the PRDP had helped community-level DRMs to respond to conflicts and crimes satisfactorily, 3,019 (71.3%) of the respondents said they did not know. The results show that the severely affected region, followed by the sporadically affected region, had the highest percentages of respondents stating that PRDP implementation had helped community-level DRMs to respond to conflicts and crimes satisfactorily. In the control region, less than 2% of the respondents had a similar response.

Figure 9: Percentage of respondents able to access justice from DRMs and agreeing that PRDP implementation has helped



Among the respondents who stated that not everyone is able to access justice from a DRM in the community, the most cited reason for this was discrimination, as reported by 563 (34.2%) of the respondents (see Table 29). This was followed by unjust officials, cited by 397 (24.1%) of the respondents overall. Unjust officials was the main reason (33.4%) cited by respondents in the control region for lack of access to justice from DRMs in the community.


**Table 29: Reasons why everyone in the community cannot get justice**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
If no, give a reason for your answer										
Discrimination (gender, tribe, religion), bribes	67	23.1	216	41.5	153	38.6	127	28.7	563	34.2
Unjust officials	97	33.4	124	23.8	86	21.7	90	20.4	397	24.1
Legal fees	51	17.6	68	13.1	59	14.9	68	15.4	246	14.9
Cases taking too long to process	41	14.1	45	8.7	40	10.1	80	18.1	206	12.5
Community ignorance about seeking justice	27	9.3	35	6.7	27	6.8	45	10.2	134	8.1
Hard-to-reach justice institutions	6	2.1	29	5.6	29	7.3	26	5.9	90	5.5
Other	1	0.3	3	0.6	2	0.5	6	1.4	12	0.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>290</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>520</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>396</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>442</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,648</b>	<b>100.0</b>

### 2.5.3 Comparative results on personal involvement in conflict or crime


The results indicate that personal involvement in conflicts in the previous two years has fallen in all four regions, but with varying rates by region (see Figure 10). The severely affected and spillover regions had the highest decline in the percentage of respondents involved in personal conflicts, decreasing at an average rate of 6.5 percentage points per year. In both regions, however, the decreases were not statistically significant. The sporadically affected region had an average annual decline of two percentage points in the proportion of respondents citing personal involvement in conflicts – a rate that was lower than that observed in the control region (4.5%). Similar to the changes observed in the spillover and severely affected regions, the rates of decline in the control and sporadically affected regions were also not statistically significant. The observed decline in personal involvement in conflict or crime over the three-year period is likely to be due to a reduction in people's engagement in acts that are known to cause conflicts, such as alcoholism and drug abuse.

**Figure 10: Percentage of respondents personally involved in conflict or crime over time**



The percentage of respondents reporting access to justice by people within their communities increased in all regions, with the control region having the highest average annual increase (14 percentage points), followed by the severely affected region (12.5 percentage points) (see Figure 11). The sporadically affected region had the lowest average annual increase (7 percentage points) in the percentage of respondents reporting that people in their communities had access to justice. However, it is important to note that the sporadically affected region had the highest percentage of respondents reporting access to justice. By 2014, the percentage of respondents who reported that people had access to justice in their communities ranged between 75.6% and 79.6%. This suggests that there have been improvements in terms of justice provision by DRMs, especially in the control region over the three-year period in question.

Figure 11: Percentage of respondents able to access justice from DRMs over time



## 2.6 Qualitative perceptions on peace and security

### 2.6.1 Control region

One of the reasons for feeling unsafe in Kasese District is the ethnic clash between the Bakonjo and the Basongora. A respondent in the consensus panel commented:

*“...there are clashes between the Bakonjo and Basongora ... the Basongora want to create their own traditional chieftaincy but the Bakonjo do not agree with them breaking away.”<sup>29</sup>*

Similarly, a civil servant in Kasese District explained:

*“...the problems of the Bakonjo and Basongora are political ... one ethnic group ends up supporting a particular political candidate and it always ends in bloody clashes ... politicians themselves sometimes incite people and play the tribe card, which usually ends in bloody clashes.”<sup>30</sup>*

29 Consensus panel, Kasese District, April 2014.

30 Key informant, Kasese District, April 2014.

The proximity of Kasese District to the border between Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was another common reason for feeling unsafe:

*“...there are rumours that the ADF and M23 will return, so people are generally worried ... after M23 whenever we see people crossing the border into Kasese, we fear for our lives.”<sup>31</sup>*

Another factor that was responsible for people feeling unsafe in their communities was the succession wrangles within the ruling party. One consensus panel participant highlighted:

*“...Sejjusa<sup>32</sup> issue is creating fear among the people ... uncertainty of what next ... people are worried that he could easily go to the bush to resolve his issues ... the media, especially TV, has been documenting all these wrangles ... when people see them, they fear for tomorrow.”<sup>33</sup>*

Strengthening the immigration department was a common recommendation in Kasese:

*“...Government should control growing movement, especially among people coming from Congo ... they should also strengthen the police ... increase personnel manning the border areas.”<sup>34</sup>*

In addition, communities were urged to be vigilant on security matters and to participate through community policing initiatives. CSOs were encouraged to engage in advocacy and raising awareness, especially concerning terrorism.

In Masaka District, the common factors for feeling unsafe were not unlike those in Kasese – particularly, land conflicts leading to increased crime rates, succession questions and growing corruption among the police. A key informant outlined:

*“...land conflicts are predominant in Masaka and many other crimes have risen out of that – for example, murder ... many people are killing each other because of land wrangles.”<sup>35</sup>*

The wide income gap and prevailing poverty, especially among the youth, were additional factors mentioned for the increased crime rate in Masaka.

Among the recommendations to government was the need to:

*“...tighten laws on corruption ... ensure even distribution of resources to reduce the income gap between the rich and poor ... skill security personnel to promote professionalism.”<sup>36</sup>*

In addition to worries about succession wrangles, in Mbarara District the drivers of decreased confidence in sustained peace included high youth unemployment:

*“...unemployment, especially among the youth ... they are more idle hence participate in crime ... poverty among the youth has forced them to resort to drugs like alcohol, marijuana and bhangì ... youth have become common – for example, the increased fraudulent land sales in Mbarara ... most of them are orchestrated by the disgruntled youth.”<sup>37</sup>*

31 Consensus panel, Kasese District, April 2014.

32 A renegade general who had fled the country at the time of the field study.

33 Consensus panel, Kasese District, April 2014.

34 Key informant, Kasese District, April 2014.

35 Key informant, Masaka District, April 2014.

36 Consensus panel, Masaka District, April 2014.

37 Key informant, Mbarara District, April 2014.

Recommendations made during the consensus panel discussion included the following:

*“...it is vital for the government to legitimise the collapsing LC system in order to promote peace in communities ... communities are also encouraged to hold community meetings and share security information through their village cells ... they should fully participate in the national ID project ... this will help in crime prevention.”<sup>38</sup>*

### 2.6.2 Spillover region

In Kiryandongo District, the percentage of respondents who reported feeling safe in their communities increased from 78.2% in 2012 to 80.7% in 2014. Some of the factors given in qualitative interviews point to the role of the PRDP programme in infrastructural development:

*“...the number of boreholes constructed under PRDP has increased ... there are now more community roads constructed under PRDP ... under PRDP, clean water coverage is now at 90% ... each village now has two boreholes.”<sup>39</sup>*

Another factor cited was security personnel:

*“Vigilance of the security personnel, especially the police ... that is one of the reasons for the reduction in crime rate.”<sup>40</sup>*

Current threats to security in Bunyoro were also discussed and they included the following:

*“...in 2014, the Sudanese refugees came to Kiryandongo and they came with their own insecurity ... the Nuer and the Dinka don't want to meet at water points, roads or even schools ... when Dinka children enter class, the Nuer children don't want to enter ... Sudanese children are harassing each other ... that is a threat to peace because we all live in the same community.”<sup>41</sup>*

Another cause of fear among the people was that:

*“...government is giving out land in Kitwaara Parish where an investor was given land, yet it was occupied by families ... this has caused tension between local leaders and communities ... it has caused violence since 2013 up to now.”<sup>42</sup>*

In Bukedi, the anti-smuggling operation in 2012 was blamed for the high crime rate due to unemployment:

*“...most youth in Osukuru Sub-county were depending on smuggling ... now that smuggling has been controlled, many of them have been left unemployed and a threat to peace ... theft, especially of animals, for example, pigs, goats, has increased...”<sup>43</sup>*

Similar to fears expressed in the control districts, succession uncertainties in the current government were also mentioned as a reason for people feeling unsafe:

*“...politics involved, for example, succession issues ... the political fights that we see in Mbale ... people fear that they could spread to Tororo...”<sup>44</sup>*

38 Consensus panel, Mbarara District, April 2014.

39 Consensus panel, Kiryandongo District, May 2014.

40 Consensus panel, Kiryandongo District, May 2014.

41 Consensus panel, Kiryandongo District, May 2014.

42 Consensus panel, Kiryandongo District, May 2014.

43 Consensus panel, Tororo District, May 2014.

44 Key informant, Tororo District, May 2014.



General recommendations advanced were that:

*“Government should continue with the disarmament process ... the presence of guns in communities is responsible for lack of peace – for example, Operation Wembley was very key in disarmament ... sensitisation and entrepreneurship skills; training of youths, especially those who have been left out of the youth fund because they have not been to school, plus encouraging them to pursue farming, for example, if government could encourage more youths to participate ... vocational skills should be strengthened to cater for these many unemployed youth ... Government should also sensitise communities on vigilance and reporting of crime...”<sup>45</sup>*

In Elgon region, qualitative results showed that people generally felt safe in their communities. In the consensus panel, some of the reasons cited for feeling safe included:

*“...prevailing peace ... there has been a long spell of peace ... peace has been uninterrupted for some time ... disarmament in Karamoja has made people in Bulambuli feel safe ... security organs realised their mistakes of 2012 and improved in 2013 ... community policing is also responsible ... there are GISOs [Gombolola internal security officers] and PISOs [parish internal security officers] in place now ... police posts have now been established at all sub-counties.”<sup>46</sup>*

Moreover, the role of government programmes was mentioned as one of the drivers of peace:

*“Government programmes such as NUSAF [Northern Uganda Social Action Fund], PRDP have helped to improve livelihood ... infrastructure in terms of schools is present – that is why people are feeling safe now.”<sup>47</sup>*

However, some of the reasons given for loss of confidence in the sustainability of peace and security were political:

*“...Mbale is predominantly for the opposition ... the opposition tries to create situations to make people believe that peace is not sustainable – for example, the Muntu-Nandala elections for FDC [Forum for Democratic Change] presidency ... also succession wrangles within the NRM [National Resistance Movement] have caused a lot of fear among the people – for example, the Sejjsa issue ... there is a lot of bickering and in-fighting within the NRM ... when people look at such issues, they lose confidence in sustainable peace.”<sup>48</sup>*

Land conflicts were also frequently mentioned in the qualitative interviews as a driver of loss of confidence in sustained peace in the Elgon region:

*“...land issues especially due to population pressure ... increased number of people yet resources are limited ... land conflict between Mbale and Butaleja over ownership of neighbouring swamp ... there are wrangles between family members on land allocation ... land grabbing has become an issue – Namatala land was gazetted to become a forest reserve so people are dissatisfied with that, especially those who had started digging along the strip.”<sup>49</sup>*

45 Consensus panel, Tororo District, May 2014.

46 Consensus panel, Mbale District, May 2014.

47 Key informant, Mbale District, May 2014.

48 Consensus panel, Mbale District, May 2014.

49 Key informant, Mbale District, May 2014.



Some of the recommendations made can be summarised as follows:

*“...strengthen patrols and security personnel along the border, especially along Kenya border because of the war there ... youth skilling to curb unemployment and involvement of other stakeholders, for example CSOs and cultural institutions, in peace and security issues.”<sup>50</sup>*

In Teso sub-region, disarmament of the Karamojong and general prevailing peace were mentioned as factors for people feeling safe:

*“...Karamoja disarmament exercise reduced the cases of cattle raiding and trespass ... disarmament exercise of Karamojong reduced insecurity issues ... intelligence officers have been deployed to sensitise people and certificates are given to each gun one surrenders ... infrastructure development has also promoted confidence in sustainable peace ... Anti-stock theft unit has helped to counter cattle raiding ... electricity poles have moved to the town and more economic opportunities are coming up because of electricity ... road networks have been improved, this is also a sign of peace ... the current government has created stability which makes people feel secure.”<sup>51</sup>*

Furthermore, land wrangles and the succession question were cited as being responsible for loss of confidence in sustainable peace in the Teso sub-region. Respondents in the Teso sub-region also recommended that government should address the issue of youth unemployment. At the same time, communities were urged to:

*“...change attitude and begin to involve themselves in security incidents in their communities ... people should report cases and participate in community policing ... communities should realise that the issue of insecurity is not just a police matter but involves them as well.”<sup>52</sup>*

### 2.6.3 Sporadically affected region

Confidence in sustainable peace and security in Lango has been showing an upward trend since 2011. Qualitative results indicate that prevailing peace is one of the drivers of this increased confidence:

*“...from 2011 to 2012 when elections were over ... people who had anticipated a rebellion started feeling safer in their communities ... there was no open encounter with rebels during that period ... local governments implemented programmes without much interference and generally people felt secure.”<sup>53</sup>*

However, war in neighbouring countries and the succession wrangles were mentioned as some of the factors leading to setbacks in confidence:

*“...the 2016 elections are a big uncertainty ... the Generals like Tinyefunza are clashing with government and many are saying that Lango will be a war zone ... some say that if Amama Mbabazi became president, there would be insecurity because he cannot manage the army ... people worry that the rebels in Somalia will attack Uganda, the government having invaded Somalia ... also the statements that government was giving that Kony is re-organising himself to attack again make people fear more for their security.”<sup>54</sup>*

50 Consensus panel, Mbale District, May 2014.

51 Consensus panel, Soroti District, May 2014.

52 Consensus panel, Soroti District, May 2014.

53 Consensus panel, Otuke District, May 2014.

54 Consensus panel, Otuke District, May 2014.

Another respondent highlighted ethnic clashes:

*“...there are inter-clan conflicts between the Lango and Acholi along the Komotorans Olyelo near Agago ... the land conflict between Otuke and Abim has never been resolved.”<sup>55</sup>*

Some of the recommendations made were as follows:

*“...to increase PRDP funding ... there should be tight monitoring and evaluation of PRDP programmes to fight corruption and promote accountability ... recruit more security personnel at sub-county levels.”<sup>56</sup>*

In West Nile, there were positive indicators of increased confidence:

*“...sensitisation on conflict management ... government programmes like NAADS [National Agricultural Advisory Services] ... people are now engaged in productive activities like agriculture and petty trade ... crime had tremendously gone down because of the role of community policing and the presence of a community liaison officer.”<sup>57</sup>*

However, negative indicators were evident as well – namely, witchcraft, drunkenness and the refugee influx, which together contributed to the loss of confidence in security.

Discussions in Adjumani and Yumbe districts showed that land disputes were a cause of insecurity in the area, as one panellist mentioned:

*“...there are still land disputes and this has been taken up to parliament, but up to now, there is no solution ... land disputes are in the upper belt of Apa zoka forest belt – the border between Amuru District and Adjumani...”<sup>58</sup>*

There was general consensus that the PRDP was appreciated, though with some recommendations for improvement:

*“...PRDP projects have helped in terms of service delivery, for example, health, education and roads which have eased movement ... but there is still a need to facilitate police with fuel for their vehicles ... in terms of healthcare, there aren't enough drugs to treat the community; so there is no safety of lives ... PRDP should do something about the electricity ... the only generator available is broken down ... this, however, serves part of South Sudan and part of Congo.”<sup>59</sup>*

There was also a general view that youth unemployment was causing loss of confidence in security in the West Nile region and, therefore, needed to be addressed.

#### 2.6.4 Severely affected region

The percentage of respondents who reported feeling safe in their communities in Acholi sub-region dropped from 80% in 2011 to 79% in 2012, almost stagnating between 2012 and 2013. Results from qualitative interviews reveal that land wrangles were partly to blame for this feeling, as the following quote illustrates:

<sup>55</sup> Consensus panel, Otuke District, May 2014.

<sup>56</sup> Consensus panel, Otuke District, May 2014.

<sup>57</sup> Consensus panel, Arua District, May 2014.

<sup>58</sup> Consensus panel, Adjumani District, May 2014.

<sup>59</sup> Consensus panel, Zombo District, May 2014.

*“...in Amuru land wrangles are the cause of insecurity ... there are border wrangles with Adjumani District ... there are also land wrangles between sub-counties ... Amuru and Pabo are always conflicting over land ... MPs are also inciting communities over land, such as Madhvani land in Amuru ... there is also a conflict between the government and the community over gazetted land in the Wiceli forest reserve and East Madi game reserve.”<sup>60</sup>*

In Lamwo District, land conflicts have even taken on an international dimension:

*“...Sudanese are claiming land at the river Lemur and this is scaring the people of Lamwo ... in 2013, the Sudanese came armed and started beating people ... they cut 5 cows and 11 bulls ... this makes people feel unsafe in their communities.”<sup>61</sup>*

“Alcoholism”<sup>62</sup> was also blamed for the increased crime rate, including SGBV.

In addition, matters regarding formerly abducted children have not been addressed and their negative impact on confidence in sustained peace is evident:

*“Confidence in Acholi is going down because of the presence of the formerly abducted children ... neglecting them is a security threat to Acholi ... they were used to hand-outs in the bush, so now you find them grabbing chicken for free ... this erodes people’s confidence in sustained peace.”<sup>63</sup>*

One of the recommendations in Lamwo was to:

*“...facilitate RDCs in Kitgum and Lamwo to hold dialogues with their counterparts in Sudan, especially to restrain their countrymen from attacking them ... the border between Sudan and Uganda should be manned to keep away the gun-trotting Sudanese.”<sup>64</sup>*

In Karamoja, one of the drivers of confidence in sustained peace was the disarmament exercise and the subsequent continued presence of security personnel:

*“...the disarmament exercise has reduced cattle rustling.”<sup>65</sup>*

*“...UPDF numbers have gone up in both Abim and Kotido ... even the police are widespread ... the UPDF and police posts are stationed at entry points which used to be used by rustlers.”<sup>66</sup>*

Community dialogues were also commended as a reason for making people feel safe:

*“...another driver of increase in people feeling safe are community dialogues funded by an organisation called Mercy Corps ... they train on issues such as cooperation, peace, reconciliation among Karamoja ... because of these community dialogues, Karamoja cattle keepers are now allowed to graze in Aleke sub-counties with permission from local governments of both Abim and Kotido.”<sup>67</sup>*

60 Consensus panel, Amuru District, May 2014.

61 Consensus panel, Lamwo District, May 2014.

62 Consensus panel, Amuru District, May 2014.

63 Key informant, Kitgum District, May 2014.

64 Consensus panel, Lamwo District, May 2014.

65 Consensus panel, Abim District, May 2014.

66 Consensus panel, Kitgum District, May 2014.

67 Consensus panel, Abim District, May 2014.

The role of restocking was discussed as well:

*“...restocking exercise being accepted by the people ... FAO has done restocking and it has given heifers to the people of Karamoja and people are readily accepting these cows ... people are also accepting goats being given by NAADS.”<sup>68</sup>*

Another sign of confidence in sustained peace in Karamoja was resettlement:

*“...people are now resettling on their original lands, which they had earlier abandoned during times of insecurity ... people can now move along the Kotido–Abim road freely.”<sup>69</sup>*

The PRDP was generally commended in Karamoja, although more recommendations were made too:

*“...more roads should be constructed under the PRDP to link the sub-county to new settlements for cultivation ... bigger dams should be established for animals ... more boreholes should be established to provide people water for human consumption ... the PRDP should also consider putting post-primary and secondary institutions in Karamoja ... the PRDP should also establish factories like the dairy or skin factories.”<sup>70</sup>*

In Moroto, it was also recommended that:

*“...government should keep supporting the disarmament exercise, especially among the communities in the mountains ... strengthen IGAs for youth who are idle and encourage agriculture production to increase food security.”<sup>71</sup>*

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<sup>68</sup> Key informant, Kitgum District, May 2014.

<sup>69</sup> Key informant, Kitgum District, May 2014.

<sup>70</sup> KII, Moroto District, May 2014

<sup>71</sup> Consensus panel, Moroto District, May 2014.

### 3. Incidence, causes of and responses to SGBV

Within communities, cases of SGBV are still prevalent. Overall, nearly half (2,062 or 48.7%) of the respondents reported that cases of SGBV were common in their communities (see Table 30). More than 50% of the respondents in the severely affected, control and spillover regions reported that cases of SGBV in their communities were common. In the sporadically affected region, a significantly lower percentage (37.1%) of respondents reported that cases of SGBV were common in their communities compared with the other regions.

Among the common forms of SGBV, physical fights ranked highest, with 29.5% of the respondents reporting such incidents of SGBV in their communities, followed by verbal arguments at 20.3%. In some regions, such as the severely affected region, an even higher percentage (32.8%) of respondents cited physical fights as the most common form of SGBV. In the control region, refusal to provide necessities and separation between husband and wife were particularly common, at 13.2% and 16.3% of the respondents, respectively, whereas, in other regions, these forms of SGBV were reported by less than 12% of the respondents. Cases of defilement and rape were not as common in communities in the severely and sporadically affected regions as they were in the control and spillover regions. In addition, communities in the control region reported more cases of hindrance or denial of participation in economic activities (4.6%) and denial of children's education (3.4%). Denial of participation in economic activities often leads to engagement in SGBV, especially in cases where the denied party does not agree, thus predisposing the two parties to verbal arguments and physical fights. Results further reveal that, in the control region, about 14% of the respondents perceived SGBV incidents as normal. Overall, this driver of SGBV was the second most cited cause, following alcohol consumption or drug abuse.

**Table 30: Occurrence and common forms of SGBV within communities**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>Are cases or incidents of SGBV common in your community?</b>										
Yes	316	53.7	745	53.8	445	37.1	556	52.4	2,062	48.7
No	273	46.3	636	45.9	753	62.9	503	47.4	2,165	51.1
N/R	0	0.0	4	0.3	0	0.0	2	0.2	6	0.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>589</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,385</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,198</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,061</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>4,233</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>If yes, what cases of SGBV are common in your community?</b>										
Physical fights	222	23.2	617	32.8	345	31.9	433	27.8	1,617	29.5
Verbal arguments (disrespect)	165	17.2	409	21.8	226	20.9	311	20.0	1,111	20.3
Refusal to provide necessities	129	13.5	204	10.9	127	11.7	176	11.3	636	11.6
Separation between husband and wife	156	16.3	192	10.2	121	11.2	158	10.2	627	11.5
Defilement	108	11.3	177	9.4	113	10.5	216	13.9	614	11.2
Rape	62	6.5	105	5.6	39	3.6	102	6.6	308	5.6
Forced marriage	35	3.7	61	3.2	44	4.1	75	4.8	215	3.9
Hinder or deny participation in economic activities	44	4.6	66	3.5	28	2.6	29	1.9	167	3.1
Denial of both girls' and boys' education	33	3.4	38	2.0	26	2.4	49	3.1	146	2.7
Other	4	0.4	11	0.6	12	1.1	7	0.4	34	0.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>958</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,880</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,081</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,556</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>5,475</b>	<b>100.0</b>

N/R = no response

### 3.1 Common forms and personal experiences of SGBV

Whereas nearly half of the respondents reported that SGBV cases were common in their communities, personal involvement was not a frequent occurrence. Overall, 640 (15.1%) respondents said they had personally experienced SGBV, with the highest percentages being found in the severely affected (18.1%) and spillover regions (17.2%). In the control region, the prevalence of SGBV was significantly lower compared with other regions, at 9.2%. The regional variations in the percentage of respondents citing personal involvement in SGBV point to differences in levels of engagement with the drivers of SGBV. For instance, in the severely affected region, alcohol or drug abuse was considered a driver by over 50% of the respondents. Forceful sale of household property was also more prevalent in this region compared with the other regions.

In terms of the common forms of SGBV experienced by victims, physical fights was once again the most common form – as reported by 35.9% of the respondents overall (see Table 31). This was followed by verbal arguments, as reported by 30.9% of the respondents overall. Victims from the severely affected and sporadically affected regions had the highest percentage of victims citing physical fights as the most common form of SGBV, at 39% and 36.4%, respectively. Refusal to provide necessities and hindrance or denial of participation in economic activities were highest in the control region, being reported by 19.5% and 8% of the respondents, respectively. In this region, it is important to note that there were more respondents who reported that acts related to SGBV were normal. Other forms of SGBV more commonly experienced in the control region included defilement, which was cited by 2.7% of the respondents. Rape was more prevalent in the sporadically affected region (1.6%), followed by the severely affected region (1.3%). In these regions, alcohol or drug abuse was also noted to be high compared with the other regions – a factor that is often related to such events.

**Table 31: Types of SGBV experienced by victims**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>What type of SGBV did you experience?</b>										
Physical fights	30	26.5	149	39.0	91	36.4	95	34.8	365	35.9
Verbal arguments (disrespect)	30	26.5	122	31.9	76	30.4	87	31.9	315	30.9
Refusal to provide necessities	22	19.5	35	9.2	31	12.4	34	12.5	122	12.0
Separation between husband and wife	13	11.5	30	7.9	26	10.4	32	11.7	101	9.9
Hinder or deny participation in economic activities	9	8.0	22	5.8	7	2.8	11	4.0	49	4.8
Denial of both girls' and boys' education	2	1.8	8	2.1	3	1.2	5	1.8	18	1.8
Defilement	3	2.7	3	0.8	6	2.4	5	1.8	17	1.7
Rape	0	0.0	5	1.3	4	1.6	2	0.7	11	1.1
Forced marriage	2	1.8	2	0.5	4	1.6	0	0.0	8	0.8
Other	2	1.8	6	1.6	2	0.8	2	0.7	12	1.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>113</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>382</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>250</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>273</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,018</b>	<b>100.0</b>

### 3.2 Reporting SGBV incidents and commonly used DRMs

Out of the 640 victims, 639 responded to the question of whether or not they reported the incident. Overall, more victims (336 or 52.5%) said they chose not to report the incident. The control region had the highest percentage of victims who did not report the incident. In the sporadically affected and spillover regions, over 50% of SGBV victims said they reported the case, while in the severely affected region 44.8% of the victims reported the incident.

When the victims were asked why they reported the case, about two-fifths (156 or 41.2%) overall said it was so that the perpetrators would not repeat the offence (see Table 32). This reason

was most commonly cited in the severely affected and sporadically affected regions, at 49% and 46.4%, respectively. However, in the spillover and control regions, more of the victims said they reported the incident to punish the perpetrator (44% and 40%, respectively). In the control region, it is worth noting that 30% of the victims also stated that they reported the incident to receive financial compensation – a reason that did not feature as much in the PRDP regions.

**Table 32: Reasons for reporting an SGBV case**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>Why did you report this SGBV?</b>										
So perpetrator will not repeat the offence	2	20.0	70	49.0	51	46.4	33	28.4	156	41.2
To punish the perpetrator	4	40.0	47	32.9	37	33.6	51	44.0	139	36.7
To receive financial compensation	3	30.0	15	10.5	8	7.3	13	11.2	39	10.3
To receive medical or psychological support	0	0.0	7	4.9	9	8.2	11	9.5	27	7.1
My family insisted on reporting the offence	1	10.0	4	2.8	5	4.5	8	6.9	18	4.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>143</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>110</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>379</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Over time, the percentage of SGBV victims who reported their case dropped in each of the four different regions (see Figure 12). The control region had the highest average annual decline of 27 percentage points, followed by the sporadically affected and spillover regions, at 11.5 percentage points each. Results show that the declining trends in the percentage of SGBV victims reporting their cases had borderline statistical significance in the spillover and sporadically affected regions ( $p=0.048$  and  $p=0.079$ , respectively). In the severely affected region, the average annual decline in the percentage of SGBV victims reporting their cases was 8 percentage points and was not statistically significant ( $p=0.136$ ).

**Figure 12: Percentage of victims reporting SGBV cases over time**





Of the SGBV victims who chose not to report their cases, the highest percentage (39.3%) stated that this was because the dispute was resolved amicably (see Table 33). This reason was mostly cited by victims in the spillover region (42.2%) followed by those in the sporadically affected region (41%). Findings further show that a substantial proportion of victims (19.1%) chose not to report SGBV incidents as they did not want to involve legal authorities and preferred to move on. This reason was most frequently cited by victims in the severely affected region (25.1%) and least cited by those in the control region (7.4%). Some victims, especially those in the control region, were not aware that what had happened to them was a crime (14.8%) or did not believe that anyone would help them (11.1%). As previously noted, it was in the control region where cases of SGBV, such as beating women and marrying off young girls, were considered to be normal. If such incidents are considered to be normal, more often than not they will go unreported.

**Table 33: Reasons why victims did not report an SGBV case**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>Why did you choose not to report?</b>										
Dispute was resolved amicably	18	33.3	67	38.3	41	41.0	49	42.2	175	39.3
I did not want to involve legal authorities – I preferred to move on	4	7.4	44	25.1	16	16.0	21	18.1	85	19.1
Family told me not to report	4	7.4	18	10.3	14	14.0	6	5.2	42	9.4
I was afraid that the perpetrator would hurt me if I reported him or her	5	9.3	13	7.4	5	5.0	11	9.5	34	7.6
I did not know that what had happened to me was a crime	8	14.8	5	2.9	7	7.0	9	7.8	29	6.5
I did not believe that anyone would help me	6	11.1	12	6.9	5	5.0	3	2.6	26	5.8
I am a woman	5	9.3	9	5.1	4	4.0	6	5.2	24	5.4
I did not know to whom I should report the crime	3	5.6	3	1.7	4	4.0	4	3.4	14	3.1
I did not have the money to report – I thought the authorities would ask me for bribes	1	1.9	4	2.3	2	2.0	3	2.6	10	2.2
Perpetrator is a person in authority	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	2.0	4	3.4	6	1.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>175</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>116</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>445</b>	<b>100.0</b>

The most commonly approached DRM to which the SGBV victims reported their case was the clan or traditional system, as cited by 152 (39.8%) of the victims overall (see Table 34). This mechanism was most commonly approached by victims in the severely affected (45.9%) and sporadically affected (45.5%) regions. Only one SGBV victim in the control region used this mechanism. In this region, the majority of SGBV victims (50%) approached police and courts of law, whereas in the spillover region the majority of victims (45.5%) reported their cases to LC officials. Police and courts of law were not approached as much in the severely affected, sporadically affected and spillover regions as in the control region. Legal aid service providers, mediation options, and probation and welfare offices were the least approached DRMs, being cited by less than 1% of SGBV victims in nearly all regions – except in the severely affected region, where 3.7% of the victims said they approached legal aid services.

Among the reasons given for the choice of a given DRM, the biggest proportion of respondents stated that the chosen DRM was the right authority to handle such cases, at 16% overall. Regionally, different reasons were cited for the choice of DRM by SGBV victims. For instance, in the severely affected region, the largest percentage (17.6%) of SGBV victims reported that the chosen DRM handled cases in a restorative way, while in the sporadically affected region more victims (17%) chose a particular DRM because they trusted it. In the spillover region, 19.9% of victims approached a given DRM because it was near. In the control region, the two main reasons cited were because the DRM was the right authority to handle such cases and because the law says that is where such cases should be reported (26.3% in each case). Survey results indicate that victims in the different regions are inclined to approach a specific DRM based on how the



cases are handled – for example, the restorative approach used by the clan or traditional system. Conversely, in the control region, SGBV victims chose the DRM based on their understanding of laws.


**Table 34: Choice of DRM and why it was chosen by an SGBV victim**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>To which DRM did you report?</b>										
Clan or traditional system	1	7.1	62	45.9	56	45.5	33	30.0	152	39.8
LC system	6	42.9	37	27.4	43	35.0	50	45.5	136	35.6
Police and court of law	7	50.0	24	17.8	22	17.9	22	20.0	75	19.6
Probation and welfare officer	0	0.0	4	3.0	1	0.8	2	1.8	7	1.8
Mediation options (religious leaders, RDC, NGOs, etc.)	0	0.0	3	2.2	1	0.8	2	1.8	6	1.6
Legal aid service provider (FIDA, Legal Aid Project, etc.)	0	0.0	5	3.7	0	0.0	1	0.9	6	1.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>135</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>123</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>110</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>382</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Why did you choose to report to this DRM?</b>										
It is the right authority to handle such cases	5	26.3	32	17.0	26	15.8	28	14.3	91	16.0
It is near	2	10.5	17	9.0	23	13.9	39	19.9	81	14.3
I trust this institution	1	5.3	17	9.0	28	17.0	23	11.7	69	12.1
They attend to victims faster	2	10.5	23	12.2	23	13.9	16	8.2	64	11.3
Cases are handled in a restorative way	0	0.0	33	17.6	17	10.3	10	5.1	60	10.6
It is cheap	1	5.3	17	9.0	12	7.3	25	12.8	55	9.7
Cases are handled privately	1	5.3	12	6.4	9	5.5	29	14.8	51	9.0
The law says that is where such cases should be reported	5	26.3	19	10.1	11	6.7	14	7.1	49	8.6
I understand how it works	0	0.0	10	5.3	10	6.1	6	3.1	26	4.6
Cases are handled in a retributive way	0	0.0	7	3.7	4	2.4	4	2.0	15	2.6
It is the only institution available in our community	2	10.5	1	0.5	1	0.6	2	1.0	6	1.1
Other	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.6	0	0.0	1	0.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>188</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>165</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>196</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>568</b>	<b>100.0</b>

### 3.3 Satisfactory response by DRMs to reported SGBV incidents


When asked if the DRM to which the SGBV victim reported the case addressed the incident satisfactorily, 242 (79.9%) of the victims said yes (see Figure 13). The sporadically affected region had the highest percentage (84.9%) of victims whose cases were satisfactorily responded to, followed by those from the spillover region (84%). The control region had the lowest percentage (54.5%) of victims stating that their cases were satisfactorily addressed.

**Figure 13: Percentage of SGBV victims reporting satisfactory resolution of case by DRMs**



Whereas the results show a decline in the percentage of SGBV victims reporting satisfactory resolution of their cases by DRMs between 2013 and 2014 in all regions, there was a general upward trend since 2012, especially in the PRDP regions (see Figure 14). Among the three PRDP regions, the spillover region had the highest average annual increase (12.5 percentage points) in the proportion of SGBV victims reporting satisfactory resolution of their cases, followed by the sporadically affected region (8.5 percentage points). The severely affected region had the lowest (5 percentage points) average annual increase in the percentage of SGBV victims reporting satisfactory resolution of their cases. While there were positive trends in the percentage of SGBV victims reporting satisfactory resolution of their cases, the trends were not statistically significant (spillover region,  $p=0.498$ ; sporadically affected region,  $p=0.472$ ; and severely affected region,  $p=0.433$ ). The control region was the only region where the percentage of SGBV victims declined with time, although the decline was not statistically significant (7.5 percentage points,  $p=0.512$ ). This implies that the clan or traditional system and the LC system may be becoming more effective in the resolution of SGBV cases, compared with the police and courts of law that were mainly approached by SGBV victims in the control region (see Table 34).

Figure 14: Percentage of SGBV victims reporting satisfactory response by DRMs over time



Of the victims who reported that their cases were not satisfactorily responded to, 22 (22.9%) attributed this to the fact that the perpetrator failed to respect the decision or ruling overall (see Table 35). In the spillover region, however, a higher percentage (28.6%) of victims attributed the unsatisfactory response to the fact that their opinion was not considered. In the control region, 22.2% of the victims whose cases were not satisfactorily addressed reported that they were asked for money. Failure by the DRM to summon the perpetrator was also a common reason cited, as reported by 18.8% of the respondents overall. This reason was mainly cited by victims in the severely affected region (25%), followed by those in the sporadically affected region (15.8%). This implies that the clan and traditional systems that were mainly approached by victims in the

severely and sporadically affected regions need to be strengthened. In addition, the LC systems should consider the opinions of both parties in the arbitration of SGBV cases.

**Table 35: Reasons for unsatisfactory resolution of SGBV case by DRM**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>If no, why do you feel the DRM you reported to did not respond satisfactorily?</b>										
Perpetrator did not respect decision or ruling	0	0.0	11	27.5	7	36.8	4	14.3	22	22.9
Perpetrator was never summoned	1	11.1	10	25.0	3	15.8	4	14.3	18	18.8
My opinion was not considered	1	11.1	5	12.5	3	15.8	8	28.6	17	17.7
Perpetrator was never arrested	1	11.1	4	10.0	2	10.5	4	14.3	11	11.5
I was asked for money	2	22.2	2	5.0	1	5.3	3	10.7	8	8.3
DRM I reported to sided with the perpetrator	1	11.1	4	10.0	0	0.0	1	3.6	6	6.3
I did not receive enough compensation	0	0.0	3	7.5	1	5.3	0	0.0	4	4.2
They kept on postponing the case	1	11.1	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	7.1	3	3.1
Perpetrator was given a small or simple sentence	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	3.6	1	1.0
Other	2	22.2	1	2.5	2	10.5	1	3.6	6	6.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>96</b>	<b>100.0</b>

### 3.4 Engagement of civil society when SGBV occurs

Engagement of NGOs or CBOs to manage an SGBV situation was not a common occurrence, with only 25 (10.3%) of the 242 SGBV victims who reported their cases to a DRM citing these organisations (see Table 36). However, survey findings show that engagement of NGOs or CBOs resulted in better management of SGBV cases. Of the aforementioned 25 victims who engaged NGOs or CBOs, 23 (92%) reported that the engagement had resulted in better management of their cases, with all victims in the sporadically affected and spillover regions reporting better management of their situation.

**Table 36: Engagement of NGOs or CBOs to manage an SGBV incident**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>Did you engage with any NGO or CBO to manage the SGBV situation?</b>										
Yes	0	0.0	12	14.3	7	9.6	6	7.6	25	10.3
No	6	100.0	72	85.7	66	90.4	73	92.4	217	89.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>242</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Did this engagement actually result in better management of the SGBV situation for you?</b>										
Yes	0	0.0	10	83.3	7	100.0	6	100.0	23	92.0
No	0	0.0	2	16.7	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	8.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0.0</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>7</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Of the 217 victims of SGBV who chose not to engage an NGO or a CBO, the highest proportion (82 or 33.7%) attributed this to the fact that they were not aware of any such organisation in their community that would handle these cases (see Table 37). In the control region, this reason was cited by 66.7% of the victims. Another common reason given for not engaging with NGOs or CBOs was that other DRMs were used instead, as cited by 28.8% of the victims overall, or by 35.8% in the severely affected region. Amicable resolution of SGBV cases was also cited by

13.6% of the victims who chose not to engage with NGOs or CBOs. This reason was more commonly cited by victims in the severely affected region (17.3%) and not at all by those in the control region.


**Table 37: Reasons why no NGO or CBO was engaged to manage the SGBV incident**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>If no, why did you not engage with any NGO or CBO to manage the SGBV situation?</b>										
Not aware of the existence of any NGO or CBO that handles SGBV in the community	4	66.7	21	25.9	26	34.2	31	38.8	82	33.7
Used other DRMs to resolve the dispute	1	16.7	29	35.8	24	31.6	16	20.0	70	28.8
Dispute resolved amicably	0	0.0	14	17.3	9	11.8	10	12.5	33	13.6
Didn't know that NGO, CBO or CSO could handle SGBV issues	1	16.7	7	8.6	4	5.3	12	15.0	24	9.9
Decided to ignore the issue	0	0.0	5	6.2	7	9.2	6	7.5	18	7.4
Perpetrators' actions have not changed	0	0.0	2	2.5	3	3.9	0	0.0	5	2.1
Perpetrator warned me against involving CSOs	0	0.0	3	3.7	0	0.0	1	1.3	4	1.6
CSOs prefer prosecution not mediation, yet it brings more problems	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	1.3	2	2.5	3	1.2
Other	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	2.6	2	2.5	4	1.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>80</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>243</b>	<b>100.0</b>

### 3.5 Occurrence of SGBV among other household members

The experience of SGBV among other members of the respondents' households was not as common as it was for the respondents themselves. Overall, 471 (11.1%) of the respondents reported that a member of their household had experienced SGBV (see Figure 15). The control region had the highest percentage of respondents (12.7%) indicating that a member within their household had experienced SGBV. However, no significant difference was observed at regional level in the percentage of respondents reporting that SGBV had been experienced by a member of their household, as was the case regarding personal experience of SGBV by the respondents. Other than the control region, where more respondents reported experience of SGBV incidents by members of their household than by themselves, in all the PRDP regions, the opposite was observed. This implies that, in the PRDP regions, it is likely that the victims do not open up to fellow household members if they have been involved in an SGBV incident.

**Figure 15: Percentage of respondents citing experience and reporting of SGBV by other household member**



In terms of types of SGBV experienced by members of respondents' households, physical fighting was the most common form, as reported by 276 (33.7%) of the respondents (see Table 38). Verbal arguments ranked second, with 142 (17.3%) respondents citing this form of SGBV. The incidence of verbal arguments was particularly common in the sporadically affected and spillover regions, as reported by 20.9% and 19.2% of the respondents, respectively. Other forms of SGBV experienced by members of respondents' households included separation between husband and wife, and refusal to provide necessities – which were particularly evident in the control region, with 16.7% and 16.2% of the respondents, respectively, citing these forms of SGBV.

Whereas only 1.7% of the SGBV victims reported having experienced defilement personally, nearly 11% reported that at least one member of their household had experienced defilement. This form of SGBV was more prevalent among respondents' households in the spillover (16.6%) and sporadically affected (10.5%) regions. The incidence of rape was also more common among respondents' households (4.5%) than among the respondents themselves who were victims of SGBV (1.1%).

**Table 38: Types of SGBV experienced by other members of respondents' households**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>What type of SGBV did they experience?</b>										
Physical fights	47	21.8	84	48.8	89	37.2	56	29.0	276	33.7
Verbal arguments (disrespect)	35	16.2	20	11.6	50	20.9	37	19.2	142	17.3
Separation between husband and wife	36	16.7	14	8.1	20	8.4	28	14.5	98	12.0
Defilement	19	8.8	18	10.5	21	8.8	32	16.6	90	11.0
Refusal to provide necessities	35	16.2	13	7.6	22	9.2	11	5.7	81	9.9
Rape	7	3.2	13	7.6	8	3.3	9	4.7	37	4.5
Forced marriage	12	5.6	4	2.3	12	5.0	6	3.1	34	4.1
Denial of both girls' and boys' education	10	4.6	4	2.3	12	5.0	8	4.1	34	4.1
Hinder or deny participation in economic activities	15	6.9	1	0.6	3	1.3	4	2.1	23	2.8
Other	0	0.0	1	0.6	2	0.8	2	1.0	5	0.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>216</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>172</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>239</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>193</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>820</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Regarding reasons why the SGBV incident was reported for victims within the respondents' households, punishment of the perpetrator was the most common reason cited overall (41.2%), followed by deterring the perpetrator from repeating the offence (29%) (see Table 39). In the control and spillover regions, a higher proportion of SGBV victims within the respondents' households reported the cases to receive financial compensation, as cited by 13% and 10.3% of the respondents, respectively. In the spillover region, 16.8% of the victims reported SGBV cases to receive medical or psychological support.

**Table 39: Reasons why SGBV case was reported for victims in respondents' households**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>Why did you report this SGBV?</b>										
To punish the perpetrator	22	40.7	47	41.6	62	42.5	42	39.3	173	41.2
So perpetrator will not repeat offence	16	29.6	33	29.2	56	38.4	17	15.9	122	29.0
To receive medical or psychological support	1	1.9	13	11.5	12	8.2	18	16.8	44	10.5
My family insisted on reporting the offence	5	9.3	9	8.0	8	5.5	16	15.0	38	9.0
To receive financial compensation	7	13.0	10	8.8	7	4.8	11	10.3	35	8.3
Other	3	5.6	1	0.9	1	0.7	3	2.8	8	1.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>54</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>113</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>146</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>107</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>420</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Regarding the DRMs approached, the biggest percentage (44.8%) of victims overall approached the LC system, although in the spillover region a higher percentage (45.4%) of the victims approached the police and courts of law (see Table 40). Whereas the clan or traditional system ranked first as the DRM approached by respondents who were themselves SGBV victims, only 60 (16.7%) of the SGBV victims in the respondents' households cited this option. Mediation options, legal aid services, and probation and welfare officers were the least cited option regarding SGBV victims in the respondents' households, as was the case with respondents themselves who were victims of SGBV.

Overall, the perception that the chosen DRM was the right authority to handle an SGBV case was cited as the main reason (16.8%) why a particular DRM was approached, followed closely by proximity (14.8%). Proximity was the most commonly cited reason why a particular DRM was chosen in the sporadically affected (19.5%) and control (15.8%) regions. In the severely affected region, 18.9% of the respondents attributed it to the fact that the law says that is where such cases should be reported.


**Table 40: DRM approached and reason why for SGBV victims in respondents' households**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>To which DRM did you report?</b>										
LC system	22	48.9	39	42.4	65	52.0	35	36.1	161	44.8
Police and court	14	31.1	35	38.0	36	28.8	44	45.4	129	35.9
Clan or traditional system	6	13.3	17	18.5	23	18.4	14	14.4	60	16.7
Mediation options (religious leaders, RDC, NGOs)	2	4.4	0	0.0	1	0.8	1	1.0	4	1.1
Legal aid service provider (FIDA, Legal Aid Project, etc.)	1	2.2	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	2.1	3	0.8
Probation and welfare officer	0	0.0	1	1.1	0	0.0	1	1.0	2	0.6
Mob justice	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>125</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>97</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>359</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Why did you choose to report to this DRM?</b>										
It is the right authority to handle such cases	7	9.2	26	19.7	28	15.1	29	20.4	90	16.8
It is near	12	15.8	10	7.6	36	19.5	21	14.8	79	14.8
They attend to victims faster	12	15.8	17	12.9	19	10.3	15	10.6	63	11.8
I trust this institution	6	7.9	12	9.1	31	16.8	14	9.9	63	11.8
The law says that is where such cases should be reported	6	7.9	25	18.9	15	8.1	14	9.9	60	11.2
It is cheap	10	13.2	8	6.1	23	12.4	17	12.0	58	10.8
Cases are handled privately	8	10.5	6	4.5	9	4.9	13	9.2	36	6.7
Cases are handled in a restorative way	3	3.9	15	11.4	7	3.8	7	4.9	32	6.0
I understand how it works	5	6.6	6	4.5	9	4.9	7	4.9	27	5.0
Cases are handled in a retributive way	3	3.9	5	3.8	5	2.7	2	1.4	15	2.8
It is the only institution available in our community	4	5.3	2	1.5	3	1.6	3	2.1	12	2.2
Other	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>76</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>132</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>185</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>142</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>535</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Of the 262 respondents who approached a DRM when a member within their household experienced SGBV, 202 (77.1%) reported that the DRM responded satisfactorily to the case (see Figure 16). The sporadically and severely affected regions had the highest percentage of respondents who reported a satisfactory response by the DRM for SGBV victims within respondents' households, at 81.3% and 78.1%, respectively. The spillover region, where the majority of the respondents reported cases experienced by household members to the police and courts of law, had the lowest percentage (71.9%) of respondents citing satisfactory resolution compared with those who approached the LC system.

Results from the survey show that, of the 471 respondents who had a member in their household experiencing SGBV, only 84 (17.8%) reported that the implementation of programmes and projects under the PRDP had helped community-level DRMs respond to SGBV satisfactorily. The control region had the lowest percentage (5.3%) of respondents stating that PRDP implementation had helped. Findings show that the majority of respondents were not aware whether PRDP implementation had helped community-level DRMs respond to SGBV satisfactorily, particularly in the control region.

**Figure 16: Percentage of respondents citing satisfactory response by DRMs to SGBV case in household and whether PRDP implementation helps**



Of the respondents who reported that the DRM did not satisfactorily address the SGBV incident, the biggest percentage (23.2%) overall attributed this to the fact that the DRM kept on postponing the case (Table 41). This was particularly evident in the control region (33.3%), followed by the spillover region (25%). In the severely affected and sporadically affected regions, the most commonly cited reason for unsatisfactory response by the DRM was the perpetrator's refusal to respect the decision or ruling, as cited by 28.6% in each region; failure of the DRM to arrest the perpetrator was also cited by 28.6% of the respondents in the severely affected region.

**Table 41: Reasons why respondents reported unsatisfactory resolution of SGBV case by DRMs**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>If no, why do you feel the DRM you reported to did not respond satisfactorily?</b>										
They kept on postponing the case	7	33.3	1	7.1	3	21.4	5	25.0	16	23.2
Perpetrator was never arrested	2	9.5	4	28.6	2	14.3	4	20.0	12	17.4
Perpetrator did not respect decision or ruling	1	4.8	4	28.6	4	28.6	1	5.0	10	14.5
I was asked for money	3	14.3	1	7.1	2	14.3	3	15.0	9	13.0
My opinion was not considered	3	14.3	2	14.3	0	0.0	2	10.0	7	10.1
Perpetrator was never summoned	1	4.8	1	7.1	2	14.3	1	5.0	5	7.2
DRM to which I reported sided with the perpetrator	3	14.3	1	7.1	0	0.0	1	5.0	5	7.2
I did not receive enough compensation	1	4.8	0	0.0	1	7.1	1	5.0	3	4.3
Perpetrator was given a small or simple sentence	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	5.0	1	1.4
Other	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	5.0	1	1.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>69</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Findings from the survey show that, of the 207 respondents who chose not to report the SGBV incident experienced by a household member, the majority (41.6%) chose not to report the incident because the dispute was amicably resolved (see Table 42). In the severely affected region, 59% of the respondents cited this reason. The other reason given was advice from the family



not to report, as reported, for instance, by 15.4% of the respondents in the sporadically affected region. A relatively higher percentage (10.8%) of respondents in the sporadically affected region attributed the lack of reporting to the fact that the respondent was a woman. In the control region, 12.9% of the respondents who did not report the SGBV incident said this was because they believed that no one would help them.

**Table 42: Reasons for not reporting SGBV experienced by members in respondents' households**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>Why did you choose not to report?</b>										
Dispute was resolved amicably	21	33.9	36	59.0	22	33.8	27	40.3	106	41.6
Family told me not to report	6	9.7	7	11.5	10	15.4	6	9.0	29	11.4
I did not want to involve legal authorities – I preferred to move on	3	4.8	7	11.5	3	4.6	11	16.4	24	9.4
I did not know that what had happened was a crime	7	11.3	4	6.6	6	9.2	5	7.5	22	8.6
I did not believe that anyone would help	8	12.9	1	1.6	3	4.6	5	7.5	17	6.7
I am a woman	3	4.8	2	3.3	7	10.8	3	4.5	15	5.9
I was afraid that the perpetrator would hurt me if I reported him or her	6	9.7	1	1.6	4	6.2	2	3.0	13	5.1
I did not have the money to report – I thought the authorities would ask me for bribes	4	6.5	1	1.6	2	3.1	3	4.5	10	3.9
I did not know to whom I should report the crime	2	3.2	1	1.6	2	3.1	2	3.0	7	2.7
Perpetrator was a person in authority	0	0.0	0	0.0	3	4.6	0	0.0	3	1.2
Other	2	3.2	1	1.6	3	4.6	3	4.5	9	3.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>67</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>255</b>	<b>100.0</b>

### 3.6 Tolerance of SGBV in communities

Overall, results from the survey show that the majority of respondents (301 out of 471, 63.9%) with a household member experiencing SGBV stated that their communities were becoming less tolerant of SGBV or factors that encourage its occurrence. The spillover region had the lowest percentage of respondents who reported that their communities were becoming less tolerant of SGBV or its driving factors.

When asked what was contributing to the increased intolerance, 27.1% of the respondents reported that community sensitisation by the police, NGOs, churches and LCs was the leading factor (see Table 43). Proactive measures by LCs and clan leaders were also cited as a leading contributory factor (25.1%) to increased intolerance of SGBV and its driving factors within communities. Knowledge of laws against SGBV and the presence of police in communities – leading to fear of being arrested – were cited as other factors contributing to increased intolerance of SGBV, particularly in the control region.



Table 43: Reasons why communities are becoming less tolerant of SGBV

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>If yes, to what do you attribute this change?</b>										
Community sensitisation by police, NGOs, churches, LCs	33	20.1	66	31.6	67	30.0	27	23.1	193	27.1
LCs and clan leaders are very active – by-laws, heavy fines, mediation	36	22.0	58	27.8	58	26.0	27	23.1	179	25.1
Tough punishment on perpetrators	19	11.6	21	10.0	33	14.8	12	10.3	85	11.9
Laws against SGBV are now known	28	17.1	17	8.1	17	7.6	16	13.7	78	10.9
Presence of police in community – people fear being arrested	24	14.6	18	8.6	19	8.5	10	8.5	71	10.0
Fear of HIV/AIDS deter rape, defilement	15	9.1	13	6.2	6	2.7	4	3.4	38	5.3
Knowledge and existence of DRMs that handle SGBV	5	3.0	11	5.3	10	4.5	10	8.5	36	5.0
Universal primary education (UPE) has resulted in a delay in early marriages that trigger SGBV	2	1.2	1	0.5	7	3.1	2	1.7	12	1.7
Participation in farming and other income-generating activities reduces time for drinking alcohol, which leads to rampant violence	1	0.6	2	1.0	1	0.4	5	4.3	9	1.3
Participation in farming and other income-generating activities enables provision of basic needs, because their absence causes violence	0	0.0	2	1.0	4	1.8	2	1.7	8	1.1
Other	1	0.6	0	0.0	1	0.4	2	1.7	4	0.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>164</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>209</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>223</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>117</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>713</b>	<b>100.0</b>

### 3.7 General perceptions on reporting of SGBV and choice of DRMs

Of the 4,049 respondents who were asked if they would report an SGBV case if they or a member of their household was a victim, 3,710 (91.6%) overall said yes. No significant variation was observed at regional level in the percentage of respondents who would report the occurrence of an SGBV incident.

Among the respondents who said that they would not report the case, 239 (46.4%) said they would solve the problem from home (see Table 44). In the control and sporadically affected regions, 23.4% and 16.2%, respectively, of those who said they would not report such a case said they would feel ashamed. Lack of trust in the DRMs was also cited by a substantial percentage of the respondents who would not report an SGBV case in the control (12.5%) and spillover (7.8%) regions.

Table 44: Reasons for not reporting SGBV experienced by respondent or member of household

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>If no, why?</b>										
Can solve problem from home	21	32.8	84	54.2	71	50.0	63	40.9	239	46.4
I did not want to involve myself in legal issues	5	7.8	27	17.4	13	9.2	31	20.1	76	14.8
Feel ashamed to report such a case	15	23.4	15	9.7	23	16.2	20	13.0	73	14.2
Do not trust the DRM system	8	12.5	5	3.2	6	4.2	12	7.8	31	6.0
I am a woman – the clan does not allow me to report	3	4.7	8	5.2	10	7.0	9	5.8	30	5.8
Think perpetrator would harm me if I reported	2	3.1	6	3.9	4	2.8	7	4.5	19	3.7
I did not have the money to report, authorities ask for bribes	4	6.3	2	1.3	1	0.7	7	4.5	14	2.7
I did not believe that anyone could help me	3	4.7	4	2.6	2	1.4	1	0.6	10	1.9
Do not know where to report	0	0.0	2	1.3	1	0.7	2	1.3	5	1.0
SGBV is not a crime	0	0.0	0	0.0	4	2.8	1	0.6	5	1.0
Other	3	4.7	2	1.3	7	4.9	1	0.6	13	2.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>155</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>142</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>154</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>515</b>	<b>100.0</b>

## 3.8 Qualitative perceptions on responses to SGBV

### 3.8.1 Control region

In the control area, the impact of corruption on SGBV was discussed:

*“...corruption is rampant at police level ... say that even if people report, the perpetrators will be left to go free, which becomes a big issue ... some people negotiate defilement because the police allow perpetrators to pay their way free ... facilitation at the CDO/police stations is lacking and, therefore, lack the personnel to follow up on SGBV cases.”<sup>72</sup>*

Similarly, in Masaka, corruption was mentioned as a reason for the downward trend in SGBV reporting:

*“...people prefer to keep quiet and not report cases of SGBV because they know that the corruption in DRMs, especially the police, will not allow them justice.”<sup>73</sup>*

However, the presence of a child protection unit at all police posts was commended for the reduced incidence of SGBV:

*“...the family protection unit as well as NGOs have helped to fight SGBV ... they do a lot of sensitisation in the communities ... for example, ISIS.”<sup>74</sup>*

The role of civil society was discussed in Masaka and Mbarara:

*“MIFUMI has done a lot of sensitisation on SGBV, hence the decline in cases.”<sup>75</sup>*

<sup>72</sup> Consensus panel, Kasese, April 2014.

<sup>73</sup> Consensus panel, Masaka, April 2014.

<sup>74</sup> Key informant, Masaka, April 2014.

<sup>75</sup> Key informant, Masaka, April 2014.

### 3.8.2 Spillover region

In the spillover region, the percentage of reported SGBV cases declined. Discussions attempted to account for this trend:

*“...mediators are offering reconciliation ... people prefer mediation and keep away from reporting because it is cheap and nearer than prosecution DRMs.”<sup>76</sup>*

In Bukedi, civil society was commended for the reduction in SGBV cases:

*“...sensitisation is done by NGOs like MIFUMI and Plan International ... they carry out community dialogues...”<sup>77</sup>*

In Tororo, there was a preference for the police in addressing SGBV cases:

*“...Tororo is more metropolitan ... there is a mixture of communities ... people therefore prefer prosecution to mediation in Tororo ... people prefer to go to police to address cases of SGBV.”<sup>78</sup>*

However, the courts were criticised:

*“...court processes take too long; that’s why people prefer to mediate out of court ... officials at the courts will sometimes encourage victims to negotiate in defilement cases instead of pursuing justice.”<sup>79</sup>*

In Teso, corruption was blamed for the low reporting of SGBV:

*“...corruption has marred the judicial system, especially the police and the courts ... confidence has now gone down, people now prefer to keep it to themselves than reporting.”<sup>80</sup>*

However, the traditional justice system was commended:

*“...in Teso the elder system is still effective ... people prefer to promote harmony through mediation than prosecution, which is too expensive and takes longer.”<sup>81</sup>*

In Amuria, a key informant commented that women’s empowerment was responsible for the drop in SGBV cases:

*“...women have now been empowered ... there has been a lot of awareness creation on SGBV ... this has led to the decline in SGBV cases.”<sup>82</sup>*

### 3.8.3 Sporadically affected region

In Lango, civil society was commended for the decline in SGBV cases:

*“...there has been massive sensitisation on SGBV through radio programmes and gatherings ... NGOs like Save the Children, War Child Holland do the sensitisation ... that’s why SGBV cases have gone down.”<sup>83</sup>*

<sup>76</sup> Consensus panel, Kiryandongo, May 2014.

<sup>77</sup> Consensus panel, Tororo, May 2014.

<sup>78</sup> Key informant, Tororo, May 2014.

<sup>79</sup> Consensus panel, Mbale, May 2014.

<sup>80</sup> Key informant, Amuria, May 2014.

<sup>81</sup> Consensus panel, Amuria, May 2014.

<sup>82</sup> Key informant, Amuria, May 2014.

<sup>83</sup> Consensus panel, Otuke, May 2014.

People in Lango preferred mediation instead of prosecution because:

*“...mediation takes a shorter period and takes place within the locality; the victims don’t have to move long distances to get mediators ... prosecution, on the other hand, is said to be expensive and it takes over six months to get justice ... that’s why the majority prefer mediation.”<sup>84</sup>*

In West Nile, however, women were blamed for the decline in reporting:

*“Women do not report to the police; they only want to solve issues through elders.”<sup>85</sup>*

Parents were also castigated for negotiating defilement cases:

*“...parents may not report defilement cases for fear of the costs and time it takes, and they only go to the police when they have failed to agree on the payment by the perpetrators.”<sup>86</sup>*

In Yumbe, the decline in reporting of cases was attributed to “ignorance”:

*“Men fear to report cases of SGBV and prefer to die in silence and LCs have a poor attitude; they claim it is love even when a woman is bleeding.”<sup>87</sup>*

### 3.8.4 Severely affected region

In the severely affected region, the drop in reporting of SGBV cases was attributed to the withdrawal of NGOs:

*“NGOs were handling SGBV in 2011 in Acholi ... in 2012 they started pulling out ... actually 90% of all the NGOs focusing on SGBV have left...”<sup>88</sup>*

The clan systems were said to be effective and hence people preferred mediation to prosecution:

*“...the clan systems are strong in Acholi and they can resolve SGBV before it gets out of hand ... mediation is cheaper, faster and transparent ... clans advocate a permanent solution to SGBV ... mediation promotes reconciliation and is generally more convenient for poor families ... courts permanently bring injury to the relationship between husband and wife ... the man keeps on saying you sued me ... prosecution is too expensive and not transparent because it is marred by corruption.”<sup>89</sup>*

A key informant in Kitgum argued:

*“...women prefer to go to FIDA to get legal redress ... this is especially true over land conflicts because they directly result in SGBV.”<sup>90</sup>*

<sup>84</sup> Key informant, Otuke, May 2014.

<sup>85</sup> Consensus panel, Adjumani, May 2014.

<sup>86</sup> Consensus panel, Adjumani, May 2014.

<sup>87</sup> Consensus panel, Yumbe, May 2014.

<sup>88</sup> Consensus panel, Kitgum, May 2014.

<sup>89</sup> Consensus panel, Kitgum, May 2014.

<sup>90</sup> Key informant, Kitgum, May 2014.

Poverty was also blamed for the decline in reporting:

*“...one time we had a case of a girl who was defiled at the border of Kitgum and Kalong and that girl and her parents were told to come to seek a health report here in Kitgum town, which is a distance of 97 kilometres from that village where she was defiled ... she needed transport but could not afford it so she could not access a health centre for examination to take place ... the case ended up dying because in such a scenario, how many men or how many women in Acholi can afford to report or pursue the defilement of their daughters?”<sup>91</sup>*

In Karamoja, the decline in reporting was attributed to women:

*“...women do not want to report their husbands to the police for fear that they will be arrested, which causes problems ... women are reluctant to report to the police for fear of implications ... women prefer to settle SGBV at village level ... there are now five women per village who can solve SGBV ... women prefer to resolve issues through these village-based women.”<sup>92</sup>*

In Karamoja, sensitisation by NGOs was commended:

*“...there has been sensitisation by NGOs about SGBV ... so the practice of SGBV has reduced.”<sup>93</sup>*

In Moroto, women peacebuilding initiatives were praised:

*“...reporting has gone down because people are sensitised on SGBV ... there have been lots of trainings, workshops and retreats ... people in the community are now aware of SGBV ... NGOs like MIFUMI and FIDA have trained LCs on handling SGBV.”<sup>94</sup>*

However, the following was also recommended:

*“...sensitisation should be extended to rural areas, especially hard-to-reach areas where roads are still poor.”<sup>95</sup>*

91 Key informant, Kitgum, May 2014.

92 Consensus panel, Kotido, May 2014.

93 Key informant, Kotido, May 2014.

94 Key informant, Moroto, May 2014.

95 Key informant, Moroto, May 2014.

## 4. Local government service delivery

### 4.1 Rating of service delivery

In relation to local government service delivery, 1,302 (30.8%) of the respondents overall rated the service as good (see Table 45). The severely affected region had the highest percentage (35.3%) of respondents in this category, followed by the sporadically affected region (29.4%). Compared with the control region, the percentage of respondents who rated local government service delivery as good was significantly higher in the severely affected region (difference of 8.1 percentage points,  $p=0.0005$ ). In the other regions, the percentage of respondents who rated local government service delivery as good was higher than in the control region, but the difference was not statistically significant (sporadically affected region – difference of 2.2 percentage points,  $p=0.3788$ ; spillover region – difference of 1.2 percentage points,  $p=0.6029$ ). A poor rating for local government service delivery in communities was highest in the spillover region (20.1%), followed by the sporadically affected region (18.6%). In the severely affected region, the percentage of respondents who rated local government service delivery as poor was 13.5%.

**Table 45: Respondents' rating of local government service delivery**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>How do you rate local government service delivery in your community?</b>										
Fair	294	49.9	597	43.1	497	41.5	468	44.1	1,856	43.8
Don't know	43	7.3	111	8.0	123	10.3	78	7.4	355	8.4
Good	160	27.2	489	35.3	352	29.4	301	28.4	1,302	30.8
Poor	92	15.6	187	13.5	223	18.6	213	20.1	715	16.9
N/R	0	0.0	1	0.1	3	0.3	1	0.1	5	0.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>589</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,385</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,198</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,061</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>4,233</b>	<b>100.0</b>

N/R = no response

In terms of the reasons why respondents rated local government service delivery unfavourably, poor healthcare services emerged as the main reason, as cited by 380 (20.1%) respondents overall (see Table 46). Bad roads ranked second (19%) overall as the reason for poor service delivery. Attributing the low rating to poor education services was particularly prevalent in the severely affected (20.4%) and spillover (16.5%) regions, while lack of agriculture-related services as a reason was particularly prevalent in the severely affected (12.6%) and sporadically affected (12.1%) regions. Conversely, in the control region, lack of employment opportunities (17.2%) and the failure to involve local people in planning (12.9%) featured more prominently as the reasons cited for poor local government service delivery.

**Table 46: Why respondents rated local government service delivery as poor**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>Why do you say that service delivery by your local government is poor?</b>										
Poor healthcare services	45	19.3	106	21.9	126	21.2	103	17.7	380	20.1
Roads are bad	48	20.6	81	16.7	109	18.4	121	20.8	359	19.0
Poor education services	24	10.3	99	20.4	91	15.3	96	16.5	310	16.4
Few and inaccessible water points	28	12.0	55	11.3	71	12.0	105	18.0	259	13.7
Lack of employment opportunities	40	17.2	50	10.3	57	9.6	48	8.2	195	10.3
No agricultural-related services	14	6.0	61	12.6	72	12.1	30	5.2	177	9.3
Local people not involved in planning	30	12.9	17	3.5	47	7.9	60	10.3	154	8.1
Corruption	4	1.7	16	3.3	21	3.5	19	3.3	60	3.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>233</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>485</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>594</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>582</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,894</b>	<b>100.0</b>

## 4.2 Participation in planning for service delivery

Participation in local government planning activities is generally low, with only 833 (19.7%) of the respondents overall stating that they had participated in such activities (see Table 47). The highest percentage of respondents participating in local government planning activities was found in the sporadically affected region (23.7%), followed by the severely affected region (20.1%).

Among the respondents who reported participation in local government planning activities, 663 (79.6%) overall attended and provided information during these activities – with the spillover region having the highest percentage (88.6%) of respondents citing such participation. The severely affected region, where 20.1% of the respondents said they participated in local government planning sessions, had the highest percentage of respondents who attended but did not provide information during the activities. Among the reasons cited for not participating in local government planning activities, 95% of the respondents overall said they had never been invited. The control region had the highest percentage (11.3%) of respondents who had been invited but did not attend, while in the spillover and severely affected regions less than 3% cited this reason (and only 5.3% in the sporadically affected region). The results indicate that, in the PRDP regions, people are more willing to participate in the planning process if invited, as evidenced by the lower percentage of respondents in these regions who were invited but did not attend.


Table 47: Participation in local government planning activities

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>Have you participated in local government planning activities?</b>										
Yes	104	17.7	278	20.1	284	23.7	167	15.7	833	19.7
No	485	82.3	1,106	79.9	912	76.1	891	84.0	3,394	80.2
N/R	0	0.0	1	0.1	2	0.2	3	0.3	6	0.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>589</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,385</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,198</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,061</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>4,233</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>If yes, how did you participate?</b>										
Attended and provided information	86	82.7	210	75.5	219	77.1	148	88.6	663	79.6
Attended but did not provide information	18	17.3	68	24.5	61	21.5	19	11.4	166	19.9
N/R	0	0.0	0	0.0	4	1.4	0	0.0	4	0.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>104</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>278</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>284</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>167</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>833</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>If no, why?</b>										
Have never been invited	428	88.2	1,068	96.6	857	94.0	868	97.4	3,221	94.9
Invited but did not attend	55	11.3	31	2.8	48	5.3	22	2.5	156	4.6
N/R	2	0.4	7	0.6	7	0.8	1	0.1	17	0.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>485</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,106</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>912</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>891</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>3,394</b>	<b>100.0</b>

N/R = no response

Over time, the percentage of respondents not attending local government planning activities has increased (see Figure 17). The spillover region had the highest average annual increase (9.5 percentage points) in the proportion of respondents not attending local government planning activities, followed by the sporadically affected region (8.5 percentage points). The lowest average annual increase in the percentage of respondents not participating in local government planning activities was found in the control region (4.5 percentage points), followed by the severely affected region (5 percentage points). Minimal or no changes were observed in the percentage of respondents not attending local government planning activities between 2013 and 2014, particularly in the sporadically affected, control and spillover regions. Having observed that the majority of respondents who did not attend local government planning activities were not invited, the noted increase in the percentage of respondents not attending such activities further suggests that local governments need to invite local people to participate in the planning process.

Figure 17: Percentage of respondents not attending local government planning activities





## 4.3 Perceived quality of education, health and vocational training services

### 4.3.1 Primary school education services

Results from the survey show that the majority of respondents (3,655 or 86.3%) reported that government was the leading provider of primary education (see Table 48). A significant variation existed between the PRDP regions and the control region when respondents were asked who was the leading provider of primary education services in their community. For instance, in the control region, 45.3% of the respondents reported that private individuals were the leading providers of primary education services, whereas, in the severely and sporadically affected regions, less than 4% of the respondents cited private individuals as the leading providers.

Overall, the quality of primary education within communities was rated as good by 48.4% of the respondents. The highest percentage of respondents rating primary education services as good was found in the severely affected region (57.9%), followed by the control region (49.4%), where a substantial percentage of respondents reported that private owners were providing primary education services. Results further show that 518 (12.5%) of the respondents overall rated the quality of primary education services in their communities as poor. All the PRDP regions had significantly higher percentages of respondents who rated primary education services as poor, compared with those in the control region – with the spillover region having the highest percentage (14.9%), followed by the sporadically (13.9%) and severely affected (11.5%) regions. A statistically significant relationship ( $p < 0.001$ ) existed between the main providers of primary education services and the reported quality of these services. Among the respondents who said primary education was provided by private individuals, 64.7% rated the services as good, whereas, among those who reported that government was the main provider, less than half (46.4%) rated the quality of services as good. This implies that engaging private individuals to provide education services could improve the quality of primary education services, particularly in the PRDP regions.

Primary schools were generally accessible in nearly all regions. However, in the spillover region, a significantly lower percentage (78.6%) of respondents reported that primary schools were accessible, compared with the other regions, where over 90% of the respondents had a similar response.

**Table 48: Provider, quality and accessibility of primary education services**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>Who is the provider of the primary education services mainly used by people in your community?</b>										
Government	311	52.8	1,289	93.1	1,119	93.4	936	88.2	3,655	86.3
Private individuals	267	45.3	53	3.8	45	3.8	97	9.1	462	10.9
Faith-based institutions	1	0.2	12	0.9	7	0.6	3	0.3	23	0.5
Civil society organisations	0	0.0	8	0.6	1	0.1	2	0.2	11	0.3
Don't know	10	1.7	23	1.7	26	2.2	23	2.2	82	1.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>589</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,385</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,198</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,061</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>4,233</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>How do you rate the quality of the primary education services provided in your community?</b>										
Good	286	49.4	789	57.9	556	47.4	380	36.6	2,011	48.4
Fair	249	43.0	416	30.5	453	38.7	500	48.2	1,618	39.0
Poor	44	7.6	156	11.5	163	13.9	155	14.9	518	12.5
N/R	0	0.0	1	0.1	0	0.0	3	0.3	4	0.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>579</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,362</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,172</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,038</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>4,151</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Do you consider this primary school to be easily accessible?</b>										
Yes	551	95.2	1,275	93.6	1,056	90.1	816	78.6	3,698	89.1
No	22	3.8	74	5.4	99	8.4	209	20.1	404	9.7
N/R	6	1.0	13	1.0	17	1.5	13	1.3	49	1.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>579</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,362</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,172</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,038</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>4,151</b>	<b>100.0</b>

N/R = no response

### 4.3.2 Secondary school education services

Overall, results from the survey show that the majority (3,279 or 77.5%) of the respondents reported that government was the provider of secondary education services mainly used by people in their communities (see Table 49). Similar to the primary education situation, the control region had the lowest percentage (56%) of respondents who cited government as the provider of secondary education services mainly used by people within their communities, followed by respondents in the spillover region (69.7%). In the severely and sporadically affected regions, more than 80% of the respondents cited government as the provider of secondary education services in their communities.

Overall, the quality of secondary education services was rated as good or fair by 53.3% and 40%, respectively, of the respondents, with only 6.4% rating the services as poor. There were significant differences in the percentage of respondents rating secondary education services as poor between the control and sporadically affected regions (3.5 percentage points,  $p=0.0049$ ) and between the control and spillover regions (2.7 percentage points,  $p=0.0262$ ). This suggests the need for improving the quality of secondary education services in both the sporadically affected and spillover regions, particularly in the government-run schools. No significant relationship ( $p=0.426$ ) existed between the main providers of secondary education services and good-quality secondary education. Among the respondents who reported that government was the main provider of secondary school services, 53% rated the quality of these services as good, while, among those who reported that private individuals were the main providers, 55% rated the quality of the services as good. The results suggest that government-run schools need to improve the quality of secondary education services offered to measure up to the standards of privately run schools.

In terms of the accessibility of secondary schools, 2,923 (73.3%) of the respondents reported that the nearest secondary school to their home was accessible. The control region had a significantly higher percentage (91.3%) of respondents stating that the nearest secondary school to their home was accessible, compared with the percentages in the other regions. In the PRDP regions, the percentage of respondents stating that the nearest secondary schools were not accessible ranged between 34.7% in the spillover region and 23.9% in the severely affected region.

**Table 49: Provider, quality and accessibility of secondary education services**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>Who is the provider of the secondary education services mainly used by people in your community?</b>										
Government	330	56.0	1,163	84.0	1,046	87.3	740	69.7	3,279	77.5
Private individuals	241	40.9	127	9.2	91	7.6	198	18.7	657	15.5
Faith-based institutions	4	0.7	35	2.5	2	0.2	4	0.4	45	1.1
Civil society organisations	0	0.0	6	0.4	0	0.0	0	0.0	6	0.1
Don't know	14	2.4	54	3.9	59	4.9	119	11.2	246	5.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>589</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,385</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,198</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,061</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>4,233</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>How do you rate the quality of secondary education services mainly used by people in your community?</b>										
Good	282	49.0	801	60.2	629	55.2	413	43.8	2,125	53.3
Fair	268	46.6	448	33.7	420	36.9	460	48.8	1,596	40.0
Poor	24	4.2	80	6.0	88	7.7	65	6.9	257	6.4
N/R	1	0.2	2	0.2	2	0.2	4	0.4	9	0.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>575</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,331</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,139</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>942</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>3,987</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Do you consider this secondary school to be easily accessible?</b>										
Yes	525	91.3	988	74.2	816	71.6	594	63.1	2,923	73.3
No	41	7.1	318	23.9	298	26.2	327	34.7	984	24.7
N/R	9	1.6	25	1.9	25	2.2	21	2.2	80	2.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>575</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,331</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,139</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>942</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>3,987</b>	<b>100.0</b>

N/R = no response

### 4.3.3 Health services

Results from the survey show that health services mainly used in communities are provided by the government, with 87% overall citing this option (see Table 50). Regional variations were observed, especially between the PRDP regions and the control region, with the PRDP regions averaging at about 88% of the respondents citing government as the provider of health services mainly used and 76.9% giving the same response in the control region. No significant variations were observed between the PRDP regions.

When asked to rate the quality of health services, only 1,503 (36.3%) of the respondents rated the quality as good. The severely affected region had the highest percentage (41.6%) of respondents who rated health services as good, followed by the control region (38%). A substantial proportion (907 or 21.9%) of respondents overall rated health services as poor. In the three PRDP regions, the percentage of respondents who rated health services as poor exceeded 20%, while in the control region a lower percentage (11.9%) of the respondents gave a similar rating for health services.

In terms of the accessibility of health facilities closest to the respondents' homes, 3,315 (80.1%) of the respondents overall reported that they were accessible. The control region had the highest percentage (90.9%) of respondents citing accessibility of the closest health facilities, while the sporadically affected region had the lowest percentage (70.8%) in this respect. On average, respondents in the control region cover a distance of 1.5 kilometres to reach the health facility nearest to their homes, whereas in the sporadically affected region respondents cover on average 2.9 kilometres to reach the health facility closest to their homes.

Table 50: Provider, quality and accessibility of health services

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>Who is the provider of the health services mainly used by people in your community?</b>										
Government	453	76.9	1,220	88.1	1,065	88.9	944	89.0	3,682	87.0
Private individuals	127	21.6	46	3.3	82	6.8	74	7.0	329	7.8
Faith-based institutions	2	0.3	93	6.7	20	1.7	0	0.0	115	2.7
Civil society organisations	0	0.0	5	0.4	0	0.0	6	0.6	11	0.3
Don't know	7	1.2	21	1.5	31	2.6	37	3.5	96	2.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>589</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,385</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,198</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,061</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>4,233</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>How do you rate the quality of these health services?</b>										
Good	221	38.0	567	41.6	414	35.5	301	29.4	1,503	36.3
Fair	291	50.0	475	34.8	451	38.6	503	49.1	1,720	41.6
Poor	69	11.9	321	23.5	299	25.6	218	21.3	907	21.9
N/R	1	0.2	1	0.1	3	0.3	2	0.2	7	0.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>582</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,364</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,167</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,024</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>4,137</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Do you consider this health facility to be easily accessible?</b>										
Yes	529	90.9	1,183	86.7	826	70.8	777	75.9	3,315	80.1
No	46	7.9	179	13.1	337	28.9	243	23.7	805	19.5
N/R	7	1.2	2	0.1	4	0.3	4	0.4	17	0.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>582</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,364</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,167</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,024</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>4,137</b>	<b>100.0</b>

N/R = no response

### 4.3.4 Primary vocational training services

Whereas the majority of respondents were aware of who the providers of primary and secondary education services were in their communities, many of the respondents were not aware of who the provider of vocational training services was in their community. Overall, nearly equal percentages of respondents cited government (1,065 or 25.2%) or private individuals (1,042 or 24.6%) as the providers of vocational training services in their communities (see Table 51).

The quality of vocational training services was rated as good by 1,222 (51.4%) of the respondents who knew the providers of these services in their communities. The severely affected region had the highest percentage (62.3%) of respondents who rated vocational training services as good, followed by the control region (57.6%). The sporadically affected region had the highest percentage (8.8%) of respondents who rated vocational training services as poor, whereas in the other regions less than 5% of the respondents rated vocational training services as poor.

In terms of accessibility, 65.6% of the respondents overall considered vocational training schools closest to their homes to be accessible. The control region had the highest percentage (86.3%) of respondents who reported that the vocational school closest to their home was accessible, followed by the severely affected region (73.5%). The spillover region had the lowest percentage (53.5%) of respondents reporting that the vocational training school closest to their community was accessible.

When asked if people who receive vocational training were able to get employment or earn an income, 1,534 (64.5%) of the respondents answered yes. Notable regional variations were observed, with 72.3% of the respondents in the severely affected region reporting that people who receive vocational training were able to get employment/earn an income compared with 47.1% in the spillover region.

**Table 51: Provider, quality and accessibility of vocational training services**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>Who is the provider of the vocational training services in your community?</b>										
Government	95	16.1	433	31.3	251	21.0	286	27.0	1,065	25.2
Private individuals	195	33.1	301	21.7	325	27.1	221	20.8	1,042	24.6
Faith-based institutions	30	5.1	101	7.3	61	5.1	2	0.2	194	4.6
Civil society organisations	1	0.2	48	3.5	9	0.8	18	1.7	76	1.8
Don't know	268	45.5	502	36.2	552	46.1	534	50.3	1,856	43.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>589</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,385</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,198</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,061</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>4,233</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>How do you rate the quality of the vocational training services provided in your community?</b>										
Good	185	57.6	550	62.3	302	46.7	185	35.1	1,222	51.4
Fair	127	39.6	304	34.4	284	44.0	316	60.0	1,031	43.4
Poor	8	2.5	29	3.3	57	8.8	24	4.6	118	5.0
N/R	1	0.3	0	0.0	3	0.5	2	0.4	6	0.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>321</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>883</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>646</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>527</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>2,377</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Do you consider this vocational training school to be easily accessible?</b>										
Yes	277	86.3	649	73.5	352	54.5	282	53.5	1,560	65.6
No	41	12.8	232	26.3	293	45.4	235	44.6	801	33.7
N/R	3	0.9	2	0.2	1	0.2	10	1.9	16	0.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>321</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>883</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>646</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>527</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>2,377</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Are people who have received vocational training able to get employment or to earn an income using the skills gained?</b>										
Yes	200	62.3	638	72.3	448	69.3	248	47.1	1,534	64.5
No	33	10.3	128	14.5	108	16.7	87	16.5	356	15.0
Don't know	85	26.5	113	12.8	88	13.6	181	34.3	467	19.6
N/R	3	0.9	4	0.5	2	0.3	11	2.1	20	0.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>321</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>883</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>646</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>527</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>2,377</b>	<b>100.0</b>

N/R = no response

## 4.4 Local government responsiveness to community needs

Overall, 2,296 (54.2%) of the respondents reported that local government was responsive to community needs (see Table 52). In two regions (control and spillover), the percentage of respondents who reported that their local government was responsive to community needs was less than 50%. The severely affected region had the highest percentage (63.3%) of respondents who reported that local governments were responsive to community needs.

When asked if PRDP implementation had helped local governments to become more responsive to community needs, 2,807 (66.3%) of the respondents overall said they did not know if there had been an improvement. Overall, only 19.7% reported that PRDP implementation had helped local governments become more responsive to community needs. Substantial variations existed between the regions in the percentage of respondents who reported that PRDP implementation had helped local governments become more responsive to community needs, with the severely affected regions having the highest percentage (32.2%) and the control region having the lowest percentage (3.1%). The limited awareness of what the PRDP has done in supporting local governments to be more responsive to community needs, especially in the PRDP regions, indicates the need for increased awareness raising of the project and its objectives. This can be achieved through greater engagement of communities in PRDP activities.

**Table 52: Local government responsiveness to community needs**


	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>Is your local government responsive to community needs?</b>										
Yes	285	48.4	877	63.3	640	53.4	494	46.6	2,296	54.2
No	209	35.5	375	27.1	346	28.9	298	28.1	1,228	29.0
Don't know	91	15.4	124	9.0	200	16.7	258	24.3	673	15.9
N/R	4	0.7	9	0.6	12	1.0	11	1.0	36	0.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>589</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,385</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,198</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,061</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>4,233</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Has PRDP implementation helped local governments become more responsive to community needs?</b>										
Yes	18	3.1	446	32.2	250	20.9	119	11.2	833	19.7
No	24	4.1	236	17.0	181	15.1	89	8.4	530	12.5
Don't know	535	90.8	689	49.7	751	62.7	832	78.4	2,807	66.3
N/R	12	2.0	14	1.0	16	1.3	21	2.0	63	1.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>589</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,385</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,198</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,061</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>4,233</b>	<b>100.0</b>

N/R = no response

Over time, the responsiveness of local government to community needs has been largely stable, changing by less than 1 percentage point annually on average for the respondents overall.

Over the three-year period, there was a zero percentage point change on average annually in the control region, with the percentage of respondents reporting that local government was responsive to the community dropping from 48% in 2012 to 36% in 2013 but rising again to 48% in 2014 (see Figure 18). In the spillover region, there was an average downtrend of -3.5 percentage points annually. Regions that experienced positive changes over the three-year period were the severely and sporadically affected regions – although the average change annually in the sporadically affected region was less than 1 percentage point, while it was 6 percentage points in the severely affected region.

Figure 18: Percentage of respondents citing responsiveness of local government service delivery to community needs over time



## 4.5 Qualitative perceptions on local government service delivery

### 4.5.1 Control region

In Kasese, decreased participation in local government activities was attributed to loss of trust. This was attributed to weaknesses within the system:

*“...people have lost trust because of corruption ... money ends up in the hands of other people ... a case in point is the Mubuku Irrigation Scheme where most of the work was left undone because money was stolen from the fund.”<sup>96</sup>*

Government was criticised for:

*“...late release of funds, which delays implementation ... when funds come late, there is pressure to implement quickly, which leads to shoddy work.”<sup>97</sup>*

In Masaka, communities were criticised for their lack of knowledge of local government structures and poor attitude towards development programmes:

*“People do not understand that needs generated from villages are prioritised at parish/ sub-county level ... so if people do not see their needs being worked on, they blame the local government.”<sup>98</sup>*

96 Consensus panel, Kasese, April 2014.

97 Key informant, Kasese, April 2014.

98 Key informant, Masaka, April 2014.

In Mbarara, similar views were expressed:

*“...limited funding in terms of division funds from the central government ... there is also poor communication and information sharing on the part of local government and the beneficiaries ... lack of development partners, communities are overwhelmed with demands yet funds are limited.”<sup>99</sup>*

*“Delay in fourth quota affected road construction, schools/health centre service delivery ... so local government suffered ... even salaries of staff were not there, so there was no way we would perform.”<sup>100</sup>*

Communities were also criticised:

*“...their poor attitude ... laziness on the side of the people who think that government can do everything ... they even fail to supplement government programmes like UPE ... Parents cannot even buy books for their children.”<sup>101</sup>*

#### 4.5.2 Spillover region (Bukedi, Bunyoro, Elgon and Teso)

In Kiryandongo, qualitative interviews showed that the lack of participation in local government activities was linked to the poor attitude of communities to planning meetings:

*“...there is increased loss of interest in government affairs ... people are increasingly shying away from voluntarism ... communities’ attitude to planning meetings is poor, especially because they do not get allowances at these meetings.”<sup>102</sup>*

However, infrastructural development under the PRDP was commended:

*“...PRDP boreholes ... Nyakagote–Techwa by PRDP as well as Kiwaara road, then Diika road via Unyama have greatly impacted on connecting to the productive areas ... PRDP access roads have eased movement of security agencies to move faster ... PRDP is covering provision of clean water through boreholes, which contributes to nutrition ... PRDP which has provided furniture and latrines in schools ... PRDP which constructed out-patient departments, and the maternity wards in health centres...”<sup>103</sup>*

In Bukedi, local government was criticised:

*“...NUSAF, NAADS issues, especially those forwarded to the Office of the Prime Minister ... funds were misappropriated ... many groups were left out.”<sup>104</sup>*

Communities were blamed for the poor attitude to planning meetings:

*“...laxity of community members to attend planning meetings ... people shun planning meetings; they prefer not to attend because they do not understand the planning process ... when they don’t see implementation, they assume that their needs have been ignored.”<sup>105</sup>*

99 Consensus panel, Mbarara, April 2014.

100 Key informant, Mbarara, April 2014.

101 Key informant, Mbarara, April 2014.

102 Consensus panel, Kiryandongo, May 2014.

103 Key informant, Kiryandongo, May 2014.

104 Consensus panel, Tororo, May 2014.

105 Key informant, Tororo, May 2014.



In Elgon, loss of trust in local government service delivery was attributed to the following reasons:

*“...communities were unaware of planning meetings and do not participate ... people are generally not aware of the planning process ... people are majorly unrealistic; after wish-lists have been generated at LC level, they are prioritised and not everything can be addressed ... needs are many and the resource envelopes are small ... there is limited government funding to local governments ... this hinders implementation.”<sup>106</sup>*

Limited funding and corruption were also mentioned as factors for loss of trust:

*“...there is limited funding from the central government to local governments ... corruption and nepotism at local government mars implementation of programmes such as CDD [community-driven development].”<sup>107</sup>*

Qualitative results from Teso region indicate that the loss of trust in local government service delivery was due to limited funding:

*“...planning targets only a few people because resource envelopes are small ... most of these grants are conditional ... most of these grants give priority to education ... the community, therefore, feels like government is not doing anything to address their other needs.”<sup>108</sup>*

#### 4.5.3 Sporadically affected region (Lango and West Nile)

In Lango, drivers of the decline in respondents reporting to have attended any local government planning meeting were that:

*“...people saw no results from those planning meetings, so they chose to shun any future planning meetings ... communities want their needs to be fulfilled at once; when they don't, they choose to keep away from any future meetings ... people want to be paid allowances, yet it is not in the local government budget to do so...”<sup>109</sup>*

However, local government was commended in Lango:

*“...constructed boreholes for us ... the local government under NUSAF has given oxen and ploughs ... the local government has given one million shillings to people with a disability in our sub-county ... under the CDD, our sub-county has distributed four million shillings to community groups...”<sup>110</sup>*

In West Nile, the loss of trust in local government was disputed:

*“The change in planning cycle from two to five years makes people think that their needs are not being met and they end up shunning these planning meetings altogether ... people are just lazy; when they come for these meetings, they expect to get paid ... and when they are not paid, it causes them to lose morale to attend any future meetings.”<sup>111</sup>*

106 Consensus panel, Mbale, May 2014.

107 Key informant, Mbale, May 2014.

108 Consensus panel, Amuria, May 2014.

109 Consensus panel, Otuke, May 2014.

110 Key informant, Otuke, May 2014.

111 Consensus panel, Adjumani, May 2014.



In Zombo, a respondent had this to say:

*“...participatory planning has become so monotonous for community members so they end up not attending ... little funding, yet needs are many ... people do not attend planning meetings because they normally happen during the planting season.”<sup>112</sup>*

#### 4.5.4 Severely affected region

In Acholi sub-region, the percentage of respondents reporting that local government service delivery is responsive to community needs has been increasing since 2011. The role of the PRDP in infrastructure development was notable:

*“PRDP has supported local governments to build schools and roads.”<sup>113</sup>*

In Kitgum, demoralisation was blamed for the lack of participation in local government activities:

*“...people have developed a low perception and negative attitude towards getting involved in planning and giving their priorities because of the undone and unimplemented priorities, which they gave in a previous year; when a new year comes and you call them to come for the planning meetings, they tell you that you go and first implement what we prioritised last year; they say go and use the plan of 2012...”<sup>114</sup>*

In Karamoja, it was reported that communities were participating in local government activities because of the prevailing peace and interventions brought about by the PRDP:

*“...PRDP is seen as having a positive impact on security ... local people are participating in the planning process ... districts are delivering services that people need; the local administration are delivering services that people raised during the planning process, and district plans are responding to people’s needs, so service delivery is okay.”<sup>115</sup>*

112 Consensus panel, Zombo, May 2014.

113 Key informant, Amuru, May 2014.

114 Consensus panel, Kitgum, May 2014.

115 Consensus panel, Abim, May 2014.

## 5. Access to economic opportunities

### 5.1 Prevalence of employable skills among respondents

The possession of employable skills by the respondents was generally low, with more than two-thirds of the respondents saying that they did not have employable skills or were still students (see Table 53). The percentage of respondents with no employable skills at all was highest in the severely affected region, followed by the sporadically affected region. The difference between the percentage of respondents with no employable skills in the severely and sporadically affected regions and the percentage in the control region was statistically significant (17.3 percentage points,  $p < 0.001$  and 14 percentage points,  $p < 0.001$ , respectively). Although the spillover region also had a higher percentage of respondents with no employable skills, compared with that in the control region, the difference was not statistically significant (2.4 percentage points,  $p = 0.3448$ ). There is a need, therefore, to establish vocational training schools and other third-level institutions in the severely and sporadically affected regions to equip people in these communities with the necessary skills.

Among the respondents who had employable skills, the majority of them had sponsored themselves to acquire the skills (787 out of 1,235 (63.7%) respondents). Acquisition of employable skills through apprenticeship was another way through which respondents with skills obtained them. This form of skills acquisition was more common in the PRDP regions, but not in the control region. In each of the three PRDP regions, over 20% of the respondents with employable skills acquired them through apprenticeship, whereas in the control region only 14% of the respondents acquired their skills through this method.

When skilled respondents were asked whether they were using their skills to earn an income, 81.6% said yes. A slightly higher percentage (43.2%) of them reported using their skills together with an additional income-generating activity, compared with the percentage (38.4%) using the skill on its own to earn an income. Regional variations were observed in the percentages of respondents who were currently using their skills to earn an income. The spillover region, for instance, had the highest percentage (56.6%) of respondents earning an income from their skills only, followed by the control region (36.4%). Results also show that the sporadically and severely affected regions had the highest percentages of respondents who used their skills together with another income-generating activity to earn an income, at 52% and 51.2, respectively.

Table 53: Employability of respondents

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>Do you have any employable skills?</b>										
Yes, vocational	164	27.8	219	15.8	201	16.8	305	28.7	889	21.0
Yes, professional	72	12.2	82	5.9	101	8.4	91	8.6	346	8.2
No	329	55.9	1,014	73.2	838	69.9	619	58.3	2,800	66.1
Still a student	24	4.1	70	5.1	58	4.8	45	4.2	197	4.7
N/R	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.1	1	0.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>589</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,385</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,198</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,061</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>4,233</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Who sponsored you to acquire this skill?</b>										
Government	10	4.2	20	6.6	28	9.3	16	4.0	74	6.0
CSO/NGO	3	1.3	51	16.9	16	5.3	25	6.3	95	7.7
Self	190	80.5	157	52.2	178	58.9	262	66.2	787	63.7
Apprenticeship	33	14.0	73	24.3	80	26.5	93	23.5	279	22.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>236</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>301</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>302</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>396</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,235</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Are you currently using this skill to earn an income?</b>										
Yes, earn income from skill only	86	36.4	84	27.9	80	26.5	224	56.6	474	38.4
Yes, use skill and other income-generating activity	85	36.0	154	51.2	157	52.0	138	34.8	534	43.2
Not at all	65	27.5	62	20.6	63	20.9	34	8.6	224	18.1
N/R	0	0.0	1	0.3	2	0.7	0	0.0	3	0.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>236</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>301</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>302</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>396</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,235</b>	<b>100.0</b>

N/R = no response

Results from the survey show that feelings of discrimination while searching for employment were common, as reported by 1,514 (37.5%) of the respondents with employable skills. These feelings were highest among skilled respondents from the severely affected region, followed by those in the sporadically affected region. In the control region, less than 25% of the skilled respondents reported feelings of discrimination while seeking employment.

The leading cause of discrimination cited by respondents who had such feelings was lack of competences (49.3%), followed by lack of appropriate job connections (37.3%) (see Table 54). In addition, lack of money to *buy* the job was also a common cause of discrimination, as cited by 7.8% of those respondents who felt discriminated against. The severely affected region had the highest percentage (57.9%) of respondents citing employment discrimination due to lack of competence, followed by the sporadically affected region (51.8%). On the other hand, the control region had the highest percentage of respondents who attributed employment discrimination to lack of appropriate job connections and lack of money to *buy* the job (42.3% and 16.4%, respectively), followed by the spillover region (41.4% and 11.7%, respectively).

Table 54: Causes of discrimination in search for employment

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>If yes, what causes this discrimination?</b>										
Lack of competences (skills, education, experience...)	77	36.2	454	57.9	280	51.8	201	39.0	1,012	49.3
Lack of connections (technical know-who)	90	42.3	274	34.9	188	34.8	213	41.4	765	37.3
Lack of money (to buy the job)	35	16.4	24	3.1	42	7.8	60	11.7	161	7.8
Belonging to different political parties	7	3.3	19	2.4	15	2.8	29	5.6	70	3.4
I am HIV/AIDS positive	1	0.5	5	0.6	7	1.3	3	0.6	16	0.8
Other	3	1.4	8	1.0	9	1.7	9	1.7	29	1.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>213</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>784</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>541</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>515</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>2,053</b>	<b>100.0</b>

## 5.2 Income sources, distribution and sufficiency

Survey results show that crop farming was the leading occupation from which respondents out of school were earning an income, with 2,112 (37.2%) of the respondents citing this occupation (see Table 55). The PRDP regions had significantly higher percentages (on average about 39%) of respondents engaged in crop farming to earn an income, compared with the percentage (23.8%) of respondents in the control region engaged in a similar activity. Whereas the control region had the highest percentage (22.6%) of respondents engaged in business activities involving shops, the PRDP regions had a higher percentage of respondents engaged in business activities involving a stall or kiosk. In addition, the percentage of respondents selling casual labour to earn an income was higher in the PRDP regions compared with the control region.


Table 55: Respondents' source of income

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover region		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>What are you currently doing to earn an income?</b>										
Farming – crops	156	23.8	741	37.3	662	39.0	553	41.4	2,112	37.2
Business – market stall/kiosk or roadside vending	70	10.7	274	13.8	289	17.0	152	11.4	785	13.8
Selling casual labour	63	9.6	357	17.9	178	10.5	179	13.4	777	13.7
Farming – livestock	52	7.9	150	7.5	110	6.5	98	7.3	410	7.2
Business – shop operation	148	22.6	83	4.2	80	4.7	99	7.4	410	7.2
Vocational occupation (tailoring, mechanics, building)	65	9.9	124	6.2	134	7.9	81	6.1	404	7.1
Nothing/old	47	7.2	104	5.2	93	5.5	74	5.5	318	5.6
Salaried worker	33	5.0	61	3.1	88	5.2	66	4.9	248	4.4
Remittances	6	0.9	70	3.5	22	1.3	10	0.7	108	1.9
Boda-boda riding	16	2.4	25	1.3	41	2.4	24	1.8	106	1.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>656</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,989</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,697</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,336</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>5,678</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Among the respondents who were engaged in some form of occupation to earn an income, the majority (1,609 or 43.3%) earned between UGX 10,000 (US\$3.5)<sup>116</sup> and UGX 50,000 (US\$17.5) per week (see Figure 19). Results also show that about a third (33.4%) of the respondents with an occupation were earning less than UGX 10,000 per week. The severely affected region had the highest percentage (38.5%) of working respondents who earned less than UGX 10,000 per week, followed by the spillover region (35.3%). The sporadically affected region had the lowest percentage (3.2%) of working respondents who were earning less than UGX 10,000 per week. Results further show that the control region had the highest percentage (17.6%) of working respondents who were earning UGX 50,000 or more per week, compared with the PRDP regions.

<sup>116</sup> US\$1 = about UGX 2,861 as at January 2015.

Figure 19: Weekly income distribution of respondents by region (UGX)



When asked if the income was sufficient to sustain their households, less than 15% of the working respondents reported that their incomes were sufficient (see Table 56). The control region had a significantly higher percentage (26.1%) of respondents whose income was sufficient to sustain their households, compared with the PRDP regions with a similar response. Among the respondents whose income was not sufficient to sustain their households, only 32.6% reported that someone supplemented their income, with all regions having a similar percentage, except the spillover region, which had a lower percentage of 27.5%.

Overall, 74.1% of the respondents whose incomes were supplemented reported it was their spouses who supplemented their income. This was followed by parents, as reported by 10.9% of the respondents. Across all regions, the percentage of respondents whose incomes were supplemented by their spouses was over 75%, except in the spillover region where the percentage was slightly lower at 66.5%. Income supplementation by parents was highest in the spillover region, with 14% of the respondents citing this option, followed by the control region (12.1%).

Results show that, of the 1,030 respondents whose insufficient income was supplemented by someone else, the majority (629 or 72%) reported that their basic needs were met with assistance from their spouse. The control region had the highest percentage (76.9%) of respondents whose basic needs were met with support from the spouse. Parents and children or grandchildren also supported respondents to meet their basic needs, providing support to 11.6% and 7.9% of all the respondents, respectively. The percentage of respondents who reported receiving support to meet their basic needs from government programmes such as NUSAF or from a CSO was less than 1% overall.

Table 56: Sufficiency of income to sustain household

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>Is your income sufficient to sustain your household?</b>										
Yes	135	26.1	123	10.2	140	13.4	134	14.2	532	14.3
No	381	73.6	1,080	89.2	902	86.2	799	84.9	3,162	85.1
N/R	2	0.4	8	0.7	5	0.5	8	0.9	23	0.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>518</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,211</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,047</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>941</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>3,717</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Does someone supplement your income?</b>										
Yes	129	33.9	373	34.5	308	34.1	220	27.5	1,030	32.6
No	248	65.1	707	65.5	591	65.5	577	72.2	2,123	67.1
N/R	4	1.0	0	0.0	3	0.3	2	0.3	9	0.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>381</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,080</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>902</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>799</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>3,162</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Who supplements your income?</b>										
Spouse	100	75.8	295	77.0	240	75.5	157	66.5	792	74.1
Parents	16	12.1	32	8.4	35	11.0	33	14.0	116	10.9
Children or grandchildren	6	4.5	32	8.4	26	8.2	19	8.1	83	7.8
Other relative	9	6.8	18	4.7	15	4.7	26	11.0	68	6.4
NGO (e.g. WFP)	0	0.0	5	1.3	1	0.3	1	0.4	7	0.7
Government programme (e.g. NUSAF)	1	0.8	1	0.3	1	0.3	0	0.0	3	0.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>132</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>383</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>318</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>236</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,069</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>How are your basic needs met?</b>										
Spouse	100	76.9	191	72.9	199	73.4	139	65.9	629	72.0
Parents	14	10.8	26	9.9	32	11.8	29	13.7	101	11.6
Children or grandchildren	6	4.6	23	8.8	24	8.9	16	7.6	69	7.9
Other relative	7	5.4	15	5.7	15	5.5	25	11.8	62	7.1
Government programme (e.g. NUSAF)	2	1.5	4	1.5	1	0.4	1	0.5	8	0.9
CSOs (e.g. World Food Programme)	1	0.8	3	1.1	0	0.0	1	0.5	5	0.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>130</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>262</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>271</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>211</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>874</b>	<b>100.0</b>

N/R = no response

### 5.3 Presence of economic opportunities

Overall, 1,537 (22.3%) of the respondents reported that there were no sufficient economic opportunities in their communities (see Table 57). The sporadically affected region had the lowest percentage (16.9%) of respondents who reported the absence of sufficient economic opportunities in their communities, while the spillover region had the highest percentage (38.7%) of respondents with a similar response. The control and severely affected regions had relatively similar percentages of respondents reporting the absence of sufficient economic opportunities in their communities.

Results further show that the type of economic opportunities that existed varied by region. In the control region, the highest percentage (33.4%) of respondents reported the presence of sufficient economic opportunities in the form of trade or business, while, in the sporadically affected, severely affected and spillover regions, the majority of respondents reported the presence of sufficient economic opportunities in the form of agriculture – as cited by 30.5%, 28.2% and 24% of the respondents, respectively. It is important to note that such opportunities are available as there is a likelihood of more utilised land in these regions, compared with the control region. In addition, the severely and sporadically affected regions had higher percentages of respondents who reported the presence of sufficient economic opportunities related to formal employment, vocational occupations and wage-related or casual work. This points to the fact that there are fewer skilled personnel in these areas to take up these opportunities, as earlier observed.

Asked whether everyone in their communities was able to take advantage of the available employment, less than 50% of the respondents said yes. The control and spillover regions had the highest percentages (54.4% and 51.8%, respectively) of respondents who reported that everyone in their communities was able to take advantage of the economic opportunities. Conversely, the sporadically and severely affected regions had the highest percentages (46.7% and 46.3%, respectively) of respondents who reported that not everyone in the community was able to take advantage of such opportunities.

**Table 57: Presence of and access to economic opportunities within communities**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>Are there sufficient economic opportunities in your community?</b>										
Yes, agriculture related	183	22.0	717	28.2	640	30.5	337	24.0	1,877	27.3
Yes, trade or business related	278	33.4	521	20.5	481	22.9	266	18.9	1,546	22.5
Yes, formal employment related	35	4.2	188	7.4	168	8.0	61	4.3	452	6.6
Yes, vocational related	51	6.1	303	11.9	249	11.9	75	5.3	678	9.9
Yes, wage related (casual work)	95	11.4	363	14.3	208	9.9	123	8.7	789	11.5
No	190	22.8	449	17.7	354	16.9	544	38.7	1,537	22.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>832</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>2,541</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>2,100</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,406</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>6,879</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Is everyone in your community able to take advantage of these economic opportunities?</b>										
Yes	217	54.4	404	43.2	340	40.3	268	51.8	1,229	45.6
No	100	25.1	433	46.3	394	46.7	154	29.8	1,081	40.1
Don't know	81	20.3	97	10.4	108	12.8	94	18.2	380	14.1
N/R	1	0.3	2	0.2	2	0.2	1	0.2	6	0.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>399</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>936</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>844</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>517</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>2,696</b>	<b>100.0</b>

N/R = no response

Among the reasons given for failure by some individuals in the community to take advantage of economic opportunities, 489 (18.5%) of the respondents cited laziness (see Table 58). This reason was most cited in regions where the majority of the respondents had reported the presence of agriculture-related opportunities, which included the sporadically affected (21.2%) and spillover (19.4%) regions. In the severely affected region, where most of the respondents had reported the presence of sufficient agriculture-related economic opportunities as well, poor health or old age was cited as the leading reason (18.7%) why not everyone in the community could take advantage of these opportunities. In the control region, where most of the individuals reported the presence of sufficient business-related economic opportunities, failure to access credit and lack of qualifications were cited as the leading reasons (21% for both) why not everyone in their communities could take advantage of the available economic opportunities. Alcoholism was also another reason why some people in the PRDP regions were unable to take advantage of the available economic opportunities – as cited by about 10% of the respondents in each of these regions.

Table 58: Reasons why some people cannot take advantage of available economic opportunities


	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>If no, why are some people not able to take advantage of the available economic opportunities?</b>										
Laziness – people don't want to work	27	12.1	165	16.8	213	21.2	84	19.4	489	18.5
Poor health, no strength to work	14	6.3	184	18.7	132	13.1	45	10.4	375	14.2
Lack of qualifications	47	21.0	121	12.3	129	12.8	63	14.5	360	13.6
Failure to access credit	47	21.0	142	14.4	105	10.5	49	11.3	343	13.0
Alcohol	16	7.1	113	11.5	107	10.7	43	9.9	279	10.5
Lack of vocational skills	15	6.7	81	8.2	101	10.1	38	8.8	235	8.9
Limited access to land	22	9.8	54	5.5	57	5.7	32	7.4	165	6.2
Lack of information on available economic opportunities	2	0.9	58	5.9	47	4.7	30	6.9	137	5.2
Poor roads, markets can't be accessed	11	4.9	13	1.3	47	4.7	25	5.8	96	3.6
Lack of markets for products	6	2.7	16	1.6	41	4.1	13	3.0	76	2.9
Land conflicts	9	4.0	31	3.1	14	1.4	10	2.3	64	2.4
Failure to provide security	6	2.7	1	0.1	5	0.5	0	0.0	12	0.5
Other	2	0.9	6	0.6	6	0.6	2	0.5	16	0.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>224</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>985</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,004</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>434</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>2,647</b>	<b>100.0</b>

## 5.4 Satisfaction with government efforts regarding economic opportunities

Overall, 2,103 (49.7%) of the respondents reported that government was responding to people's needs in terms of economic opportunities (see Figure 20). The severely affected region had the highest percentage (60.8%) of respondents who reported that government was responding to people's needs regarding economic opportunities, followed by the sporadically affected region (46.3%). Among the respondents who reported that government was not responding to people's needs in terms of economic opportunities, the majority (463 or 38.1%) reported that affordable vocational education was missing, followed by the absence of markets for products.

Overall, 976 (29.4%) out of 3,315 respondents were satisfied with government efforts to respond to people's needs in terms of economic opportunities. The severely affected region followed by the sporadically affected region had the highest percentages (33.4% and 30.0%, respectively) of respondents who were satisfied with government efforts in this regard. The spillover region had the lowest percentage (24.7%) of respondents who were satisfied with government efforts to respond to people's economic needs.

Figure 20: Percentage of respondents reporting evidence of and satisfaction with government responsiveness to economic needs





Results further show that, in the severely and sporadically affected regions, higher percentages (21.3% and 16.1%, respectively) of respondents reported the absence of affordable vocational education as the leading cause of government failure to respond to people's needs in terms of economic opportunities (see Table 59). On the other hand, in the spillover and control regions, more respondents (18.2% and 17.7%, respectively) cited the absence of markets for products. Other reasons attributed to the lack of government response to provide economic opportunities included lack of financial institutions (cited by 12% of the respondents overall) and proper roads (10.4%). In the control region, the highest percentage (20.7%) of respondents reported the absence of actual employment opportunities as the reason why government is not responding to people's needs in terms of economic opportunities.

**Table 59: Reasons why government is not doing enough to provide economic opportunities**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>If no, what is missing?</b>										
Affordable vocational education	69	15.9	141	21.3	149	16.1	103	14.5	462	16.9
Markets for products	77	17.7	90	13.6	146	15.8	129	18.2	442	16.2
Financial institutions	54	12.4	64	9.7	118	12.8	91	12.8	327	12.0
Proper roads	33	7.6	63	9.5	104	11.3	85	12.0	285	10.4
Electricity supply	34	7.8	44	6.6	111	12.0	90	12.7	279	10.2
Actual employment opportunities	90	20.7	55	8.3	73	7.9	59	8.3	277	10.1
Affordable prices for inputs (agricultural)	26	6.0	113	17.0	74	8.0	61	8.6	274	10.0
Police post to provide security	14	3.2	41	6.2	78	8.4	34	4.8	167	6.1
Other	38	8.7	52	7.8	71	7.7	58	8.2	219	8.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>435</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>663</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>924</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>710</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>2,732</b>	<b>100.0</b>

## 5.5 Business vibrancy and financial institutions

Survey results show that the majority of respondents reported that the level of business vibrancy in their communities was low (50.7% overall), especially in the PRDP regions (see Table 60). The control region had the highest percentage (56.8%) of respondents who reported that the level of business vibrancy in their communities was high or moderate. Results further show that, among the PRDP regions, the sporadically affected region had the highest percentage (37.2%) of respondents who reported that the level of business vibrancy in their community was moderate, compared with the other two PRDP regions, where about 33% of the respondents had a similar response.

**Table 60: Level of business vibrancy in respondents' community**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>What is the level of business vibrancy in your community?</b>										
High	101	17.1	103	7.4	102	8.5	98	9.2	404	9.5
Moderate	234	39.7	462	33.4	446	37.2	358	33.7	1,500	35.4
Low	222	37.7	789	57.0	601	50.2	534	50.3	2,146	50.7
Don't know	30	5.1	29	2.1	49	4.1	68	6.4	176	4.2
N/R	2	0.3	2	0.1	0	0.0	3	0.3	7	0.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>589</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,385</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,198</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,061</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>4,233</b>	<b>100.0</b>

N/R = no response

Overall, 2,796 (66.1%) of the respondents reported the presence of a financial institution in their community (see Table 61). The control region had the lowest percentage (58.4%) of respondents who reported the presence of a financial institution within their community, while the severely affected region had the highest percentage (71.6%) of respondents with a similar response. The type of financial institution available within the respondents' communities varied by region, with the severely affected region followed by the spillover region having the highest percentage (63.1% and 56%, respectively) of respondents who reported the availability of village savings and loan associations (VSLAs) in their communities. The control region, on the other hand, had the highest percentage of respondents who reported the availability of savings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs) and microfinance institutions, compared with the other regions.

**Table 61: Presence of financial institutions in respondents' community**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>Do you have any financial institutions in your community?</b>										
Yes	344	58.4	991	71.6	821	68.5	640	60.3	2,796	66.1
No	242	41.1	392	28.3	376	31.4	419	39.5	1,429	33.8
N/R	3	0.5	2	0.1	1	0.1	2	0.2	8	0.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>589</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,385</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,198</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,061</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>4,233</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>If yes, which are these?</b>										
VSLAs	219	33.4	909	63.1	684	54.1	497	56.0	2,309	54.4
SACCOs	208	31.7	182	12.6	189	14.9	254	28.6	833	19.6
Banks	100	15.2	238	16.5	242	19.1	81	9.1	661	15.6
Microfinance institutions	129	19.7	111	7.7	150	11.9	55	6.2	445	10.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>656</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,440</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,265</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>887</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>4,248</b>	<b>100.0</b>

N/R = no response

Overall, 50.2% of the respondents reporting the availability of financial institutions in their community reported using at least one of the institutions (see Table 62), with the severely affected region having the highest percentage (53.5%). Although the majority of respondents in each region reported using VSLAs, there were notable variations across regions in the percentage of respondents using a specific financial institution. For example, while the severely affected region had the highest percentage (83%) of respondents using VSLAs, the control region had the highest percentages of respondents using banks, SACCOs and microfinance institutions (24.3%, 21.5% and 7.5%, respectively).

**Table 62: Respondents' use of available financial institutions**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>Do you use any of these institutions?</b>										
Yes	174	50.6	530	53.5	424	51.6	275	43.0	1,403	50.2
No	170	49.4	459	46.3	394	48.0	364	56.9	1,387	49.6
N/R	0	0.0	2	0.2	3	0.4	1	0.2	6	0.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>344</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>991</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>821</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>640</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>2,796</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>If yes, which financial institutions do you use?</b>										
VSLAs	100	46.7	474	83.0	339	69.6	218	71.9	1,131	71.8
Banks	52	24.3	73	12.8	77	15.8	29	9.6	231	14.7
SACCOs	46	21.5	12	2.1	47	9.7	46	15.2	151	9.6
Microfinance institutions	16	7.5	12	2.1	24	4.9	10	3.3	62	3.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>214</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>571</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>487</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>303</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,575</b>	<b>100.0</b>

N/R = no response

The leading reason given for not using a financial institution was lack of money to save, as cited by 48.2% of the respondents overall (see Table 63). Not belonging to any group was the next most common reason cited – especially in the severely and sporadically affected regions, where about 25% of the respondents gave this reason.

**Table 63: Reasons for not using available financial institutions**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>If no, why aren't you using the financial institutions in your community?</b>										
No money to save	105	46.5	313	52.7	260	49.5	225	42.5	903	48.2
I don't belong to any group	36	15.9	152	25.6	135	25.7	99	18.7	422	22.5
High interest rates	27	11.9	27	4.5	36	6.9	46	8.7	136	7.3
I am not interested in using them, I don't need them	23	10.2	25	4.2	35	6.7	40	7.6	123	6.6
Fear of losing money, group leaders steal money	18	8.0	37	6.2	19	3.6	32	6.0	106	5.7
Lack of security or collateral	7	3.1	23	3.9	23	4.4	41	7.8	94	5.0
Fear of losing collateral	8	3.5	9	1.5	13	2.5	33	6.2	63	3.4
Other	2	0.9	8	1.3	4	0.8	13	2.5	27	1.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>226</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>594</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>525</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>529</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,874</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Overall, 3,675 (86.8%) of the respondents had a personal development plan, with the control region having the highest percentage (92.4%) of respondents with such plans, followed by the severely affected region (88.4%). The type of personal development plans respondents had varied across regions (see Table 64). For instance, the control region had the highest percentage (25.7%) of respondents who planned to start or expand their businesses, while in the PRDP regions more respondents planned to educate their children or to develop their agricultural activities. Development plans such as buying land were cited by a substantial percentage (18.3%) of respondents in the control region, but less so in the PRDP regions.

When asked how they intended to finance the personal development plans, 3,056 (59.3%) of the respondents overall said they would use their personal savings. Borrowing from a VSLA was the next most popular strategy that respondents intended to use to finance their development plans, as cited by 9.9% of the respondents overall. This strategy, together with borrowing from financial institutions, was most commonly reported by respondents in the severely affected region, followed by the spillover region, and least reported by respondents in the control region.

Table 64: Type of personal development plan and planned ways to finance it

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>If yes, what personal development plans do you have?</b>										
Start or expand a business	306	25.7	520	19.3	496	19.9	361	18.9	1,683	20.3
Educate children	144	12.1	547	20.3	509	20.4	316	16.5	1,516	18.3
Agriculture	83	7.0	578	21.5	345	13.8	255	13.4	1,261	15.2
Construct a house	186	15.6	290	10.8	360	14.4	305	16.0	1,141	13.8
Buy land	218	18.3	74	2.7	151	6.0	229	12.0	672	8.1
Rear animals – cattle, goats, pigs	77	6.5	273	10.1	157	6.3	164	8.6	671	8.1
Education for myself	46	3.9	140	5.2	150	6.0	80	4.2	416	5.0
Savings in bank	46	3.9	50	1.9	73	2.9	49	2.6	218	2.6
Buy an ox-plough	1	0.1	98	3.6	65	2.6	17	0.9	181	2.2
Plant trees	5	0.4	33	1.2	73	2.9	33	1.7	144	1.7
Buy a car	41	3.4	15	0.6	45	1.8	35	1.8	136	1.6
Marriage	12	1.0	49	1.8	38	1.5	21	1.1	120	1.4
Buy boda-boda	26	2.2	22	0.8	28	1.1	39	2.0	115	1.4
Other	0	0.0	5	0.2	6	0.2	6	0.3	17	0.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,191</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>2,694</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>2,496</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,910</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>8,291</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>How do you intend to finance these personal investment plans?</b>										
Own income/savings	500	69.0	992	56.0	893	60.9	671	56.4	3,056	59.3
Borrow from VSLA	18	2.5	245	13.8	104	7.1	145	12.2	512	9.9
Get support from NGO	44	6.1	210	11.9	148	10.1	70	5.9	472	9.2
Borrow from a financial institution	32	4.4	178	10.1	129	8.8	123	10.3	462	9.0
Borrow from relatives	94	13.0	73	4.1	142	9.7	130	10.9	439	8.5
Pool money with friends	37	5.1	73	4.1	50	3.4	50	4.2	210	4.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>725</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,771</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1,466</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,189</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>5,151</b>	<b>100.0</b>

## 5.6 Access to increased economic opportunities

Results from the survey show that 1,309 (30.9%) of the respondents reported access to increased economic opportunities in the last two years (see Table 65). The control region, followed by the severely affected region, had the highest percentage of respondents who had access to increased economic opportunities.

Among the respondents who had access to increased opportunities, 78.1% overall reported a rise in the rate of access to economic opportunities within the last two years, with the control region having the highest percentage (86%) of respondents citing an increase. The severely affected region had the highest percentage (15.6%) of respondents who reported a decrease in the rate of access to economic opportunities within the last two years, followed by the sporadically affected region (13.1%).

When respondents were asked if implementation of the PRDP had improved their access to economic opportunities, only 257 (19.6%) overall said yes. The severely affected region had the highest percentage (30.1%) of respondents who reported that PRDP implementation had increased their access to economic opportunities. On the other hand, the control region – which had the highest percentage (90.4%) of respondents who did not know whether PRDP implementation had improved their access to economic opportunities – had the lowest percentage (3.5%) of those who said yes.

**Table 65: Rate of access to economic opportunities and role of PRDP implementation**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>How do you rate your access to economic opportunities within the last two years?</b>										
Increased	196	86.0	375	73.8	264	78.8	187	78.6	1,022	78.1
Decreased	18	7.9	79	15.6	44	13.1	22	9.2	163	12.5
No change	10	4.4	46	9.1	26	7.8	26	10.9	108	8.3
N/R	4	1.7	8	1.6	1	0.3	3	1.2	16	1.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>228</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>508</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>335</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>238</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,309</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Has the implementation of the PRDP improved your access to economic opportunities?</b>										
Yes	8	3.5	153	30.1	67	20.0	29	12.2	257	19.6
No	10	4.4	182	35.8	121	36.1	57	23.9	370	28.3
Don't know	206	90.4	166	32.7	145	43.3	149	62.6	666	50.9
N/R	4	1.4	7	1.4	2	0.6	3	1.2	16	1.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>228</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>508</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>335</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>238</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,309</b>	<b>100.0</b>

N/R = no response

Results from the survey show that very few respondents had worked with NGOs or CBOs to gain access to increased economic opportunities. The severely affected region had the highest percentage (16.3%) of respondents who had worked with an NGO or CBO to gain access to economic opportunities. In the other regions, an average of 8% of the respondents reported working with NGOs or CBOs to gain access to increased economic opportunities. Of those who reported engagement of NGOs or CBOs, the majority (373 or 81.6%) said this resulted in access to increased economic opportunities.

Among the respondents who reported that engagement of NGOs or CBOs did not result in access to increased economic opportunities, the highest percentage (33.7%) overall attributed this to the fact that these organisations did not provide start-up inputs (see Table 66). In the control and spillover regions, the respondents most frequently cited the fact that the NGOs or CBOs did not provide anything and that they targeted a limited number of people.

**Table 66: Reasons why engagement of NGOs or CBOs did not result in access to economic opportunities**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>If no, why?</b>										
Provided only training, did not provide things like start-up capital, tools, seeds	2	20.0	16	40.0	8	40.0	4	21.1	30	33.7
They target very few people	3	30.0	8	20.0	6	30.0	6	31.6	23	25.8
Group was formed but we have never been given anything	4	40.0	8	20.0	4	20.0	5	26.3	21	23.6
Project or initiative has just started	1	10.0	4	10.0	1	5.0	4	21.1	10	11.2
Other	0	0.0	4	10.0	1	5.0	0	0.0	5	5.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>20</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>89</b>	<b>100.0</b>

## 5.7 Access to adequate land for production and tenure security

Survey results indicate that only 35.9% of all respondents had access to adequate land to support their desired agricultural production activities. The spillover and the control regions had the lowest percentage of respondents who reported having access to adequate land to support their desired agricultural production activities (18.9% and 25%, respectively). Results further show

that, whereas the majority (43.5%) of respondents in the control region were staying in rented houses and as such did not carry out agricultural production, in the spillover region the majority (64.3%) of the respondents reported that the land available to them was not adequate. In the spillover region, it was likely that people staying in such areas sought refuge there during the turmoil periods and had limited access to land.

In terms of reasons why it was difficult to access adequate land, the growing population and scarcity of land ranked first overall, with 31.3% of the respondents citing this reason (see Table 67). The highest percentages of respondents citing this reason were found in the spillover (40.6%) and severely affected (30.4%) regions. The lack of land for sale in the community emerged as the second most common reason (30.4%) for difficulty in accessing adequate land – particularly in the spillover (33.9%) and sporadically affected (30.4%) regions.

**Table 67: Reasons why it is difficult to access adequate land**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>If difficult, why?</b>										
Population has increased and land has become scarce	36	15.1	421	30.4	298	26.6	459	40.6	1,214	31.3
No land for sale in our community	46	19.3	408	29.5	341	30.4	383	33.9	1,178	30.4
Lack of community consultation	30	12.6	108	7.8	111	9.9	46	4.1	295	7.6
Failure to build community trust	21	8.8	96	6.9	87	7.8	43	3.8	247	6.4
Corruption among leaders	16	6.7	63	4.6	66	5.9	54	4.8	199	5.1
Ongoing land conflicts	5	2.1	102	7.4	50	4.5	29	2.6	186	4.8
Approaching the community through the 'wrong people'	17	7.1	56	4.0	68	6.1	31	2.7	172	4.4
Failure to appreciate sensitivity of land issues	19	8.0	54	3.9	45	4.0	36	3.2	154	4.0
Failure to explain benefits of such land transaction to the community	5	2.1	54	3.9	38	3.4	19	1.7	116	3.0
Other	43	18.1	22	1.6	17	1.5	30	2.7	112	2.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>238</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,384</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,121</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,130</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>3,873</b>	<b>100.0</b>

When asked how much land their household had access to, the majority (58.8%) of respondents reported between 1 and 4.9 acres (see Table 68). The control region had the highest percentage (64.5%) of respondents who reported having access to 1–4.9 acres of land. The percentage of respondents who reported having access to 5 or more acres of land was highest in the severely affected region (44.5%), followed by the sporadically affected region (25.9%).

Results from the survey show that the majority (49.2%) of respondents overall accessed this land through inheritance. This form of access to land was cited by more respondents in the PRDP regions, while in the control region the majority (51.2%) of respondents said they accessed land through purchases.

Table 68: Amount of land accessed and ways of accessing for production purposes

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>How much land does your household currently have access to?</b>										
0 acres	10	3.0	6	0.5	20	1.9	24	2.7	60	1.7
0.1–0.9 acre	65	19.6	33	2.7	124	11.7	113	12.8	335	9.6
1.0–4.9 acres	214	64.5	638	52.3	640	60.5	563	63.8	2,055	58.8
5 or more acres	43	13.0	542	44.5	274	25.9	183	20.7	1,042	29.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>332</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,219</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,058</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>883</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>3,492</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>How do you access land for production purposes?</b>										
Inherited	92	25.5	753	55.0	656	50.3	500	48.6	2,001	49.2
Given	37	10.2	371	27.1	315	24.2	127	12.3	850	20.9
Purchased	185	51.2	86	6.3	123	9.4	192	18.7	586	14.4
Rented	26	7.2	67	4.9	114	8.7	162	15.7	369	9.1
Borrowed	9	2.5	54	3.9	61	4.7	20	1.9	144	3.5
Share cropping	1	0.3	15	1.1	21	1.6	12	1.2	49	1.2
Don't know	10	2.8	4	0.3	6	0.5	7	0.7	27	0.7
Squatting	0	0.0	17	1.2	1	0.1	3	0.3	21	0.5
Leased	1	0.3	2	0.1	7	0.5	6	0.6	16	0.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>361</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,369</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,304</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,029</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>4,063</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Of the 3,492 respondents who owned land, the most common type of land tenure was customary land tenure without certificate of customary ownership (CCO), which was reported by 54% of the respondents overall (see Table 69). This form of land tenure was particularly common in the sporadically (71.8%) and severely affected (69.9%) regions. In the spillover region, the most common form of land tenure was customary land, but with a CCO (28.3%). A freehold with a land title as well as a *mailo* with a land title were more common forms of land tenure in the control region, but not in the PRDP regions. It is also important to point out that a substantial number (509 or 14.5%) of respondents, especially in the control region, did not know the tenure of the land they had access to.

In terms of ownership, 33.8% of the respondents overall owned the land they had access to. The control region had the highest percentage (45.7%) of respondents who owned the land, followed by the severely affected region (33.5%). Results also show that 21.6% of all respondents who accessed land said the land belonged to their partners. The percentage of respondents with this response did not vary significantly by region, ranging from 19.9% in the spillover region to 23.1% in the control region. While 13.3% of the respondents in the control region reported that the land they accessed belonged to their father, in the severely and sporadically affected regions higher percentages of respondents reported that it belonged to other relatives (15.9% and 14.2%, respectively).

Table 69: Types of land tenure and owner of land accessed to carry out agricultural activities

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>What type of tenure is this land under?</b>										
Customary land without CCO	52	15.5	855	69.9	762	71.8	229	25.7	1,898	54.0
Customary land with CCO	46	13.7	199	16.3	90	8.5	252	28.3	587	16.7
Freehold (land title)	80	23.9	55	4.5	49	4.6	98	11.0	282	8.0
Tenant or Kibanja	39	11.6	6	0.5	9	0.8	62	7.0	116	3.3
Leasehold (land title)	5	1.5	19	1.6	20	1.9	22	2.5	66	1.9
Mailo (land title)	41	12.2	2	0.2	2	0.2	9	1.0	54	1.5
Don't know	72	21.5	88	7.2	129	12.2	220	24.7	509	14.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>335</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,224</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,061</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>892</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>3,512</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Who owns this land?</b>										
Myself	158	45.7	482	33.5	393	31.6	318	33.0	1,351	33.8
My partner	80	23.1	322	22.4	271	21.8	192	19.9	865	21.6
My own relatives	15	4.3	229	15.9	177	14.2	66	6.8	487	12.2
Father	46	13.3	116	8.1	114	9.2	85	8.8	361	9.0
Clan	4	1.2	73	5.1	100	8.0	92	9.5	269	6.7
Neighbour or non-relative	18	5.2	62	4.3	69	5.5	85	8.8	234	5.9
My in-laws	2	0.6	69	4.8	31	2.5	31	3.2	133	3.3
My own children	1	0.3	44	3.1	42	3.4	11	1.1	98	2.5
The heir	3	0.9	20	1.4	19	1.5	47	4.9	89	2.2
My husband's children	5	1.4	11	0.8	11	0.9	20	2.1	47	1.2
Local community leader	5	1.4	10	0.7	6	0.5	7	0.7	28	0.7
Private investors	6	1.7	1	0.1	2	0.2	5	0.5	14	0.4
Government institution (e.g. NFA, UNRA, UWA)	1	0.3	1	0.1	2	0.2	5	0.5	9	0.2
Religious institution	0	0.0	0	0.0	8	0.6	0	0.0	8	0.2
Other	2	0.6	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.1	3	0.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>346</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,440</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,245</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>965</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>3,996</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Results from the survey show that the presence of any documentation that proves ownership of the land accessed was unusual, with over 50% of the respondents reporting no documentation proving ownership of land. Among the PRDP regions, the percentage of respondents reporting no documentation of land ownership was as high as 72.1% in the severely affected region. On the other hand, in the control region, the percentage of respondents who reported having documentation proving ownership was higher than that of respondents who did not have any such documentation.

The type of land documentation did not vary greatly across the different regions, with the highest percentage (44.6%) of respondents overall citing purchase agreements as the main type of documentation (see Table 70). However, CCOs were more common in the PRDP regions than in the control region, especially in the spillover region (34.9%), while land titles were particularly common in the sporadically affected region (29.8%).

Overall, in terms of the names on land documentation, the highest percentage (42.1%) of respondents reported that the documentation was in their name. Land documentation in the name of the respondents' partners ranked second (21.4%). In the severely affected region, 10.3% of the respondents who accessed land reported that the documentation was in the name of relatives other than their parents – an occurrence that was rare in other regions, especially in the control region.



Table 70: Types of land documentation and names appearing on documents

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>If yes, what type of documentation?</b>										
Purchase agreement	146	64.9	72	34.1	80	41.9	148	39.8	446	44.6
Certificate of customary ownership	16	7.1	71	33.6	39	20.4	130	34.9	256	25.6
Land title	57	25.3	48	22.7	57	29.8	74	19.9	236	23.6
Rental agreement	0	0.0	17	8.1	14	7.3	20	5.4	51	5.1
Busily receipt	6	2.7	3	1.4	1	0.5	0	0.0	10	1.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>225</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>211</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>191</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>372</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>999</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>If yes, whose name is on the documentation?</b>										
Myself	123	54.9	83	34.2	84	41.2	144	39.9	434	42.1
My partner	50	22.3	60	24.7	44	21.6	67	18.6	221	21.4
Father	31	13.8	33	13.6	31	15.2	50	13.9	145	14.1
My own relatives	5	2.2	25	10.3	15	7.4	28	7.8	73	7.1
The heir	2	0.9	8	3.3	4	2.0	20	5.5	34	3.3
Neighbour or non-relative	3	1.3	12	4.9	12	5.9	7	1.9	34	3.3
Clan	0	0.0	5	2.1	4	2.0	19	5.3	28	2.7
My in-laws	1	0.4	6	2.5	3	1.5	11	3.0	21	2.0
My own children	1	0.4	6	2.5	6	2.9	4	1.1	17	1.6
My husband's children	3	1.3	2	0.8	1	0.5	9	2.5	15	1.5
Private investors	4	1.8	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	4	0.4
Government institution (e.g. NFA, UNRA, UWA)	1	0.4	1	0.4	0	0.0	1	0.3	3	0.3
Local community leader	0	0.0	1	0.4	0	0.0	1	0.3	2	0.2
Religious institution	0	0.0	1	0.4	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>224</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>243</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>204</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>361</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,032</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Threats of evicting or chasing respondents from the land from which they derive their sustenance were not very common, as only 656 (15%) of the respondents overall reported having experienced such threats. Results further show that these threats were more prevalent among respondents in the severely affected region, followed by those in the spillover region.

In terms of the perpetrators of threats, neighbours or non-relatives were the most commonly cited (47.5%) individuals who threatened to evict or chase respondents from the land where they derive their sustenance, followed by respondents' own relatives (22.8%) (see Table 71). In the spillover region, threats of land eviction perpetrated by government institutions such as the National Forestry Authority (NFA), the Uganda National Roads Authority (UNRA) and the Uganda Wildlife Authority (UWA) were more common, as cited by 9.6% of the respondents in this region.

Table 71: Perpetrators of land eviction threats

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>If yes, who threatened to chase you off this land?</b>										
Neighbour or non-relative	20	54.1	139	49.1	77	44.8	87	46.3	323	47.5
My own relatives	4	10.8	70	24.7	33	19.2	48	25.5	155	22.8
My in-laws	5	13.5	39	13.8	28	16.3	17	9.0	89	13.1
Government institution (e.g. NFA, UNRA, UWA)	2	5.4	6	2.1	10	5.8	18	9.6	36	5.3
Local community leader	0	0.0	7	2.5	5	2.9	5	2.7	17	2.5
Clan	1	2.7	7	2.5	3	1.7	4	2.1	15	2.2
My partner	2	5.4	5	1.8	3	1.7	3	1.6	13	1.9
Private investors	2	5.4	3	1.1	1	0.6	3	1.6	9	1.3
Co-wife	1	2.7	0	0.0	6	3.5	1	0.5	8	1.2
My husband's children	0	0.0	1	0.4	4	2.3	1	0.5	6	0.9
Religious institution	0	0.0	3	1.1	0	0.0	0	0.0	3	0.4
The heir	0	0.0	1	0.4	1	0.6	0	0.0	2	0.3
My own children	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.6	0	0.0	1	0.1
Other	0	0.0	2	0.7	0	0.0	1	0.5	3	0.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>283</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>172</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>188</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>680</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Of the 656 respondents who had experienced threats of being chased or evicted from the land, 22.1% of them reported that they had actually been evicted or chased from a piece of land they had been staying on or using (see Table 72). The control region had the highest percentage (26.3%) of victims of land evictions, followed by the spillover region (22.3%). Results further show that 42.3% of those who had ever been evicted or chased away had been evicted more than once. The severely affected region had the highest percentage (57.9%) of those evicted more than once, followed by the control region (44.4%).

Neighbours or non-relatives were cited as the leading individuals (25.8%) who evicted or chased victims from their land, followed by the respondents' own relatives (25.2%). Regional variations existed regarding who the land eviction perpetrators were, with more victims in the spillover and severely affected regions citing neighbours or non-relatives (33.3% and 29.2%, respectively), whereas own relatives were the leading perpetrators of evictions in the sporadically affected region (23.8%). In the control region, the leading perpetrators of land evictions were in-laws, as cited by 40% of the victims. It is also important to note that, in the sporadically affected and spillover regions, government institutions had evicted 14.3% and 11.9% of the victims, respectively.

Table 72: Victims of land evictions

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
Have you ever been chased or evicted from any piece of land that you were using or staying on?										
Yes	10	26.3	59	21.6	36	21.7	40	22.3	145	22.1
No	26	68.4	210	76.9	125	75.3	132	73.7	493	75.2
N/R	2	5.3	4	1.5	5	3.0	7	4.0	18	2.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>273</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>166</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>179</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>656</b>	<b>100.0</b>
How many times has this happened to you?										
Once	5	55.6	24	42.1	28	77.8	25	62.5	82	57.7
Twice or more	4	44.4	33	57.9	8	22.2	15	37.5	60	42.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>57</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>142</b>	<b>100.0</b>
Who actually chased you?										
Neighbour or non-relative	1	10.0	19	29.2	7	16.7	14	33.3	41	25.8
My own relatives	2	20.0	15	23.1	10	23.8	13	31.0	40	25.2
My in-laws	4	40.0	18	27.7	7	16.7	4	9.5	33	20.8
Government institution (e.g. NFA, UNRA, UWA)	1	10.0	4	6.2	6	14.3	5	11.9	16	10.1
My partner	1	10.0	3	4.6	3	7.1	2	4.8	9	5.7
Clan	0	0.0	3	4.6	1	2.4	2	4.8	6	3.8
Co-wife	1	10.0	0	0.0	3	7.1	0	0.0	4	2.5
My husband's children	0	0.0	0	0.0	3	7.1	0	0.0	3	1.9
The heir	0	0.0	1	1.5	1	2.4	1	2.4	3	1.9
Local community leader	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	2.4	1	2.4	2	1.3
Private investors	0	0.0	1	1.5	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.6
Religious institution	0	0.0	1	1.5	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>42</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>159</b>	<b>100.0</b>


N/R = no response

## 5.8 Trends on access to economic opportunities

### 5.8.1 Employable skills

Survey results show that over time, the percentage of respondents with employable skills had declined in three out of the four regions (Figure 21). The sporadically affected region had the largest average annual decline of 3.5 percentage points, although it was not statistically significant ( $p=0.469$ ). In the control region, the average annual decline in the percentage of respondents with employable skills was 2 percentage points, while in the severely affected region it was 1 percentage point. The spillover region was the only region with an average annual increase of 4.5 percentage points, although the observed upward trend was not statistically significant ( $p=0.593$ ).

Figure 21: Percentage of respondents with employable skills over time



### 5.8.2 Access to economic opportunities

Respondents' access to increased economic opportunities rose over time in two out of the four regions (see Figure 22). The control region had the highest average annual increase of 3.5 percentage points in access to increased economic opportunities, followed by the severely affected region (1 percentage point increase). The observed annual increase in the control region had borderline statistical significance ( $p=0.052$ ), whereas the annual increment in the severely affected region was not statistically significant. The two regions where a decline was registered were the spillover region (2 percentage point average annual decrease) and the sporadically affected region (1.5 percentage point decline), but neither of these had a statistically significant decline ( $p=0.454$  and  $p=0.593$ , respectively).


Figure 22: Percentage of respondents with access to increased economic opportunities over time



### 5.8.3 Sufficient income to sustain households

The percentage of respondents with sufficient income to sustain their households remained largely the same in the three PRDP regions over time (see Figure 23). The spillover and sporadically affected regions had an average annual increase of just 1 percentage point each, while the severely affected region showed an average increase of only half a percentage point. The control region had a higher average annual increase of 4 percentage points in the proportion of respondents with sufficient income to sustain their households, although this was not statistically significant ( $p=0.398$ ).


Figure 23: Percentage of respondents with sufficient income to sustain households over time



#### 5.8.4 Satisfaction with government efforts to respond to economic needs

Over the three-year period, the percentage of respondents who were satisfied with government efforts to respond to the economic needs of people increased in each of the regions (see Figure 24). The severely affected region had the highest average annual increase of 8.5 percentage points in the proportion of respondents who were satisfied with government efforts to respond to economic needs, followed by the control region (7 percentage points). The rate of increase in the severely affected region had borderline significance ( $p=0.065$ ), but in the control region the observed annual increment was not statistically significant ( $p=0.249$ ). In the sporadically affected region, the percentage of respondents satisfied with government efforts to respond to people's economic needs steadily increased by an average of 5 percentage points per year. In the spillover region, the average annual increase was 5.5 percentage points but was not statistically significant ( $p=0.099$ ).

Figure 24: Percentage of respondents satisfied with government efforts to respond to economic needs over time



## 5.9 Qualitative perceptions on economic opportunities

### 5.9.1 Control region

Qualitative interviews from Kasese indicate that business is booming:

*“...there is liberalisation-free trade between Congo–Rwanda–Uganda ... illegal trading through rivers and mountains, hence the increase in incomes to sustain households.”<sup>117</sup>*

One participant in the consensus panel explained the reason for the increased access to economic opportunities:

*“...agricultural improvement ... people are now growing and trading in bananas and coffee ... SACCOs and VSLAs have helped to provide credit for people to get capital to start businesses ... Banks have also contributed – for example, Barclays supports community-based organisations in financial literacy ... it also increases people’s access to credit ... Government programmes CDD, NAADS is improving the livelihood of people ... Government programmes CDD, NAADS have economically empowered people – for example, NAADS gives seedlings, chemicals to boost farming.”<sup>118</sup>*

In addition:

*“...increased access to economic opportunities in Kasese is because of the improved road network to promote trade and open markets, connecting community access roads between mountains ... tourism is booming as parishes near national parks are getting 20% from park taxes...”<sup>119</sup>*

In Masaka and Mbarara, similar views as in Kasese were mentioned, especially regarding the availability of credit facilities and government programmes, which greatly accounted for the booming opportunities both in business and agriculture.

### 5.9.2 Spillover region

In Kiryandongo, although it was documented that there had been a decline in respondents with employable skills, these results were disputed by panellists. However, the PRDP was criticised for its failure to tackle the problem of youth unemployment:

*“PRDP has failed to support youth to form groups in order for them to benefit from the maize and cassava mills for value addition ... PRDP has failed to give youth start-up capital to help them apply their vocational skills.”<sup>120</sup>*

Government was criticised for:

*“...failure to subsidise farmers during seasons of high production ... in 2013, government put a ban on the exportation of maize to South Sudan, which greatly affected farmers.”<sup>121</sup>*

In Bukedi, Elgon and Teso sub-regions, VSLAs have been effective in improving livelihoods in communities. Moreover, most government programmes other than NAADS were applauded for their contribution to the upward trend. Other signs of increased access to economic opportunities were cited too:

117 Consensus panel, Kasese, April 2014.

118 Consensus panel, Kasese, April 2014.

119 Key informant, Kasese, April 2014.

120 Consensus panel, Kiryandongo, May 2014.

121 Consensus panel, Kiryandongo, May 2014.

*“...today everything has become a cash crop ... people are now exporting to Kenya ... trade especially in agriculture is booming and generally people have more income.”<sup>122</sup>*

Youth unemployment was mentioned in qualitative interviews as a major issue in Bukedi, Elgon and Teso, with one panellist making this observation:

*“...youth skilling in entrepreneurship to enable those youth to gain employable skills ... the curriculum also needs to be revised in vocational schools ... instead of training youth for three months, programmes should be allocated for two years to effectively skill the youth ... youth also have a poor attitude towards work ... they prefer white-collar jobs – for example, in Tororo Cement there are jobs, but the youth prefer not to pursue them because they look at them as dirty ... youth should keep away from betting and learn to work.”<sup>123</sup>*

### 5.9.3 Sporadically affected region

In Lango, there was an increase in access to economic opportunities in 2012. Results from the qualitative interviews showed that:

*“...in 2012, there were many NGOs training people and equipping them with employable skills ... in 2012, many people with employable skills had not yet migrated to go to work on tea and sugar plantations in Jinja and Masindi ... the NGOs pulled out in 2013.”<sup>124</sup>*

Financial institutions and credit facilities as well as government programmes were commended for the upward trend in opportunities in the Lango sub-region.

In West Nile, the roles of agriculture and government programmes, particularly the PRDP, were discussed:

*“...since agriculture is a seasonal activity, it is likely to fluctuate with the weather; when the weather is favourable and the harvests are good, it is more likely that people will have increases in incomes ... that is what happened in 2012.”<sup>125</sup>*

*“...even though there is little funding at sub-county level, programmes like NAADS, CDD and NUSAF have helped people to prosper ... there are roads which have helped farmers to transport produce ... there is free trade, people are now able to sell their produce to neighbouring countries like South Sudan.”<sup>126</sup>*

*“...roads and bridges have been rehabilitated ... PRDP has constructed schools and health facilities ... boreholes have been constructed under PRDP to provide clean water ... PRDP has also contributed to the School Facility Grant, which increases access to economic opportunities.”<sup>127</sup>*

In Arua, youth unemployment was blamed for the reduction in access to economic opportunities:

*“...the youth are unemployed and resort to drug abuse, alcohol and playing cards, which in turn lead to food shortages ... the people who would grow the food are idle ... youth are lazy ... they do not want to work.”<sup>128</sup>*

<sup>122</sup> Consensus panel, Tororo, May 2014.

<sup>123</sup> Consensus panel, Tororo, May 2014.

<sup>124</sup> Consensus panel, Lira, May 2014.

<sup>125</sup> Consensus panel, Adjumani, May 2014.

<sup>126</sup> Key informant, Adjumani, May 2014.

<sup>127</sup> Consensus panel, Adjumani, May 2014.

<sup>128</sup> Consensus panel, Arua, May 2014.

### 5.9.4 Severely affected region

In the Acholi qualitative interviews, the increased access to economic opportunities was attributed to government programmes:

*“NAADS has economically empowered people ... PRDP has opened lands for people to grow crops, for example, groundnuts, beans ... community roads have also improved.”<sup>129</sup>*

Access to financial institutions such as Crane Bank, Centenary Bank and VSLAs was commended for the increased access to economic opportunities. However, youth unemployment was also underlined as a reason why some people reported having no access to economic opportunities.

*“...youth are idle, resort to drinking, stealing ... there is a lot of corruption, which needs to be addressed.”<sup>130</sup>*

In Kitgum, it was highlighted how private sector partnership was providing sustainability:

*“...Olam Uganda Limited came to Acholi and Kitgum in 2012 and provided simsim seeds to farmers ... Olam then ensured farmers were not cheated as they bought the seeds at open market prices.”<sup>131</sup>*

In Karamoja, there was an increase in access to economic opportunities. In Abim, youth skills development by CSOs was highlighted as playing a big role:

*“...War Child Holland picks young men and women from the villages and town council and sends them for skills development in technical institutions ... so far, they have taken 50 youths for that skills development training for the whole of Abim District ... there is also another organisation called VSO, which picks school drop-outs and sponsors them ... Arid Development Programme also does skills development; they pick young girls and train them in tailoring, bakery and blacksmithing.”<sup>132</sup>*

Apart from praising government programmes – as in other regions above – youth employment was also commended in both Kotido and Moroto:

*“...youth formed credit groups and they were able to get income to look after households ... others started making stools which is a source of income ... the youth now buy and sell animals as far as Soroti ... youth have also bought boda-bodas and they are involved in the charcoal business.”<sup>133</sup>*

129 Consensus panel, Amuru, May 2014.

130 Consensus panel, Amuru, May 2014.

131 Consensus panel, Kitgum, May 2014.

132 Consensus panel, Abim, May 2014.

133 Consensus panel, Kotido, May 2014.



## 6. Competition and grievance

### 6.1 Access to information and ability to compare communities

In relation to access to information, results from the survey show that a substantial number of respondents were not well informed about news in the country. The severely and sporadically affected regions had the highest percentages of respondents who were not well informed about the country's news, at 45.3% and 40.2%, respectively (see Table 73). The control region had a significantly lower percentage (17.1%) of respondents stating that they were not well informed compared with the PRDP regions.

Overall, 3,038 (39.8%) of the respondents said they obtained information from radio, followed by family or friends (20%). In the severely affected region, 480 (19.7%) of the respondents obtained information from local authorities – a source of information that was not popular in the control and spillover regions. On the other hand, the control region had a significantly higher percentage of respondents who obtained information from the television compared with the PRDP regions. Results further show that about 6% of the respondents in the PRDP regions did not have any source of information.

**Table 73: Level of information and source of news about events in the country**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>In general, how informed do you think you are about news in the country?</b>										
Well informed	181	30.7	227	16.4	157	13.1	184	17.3	749	17.7
Moderately informed	300	50.9	521	37.6	548	45.7	461	43.4	1,830	43.2
Not well informed	101	17.1	627	45.3	481	40.2	403	38	1,612	38.1
N/R	7	1.2	10	0.7	12	1.0	13	1.2	42	1.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>589</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,385</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,198</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,061</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>4,233</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>How do you get informed?</b>										
Radio	498	42.1	853	35.1	890	39.5	797	45.0	3,038	39.8
Family, friends	160	13.5	542	22.3	534	23.7	290	16.4	1,526	20.0
Local authorities	94	8.0	480	19.7	331	14.7	167	9.4	1,072	14.0
Newspaper	136	11.5	139	5.7	158	7.0	181	10.2	614	8.0
Television	225	19.0	85	3.5	86	3.8	119	6.7	515	6.7
Religious authorities	49	4.1	160	6.6	131	5.8	92	5.2	432	5.7
No source of information	17	1.4	145	6.0	120	5.3	118	6.7	400	5.2
NGO	3	0.3	27	1.1	6	0.3	9	0.5	45	0.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,182</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>2,431</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>2,256</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,773</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>7,642</b>	<b>100.0</b>

N/R = no response

Over the three years in question, the majority (2,837 or 67%) of the respondents had not travelled or stayed outside of their districts. The sporadically affected region had the highest percentage of respondents who had not travelled or stayed outside of their district. The control region, followed by the severely affected region, had the highest percentage of respondents who had travelled or stayed outside of their district.

Results further show that the highest percentage (38.7%) of respondents travelled or stayed outside of their districts to visit relatives or for tourism purposes (see Table 74). The spillover region had the highest percentage (44.5%) of respondents citing this reason. Travel for business

purposes ranked second overall (25%), followed by travel for employment reasons (14.8%). Compared with the other regions, a considerably higher percentage (11.4%) of respondents in the sporadically affected region travelled or stayed outside of their districts to access better health services.

## 6.2 Competition and grievance within communities, districts and regions

Of all the respondents who travelled outside of their districts, 52.1% reported that the level of development in their district was worse compared with the districts they travelled to (see Table 74). Significant regional variations existed between the percentages of respondents who considered their districts to be worse off compared with those travelled to. For instance, only 29.1% of the respondents in the control region considered the level of development in their districts to be worse than that in the districts travelled to, whereas in the PRDP regions the percentage was as high as 57.1% in the severely affected region. Apart from respondents in the control region, the majority of the respondents in the other regions did not interpret the difference in development in terms of competition and grievance.

Nevertheless, competition and grievance between districts was considered to be a reality by the majority of respondents (89.2%). The spillover region had the highest percentage (92.9%) of respondents who reported that competition and grievance between the districts was a reality, followed by the severely affected region (89.8%).

**Table 74: Comparison of level of development between respondents' own district and district visited**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>What was the reason for your travel or stay outside of your district?</b>										
Visiting relatives or tourism	118	39.3	206	38.4	151	33.6	178	44.5	653	38.7
Business	83	27.7	136	25.3	113	25.2	90	22.5	422	25.0
Employment	76	25.3	50	9.3	59	13.1	64	16.0	249	14.8
Seeking better education services	17	5.7	82	15.3	59	13.1	43	10.8	201	11.9
Seeking better health services	5	1.7	40	7.4	51	11.4	15	3.8	111	6.6
Seek legal services	0	0.0	4	0.7	4	0.9	3	0.8	11	0.7
Other	1	0.3	19	3.5	12	2.7	7	1.8	39	2.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>300</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>537</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>449</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>400</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,686</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>How do you rate the level of development in your district compared with the other districts you travelled to or stayed in?</b>										
Better	123	54.2	140	30.2	110	29.7	100	30	473	33.9
Same	38	16.7	59	12.7	50	13.5	48	14.4	195	14.0
Worse	66	29.1	265	57.1	210	56.8	185	55.6	726	52.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>227</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>464</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>370</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>333</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,394</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Do you interpret this difference in development in terms of competition and grievance?</b>										
Yes	108	57.1	196	48.4	126	39.4	127	44.6	557	46.5
No	81	42.9	208	51.4	194	60.6	157	55.1	640	53.4
N/R	0	0.0	1	0.2	0	0.0	1	0.4	2	0.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>189</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>405</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>320</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>285</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,199</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Is competition and grievance between districts a reality to you?</b>										
Yes	92	85.2	176	89.8	111	88.1	118	92.9	497	89.2
No	9	8.3	12	6.1	9	7.1	4	3.1	34	6.1
Don't know	7	6.5	8	4.1	6	4.8	5	3.9	26	4.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>108</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>196</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>126</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>127</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>557</b>	<b>100.0</b>

N/R = no response

Among the respondents who reported that competition and grievance was a reality to them, the highest percentage (27.7%) overall reported that infrastructure development tends to favour a few districts (see Table 75). Such infrastructure development included roads, schools, hospitals and banks. The percentage of respondents in the PRDP regions citing unfair distribution of social services was slightly higher in the PRDP regions compared with the control region. This finding points to the fact that the government and its partners need to increase their investment in infrastructure to match that invested in the control region over the years of relative political stability in this region. Other reasons cited as causes of imbalances, with the PRDP regions having higher percentages of respondents citing these causes compared with the control region, included the preference of qualified personnel to work in developed districts. While higher percentages of respondents in the PRDP regions than those in the control region cited other reasons, the differences were not statistically significant.

Results from the survey further show that the majority of respondents (62%) believed that the level of competition and grievance between their region and other PRDP regions had not decreased. This opinion was more frequently cited by respondents in the PRDP regions than by those in the control region. When asked if implementation of the PRDP had helped to overcome competition and grievance, a substantial percentage of respondents (64.2% overall), especially in the PRDP regions, said no. For example, in the sporadically affected region, 74.8% of the respondents reported that PRDP implementation had not helped to overcome competition and grievance between their sub-region and other sub-regions. The percentage of respondents who reported that PRDP implementation had in fact helped to overcome competition and grievance was highest in the control region (39.1%).

**Table 75: Competition and grievance between districts**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>If yes, what do districts compete over or have grievances over?</b>										
Infrastructure development processes tend to favour a few districts – good roads, schools, hospitals, banks, etc.	48	28.4	134	28.2	83	29.9	81	24.8	346	27.7
Unfair distribution of social services	32	18.9	99	20.8	59	21.2	62	19.0	252	20.2
Unfair resource allocation – new and old districts get the same amount, while others too much	28	16.6	57	12.0	25	9.0	54	16.6	164	13.1
Qualified personnel prefer to work in developed districts	13	7.7	61	12.8	34	12.2	44	13.5	152	12.2
Unfair allocation of government projects – tend to concentrate on a few districts	21	12.4	52	10.9	35	12.6	30	9.2	138	11.1
NGOs and CSOs tend to concentrate on specific districts	8	4.7	23	4.8	17	6.1	16	4.9	64	5.1
Unfair allocation of big government jobs – CAOs, RDCs, civil service, ministers, etc.	6	3.6	26	5.5	15	5.4	17	5.2	64	5.1
Tribal differences within districts or regions – for example, conflicts between the Acholi and the Lango	4	2.4	12	2.5	5	1.8	19	5.8	40	3.2
Don't know or cannot tell	6	3.6	2	0.4	1	0.4	1	0.3	10	0.8
Other	3	1.8	9	1.9	4	1.4	2	0.6	18	1.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>169</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>475</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>278</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>326</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1,248</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>In your opinion, is there a decrease in levels of competition and grievance between your region and other PRDP regions?</b>										
Yes	41	44.6	59	33.5	28	25.2	44	37.3	172	34.6
No	43	46.7	115	65.3	83	74.8	67	56.8	308	62.0
Don't know	2	2.2	0	0.0	0	0.0	3	2.5	5	1.0
N/R	6	6.5	2	1.1	0	0.0	4	3.4	12	2.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>176</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>497</b>	<b>100.0</b>
<b>Has PRDP implementation helped overcome competition and grievance between your sub-region and other sub-regions?</b>										
Yes	36	39.1	54	30.7	27	24.3	36	30.5	153	30.8
No	46	50.0	119	67.6	83	74.8	71	60.2	319	64.2
Don't know	3	3.3	1	0.6	1	0.9	6	5.1	11	2.2
N/R	7	7.6	2	1.1	0	0.0	5	4.2	14	2.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>176</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>111</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>497</b>	<b>100.0</b>

N/R = no response

## 6.3 Competition and grievance between north and south of Uganda

Comparing the level of development between the north and the south of Uganda, a total of 754 out of 1,394 (54.1%) respondents reported an imbalance between these two regions. The percentage of respondents who reported an imbalance between the north and the south was significantly higher in the PRDP regions compared with the control region (severely affected region 65.9%,  $p<0.0001$ ; sporadically affected region 58.6%,  $p<0.0001$ ; and spillover region 47.4%,  $p=0.0008$ ). The existence of imbalances between the north and the south in terms of development further confirms the earlier observation of better infrastructure development in the control region over the years of stability.

Reasons cited for the imbalance between the north and the south of Uganda (see Table 76), especially by respondents in the PRDP regions, included better infrastructure development (22.4%) and more vibrant business activities in the south (13.1%). Across all the regions, relatively similar percentages of respondents reported that the south has enjoyed peace and security for a long time – ranging from 11.4% in the spillover region to 17.6% in the control region.

**Table 76: Causes of imbalances between north and south of country**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>What makes you say that there is an imbalance in terms of development between the north and the south of the country?</b>										
Better infrastructure development – roads, schools, hospital, banks, etc.	37	19.8	235	24.2	154	24.2	103	18.1	529	22.4
South has enjoyed peace and security for a long time	33	17.6	134	13.8	84	13.2	65	11.4	316	13.4
More vibrant business activities are in the south	17	9.1	133	13.7	91	14.3	68	12.0	309	13.1
South has more job opportunities	29	15.5	90	9.3	68	10.7	72	12.7	259	11.0
More resources go to the south	21	11.2	87	9.0	57	8.9	71	12.5	236	10.0
More government projects go to the south	16	8.6	48	4.9	43	6.8	43	7.6	150	6.3
Resources meant for the north are diverted to the south	5	2.7	60	6.2	45	7.1	30	5.3	140	5.9
South has better social services	12	6.4	55	5.7	29	4.6	31	5.4	127	5.4
Differences in allocation of government jobs	4	2.1	44	4.5	27	4.2	31	5.4	106	4.5
South has leaders who are able to provide community services	10	5.3	29	3.0	16	2.5	29	5.1	84	3.6
Leaders in the north are corrupt	0	0.0	34	3.5	16	2.5	18	3.2	68	2.9
People in the north are not committed to development	2	1.1	13	1.3	3	0.5	4	0.7	22	0.9
Other	1	0.5	9	0.9	4	0.6	4	0.7	18	0.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>187</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>971</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>637</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>569</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>2,364</b>	<b>100.0</b>

Results from the survey further show that, among the respondents who reported an imbalance between the north and the south of Uganda, competition and grievance was deemed a reality by 481 (63.8%) of the 754 respondents (see Table 77). The severely affected region had a significantly higher percentage (72.2%) of respondents who reported that competition and grievance between the north and the south of Uganda was a reality to them, compared with the control region (58.9%). In the other PRDP regions, however, no significant differences existed in this respect when compared with the control region.

The majority of respondents (64.3%) were of the opinion that the level of competition and grievance between the north and the south of the country had not decreased. Compared with the control region, the three PRDP regions had significantly higher percentages of respondents who believed that there was no decrease in the level of competition and grievance between the north and the south of the country. Similar observations were made when respondents were asked if implementation of the PRDP had helped to overcome the imbalances between the north and the

south of the country. Within the PRDP regions, between 30.4% of the respondents in the spillover region and 35% in the sporadically affected region reported that PRDP implementation had helped to overcome the imbalances between the north and the south. In the control region, on the other hand, 46.6% of the respondents had a similar response.

While fewer respondents reported that PRDP implementation had helped to overcome imbalances between the north and the south, more respondents (48.7%) believed that the government was doing enough to bridge the gap between these two regions. However, it is important to note that the control region had a significantly higher percentage (74%) of respondents who reported that the government was doing enough to bridge the development gap between the north and the south, compared with the three PRDP regions (47.5%, 47.4% and 41.1% in the sporadically affected, severely affected and spillover regions, respectively). Rating of government efforts to bridge the gap between the north and the south of the country also varied across regions. In the control region, 20.5% of the respondents rated government efforts as good, while less than 14% of the respondents in the PRDP regions had a similar response.

**Table 77: Competition and grievance between north and south of country**

	Control		Severely affected		Sporadically affected		Spillover		Total	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
<b>Is competition and grievance between the north and the south of Uganda a reality to you?</b>										
Yes	43	58.9	221	72.2	122	56.2	95	60.1	481	63.8
No	18	24.7	64	20.9	60	27.6	36	22.8	178	23.6
Don't know	12	16.4	21	6.9	35	16.1	25	15.8	93	12.3
N/R	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	2	1.3	2	0.3
<b>In your opinion, is there a decrease in the level of competition and grievance between the north and the south of the country?</b>										
Yes	38	52.1	95	31.0	76	35.0	53	33.5	262	34.7
No	34	46.6	210	68.6	140	64.5	101	63.9	485	64.3
Don't know	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.6	1	0.1
N/R	1	1.4	1	0.3	1	0.5	3	1.9	6	0.8
<b>Has PRDP implementation helped to overcome imbalances between the north and the south of the country?</b>										
Yes	34	46.6	101	33.0	76	35.0	48	30.4	259	34.4
No	34	46.6	203	66.3	134	61.8	106	67.1	477	63.3
Don't know	4	5.5	1	0.3	5	2.3	2	1.3	12	1.6
N/R	1	1.4	1	0.3	2	0.9	2	1.3	6	0.8
<b>Do you believe that the government is doing enough to bridge the development gap between the north and the south of the country?</b>										
Yes	54	74.0	145	47.4	103	47.5	65	41.1	367	48.7
No	17	23.3	157	51.3	113	52.1	88	55.7	375	49.7
Don't know	1	1.4	2	0.7	0	0.0	1	0.6	4	0.5
N/R	1	1.4	2	0.7	1	0.5	4	2.5	8	1.1
<b>How do you rate government efforts to address imbalances between the north and the south of the country?</b>										
Good	15	20.5	29	9.5	30	13.8	14	8.9	88	11.7
Fair	45	61.6	179	58.5	115	53.0	92	58.2	431	57.2
Poor	13	17.8	98	32.0	72	33.2	51	32.3	234	31.0
N/R	0	0.0	0	0.0	0	0.0	1	0.6	1	0.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>73</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>306</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>217</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>158</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>754</b>	<b>100.0</b>


N/R = no response

## 6.4 Trend analysis of competition and grievance

Between 2012 and 2014, the percentage of respondents reporting a decrease in competition and grievance among the PRDP regions varied considerably by region (see Figure 25). While the spillover region had an average annual increase of 3 percentage points in the proportion of respondents reporting a decrease in the level of competition and grievance between the PRDP


regions, the sporadically affected region showed a decline of 6.5 percentage points. In the severely affected region, the percentage remained stable at 33%. The observed decline in the sporadically affected region implies that respondents in this region acknowledge the contribution of government programmes in bridging the north and south gap.

**Figure 25: Percentage of respondents reporting a decrease in competition and grievance between PRDP regions over time**




Regarding the level of competition and grievance between the north and the south of Uganda, there was a rise in the percentage of respondents reporting a decrease in levels of competition and grievance in three regions, particularly the control region (see Figure 26). In the latter region, the percentage of respondents who reported a decrease in levels of competition and grievance between the north and the south rose by an average of 8 percentage points annually. Other regions where there was an increase included the spillover region (3 percentage points) and the sporadically affected region (1.5 percentage points). Unlike the control region, where the annual increase was statistically significant ( $p=0.043$ ), the increase in the spillover and sporadically affected regions was not statistically significant ( $p=0.74$  and  $p=0.846$ , respectively). In the severely affected region, there was a slight decline of half a percentage point in the proportion of respondents reporting a drop in levels of competition and grievance between the north and the south of the country. Therefore, respondents in this PRDP region still viewed the south of the country as being more privileged, especially in terms of providing social services to regions in the south.

**Figure 26: Percentage of respondents reporting a decrease in competition and grievance between north and south of Uganda over time**



Results from the survey show that, over time, the percentage of respondents who reported that the government was doing enough to bridge the gap between the north and the south increased in all regions, although the rise in the PRDP regions was not as high as in the control region (see Figure 27). In the PRDP regions, the average annual increase in the percentage of respondents reporting that the government was doing enough to bridge the gap between the north and the south was 2.5 percentage points in the spillover and sporadically affected regions and 1 percentage point in the severely affected region. In the control region, there was an average annual rise of 11.5 percentage points in the proportion of respondents reporting that the government was doing enough to bridge the gap between the north and the south, although it was not statistically significant ( $p=0.357$ ). The decline in 2013 in the percentage of respondents in the control region reporting that the government was doing enough to bridge the gap between the north and south affected the overall trend. Nonetheless, the observed increase in the control region suggests that respondents in this region were becoming increasingly aware of the contributions of government in the northern part of the country.

**Figure 27: Percentage of respondents reporting that government is doing enough to bridge gap between north and south over time**



## 6.5 Qualitative perceptions on competition and grievance

### 6.5.1 Control region

In terms of competition with other regions, the qualitative results from Kasese indicate that there is a need for more even distribution of infrastructure:

*“...universities should be evenly spread out ... health facilities should be established at parish levels ... some parishes like Bwera have no health facility ... safe water should be provided especially for people living in mountainous areas ... since the majority depend on agriculture, funding for irrigation schemes should be provided especially during the dry season.”<sup>134</sup>*

In Masaka, respondents commended the government for infrastructure development in all regions:

*“Government has done a great job in terms of roads and schools in all regions ... bravo ...”<sup>135</sup>*

<sup>134</sup> Consensus panel, Kasese, April 2014.

<sup>135</sup> Consensus panel, Masaka, April 2014.



In Mbarara, respondents criticised the government:

*“...politicisation of all government programmes ... there is a lot of political interference with programmes such as PRDP ... poor information sharing with beneficiaries ... nepotism where top officers in the army and police come from the West compared with other regions ... corruption is still a huge issue in government programmes.”<sup>136</sup>*

### 6.5.2 Spillover region

Qualitative interviews from Kiryandongo indicate that there is a general grievance that the north is getting a larger share of resources under the PRDP:

*“...roads, schools and health centres have been constructed in the north ... massive support has been given to police outposts in the north and furniture in schools has been provided for under PRDP ... there are widespread boreholes in the north.”<sup>137</sup>*

In Bukedi, it was recommended that the PRDP should continue but that there should be a shift from infrastructure to livelihood promotion:

*“...it makes more sense to focus on livelihoods than on things that wither like classrooms and roads.”<sup>138</sup>*

The PRDP was criticised for its failure to support communities to take ownership of projects:

*“...PRDP is encouraging people to be lazy ... it is making them get used to hand-outs ... people should be taught to own projects and co-funding should be encouraged.”<sup>139</sup>*

In Elgon, it was recommended that the PRDP should continue because it was closing the development gap:

*“Funds should increase ... because we too suffered the spillover effects of the war ... roads should be constructed to link production areas to markets ... imbalances are still there because the West is more developed ... maybe because of insecurity, investors prefer Mbarara to areas of Teso and Karamoja ... peace should be established in all regions to further reduce these imbalances.”<sup>140</sup>*

In Teso, the PRDP was commended for improving security in the region:

*“...vehicles provided under PRDP have helped crime prevention, especially to stop Karamojong's rustling.”<sup>141</sup>*

In Amuria, government programmes were praised:

*“...government programmes have done a good job in narrowing the gap between regions ... projects like PAPSCA [Programme for Alleviation of Poverty and Social Costs of Adjustment], NUSAF and PRDP have helped a lot ... NUSAF has been effective and other projects implementers should pick a leaf.”<sup>142</sup>*

136 Consensus panel, Mbarara, April 2014.

137 Consensus panel, Kiryandongo, May 2014.

138 Consensus panel, Tororo, May 2014.

139 Key informant, Tororo, May 2014.

140 Key informant, Mbale, May 2014.

141 Consensus panel, Soroti, May 2014.

142 Consensus panel, Soroti, May 2014.



### 6.5.3 Sporadically affected region

Respondents from Lango pointed to a need to rethink the PRDP allocations:

*“...the criteria for allocating PRDP money should be clear and acceptable to all local governments; otherwise, people will keep saying PRDP is favouring certain local governments.”<sup>143</sup>*

In West Nile, the end of the LRA war was discussed as the driver for a decrease in competition between regions:

*“...the Kony war influenced West Nile a lot ... many people died in ambushes and were abducted ... the fact that it has ended is a clear sign that grievances are reducing between regions.”<sup>144</sup>*

### 6.5.4 Severely affected region

In Acholi, notions of competition and grievance were disputed:

*“...the national cake is not shared equally ... Acholi are very few among those employed ... even after a hundred years, the north will never catch up with the south.”<sup>145</sup>*

However, the government was commended for its programmes:

*“...livelihoods have been promoted under NUSAF II ... there was restocking and people are getting milk from these cows ... in Kitgum alone, 182 livelihood projects were implemented ... this had narrowed the development between regions.”<sup>146</sup>*

*“...we have installed lightning arresters in 82 primary schools, including Agoromin Primary School in Orom Sub-County ... boreholes have also been constructed to provide clean water to communities ... roads have been reconstructed under PRDP, for example, the Mucwini–Namukora road.”<sup>147</sup>*

In Karamoja, competition and grievance was attributed to poor infrastructure development:

*“...there is no referral hospital in Kotido ... in Karamoja, rural electrification has not yet been achieved as is in Acholi and West Nile ... there are no tertiary institutions in Karamoja ... it is impossible to compete when we don't have quality education.”<sup>148</sup>*

In Moroto, it was mentioned that people from other areas are now aware that others too deserve the PRDP:

*“...the Acholi used to think that the region suffered more but they no longer think like that ... they have come to appreciate that Karamoja also deserves to be supported.”<sup>149</sup>*

Government efforts were commended in the Moroto consensus panel, and programmes such as NAADS, CDD and NUSAF II were highlighted for their contribution to reducing the development gap between the regions.

<sup>143</sup> Consensus panel, Lira, May 2014.

<sup>144</sup> Consensus panel, Arua, May 2014.

<sup>145</sup> Consensus panel, Kitgum, May 2014.

<sup>146</sup> Key informant, Kitgum, May 2014.

<sup>147</sup> Consensus panel, Kitgum, May 2014.

<sup>148</sup> Consensus panel, Kotido, May 2014.

<sup>149</sup> Consensus panel, Moroto, May 2014.

## 7. Discussion, conclusions and recommendations

### Discussion

This report examines the economic policies and priorities that should take precedence in post-conflict conditions. A post-conflict society should give overriding priority to reducing the risk of renewed conflict. To achieve this, increased work and/or employment opportunities for unskilled young men and women are crucial.<sup>150</sup> Broad-based recovery can help in securing peace by reducing grievances. Grievances typically start to ferment when one or more socio-economic group (defined by ethnicity, region, religion or some combination of these characteristics) experiences a fall in its standard of living in either *absolute* terms or *relative* to another group. This study points to the existence of grievances. Stable societies are those that successfully direct grievance into non-violent channels in terms of both its expression and resolution, and over time most people come to respect these informal and formal institutions (or ‘rules of the game’ in the terminology of the new institutional economics). However, when institutions are weak – and many African countries have inherited weak institutions at independence – grievance takes on an increasingly violent character and the social contract that underpins peace can be fatally weakened.

There is no single solution for achieving lasting peace: a focus on broad-based recovery must be accompanied by resolute efforts to tackle the other undercurrents of conflict, such as land problems and uneven service delivery. For broad-based recovery, transformation rather than reconstruction is the watchword.<sup>151</sup> If resources are available, then rebuilding shattered infrastructure is a reasonably straightforward task. Reassembling pre-war institutions may not be too difficult either. However, it is a lot harder to transform mindsets, everyday practices, institutions and policies, especially when these have been adapted over a lengthy conflict. Yet, unless this is done, recovery is narrow rather than broad in its benefits; poverty remains high, and the likelihood of conflict returning becomes real.

Although salutary, the continued focus of external actors on their own activities, capacities and mechanisms tends to overshadow the more pressing need to strengthen the capacities of domestic actors.

Ultimately, the transfer of power, resources and capacities to local actors defines the effectiveness of peacebuilding on the ground.<sup>152</sup> Indeed, many evaluation studies readily acknowledge this but shy away from offering ways of addressing it. In a nutshell, external actors approach peacebuilding as a short-term, time-bound and project-based enterprise, even while acknowledging that peacebuilding is a long-term, home-grown and multi-dimensional process. The following issues stand out as critical lessons from this study.

#### 1. The fallacy of ‘catching up’ and the trickle-down of development outcomes

Testimonies obtained from sources involved in implementing the PRDP programmes at district level indicated that PRDP funds were not over and above regular budget allocations; in reality, the districts suffered a cut in regular budget allocations as PRDP funds came in. As such, a

150 P. Collier (2007). *Post-Conflict Recovery: How Should Policies be Distinctive?* Oxford: Centre for the Study of African Economies, Department of Economics, Oxford University. Available at <http://economics.ouls.ox.ac.uk/14672/1/PostConflict-Recovery.pdf>

151 T. Addison (2003). *Africa's Recovery from Conflict: Making Peace Work for the Poor*. Helsinki: UN University World Institute for Development Economics Research ( UNU/WIDER). Available at <http://rrajasatabank.info/unupb6.pdf>

152 N. Tschirgi (2004). *Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Revisited: Achievements, Limitations, and Challenges*, Prepared for the WSP International/ IPA Peacebuilding Forum Conference, New York, 7 October. Available at [http://www.un.org/esa/peacebuilding/Library/Post\\_Conflict\\_Peacebuilding\\_IPA.pdf](http://www.un.org/esa/peacebuilding/Library/Post_Conflict_Peacebuilding_IPA.pdf)

comparative advantage resulting in a ‘catch-up’<sup>153</sup> effect was lost, meaning that there was no increase in the pace and permeation of service delivery initiatives that would create a difference in development outcomes. In fact, development parameters between severely affected, sporadically affected and spillover conflict regions compared reasonably well with the non-conflict control region, implying that ‘catching up’ is a falsehood. Infrastructure investments by government in roads, schools and hospitals are not unique to PRDP implementing areas; they are taking place all over the country. The distinguishing issue is the ‘trickle down’ effect of development outcomes for households and individuals. Here, national development statistics correlate with the findings of this report; incomes are meagre, and those who can afford to sustain their households are few and not increasing at a pace that demonstrates a ‘catching up effect’ for the PRDP implementing areas.

## 2. Linkages between security/peace and livelihood/incomes

The findings of this study show an intricate connection between peace and security, on the one hand, and thriving economic opportunities that serve to bolster livelihoods and incomes, on the other. This connection is well theorised in the PRDP objectives but not reflected in the actual investment/expenditure priorities. While PRDP 1 had tried to balance the objective of consolidating state authority and infrastructure development with other people-centred objectives, PRDP 2 was well on the way in this respect, negating the obvious need to match investments to livelihoods for improved incomes. Other studies<sup>154</sup> have shown that a person’s predisposition to subversion is underpinned by personal and at times household dissatisfaction. While this study shows more positive perceptions around peace and security, perceptions on economic issues did not inspire confidence regarding advancement of people’s lives in the PRDP implementing communities. This disparity is at the heart of persistent grievance.<sup>155</sup>

## 3. Moving from national to regional or possibly district-level priorities

Conflict-sensitive development planning is often nuanced by the need to pay attention to latent issues that often result in overt conflict. This study finds evidence of nationally conceived objectives and strategies of the PRDP that are heavily criticised due to the lack of community/local ownership. There is no sense of partnership between the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM) and the local authorities, in part because the PRDP looks at issues from a macro context; however, for conflict-sensitive development planning to occur and in order to respond to latent triggers of conflict, a micro perspective is important. In addition, PRDP implementation has multiple instructional stakeholders such as the OPM and the Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (MFPED), which often do not seem to be in tandem.<sup>156</sup> This results in multiple instructions that create loopholes for corruption and a chronic lack of supervision.<sup>157</sup> This study finds that it is widely believed that management of PRDP implementation should be moved to regional level, with resources sent directly for a more hands-on and responsive strategy.

153 PRDP 2 Operational Guidelines (June 2012), available at <http://www.prdp.org.ug/templates/codebliss/uploads/PRDP2%20Operational%20%20Guidelines.pdf>

154 See, for example: *Northern Uganda Conflict Analysis*. Available at [http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ACCS\\_Northern\\_Uganda\\_Conflict\\_Analysis\\_Report.pdf](http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/ACCS_Northern_Uganda_Conflict_Analysis_Report.pdf); and War Child’s overview of Lord’s Resistance Army, available at <http://www.warchild.org.uk/issues/the-lords-resistance-army>

155 See, for example, *Northern Uganda Conflict Analysis*. Op. cit.

156 Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development (2010). *Annual Budget Monitoring Report, July 2009 – June 2010*. Kampala. Available at [http://www.budget.go.ug/budget/sites/default/files/National%20Budget%20docs/Annual%20BMAU%202009\\_10%20Report.pdf](http://www.budget.go.ug/budget/sites/default/files/National%20Budget%20docs/Annual%20BMAU%202009_10%20Report.pdf)

157 See IWPR article, ‘Concerns over north Uganda development plans’, 8 October 2012. Available at <http://iwpr.net/report-news/concerns-over-north-uganda-development-plans>

## Conclusions

Overall, there has been a positive trend in people's perceptions regarding sustained peace and security. Different factors account for this positive change, mainly due to the absence of war/violence in most parts of the country. In post-war northern Uganda, the departure of the LRA and the increased presence of police posts, for example, have contributed to the positive feeling of safety within communities. However, fear still persists, particularly in the rest of the country – as represented by the survey in the control region – with regard to power/government transition.

There has been a positive trend in the area of SGBV regarding the number of victims, reporting of and resolution of cases. Various DRMs have been a point of reference for the victims – ranging from negotiated settlements, to informal and formal structures, such as the police and courts of law. There has been a rise too in the level of awareness regarding what constitutes an SGBV crime and justice application. Civil society seems to have taken a lead in raising such awareness. Nevertheless, shortcomings remain and access to justice is not guaranteed for one reason or another. In some cases, such access is not feasible in terms of costs, distance and convenience.

Whereas (local) government has done work to respond to people's needs, there is still room for enhanced performance, particularly in terms of engaging community members in planning. As the situation currently stands, some sections of the community feel detached from the planning process and from implementation of plans and programmes.

Employment and employability have been consistently on a downward trend throughout the three-/four-year period of successive study. Young people increasingly lack the necessary skills required in a small job market. This problem has been compounded in post-war northern Uganda, where the war-affected youth have not been duly considered by the different key players such as government, civil society, development partners, to mention but a few. Consequently, a growing number of young people have engaged in illicit activities such as drugs and alcohol abuse or petty crime.

General lack of information and the need for a holistic approach to address post-war effects in northern Uganda are two factors that have maintained relatively high levels of competition and grievances – although it should be mentioned that the gap has narrowed. Whereas the south, as represented by the survey results from the control region, generally feels that government has done ample work in the recovery of war-affected northern Uganda, the north generally believes that the development gap has not been sufficiently attended to.

In view of the previous findings, the following recommendations are deemed pertinent.

## Recommendations

The following recommendations are based on feedback from respondents in the survey regions – as indicated in each of the recommendations below. Additional recommendations were generated by the field research team.

### On sustained peace and security

#### To government and government agencies:

- Government, through programmes such as the PRDP, should invest in research on land conflicts and then make progressive and informed decisions to curb them. Trained local and cultural leaders could be vital in mitigating and resolving land wrangles.<sup>158</sup>

<sup>158</sup> Consensus panel, Zombo, May 2014; Key informant, Kitgum, April 2014.

- Government should equip the police deployed in various parts of the country, particularly in post-war northern Uganda, in terms of mobility and accommodation so that police presence in the community continues to be felt on a sustained basis.<sup>159</sup>
- Government should support the training of the police, probation officers, prison staff and the judiciary in social justice to equip them with skills in alternative justice; this could be done at district level through capacity building. Similarly, the capacity of LC courts should be strengthened to contribute to bringing about social justice.<sup>160</sup>

## On SGBV

### To government and government agencies:

- Government should complement and share information with CSOs so they can identify gaps in the handling of SGBV cases.<sup>161</sup> Government should also facilitate and train agencies such as cultural institutions on how to handle SGBV cases.<sup>162</sup>
- The investigative arm of the police that handles SGBV should be strengthened to avoid unnecessary circumstances such as ‘lost’ cases and mismanaged evidence.<sup>163</sup>

### To CSOs and communities:

- At the community level, CSOs should invest in a mechanism of first responders when SGBV occurs and consider paying for the legal services of poor SGBV victims.<sup>164</sup>
- CSOs and community members should be vigilant and report cases of SGBV, as not all cases qualify to be handled at family level. In this regard, CSOs may use church and traditional leaders to sensitise people about SGBV.<sup>165</sup>

## On access to economic opportunities

### To government and government agencies:

- Greater thought should be put into the manner in which vocational training is managed in the country. There is a mismatch between what the institutions are producing and what the communities need. Vocational training should be market driven.<sup>166</sup>
- Government should invest in region-relevant and suitable industries – for example, a starch factory in Lango or a citrus fruits factory in Teso would be good.<sup>167</sup>
- Government should reach out to SACCOs with more financial support to increase access to economic opportunities. It should also help farmers to form primary societies so they can sell in bulk and take measures such as revitalising cooperative societies for better markets.<sup>168</sup>

### To CSOs and communities:

- CSOs should invest in project seed financing and the provision of start-up capital for increased economic opportunities.<sup>169</sup>
- CSOs and communities should collaboratively aim to change attitudes towards investment financing – in particular, people should be taught to plan and pay back money even if it is provided by the government.<sup>170</sup>

159 Consensus panel, Kiryandongo, May 2014; Consensus panel, Abim, April 2014.

160 District community development officer, Zombo, May 2014.

161 Consensus panel, Mbarara, April, 2014.

162 Key informant, Mbale, May 2014.

163 Key informant, Kasese, Otuke and Kitgum, April 2014.

164 Key informant, Otuke, May 2014.

165 Key informant, Amuria May 2014, and Masaka in April.

166 Key informant, Soroti and Amuria, May 2014; Consensus panel, Mbale, May 2014.

167 Consensus panel, Lira, May 2014.

168 Consensus panel, Zombo, May 2014.

169 Key informant, Amuru, May 2014.

170 Key informant, Masaka and Mbarara, April 2014.

## On competition and grievance

### To government and government agencies:

- Government should balance appointments in ministries, the army, the police and other departments to ensure equal representation between the south and the north of Uganda as one of the practical demonstrations of bridging the gap between these two regions.<sup>171</sup>
- Government should work hand-in-hand with CSOs and cultural institutions to ensure that civic education is imparted to citizens in order to encourage good governance. A shared heritage and an inclusive country should be fostered. Instead of leaving it to election time, this should be a continuous process.<sup>172</sup>
- Both central and local governments should publicise the criteria used to allocate funds for government programmes such as the PRDP to avoid unnecessary speculation from the beneficiaries.<sup>173</sup>

## On local government responsiveness to community needs

### To government and government agencies:

- Guidelines for conditional grants do not allow for flexibility. Therefore, they should be revised to allow for flexibility in addressing needs. Planning should involve local community members as beneficiaries of government programming.<sup>174</sup>
- Government should put in place a clear budget line for supervision of government programme contracts. This has been a problem, especially in the construction sector, leading to shoddy work due to shortage of money to facilitate supervision. There should also be a focus on community mobilisation, so that communities where projects are implemented know, embrace and own these projects.<sup>175</sup>
- Government programmes should have regional centres to oversee how funds are disbursed and absorbed. They should also promote the practice of districts learning lessons from each other.<sup>176</sup>

## Additional recommendations from the research team

### To government:

- In order to achieve durable solutions in northern Uganda, government should increase efforts to address the needs and challenges affecting the returnee and resettling populations in the northern and Karamoja regions. This includes increased investment to improve service delivery in areas of return or resettlement and targeted policies for the most vulnerable populations.<sup>177</sup>
- Government should support IDPs to either integrate into their current locations or to relocate to other parts of the county if they so wish.
- Government should ensure an enabling environment for civil society. Accountable, responsive, inclusive and transparent governance and rule of law are prerequisites for dealing with the underlying human rights violations that often drive conflict and fragility. In the vacuum of the state, non-state actors – such as NGOs and CSOs, faith-based organisations and social movements – assume many of its responsibilities. Therefore, enabling environments for civil society need to be supported.

<sup>171</sup> Key informant, Kitgum, April 2014.

<sup>172</sup> Key informant, Mbale, May 2014.

<sup>173</sup> Key informant, Lira, May 2014.

<sup>174</sup> Consensus panel, Amuria, May 2014.

<sup>175</sup> Key informant, Lira, May 2014.

<sup>176</sup> Key informant, Lira, May 2014.

<sup>177</sup> United Nations Country Team in Uganda (2013). *Submission to the Universal Periodic Review*. Available at <http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/session12/UG/UNCT-eng.pdf>

**To local government:**

- Local government should focus on governance issues, including peacebuilding in post-war contexts. This requires marrying support to local government capacity and the development of a strategic framework with central government authorities that can foster a sustainable, long-term relationship.
- A simple emphasis on service provision without also supporting the institutional capacity development of local authorities and sectoral ministries should be avoided. Holistic approaches are needed.



## Annex: Methodology

### Overall approach

This study used both qualitative and quantitative data-collection methods. The qualitative data-collection method was chosen because it allows for the generation of collective opinions and the triangulation of information from stakeholders and members of the various community structures. The quantitative data collection allows for the analysis of trends and the establishment of incidences at both individual and community levels.

### Secondary data

#### Literature review

This covered a review of relevant documents connected with the assignment – including client documents, policy and legislative framework documents, and any relevant studies and reports that were important to the context and study findings. The literature review was particularly useful for crafting conclusions and revising data collection instruments.

#### Existing PCI datasets

These datasets constituted an integral part of the analysis materials. Since Lango and Acholi were on the fourth round of data collection, it was important to test the data for trends and significance of changes. This constituted the first step in trying to create the time series reality on the peace and conflict indicators (PCIs) from the data collection efforts that started in 2011.

### Primary qualitative data collection

#### Consensus panels

The consensus panels were used to build qualitative consensus on perceptions and the drivers of those perceptions. This technique of data collection was only applied to the sub-county level. In terms of procedure, the consensus panel would start with a round of self-introductions, followed by a facilitator explaining the purpose of coming together and handing out a set of questions to guide discussions. The consensus-building process occurred as the facilitator flagged all the important issues presented and went over them with the panellists. Wherever possible, with the permission of the panellists, all discussions would be voice-recorded to ensure accuracy of the eventual script. The panellists would be mobilised ahead of time by invitation letters, with a brief description issued to them of their expected input and a predetermined venue for the meeting communicated. The participants would be modestly facilitated to participate. The panellists were individuals who could reflect on the trickle-down effects of implementation of the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan (PRDP). Therefore, mobilisation for the panels sought to include technical and non-technical persons, that is, political leaders or staff including the following:

1. Sub-County Chief
2. Local Council (LC) 3 Chairperson
3. Assistant Community Development Officer
4. Secretary for Youth
5. Gombolola Internal Security Officer (GISO)
6. Sub-County Health Assistant or In-charge Health Centre III
7. Officer-in-Charge Police



8. Secretary for Defence LC 3
9. Secretary Gender
10. Area Land Committee Member

### Key informant interviews

Key informant interviews were conducted with specific district officials presumed to be competent to provide data pertinent to a specific PCI. The interviews were interpersonal and conducted in English; where possible, they were voice recorded. Building on experiences in conducting consensus panels at district level, the following were proposed as key informants in each district:

1. Resident District Commissioner (RDC) or District Police Commander (DPC) or District Internal Security Officer (DISO)
2. PRDP Focal Person
3. NUSAF Focal Person
4. District Planner/Economist
5. District NGO Forum
6. Community Development Officer
7. District Gender Officer
8. District Production Officer
9. The perceptions survey

Bearing in mind that the overall objective of monitoring the peace and conflict impacts of the PRDP annually was to eventually create a time series reality, the survey districts, sub-counties and parishes were maintained. Otherwise, attempts to change them would introduce deliberate bias, which would make sampling questionable.

## Sampling protocol

### Enumeration area determination

International Alert had conducted prior visits to the regions and had discussions with district leaders over where data collection was to take place. The key driver in the selection of districts and sub-counties was to capture locations where implementation of the PRDP and Post-Conflict Development Programme (PCDP) projects was taking place, and also to have urban/town alongside rural perceptions. Therefore, purposive selection of districts and sub-counties was carried out. In each sub-county, two parishes were randomly sampled by randomising all parish names in the selected sub-county using MS Excel. In each parish, a list of all villages (LCs 1) was compiled with the help of the Chairperson LC II or the Parish Chief. From this list, any two villages were randomly sampled to constitute the survey area.

### Survey respondent determination

The survey samples were determined at parish level for reasons of consistency. The specific calculation of samples considered all individuals in the selected locality aged 18 and over to be eligible to give information. Therefore, from the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) 2013 population projections for a selected parish, the proportion of the population aged 18 and over was determined for both females and males. The Krejcie and Morgan Sample Determination Table was then used to determine the parish-level sample that is used to create area quotas by proportional representation.

On entering an LC 1 and gaining permission from the LC 1 to conduct the survey, enumerators worked with the LC 1 and/or other administrative persons to make two lists: one of all males in the locality aged 18 and above; and another of all females aged 18 and above. These two lists constituted the sampling frames. However, specific returns or interviews from each village were determined by sub-dividing the parish sample by the population proportion. Thus, with the

lists developed, team supervisors quickly entered the lists into Microsoft (MS) Excel and, using the Excel worksheet function “rand ()”, the names were randomised. It is from these randomly generated lists that individuals were sought for interview, with the help of village leaders. To carry out this work, every team had access to a laptop with the MS Excel programme. Care was taken to ensure that the laptops had reasonable battery life.

## Survey interview implementation procedure/protocol

After the sampling lists were randomised, enumerators were led to the relevant households by local council officials who performed the mobilisation function of the survey. The local council official would first introduce the enumerator to the prospective respondent; after this, the enumerator would seek informed consent from the prospective respondent by reading out an introductory note, which was part of the informed consent form that was attached to every questionnaire.

If the prospective respondent agreed to the interview, the interview would be conducted in confidence, away from other individuals in the household or interview location. To avoid any misunderstanding, female respondents were interviewed by female enumerators and all interviews were interpersonal and conducted in the local language. If the prospective respondent would not agree to the interview, another respondent would be identified from the randomised list and sought out.

## Data management and analysis approaches

### Survey data

In the course of data collection, field data editors were responsible for ensuring that the data collection was coherent and of requisite quality by reading through every questionnaire *in-situ*. This greatly reduced the time required for data cleaning. Completed questionnaires were reviewed, coded and serialised, after which data entry commenced on a prepared template. Random coherence/consistence testing of the data was run, and thereafter descriptive statistics were generated using STATA data analysis and statistical software.

### Secondary, panel and key informant data

After fieldwork panel data and key informant interviews (KIIs) were transcribed from the recorders, they were translated, if necessary, and scripted for the report-writing team to review. After review, themes were developed in line with the indicators. The qualitative data was then thematically extracted/grouped and then resubmitted to the report-writing team. It is important to note that, although analysis was mostly done by the report-writing team, the field teams did engage in generating analysis and insights through debriefing sessions, which provided insights of the team members on what they had seen as key emerging issues.

## Limitations of the study

The 2013 household survey data from Kasese was not collected due to the natural disaster that destroyed roads and bridges, especially in Kilembe sub-county, leaving the survey villages inaccessible. Owing to this, the 2013 survey did not cover the project perceptions survey sample of 4,101 respondents, but rather had a coverage of 3,972 respondents – representing a shortfall of 3.1%. However, the sub-county consensus panel meeting was held for Kilembe sub-county officials, and a few members of the Parish Development Committee were also interviewed using the leadership rapid appraisal tool.



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