



PEACE PERCEPTIONS POLL 2018






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PEACE
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Bringing together the views of more than 100,000 people, the Peace Perceptions Poll sought to answer questions around how people experience and respond to violent conflict, and how they think their government should respond to conflict.

More countries are experiencing violent conflict now than at any time in the past 30 years. People have been displaced from their homes at a rate not seen since the Second World War. The cost of conflict is currently estimated at US\$1.04 trillion a year.¹

As conflict rages unchecked and humanitarian global norms are flouted, people's faith in international institutions is being undermined. Confrontation between great powers is back on the agenda. And with some of today's worst conflicts taking place in middle-income countries, economic growth is no guarantee of peace and stability.

This is the disturbing context to this inaugural Peace Perceptions Poll. Led by International Alert and the British Council, in partnership with global polling agency RIWI, the poll aims to provide information for political leaders and senior policy-makers aspiring to deal with the root causes of conflict. It also seeks to contribute to a greater public discourse around peacebuilding – dealing with the drivers of conflict and building people's capacity to resolve disputes peacefully – as a critical approach to preventing and responding to violence. For 2018, it includes a 'special insight' on the role of political and economic exclusion as drivers of conflict.

The countries polled in 2018 represent a wide range of circumstances, from more peaceful states to those at risk of conflict and those where there is active armed conflict. They include: Brazil, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Hungary, India, Lebanon, Myanmar, Nigeria, the Philippines, South Africa, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States of America (US). Targeted polling was also undertaken separately in Northern Ireland.

The report includes four dedicated country snapshots on Colombia, DRC, Lebanon and Ukraine, together with a 'special insight' on Northern Ireland. Northern Ireland represents a story of progress, while still retaining echoes of conflict; Colombia has just crossed the threshold of peace; while DRC, Lebanon and Ukraine are experiencing conflicts that have largely fallen out of the public spotlight in the west but continue to threaten and disrupt the lives of millions.

The next two pages provide a summary of the main findings outlined in each section of this report.

SECTION 1: PERCEPTIONS OF PEACE AND CONFLICT

Those living in more peaceful countries tended to be more pessimistic about their future prospects for peace. The UK topped the list of countries with more people thinking that peace and security would get worse than those that thought it would get better, followed by Brazil, the US and Hungary. By comparison, people in some of the worst conflict environments, such as Syria, Nigeria and DRC, were the most optimistic.

National responses in conflict-affected countries, however, masked sub-national variations, reflecting the reality that in many countries conflict often takes place outside capitals and major population centres.

Terrorism and criminal violence were people's top security concerns. Violence or harassment by the state, tribal, religious and ethnic conflict as well as domestic violence ranked highly in select countries.

SECTION 2: WHY DO PEOPLE TURN TO VIOLENCE?

'A lack of jobs and ability to provide for one's family' ranked highest when it came to what people thought motivated others in their communities to violence, with nine countries ranking it first and a further four ranking it second. This was followed by a sense of injustice and a need to improve one's social status. This suggests that a blend of political, economic and social factors drive violence, contrary to common political rhetoric that often simplifies such motivations to just one of these factors.

SECTION 3: HOW DO PEOPLE RESPOND TO VIOLENCE?

Findings showed that the way people respond to violence is often very context specific. The most common responses to violence within

communities were asking local police or security forces to take action, and non-violent protests, followed by approaching local political leaders, traditional dispute resolution or the courts, violent acts in retaliation, and migration.

The findings challenged some traditional assumptions. For example, people who feel politically excluded were more likely to select migration as a response to conflict in their community. By contrast, conventional political narratives on migration tend to focus on a lack of jobs and poor border security.

SECTION 4: WHAT DOES PEACE LOOK LIKE?

The poll found universal factors that people – from the UK to Ukraine and Nigeria to the Philippines – felt represented more peaceful societies. The top five responses were when:



people can resolve disputes without violence



people have the opportunity to earn a living to support their family



there is less crime



people can vote in national elections



there is less violence

A number of these factors reflect 'positive' peace – or factors that represent more than just the absence of violence.

SPECIAL INSIGHT: POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INCLUSION

Political and economic inclusion were regarded as fundamental to peace and security: 90% of respondents said economic inclusion was very or somewhat important to peace in their country, while 83% said political inclusion was.

DRC and South Africa perceived the highest levels of political exclusion, followed by the UK, Hungary and the US. In these countries, a greater number

of people thought they had less political agency than they had five years ago than those who thought they had more.

Across the majority of countries polled, corruption in politics was cited as the number one reason why people felt they had less political agency. Eleven countries ranked it first, while a further three ranked it second. This factor was felt most strongly in South Africa, Ukraine and Nigeria.

Those who thought they had more political influence attributed it extensively to social media and technology – seemingly a force for political agency. At a time when trust in technology companies is at an all-time low, this finding could set an interesting challenge for the industry and regulators.

Those who felt most economically excluded generally lived in middle- to high-income countries, including Hungary, Ukraine, the UK, Lebanon, the US and South Africa. While we know that other countries have far higher levels of poverty and inequality, it does speak to the feelings of exclusion that are driving – sometimes dramatic – political change.

SECTION 5: HOW SHOULD WE RESPOND TO CONFLICT?

People fundamentally understood what it takes to get to peace. When asked what they thought was the most effective approach to creating long-term peace, 10 countries ranked **‘dealing with the reasons why people fight in the first place’ top, with a further four countries ranking it second.**

What ultimately sets this poll apart is that, rather than just focusing on threats to peace, it examines perceptions around the path to peace. Through harnessing the views and aspirations of thousands of people in 15 countries, we have dug behind the otherwise amorphous term ‘peace’ to see what it looks like in tangible terms – its core ingredients and how we can ensure there is more of it. In this sense, the findings link conceptually with the United Nations’ (UN) Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and, in particular, Goal 16, which focuses on peaceful and inclusive societies.²

Overall, the results underscore the need for tailored, informed, long-term solutions to conflict. They highlight a level of innate understanding from members of the public about how to tackle conflict that we may not otherwise appreciate if we did not ask. With space for nuance in political discourse diminishing, this poll shows that nevertheless, this is what people demand when it comes to the challenge of conflict. While the poll illustrates the diversity of people’s experiences, it also shows how much people have in common when it comes to how we aspire to, create and sustain more peaceful and secure societies.

And nine countries ranked ‘supporting societies and communities to deal with conflict peacefully’ in their top two.

These two elements constitute ‘peacebuilding’, which focuses on dealing with the root causes of conflict as well as building capacity for peaceful conflict resolution.

This outcome will be of particular interest to political leaders and senior policy-makers seeking to pursue a root causes approach to dealing with conflict.

To date, however, peacebuilding has remained a relatively underutilised tool compared to other responses to conflict, such as military intervention and humanitarian aid, both of which tend to be used responsively rather than preventatively.

The findings offer further guidance for policy-makers and funders, in that when asked where governments should spend more to promote peace, while given options such as emergency aid, military intervention and diplomacy, **‘dealing with the reasons why people fight in the first place’ ranked first in 11 of the 15 countries,** followed by **‘teaching peace, tolerance and conflict resolution in schools’ ranked second overall.**

PERCEPTIONS OF PEACE AND CONFLICT

1



WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE?

Despite global and national indicators, those in the most conflict-affected countries were often more optimistic when asked whether peace would get better or worse in the next five years. People in Syria, Nigeria and DRC topped the list of those who thought things would get better.

By contrast, it was the relatively peaceful, stable, middle- and high-income countries that were the most pessimistic about their prospects for peace. The UK topped the list, with more people thinking things would get worse than those who thought peace and security would get better, followed by Brazil, the US and Hungary.


Each of these countries has been experiencing their own incarnations of political and security stresses, whether it be the recent terror attacks combined with the political uncertainty following the Brexit referendum in the UK, an erosion of the rule of law in Hungary, a more virulent and

Those in the most conflict-affected countries were often more optimistic about their prospects for peace, while those in relatively peaceful, stable, middle- and high-income countries were the most pessimistic.

unpredictable brand of politics in the US, or the political turmoil in Brazil in the wake of the impeachment of its president for corruption.

This might come down to historically more stable countries being less attuned to dealing with political shocks and instability, whereas people in consistently less stable states have normalised and become more resilient to a certain amount of conflict and violence. For those most affected by conflict, the sad reality is it may be difficult to see how things could get worse.

FIGURE 1: WHAT WILL HAPPEN TO LEVELS OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS – NATIONALLY




Yet, national statistics often mask the highly differentiated experiences of people within different parts of a country. For example, while a majority of people in Colombia thought things would get better, those living in rural areas were more pessimistic about the prospects for peace, reflecting the concentration of violent conflict in rural and regional areas outside major population centres.

For example, in Nariño, a region in the west of the country bordering Ecuador that has seen significant violence between the government and armed groups over the years (see Colombia snapshot for further detail), people were less confident about their future than their urban counterparts. Similarly, in Baalbek-Hermel and North Lebanon, border communities that have borne the brunt of the Syria crisis felt peace and security would get worse. There were also variations in Ukraine between regions experiencing the impact of conflict in the east and other more peaceful parts.

Similarly, in Colombia, DRC, Lebanon, Nigeria, the Philippines and Tunisia, people living in rural areas were more likely than those in urban areas to think that peace and security would either get worse in the next five years or remain unchanged.

FIGURE 2: THOSE WHO THINK LEVELS OF PEACE AND SECURITY WILL GET WORSE IN THE NEXT FIVE YEARS – REGIONALLY



This again reflects where conflict has been present and the territorial inequalities, vulnerabilities and conditions that mark communities' perceptions of their security. Given this, it is what people in these regions think that could be a better indicator of a country's peace and security, as it is there where conflict often originates or manifests.

There were not significant variations by sex or age at the global level, but individual countries did record variations. For example, women were more likely to think peace and security would get worse in the US, and more men were likely to think things would get better in DRC. And in a number of countries, people over the age of 55 were more pessimistic about the future.

Thus, overall, there is a need for geographically tailored solutions to conflict that reflect challenges at a sub-national and local level, not just the national level. It also highlights the need for specific actions to ensure that peace and security dividends are felt outside major cities or wealthier regions.

CONFLICT TAKES MANY FORMS

When asked what type of violence concerned people the most, there were distinct similarities across countries alongside marked differences.

With only a few exceptions, terrorism (in all its many interpretations³) was rated as the top concern across the countries surveyed. Terrorism was of greatest concern to people living in the UK, followed by the Philippines, Tunisia, the US and India.⁴ Based on western media coverage, one might think terrorism would rank first in places such as Nigeria and Syria, but the data told a different story. Although terrorism ranked highly, 'tribal, religious or ethnic conflict' and 'interference by foreign states' were of greater concern in Nigeria and Syria respectively.

In other countries, 'violence or harassment by state authorities' was more of an issue. It ranked top in DRC and was in the top three in Hungary, Ukraine and the US. It is likely that in DRC, this response relates to grievances around abuses committed by state security forces, but it is also probably informed by political violence associated with the postponed presidential elections, which was a live issue at the time of polling.⁵ Those citing state harassment as a key concern in Hungary were more strongly represented in the capital

FIGURE 3: WHAT TYPES OF VIOLENCE MOST COMMONLY APPEAR IN COUNTRIES' TOP THREE CONCERNS





FIGURE 4: WHAT TYPES OF VIOLENCE CONCERN PEOPLE THE MOST



and among those with higher levels of education. This likely reflects ongoing criticism of the current government's attitude towards liberal democratic norms and the voicing of dissent. Without further exploration, it is harder to explain the result in the US, particularly as there are no significant variations across demographics. However, one suggestion would be the incidents that have given rise to movements such as Black Lives Matter, responses to undocumented migrants and other forms of structural violence.

Eight countries ranked criminal violence in their top two, among them some unexpected countries

such as Hungary and the US. In the US, this might in part be attributable to the recurrent high-profile mass-shootings and political narratives around urban crime. Even so, both countries have comparatively low crime rates compared to the other countries listed, suggesting that perception and reality are not always aligned. It is less surprising to see South Africa high on this list. While a number of crime indicators in South Africa⁶ have been slowly declining, those such as homicide rates are still high in global terms.⁷ In the Philippines, President Duterte's high-profile war on drugs might account for the increased perception of criminal-based violence. In Colombia, the long

history of violent drug cartels intermeshed with other violent groups makes its inclusion in the top five sadly unsurprising.

In addition to Nigeria, 'tribal, religious or ethnic conflict' was the greatest or second greatest concern in DRC, India and Myanmar. In India, alongside the challenges posed by the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir, there are conflicts lesser-known to outsiders. Currently, there are a number of active and inactive insurgent groups in India,⁸ their objectives including secession, separate ethnic states, tribal autonomy, and the protection of the rights and identities of religious and ethnic communities.

In Myanmar, although the Rohingya have borne the brunt of recent violence, ethnic conflict is far broader, representing a key faultline along which separatist conflicts have and are continuing to be fought, for example in Kachin, Karen and Shan states.

While many closely associate violence in Nigeria with Boko Haram, it has been suggested that the significant conflict over farmland, grazing areas and livestock routes, which spans across the country's middle belt,⁹ has claimed more lives.¹⁰ It represents a seminal case study on the consequences of unaddressed political and economic exclusion.

In states embroiled in conflict with geo-political dimensions, including Lebanon, Syria and Ukraine, people consistently ranked 'interference by a foreign country' as their number one concern.

Similar ethnic and resource contests feed ongoing conflict in DRC. In March, ethnic clashes between Hema herders and Lendu farmers in the northeastern Ituri province killed more than 40 people,¹¹ a smaller echo of the war that took place in the region between 1998 and 2003, which claimed thousands of lives. North Kivu has seen continuing violence between Hunde, Hutu, Nyanga and Tutsi militia forces following an influx of Hutus at the end of the 1994 Rwandan genocide.¹²

Domestic violence meanwhile ranked in the top three for Brazil, India, Lebanon, South Africa and

Syria, and equal third in Tunisia and Nigeria. In India, violence against women has been an increasing feature of public discourse over the last decade, following a string of high profile cases. There were over 40,000 dowry-related deaths recorded between 2011 and 2015.¹³ While statistics are limited in South Africa, last year the senior South African police official, Tebello Mosikili, warned that domestic violence was on the rise.¹⁴

In states embroiled in conflict with geo-political dimensions, including Lebanon, Syria and Ukraine, people consistently ranked 'interference by a foreign country' as their number one concern. The 2018 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) States of Fragility report highlights a trend in the internationalisation of internal violent conflict, which it describes as presenting "new, worrisome challenges". Among these are that "external actors offer combatants additional resources to sustain conflicts that would otherwise lose steam".¹⁵

What we know of modern conflict is that all these forms of violence rarely occur in isolation; in fact, they intersect.¹⁶ This, alongside the significant differences globally in concerns around peace and security, underscores the sense that a 'one size fits all approach' to security cannot work. Those designing policies and interventions need to take into account both perceptions and realities, be sensitive to geographical differences – down to the most local scale – and look for the interplay between the various forms of conflict experienced by a population.

UKRAINE



Ukraine's crisis began in 2013, with protests in Kyiv against President Viktor Yanukovich's decision to reject a deal for greater political, economic and social integration with the EU. After a crackdown by state security forces galvanised protesters, the president fled the country.

The following year, Russian troops took control of the Crimea region, citing the need to protect the rights of Russian 'compatriots' in Crimea and southeast Ukraine. Two months later, separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions held referendums to declare independence from Ukraine. Since then, there has been fighting along the established and now largely-static 'line of contact'. Neither the annexation of Crimea nor the referenda results in the east have been recognised by the international community.

The ensuing violence is reported to have led to around 10,000 deaths and over 22,000 injured, and a staggering 1.8 million internally displaced people.¹⁷


WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE?

When asked about the expected level of peace and security in their country over the next five years, 30% said it would stay the same, 25% get worse and 45% get better.


Conflict-affected parts of the country were more likely to think things would get worse or stay the same. The Donetsk and Dnipropetrovsk regions both ranked above the national average for those who thought things would get worse. The conflict in the east has been concentrated in and around Donetsk, which is bisected by the line of control. Dnipropetrovsk lies immediately adjacent to the conflict-affected region and served as buffer zone against the further spread of military operations. It also hosts the largest military hospital and has received large numbers of internally displaced people. People in the Lviv region, which was a significant source of those who joined volunteer units at the beginning of the war, ranked above the national average in thinking things would stay the same, as did those in the Zaporizhia region, which borders the conflict.

FIGURE 5: WHAT TYPES OF VIOLENCE CONCERN PEOPLE IN UKRAINE THE MOST

NATIONALLY



REGIONALLY



WHAT ARE PEOPLE WORRIED ABOUT?

People ranked 'interference by a foreign country' as their number one concern, followed by 'violence or harassment by state authorities' and 'terrorism'. Interference by a foreign state ranked significantly higher in Dnipropetrovsk, whereas Donetsk ranked harassment or violence by the state more highly.

WHY DO PEOPLE TURN TO VIOLENCE?

Ranked top was 'a sense of injustice' (27%), followed closely by 'lack of jobs or the need to provide for their families' (25%). This may have pressing economic and social associations – for example, ex-combatants not having access to the benefits provided by the state, IDPs deprived of civic rights such as the right to vote, and corruption among officials.

The degree to which people cited the two factors varied by region. 40% of people in Zaporizhia and 35% in Kharkiv chose injustice. By comparison, in Dnipropetrovsk, injustice was marginally higher than the national average, but lack of jobs ranked significantly higher, at 45%.

The 36% who thought they had less influence cited 'corruption and bribery in politics' as the main reason.

WHAT DOES PEACE LOOK LIKE?

When asked what best represents a peaceful society in their country, people said it was when:



I have the opportunity to earn a living to support my family



there is less crime



we are able to resolve disputes without violence



I can participate in community decision-making processes



there is less violence

DO PEOPLE FEEL POLITICALLY INCLUDED?

When asked how important the 'ability of people to participate in and influence political decisions that affect them' was to peace, 44% said very important, 42% somewhat and 15% not at all.

Compared to five years ago, 47% of Ukrainians felt their ability to influence political decisions that affect them was about the same, while 36% said it was less. Just 18% said they had more influence, attributing this to 'technology and social media'.

Of those who said they had less influence, 47% cited 'corruption and bribery in politics' as the main reason.¹⁸ Delays in the establishment of a new independent anti-corruption court – a condition of continued International Monetary Fund assistance from next year – along with continuing failures to prosecute any alleged major perpetrators of corruption from both the former and post-Maidan structures of influence, are unlikely to instil the Ukrainian population with confidence when it comes to dealing with corruption in politics.¹⁹

Confidence also weakened around a bill perceived as being intended to constrain the existing and otherwise competent anti-corruption bureau as well as delays in land reform, which play a role in entrenching economic exclusion.²⁰

Some suggest there is an increasing perception among Ukrainians that “much of the old predatory political class has survived” the 2014 revolution and that “the fundamentals of the old system remain unchanged”.²¹


Those who placed a greater emphasis on participation in community decision making as an indicator of peace felt they had more political agency.

HOW SHOULD WE CREATE LONG-TERM PEACE?

Ranked number one was ‘dealing with the reasons why people fight in the first place’ (29%). However, this figure grows to nearly 40% among people who said they had less political influence than five years ago.

When asked where governments should spend more to promote peace, ‘dealing with the reasons people fight’ (37%) came in first. This increases to 43% among those who thought they had less political influence compared to five years ago.

FIGURE 6: WHAT WOULD BE MOST EFFECTIVE IN CREATING LONG-TERM PEACE IN UKRAINE



WHY DO PEOPLE TURN TO VIOLENCE?

2



People were offered the opportunity to choose from eight reasons why people in their communities were motivated to violence (see Figure 7).

'Lack of jobs or the need to provide for their families' topped the list, with nine countries ranking it number one. Brazil, Colombia, Hungary, the Philippines and South Africa – all middle-income countries – together with Nigeria scored it highest. 'A sense of injustice' ranked second overall, polling more strongly in Brazil, Lebanon, Tunisia, Ukraine and the US. Ranked third overall, and concentrated in DRC, Syria and Tunisia, was the motivation to 'improve social status'.


Lack of employment can be a powerful motivating factor to turn to criminal violence or join armed groups.²² It is rarely a stand-alone factor though, and the latest thinking from the UN and World Bank suggests that there is no natural correlation between creating more jobs and less violence.²³ The key is how jobs are created, especially how that intersects with the distribution of both political and economic inequalities. This is a particular challenge for those countries with rapidly growing demographics. In Nigeria,

Africa's most populous country, around 67% of young people are either unemployed or underemployed.²⁴ Lack of employment in middle-income countries and its link to violence may necessitate a re-think of aid approaches that tend to graduate countries from aid once they reach middle-income status.

Multiple factors are likely to contribute to a sense of injustice. The feeling of what is just – or unjust – is deeply personal and hard to calibrate. There is a similar issue with social status. In Tunisia, for example, unemployment and underemployment generate a social 'devaluation', especially among the 29% of young graduates who cannot find work.²⁵ They also contribute to other social issues, such as dropping out of school, drug use and suicide. Experiences of political, economic and social marginalisation, as well as lack of social stability, have been tapped into by armed groups in many different countries.


FIGURE 7: WHAT MOTIVATES PEOPLE TO TAKE VIOLENT ACTIONS

GLOBALLY




- Forced by armed groups
- Improve social status
- Lack of jobs or need to provide for family
- Not having a say in political decisions
- Political ideology
- Religious ideology
- Security force or government actions
- Sense of injustice

NATIONALLY



DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO



Because of the complexity and duration of violent conflict in DRC, and perceptions that it is all but intractable, the country has largely disappeared from public view outside the region. Few people would know that the war that raged between 1998 and 2003 claimed as many as five million lives, largely as a result of disease and starvation.²⁶

The current conflict in DRC is a legacy of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, when Hutus involved in the genocide fled to eastern DRC and formed armed groups. Tutsi and other rebel groups sprung up in response, backed by Rwanda and Uganda.

Despite the signing of a peace deal in 2003, and the presence of the world's largest peacekeeping force, conflict has persisted. At least 70 armed groups are believed to be operating in eastern DRC, exerting control over loosely governed regions.²⁷ Today, there are around 4.5 million internally displaced people in DRC and over 780,000 refugees in other nations.²⁸

President Joseph Kabila's refusal to call elections over the last two years also led to political violence. In August 2018, Kabila indicated the country would hold elections in December this year, backing his former interior minister as his successor.²⁹

WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE?

Globally, DRC was one of the more optimistic countries polled. 68% thought that peace and security would get better in the next five years. The reality though is that for many in DRC, things probably could not get much worse.

The picture changes dramatically when looking at where people live. While around 71% of people

People in DRC were most concerned about 'violence or harassment by state authorities', it scoring nine percentage points higher than the next largest factor.

living in cities (primarily Kinshasa) thought things would get better, this dropped to 52% for people living in villages and farms. People living in villages were more likely to think that things would get worse compared to the national average, while people living on farms were more likely to think things would remain the same compared to the national average.


WHAT ARE PEOPLE WORRIED ABOUT?

Reflecting the multiple dimensions of conflict in DRC, when people were asked what concerned them the most, responses were spread across a number of categories. However, ranked number one, nine percentage points higher than the next largest factor, was 'violence or harassment by state authorities' (25%).

Security forces have had a mixed history in DRC. In 2017, the UN alleged that the country's security forces had taken sides in an ethnic-based conflict in Kasai that claimed more than 200 lives, with some actions potentially constituting international crimes.³⁰

Nationally, more people thought that the presence of security forces increased (34%) rather than decreased (32%) the levels of violence in their area. Even though the difference was slight,

FIGURE 8: WHAT TYPES OF VIOLENCE CONCERN PEOPLE IN DRC THE MOST



this markedly sets DRC apart from most other countries, where people tended to think forces overall decreased violence.

However, violence is only part of the story. Of those who had negative experiences with security forces, bribery and corruption ranked number one (38%), followed by physical violence (26%).

WHY DO PEOPLE TURN TO VIOLENCE?

Again, people cited a diverse range of reasons for people turning to violence in their community. The number one reason was 'lack of jobs or the need to provide for their families' (28%), followed by a desire to 'improve social status' (18%). DRC still ranks among the poorest countries in the world, at 176 out of 188 countries on the UN's latest Human Development Index.³¹ While difficult to measure, it is estimated that DRC has around a 46% unemployment rate.³²






HOW DO PEOPLE RESPOND TO VIOLENCE?

While below the global average, 'Asking your local police or security forces to take action' still ranked top (25%) of the list for how people respond to violence. This was followed by 'non-violent protests' (19%) and 'asking your local political leader to take action' (18%). Those who thought peace would get worse in the next five years ranked 'violent acts in retaliation' first.

Peaceful protests have increasingly turned violent in DRC since 2015, when reforms were first proposed that would have allowed the current president to stay in office beyond his term limit.³³ In January 2018, at least five people were killed when authorities cracked down on banned protests.³⁴ This followed in the wake of protests in December 2017 that saw a further seven people killed.³⁵

WHAT DOES PEACE LOOK LIKE?

When asked what best represents a peaceful society in their country, people said it was when:

-  I can vote in a national election
-  we can resolve disputes peacefully
-  I have the opportunity to earn a living to support my family
-  there is less crime
-  there is less violence

Voting in a national election tended to be seen as more important among young people, who also placed significantly more weight on education, ranking second for 16–24 year-olds after national elections.

DO PEOPLE FEEL POLITICALLY INCLUDED?

The delay in holding national elections – which had not been resolved at the time the poll was conducted – was clearly at the forefront of people's minds when asked, 'compared to five years ago, are you more or less able to influence the political decisions that affect you?' 51% of respondents said they had less influence, 29% more and 21% said about the same. When asked about the reasons for the decrease, people ranked 'corruption and bribery in politics' (30%) and 'lack of interest in politics' (29%) almost equal first.


When asked overall 'how important to peace and security in your country is the ability to participate in and influence political decisions that affect you', 39% said very, 32% somewhat and 29% not at all. This put DRC in the bottom two of the countries polled when it came to placing importance on political inclusion. This is to be expected in a country where political leaders have little accountability to their constituents. Those who thought peace would get worse in the next five years were more likely to feel politically excluded, by a margin of more than 20 percentage points.

HOW SHOULD WE CREATE LONG-TERM PEACE?

Perhaps unsurprisingly, 'democratic elections' (39%) ranked number one in the ways we should promote peace, followed by 'deal with the reasons why people fight in the first place' (19%).

There was a correlation with what people thought their government should spend more on, with 'deal with the reasons why people fight' (30%) in first place, followed by 'teaching peace, tolerance and conflict resolution in schools' (21%).

FIGURE 9: WHAT WOULD BE MOST EFFECTIVE IN CREATING LONG-TERM PEACE IN DRC



- Assistance of international security forces
- Deal with reasons people fight in the first place
- Have democratic elections
- Negotiate peace agreement with political leaders
- Support societies and communities to resolve conflict peacefully
- Use military to address violence

HOW DO PEOPLE RESPOND TO VIOLENCE?

3



POLICE AND SECURITY FORCES

When asked how people in their community responded to violence when it occurs, the most common answer was to 'ask their local police or security forces to take action', with around 32% of respondents choosing this option. However, it is telling to look at the variances in the data when other factors are examined.

Firstly, there is a generation gap. In nine countries (Brazil, Colombia, Hungary, Lebanon, the Philippines, Syria, Tunisia, the UK and the US), young people (defined in this report as those aged 16 to 24) were less likely to select this response in comparison to older respondents.

Unsurprisingly, a sense of exclusion affects how people engage the police or security forces. In seven countries (DRC, Lebanon, Myanmar, the Philippines, South Africa, Syria and the US), those who felt more politically excluded were less likely to resort to the police compared to those who felt more politically engaged. And in seven countries (Colombia, India, Lebanon, the Philippines, South Africa, Syria and the UK), people who felt economically excluded were less likely to cite the police as a response.

There is also a geographic gap. In five countries (Brazil, Colombia, India, Tunisia and Ukraine), people living in rural areas were less likely to resort to the police.

NON-VIOLENT PROTESTS

Protests ranked second overall as a response to violence. Those countries that placed a particular emphasis on peaceful protests included Brazil, India, Myanmar and Tunisia. In Brazil, in 2015 more than a million people participated in anti-government rallies around the embattled President Dilma Rousseff,³⁶ who was ultimately impeached over corruption charges. In May 2018, the country witnessed one of the largest strikes in its history, over fuel subsidies. Political transitions in Myanmar and Tunisia were both precipitated by popular protest. In Tunisia, more recent protests focused on price rises, a worsening economic situation and progress of reforms.³⁷ In India, there are frequent protests over a vast array of issues,³⁸ ranging from caste³⁹ to an agrarian crisis⁴⁰ to environmental issues⁴¹ to sexual violence against women.

We can see a link between peaceful protest and social media, with those who cited non-violent protests ranking social media in their top two reasons for feeling more politically empowered.

It is particularly interesting to note the role protests have been playing in Brazil, Myanmar and Tunisia, as countries with previously closed or authoritarian forms of government. Such protests may demonstrate a sense of greater political openness and a more vibrant, participatory political culture. At the same time though, they may point to increased conflict stressors in those contexts and we cannot ignore the fact that government responses to protests in some contexts have involved violence.


We can see a link between peaceful protest and social media, with those who cited non-violent protests ranking social media in their top two reasons for feeling more politically empowered. This was particularly evident in Brazil, Nigeria, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine. Generally, social media has played a role in more rapidly connecting people and accelerating the organisation of protests.⁴² However, this has not been without its risks (see 2018 Special insight: Political and economic inclusion).

Men and women selected protests as an option on a relatively even basis, with the exception of DRC, where men were more inclined to choose protests than women (21% vs. 15%).

LOCAL POLITICAL LEADERS

Ranked third as a response to violence was 'asking your local political leader to take action', featuring strongly in Brazil, DRC, Lebanon, Myanmar and the Philippines. In some contexts, local political leaders are easier to access and may have a greater stake in local issues. This also makes sense in the context of countries like DRC, where traditional means of dispute resolution still reside with some local leaders. In Lebanon, it is likely to be more reflective of the new generation

FIGURE 10: HOW PEOPLE RESPOND TO VIOLENCE IN THEIR COMMUNITY



of political leader that has sprung up at the municipal level – emerging from activist roots and pursuing a less sectarian agenda, focusing more on social policies and public goods (see the Lebanon snapshot).

VIOLENT RETALIATORY ACTS

Ranking equal fourth as a response to violence was ‘violent acts in retaliation’. Colombia, Nigeria, South Africa and the US all had this among their top three out of six options.

In Colombia, Nigeria and South Africa, citizens may feel they have no one to turn to to help address or prevent violence, owing to the sometimes weak or hard to access judicial systems and predatory security forces.

Some research shows exposure to violence is more likely to lead to a violent response.⁴³ As the only dedicated sampling of a former highly conflict-affected region, the data from Northern Ireland possibly gives an insight into what highly conflict-affected areas look like. It ranked violent acts in retaliation at 24%, only two percentage

points behind asking the local police or security forces to act, whereas for the wider UK violent retaliation scored 14%.

In Colombia, retaliatory violence scored higher among those aged 16–24, those who thought peace would get worse and those who felt less able to improve their economic situation. In Nigeria and South Africa, it was higher among those who felt economically and politically excluded, and those who perceived peace to be getting worse. In South Africa, it was also those with lower levels of education.

In the US, retaliatory violence scored higher among those living in urban environments. In contrast to other countries, it was also higher among those who felt politically included.

MIGRATION

Those countries that placed the greatest weight on migration as a response to violence were Lebanon (ranking it first), Syria and Ukraine (both ranking it second), and Colombia and South Africa (both ranking it third).

In Lebanon, the greatest contemporary movement of people occurred around the country's civil war (1975–1990), when about one million people are said to have fled the country.⁴⁴ Massive refugee flows have been a hallmark of the Syrian conflict, with around 5.6 million people fleeing the country and a further 6.6 million internally displaced.⁴⁵ Ukraine has around 1.8 million internally displaced people as a result of the conflict in the east and the annexation of Crimea.⁴⁶ And as of 2017, there were a staggering 7.3 million internally displaced people in Colombia,⁴⁷ while a further 340,000

‘Violent acts in retaliation’ ranked in the top three responses to violence in Colombia, Nigeria, South Africa and the US.

have found refuge in countries such as Costa Rica, Ecuador, Panama and Venezuela.

There is a clear connection between conflict and migration, and the costs to host countries are huge – both financial and in terms of the strains to the social fabric. However, the international community's approach tends to be one of response rather than prevention. The global emergency humanitarian budget has almost tripled since 2006, from US\$9.2 billion⁴⁸ to US\$27.3 billion,⁴⁹ with the majority going to a handful of countries: Iraq, Jordan, South Sudan, Syria and Yemen. This does not include the huge costs to the national budgets of host countries, which are in the hundreds of billions. The migration crisis in Europe is a crisis emerging from conflict. Until the conflict drivers of displacement are adequately addressed, we are unlikely to see sustainable solutions to this ever-growing challenge.

SORTIE

LEBANON



Lebanon's civil war, which lasted from 1975 to 1990, claimed as many as 150,000 lives, injured 300,000 and resulted in around one million people fleeing the country.⁵⁰ Today, Lebanese society and politics remain fractured along sectarian lines. The country has also suffered from political violence, the most high-profile case being the assassination of Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in 2005. There have been successive clashes with Israel, the most recent being a 34-day conflict in 2006. It has also been highly affected by the war in Syria, hosting at least one million refugees (equivalent to a quarter of its population), with violence on its borders with Syria.⁵¹

WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE?

In retrospective looking polls, most Lebanese have generally said they are less secure than before the Syria conflict.⁵² The peace poll asked Lebanese to look to the future. When asked about peace and security in the next five years, 53% of Lebanese said it would get better – possibly anticipating a conclusion to the conflict in Syria and recent refugee returns – and 29% said it would stay the same. This is compared to 18% who thought it will get worse.

However, these figures mask regional variations, which largely fall along a capital-regional divide. In Baalbek, a marginalised area dealing with the fallout of the Syria crisis, 30% of people thought peace and security would get worse – well above the national average. In North Lebanon, a region that includes both Tripoli, known for its sectarian clashes, and Akkar, which has also been impacted by an influx of refugees, people were most likely to think there would be no change. The same applied in South Lebanon, which was most affected by the conflict with Israel.

WHAT ARE PEOPLE WORRIED ABOUT?

People rated their greatest overall concern as relating to 'interference by a foreign country' (presumably Syria and Israel), followed by 'terrorism' and 'domestic violence'.


WHY DO PEOPLE TURN TO VIOLENCE?

A 'sense of injustice' (22%) emerged as the top motivation to violence, probably reflecting a concentration of political and economic power among elites. This was followed by 'lack of jobs or need to provide for their families' (21%), perhaps unsurprising given that Lebanon currently has an unemployment rate thought to be in excess of 30%.⁵³ 'Religious ideology' also featured, although coming in third after more social and economic issues.

HOW DO PEOPLE RESPOND TO VIOLENCE?

When violence does occur, 'migrating to another province or country' (21%) was the top response, followed by 'asking local police or security forces to take action' (19%). People over 55 tended to cite migration more as a response – most likely remembering the civil war, when hundreds of thousands migrated – as did those who felt they have less political influence than five years ago.

FIGURE 11: WHAT TYPES OF VIOLENCE CONCERN PEOPLE IN LEBANON THE MOST



'Violent acts in retaliation' registered more strongly among young people aged 16–24. At the same time, 16–24-year-olds also placed greater weight on non-violent protests. Activism has become more common in recent years, spawned by the three-year long garbage collection crisis caused by the inability of a parliament divided along sectarian lines to award a new contract for garbage removal.

WHAT DOES PEACE LOOK LIKE?

When asked what best represents a peaceful society in their country, people said it was when:



we are able to resolve disputes without violence



I can participate in community decision-making processes



there is less violence



there is the opportunity to earn a living to support my family



there is justice for acts of violence

Community decision making ranked more highly than national elections, probably because it is less affected by sectarian divides, seen as more accessible and as having a more direct impact on people's daily lives than broader national policy-making. Those who thought peace would get worse were much less likely to identify national elections as an indicator of peace. Young people overwhelmingly saw 'access to education' as key to more peaceful societies.

Community decision making ranked more highly than national elections, probably because it is less affected by the sectarian divides, seen as more accessible and has a more direct impact on people's daily lives.

DO PEOPLE FEEL POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY INCLUDED?

When asked overall how important the ability of people to participate in and influence political decisions that affect them was to peace, 53% said very important, 27% somewhat important and 21% not at all.

Compared to five years ago, 39% of Lebanese felt their ability to influence political decisions that affect them was about the same; 36% said they had more influence, attributing this to 'new political leaders' and 'technology and social media'. Among the 'new political leaders' may be the progressive party Beirut Madinati, which performed well in the 2016 municipal elections. Its platform of improving public goods and reducing corruption helped it to move away from sectarian politics.⁵⁴

For the 25% who said they had less influence, 'corruption and bribery in politics' was ranked as the top reason for this, followed by 'not being interested in politics'. The 2018 parliamentary elections, the first in nine years, saw less than half of registered voters participate.⁵⁵

People who felt they had less political influence were much more inclined to think that peace would get worse. Meanwhile, those who thought they had greater political influence were less likely to cite migration as a response to violence.

When asked whether people felt 'able to improve their family's economic situation', 29% of people said very much so, 35% somewhat and 37% not really or not at all. People who felt more pessimistic tended to live outside the capital. Overall, 88% of people saw 'access for everyone to economic opportunities' as very or somewhat important to peace in their country.

HOW SHOULD WE CREATE LONG-TERM PEACE?


The most effective way of creating long-term peace was thought to be 'dealing with the reasons why people fight in the first place' (32%). Popular support for a root causes approach could be an important tool for the national government and international community in seeking to enhance peace and security.

'Have a democratic election' (18%) ranked second. Here, 'democratic' may be the operative word, drawing a distinction with earlier responses around 'national elections', which tend to be perceived as reinforcing elite power.

'Use the military to address violence' came in joint third with 'negotiate a peace agreement with political leaders' (14%). The Lebanese Armed Forces are well respected as a relatively non-sectarian actor in society. More deliberately connecting the military with communities to address common concerns could further capitalise on this trust.

When asked how their government should spend money to promote peace, people ranked 'dealing with the reasons people fight' (35%) first, followed by 'teaching peace, tolerance and conflict resolution in schools' (22%).

FIGURE 12: WHAT WOULD BE MOST EFFECTIVE IN CREATING LONG-TERM PEACE IN LEBANON



WHAT DOES PEACE
LOOK LIKE?

4








It is easy to know what violence looks like; we see it on our screens every day. Too many millions live with conflict.

Yet, understanding what people perceive as contributing to peaceful and stable societies is essential not only for what national governments and the international community do, but how they do it.

SO WHAT DO PEOPLE THINK MAKES FOR A PEACEFUL SOCIETY?

Despite very different political and economic contexts, be they in Nigeria, Ukraine or the US, people share some fundamental understanding of what peace is.

The top five ranked responses globally were when:

-  people can resolve disputes without violence
-  people have the opportunity to earn a living to support their family
-  there is less crime
-  people can vote in a national election
-  there is less violence

The top results represent a mix of political, economic and security factors, illustrating how

The top results for what people think makes for a peaceful society represent a mix of political, economic and security factors, illustrating how complex and multifaceted achieving and sustaining peace can be.

complex and multifaceted achieving and sustaining peace can be. It also reflects what is generally regarded as 'positive peace' – where peace is more than the absence of violence, but the ability of a society to manage conflict peacefully.

In this respect, 'I feel safe to ask the police for help' and 'when there are more security forces on the street' ranked second to last and last respectively, suggesting that what peace means to people is more about being able to go about their daily lives and shape decisions that affect them, rather than the presence of, or interaction with, police or security forces.

Naturally, there are variations worth highlighting. For a start, when you look beyond global average numbers of poll participants to how the 12 factors were ranked by country, you get a more nuanced view.

In Brazil and Colombia, for example, 'access to education' was ranked first, while in Syria it ranked

FIGURE 13: WHAT BEST REPRESENTS A PEACEFUL SOCIETY – TOP FIVE





FIGURE 14: WHAT BEST REPRESENTS A PEACEFUL SOCIETY – RANKING



fourth. Those living in more developed countries, including Hungary, Ukraine, the UK and the US, considered it much less important, but regarded the opportunity to earn a living more highly than their counterparts in developing countries.

Participation in community decision making was rated more highly than voting in national elections in Colombia, Lebanon, Syria and Tunisia. While it is not possible to be certain without further data, this could possibly reflect the challenges present in the national politics of these countries, or the reality that in some situations decisions made at a community level have more impact on people's daily lives. Among those countries that ranked elections highest, all but India have had political transitions from military dictatorship within the living memory of many of their citizens (DRC, Myanmar, Nigeria and the Philippines). While political elites may not be delivering for people in some of these countries, it suggests that people still place value on the potential for change that elections hold and the democratic values that underpin them.

The 'opportunity to improve social status' was of much greater importance in Myanmar and Tunisia, and still ranking highly against the global average in Lebanon. As noted previously, in countries like

Lebanon and Tunisia, social status is conferred by things such as employment, marriage and adulthood. Myanmar being a society historically marked by inequalities in social status between religious and ethnic groups goes some way to explaining the results there.

The overall findings diverge again when looking at age and education.

Globally, access to education was the number one factor for people aged 16–24, followed closely by resolving disputes peacefully. Those with higher levels of education tended to associate less crime more strongly with peace. Those with lower levels of education tended to place more weight on voting in national elections, whereas people with higher levels of education saw participation in local community decision making as more important, drawing an interesting distinction between direct and representative decision-making processes and the access to, and capacity for, less educated people to participate in them.

There is a story to be told about the relationship between investment in education and peace and security.⁵⁶ The data suggests the simple fact that providing educational opportunities goes a long way to meeting the expectations of young people

when it comes to peace indicators. The connection between higher levels of education and reduced chances of taking the path of retaliatory violence in response to conflict is by itself a justification for increased investment. Education appears to also help increase political inclusion and is key to greater economic inclusion as well. In contexts of mass displacement because of conflict, maintaining education services is essential to ensuring that people can constructively participate in society at the conclusion of hostilities, through the knowledge, values and skills education transfers.

Overall, these findings on what people see as promoting peaceful and secure societies suggest two things. Firstly, and reinforcing the OECD's 2018 States of Fragility report,⁵⁷ they suggest that interventions designed to promote peace and security need to be much more tailored, taking into account differences in perceptions of peace not only by where people live but also social and economic identities. Secondly, if this is what peace looks like, our responses need to be more integrated. Development, political and security efforts need to be more joined up in their planning and delivery, and accountable against peace-promoting objectives. Continuing to work in silos (e.g. development vs. security) will continue to undermine the potential of such interventions to contribute to peace. Security interventions that are disconnected from action on political and economic factors are probably less likely to succeed, and vice versa.

These perspectives largely correlate with the statebuilding and peacebuilding goals that underpin the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States.⁵⁸ These are:

1. legitimate politics: foster inclusive political settlements and conflict resolution
2. security: establish and strengthen people's security
3. justice: address injustices and increase people's access to justice
4. economic foundations: generate employment and improve livelihoods
5. revenues and services: manage revenue and build capacity for accountable and fair service delivery

The UN's SDGs also set the stage for a more integrated approach with the inclusion of SDG 16 on peaceful and inclusive societies.⁵⁹ How far SDG 16 is integrated across the other goals, as per the recommendations of *The roadmap for peaceful, just and inclusive societies*,⁶⁰ will be decisive in whether

'leaving no one behind' remains a mantra or becomes a reality, and, indeed, whether the SDGs ultimately succeed.

COLOMBIA



Colombia's 50-year armed conflict with the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) resulted in an estimated 220,000 dead, 25,000 'disappeared' and around seven million displaced.⁶¹ It concluded in 2016 with an historic peace deal between the government and FARC. However, the path ahead is not straightforward. The peace deal was initially defeated in a popular referendum before being amended by the government, and it is uncertain how the newly-elected President Iván Duque will follow through with his previously expressed opposition of the deal. Meanwhile, the conflict with the National Liberation Army (ELN) remains ongoing and criminal violence centred around the illegal drug trade, illegal economies and criminal gangs continues.

WHAT ARE THE PROSPECTS FOR PEACE?

The polling in Colombia took place during the runoff phase of the presidential election. This could account for the level of optimism when people were asked about the levels of peace and security in their country in the next five years. 50% believed it would get better, 31% thought that it would stay the same and only 19% said it would get worse.

There were regional variations though. 33% of those living in villages thought things would get worse, well above the national average. In Nariño, a conflict-affected region that was a battleground for the ELN, FARC and government forces, 30% of people thought peace and security would get worse. In Bolivar, 45% thought things would remain the same – a worrying prospect, given the ongoing violence in the region driven by guerrillas, criminal gangs and government forces.

Those over the age of 45 perceived a greater level of peace than those aged 16–34. People over 45 lived through the 'La Violencia' period (10-year civil war) as well as the guerrilla and paramilitaries war. Now with the peace deal, the prospect for peace may seem more real for them.

WHAT ARE PEOPLE WORRIED ABOUT?

People's top concerns were around 'criminal violence' (29%) and 'violent armed groups' (25%). However, in rural areas people were more concerned about 'violence or harassment from state authorities'. Women were more concerned about criminal violence than men, suggesting a need for tailored approaches.⁶²


WHY DO PEOPLE TURN TO VIOLENCE?

Colombians ranked 'a lack of jobs or need to provide for their families' (34%) as the number one driver of violence in their country, followed by 'a sense of injustice' (15%). In rural areas, being 'forced by armed groups' to participate in violence was also cited as a factor.

HOW DO PEOPLE RESPOND TO VIOLENCE?

'Asking local police or security forces to take action' (35%) was cited as the top response to violence, followed by 'violent acts in retaliation' (18%), registering the highest among young people and those with lower levels of education. Perceived high levels of impunity, the violent suppression of protests and feeling the need to

FIGURE 15: WHAT TYPES OF VIOLENCE CONCERN PEOPLE IN COLOMBIA THE MOST



resort to vigilante justice could account for the latter result. Those who thought peace would get worse were more likely to select violent retaliation.

'Non-violent protests' and 'migrating' (both on 13%) came joint third as a response to violence. In July 2018, thousands took to the streets demanding an end to the killing of human rights defenders.⁶³

WHAT DOES PEACE LOOK LIKE?

When asked what best represents a peaceful society in their country, people said it was when:



we are able to resolve disputes without violence



there is access to education



there is less violence



I can participate in community decision-making processes



I can vote in a national election

While involvement in community decision making registered strongly with people with high levels of education, those with low levels of schooling placed greater importance on voting. With high levels of attacks against human rights defenders and social leaders in Colombia,⁶⁴ the relative anonymity of an election may be preferable to those from marginalised communities.

Access to education and peaceful dispute resolution were seen among the most significant indicators of peace for 16–34 year-olds in Colombia.

Access to education and peaceful dispute resolution were seen among the most significant indicators of peace for 16–34 year-olds. During the presidential elections, education and access to it was an important issue, seen as a path to social mobility and economic opportunities.

DO PEOPLE FEEL POLITICALLY AND ECONOMICALLY INCLUDED?

Compared to five years ago, 41% of Colombians felt their ability to influence political decisions that affect them was about the same. 34% said they had more influence, largely attributing this to 'technology and social media' (26%), 'new political leaders' (26%) and 'social movements' (21%).

Young people who supported the peace agreement were active after the referendum and during the recent elections. Social media was a key platform for them in mobilising support,⁶⁵ while the combination of the peace agreement and Opposition Law,⁶⁶ which protects political agency, has helped create new space for social movements such as the social change focused La Paz Querida and Movilizatorio.

Those who thought they had less influence cited 'corruption and bribery' (42%) as the number one factor. They were also more likely to think that peace would get worse in their country over the next five years.


When asked whether people felt 'able to improve their family's economic situation', 27% of people said very much so, 50% somewhat and 22% not really or not at all. Those who felt less able to improve their family's economic situation were more pessimistic about peace and security in the next five years, by a difference of more than 15 percentage points.

HOW SHOULD WE CREATE LONG-TERM PEACE?

The two top responses were 'dealing with the reasons why people fight in the first place' (27%) and 'supporting societies and communities to resolve conflict peacefully' (26%). In third place was 'have a democratic election' (18%). There is a significance to this last result, as 2018 was the first election with FARC as a political party – their political integration being a key plank of the peace agreement.

To achieve lasting peace, Colombians thought their government should spend more on ‘teaching peace, tolerance and conflict resolution in schools’ (31%). This could be partly due to the Cátedra para la Paz initiative, focused on promoting a culture of peace through the classroom. ‘Dealing with the reasons why people fight in the first place’ (24%) was ranked second.

FIGURE 16: WHAT WOULD BE MOST EFFECTIVE IN CREATING LONG-TERM PEACE IN COLOMBIA



POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INCLUSION

2018 SPECIAL INSIGHT



Over the last decade, the response to a growing gap in power, wealth and opportunity between the centre and the periphery of societies has manifested in a variety of ways, all involving some form of conflict or social tension, and, in every case, political upheaval. Lines of division are diverse, ranging from urban-rural splits to political class divides to those based around identity. Yet, the common theme has been exclusion – both political and economic, and generally a blend of the two.

If we imagine a spectrum from more peaceful to less peaceful responses to exclusion, we see at one end the recent political upheaval in countries such as Hungary, the UK and the US, where disruptive forms of politics have had ‘break-through moments’. In these contexts, there has been a rejection of the so-called ‘elite’ or ‘political establishment’, as well as an erosion of institutions, social norms and conventions. Exclusion has formed a key narrative in the politics that led to these outcomes.

Further along the spectrum, you have countries like Syria and Ukraine. In Syria, decades of political and economic exclusion under an oppressive regime helped catalyse the political events that led to war.⁶⁷ The multitude of historic and contemporary factors that drove the conflict in Ukraine are closely interwoven with dimensions of political and economic exclusion, whether that is

People overwhelmingly saw political inclusion as key to peace in their country, with 83% of respondents saying it was very important or somewhat important.

elite capture of resources through corruption⁶⁸ or perceptions of political and economic inequality in the east of the country.⁶⁹

POLITICAL INCLUSION AND EXCLUSION

Political agency versus political exclusion has been a key faultline along which conflict has emerged. It is not surprising, therefore, that people overwhelmingly saw political inclusion as key to peace, with 83% of respondents saying it was very important or somewhat important to peace in their country – Colombia, Myanmar, Hungary and the US topping the list.

There was a more mixed picture when people were asked about their own political agency –

FIGURE 17: WHETHER PARTICIPATING IN AND INFLUENCING POLITICAL DECISIONS IS IMPORTANT TO PEACE AND SECURITY





FIGURE 18: WHETHER PEOPLE FEEL MORE OR LESS ABLE TO INFLUENCE POLITICAL DECISIONS THAT AFFECT THEM



whether they felt 'more or less able to influence the political decisions that affect them' (a proxy for political inclusion). Figure 18 shows which answer was ranked highest in each country.

WHAT IS DRIVING A SENSE OF GREATER POLITICAL INCLUSION?

While 'new political leaders' and 'new social movements' scored highly, ranking second and third, it was technology and social media that consistently topped the list of reasons why people thought they had more influence. In 11 countries, social media and technology was ranked the top reason for increased political agency, polling the highest in Brazil, Nigeria, Syria and Tunisia. It was ranked second in a further three countries.

Yet, the influence of technology and social media can be a double-edged sword. Its manipulation by extremist groups such as ISIS is well known, as is its use to interfere in the 2016 US elections. In Myanmar, it has been suggested that social media has helped amplify hate speech and mobilise violence against the Rohingya population,⁷⁰ while in India and Sri Lanka WhatsApp and Facebook have been blamed for an increasing amount of mob violence and lynchings.⁷¹ There is also the potential for social media to increase political inequality, given that coverage can be purchased or controlled. An increasing number of governments are blocking access to social media


during elections and other politically sensitive times, including Bangladesh, Cameroon, DRC and Uganda.⁷²

However, it has also demonstrated, perhaps more quietly, its potential for good. In Lebanon, social media and technology have aided the growth of a series of citizen-led movements, combining on-the-ground actions with online campaigns that not only mobilise people around issues such as the environment, social services and elite accountability, but also advance non-sectarian narratives.⁷³ Social media has also been used to crowdsource information in conflict hotspots as part of various conflict prevention measures, including in Kenya and Nigeria, especially around elections.⁷⁴

As such, there is a challenge for the technology community and regulators to rise to. Part of this will be better understanding where technology can make a positive contribution. There is also a trust gap to overcome. This calls for a much more deliberate investigation of, and planned approach around, the role of technology in peace.


FIGURE 19: WHY PEOPLE ARE MORE ABLE TO INFLUENCE POLITICAL DECISIONS THAT AFFECT THEM COMPARED TO FIVE YEARS AGO

GLOBALLY



- Can change things through social movements
- Can communicate views through technology and social media
- Constitutional change, peace agreement or new laws
- New political leaders who represent person's views
- Other

NATIONALLY



WHAT IS SEEN AS DRIVING POLITICAL EXCLUSION?

Those who felt they had less political influence than five years ago were led by DRC (50%), South Africa (44%) and the UK (41%), with Hungary only one percentage point behind. At the time of polling, the situation in DRC was one of uncertainty about when elections would be held and how effectively, and whether or not there would be a peaceful transition of power. The divisive nature of the Brexit vote in the UK almost certainly is reflected in this poll. South Africa had a watershed political moment in February 2018 with the resignation of President Jacob Zuma, but the recent change in leadership will take time to arrest the increasing economic inequality, high unemployment and extreme poverty of the last decade, possibly accounting for the country's results.⁷⁵ Moreover, some have suggested that the South African electoral system does not provide a sufficient link between citizens and their elected representatives.⁷⁶

The countries that topped the list of those that thought they had the same level of influence as


five years ago were Ukraine (47%), Tunisia (44%) and Syria (43%). All three have had historically high levels of political exclusion, which has directly contributed to violent conflict. In Tunisia, the result may reflect a perceived stagnation in its political transition,⁷⁷ though it is difficult to know without further data. While the results in Ukraine may reflect both the failure by political leaders to make headway on issues such as corruption and also the stagnation of the conflict in the east.

Across the countries where people thought they had less political influence, the main reason given was 'corruption and bribery in politics'. Two exceptions were the UK, where lack of trustworthy information was the key factor, and the US, where corruption and bribery drew equal with lack of trustworthy information. South Africa (49%), Ukraine (46%) and Nigeria (44%) scored corruption the highest, followed by Colombia, Brazil and Hungary. There was little variation in perception by age, sex, where people lived, education or economic status.

While corruption scored the highest globally, a simple 'lack of interest in politics' came in second, and was ranked highest in Syria (40%), India (32%), Tunisia (31%) and Lebanon (31%). In Tunisia, there are increasing questions about what the revolution has delivered, while in Lebanon,


FIGURE 20: WHY PEOPLE ARE LESS ABLE TO INFLUENCE POLITICAL DECISIONS THAT AFFECT THEM COMPARED TO FIVE YEARS AGO

GLOBALLY



- Corruption and bribery in politics
- Government not representative of person's views
- Lack of trustworthy information about what is happening
- Not interested in politics
- Other

NATIONALLY



stability and the delicate balance of power has been maintained since the civil war at the expense of reform. While it is not possible to be precise without further polling, in Syria the results may be indicative of the high degree of risk associated with political activity in the country. Indeed, even admitting an interest in politics could be seen as a risk and have influenced respondents' selection. The picture is also unclear in India, which has recorded high voter turnouts in recent elections.⁷⁸

Overall though, efforts to promote peace and security need to work hand in hand with efforts to tackle corruption and increase accountability between citizens and the state – core objectives of SDG 16 targets. Where this is weak, the seeds of violent conflict and instability can grow.

WHO ARE THE EXCLUDED?


Certain segments of the population felt political exclusion more acutely. In 11 countries, those who thought peace and security overall was likely to get worse in their country over the next five years thought they had less political influence, reinforcing the close connection between political inclusion and perceptions of peace.

Those who had only reached a secondary level of education were more likely to feel they had less political influence in India, Lebanon, Nigeria, the Philippines, South Africa, Syria and Tunisia. In 11 countries (Brazil, Colombia, DRC, India, Lebanon, Nigeria, the Philippines, Tunisia, Ukraine, the UK and the US), those on a low income were more likely to feel they had less political influence.

People feeling politically excluded were also more likely to see migration as a legitimate response to violence in their communities. In Brazil, Colombia, DRC, Hungary, Lebanon, the Philippines, South Africa, Syria, Tunisia and Ukraine, those who felt they had less political influence cited migration in the top three most common responses when violence occurs in their community. This correlation between migration and political exclusion is worthy of greater evaluation, given that traditional political narratives in the west tend to explain migration primarily through a jobs and border security lens.

There was also a link between political exclusion and areas where violence is concentrated. For example, in Ukraine, people in the Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia regions felt they had less political influence than the national average. Donetsk is at the heart of the eastern conflict, while Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia border the conflict. The same holds true for

FIGURE 21: WHETHER EVERYONE HAVING ACCESS TO ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES IS IMPORTANT TO PEACE AND SECURITY



conflict-affected areas in DRC (North Kivu) and Lebanon (Beqaa and Nabatieh).

In summary, those feeling less politically included tended to be more pessimistic about their future, less educated and more likely to be living in conflict affected-areas. They are also more likely to see migration as a response to violence in their communities and less likely to access the local police or security forces. In a small number of countries, they are more likely to rationalise violent retribution in response to violence.

ECONOMIC INCLUSION


People across the countries polled overwhelmingly saw access to economic opportunities for all as essential to peace and security, with 90% of people saying it was very or somewhat important for peace. Syria, the Philippines, Nigeria, Hungary, Myanmar, Lebanon and South Africa respectively topped the list of countries that thought it was very important. Interestingly, the majority of these are middle-income countries.

When asked about their own economic prospects, specifically ‘do you feel able to improve your or your family’s economic situation?’ – as an indicator for economic inclusion, there was a mixed picture.

People across the countries polled overwhelmingly saw access to economic opportunities for all as essential to peace and security, with 90% of people saying it was very or somewhat important for peace.

Those that felt the most economically excluded lived in relatively developed, middle- and high-income countries, including Hungary (42%), Ukraine (41%), the UK (40%), Lebanon (37%), the US (33%) and South Africa (28%). This correlates with the earlier findings on people’s prospects for peace in the next five years. In reality, these people are not as poor or insecure as those in some of the other countries polled, as the UN’s Human Development Index illustrates.⁷⁹ However, it is important to remember that they are basing their decision on their own national context, where in some cases inequalities may have increased and certainly narratives of economic exclusion have featured strongly in national politics.

FIGURE 22: WHETHER PEOPLE FEEL ABLE TO IMPROVE THEIR FAMILY'S ECONOMIC SITUATION



The unfair distribution of economic benefits or access to income-generating resources is a hallmark of many conflicts. The economic divide between rural and urban populations was one contributing factor to the war in Syria, the pastoralist–herder conflict in Nigeria has its roots in competition over land and other resources, while DRC is infamous for the role its natural wealth, particularly minerals, has played in sustaining violence. As seen earlier, elite capture of economic resources, for example through corruption, is also a driving force for dissatisfaction and instability in places like Ukraine, damaging the state–citizen contract. By contrast, in Northern Ireland, new laws aimed at addressing discrimination in education, housing and the labour market are helping close economic inequalities and sustain peace. And in the Philippines, fiscal independence is at the heart of autonomy arrangements under the Mindanao peace agreement and supporting Organic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region.⁸⁰

Overall, those who felt less economic opportunity were more likely to be pessimistic about peace and security over the coming five years and were on lower incomes.

REDRESSING EXCLUSION

Reducing political and economic exclusion as a means to reduce violent conflict appears a challenging task.

It has been tried and met with success in a number of contexts though. The case of Mindanao in the Philippines is a promising model. The devolution of power and authority through the establishment of Mindanao as an autonomous region with a greater ability to generate its own revenue, and the creation of new security arrangements, together with the existing truth and reconciliation commission, have helped end a long-running conflict that cost thousands of lives.⁸¹

Similarly, in Northern Ireland, political devolution, reforms to security forces and efforts to improve economic inclusion helped place it on the path to peace. However, some communities feel they have not benefited from the anticipated ‘peace dividend’, and while the institutional reforms can be seen as going some way to combating exclusion, the current political deadlock shows how fragile the settlement is, highlighting the need for a renewed focus on building and sustaining peace.

The ultimate equalizer is to be found in South Africa, with the end of Apartheid – a system that had at its heart the denial of political and economic rights. Its legacy of course lives on, and while great steps forward have been taken, particularly on political inclusion, reductions in economic exclusion have not kept pace with public expectations.

What these three contexts have in common though is that they went through a deliberate process that identified and then addressed areas of political and economic exclusion. Those seeking to build peace and stability need to go through an equally deliberate process when planning their support, examining political and economic exclusion as drivers of conflict. Closing the political and economic gap will not happen organically.

These findings chime strongly with those of the World Bank and UN 2018 report, *Pathways for peace: Inclusive approaches to preventing violent conflict*,⁸² in particular around the connection between access to power and conflict.

This is the real challenge for the international community and the implementation of the SDGs. There is a risk of taking a mechanical, indicator-driven approach focused on technical solutions, whereas what is needed is a much more deeply embedded, holistic theory of political and social change. This can be assisted by sound national plans of action and committed leadership. However broad-based public and political buy-in will be essential to navigate the national- and local-level political and economic incentives that work against more peaceful societies in too many countries.

HOW SHOULD WE RESPOND TO CONFLICT?

5



With conflict spiralling out of control in many parts of the world, the international community has been at best playing catch up. While institutional leaders such as the UN and the World Bank are encouraging more approaches that prioritise prevention,⁸³ the lion's share of action has been reactive, often characterised by security interventions and emergency humanitarian aid.

However, such responsive approaches tend to put a lid on conflict rather than dealing with its underlying drivers. This thinking was summed up by General John Allen, former Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, who in 2015 said the lesson from US military action in Iraq and Syria is the importance of solving the “underlying social, economic and political subcurrents”. “If we don’t get to the left of those symptoms and try to solve these underlying circumstances,” he continued, “then we’re going to be condemned to fight forever.”⁸⁴


Results suggest that people around the world fundamentally agree. When presented with all the options, they know what it takes to build long-term peace.

Across the countries surveyed, from the UK to Colombia and Nigeria to the Philippines, when people were asked what they thought were the most effective means of creating long-term peace, ‘dealing with the reasons why people fight in the first place’ and ‘supporting societies to deal with conflict peacefully’ were acknowledged as the two most important paths to peace. These two elements constitute the core of peacebuilding, which focuses on dealing with the root causes of conflict as well as building capacity for peaceful conflict resolution.

These results closely align with, and illustrate public support for, the approach outlined by the UN and the World Bank in their Pathways for Peace report, which emphasises the importance, cost effectiveness and sustainability of conflict prevention.⁸⁵

The reality though is that peacebuilding as a tool for preventing and responding to conflict is a little-known and little-used option. Political leaders have historically framed ‘decisive’ political action in terms of security interventions and diplomatic engagement, augmented most recently with emergency humanitarian aid. Up until about 50 years ago, when peacebuilding as an approach

FIGURE 23: WHAT WOULD BE MOST EFFECTIVE IN CREATING LONG-TERM PEACE



began to take shape, these were in reality their only options. Yet, in an environment where interstate wars have declined but there has been a rise in civil wars driven by historical grievances, political and economic exclusion – often trapping countries in cycles of violence – there is a need to elevate peacebuilding as the fourth pillar of conflict prevention and response.

The poll results show support for the increased use of peacebuilding or root causes approaches. It suggests that the public is more likely to support peacebuilding where they understand all the available options, highlighting the need for political leaders to be more vocal about peacebuilding as a tool to pursue national security objectives.

Of course, anyone will say they support peace. The challenge is when we are asked to choose between different types of interventions. Prioritisation is the unrelenting challenge of policy-makers and politicians. That is why these results are all the more significant, given that people were provided with the full suite of options (see Figure 23) and still ranked the two constituent parts of peacebuilding highest.


EVEN THE BEST POLICY IDEAS ARE DOOMED TO FAIL WITHOUT ADEQUATE RESOURCING

When asked where governments should spend more to promote peace, there was a correlation with their earlier answers, with the majority of respondents choosing ‘dealing with the reasons why people fight in the first place’ as their first priority for more government spending.

Even those living in the midst of war and those most concerned about the threat of terrorism saw a clear path to long-term peace offered by spending more on this approach, when they could otherwise have chosen things like emergency humanitarian assistance or military interventions.

The Global Peace Index has estimated that for every US\$1 invested in prevention, about US\$16 is saved in the cost of conflict.⁸⁶ So peacebuilding makes economic sense and would ease the

FIGURE 24: WHAT SHOULD THE GOVERNMENT SPEND MORE ON TO PROMOTE PEACE



unsustainable burden on humanitarian assistance, which has almost tripled since 2006, from US\$9.2 billion⁸⁷ to US\$27.3 billion.⁸⁸ The European Union (EU), Germany, Japan, the UK and the US paid almost two-thirds of the total humanitarian budget in 2016.⁸⁹ Yet, even the potential savings made here are brought into stark relief by the annual cost of violent armed conflict, which stands at US\$1.4 trillion.⁹⁰ Still, peacebuilding remains the poor cousin when it comes to funding, at just US\$10 billion per year, as opposed to US\$27.3 for humanitarian assistance, US\$142 billion on development aid and US\$1.7 trillion on military expenditure.⁹¹

The second most popular response when it came to spending was 'teaching peace, tolerance and conflict resolution in schools'. Peace education and dealing with the reasons why people fight are closely interconnected.

Peace education has been an established area of learning for some time, but is not widely integrated into curricula by national governments. Some international organisations such as the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), as well as international non-government organisations such as International Alert,⁹² have highlighted the importance of peace education, integrating it into the programming. But it has not yet become a standard or systematic part of the conflict prevention and response toolkit among governments.

Peace education is an investment for the future. It can help young people and communities learn how to tackle conflict in their societies. Where countries are recovering from conflict, it can help address the intergenerational effects of conflict. For example, trauma, grievances and perceptions born of experiencing violence commonly transfer down the generations, requiring ongoing attention and work. It also has value in states undergoing transitions, for example from authoritarian regimes to democracies, where there has not been a prior culture of open dialogue and transparent conflict resolution mechanisms.

It can be curriculum based, but also involve shaping the structures of educational institutions. In Ireland and Northern Ireland, the EU has provided €35 million to enable 350 schools to take part in shared education on a cross-border basis, promoting a better understanding of communities on both sides of the border.⁹³

Given the level of perceived demand from the public, there is certainly value in governments and education ministries investigating peace education further as a policy option to promote peaceful and inclusive societies, both at home and abroad.

Even those living in the midst of war and those most concerned about the threat of terrorism saw a clear path to long-term peace offered by spending more on 'dealing with the reasons why people fight in the first place'.

NORTHERN IRELAND

2018 SPECIAL INSIGHT



Northern Ireland was chosen for a special insight as a context that has been looked to by others as a positive example of peacebuilding.

While people from Northern Ireland were included in the wider UK polling, there were not enough respondents to draw meaningful conclusions about perceptions in Northern Ireland. We therefore conducted additional polling in Northern Ireland. This was not added to the existing data for the UK, as doing so would lead to an overrepresentation. In this special insight, we therefore refer to data from Northern Ireland as distinct from that of the UK as a whole.

The Good Friday/Belfast Agreement,⁹⁴ which ended the most recent incarnation of the conflict, established three strands of institutional governance,⁹⁵ one of which was a power-sharing government. A restructured and more accountable police force helped balance institutional power and address divisions, while significant investment helped to address economic inequalities. Civil society peacebuilding initiatives were also vital.

Brexit, however, will test the resilience of the peace agreement. The World Bank has noted that “dependency on EU aid funds for certain areas of social spending is heavy” and that “divisions also remain, especially with regard to housing and

education”.⁹⁶ Moreover, re-establishing a hard border between Ireland and Northern Ireland could undermine a key element of the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement: the free movement of goods and people.

This comes at a time when the devolved governance institutions are already under stress. Northern Ireland has been without its power-sharing government for more than a year.⁹⁷

THE NUMBERS TELL A STORY OF PROGRESS

The fact that a number of important indicators do not vary significantly from the wider UK reflects a positive change. For example, when asked what concerned them the most, terrorism ranked first, followed by tribal, religious or ethnic conflict and criminal violence, all not much different than the wider UK. The same was the case for those who said they were most concerned about ‘violence or harassment from state authorities’. This is particularly significant, as trust in authorities was all but absent among much of the Nationalist population during the conflict.

People living in Northern Ireland were generally more optimistic about their prospects for peace

FIGURE 25: WHAT TYPES OF VIOLENCE CONCERN PEOPLE IN NORTHERN IRELAND THE MOST COMPARED TO THOSE IN THE WIDER UK










FIGURE 26: WHETHER PEOPLE IN NORTHERN IRELAND ARE MORE OR LESS ABLE TO INFLUENCE POLITICAL DECISIONS THAT AFFECT THEM COMPARED TO FIVE YEARS AGO



compared to the wider UK. For example, 40% of people in the UK thought peace and security would get worse in the next five years, compared to 28% in Northern Ireland. However, it is worth noting this is still high in global terms.


Consistent with the wider UK, when asked about the most effective means of creating long-term peace, respondents in Northern Ireland ranked ‘deal with the reasons why people fight in the first place’ and ‘support societies to resolve conflict peacefully’ at one and two respectively.

When asked what best represents a peaceful society, people ranked the following answers:

-  I have the opportunity to earn a living to support my family
-  there is less crime
-  we are able to resolve disputes without violence
-  there is less violence
-  I can vote in a national election

This is again consistent with the overall UK findings. However, more emphasis was placed on ‘less violence around me’ in Northern Ireland, with the wider UK ranking it fifth.

FIGURE 27: WHAT WOULD BE MOST EFFECTIVE IN CREATING LONG-TERM PEACE IN NORTHERN IRELAND COMPARED TO IN THE WIDER UK



THE FINGERPRINTS OF CONFLICT STILL REMAIN HOWEVER

Those aged 65 and over were more pessimistic about the prospects for peace in the next five years, with 38% saying things would get worse versus 26% who thought things would get better. This is the generation that lived through the period of violence often referred to as 'the Troubles',⁹⁸ having been in their late teens/early twenties at its height.

When asked what motivates people to take violent actions, 'religious ideology' (27%) ranked number one, compared to 'lack of jobs or the need to provide for their families' (21%) in the wider UK.

When asked what people do when violence occurs, 'asking local police to take action' (26%) ranked first, closely followed by 'violent acts in retaliation' (24%). Northern Ireland was one of the few contexts to rank retaliatory actions in its top two responses to violence. Compared to the UK average, people in Northern Ireland were still less inclined to go to the police when faced with violence in their community, by a margin of around 10 percentage points.


Compared to five years ago, more people thought they had less influence over political decision making that affects them (38%) than those who thought they had more (23%). This could be a consequence of the collapse of the power-sharing assembly.

Those who said they did not feel able to improve their family's economic situation in part or in whole were more likely to think that peace would get worse in the next five years, by a margin of 20 percentage points.

When asked who they 'trust to build and maintain peace', community leaders ranked more strongly in Northern Ireland than the UK average (NI: 44%, wider UK: 34%), while there was significantly less trust in the military (NI: 16%, wider UK: 25%), slightly less trust in the courts (NI: 28%, wider UK: 33%) and more trust in religious leaders (NI: 22%, wider UK: 15%).

The poll results from Northern Ireland show encouraging signs amid the persistent echoes of conflict. There has been speculation about the conditions under which the lines of conflict could re-emerge.⁹⁹ We know that building peace is an intergenerational exercise, peace agreements marking the beginning of a path to peace, not the end, and that shocks can quickly reverse gains. The worry is that with so many issues on the Brexit agenda, Northern Ireland slips into the background and, if the right conditions materialise, away from peace.

FIGURE 28: HOW PEOPLE RESPOND TO VIOLENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND COMPARED TO THOSE IN THE WIDER UK



METHODOLOGY

6



The polling was conducted in collaboration with global survey agency, RIWI. Their technology-based approach¹⁰⁰ delivers anonymous opt-in surveys to random online users who land on websites that are inactive, no longer exist or non-trademarked, by typing in a lapsed or dormant website address. This method enables the capture of anonymous and randomised opinion data within a specific location anywhere in the world with internet access.

The questions in this poll were translated into the local languages where the poll was being targeted, allowing more people to take part and answer the questions with ease and accuracy. The survey was also optimised for mobile devices, to take advantage of the greater use of mobile technology in some of the countries surveyed compared to use of laptops and desktops.

Telephone and face-to-face surveys are not always anonymous, meaning candid responses are sometimes constrained by social bias and the tendency of respondents to answer questions in ways they think the interviewers would want them to. With RIWI's methodology, no personally identifiable or traceable information is collected, stored or transferred. This means that respondents can take part without fear, as some of the countries polled are highly volatile and can be dangerous for those taking part.

The RIWI method does not provide financial incentives for participation and people can leave the poll at any time. Therefore, the number of responses for each question will vary. Incentives can increase participation, but they make candour and anonymity challenging. It can also be perceived as coercive or suspicious to the respondent, especially in conflict areas. Without financial incentives, respondents may take part in the survey simply because they find it interesting, the questions may be highly relevant and important to them, or they have no other means to safely express their opinions on this matter.

WHY DO BROKEN LINKS WORK?

Statistically, everyone using the internet has made a manual input error at least once, but may not have answered a RIWI survey. These errors will occur more frequently given the evolution of the web over time, the growth of smartphone usage and new domain name extensions rendering old ones defunct. People who make these errors

make up a random and highly representative sample of a given online population.

WEIGHTING

Since RIWI are intercepting a given internet population randomly, this can result in reaching a higher number of males and young people, who invariably use the internet more often. Consequently, RIWI weight the data based on age and gender using the most recent national census data available in the US Census Bureau world database. For example, responses from older women may be given a higher weight than younger males.

THE DATA

The polling commenced in the last week of May 2018. The majority of countries had received sufficient responses by the first week of July. However, given response rates are dependent on population size, some countries took longer than others, meaning that the final results were not completed until the end of July.

Fifteen countries were polled: Brazil, Colombia, DRC, Hungary, India, Lebanon, Myanmar, Nigeria, the Philippines, South Africa, Syria, Tunisia, Ukraine, the UK and the US. Northern Ireland was also oversampled and specifically targeted separately from the UK, as both a positive example of peacebuilding, but also a context currently experiencing stressors. This additional data was not added to the existing data for the UK, as that already included respondents from Northern Ireland and doing so would lead to an overrepresentation.

110,830 people participated in the poll and answered at least three questions. A total of 17,642 completed the entire poll. The minimum number of respondents required from each polled country was 1,000, though the eventual total exceeded that minimum target. The weighted percentage of men and women who took part in the poll was 53% and 47%.

QUESTION DESIGN

The questions were developed with the intention of making the Peace Perceptions Poll a multi-year activity that could identify and highlight trends. Built on a set of core themes, including societal peace factors, conflict motivation and

response mechanisms, a core set of replicable questions were devised together with special insights questions on political and economic inclusion. The questions were consulted upon by an external group of individuals and refined in collaboration with poll partner RIWI to ensure they were optimised for single-click mobile technology platforms.

The question around what represents a peaceful society in your country was segmented into four components: justice, security, political and economic. Only two of the four components were randomly shown to the respondents to answer. The answers were then pooled together at the end, with the top five answers used to identify the most popular responses.

DEMOGRAPHIC SPLITS

All data was reviewed by gender, age, income, levels of education and where people lived. This data is only referenced in the report where there was a pattern or significant variation in perceptions. It should be noted that there was significantly less variation by gender than originally expected, such that we were unable to identify significant trends at the global level between countries. There was limited differentiation at the national level too. On the whole, women's and men's perceptions appeared quite aligned, to the point where there were only one to three percentage points different between them, and sometimes none at all. Any significant differences have been highlighted.

TREATMENT OF PEACEBUILDING

With low levels of awareness about what peacebuilding is among the public, when testing levels of support, rather than providing a definition, it was broken down into its constituent parts: dealing with the reasons why people fight in the first place and building the capacity of societies to resolve conflict peacefully. Apart from making peacebuilding more understandable, it helped to avoid a skewing of results. For example, providing a definition and explanation for just one option may have been seen as placing more weight on one answer and therefore influencing the responses.

CONSTRAINTS

The polling was reliant on the internet, and therefore the respondents were limited to internet users only. This limitation was factored against the ability of the technology to reach into countries we might not otherwise have been able to poll, as well as the international breadth of contexts that would have been harder to reach with traditional survey methods. It did mean in some contexts there was a higher proportion of respondents from urban population centres. This can be adjusted in the future through increased strategic oversampling. In Syria, polling data was only evident from government-held areas. The extreme circumstances the population currently finds itself in may also account for some results that, compared to the country context, may appear anomalous.

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