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# MONITORING THE IMPACT OF THE PEACE, RECOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT PLAN ON PEACE AND CONFLICT IN NORTHERN UGANDA

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## 2012

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# Abbreviations and acronyms

| | |
|---|---|
| **ACCS** | Advisory Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity |
| **CSO** | Civil society organisation |
| **DFID** | Department for International Development |
| **DRM** | Dispute-resolution mechanism |
| **GBV** | Gender-based violence |
| **IDP** | Internally displaced person |
| **JICA** | Japan International Cooperation Agency |
| **KI** | Key informant |
| **KIDP** | Karamoja Integrated Development Programme |
| **KII** | Key informant interview |
| **LC** | Local council/councillor |
| **LRA** | Lord's Resistance Army |
| **NAADS** | National Agricultural Advisory Services |
| **NGO** | Non-governmental organisation |
| **NRM** | National Resistance Movement |
| **NUREP** | Northern Uganda Rehabilitation Programme |
| **NUSAF** | Northern Uganda Social Action Fund |
| **OPM** | Office of the Prime Minister |
| **PCDP** | Post-Conflict Development Programme |
| **PCI** | Peace and conflict indicator |
| **PRDP** | Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda |
| **REAP** | Reconstruction Assistance Programme in Northern Uganda |
| **SACCO** | Savings and credit cooperative |
| **SGBV** | Sexual and gender-based violence |
| **UBOS** | Uganda Bureau of Statistics |
| **UPDF** | Uganda People's Defence Forces |
| **USAID** | United States Agency for International Development |
| **VSLA** | Village savings and loans association |

# Executive summary

The government of Uganda started the Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP) in 2007 as a framework through which development support would be channelled to northern Uganda. In December 2009 the British government approved support for the PRDP through the UK Department for International Development (DFID) under the Post-Conflict Development Programme (PCDP) in northern Uganda. At the same time, the DFID also established a partnership with International Alert, the Refugee Law Project and Saferworld to support the formation of the Advisory Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity (ACCS). The overall aim was to assist the DFID and its partners to strengthen the potential of the PRDP and the recovery process to address the causes of conflict and contribute to sustainable peace and stability. In fulfilment of its mandate, Alert developed peace and conflict indicators (PCIs) to measure the peace dividends accruing to the implementation of the PRDP and the PCDP. A research was thereafter commissioned to monitor the extent to which interventions under the PRDP, particularly those funded by the DFID, succeed or fail in achieving peacebuilding aims in northern Uganda.

## Methodology

This study used both quantitative and qualitative approaches. The study covered a total of 21 districts: in Acholi (Amuru, Gulu, Kitgum and Lamwo); Bukedi (Tororo); Bunyoro (Kiryandongo); Elgon (Mbale); Karamoja (Abim, Kotido and Moroto); Lango (Lira and Otuke); Teso (Amuria and Soroti); West Nile (Adjumani, Arua, Yumbe and Zombo); and the Control districts (Masaka, Mbarara and Kasese). The data collection methods used included consensus panels and key informant interviews (KIIs) that yielded a total of 145 respondents (30 at district level, 48 at sub-county level and 67 at parish/community level). They also included a perceptions survey that covered a total of 3,982 (1,963 male and 2,019 female) respondents.

## Key findings

### Confidence in sustained peace and security
Overall, out of 3,982 respondents, 68.8% (n=2,740) expressed confidence in sustained peace and security in their communities. In Lango, 78.7% respondents expressed confidence in sustained peace and security, followed by Acholi (69.8%), Bukedi (67.4%), Karamoja (67.0%), Bunyoro (62.2%), the Control districts (60.7%) and Teso (58.7%). Community-level results revealed that confidence in sustained peace and security was mostly attributed to the increased presence of security agencies (30.1%), the perception that government has a commitment to security (19.1%), the absence of war for a long time (15.6%) and increased access to dispute-resolution options (11.4%). On the other hand, the primary factors contributing to diminishing confidence in sustained peace and security were land conflicts (28.8%), domestic violence (28.2%) and conflicts arising from rampant theft of livestock and crops (23.8%).

### Local government responsiveness to community needs
The proportion of respondents who attested to the fact that the local government is responsive to community was just above average at 52% (n=2,071). By region, Elgon (71.7%) had the highest percentage of respondents who have access to local government services, followed by Bukedi (62.9%), Acholi (55.2%) and Lango (53.1%), and the lowest was Bunyoro (39.4%). On the other hand, 37.1% of the respondents indicated that local government were not responsive to community needs, while 10.8% did not know whether or not local government were responsive

to their needs. Among those respondents who indicated that local government was responsive to community needs, 22.7% felt that local government provided education services, followed by health services (19.5%) and security (15.9%).

However, 63.1% of the respondents pointed out that they had never been invited to participate in local government planning activities. This was also reflected during the panel group discussions, which alluded to poor community mobilisation during the development planning process at the lower local government levels. At the community level, the primary reasons given for dissatisfaction with services provided in education, health and vocational skills training were inadequate staffing, poorly equipped facilities and long distances to facilities.

### Dispute-resolution mechanisms (DRMs)
The majority of respondents (77.1%, n=3,070) from all regions stated that DRMs address community-level security satisfactorily. The proportion of respondents who perceived that DRMs address sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) satisfactorily was 64.6%. This percentage was highest in West Nile (81%), followed by Karamoja (77.8%), and lowest in Bunyoro (36.4%). In Lango, it was 50% and in Acholi 49.1%. However, 30% of SGBV cases were not reported to any authority or conflict-resolution mechanism. Among the 228 respondents who reported that DRMs satisfactorily address SGBV, 48.2% sought redress from the local council/councillor (LC) courts, while 37.7% used the clan system; or matters were resolved at family level.

### Access to economic opportunities
It is important to note that 69.2% of all the survey respondents did not have access to increased economic opportunities. This proportion was highest in Teso (83.8%) and lowest in Bunyoro (51.6%). The proportions of those who had no access to increased economic opportunities in the other regions were Bukedi (81.5%), Karamoja (80.9%), West Nile (75.7%), the Control districts (68.3%), Elgon (63.6%), Lango (58.4%) and Acholi (54.8%). Only 30.8% of all the survey respondents confirmed that they had access to increased economic opportunities. This proportion was highest in Bunyoro (48.4%) and lowest in Teso (16.2%). On average, only 16.4% of all the survey respondents were satisfied with government efforts in responding to their needs with regard to economic opportunities. This percentage was highest in Lango (32.8%) and lowest in Teso (11.5%).

The largest number of respondents who had access to increased economic opportunities attributed it to increased business activities in their localities (39.7%), followed by local government initiatives (17.4%) and improved security (17.1%). However, it should be noted that the majority of respondents from all regions surveyed (54.1%) rated the level of business vibrancy in their communities as low, with only 7.5% of the respondents overall rating it as high. The most common income activity was crop farming (39.7%), followed by business in market stalls, kiosks or roadside vending (13.1%) and selling of casual labour (12.5%).

Even among those respondents who reported that there were sufficient economic opportunities in their communities, 46.7% felt that not everyone was able to take advantage of the available economic opportunities because of lack of access to credit (24.5%), laziness/alcohol (16.8%) and lack of qualifications (13.2%).

### Regional competition and grievances
Across all the regions surveyed, 31.3% (n=1,244) of the respondents perceived a decrease in the levels of competition and grievances between northern and southern Uganda. This portion was largest in Lango (42.6%) and lowest in Teso (21.6%). It is important to note that a large proportion of respondents (36.3%) did not know whether there was a decrease or not in the levels of competition and grievances between northern and southern Uganda. This proportion was largest in Karamoja (56.4%) and lowest in Lango (24.9%). Although results did not indicate strong perceptions on whether or not levels of competition and grievances have decreased,

they did point towards overall confidence in government efforts to bridge the development gap between northern and southern Uganda. Those who said there was no decrease in competition and grievances made up 32.4% of the overall sample.

Across the PRDP regions, there was a decrease (34.2%) in competition and grievances among the PRDP regions. This percentage was highest in West Nile (39.8%) and lowest in Bukedi (19.7%). It is important to note that a large proportion of respondents were unable to compare their region to others in terms of competition and grievances (41.5%). Respondents who felt that other regions were better off pointed out reasons of business vibrancy (18.6%), coverage and/or proximity to a main tarmac road (17.7%), better healthcare facilities (15.4%) and the presence of many schools (12.4%). Looking at why they assessed their own districts to be worse off, most respondents mentioned the effects of war and displacement (17.4%), corruption (16%), unfair resource allocation (15.8%) and bad leadership (14.6%). The perception that other regions have more benefits and investment from government than their own regions was prevalent among the respondents (63.7%).

## Key recommendations

### Central government
The government should provide information on PRDP activities, funds, implementation strategies, monitoring and evaluation; it should also establish a PRDP information desk in all districts where stakeholders can access information. Where necessary, there should be regular radio broadcasts about the PRDP, and printed information should be translated into local languages. This will improve information flow about the programme and encourage community participation.

Strategic objective 1 of the PRDP is set to restore, strengthen and build trust in government in northern Uganda. Although the presence of government is visible in northern Uganda, there is a need to strengthen the capacities of government officials to carry out quality post-conflict reconstruction functions. Specifically, the government needs to train and deploy health officers and teachers in northern Uganda; recruit and train medical staff in the police force to handle cases of SGBV; establish legal aid clinics for SGBV survivors; and train community development officers to sensitise communities about the PCDP.

Infrastructure development and restoring social services need urgent attention, in particular to build, equip and refurbish health centres, schools (primary, secondary and vocational schools), agricultural training institutes and business incubation centres. These will provide the needed services and develop the skills required to provide quality social services in northern Uganda.

The government ought to allow development partners to directly intervene in the recovery and development processes within the existing government framework, while maintaining the overall monitoring role. This may restore the trust the communities lost in the government when resources meant for the PRDP were stolen from the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM).

The government should ensure that peace continues to prevail in northern Uganda. The peacebuilding and reconciliation process requires access to information by stakeholders; provision of counselling services for those affected by conflict; establishment of mechanisms for intra/inter-communal and national conflict resolution; the strengthening of local governance and informal leadership structures; and the reinforcing of the socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants. The government should establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a framework to deal with the past ills and help aggrieved communities to get justice, reconcile and work together in the recovery and development of Uganda.

There should be a framework within the PRDP to address the intensifying land conflicts that are threatening the relative peace in northern Uganda. Since land is mainly held under customary tenure, customary and local government institutions should be strengthened to mend the internal administration of land and adjudication of disputes.

The government should strengthen the Equal Opportunities Commission to deal with systemic perceptions of discrimination of the north-south divide and promote balanced development. There is a need to carry out additional study in Karamoja, which expressed a particularly strong sentiment of discrimination, and comprehensively address such a perception. The government should take affirmative action to deal with high levels of poverty and vulnerabilities. The approaches should include provision of information and training about the available market opportunities; and community-managed loan schemes specifically targeting women, the youth, the elderly and people with disabilities.

## Development partners

This study recognises the important role the development partners continue to play in the recovery of northern Uganda. It recommends that they should continue to strengthen national capacities and support community ownership of recovery and development processes. Development partners should make a stronger commitment to address cross-cutting issues, particularly gender, environment and disease (HIV/AIDS, nodding syndrome, hepatitis and mental illness, among others).

The donor support to the active poor, progressive farmers and business communities through the Private Sector Foundation Uganda loan scheme is good. However, the programme marginalises extremely vulnerable persons like widows, the youth, orphans and the elderly who cannot pass the criteria to secure such loans. A preferential option for the poor should be taken by developing a loan scheme that can unlock their economic potentials.

Considering that donor support in Uganda is mainly in the form of budget support, development partners should be strategic in both developing partnerships and identifying policy areas where support will make a significant difference in the recovery and development of northern Uganda. This can be done in partnership with the central government, local government, civil society organisations, the private sector and the community. There is a need to strengthen policy and accountability procedures to stamp out corruption and improve transparency in governance and service delivery.

The PRDP coordination has not resulted in joint planning across the framework and between funding modalities. There is a need for integrated and effective coordination within the donor community to avoid duplication that may result in resource wastage and inefficient operations. Development partners should also be more proactive in their engagement of sector working groups and in the coordination mechanisms of recovery and development of northern Uganda.

Development partners should support policy research to continuously inform the ever-changing recovery and development environment in northern Uganda. In this way, their intervention will be informed by facts and will be relevant to the communities.

## Local government

Local government ought to involve communities in the monitoring and evaluation of quality of services. Communities can provide feedback by use of social audit in a form that allows them to review and cross-check the information provided by the service provider against information collected from users of the service. This form of monitoring and evaluation could establish whether funds allocated for social services actually reach projects; whether communities actually receive quality social service benefits; and whether providers do their work well. The results of the audit should be announced during public gatherings attended by users as well as public officials involved in the management of services and the providers.

Local government should provide an enabling environment for business and economic development. There is a need to re-establish a stable economic framework; reconstruct the basic productive infrastructure; strengthen food security; promote structural reforms – fiscal reform and agricultural reform – that allow for the situations of poverty, inequality and exclusion to be overcome – factors that instigate conflicts and derail post-conflict development.

Employment opportunities for the youth should be expanded through diversification of the economy. Employment opportunities for the youth should also address the existing gender disparity that favours males over females. Local government should create an enabling environment to enable the youth to access micro-credit to address the widely expressed need for start-up funds to commence economic activities.

Communities should be involved in security programmes to restore traditional relationships and values ripped apart by conflicts and ethnic rivalries. Communities ought to be empowered to participate and find lasting solutions to conflicts emerging from resettlement, such as land boundaries, economic hardships, social and political rivalries.

There should be support and increased information flow about the PRDP activities, funds and implementation. There should be a channel for communities to monitor and report about the implementation of the PRDP.

### Civil society organisations (CSOs)

CSOs should strengthen administrative, social and economic organisations in the affected communities and contribute to re-establishing psychological wellbeing by promoting forms of community organisation around rehabilitation, reconstruction and development projects, which involve vulnerable people belonging to different groups. In addition, CSOs ought to encourage dialogue, communication, the coming together of the parties, peaceful resolution of disputes and inter-community relationships based on mutual trust and shared values. The promotion of the participation and strengthening of the capacities of CSOs at the local level represents, in this context, a positive contribution to the aims of democratisation, good governance and peacebuilding.

One of the most devastating legacies of violent conflict is the polarisation of social relationships. The conditions of insecurity contribute to the creation of a lasting social mistrust. Extending communication bridges again between the social groups and promoting participation in community events are essential requirements for social reconciliation. CSOs have always played a role in reconciling communities and can continue to play that role in reconciling aggrieved societies in northern Uganda.

In order to reduce the propensity to inadvertently aggravate SGBV, the importance of conflict-sensitive approaches to gender interventions has been highlighted. One way of doing so would be to ensure the inclusion of men, especially family members, religious leaders and opinion leaders, at all stages of sensitisation. Successful implementation of preventive measures is dependent upon the extent to which the offenders understand their contribution and agree to take a lead in curbing the practice.

The local traditional authorities, at the same time, are institutions that have evolved over time to help manage tensions in the communities. The informal mechanisms for the resolution of disputes have an enormous influence on the political leaders. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) should support traditional initiatives for peacebuilding, such as advice from elders or religious leaders. This is important in peacebuilding and reconciliation processes.

### The media

The pluralism of the media outlets is basic for the exchange of information and perspectives regarding the type of society that is to be constructed. The media ought to expose abuses of all sorts, particularly with regards to governance and accountability, and promote transparency; to spread information on key aspects of the process; and to strengthen social groups that support the peacebuilding efforts. The media can mutually reinforce other stakeholders in constructive post-conflict programming.

### Communities

Community members should take ownership of the PRDP and demand accountability from central government, local governments and community leaders. This may be achieved through self-mobilisation that calls for accountability, which emerges as a complex chain of relationships linking users, policymakers and service providers.

# 1. Introduction

In 2009 the United Kingdom Department for International Development (DFID) approved a five-year grant for a Post-Conflict Development Programme (PCDP) in northern Uganda. This programme has been making a major contribution to the over-arching framework of the government of Uganda's Peace, Recovery and Development Plan for Northern Uganda (PRDP). The PCDP supports the PRDP to create economic, social and political opportunities that improve the lives of people affected by conflict, by investing in the improvement of access to key basic services, especially health and education; reversing economic stagnation, extreme poverty and tackling youth unemployment; as well as providing support to national reconciliation and conflict-resolution processes. Within the PCDP, the DFID also supports the Advisory Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity (ACCS), composed of International Alert, the Refugee Law Project and Saferworld. The overall purpose of the ACCS is to strengthen the ability of key stakeholders in the PCDP to effectively address the drivers of conflict and contribute to building peace through their interventions.

As part of Alert's role in the ACCS – monitoring the extent to which interventions under the PRDP, particularly those funded by DFID, succeed or fail in achieving peacebuilding aims and monitoring impacts – Alert developed a monitoring framework centred on five peace and conflict indicators (PCIs):

- PCI 1: Confidence in sustained peace and security (goal level);
- PCI 2: Responsiveness of local government to community needs;
- PCI 3: Conflict-resolution mechanisms for addressing community-level security and incidence of SGBV;
- PCI 4: Access to economic opportunity among selected groups; and
- PCI 5: Competition and grievance between PRDP regions, and between the north and south of Uganda.

These PCIs were derived from the DFID/ACCS log frame. They are perceptual in nature and seek to measure the peace and conflict impacts of the PCDP/PRDP implementation over a period of time. These indicators respond to the "theory of change" based on implicit assumptions about the peace dividends to be gained across the four outputs of the PRDP, as well as at the goal level. They embody a definition of "positive peace" that is based on meeting people's needs across the areas of governance, human security, economic opportunity and shared national identity to which these indicators broadly correspond. The theory of change is based on the assumption that the above indicators, when measured, are able to provide necessary conclusions about peace impacts of the PCDP. It is hoped that the impact, influence and leverage of the PCDP/PRDP implementation are likely to change perceptions of families, communities and regions positively. It is these perceptions that Alert is monitoring under different activities of the PCDP/PRDP interventions.

The PRDP and PCDP are not the only interventions that have been undertaken in northern Uganda. There are several government and agency-led interventions in the Greater North (northern Uganda and Karamoja) to support livelihood recovery by encouraging greater development, peacebuilding and poverty reduction. These include:

- The PRDP I (2009–2011/12) and PRDP II (2012–2015);
- The Northern Uganda Reconstruction Programme (NURP) – NURP I and NURP II – the predecessor of PRDP;
- The Northern Uganda Agricultural Livelihoods Recovery Programme;

- The Karamoja Livelihoods Programme;
- The Northern Uganda Social Action Fund (NUSAF) – NUSAF I and NUSAF II;
- The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Northern Uganda Transition Initiative;
- The Northern Uganda Social Action Fund Youth Opportunities Project;
- The Northern Uganda Rehabilitation Programme (NUREP) 2006–2010;
- The Karamoja Integrated Development Programme (KIDP) 2006–2015;
- The UK PCDP; and
- The Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Reconstruction Assistance Programme in Northern Uganda (REAP).

The overall goal of the PRDP is to consolidate peace and security and lay the foundation for recovery and development. Specifically, the PRDP aims to promote socio-economic development of the communities of northern Uganda and to bridge the gap between the north and the rest of the country, so that the north achieves a "national average level" in the main socio-economic indicators. The PCDP supports the PRDP to create economic, social and political opportunities that improve the lives of people affected by conflict.

While there are many livelihood interventions, few have been the subject of rigorous impact assessment; and even those impact assessments that have taken place yield limited information of practical importance for policymakers and programme designers. There is very little evidence on impact or on how findings are fed into policy discourses, programming and implementation. This undertaking around the PCIs attempts to contribute to redressing this deficit.

## Objectives of the baseline:
- To conduct both qualitative and quantitative baseline research on the PCIs in the selected districts of Bukedi, Bunyoro, Elgon, Karamoja, Teso and West Nile where the PCDP/PRDP is being implemented;
- To re-run the baseline data for Acholi and Lango regions to incorporate qualitative information and impact level data that answer the DFID/ACCS log frames; and
- To produce one report (highlighting specific perceptions issues in the different regions where the baseline has been conducted) and produce baseline data for peace and conflict impacts of the PCDP/PRDP implementation for the regions.

# 2. Confidence in sustained peace and security

As a goal-level indicator, PCI 1 results present an overall picture of the current status of peace and security in selected PRDP sub-regions and, in particular, of how widespread perceived confidence in sustained peace and security is. The results presented also discuss factors driving negative and/or positive perceptions of confidence in sustained peace and security. All respondents were asked the question of whether they had confidence in sustained peace and security in their community. Both qualitative and quantitative results are presented.

## 2.1 Statistical overview

Overall, out of 3,982 respondents, 68.8% (2,740 respondents) expressed confidence in sustained peace and security in their communities. Of these, 49.6% rated their confidence as average, 47.7% rated it as high, while only 2.7% rated it as low. Confidence in sustained peace and security was lower than the overall picture in Teso (58.7%), the Control districts (60.7%), Bunyoro (62.2%), Karamoja (67.0%) and Bukedi (67.4%), despite respondents attesting to improved security in their communities (see Table 1).

Comparing 2011 and 2012, results for Acholi and Lango showed a reduction of 9.4 percentage points and 1 percentage point in the proportion of respondents with confidence in sustained peace and security, respectively. In Acholi, there was a reduction from 79.2% in 2011 to 69.8% in 2012, while, in Lango, the reduction was from 79.7% in 2011 to 78.7% in 2012.

Table 1: Proportion of sample with confidence in sustained peace and security

| Region | Have you experienced an improvement in the security situation in your community in the past two years? Yes | | Indicator Do you have confidence in sustained peace and security in your community (PCI 1)? Yes | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | No. | % | No. | % |
| Acholi | 665 | 87.4 | 531 | 69.8 |
| Bukedi | 129 | 72.5 | 120 | 67.4 |
| Bunyoro | 127 | 67.6 | 117 | 62.2 |
| Elgon | 138 | 73.8 | 155 | 82.9 |
| Karamoja | 491 | 89.1 | 369 | 67.0 |
| Lango | 355 | 94.7 | 295 | 78.7 |
| Teso | 336 | 78.9 | 250 | 58.7 |
| West Nile | 607 | 81.0 | 558 | 74.5 |
| Control | 303 | 53.4 | 344 | 60.7 |
| Total | 3,151 | 79.1 | 2,739 | 68.8 |

Further disaggregation of those who attested to confidence in sustained peace and security showed more males (72.2%, 1,417 respondents) than females (65.5%, 1,322 respondents) presenting this perception. The difference of 6.7 percentage points was found to be statistically significant.

Using the age groups 18–35, 36–55 and 56+, the percentage of the respondents with confidence in sustained peace and security in their communities varied and significant association was observed between age groups. Taking the two extreme age groups (18–35 and 56+), there is a difference of 45.4 percentage points in the confidence in sustained peace and security. This implies that changes in the PCIs are more sensitive to age than gender (see Table 2).

**Table 2: Distribution by gender and age of those with confidence in sustained peace and security**

| | Yes | | Male | | Female | | 18–35 | | 36–55 | | 56+ | |
| Region | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Acholi | 531 | 69.8 | 259 | 48.8 | 272 | 51.2 | 313 | 58.9 | 155 | 29.2 | 63 | 11.9 |
| Bukedi | 120 | 67.4 | 56 | 46.7 | 64 | 53.3 | 60 | 50.0 | 49 | 40.8 | 11 | 9.2 |
| Bunyoro | 117 | 62.2 | 69 | 59.0 | 48 | 41.0 | 70 | 59.8 | 41 | 35.0 | 6 | 5.1 |
| Elgon | 155 | 82.9 | 70 | 45.2 | 85 | 54.8 | 106 | 68.4 | 38 | 24.5 | 11 | 7.1 |
| Karamoja | 369 | 67.0 | 228 | 61.8 | 141 | 38.2 | 179 | 48.5 | 133 | 36.0 | 57 | 15.4 |
| Lango | 295 | 78.7 | 144 | 48.8 | 151 | 51.2 | 151 | 51.2 | 101 | 34.2 | 43 | 14.6 |
| Teso | 250 | 58.7 | 144 | 57.6 | 106 | 42.4 | 126 | 50.4 | 89 | 35.6 | 35 | 14.0 |
| West Nile | 558 | 74.5 | 277 | 49.6 | 281 | 50.4 | 312 | 55.9 | 179 | 32.1 | 67 | 12.0 |
| Control | 344 | 60.7 | 170 | 49.4 | 174 | 50.6 | 239 | 69.5 | 85 | 24.7 | 20 | 5.8 |
| Total | 2,739 | 68.8 | 1,417 | 51.7 | 1,322 | 48.3 | 1,556 | 56.8 | 870 | 31.8 | 313 | 11.4 |

## 2.2 Drivers of confidence in sustained peace and security

### Karamoja and Teso

From the statistical results, Karamoja and Teso sub-regions were among those presenting the lowest levels of confidence in sustained peace and security. The common experience of cattle-rustling and the associated proliferation of arms in the communities were repeatedly mentioned in the consensus panels. Although both regions praised the positive impact that disarmament programmes have had on security levels, there was a clear sense that such processes are far from complete. In Teso, threats posed by unemployed youth, and poverty more generally, were considered to be dramatically exacerbated by the presence of illegal arms in the community, with one respondent commenting: '*as long as you have a gun then there is a problem.*'[1] This was often discussed against the backdrop of repeated incursions from Karamoja.

In Karamoja, an overall sense of improved peace and security (as affirmed by 67% of community survey respondents) was attributed to a reduction in the prevalence and severity of cattle-rustling in the panel discussions. However, respondents categorised their current peace as '*relative*', with '*pockets of violence*'[2] remaining. Inter-tribal and clan tensions, particularly with the Turkana of Kenya, continue to be felt. Testimonies of disruptions to peace and security were frequent, and included instances of brutality against both women and children.

In addition, respondents frequently mentioned threats posed by a '*spirit of revenge*' in the region. Violent retaliations were common in the testimonies, drawing attention to the propensity for such conflicts to escalate if not managed sensitively. There were also reservations as to the sustainability of current peace in Karamoja, with panellists voicing a sense of its fragility due to high levels of reliance on external security assistance, particularly the role played by the Uganda People's Defence Forces (UPDF). This was seen especially in the context of unsuccessful disarmament in

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1    Consensus panel, district level, Soroti-Teso (August 2012).
2    Consensus panel, district level, Moroto-Karamoja (August 2012).

some more remote areas of Karamoja: '*it means should anything happen and they pull out these forces, especially the army, I think we are seeing a situation go back into a serious conflict.*'[3]

The threat posed by the movement of arms across the Kenyan border in the context of continuing conflict with groups such as the Turkana and Pokot was also recurrently mentioned. It was felt that, however successful disarmament processes are within Uganda, if arms continue to proliferate across their national borders, the impact of such programmes will be limited. The need for improved regional coordination in cross-border disarmament was therefore emphasised.

### Bunyoro and Bukedi

Although these two sub-regions are apart in terms of geographical location and ethnic composition of the citizenry within, the drivers of low confidence in sustained peace and security were similar for Bunyoro and Bukedi. Panel discussions commonly highlighted ethnic tensions. In Bukedi (Tororo), constant reference was made to the Japadhola and Ateso wrangles over the establishment of districts, and how they were contributing to feelings of hatred between the different ethnic communities.[4] In Bunyoro (Kiryandongo), the influx of internally displaced persons (IDPs) was discussed in the panels. It was indicated that most of the displaced had not returned to their home areas since the cessation of hostilities; their continued stay was perceived to have altered the ethnic composition of the communities – creating discontent and marginalisation of some by others. Discussants considered consequent animosity between the different groups to be undermining confidence in sustained peace and security.

### The Control districts

Drivers of confidence in sustained peace and security in the Control areas were of a different character. Political security appeared to be more important here than in the PRDP regions. Specifically, the turmoil surrounding elections, or, as one panellist termed it, '*fear of the political transition*',[5] was commonly referred to. Panellists felt that the history of political oppression and '*excessive use of force to crush opposition during elections*'[6] indicated that the 2016 presidential elections would have the potential to severely destabilise their region. This was perceived particularly in Central Uganda, but was considered a relevant threat to the country as a whole. In the context of such fears, and in contrast with the PRDP regional narratives, panellists tended to pin their confidence or otherwise on the strength of the government and the stabilising role of the UPDF.

Alongside frustration at the '*oppressive*' nature of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) government, and a sense that '*bad governance*' permeates throughout Uganda, were fears that with the gradual decline of the popularity of the NRM and the rise of the opposition would come increased insecurity.

In this sense, a contradiction arose over how the stabilising role of the government was viewed in the Control districts. On the one hand, corruption and, often violent, political oppression were considered to be leading to increased insecurity by giving rise to equally violent forms of retaliation on the side of the opposition. On the other hand, there was the impression, as one panellist pointed out, that the '*current peace and security is long-lasting as long as the NRM is in power*'.[7] This perception was viewed in light of the country's violent political history:

> '*… most people think that if NRM goes, there will be instability; that is their perception and that perception is derived from the country's past history because it's under the NRM that they have tasted peace.*'[8]

3    Ibid.
4    Other studies have pointed to the conflicts arising out of the proliferation of new ethnic/tribal-based districts (e.g. ACCS (2012). 'Northern Uganda Conflict Analysis (Draft)'. Kampala: ACCS).
5    Key informant (KI), district level, Kasese-Control (August 2012).
6    Ibid.
7    KI, district level, Kasese-Control (August 2012).
8    Ibid.

*'The older generation who saw Uganda's turbulent past and have now invested their money are saying we don't want to go back, but they are also scared of how political transition will be – whether peaceful or violent.'*[9]

Other factors leading to a perception of the precarious peace in the narratives included the proximity of Western districts to national borders, particularly Kasese with its position close to the Congolese border. The overflow of conflict from Congo into Uganda, evidenced by an influx of refugees, was considered by panellists to be posing an acute threat to regional security. Added to the intensity of such threats was the sense among some panellists that controlling the borders and the conflicts in Congo is beyond the capacity of the government:

*'… people have doubts because some issues are beyond the capacity of the community and the Uganda government. This is because the Kasese borders with Congo and the war in Congo is beyond the government of Uganda's control.'*[10]

## Positive drivers

Community-level results showed that confidence in sustained peace and security was mostly attributed to the increased presence of security agencies (30.1%), followed by the perception that government has commitment to security (19.1%), the absence of war for a long time (15.6%) and increased access to dispute-resolution options (11.4%).

**Table 3: Positive drivers of confidence in sustained peace and security**

| To what do you attribute confidence in sustained peace and security? | Acholi | Bukedi | Bunyoro | Elgon | Karamoja | Lango | Teso | West Nile | Control | Average |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Increased presence of security agencies | 29.1 | 32.2 | 30.4 | 24.2 | 25.8 | 32.0 | 26.5 | 35.1 | 32.0 | 30.1 |
| Government commitment to security | 14.3 | 25.1 | 31.3 | 23.1 | 24.1 | 5.8 | 21.5 | 17.5 | 23.4 | 19.1 |
| No war for a long time | 30.3 | 2.4 | 13.5 | 8.5 | 4.7 | 26.0 | 15.7 | 14.1 | 6.7 | 15.6 |
| Increased access to dispute resolution | 10.2 | 3.3 | 9.6 | 10.4 | 9.8 | 13.2 | 14.6 | 13.9 | 10.5 | 11.4 |
| The concern now is development | 15.0 | 2.8 | 14.3 | 4.2 | 8.4 | 22.8 | 4.0 | 5.3 | 5.6 | 9.4 |
| Involving community in peace and security | 1.1 | 22.3 | 0.9 | 15.0 | 19.5 | 0.2 | 11.3 | 7.5 | 15.7 | 9.3 |
| No conflicts/threats in community | 0.0 | 11.8 | 0.0 | 14.6 | 7.6 | 0.0 | 6.4 | 6.5 | 6.0 | 5.1 |
| **Total** | **100** | **100** | **100** | **100** | **100** | **100** | **100** | **100** | **100** | **100** |

These reasons were consistent among respondents who noticed improved security in their communities in the two years preceding the survey. In district- and sub-county-level panel discussions, confidence in sustained peace and security was similarly influenced by a positive impression of government efforts to improve security infrastructure. This was apparent particularly in Lango and Acholi sub-regions where such efforts have been concentrated.

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9    KI, district level, Mbarara-Control (August 2012).
10   KI, district level, Kasese-Control (August 2012).

> '*[The Peace, Recovery and Development Plan] has significantly improved security for all … because if it wasn't for this programme we would not have the police quarters here, or communication systems.*'[11]

The positive impact of community sensitisation and policing interventions was also acknowledged in the qualitative findings. For instance, in Karamoja, panellists cited the success of government disarmament programmes that emphasise dialogue over taking up arms. These were thought to have resulted in increased use of formal mechanisms to resolve disputes: '*… because of sensitisation and dialogue, people are now much more aware and there are certain outputs that they actually take to the police.*'[12]

These qualitative insights were further supported by the quantitative results, where community sensitisation on peace and security is a major initiative rated at a level of 30.9%, followed by community policing initiatives (22.4%), patrols by security agencies (18.2%) and construction of police posts (13.7%).

Finally, the third most common driver of sustained peace and security in the survey results was "the long-term absence of war". This suggests that, in addition to concrete peacebuilding and reconstruction interventions, confidence in the PRDP regions is attributable to a sense of comparative yet prevailing peace. This perception was also common in the qualitative results. As one West Nile respondent commented:

> '*… when you compare it with the past I think there is relative peace in the district. Those days it was the issue of war bringing problems and it made life difficult for us all, and we couldn't move freely but now you can move anytime.*'[13]

## Negative drivers

The primary factor contributing to limited confidence in sustained peace and security was reported as persistent conflicts. Notable among such conflicts, in order of mentions, were: land disputes (28.8%), followed by domestic violence (28.2%) and conflicts arising from rampant theft of livestock, crops and at times household chattels (23.8%).

A similar result was obtained when respondents were asked what new threats to sustained peace and security they faced. The mentions included theft (35.6%), land conflicts (16.1%), hunger and famine, which were fuelling desperation and thefts (15.1%), murders and killings in communities (11%) and domestic violence (10.3%).

Evidence from panel discussions at district and sub-county levels presented a similar picture. Here, the most frequently mentioned threats to sustained peace and security were land conflicts, followed by crime (commonly in the form of theft) and SGBV/domestic violence. The key dynamics of these threats, according to both quantitative and qualitative results, will be discussed in the following paragraphs.

### I. Land conflicts

In Teso, consensus panel respondents predicted land disputes could lead to '*civil war*' if they were not '*handled well*'.[14] In addition to interpersonal (familial and clan-based) land disputes, qualitative results presented examples of conflicts involving administrative boundaries and districts. As well as '*affecting the peace*',[15] these disputes were thought to be negatively impacting the delivery of

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11   Consensus panel, sub-county level, Otuke-Lango (June 2012).
12   Consensus panel, district level, Moroto-Karamoja (September 2012).
13   Consensus panel, district level, Adjumani-West Nile (June 2012).
14   Consensus panel, district level, Gulu-Acholi (June 2012).
15   Consensus panel, district level, Amuria-Teso (August 2012).

services and infrastructure, particularly health centres and schools. In this context, one respondent lamented that systems of customary land tenure are making '*development difficult*'[16] due to the prevalence of claims made in the face of public service development projects.

Regarding regional trends and dynamics, in Adjumani district, panellists drew attention to the specific threat posed by ongoing conflict with Amuru district:

> '*... the communities are fighting especially because of the people that move from Amuru and settle in Adjumani. The people of Adjumani are saying: "no you are settling in the wrong place and you must go back."*'[17]

Also in the context of conflict in Amuru and Adjumani districts, there were fears emanating from armed and poorly managed evictions involving the Uganda Wildlife Authority. In terms of drivers, in regions with a history of significant displacement such as Lango and Acholi, land disputes were commonly associated with the return of IDPs and subsequent boundary disputes between landowners or holders. A primary challenge was considered to be the loss of historical land demarcations. Such findings were indicative of broader problems posed by an insecure land tenure system based predominantly on undocumented customary rights. As one panellist explained:

> '*… at the local level in the villages, returnees are having problems … there is a big struggle for land with the boundaries; people have stayed in the camps for so long and have lost track of where their boundaries used to be …*'[18]

These testimonies were supported by community-level survey results among respondents who admitted to having been '*personally involved in conflict within the last two years*'. The major drivers cited for such conflicts were the '*destruction of land boundary marks*' and (to a lesser extent) '*people falsely claiming land*'.

In addition to the impact of displacement within the context of insecure land tenure, both quantitative and qualitative data pointed towards poverty as a significant driving factor behind land conflicts. It was commonly argued that the increasing commercialisation of land, teamed with growing realisation at community level of its worth, is dramatically fuelling land disputes. As a panellist in Amuru reasoned, '*poverty is bringing problems. Land is the only wealth we have and being a source of money, there are a lot of wrangles.*'[19] These arguments were supported by quantitative results at the community level, where two of the most commonly mentioned causes of conflict, in addition to those relating directly to land, were '*poverty/laziness and theft*' (23.5%) and '*greed and awareness of land value*' (7.7%).

## II. Domestic violence

According to the community-level survey results, domestic violence was the second most commonly mentioned form of conflict threatening confidence in sustained peace and security across all regions. Results gained in panel discussions reflected community-level survey results by confirming both its seriousness and prevalence. Indeed, physical fighting between partners, frequently over the control of household assets, arose as the most prevalent form of SGBV in qualitative results. This was supported by SGBV disaggregated community survey findings: both male and female respondents from all regions reported beating or fighting as the most prominent cases of gender-based violence (GBV) in their communities, followed by refusal to provide necessities.

16    Consensus panel, district level, Soroti-Teso (August 2012).
17    Consensus panel, district level, Adjumani-West Nile (August 2012).
18    Consensus panel, district level, Lira-Lango (June 2012).
19    Consensus panel, sub-county level, Amuru-Acholi (June 2012).

In terms of regional trends and dynamics, the community-level survey results showed that Acholi, Lango, Karamoja, Teso and Elgon regions had the highest percentages of respondents (over 70% in all) reporting the existence of GBV in their communities. This view was shared by both male and female respondents. Indeed, evidence gained in Karamoja districts and sub-county consensus panel discussions presented particularly strong perceptions of the prevalence and severity of SGBV in their region. Specific reference was made to practices such as female genital mutilation and child marriages/labour, which were commonly associated with the premature withdrawal of girls from school.

As well as featuring among regions reporting the highest levels of SGBV in their communities, Karamoja presented the widest gender disparity of those reporting confidence in sustained peace and security. Here, women (38.2%) made up a considerably smaller proportion than men (61.8%). Such evidence supports qualitative testimonies attesting to the prevalence and severity of SGBV in Karamoja by indicating that men are the main drivers of confidence in sustained peace and security in the region.

In terms of driving factors, as with the other prevalent forms of conflict/violence in the selected sub-regions, domestic violence had a strong economic dimension in both the quantitative and qualitative results. According to community-level survey results, "poverty" was the second most prevalent cause of SGBV, after "alcohol consumption and drug abuse", which also featured highly in the qualitative findings. This perception was mirrored in the panel discussions, where a common sense that '*domestic violence is really a part of the psycho-social effects of the war and the poverty attendant to recovery*'[20] was presented.

The impact of women's changing roles and responsibilities was also highlighted. Most notably, the increasing economic independence of women from their husbands was seen to have resulted in growing tension at the household level. It was commonly said that, during the period of crop cultivation, partners remain close and peaceful, only to fall apart following the harvest period, when it is time to sell the produce. Conflicts increase as partners struggle to control the proceeds of their work.

Similar arguments around cultural norms and practices were also used to explain the prevalence of SGBV. These included perceptions that the '*introduction of women's rights*' has led to the breakdown of respect for their husbands/male partners, and thus a justified escalation of violence in the home. It was commonly perceived that women are '*over-exercising*'[21] their rights. In order to ensure a conflict-sensitive approach, it was argued that the women's empowerment drive needs to have a double entry point targeting both men and women:

> '... my *problem is that the women have been trained but the men are not trained on how to manage SGBV. The women who are trained try to pass this information to their husbands but very little effect has been realised. Therefore we urge the government and other development partners to provide enough training to men if SGBV is to reduce in the district.*'[22]

### III. Incidence of crime

In support of the community-level survey results, qualitative evidence also presented a recurrent fear fuelled by crime, especially theft, at times violent, and involving the use of arms. Particularly worrying were testimonies in the Acholi narratives of youths colluding with "thugs" from different districts – implying that crime is taking on an organised nature in the region.

Notably in Lango and Acholi sub-regions, where the experience of displacement has been so widespread – although similar perceptions arose across regions – increasing levels of violent crime

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20   KI, district level, Lamwo-Acholi (June 2012).
21   Consensus panel, district level, Gulu-Acholi (June 2012).
22   Consensus panel, district level, Kitgum-Acholi (June 2012).

were commonly attributed to male youth, considered a '*lost generation*' due to having grown up in IDP camps. As a result, they were thought to have lacked both the formal education and morally instructive upbringing of former generations who grew up in more homogeneous communities. Largely uneducated and unemployed, this '*lost generation*' was considered vulnerable to falling into criminal activity and capable of posing a significant threat to sustained peace and security. This impression was subset within wider acknowledgement that rising levels of theft and crime are directly attributable to socio-economic challenges associated with high poverty levels:

> '*… this kind of poverty is what contributes to violence, people robbing each other, and also conflicts over land … the mindset of our youth who are facing economic challenges like unemployment, and so many others, which results usually in robbery and things like stealing of farm produce from gardens.*'[23]

It was also supported by quantitative results, where '*poverty/laziness/theft/not wanting to work*' were reported among the chief drivers for respondents who had been personally involved in conflict within the previous two years.

Other common drivers were reported as a lack of sufficient punitive and thus deterrent measures for criminals. This was due to perceptions that security and police services are under-resourced and, therefore, less able to respond to crimes effectively. They were also considered to be more prone to corruption. A common example was the demand for obligatory facilitation fees for fuel to enable police officers to respond to crime. According to these arguments, attributions of confidence in sustained peace and security to the improvement of security infrastructure were challenged by a recurrent perception that the resources required to operate and maintain these services are not available. As result, it was commonly felt that, although the police are '*doing their best*', their services are '*skeletal*'[24] in nature. These results are discussed in further detail under PCI 3(b) (conflict resolution mechanisms for addressing community-level security).

As noted earlier, the majority of respondents (68.8%) expressed confidence in sustained peace and security. Positive results under PCI 1 indicate that peacebuilding interventions have contributed to confidence in sustained peace and security in the PRDP regions surveyed. There was general recognition of government efforts to strengthen security infrastructure through increasing police presence. However, another strong driver of confidence was a sense of "relative peace". In the context of over two decades of armed conflict and displacement, the "absence of war for a long time" is driving people's confidence in its sustainability. Such results indicate that caution is required in over-attributing positive perceptions directly to government interventions. Confidence is being substantially driven by a comparison with the past.

Moreover, respondents commonly referred to continuing and, in some cases, escalating threats to peace and security in the form of '*pockets of violence*'. According to the findings highlighted above, these are mainly: land conflicts, domestic violence and crime/theft. Such drivers of insecurity need serious attention if peace is to be sustained.[25] These conflicts were predominantly interpersonal – whether over land, within the home or involving theft of property. Poverty, as a driving factor, cuts across all of them. As mirrored in the PRDP structure, interventions designed to promote peace and reconciliation cannot be viewed in isolation of broader drivers such as access to economic opportunities and basic services. In addition, such interventions must be focused at community level, and sensitive to the complex interplay between poverty and conflict. As one panellist reasoned: '*The biggest problem was the war … armed war; we don't have armed war now; we have war with poverty, war with access to services … war with attitudes of the people.*'[26]

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23   Consensus panel, district level, Kitgum-Acholi (June 2012).
24   Consensus panel, sub-county level, Amuria-Teso (June 2012).
25   According to the ACCS conflict analysis of northern Uganda, which offers a snapshot of prominent drivers fuelling tension among communities in all eight sub-regions, some of these situations have already escalated into violent conflicts. (See ACCS (2012). Op. cit.)
26   Consensus panel, sub-county level, Otuke-Lango (June 2012).

# 3. Local government responsiveness to community needs

PCI 2 results focus on how local governments determine service delivery priorities and the extent to which those priorities respond to community needs, particularly in the areas of health, professional/vocational skills and education. Perceptions collected at individual and community levels show how the aspirations of citizens, and the community as a whole, are reflected in local government priorities, budget allocations and services. The analysis also reveals whether feelings of marginalisation and alienation in delivery of health services, education services and opportunities to acquire professional/vocational skills have shifted as a result of the PCDP and PRDP investments; and the extent to which this has contributed to achieving desired societal conditions. This was a general indicator – the pertinent questions were posed to all respondents in the survey.

## 3.1 Statistical overview

Overall, across regions, the proportion of respondents positively assessing that local government is responsive to community was just above average, at 52.1% (2,075 respondents). Regarding results on community participation, a much smaller percentage (33.8%) of respondents overall attested that they had engaged with local government service delivery planning activities.

By region, high percentages of those positively assessing local government responsiveness were obtained from Elgon (71.7%) and Bukedi (62.9%), while the lowest was from Bunyoro (39.4%) (see Table 4). Comparing this result with the 2011 results for Acholi and Lango, there was an increase of 11.5 percentage points (from 43.6% in 2011 to 55.1% in 2012) in Acholi and an increase of 8.8 percentage points (from 43.7% in 2011 to 52.5% in 2012) in Lango.

**Table 4: Proportion of sample assessing that local government is responsive to community needs**

| Region | Have you ever participated in local government service delivery planning activities? | | Indicator Is your local government responsive to community needs (PCI 2)? | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Yes | | Yes | |
| | No. | % | No. | % |
| Acholi | 261 | 34.4 | 419 | 55.1 |
| Bukedi | 66 | 37.1 | 112 | 62.9 |
| Bunyoro | 77 | 41.0 | 74 | 39.4 |
| Elgon | 79 | 42.2 | 134 | 71.7 |
| Karamoja | 135 | 24.5 | 257 | 46.6 |
| Lango | 137 | 36.7 | 197 | 52.5 |
| Teso | 120 | 28.2 | 208 | 48.8 |
| West Nile | 317 | 42.4 | 398 | 53.1 |
| Control | 151 | 26.6 | 277 | 48.9 |
| Total | 1,343 | 33.8 | 2,076 | 52.1 |

Disaggregation of those who said their local governments were responsive to community needs (52.1%, 2,076 respondents) by gender and age groups shows close agreement in perception between females (49.3%) and males (50.7%), and more respondents in the younger age group sharing this perception (see Table 5).

**Table 5: Disaggregation of those assessing that local government is responsive to community needs**

| Region | Yes No. | Yes % | Male No. | Male % | Female No. | Female % | 18–36 No. | 18–36 % | 37–54 No. | 37–54 % | 55+ No. | 55+ % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Acholi | 419 | 55.1 | 211 | 50.4 | 208 | 49.6 | 242 | 57.8 | 125 | 29.8 | 52 | 12.4 |
| Bukedi | 112 | 62.9 | 54 | 48.2 | 58 | 51.8 | 63 | 56.3 | 39 | 34.8 | 10 | 8.9 |
| Bunyoro | 74 | 39.4 | 38 | 51.4 | 36 | 48.6 | 40 | 54.1 | 28 | 37.8 | 6 | 8.1 |
| Elgon | 134 | 71.7 | 62 | 46.3 | 72 | 53.7 | 93 | 69.4 | 29 | 21.6 | 12 | 9.0 |
| Karamoja | 257 | 46.6 | 157 | 61.1 | 100 | 38.9 | 121 | 47.1 | 98 | 38.1 | 38 | 14.8 |
| Lango | 197 | 52.5 | 89 | 45.2 | 108 | 54.8 | 107 | 54.3 | 65 | 33.0 | 25 | 12.7 |
| Teso | 208 | 48.8 | 118 | 56.7 | 90 | 43.3 | 101 | 48.6 | 77 | 37.0 | 30 | 14.4 |
| West Nile | 398 | 53.1 | 194 | 48.7 | 204 | 51.3 | 233 | 58.5 | 119 | 29.9 | 46 | 11.6 |
| Control | 277 | 48.9 | 129 | 46.6 | 148 | 53.4 | 199 | 71.8 | 62 | 22.4 | 16 | 5.8 |
| **Total No./ Average %** | **2,076** | **52.1** | **1,052** | **50.7** | **1,024** | **49.3** | **1,199** | **57.8** | **642** | **30.9** | **235** | **11.3** |

It is important to note that, in the overall sample, 37.1% of the respondents were of the opinion that their local governments were not responsive to community needs, while 10.8% did not know whether they were or not. The largest proportion of those stating that local governments were not responsive to community needs came from Bunyoro (54.8%) and the lowest from Elgon (24.1%). The proportions of those who shared this perception in the other regions were as follows: Control (42.9%), Teso (44.1%), Lango (38.1%), Acholi (36.5%), Karamoja (35.8%), Bukedi (30.9%) and West Nile (30%).

By sector, education received the most positive results: 28.5% of the respondents from all regions rated the quality of primary education provided by government as good, followed by 27.8% who rated it as fair. However, negative perceptions of primary education services were considerable, with 23.5% rating it as poor and 9.6% rating it as very poor. With regard to secondary education, 29.2% of the respondents rated the quality as good, followed by 25.3% who rated it as fair and 14.1% who rated it as poor. With regard to vocational skills training, it is notable that the majority of respondents were not able to comment, with 52.4% from all regions reporting that they did not know about the quality of vocational skills training provided by government. Of the remaining respondents, 14.3% rated it as fair, 12.3% as poor and 5.9% as very poor. Such a result indicates, firstly, a lack of engagement with and/ or knowledge of these services and, secondly, a negative perception among those who are in a position to make such an assessment.

Finally, in relation to other sectors, health received the most negative perceptions, with 27.6% of respondents rating the quality of health services provided by the government as poor and 12.2% as very poor. The majority (28.2%), however, rated them as fair followed by 20.5% who rated them as good.

## 3.2 Drivers influencing local government responsiveness to community needs

### Positive drivers

Among those respondents who reported that local government was responsive to community needs, 22.9% felt that local governments provided much-needed education services, followed by those who noted the provision of health services (19.5%) and security (15.9%) (see Table 6).

Table 6: How local government is responsive to community needs

| How is your local government responsive to community needs? | Acholi | Bukedi | Bunyoro | Elgon | Karamoja | Lango | Teso | West Nile | Control | Average |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % | % |
| Provides education | 25.0 | 28.9 | 21.5 | 21.7 | 17.8 | 24.4 | 20.3 | 21.7 | 24.9 | 22.9 |
| Provides healthcare services | 21.0 | 23.9 | 20.2 | 14.5 | 17.8 | 17.9 | 19.3 | 17.8 | 23.2 | 19.5 |
| Provides security | 11.7 | 20.6 | 10.9 | 13.9 | 19.5 | 11.2 | 20.3 | 19.5 | 13.9 | 15.9 |
| Provides agricultural aid | 14.3 | 9.6 | 15.4 | 11.7 | 16.0 | 14.8 | 11.3 | 8.7 | 12.8 | 12.6 |
| Water services | 10.5 | 5.6 | 14.2 | 15.1 | 16.4 | 15.7 | 12.9 | 14.5 | 7.1 | 12.6 |
| Builds and maintains roads | 13.0 | 8.0 | 13.4 | 10.8 | 10.7 | 13.4 | 12.9 | 10.7 | 12.5 | 11.8 |
| Involves citizenry in planning | 2.4 | 3.0 | 3.6 | 12.0 | 1.8 | 2.4 | 1.3 | 4.6 | 5.3 | 3.6 |
| Credit services | 2.0 | 0.3 | 0.8 | 0.3 | 0.1 | 0.2 | 1.6 | 2.4 | 0.4 | 1.2 |
| Total | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 | 100 |

In the qualitative evidence, the role played by the PRDP in improving service delivery infrastructure, for instance, building schools and hospitals, was commonly noted. One respondent saw such improvements as corresponding directly to an improvement in the peace and security environment: '*when you went to schools, there were large numbers sitting in one room but now there is construction of infrastructure in the area and this has brought peace.*'[27]

Another common factor influencing positive perceptions in the panel discussions was an impression of the community's active engagement in service delivery and budget prioritisation. This was seen as a direct result of the local government participatory planning structure used to incorporate community needs from village up to district levels:

> '*... on my part I would say there is confidence because they usually actively participate in development programmes; they come willingly to discuss and share with you issues that concern them.*'[28]

However, such an impression was not supported by the community-level survey, where a sizeable 63.1% of the respondents reported having never participated in local government planning activities because they had never been invited. Only 16.3% of the respondents reported having provided and sought information in planning meetings. Such impressions were reflected in counter-concerns raised in panel discussions regarding insufficient community mobilisation for, and engagement with, the planning process at lower levels, the details of which are analysed below – among other factors, influencing negative perceptions of local government responsiveness to community needs in both quantitative and qualitative evidence.

## Negative drivers

At the community level, the primary reasons given for dissatisfaction with services provided in education, health and vocational skills training were: inadequate staffing; the facilities not being

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27   Consensus panel, sub-county level, Kiryandongo–Bunyoro (June 2012).
28   Consensus panel, district level, Kotido–Karamoja (June 2012).

well equipped; and the need to travel long distances in order to access them. Overall, healthcare services were rated as the most lacking, at 19.9% of all mentions, followed by education services (17.1%), road network (13.8%) and water provision (12.6%).

Due to its direct engagement with local government officials, at district and sub-county levels, qualitative evidence gained in panel discussions offered particularly important insights in relation to the community-level results. On the one hand, these respondents supported findings of community dissatisfaction by affirming that they were aware of it, as well as partially validating it by admitting to service provision gaps and their own capacity deficiencies. On the other, the district- and sub-county-level respondents were able to offer a defence of such deficiencies and, in doing so, provided an additional layer of insight.

The two most common arguments advanced by panel respondents in this respect were: restrictions on their ability to respond to community needs due to funding/resource limitations, commonly blamed on conditions and constraints imposed by central government; and lack of community knowledge with regard to such restrictions, due to insufficient sensitisation of and/or engagement with planning, monitoring and evaluation processes for service delivery – each of which will be discussed through comparison with the quantitative results in the following sections.

## I. Inadequate service provision

In terms of correlating quantitative and qualitative results, the three key drivers of negative perceptions relating to health, education and vocational skills training presented at community level (inadequate staffing, not being well equipped and long distances) were supported by arguments advanced in the panel discussions relating to resource and funding restrictions.

Again, in support of community results, such limitations were often viewed as affecting health service provision in particular. For instance, one Karamoja respondent admitted that they did not have enough medical personnel in Kotido district to respond to community needs, which has led to people not '*responding very well to the government; they say government money is little*'.[29] It was commonly appreciated that infrastructure has been put in place – schools and health centres built – but the resources required to sustain and run them were considered unavailable. Such deficiencies have led panellists to characterise services as '*mere structures*'.[30] This was seen particularly in the case of staff shortages, but also in terms of a lack of medication in health centres and even amenities such as water and electricity in hospitals and schools. As a respondent in the Lango panel discussions commented:

> '… *the government budget for the health centres is not enough like the drugs we receive …  even the hospital staff … when you look around we do not have enough water services … this is really frustrating … in relation to the hospital there are things lacking in the maternity wing for safe motherhood or delivery … even the children's wards are not there …*'[31]

Limited budget allocations from the central government resulted in feelings of marginalisation among the respondents. Service delivery was characterised as being centrally dictated, rather than a demand-driven provision. In some contexts, such reliance on the centre was viewed as ultimately undermining the legitimacy of Uganda's decentralised government structure. It was felt that those districts without alternative sources of revenue could not avoid having their activities prescribed centrally. Indeed, in the validation meetings, it emerged that there could be a sense of frustration from the side of the citizenry with regard to planning arising from repeated planning activities and yet activities are not usually carried forward because they do not correspond to central government interests.[32]

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29   Consensus panel, district level, Moroto-Karamoja (June 2012).

30   Consensus panels, district level, Kitgum-Acholi (August 2012) and Abim-Karamoja (August 2012).

31   Consensus panel, sub-county level, Lira-Lango (June 2012).

32   Soroti validation meeting, 18th January 2013; Arua validation meeting, 22nd January 2013; and Gulu validation meeting, 24th January 2013.

*'… budgeting and planning is controlled by the centre, especially in the local governments that have low local revenue base. If the centre doesn't bring money, you cannot do anything, so whereas there is talk of decentralisation, the power over resources is not there.'*[33]

It was also felt that the monitoring of projects centrally is hindering local government's ability to respond to community needs. Assertions of this nature were commonly made in relation to limited information and sensitisation regarding the PRDP activities in the communities. This was thought to have resulted in an inability to monitor contractors at local levels, as well as attribute development projects to their specific funding sources. The subsequent lack of transparency, alongside testimonies of '*shoddy work*'[34] being done by government contractors, gave rise to allegations of corruption in the award of tenders for the PRDP activities. As well as frustration directed towards central government, such feelings of disempowerment and inability to meaningfully engage in project planning, implementation and monitoring were also commonly voiced at the sub-county level in relation to the control exercised by district-level government.

## II. Limited community engagement

The high frequency of confident assertions that participatory planning structures are positively influencing local government responsiveness to community needs in the qualitative findings contrasted with low results for community participation in the survey. Only 16.3% of the respondents reported having ever substantively engaged with such structures. However, qualitative evidence also presented strong counter-perceptions of a "gap" between policy and practice with regard to participatory planning. Panellists frequently asserted that implementation of community priorities is often frustrated by prevailing challenges, including budget restrictions and inadequate engagement with the process at lower levels. For instance, in Acholi, panel respondents raised concerns that some groups can be marginalised from the planning process as a result of poor mobilisation, leading to low turnout levels. A general lack of awareness among communities regarding their role in the planning processes was also highlighted: '*… the way it is handled is not very good because people are not always sensitised; they don't know about their roles.*'[35] Such impressions were supported by community-level results noted earlier, where a sizeable 63.1% of the respondents had never participated in local government planning activities because they had never been invited. However, in the qualitative evidence, high attendance was not thought to necessarily correspond with quality participation. This was seen particularly in the case of gender disparities: '*… women do not participate as broadly as men in planning meetings even if they attend … they are afraid to talk.*'[36]

Other challenges in the implementation of service delivery were those associated with a '*lack of ownership*'[37] on the part of the community towards the services provided to them. This was thought to be having a direct and negative effect on the sustainability of government programmes. For instance, rather than maintain a borehole, communities were said to '*run to the sub-county to complain*'.[38] Such a lack of ownership was considered by one panellist to be '*the biggest challenge in service delivery in this area*'.[39]

Finally, it was widely raised in the panel discussions that negative perceptions of local government responsiveness to community needs were being driven by insufficient feedback and follow-up in the aftermath of community planning meetings:

*'I am noticing laxity in giving feedback to the communities once they have sent their priorities, because they expect feedback … to inform them what's going to be done, where, and what can't be done within the year.'*[40]

33    Consensus panel, sub-county level, Tororo-Bukedi (September 2012).
34    Consensus panel, district level, Abim-Karamoja (August 2012).
35    Consensus panel, district level, Kitgum-Acholi (August 2012).
36    Consensus panel, district level, Otuke-Lango (June 2012).
37    Consensus panel, sub-county level, Tororo-Bukedi (September 2012).
38    Consensus panel, sub-county level, Mbale-Elgon (September 2012).
39    Consensus panel, sub-county level, Tororo-Bukedi (September 2012).
40    Consensus panel, district level, Otuke-Lango (June 2012).

It was felt that a lack of such engagement was resulting in communities resigning themselves from local government planning activities:

> '... *because if not, when you hold the next meeting the following year, they won't come because they'll think nothing has been done because of a lack of feedback.*'[41]

General levels of satisfaction with government responsiveness to community needs in the areas of health, education and vocational skills training were average – implying the need for significant improvement. A worrying figure of 37.1% of the respondents felt that their local governments were not responsive to community needs.[42] The impact of the PRDP interventions in improving service delivery infrastructure, particularly by building schools and hospitals, was recognised. However, pervasive resource and funding limitations were considered to be severely inhibiting local government's ability to fully operationalise such services. Subsequent gaps in service provision were seen to be affecting the health sector in particular, where shortages in staff and medical supplies are driving negative perceptions of government responsiveness to community needs.

The lack of access to basic services and substandard infrastructure along with the perceived neglect of community needs by the authorities, exacerbated by districts' resource and staffing shortages amidst allegations of widespread corruption, continue to fuel grievances in northern Uganda. Poor infrastructure and failure to deliver basic services by state institutions has been a significant barrier to peacebuilding, while contributing to resentment and hostility towards state institutions. The dominant perception among communities is continued deliberate exclusion and marginalisation.

In terms of community engagement with local government planning activities, despite widespread acknowledgement of participatory planning policies and structures with the potential to ensure local government responsiveness to community needs, the results presented a "gap" between policy and practice. Results highlighted low levels of community participation in planning activities and, where it does occur, insufficient follow-up and feedback by local government in the aftermath of priority setting. A sizeable 63.1% of the respondents reported having never participated in local government planning activities because they had never been invited. This is worrying as it points to the lack of the community's active engagement in service delivery budget prioritisation. The participatory planning processes praised in many official documents are not a reality, as there is no robust evidence on how this happens in practice and their impacts.[43]

The study has found that service delivery is marked by a lack of participation and involvement at all levels of governance. The district-level officials expressed frustration and feelings of disempowerment in relation to central government due to their inability to meaningfully engage in project planning, implementation and monitoring. Sub-county representatives directed similar frustration towards district-level governance structures. The local communities in turn also presented a sense of exclusion from local government planning processes and service delivery.

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41   Ibid.

42   Many studies have provided evidence that the communities are not satisfied with the provision of services by local governments. The PRDP Mid-Term Review recognised that northern districts are under-staffed and under-performing – this, of course, leads to poor service delivery. According to the conflict analysis of northern Uganda, the dominant and damaging perception among northerners is that inadequate service delivery and failures to repair and maintain infrastructure are the outcome, at best, of neglect and, at worst, of a deliberate attempt to keep the north down. (ACCS (2012). Op. cit.)

43   Trócaire (2008). 'On the Road to Recovery – Uganda Country Strategy Paper 2008–2012'. Kampala, Uganda.

# 4. Dispute-resolution mechanisms (DRMs)

## 4.1 Do DRMs address SGBV satisfactorily?

PCI 3(a) results are concerned primarily with the effectiveness of DRMs in dealing with cases of SGBV by measuring perceptions of how satisfactorily they do so. In addition, changes in the visibility of and attitudes towards SGBV at individual and community levels are presented. In the context of tracking societal/attitudinal norms and practices, PCI 3(a) also measures sensitisation efforts, particularly those involving the use of the media, and whether they have helped to curb SGBV in the communities. In calculating this indicator, the analysis isolated respondents who had been personally affected by SGBV, and who had reported the case to a DRM in their community. The opinions of these respondents were then analysed for results on the indicator question. This filter was important in order to control the influence of speculative responses by those who had not personally engaged with DRMs for SGBV.

### 4.1.1 Statistical overview

The overall percentage of respondents perceiving that DRMs address SGBV satisfactorily was 64.6%. This percentage was highest in West Nile (81%), followed by Karamoja (77.8%) and lowest in Bunyoro (36.4%). In Lango, it was 50% and, in Acholi, 49.1%. Important to note for this result are the numbers involved (see Table 7). Of those respondents who had been personally involved in conflict in the two years preceding the survey, 43.6% reported that it had involved various forms of SGBV. However, 30% of these matters were not reported to any authority or DRM.

**Table 7: Incidence of SGBV and proportion assessing that DRMs respond to SGBV satisfactorily**

| Region | Involved in any conflict at personal level in past two years? Yes | | Was the personal conflict SGBV? Yes | | Was the SGBV matter reported to any authority? Yes | | Indicator Did the authority respond to the SGBV matter satisfactorily? Yes | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % |
| Acholi | 318 | 41.8 | 70 | 22.0 | 53 | 75.7 | 26 | 49.1 |
| Bukedi | 27 | 15.2 | 20 | 74.1 | 15 | 75.0 | 9 | 60.0 |
| Bunyoro | 68 | 36.2 | 19 | 27.9 | 11 | 57.9 | 4 | 36.4 |
| Elgon | 40 | 21.4 | 34 | 85.0 | 25 | 73.5 | 14 | 56.0 |
| Karamoja | 194 | 35.2 | 135 | 69.6 | 72 | 53.3 | 56 | 77.8 |
| Lango | 137 | 36.5 | 40 | 29.2 | 32 | 80.0 | 16 | 50.0 |
| Teso | 139 | 32.6 | 81 | 58.3 | 64 | 79.0 | 42 | 65.6 |
| West Nile | 138 | 18.4 | 53 | 38.4 | 42 | 79.2 | 34 | 81.0 |
| Control | 95 | 16.8 | 52 | 54.7 | 39 | 75.0 | 27 | 69.2 |
| Total No./ Average % | 1,156 | 29.0 | 504 | 43.6 | 353 | 70.0 | 228 | 64.6 |

Further analysis shows that, among the 228 respondents who reported that DRMs satisfactorily respond to SGBV, 48.3% had used the local council/councillor (LC) system, while 37.7% had used the clan system or had the matter resolved at family level. Generally, there was minimal forum shopping with most respondents (55.7%) using only one option to resolve an SGBV matter (see Table 8).

**Table 8: Options and number of authorities approached to satisfactorily respond to SGBV**

|  |  | Male | | Female | | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
|  |  | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % |
| **Option that satisfactorily responded to the SGBV matter** | LC system | 49 | 50.5 | 61 | 46.5 | 110 | 48.3 |
|  | Clan system | 36 | 37.2 | 50 | 38.2 | 86 | 37.7 |
|  | Police and court | 8 | 8.2 | 15 | 11.5 | 23 | 10.1 |
|  | Mediation options (religious leaders, politicians, traditional leaders) | 4 | 4.1 | 5 | 3.8 | 9 | 3.9 |
|  | **Total** | **97** | **100** | **131** | **100** | **228** | **100** |
| **No. of authorities approached before matter was satisfactorily responded to** | 1 | 51 | 52.6 | 76 | 58.0 | 127 | 55.7 |
|  | 2 | 36 | 37.1 | 44 | 33.6 | 80 | 35.1 |
|  | 3 | 10 | 10.3 | 11 | 8.4 | 21 | 9.2 |
|  | **Total** | **97** | **100** | **131** | **100** | **228** | **100** |

## 4.1.2 Drivers of perceptions on whether DRMs are addressing SGBV satisfactorily

### I. DRMs

Panel respondents commonly felt that victims of SGBV are denied justice due to the overwhelming community preference for managing cases through informal channels as opposed to the police or courts. In addition, attention was frequently drawn to the prevalence of case mismanagement as a result of capacity deficiencies and corruption in the formal system. Another challenge to the majority of respondents who perceived that DRMs address SGBV satisfactorily was the strong perception of its prevalence as a significant threat to peace and security, in both the quantitative and qualitative evidence. Indeed, domestic violence appeared as the second most frequently mentioned form of conflict in the survey results. In order to understand how the results relate to each other, it was necessary to examine the term "satisfactorily". One way of doing so was to analyse in more detail the types of DRMs being used to manage SGBV.

In the qualitative evidence gained in panel discussions, there was common recognition of efforts to improve the effectiveness of formal mechanisms for dealing with SGBV, including the development of, and community sensitisation to, referral pathways. However, the overriding impression was of community preference for using informal (traditional/local-level) mechanisms: '*[the] majority of cases are handled locally or culturally and very few cases are taken to the courts of law.*'[44] The two most common mechanisms used in this context were: mediation by local and cultural leaders, the methods of which were in some cases perceived as synonymous, with one respondent commenting: '*LCs usually use the cultural method of resolving these problems*';[45] and, secondly, direct negotiation between the parties involved, whereby compensation terms are agreed. Often coupled with such claims were arguments that reporting cases through the formal justice system can actually exacerbate disputes further, leading to '*misunderstandings*'.[46] Respondents reasoned that '*… cases of domestic violence are handled well here*' because the accused is '*not arrested but summoned for a round-table discussion. If both parties are not convinced, then we summon*

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44  Consensus panel, sub-county level, Kotido-Karamoja (August 2012).
45  Consensus panel, district level, Amuria-Teso (August 2012).
46  Consensus panel, sub-county level, Soroti-Teso (August 2012).

*their parents so that we harmonise both parties. They are taken home after reaching a common consensus.*'[47] Particularly in the context of domestic violence, this form of resolution was seen to be favourable for both parties, as female victims were considered reluctant to lose the financial and familial support of their partners if they were to be imprisoned.

### 'Making it a business'

However, panel respondents did not always view such informal mediation and negotiation measures so positively. In fact, they were often associated with a clear denial of justice for the victim. Of particular concern to such respondents was the prevalence of out-of-court settlements in cases where a child has been abused. It appears that parents, in order to reap maximum material gains, are manipulating the laws against SGBV. In what could be termed the informal "commercialisation" of SGBV dispute resolution, panellists reported that parents are using the threat of formal prosecution to add weight to negotiation of informal compensation packages. Such practices led one respondent to claim that they are '*making it a business*'.[48]

A particularly troubling example arose in the West Nile panel discussions, where one respondent told of a father who sent his daughter to live with a man, only to later claim that the man had raped her. While reporting the incident to the police, he, at the same time, offered the accused an out-of-court settlement. As well as its significance for the management of SGBV, this example is indicative of a wider context presented across the qualitative evidence, in which two parallel conflict-resolution structures are being used by communities simultaneously: the statutory and the customary. However, rather than operating in harmony, through integrated approaches, communities appear to be using the two structures against each other. Similar examples arose in the context of land disputes, where unfavourable court decisions are ignored and cultural leaders turn to alternative rulings. As a result, both informal and formal justice systems lose influence and legitimacy, and systems become subverted for personal gain. In this case, it also implies that legislation introduced to protect individuals from SGBV is actually indirectly making them more vulnerable to it.

### Defining "satisfactorily"

According to these testimonies, the definition of "satisfactorily" in relation to the ability of DRMs to address cases of SGBV is relative. As the qualitative evidence attests, and the quantitative evidence supports, communities are inclined to use informal methods to resolve SGBV, whether through the mediation assistance of local councillors or cultural leaders or direct negotiation between the parties involved. On the one hand, respondents viewed such methods as entirely satisfactory, as they lead to '*harmonisation*'[49] and reconciliation of the parties involved, rather than aggravating the situation further through the threat of formal prosecution. In this context, "satisfactorily" could mean the agreement of compensation packages, whereby parents benefit financially, or the negotiation of child marriages to avoid disgrace and public exposure (testimonies of which arose most notably in the Karamoja panel discussions). On the other hand, as the qualitative results attest, such practices mean that victims '*remain vulnerable*'[50] and the perpetrators are free to act with relative impunity. Indeed, the preference among parents to settle cases within the family, for financial gain or otherwise, leads to perceptions that '*irresponsible parenthood*' is the '*primary cause*'[51] of SGBV, as expressed in the panel discussions.

Deeper analysis points to high proportions of community-level respondents reporting that DRMs address SGBV satisfactorily, alongside an equally high proportion who viewed it as one of the most prevalent threats to peace and security at community level. This has significant and valuable implications. It indicates, on the one hand, that the informal mechanisms being applied are favourably resolving disputes for the families of victims, the perpetrators and even the victims

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47    Consensus panel, sub-county level, Gulu-Acholi (June 2012).
48    Consensus panel, district level, Soroti-Teso (August 2012).
49    Consensus panel, district level, Amuria-Teso (August 2012).
50    Consensus panel, district level, Moroto-Karamoja (September 2012).
51    Consensus panel, district level, Soroti-Teso (August 2012).

themselves in cases where avoiding the loss of familial support from a partner or public exposure are of concern. This argument presents the distinction between the elitist and common person's definition of what works. The sub-county and district panels that involved public servants who were inclined more towards retributive justice felt that DRMs do not work in the face of SGBV; on the other hand, the survey and the parish-level panels, with ordinary citizens more concerned with restorative justice, felt that the DRMs work in the face of SGBV.

However, it also implies that punitive measures designed to deter perpetrators from committing the crime of SGBV do not work. These measures are mostly in the formal justice system, which is clearly avoided. This leads to questions regarding the extent to which such behaviour is considered criminal in the communities surveyed.

The following section will look in more detail at the second area of focus under PCI 3(a): norms, values and perceptual changes in practices that tolerate SGBV.[52]

## II. Societal norms, traditions and practices

Overall, results under PCI 3(a) relating to changes in societal norms and practices that encourage SGBV were encouraging, with 63% of respondents from all regions reporting that they had noticed a decrease in factors that exacerbate SGBV. Similarly, the results showed that the majority (37.2%) of respondents from all regions reported that the belief that GBV was natural and legitimate was very weak, followed by 30.9% who said that it was weak. However, 15.1% reported that it was strong.

In the context of DRMs among respondents who said they would not report SGBV, 53.2% said that the matter could be resolved at home; 21.9% were afraid and/or would be ashamed; and 12.8% indicated that it was not within their norms and values to report such a matter.

By gender, a larger percentage of females (76.7%) than males (68.8%) confirmed that they would report the matter if they were victims of SGBV. This result was supported by qualitative evidence attesting to fear of reporting among male victims due to the social stigma attached to such cases.

The qualitative evidence also supported the overall impression that societal norms encouraging SGBV are shifting, by giving testimony to the increasing prevalence of women asserting equal rights, particularly financial independence, in relation to men. However, rather than resulting in fewer cases of SGBV, this was seen to be exacerbating tensions between women and their partners, resulting in increased violence and conflict in the home. Such arguments highlight the importance of conflict-sensitive approaches to gender interventions. One way of doing so would be to ensure the inclusion of men, especially family members, at all stages of sensitisation.

With regard to gender interventions, results showed that their reach is still limited, with 50.9% of respondents from all regions reporting that they have never been exposed to campaigns that say that GBV is not legitimate. Of those who had, most (37.4%) reported that the exposure campaigns were run by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), followed by 18.5% who reported that the campaigns were run by political leaders and 15.8% who said that they were run by police. The roles played by the media and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in sensitisation efforts to reduce SGBV were also commonly recognised in the panel discussions at district and sub-county levels. However, it was felt that wider exposure and impact would be achieved by direct engagement at the community level through, for example, drama productions rather than the media. Although the radio has a broad penetration in the communities surveyed, some respondents noted that it is usually men who own radio sets and thus control what is listened to. Drama, on the other hand, has the ability to openly engage all members of the community.

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52  Past studies in this area have found that, at the societal level, customary and traditional practices (and sometimes religious beliefs) lead to forms of SGBV, which include dowry-related problems, female circumcision and child marriage or early marriage – all of which are practices that are traditionally still legal and prevalent in many countries, including Uganda.

The views at the community level on DRMs for addressing SGBV satisfactorily gave an impression that they are functioning effectively. However, on examination of the context of qualitative evidence that demonstrates how and the extent to which informal mechanisms are being applied, a different picture is presented. Although such mechanisms are resolving disputes "satisfactorily", in the sense that they are achieving consensus and, in some cases, financial compensation for the victims and their families, they are not operating as punitive deterrent measures.[53] Poverty no doubt plays a role in driving such practices, but they also point towards the existence of norms and values that limit the extent to which SGBV is viewed as criminal. The potential "commercialisation" of conflict resolution for SGBV cases in such instances requires further attention, and should be perceived as a form of violence in itself.

One way of responding to this problem would be to increase and improve sensitisation on justice mechanisms. It is possible that users are not fully aware of the reach of such justice mechanisms. The apparent preference for consensus-based restorative justice does not necessarily mean that communities are achieving peace. As has been shown, informal mechanisms are not immune to power imbalances and other dynamics. One or more of the parties involved could have greater influence over the final outcome, and the victim's hurt may not be recognised. Equally, retributive approaches do not automatically serve to invite further conflict. Ultimately, an approach that incorporates both restorative and deterrent measures should be the goal. This could mean a hybrid of formal and informal mechanisms using integrated yet distinct approaches, with clear appellant relations and finality in decision-making. But it should *not* mean two parallel structures that are manipulated and used against each other for personal gain. Ensuring communities – as well as local leaders and those in the justice sector – understand the specific objectives and comparative benefits of each approach could achieve this.

With regard to changes in perceptions of societal norms and values that encourage SGBV, results indicated the need for sensitisation methods to be revised in order to: increase community exposure; and reduce the propensity to inadvertently aggravate domestic violence. Although normative shifts were apparent in both quantitative and qualitative findings, they were commonly characterised as women "over-exercising" their rights and inciting conflict in the home. These perceptions were supported by results under PCI 1, which showed that domestic violence is the second most prevalent form of conflict in the surveyed regions, after land disputes. In sum, such results make a strong argument for more conflict-sensitive approaches to SGBV and gender interventions to be exercised more widely.

## 4.2 Do DRMs address community-level security?

PCI 3(b) results are concerned with the effectiveness of DRMs in addressing community-level security. These include formal statutory structures such as the police and courts, but also informal customary mechanisms applied, for example, by local and cultural leaders. Results assess the availability and accessibility of conflict-resolution institutions and their functionality (distance, institutions and costs) in addressing conflicts and disputes. In doing so, they address how, and the extent to which, both statutory and customary institutions play a role in ensuring peace and security at community level. They also present perceptions relating to the improvement or the rate at which conflicts/disputes are resolved. Through such an assessment, results document how DRMs impact on overall levels of peace and security at community level.

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53   Supported by PCI 1 (confidence in sustained peace and security) results, where domestic violence was reported as the second most common form of conflict.

## 4.2.1 Statistical overview

The majority of respondents (77.1%, 3,070 respondents) from all regions reported that DRMs address community-level security satisfactorily (see Table 9). An even higher percentage (81.9%) attested that they felt safe in their communities, despite many (72.9%) reporting that they were experiencing community-level peace and security disruptions. By region, Karamoja presented the lowest proportion (67.2%) of respondents perceiving DRMs as effective, and West Nile the highest (89.1%).

**Table 9: DRMs addressing community-level security**

| Region | Conflict taking place within respondent's community | | Presence of initiatives to ensure peace and security within respondent's community | | Do you feel secure/ safe in your community? | | Indicator Do DRMs in your community address community-level security disruptions satisfactorily? | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Yes | | Yes | | Yes | | Yes | |
| | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % |
| Acholi | 663 | 87.1 | 563 | 74.0 | 610 | 80.2 | 576 | 75.7 |
| Bukedi | 83 | 46.6 | 146 | 82.0 | 148 | 83.1 | 135 | 75.8 |
| Bunyoro | 153 | 81.4 | 123 | 65.4 | 147 | 78.2 | 136 | 72.3 |
| Elgon | 131 | 70.1 | 160 | 85.6 | 138 | 73.8 | 145 | 77.5 |
| Karamoja | 417 | 75.7 | 446 | 80.9 | 468 | 84.9 | 370 | 67.2 |
| Lango | 298 | 79.5 | 271 | 72.3 | 344 | 91.7 | 316 | 84.3 |
| Teso | 327 | 76.8 | 292 | 68.5 | 357 | 83.8 | 318 | 74.6 |
| West Nile | 454 | 60.6 | 554 | 74.0 | 648 | 86.5 | 667 | 89.1 |
| Control | 377 | 66.5 | 392 | 69.1 | 400 | 70.5 | 406 | 71.6 |
| Total No./ Average % | 2,903 | 72.9 | 2,947 | 74.0 | 3,260 | 81.9 | 3,069 | 77.1 |

The indicator result disaggregated by gender and age groups is shown in Table 10.

**Table 10: DRMs and community-level security disaggregated by gender and age**

| Region | Yes | | Male | | Female | | 18–36 | | 37–54 | | 55+ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % |
| Acholi | 576 | 75.7 | 279 | 48.4 | 297 | 51.6 | 332 | 57.6 | 166 | 28.8 | 78 | 13.5 |
| Bukedi | 135 | 75.8 | 69 | 51.1 | 66 | 48.9 | 67 | 49.6 | 53 | 39.3 | 15 | 11.1 |
| Bunyoro | 136 | 72.3 | 64 | 47.1 | 72 | 52.9 | 74 | 54.4 | 50 | 36.8 | 12 | 8.8 |
| Elgon | 145 | 77.5 | 75 | 51.7 | 70 | 48.3 | 97 | 66.9 | 36 | 24.8 | 12 | 8.3 |
| Karamoja | 370 | 67.2 | 222 | 60.0 | 148 | 40.0 | 183 | 49.5 | 124 | 33.5 | 63 | 17.0 |
| Lango | 316 | 84.3 | 155 | 49.1 | 161 | 50.9 | 157 | 49.7 | 107 | 33.9 | 52 | 16.5 |
| Teso | 318 | 74.6 | 163 | 51.3 | 155 | 48.7 | 164 | 51.6 | 114 | 35.8 | 40 | 12.6 |
| West Nile | 667 | 89.1 | 320 | 48.0 | 347 | 52.0 | 374 | 56.1 | 215 | 32.2 | 78 | 11.7 |
| Control | 406 | 71.6 | 192 | 47.3 | 214 | 52.7 | 262 | 64.5 | 114 | 28.1 | 30 | 7.4 |
| Total | 3,069 | 77.1 | 1,539 | 50.1 | 1,530 | 49.9 | 1,710 | 55.7 | 979 | 31.9 | 380 | 12.4 |

### 4.2.2 Drivers of perceptions on whether DRMs are addressing community-level security

#### Positive drivers

Community-level survey results showed that the LC system was by far the most commonly used form of DRM. Qualitative evidence presented claims that the '*majority of people resort to LC courts because they are cheap*',[54] '*among themselves*'[55] and therefore '*more effective*'.[56] Others commented that the '*LCs usually use the cultural method of resolving these problems*'.[57] Such statements indicate that positive perceptions of DRMs addressing community-level security were driven by their accessibility and affordability. A certain level of integration between the LC courts and traditional structures and methods was also evident.

As presented under PCI 1 (confidence in sustained peace and security), positive perceptions of DRMs were also driven by an increase in community policing interventions, with many arguing for a scaling up of such programmes in the qualitative findings. One panel respondent commented that '*in the past, the guns were loud and people died, but ever since the government came up with the plan that the police start community policing exercises [and] sensitisations I see an improvement*'.[58] Others attributed '*justice prevailing in the community*'[59] to sensitisation interventions such as the development and dissemination of justice, law and order manuals, as well as the holding of security meetings that encourage communities to use local authorities in the management of their cases. In Karamoja and Teso regions, a positive impression of government disarmament programmes played a particularly significant role in driving positive perceptions of DRMs as being effective.

#### Negative drivers

The community-level results showed that inappropriate behaviour by security agencies was a matter to contend with. This was mostly because they take bribes, or asked for money to do the work that they are employed to do (34.6%). They threaten and/or intimidate people (23.2%); and they take a long time to respond to reported incidents (13.8%). Among the respondents who reported that not everyone was able to access justice (43.9%), the most advanced reason was bribes (39.7%), followed by unjust officials (20.8%), legal fees (10.8%) and cases taking too long to be heard (10.3%).

In the qualitative evidence, similar results were presented. Here, the primary drivers of negative perceptions regarding the ability of conflict-resolution mechanisms to address community-level security were the inter-relationship between under-funded institutions and high levels of corruption; and capacity challenges, including the need to empower local leaders and traditional structures so that they are able to address community-level security more effectively. The dynamics of these drivers will be analysed in the following paragraphs.

#### I. The inter-relationship between under-funding and corruption
In support of quantitative results, a common driver of negative perceptions among panel respondents was the relationship between under-funded security and justice institutions and the soliciting of "facilitation fees" (bribes). The prerequisite of paying such fees led respondents to claim '*justice in this country is really expensive*'[60] and, thus, '*something that the communities cannot afford*'.[61]

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54    Consensus panel, district level, Amuria-Teso (August 2012).
55    Ibid.
56    Ibid.
57    Consensus panel, sub-county level, Lira-Lango (June 2012).
58    Ibid.
59    Consensus panel, sub-county level, Mbale-Elgon (September 2012).
60    Consensus panel, district level, Amuria-Teso (August 2012).
61    Ibid.

The inability of police officers to travel to scenes of reported crimes, despite having been allocated motorcycles, without asking victims to contribute towards fuel was a recurring comment. In this context, time delays in responding to crimes, as a result of long distances, was a commonly raised issue. Such inaccessibility of security services, affecting particularly those living in rural areas, led one respondent to comment that it '*makes people lose hope*'.[62]

Thus, despite the recognition that the police '*are doing their best*',[63] the prevailing challenges posed by limited resources led to claims of a '*denial of justice*'.[64] This was particularly argued in the context of the poor, who are unable to afford transport to police stations, and are often asked to pay further fees in order to have their cases processed. In the management of cases, more complex case-referral pathways were seen to be exacerbating the effects of corruption. Victims, especially those of SGBV, are required to engage with a larger number of service points, thus increasing their exposure to bribery.

## II. Capacity challenges and the need to empower local leaders

In addition to corruption, capacity deficits were felt strongly with regard to the LC court system, where officials are not thought to have been '*empowered on how to handle most of the cases*',[65] particularly at lower levels. It was perceived that initiatives under the PRDP have not done enough to support capacity development of community-level DRMs. In order to do so, it was thought necessary for traditional justice mechanisms to play a greater role. However, as one respondent pointed out, '*the challenge is that the justice system does not recognise these traditional systems, and yet the traditional justice mechanism would be the best*'.[66] Panellists emphasised that resolutions arbitrated by local/cultural leaders are often more sustainable due to their ability to monitor and follow up more closely than higher and more remote structures. However, they also recognised challenges in doing so, including aligning traditional resolution methods within modern rights-based legal frameworks. The informal management of SGBV cases, as presented in PCI 3(a) results, would be a case in point. Such factors, however, only strengthened arguments for the empowerment of the traditional system through increased training and capacity development.

Overwhelmingly, the inter-relationship between corruption and under-funded justice and security sectors was considered the primary challenge to these two critical sectors. Poorer/more remote communities, as well as SGBV victims, were seen as disproportionately affected. On the other hand, those with influence and financial standing were thought to be able to easily manipulate systems in their favour.

Taken together, these results show that people respond well to DRMs that are integrated at community level and incorporate traditional methods. However, the ability of these mechanisms to support sustained peace and security by effectively resolving community disputes remains in question. Principal among the challenges posed to their success are capacity and funding gaps, resulting in inefficient and often corrupt systems.

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62   Ibid.
63   Consensus panel, sub-county level, Moroto-Karamoja (August 2012).
64   Ibid.
65   Ibid.
66   Consensus panel, district level, Otuke-Lango (June 2012).

# 5. Access to economic opportunities

PCI 4 results indicate levels of access to economic opportunities among community members in order to measure whether they perceive themselves as being part of the regional or national trend of economic advancement. This is also a powerful proxy measure of community and individual predisposition to engage in conflict as a result of discontent. Results are concerned with the assurance of basic sustenance through livelihood initiatives and whether long-term patterns of social exclusion in the economic sphere are being addressed as a result of the PRDP/PCDP interventions, as mechanisms for stimulating broad economic growth. Of particular interest under this PCI are changes in public funds allocation at district level and how these resources reach communities. Changes in private investment opportunities that determine inflow of private capital and resources into the various PRDP sub-regions, and whether citizens actually think that they can and do access economic opportunities, are also central to the observations made under PCI 4.

## 5.1 Statistical overview

Overall, only 30.8% (n=1,228) of all respondents involved in the survey reported that they had access to increased economic opportunities. This proportion was highest in Bunyoro (48.4%) and lowest in Teso (16.2%) (see Table 11). For Acholi and Lango, where similar data was collected in 2011, there was an increment of 13.7 percentage points (from 31.5% in 2011 to 45.2% in 2012) in Acholi and of 14.6 percentage points (from 27% in 2011 to 41.6% in 2012) in Lango in the percentage of respondents perceiving they had access to increased economic opportunities. On average, only 16.4% of all the survey respondents were satisfied with government efforts in responding to their needs with regard to economic opportunities. This percentage was highest in Lango (32.8%) and lowest in Teso (11.5%).

**Table 11: Access to increased economic opportunities**

| | Are there sufficient economic opportunities in your community? | | Are people in your community able to take advantage of available economic opportunities? | | Is your income sufficient to sustain the household? | | Are you satisfied with government efforts in responding to your needs with regard to economic opportunities? | | Indicator Have you had access to increased economic opportunities in the last two years? | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Yes | | Yes | | Yes | | Yes | | Yes | |
| Region | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % |
| Acholi | 579 | 76.2 | 287 | 49.3 | 105 | 13.8 | 150 | 19.7 | 344 | 45.2 |
| Bukedi | 69 | 38.8 | 43 | 62.3 | 20 | 11.2 | 19 | 10.7 | 33 | 18.5 |
| Bunyoro | 154 | 81.9 | 67 | 43.5 | 21 | 11.2 | 39 | 20.7 | 91 | 48.4 |
| Elgon | 120 | 64.2 | 86 | 71.7 | 46 | 24.6 | 26 | 13.9 | 68 | 36.4 |
| Karamoja | 246 | 44.6 | 117 | 47.2 | 20 | 3.6 | 72 | 13.1 | 105 | 19.1 |
| Lango | 289 | 77.3 | 168 | 57.5 | 46 | 12.3 | 123 | 32.8 | 156 | 41.6 |
| Teso | 260 | 61 | 84 | 32.2 | 31 | 7.3 | 49 | 11.5 | 69 | 16.2 |
| West Nile | 422 | 56.6 | 186 | 43.7 | 80 | 10.7 | 106 | 14.2 | 182 | 24.3 |
| Control | 327 | 57.8 | 128 | 39.0 | 103 | 18.2 | 71 | 12.5 | 180 | 31.7 |
| Total No./ Average % | 2,466 | 62.0 | 1,166 | 47.0 | 472 | 11.9 | 655 | 16.4 | 1,228 | 30.8 |

Of those who attested to increased access to economic opportunities (1,228 respondents), more males (56%) than females (44%) made this assessment. By age, those within the younger age group (18–36) made up a larger proportion of respondents perceiving they have increased access, compared with the older age groups (see Table 12 by region).

**Table 12: Access to increased economic opportunities by gender and age**

| | Improved access to economic opportunities | | | | | | | | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | Yes | | Male | | Female | | 18–36 | | 37–54 | | 55+ | |
| Region | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % |
| Acholi | 344 | 45.2 | 182 | 52.9 | 162 | 47.1 | 200 | 58.1 | 114 | 33.1 | 30 | 8.7 |
| Bukedi | 33 | 18.5 | 24 | 72.7 | 9 | 27.3 | 15 | 45.5 | 14 | 42.4 | 4 | 12.1 |
| Bunyoro | 91 | 48.4 | 51 | 56.0 | 40 | 44.0 | 48 | 52.7 | 39 | 42.9 | 4 | 4.4 |
| Elgon | 68 | 36.4 | 31 | 45.6 | 37 | 54.4 | 49 | 72.1 | 12 | 17.6 | 7 | 10.3 |
| Karamoja | 105 | 19.1 | 75 | 71.4 | 30 | 28.6 | 52 | 49.5 | 39 | 37.1 | 14 | 13.3 |
| Lango | 156 | 41.6 | 79 | 50.6 | 77 | 49.4 | 79 | 50.6 | 58 | 37.2 | 19 | 12.2 |
| Teso | 69 | 16.2 | 48 | 69.6 | 21 | 30.4 | 29 | 42.0 | 34 | 49.3 | 6 | 8.7 |
| West Nile | 182 | 24.3 | 101 | 55.5 | 81 | 44.5 | 100 | 54.9 | 64 | 35.2 | 18 | 9.9 |
| Control | 180 | 31.7 | 97 | 53.9 | 83 | 46.1 | 118 | 65.6 | 57 | 31.7 | 5 | 2.8 |
| Total No./ Average % | 1,228 | 30.8 | 688 | 56.0 | 540 | 44.0 | 690 | 56.2 | 431 | 35.1 | 107 | 8.7 |

It is important to note that 69.2% of all the survey respondents reported that they did not have access to increased economic opportunities. This proportion was highest in Teso (83.8%) and lowest in Bunyoro (51.6%). The proportions of those who said they had no access to increased economic opportunities in the other regions were as follows: Bukedi (81.5%), Karamoja (80.9%), West Nile (75.7%), Elgon (63.6%), the Control districts (68.3%), Lango (58.4%) and Acholi (54.8%).

## 5.2 Drivers of perceptions on access to increased economic opportunities

### Positive drivers

The largest number of respondents who had access to increased economic opportunities attributed it to increased business activities in their localities (39.7%), followed by local government initiatives (17.4%), while improved security (17.1%) was also mentioned as a driver. However, it should be noted that the majority of respondents from all surveyed regions (54.1%) rated the level of business vibrancy in their communities as low. Only 7.5% of the respondents overall rated the level of business vibrancy in their communities as high.

In the qualitative evidence, positive perceptions of increased economic opportunity were also limited. However, according to the narratives, strong potential was commonly observed in agricultural activities, influenced by a sense of abundant land and favourable conditions for livestock and crop farming. This was supported by community-level survey results showing that the most common economic opportunities were agricultural (30.9%). Moreover, a large majority of respondents (72.9%) from all regions reported having access to land that they owned, while 12.8% had access to rented land, and only 10.3% had none. Indeed, the most common current income activity was stated as crop farming (39.7%), followed by business in market stalls, kiosks or roadside vending (13.1%) and selling of casual labour (12.5%).

The role played by government programmes featured highly in the qualitative evidence, with the National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) and the NUSAF being the most frequently mentioned. Although panel respondents recognised that these programmes had contributed towards community capacity development, and assisted a number of farmers in expanding their economic potential, their reach and impact were generally thought to be limited – the reasons for which are looked at in further detail in the following section.

## Negative drivers

Even among those respondents who reported that there were sufficient economic opportunities in their communities, 46.7% felt that not everyone was able to take advantage of them. Failure to access credit was the reason most advanced (24.5%), followed by laziness/alcohol (16.8%) and lack of qualifications (13.2%). In the qualitative evidence, the primary reasons advanced for a lack of access to increased economic opportunities were: dissatisfaction with government interventions due to inappropriate guidelines and funding restrictions; and lack of agricultural sector development despite widespread perceptions of its economic potential.

### I. Failure to access credit
The overall picture presented by the quantitative results was that, despite the majority of respondents from all regions reporting that they had personal investment plans, as well as observing the existence of financial institutions in their communities, the majority of people were not using them to realise their plans. Acholi had the largest percentage (91.6%) of respondents with personal investment goals, followed by Lango (90.9%). The majority of respondents (26%) from all regions surveyed had plans for starting/expanding their businesses. This was followed by respondents who wanted to educate their children (24.3%), those who wanted to rear livestock (17.1%) and those who wanted to construct houses (16.7%).

However, despite widespread recognition of village savings and loans associations (VSLAs) and savings and credit cooperatives (SACCOs) in the communities surveyed, the majority of respondents (52.3%) indicated that they intended to finance investment plans using their own income/savings. Only 15.1% of the respondents intended to borrow from financial institutions, and 8.4% hoped to borrow from VSLAs.

Indeed, of the respondents who reported the existence of financial institutions in their communities, 49.9% were not using them. The majority of such respondents (48.1%) advanced the '*lack of money to save*' as their major hindrance, while 25.3% mentioned not belonging to any group and 7.6% reported high interest rates.

In the qualitative evidence, perceptions of financial mechanisms designed to improve economic opportunities in the community were varied. In Acholi, respondents highlighted the failure of SACCOs to offer fully inclusive and accessible financial assistance. There was a sense that communities have not been properly sensitised on how to access and use SACCOs, as well as expressions of perceived corruption and mismanagement among those who are responsible for running them. In other regions such as Teso, they were praised for their role in realising the personal investment plans of community members. No doubt, such mechanisms are more effective in some regions than others, depending on differences in managerial and user contexts.

### II. Lack of qualifications
In support of results presented under PCI 1 (confidence in sustained peace and security) relating to the threats posed by high unemployment, the third most commonly mentioned hindrance to accessing economic opportunities in the community-level survey results was a lack of employable skills/qualifications. Indeed, across regions, the larger percentage of respondents (69.7%) did not have any employable skills. Only 19.7% of them had vocational skills, and 10.5% had professional skills. Of the respondents who had employable skills, only 31% were earning income

from the skill alone, 44.6% were using the skill and some other income activity, and 24.4% of them were not using their skill at all. In terms of how they had acquired employable skills, 65.9% had sponsored themselves, 19.1% had gone through an apprenticeship, and 8.6% had been sponsored by the government. As well as a lack of qualifications and skills hindering access to increased economic opportunities, discrimination in employment was reported by 49.9% of respondents. Of those making this assessment, 49.2% reported lack of connections ("technical know-who") as the major cause.

### III. Failure to develop the agricultural sector despite its potential
Qualitative evidence highlighted the need to do more to develop agricultural production if access to economic opportunities is to be improved. Panellists lamented the inability of farmers to fully capitalise on the economic potential of their regions due to the lack of favourable market structures, capacity and technology.

Despite a broad variety of produce in the regions surveyed, it was felt that benefits from potential income gains through value addition were lost due to lack of capacity, insufficient processing infrastructure and inappropriate financing mechanisms. One respondent pointed out that:

> '... most of what is produced is sold in its original form; there is nothing like value addition, so, if someone came up with a value income system, there would be a lot of money here because of the raw materials that are available.'[67]

Other challenges included high transaction costs arising from poor infrastructure development, particularly roads.

### IV. Limited impact of government interventions
In relation to government interventions, it was felt that grants, such as those under community-driven development programmes, are often 'too small',[68] and thus, despite their input, communities are still lacking access to start-up capital and capacity development. Allocations under programmes such as the NAADS and the NUSAF were also considered 'small' and the selection of beneficiaries was also challenged. For instance, it was felt that the policy of targeting farmers 'who are already doing well',[69] under the NAADS programme, rather than those in real need of assistance, was inhibiting such programmes from benefiting communities as a whole. Other complaints arose with regard to time delays in their implementation:

> 'NUSAF came with a lot of sensitisation but its implementation is so slow that even the people who were identified to benefit from the project themselves forget that they were identified because it takes a full year or more to benefit.'[70]

Concerns were also raised with regard to a lack of community ownership over, and therefore sustainability of, the services and products provided to them.

These perceptions were supported by quantitative results that showed larger percentages of respondents from all surveyed regions (47.7%) were not satisfied at all with government efforts in response to their economic needs.

### V. Regional highlights: Karamoja and natural resource extraction
Qualitative narratives highlighted a number of challenges associated with developing the economic potential of the Karamoja region. Firstly, there was overwhelming interest from private mining

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67    Consensus panel, sub-county level, Kiryandongo-Bunyoro (June 2012).
68    Consensus panel, sub-county level, Gulu-Acholi (June 2012).
69    Consensus panel, sub-county level, Mbale-Elgon (September 2012).
70    Consensus panel, sub-county level, Kiryandongo-Bunyoro (June 2012).

companies. This resulted in conflicts over the rights to conduct activities, thus seen to be delaying potential economic gains to be made from the sector. In addition, panellists warned that local populations stand to benefit very little from the activities of private investors if companies are not governed responsibly – with one panel respondent voicing the impression that they '*cheat people*'.[71]

Other concerns were raised regarding the costs and dangers associated with extractive and farming industries in the region. In particular, miners were considered to be at risk due to the dangerous nature of their work. In addition, the high transaction costs associated with poor infrastructure development were seen to be severely impeding both farming and mining sectors. Despite years of investment in recovery and development through different programmes, all of which have had strong livelihood components focusing on incomes and economic opportunities, PCI 4 results do not seem to be encouraging. There are high perceptions of limited access to opportunities, low levels of business vibrancy and insufficient incomes to sustain households – a situation also seen in the Control districts.

There is expression of dissatisfaction towards government programmes (especially in the agricultural sector) for their ineptness at addressing real issues, needs and deserving beneficiaries. This was viewed as regrettable (by respondents), given the potential in the sector.

Other binding constraints include: lack of capacity, lack of markets and technology, and high transaction costs due to poor infrastructure. Respondents felt that the move from subsistence to commercial farming was difficult due to existing methods of agricultural production and marketing. Indeed, results indicated that, although the "farming of crops" is being reported as the primary income activity across regions, it is not even able to sustain households.

These results point to a failure of various development programmes, including the PRDP, to respond to one of the primary intents of recovery and development programmes, which is overcoming poverty through community empowerment and economic revitalisation. PCI 4 results demonstrate that interventions are falling short of responding to the biggest driver of discontent underpinning the tendency of individuals and communities to engage in behaviours and activities that undermine peace and security. To this end, the peacebuilding aims of the PRDP are not being met. Perceptions of neglect, marginalisation and exclusion are widespread in northern Uganda. Poverty breeds despair, disgruntlement and conflict.[72]

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71   Consensus panel, district level, Moroto-Karamoja (August 2012).

72   As reported in the conflict analysis of northern Uganda Study, the communities consulted for the research explicitly described the low levels of development and comparatively greater poverty levels in the north as a consequence not only of war and displacement, but as a direct outcome of 'government keeping the north down'. (ACCS (2012). Op. cit. p. 43.)

# 6. Competition and grievances

## 6.1 Competition and grievances between PRDP regions

The focus of findings under PCI 5 are changes in policies, political and public will, as well as those in regulation and practices that aid or support affirmative action development efforts for the PRDP compared with other regions in Uganda. The overall assumption is that a catch-up development programme, such as the PRDP, will promote national harmony by addressing regional imbalances using poverty indicators. Results, therefore, primarily present: perceptions of how citizens assess their region compared with others; perceptions of how citizens assess coherence among political leaders from their region and others in responding to region-specific and national issues; perceptions of optimism or pessimism that the differences between communities within and outside the sub-regions will be bridged by different actors; and explanatory factors or reasons for the various perceptions on development gaps between the PRDP regions both at individual and community levels.

### 6.1.1 Statistical overview

Across regions, 34.2% of all the survey respondents reported that there was a decrease in competition and grievances between their region and the other PRDP regions. This percentage was highest in West Nile (39.8%) and lowest in Bukedi (19.7%). Among those who reported that there was a decrease in competition and grievances, the proportion of males was larger (57.3%) than females (42.7%). By age, the younger age group (18–36) made up the largest proportion (55.7%) of those who reported a decrease, compared with the older age groups (see Table 13). It is important to note the large proportion of respondents who were unable to compare their region to others in terms of competition and grievances (41.5%). This percentage was highest in Bunyoro (56.4%) and lowest in Teso (28.9%). The other regions had the following proportions of respondents who did not know: West Nile (39.1%), Bukedi (46.1%), Karamoja (49%), Elgon (40.3%), Acholi (41.9%) and Lango (39.7%). Those who said there was no decrease in competition and grievances made up 32.4% of the overall sample.

**Table 13: Decrease in competition and grievances between PRDP regions**

| Region | Yes No. | Yes % | Male No. | Male % | Female No. | Female % | 18–36 No. | 18–36 % | 37–54 No. | 37–54 % | 55+ No. | 55+ % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Acholi | 255 | 33.6 | 135 | 52.9 | 120 | 47.1 | 152 | 59.6 | 77 | 30.2 | 26 | 10.2 |
| Bukedi | 35 | 19.7 | 22 | 62.9 | 13 | 37.1 | 20 | 57.1 | 10 | 28.6 | 5 | 14.3 |
| Bunyoro | 44 | 23.4 | 24 | 54.5 | 20 | 45.5 | 26 | 59.1 | 13 | 29.5 | 5 | 11.4 |
| Elgon | 71 | 38.2 | 46 | 64.8 | 25 | 35.2 | 47 | 66.2 | 18 | 25.4 | 6 | 8.5 |
| Karamoja | 181 | 32.8 | 120 | 66.3 | 61 | 33.7 | 99 | 54.7 | 61 | 33.7 | 21 | 11.6 |
| Lango | 137 | 36.5 | 72 | 52.6 | 65 | 47.4 | 68 | 49.6 | 48 | 35.0 | 21 | 15.3 |
| Teso | 147 | 34.5 | 77 | 52.4 | 70 | 47.6 | 77 | 52.4 | 52 | 35.4 | 18 | 12.2 |
| West Nile | 298 | 39.8 | 173 | 58.1 | 125 | 41.9 | 162 | 54.4 | 100 | 33.6 | 36 | 12.1 |
| Total No./ Average % | 1,168 | 34.2 | 669 | 57.3 | 499 | 42.7 | 651 | 55.7 | 379 | 32.4 | 138 | 11.8 |

## 6.1.2 Drivers of competition and grievances between PRDP regions

Analysis of ways in which respondents felt other regions were better off showed the most advanced distinction to be business vibrancy (18.6%), followed by coverage and/or proximity to a main tarmac road (17.7%), better healthcare facilities (15.4%) and presence of many schools (12.4%). Looking at why they assessed their own districts to be worse off, the most mentioned reasons were the effects of war and displacement (17.4%), followed by corruption (16%), unfair resource allocation (15.8%) and bad leadership (14.6%).

The perception that other regions had more benefits or investment from government than their own regions was very prevalent among the respondents – reported by 63.7% overall. In line with this perception, the most rated suggestion on how government should address imbalances was through ensuring equitable resource allocation (25%), followed by government developing infrastructure (17.3%) and improving the monitoring of projects (to fight corruption) (15.9%).

### I. Perceptions of unequal resource allocation and expansive PRDP coverage[73]

Similar observations arose in the qualitative evidence, where development disparities between different PRDP regions and districts were commonly perceived as a result of differences in resource allocation.[74] The main points of contention were twofold. On the one hand, discontent was expressed towards regions that had received concentrated recovery and development assistance as a result of having been impacted so severely by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) insurgency. On the other hand, people were aggrieved by the coverage of the PRDP assistance beyond those regions that had been directly affected by the conflict. For example, in Lango and Acholi regions, both perceptions were present. Here, especially in Acholi, there was significant discontent expressed with regard to the coverage of the PRDP beyond Acholi and Lango sub-regions: '*why do you want these resources to spread to districts that have not been badly affected?*'[75]

In Lango, there were strong indications of grievances towards other PRDP regions/districts, particularly the Acholi sub-region, which was thought by panellists to have benefited most from the longer-term presence of war. One Lango district respondent went as far as stating that '*they were the trouble causers and now they are the beneficiaries*' and '*because we don't like wars, so we are not taken seriously*'.[76] Such narratives presented particularly strong views. Specifically, the difference in roads and quality of service delivery were used to illustrate development disparities.

However, Lango and Acholi were not the only sub-regions to express these forms of competition and grievances. In Teso, it was felt that the government had not allocated the PRDP funds fairly. Respondents considered themselves to have received less than other PRDP regions and, as a result, felt that some regions were moving forward faster than others. Indeed, panellists perceived that they were more accurately undergoing "recovery" than experiencing "development": '*I think for us we are not developing yet but recovering because others recovered and are now developing.*'[77] Panellists observed differing levels of development between the PRDP regions, with one commenting: '*we are only better than maybe Karamoja, under the PRDP.*'[78]

Similarly, across regions, qualitative findings presented perceptions that Gulu district had benefited the most in comparison to other PRDP districts as a result of its centrality in the LRA insurgency.

73   Regarding geographical coverage, it is worth noting that the PRDP covers 55 districts, which between them have 38% of Uganda's population. However, only one-third of the population in this area lives in districts that have been significantly affected by conflict or cattle-rustling; another one-third has been sporadically affected by conflict and cattle-rustling; and the last third has suffered only the spillover effects from conflict or cattle-rustling, according to the OPM (2012) Issues Paper for the Development of a National Peacebuilding and Conflict Resolution Policy for Uganda.

74   The criteria for funds allocation, based on damage inflicted by the war and population size, are not widely known or understood. This has given rise to accusations of favouritism of some communities to the detriment of others, thus fuelling inter-communal conflicts.

75   KII, district level, Lamwo-Acholi (June 2012).

76   Consensus panel, district level, Otuke-Lango (June 2012).

77   Consensus panel, district level, Amuria-Teso (August 2012).

78   Consensus panel, district level, Otuke-Lango (June 2012).

Here, the important development role being played by NGOs was commonly emphasised. For example, in Kiryandongo, one respondent commented:

> '... *relating that to NGOs, you may find that here in Kiryandongo there are three or four NGOs and when you go to Gulu you will find fifty NGOs and the upkeep of the community is properly mobilised.*'[79]

In the context of examining conflict sensitivity, it is important to note recurring observations regarding regional disparities in NGO support, and the role such perceptions can play in fuelling competition and grievances.

In sum, results indicated that the PRDP resource allocations have the potential to incite divisions and competition, especially at the sub-regional level with regard to PRDP inclusiveness. In order to mitigate this divisive impact, allocations must be transparent, equitable and correlated to the conflict impact that was felt within regions.

### II. Regional highlights: Karamoja

In Karamoja, qualitative reports indicated that the region perceived itself as being particularly disadvantaged, especially as a result of its remoteness and the hardships associated with the region's terrain and climate:

> '... *there are things that are happening here that are not happening elsewhere ... the life we are living here is a very hard one.*'[80]

Consequently, the challenges involved in service provision were considered to be far greater than those in other regions.

In addition to characterising these particular challenges, a strong sense of marginalisation was expressed from the support provided to the rest of the country, with one panellist commenting on '*hatred that the whole population surrounding Karamoja has*'[81] towards it (Karamoja region). Karamoja respondents did not consider themselves to be technically '*recovering*' like other PRDP regions. Due to the long-term historical presence of conflict in the region, respondents felt that it had never developed beyond its current levels in the aftermath of being affected by serious conflict. They argued that it did not, therefore, have the infrastructure in place, in the first place, in order to recover:

> '... *the starting point was really wrong for us to be classified under recovery when we had nowhere to start from. Elsewhere they had no problem because they had structures to rehabilitate.*'[82]

## 6.2 Level of competition and grievances between north and south

### 6.2.1 Statistical overview

Across all surveyed regions, 31.3% of respondents perceived a decrease in the levels of competition and grievances between the north and south of Uganda. This portion was largest in Lango (42.6%) and lowest in Teso (21.6%). Overall, more male (54.8%) than female (45.2%) respondents held this perception. Across age groups, again the younger group (18–35) shared this perception more widely (57.5%) than the older age groups (see Table 14). It is important to note that, in assessing this indicator, a large proportion of respondents (36.3%) did not know whether or not there was a decrease in the levels of competition and grievances between the north and south of Uganda.

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79   Consensus panel, sub-county level, Kiryandongo-Bunyoro (June 2012).
80   Consensus panel, district level, Moroto-Karamoja (August 2012).
81   Ibid.
82   Ibid.

This proportion was largest in Karamoja (56.4%) and lowest in Lango (24.9%). The other regions had the following proportions of respondents who did not know: Bukedi (49.4%), Elgon (42.5%), West Nile (31.9%), Teso (27%), Bunyoro (25.5%), Control (41.3%) and Acholi (31%). Furthermore, 32.4% of the survey respondents were of the opinion that there was no decrease in levels of competition and grievances between the north and south.

**Table 14: Decrease in competition and grievances between north and south Uganda**

| Region | Yes | | Male | | Female | | 18–36 | | 37–54 | | 55+ | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % | No. | % |
| Acholi | 259 | 34.1 | 136 | 52.5 | 123 | 47.5 | 145 | 56.0 | 86 | 33.2 | 28 | 10.8 |
| Bukedi | 37 | 20.8 | 22 | 59.5 | 15 | 40.5 | 22 | 59.5 | 9 | 24.3 | 6 | 16.2 |
| Bunyoro | 72 | 38.3 | 32 | 44.4 | 40 | 55.6 | 42 | 58.3 | 23 | 31.9 | 7 | 9.7 |
| Elgon | 66 | 35.5 | 37 | 56.1 | 29 | 43.9 | 47 | 71.2 | 12 | 18.2 | 7 | 10.6 |
| Karamoja | 149 | 27.0 | 104 | 69.8 | 45 | 30.2 | 85 | 57.0 | 48 | 32.2 | 16 | 10.7 |
| Lango | 159 | 42.6 | 86 | 54.1 | 73 | 45.9 | 83 | 52.2 | 56 | 35.2 | 20 | 12.6 |
| Teso | 92 | 21.6 | 55 | 59.8 | 37 | 40.2 | 44 | 47.8 | 36 | 39.1 | 12 | 13.0 |
| West Nile | 206 | 27.5 | 103 | 50.0 | 103 | 50.0 | 106 | 51.5 | 72 | 35.0 | 28 | 13.6 |
| Control | 206 | 36.3 | 108 | 52.4 | 98 | 47.6 | 142 | 68.9 | 53 | 25.7 | 11 | 5.3 |
| **Total** | **1,246** | **31.3** | **683** | **54.8** | **563** | **45.2** | **716** | **57.5** | **395** | **31.7** | **135** | **10.8** |

## 6.2.2 Drivers of perceptions on competition and grievances between north and south

Although results did not indicate strong perceptions on whether or not levels of competition and grievances have decreased, they did point towards overall confidence in government efforts to bridge the development gap between the north and south of Uganda.

Findings gained in panel discussions went some way in supporting these results by presenting a common sense that government programmes targeting the north are legitimate. As a result of its history of insurgency, it was felt that the region was entitled to affirmative action. As one respondent from the north reasoned:

> '*I would also compare the districts in the north with those in the south … most of our times were spent in wars; most of our parents fought wars without a just cause and this left the little development on ground destroyed.*'[83]

The PRDP was designed partly as an affirmative action to bridge the gap between northern Uganda and the rest of Uganda. Its stated commitment is to 'improve socio-economic indicators to be in line with national ones in these areas affected by conflict and serious breakdown in law and order'.[84] However, there is still a significant shortfall in northern Uganda's performance against key socio-economic indicators relative to other parts of the country. The north remains the poorest region in Uganda – lagging behind in terms of income poverty as well as on social indicators. As long as poverty and regional inequalities continue, sustained peace will remain but an illusion.[85] As long as the apparent north-south divide continues, there will be no sustained peace.

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83    Consensus panel, sub-county level, Amuria-Teso (August 2012).
84    PRDP, p. 17.
85    Virtually all past studies have pointed to poverty and inequalities between the north and south as contributing factors to the LRA insurrection.

# 7. Conclusions and recommendations

PCI 1 is a goal-level indicator; out of 3,982 respondents involved in the study, 68.8% (2,740 respondents) expressed confidence in sustained peace and security in their communities. This general picture of optimism is shared only by one indicator PCI 3(b), where 77.1% (3,070 respondents) of respondents from all regions reported that DRMs address community-level security disruptions satisfactorily. It should be noted that achieving peace dividends takes more than investing in security mechanisms and infrastructure. Other factors, such as failure to access increased economic opportunities, failure to correlate services delivery with community needs, and persistent perceptions that others are better off can foment discontent. This results in failure to realise peacebuilding aims that are often more latent than overt in development interventions implemented in communities emerging from conflict.

This study demonstrates that access to increased economic opportunities is elusive. One gets the sense that the most important objective of these development interventions (dealing with poverty) is on the wayside.

A sizeable 63.1% of the respondents reported having never participated in local government planning activities because they had never been invited.

Opening up the local government services delivery planning arena to the citizenry should be considered. Failure to do so is partly responsible for corruption and the impression of development disparities between the PRDP regions.

The proportion of respondents assessing that local governments were responsive to community was just above average, at 52.1%.

A total of 34.2% of the respondents felt there was a decrease in competition and grievances between the PRDP regions receiving the same development interventions, while only 31.3% felt the gap between the north and south was narrowing.

Although the LRA insurgency is no longer active in northern Uganda, its legacy remains visible and alive in the minds of the local populace, particularly through the current recovery challenges and enduring physical and psychological wounds. This is a vulnerable populace; there is a need to meaningfully deal with community grievances and to build peace from the grassroots. Future programming for the development of northern Uganda should not rely on the assumption that peace is a constant factor, but rather work to adopt conflict-sensitive and peace-promoting strategies in all interventions. In this regard, the prevention of conflicts, such as those on land, becomes of utmost importance.

On the basis of this study, it is difficult to say that the PRDP areas are on a sustainable path to recovery and development, when elements of instability and conflict are evident, and deserve to be treated as such within the wider programming of the PRDP. These results do not inspire confidence that communities are being stabilised through these development interventions over the long term.

## Key recommendations

### Central government
The government should provide information on PRDP activities, funds, implementation strategies, monitoring and evaluation; it should also establish a PRDP information desk in all districts where

stakeholders can access information. Where necessary, there should be regular radio broadcasts about the PRDP, and printed information should be translated into local languages. This will improve information flow about the programme and encourage community participation.

Strategic objective 1 of the PRDP is set to restore, strengthen and build trust in government in northern Uganda. Although the presence of government is visible in northern Uganda, there is a need to strengthen the capacities of government officials to carry out quality post-conflict reconstruction functions. Specifically, the government needs to train and deploy health officers and teachers in northern Uganda; recruit and train medical staff in the police force to handle cases of SGBV; establish legal aid clinics for SGBV survivors; and train community development officers to sensitise communities about the PCDP.

Infrastructure development and restoring social services need urgent attention, in particular to build, equip and refurbish health centres, schools (primary, secondary and vocational schools), agricultural training institutes and business incubation centres. These will provide the needed services and develop the skills required to provide quality social services in northern Uganda.

The government ought to allow development partners to directly intervene in the recovery and development processes within the existing government framework, while maintaining the overall monitoring role. This may restore the trust the communities lost in the government when resources meant for the PRDP were stolen from the Office of the Prime Minister (OPM).

The government should ensure that peace continues to prevail in northern Uganda. The peacebuilding and reconciliation process requires access to information by stakeholders; provision of counselling services for those affected by conflict; establishment of mechanisms for intra/inter-communal and national conflict resolution; the strengthening of local governance and informal leadership structures; and the reinforcing of the socio-economic reintegration of ex-combatants. The government should establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission as a framework to deal with the past ills and help aggrieved communities to get justice, reconcile and work together in the recovery and development of Uganda.

There should be a framework within the PRDP to address the intensifying land conflicts that are threatening the relative peace in northern Uganda. Since land is mainly held under customary tenure, customary and local government institutions should be strengthened to mend the internal administration of land and adjudication of disputes.

The government should strengthen the Equal Opportunities Commission to deal with systemic perceptions of discrimination of the north-south divide and promote balanced development. There is a need to carry out additional study in Karamoja, which expressed a particularly strong sentiment of discrimination, and comprehensively address such a perception. The government should take affirmative action to deal with high levels of poverty and vulnerabilities. The approaches should include provision of information and training about the available market opportunities; and community-managed loan schemes specifically targeting women, the youth, the elderly and people with disabilities.

### Development partners
This study recognises the important role the development partners continue to play in the recovery of northern Uganda. It recommends that they should continue to strengthen national capacities and support community ownership of recovery and development processes. Development partners should make a stronger commitment to address cross-cutting issues, particularly gender, environment and disease (HIV/AIDS, nodding syndrome, hepatitis and mental illness, among others).

The donor support to the active poor, progressive farmers and business communities through the Private Sector Foundation Uganda loan scheme is good. However, the programme marginalises extremely vulnerable persons like widows, the youth, orphans and the elderly who cannot pass the criteria to secure such loans. A preferential option for the poor should be taken by developing a loan scheme that can unlock their economic potentials.

Considering that donor support in Uganda is mainly in the form of budget support, development partners should be strategic in both developing partnerships and identifying policy areas where support will make a significant difference in the recovery and development of northern Uganda. This can be done in partnership with the central government, local government, civil society organisations, the private sector and the community. There is a need to strengthen policy and accountability procedures to stamp out corruption and improve transparency in governance and service delivery.

The PRDP coordination has not resulted in joint planning across the framework and between funding modalities. There is a need for integrated and effective coordination within the donor community to avoid duplication that may result in resource wastage and inefficient operations. Development partners should also be more proactive in their engagement of sector working groups and in the coordination mechanisms of recovery and development of northern Uganda.

Development partners should support policy research to continuously inform the ever-changing recovery and development environment in northern Uganda. In this way, their intervention will be informed by facts and will be relevant to the communities.

## Local government

Local government ought to involve communities in the monitoring and evaluation of quality of services. Communities can provide feedback by use of social audit in a form that allows them to review and cross-check the information provided by the service provider against information collected from users of the service. This form of monitoring and evaluation could establish whether funds allocated for social services actually reach projects; whether communities actually receive quality social service benefits; and whether providers do their work well. The results of the audit should be announced during public gatherings attended by users as well as public officials involved in the management of services and the providers.

Local government should provide an enabling environment for business and economic development. There is a need to re-establish a stable economic framework; reconstruct the basic productive infrastructure; strengthen food security; promote structural reforms – fiscal reform and agricultural reform – that allow for the situations of poverty, inequality and exclusion to be overcome – factors that instigate conflicts and derail post-conflict development.

Employment opportunities for the youth should be expanded through diversification of the economy. Employment opportunities for the youth should also address the existing gender disparity that favours males over females. Local government should create an enabling environment to enable the youth to access micro-credit to address the widely expressed need for start-up funds to commence economic activities.

Communities should be involved in security programmes to restore traditional relationships and values ripped apart by conflicts and ethnic rivalries. Communities ought to be empowered to participate and find lasting solutions to conflicts emerging from resettlement, such as land boundaries, economic hardships, social and political rivalries.

There should be support and increased information flow about the PRDP activities, funds and implementation. There should be a channel for communities to monitor and report about the implementation of the PRDP.

### Civil society organisations (CSOs)

CSOs should strengthen administrative, social and economic organisations in the affected communities and contribute to re-establishing psychological wellbeing by promoting forms of community organisation around rehabilitation, reconstruction and development projects, which involve vulnerable people belonging to different groups. In addition, CSOs ought to encourage dialogue, communication, the coming together of the parties, peaceful resolution of disputes and inter-community relationships based on mutual trust and shared values. The promotion of the participation and strengthening of the capacities of CSOs at the local level represents, in this context, a positive contribution to the aims of democratisation, good governance and peacebuilding.

One of the most devastating legacies of violent conflict is the polarisation of social relationships. The conditions of insecurity contribute to the creation of a lasting social mistrust. Extending communication bridges again between the social groups and promoting participation in community events are essential requirements for social reconciliation. CSOs have always played a role in reconciling communities and can continue to play that role in reconciling aggrieved societies in northern Uganda.

In order to reduce the propensity to inadvertently aggravate SGBV, the importance of conflict-sensitive approaches to gender interventions has been highlighted. One way of doing so would be to ensure the inclusion of men, especially family members, religious leaders and opinion leaders, at all stages of sensitisation. Successful implementation of preventive measures is dependent upon the extent to which the offenders understand their contribution and agree to take a lead in curbing the practice.

The local traditional authorities, at the same time, are institutions that have evolved over time to help manage tensions in the communities. The informal mechanisms for the resolution of disputes have an enormous influence on the political leaders. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) should support traditional initiatives for peacebuilding, such as advice from elders or religious leaders. This is important in peacebuilding and reconciliation processes.

### The media

The pluralism of the media outlets is basic for the exchange of information and perspectives regarding the type of society that is to be constructed. The media ought to expose abuses of all sorts, particularly with regards to governance and accountability, and promote transparency; to spread information on key aspects of the process; and to strengthen social groups that support the peacebuilding efforts. The media can mutually reinforce other stakeholders in constructive post-conflict programming.

### Communities

Community members should take ownership of the PRDP and demand accountability from central government, local governments and community leaders. This may be achieved through self-mobilisation that calls for accountability, which emerges as a complex chain of relationships linking users, policymakers and service providers.

# Annex: Research methodology

This study was designed as an exploratory research because of the relatively new way of looking at peacebuilding aims behind development interventions in communities emerging from conflict using the PCIs, which were an innovation of the ACCS. However, elements of cross-sectional and descriptive study designs were borrowed in order to blend qualitative and quantitative approaches for purposes of ascertaining how widespread perceptions were and at the same time exploring explanations for the prevalence of those perceptions.

As far as the study areas are concerned, the ACCS has been working across the PRDP catchment area, focusing on selected focal districts. It is from this prior engagement that the ACCS rationalised the study areas. However, it should be noted that the overriding consideration was to represent the various sub-regions and also to balance out the known conflict dynamics at play. In addition, it was imperative that, since the study was centred on a development bridging intervention, Control districts (non-PRDP-implementing districts) be included for comparative analysis. Thus, the study covered a total of 21 districts categorised by region as:

- Acholi (4 districts: Amuru, Gulu, Kitgum and Lamwo)
- Bukedi (1 district: Tororo)
- Bunyoro (1 district: Kiryandongo)
- Elgon (1 district: Mbale)
- Karamoja (3 districts: Abim, Kotido and Moroto)
- Lango (2 districts: Lira and Otuke)
- Teso (2 districts: Amuria and Soroti)
- West Nile (4 districts: Adjumani, Arua, Yumbe and Zombo)
- Control (3 districts: Masaka, Mbarara and Kasese).

## Secondary data: Literature review

This covered a review of relevant documents connected with the assignment, including client documents, policy and legislative framework documents, and other relevant studies and reports.

## Primary qualitative data collection

### 1. Consensus panels and KIIs
The panels were used to build qualitative consensus on perceptions and the drivers of those perceptions. These panels were conducted as facilitated roundtable discussions that involved on average six to eight individuals at district, sub-county and community (parish) level. This was done in every district that was included in the survey. It should be noted that not all desired respondents were able to attend the panels mostly due to mobilisation limitations; some were interviewed as KIs. The district leadership of Lamwo was accessed through KIIs. In Kiryandongo, at parish level, only a KII was conducted. In the Control districts, instead of consensus panels at district level, only KIIs of the Chief Administrative Officer, the District Planner, the District NAADS Coordinator and the District Community Development Officer were carried out. Altogether, the panels yielded a total of 145 respondents (30 at district level, 48 at sub-county level and 67 at parish/community level).

## 2. The perceptions survey

The perceptions survey sought to establish the prevalence of perceptions in the general populace in the sampled survey locations. The survey districts and sub-counties were pre-selected by Alert. The parishes, on the other hand, were determined by the need to capture urban/town perceptions alongside rural perceptions. In each sub-county, two parishes were randomly sampled and, in each parish, two villages were randomly sampled to constitute the survey area. The survey samples were determined for statistical significance at sub-county level using the Krejcie and Morgan Sample Determination Table.[86] This was because the Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) was unable to provide us with population data up to village level. The proportion of the population that is 18 years and above, for both females and males, was eligible for the survey. This population, once calculated from the UBOS population projections for 2012, was compared with the corresponding one on the Krejcie and Morgan Sample Determination Table, which indicates the appropriate representative sample. In the sampled villages, two listings were made – one of all males in the locality who are 18 years and above; and another of all females who are 18 years and above. These two listings constituted the sampling frames. However, specific returns or interviews from each village were determined by sub-dividing the parish sample calculated prior by population proportion on the sub-county sample obtained from the Krejcie and Morgan Sample Determination Table. The perceptions survey had a projected sample of 3,971 (1,895 males and 2,076 females) respondents; in the end, fieldwork yielded 3,982 respondents (1,963 males and 2,019 females) (see Table 15).

### Table 15: Sample distribution by gender, age and region

| Region | Male No. | Male % | Female No. | Female % | 18–36 No. | 18–36 % | 37–54 No. | 37–54 % | 55+ No. | 55+ % | Total No. | Total % |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Acholi | 378 | 49.7 | 383 | 50.3 | 430 | 56.5 | 232 | 30.5 | 99 | 13.0 | 761 | 100 |
| Bukedi | 86 | 48.3 | 92 | 51.7 | 95 | 53.4 | 66 | 37.1 | 17 | 9.6 | 178 | 100 |
| Bunyoro | 92 | 48.9 | 96 | 51.1 | 105 | 55.9 | 67 | 35.6 | 16 | 8.5 | 188 | 100 |
| Elgon | 95 | 50.8 | 92 | 49.2 | 131 | 70.1 | 41 | 21.9 | 15 | 8.0 | 187 | 100 |
| Karamoja | 278 | 50.5 | 273 | 49.5 | 279 | 50.6 | 182 | 33.0 | 90 | 16.3 | 551 | 100 |
| Lango | 182 | 48.5 | 193 | 51.5 | 190 | 50.7 | 130 | 34.7 | 55 | 14.7 | 375 | 100 |
| Teso | 220 | 51.6 | 206 | 48.4 | 221 | 51.9 | 157 | 36.9 | 48 | 11.3 | 426 | 100 |
| West Nile | 360 | 48.1 | 389 | 51.9 | 428 | 57.1 | 235 | 31.4 | 86 | 11.5 | 749 | 100 |
| Control | 272 | 48.0 | 295 | 52.0 | 380 | 67.0 | 152 | 26.8 | 35 | 6.2 | 567 | 100 |
| Total | 1,963 | 49.3 | 2019 | 50.7 | 2,259 | 56.7 | 1,262 | 31.7 | 461 | 11.6 | 3,982 | 100 |

## 3. The validation meetings

The study results were presented to three validation meetings in Soroti, Arua and Mbale. The participating districts were invited to these locations. At the meetings, the consultant presented the results. This was followed by general comments. Later, the meetings would be constituted into groups on the basis of districts for a discussion on whether they agreed or disagreed with the results and what other additional information they could give to improve the report.

86    R.V. Krejcie and D.W. Morgan (1970). *Educational and Psychological Measurement: Determining Sample Size for Research Activities.* Available at http://opa.uprrp.edu/InvInsDocs/KrejcieandMorgan.pdf

## Data processing and report writing

All the panel data was voice-recorded wherever participants allowed. Panel and KI data transcripts were created and thematic categorisation of this data was created for content analysis, where commonalities and differences were drawn to establish the most prevalent and unique perceptions.

The survey data, on the other hand, was cleaned and captured electronically into STATA for analysis. The analysis here was more inclined to answering the perception prevalence question on each PCI and on rating the key positive and negative drivers of that indicator. Report writing collated both qualitative and quantitative data. In the end, the research product comprises two parts: volume I which is the summary report and volume II which comprises the detailed regional reports and statistical output.

## Plausibility of indicators and the sample

At the commencement of this work, the study team was handed five perception indicators which had been crafted between the OPM and the ACCS. It should be noted that PCIs 3 and 5 were compounded indicators with completely different issues to measure put together. PCI 3 had to be split in order to be able to measure the percentage of respondents assessing DRMs with regard to SGBV, on the one hand, and community-level security disruptions, on the other. PCI 5 was split in order to be able to measure the percentage of respondents perceiving a decrease in competition and grievances between the PRDP regions, on the one hand, and between the north and south of Uganda, on the other.

It should also be noted that PCI 3(a), on whether DRMs were addressing SGBV satisfactorily, was giving misleading results when tested from the general sample. More reasonable results were obtained when analysis was carried out only for respondents who had experienced SGBV and had reported the matter. This has implications for the manner in which the sample structure is constructed for statistically significant results to be obtained.

In determining the sample, the level of statistical significance was taken to be the sub-county. However, results in both the 2011 and the 2012 surveys have not been presented at the level of the sub-county but rather at the level of regions (and not even at district level). It would be important for the ACCS to have a discussion on sample rationalisation for the next round of monitoring. In addition, the selection of districts also needs to be thought through again in order to create a platform for efficient deployment of survey resources.

## Study limitations

1. The study investigated SGBV as a collective categorisation; this was not appropriate. SGBV should have been broken down into specific typologies such that more end-user-friendly results would be obtained from the investigation on why specific typologies are reported and others are not.[87]
2. The study did not directly capture the contribution of civil society organisations (CSOs) in realising the PCIs; yet the PRDP leaves nearly all the elements of peacebuilding work to CSOs and, at the same time, a reasonable amount of donor funds are channelled directly to CSOs.[88]

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87    Soroti validation meeting, 18th January 2013.

88    Arua validation meeting, 22nd January 2013, and Gulu validation meeting, 24th January 2012.