

# Can more jobs bring peace?



Understanding peace impact in employment programme design in Kenya and Somalia



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An agricultural shop selling products like seeds and fertiliser in Bungoma, Kenya



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### **Executive summary**

Within fragile, conflict-affected and post-conflict settings, employment-promotion programmes are often presented as a 'silver bullet' to development and peacebuilding. These programmes, ranging from promoting value chains for job creation to providing technical and vocational trainings, are not only designed as initiatives to reduce poverty levels or foster economic recovery, but are also frequently planned as an active means for reducing violence and building stability and peace.

Given the conflict context in the Horn of Africa, employment and related economic development programmes are often based on the rationale that increasing employment and improving economic development reduces levels of violence. While this offers an intuitive justification given concerns over youth bulges and high levels of unemployment in the region, there is little evidence of analysis of the assumptions underpinning the causal relationship between employment and peace.

Increasing numbers of analysts and practitioners have challenged this purported causality at different levels and highlight that the drivers that trigger, perpetuate or escalate violent conflict are more complex and cannot be reduced to merely a lack of employment opportunities. Economic marginalisation is often closely linked to, and rooted in, systems and structures of political and social exclusion.

Based on these observations, International Alert has analysed the intervention logic of a series of economic development interventions in fragile and conflict-affected settings in the Horn of Africa, as well as if and how the principles of conflict sensitivity are integrated, in order to highlight evidence of what works (good practice) and what could be improved (risks, challenges and gaps) at different stages of the project cycle, with the aim of informing donors, policy-makers and practitioners.

### **1. Introduction**

Within fragile, conflict-affected and post-conflict settings, programming on livelihoods promotion and job creation, under the umbrella of private sector development, is often presented as a 'silver bullet' to development and peacebuilding.<sup>1</sup> Employment-promotion programmes are designed not only as initiatives to reduce poverty levels and foster economic recovery in these settings (working *in* fragility), but also frequently as an active means for reducing violence and building stability and/or peace (working *on* fragility).<sup>2</sup>

In the Horn of Africa, given the conflict context in Somalia and the risks of a return of politically driven conflict in Kenya, as well as the growing field of preventing and countering violent extremism (PVE/CVE), employment and economic development programmes are often based on the rationale that increasing employment and improving economic development reduces violence. For example, within PVE/CVE, youth unemployment has been identified as a key vulnerability factor.<sup>3</sup>

Whereas the assumption that peace can be built through employment permeates a number of programmes in the global south and particularly so in the Horn of Africa, there is little evidence to analyse the assumptions underpinning the causal relationship between employment and peace. Increasing numbers of analysts and practitioners have challenged this purported causality at different levels – a prominent example being Mercy Corps' 2015 report, *Youth and consequences: Unemployment, injustice and violence*, which questions the assumption that 'idle youth' are prone to recruitment by armed groups.<sup>4</sup> These analyses show that the drivers that trigger, perpetuate or escalate violent conflict are more complex and cannot be reduced to merely a lack of employment opportunities. Economic marginalisation is often closely linked to, and rooted in, systems and structures of political and social exclusion.

Based on these observations, International Alert analysed the intervention logic of a series of economic development interventions in fragile and conflict-affected settings in the Horn of Africa. The analysis focused on evidence of what works (good practice) and what could be improved (risks, challenges and gaps) at different stages throughout the project cycle with the aim of informing donors, policy-makers and practitioners.

The study was based on a desk review of publicly available project documentation from 14 employmentpromotion and -creation programmes implemented in Kenya and Somalia,<sup>5</sup> including project proposals and business cases, logical frameworks, evaluations and assessment reports. This was supplemented with a review of more general academic and grey literature on employment interventions in fragile and conflictaffected settings as well as key informant interviews with two programme staff. This study is not intended as an exhaustive mapping of 'employment for peace' programming in the Horn of Africa, nor does it attempt to analyse the impact of programmes on peace dynamics.<sup>6</sup> Instead, focus is placed on identifying examples of good practice from the approaches and rationales presented within the design and monitoring and evaluation (M&E) documentation available.

<sup>1</sup> For example, within World Bank, World Development Report 2013: Jobs, Washington, DC: World Bank, 2012.

<sup>2</sup> R. Holmes, A. McCord and J. Hagen-Zanker, with G. Bergh and F. Zanker, What is the evidence on the impact of employment creation on stability and poverty reduction in fragile states – A systematic review, London: Overseas Development Institute, May 2013

<sup>3</sup> A. Saldinger, Look beyond jobs to address youth extremism, devex, 16 March 2015, https://www.devex.com/news/look-beyond-jobs-toaddress-youth-extremism-85650

<sup>4</sup> Mercy Corps, Youth and consequences: Unemployment, injustice and violence, Portland: Mercy Corps, 2015, https://www.mercycorps. org/sites/default/files/MercyCorps\_YouthConsequencesReport\_2015.pdf

<sup>5</sup> A third of the projects reviewed were still ongoing, while the remainder had recently been completed (within the past three to four years).

<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, in drawing on publicly available data, the amount of information available in this review varies considerably from project to project. For some the team was able to access evaluations or lessons learned studies that had been published, while for others the information was limited to business case and review documents (e.g. available on the UK government DevTracker website).



A farm worker planting crops in Lower Shabelle, Somalia

Out of the 14 reviewed projects, 10 were implemented in Somalia and four in Kenya. Eight of them had an explicit stability objective – either integrating peacebuilding activities or assuming improvement in livelihoods would lead to increased stability. While employment programming can take many forms, in the studied sample, projects fell into two overlapping categories: strengthening the private sector through diverse development strategies (focusing on both the demand and supply side); and direct employment and livelihood-opportunities creation. The sample was made up of direct interventions aimed at generating change in the way markets function in the short term (interventionist approach). Activities implemented as part of these projects included promoting market linkages, value chains, cash for work scheme, matching grants, vocational trainings, apprenticeships, training vouchers and income-generation activities, among others.

This desk review was undertaken as part of the UK government-funded Peace Research Partnership project (2017–2020), which aims to generate evidence and lessons for policy-makers and practitioners on how to support peaceful, inclusive change in conflict-affected areas.

Section 2 of this report analyses the assumptions that underpin project design within 'employment for peace' programming in the Horn of Africa and examines the M&E processes for these programmes that are working *on* fragility – i.e. that are attempting to address peace outcomes in some way. Section 3 then focuses on the broader issue of the implications of working *in* fragility and examines how these programmes apply conflict sensitivity in their approach. This report identifies a set of practical factors specific to employment interventions in the Horn of Africa that need to be taken into consideration for interventions to avoid exacerbating existing (or creating new) conflict dynamics in the context in which they are working and to maximise their positive impact.

### 2. Working on fragility

This section analyses the assumptions that underpin project design and approaches within programming on 'employment for peace' in the Horn of Africa. It highlights several ways in which 'theories of change' (both explicit and implicit) make the link between employment programming, peace and stability, and how this is then reflected in their design and M&E.

There is much attention within the region on the role of 'youth' in relation to violent conflict, which stems from the demographic trends towards continuing 'youth bulges' in Kenya and Somalia accompanied by high levels of youth unemployment. Lack of employment opportunities is thought to fuel frustrations and grievances against the state and dominant groups, as well as inequalities and feelings (real or perceived) of marginalisation by certain groups. Unemployed youth and other marginalised groups are seen as more receptive to dividing narratives (and financial incentives) and more vulnerable to recruitment by 'peace spoilers', such as non-state armed groups, including armed wings of political parties. They are also likely to be recruited by armed groups and labelled as 'extremist'. For example, in Somalia, this manifests as the risk of the perpetuation of ongoing conflicts as well as recruitment to violent extremist groups. "It has been and probably will continue to be the major source of conflict in Somalia, where two-thirds of youth are unemployed – one of the highest rates of unemployment in the world."7 While the Kenyan context differs considerably from that of Somalia, there are still widespread tensions over political and economic resources that manifest in violence. The so-called 'idle youth' are considered vulnerable to manipulation for politically driven violence. More recently, in northern Kenya, unfulfilled high expectations of employment from emerging industries, such as oil and gas, have led to violent clashes.

### How assumptions on employment and peace shape theories of change

More than half of the programmes selected for review in this study made the assertion that increasing employment would contribute to peace and/or stability. Frequently, this was part of the rationale for the intervention to take place, and therefore can be considered an implicit part of the theory of change. Other programmes were more explicit in identifying the link within their theories of change. For example, a theory of change for an employmentpromotion and -creation project in south central Somalia explicitly "identifies potential connections between unemployment as a driver of radicalisation and sustainable employment as a way to reduce conflict and increase stability".

Federal Government of Somalia, Somalia National Development Plan (SNDP) - Towards recovery, democracy and prosperity 2017-2019, Mogadishu: Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, 2018, p.1, https://www.refworld.org/docid/5b4315554.html

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# Terminology and conceptual clarifications: distinguishing between peace and stability

This report has taken a broad definition of 'employment for peace' programming, which includes programmes that aim to achieve a number of different, but related, objectives, including 'peacebuilding', 'stability', 'conflict/violence reduction' or 'reduced participation in violence', e.g. joining armed groups. While these are related, there is a need to highlight the distinction between 'peace' (writ large) and 'stability'.

Stability is generally considered the cessation of fighting (or significant levels of fighting) in a conflict context or the removal of the immediate risk of further violence.<sup>8</sup> This is not necessarily a situation that is immune to the risk of further violence. Stability can mask the underlying grievances and conflict drivers that have not been addressed. This is often referred to as a situation of 'negative peace'.

'Positive peace' is the goal of peacebuilding; "achieving incremental improvements in governance, and in fair access to economic opportunities, justice, safety and other aspects of wellbeing such as health, education and a decent environment in which to live".<sup>9</sup>

While stability can be a stepping stone to positive peace, e.g. by allowing institutions of governance to be strengthened, it can also slide back to violent conflict.

When applied to the projects reviewed, some used the language of 'peace', 'stability' and 'conflict reduction' interchangeably, while others were more explicit. For example, a value chain development programme in south central Somalia characterised private sector engagement as something that can support peace beyond the re-establishment of stability. Other projects, particularly those concerned with PVE/CVE, focused on levels of participation in armed or violent groups. While all these projects may aim to contribute towards 'peacebuilding', the framing of their objectives is critical for ensuring that they can be sustainable and create a context of positive peace. For example, short-term job creation, frequently a common element of disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes or 'post-conflict reconstruction', can create short-term stability but this is limited by the length and quality of employment and the distribution between different groups in a potentially highly socially fractured society.

Beyond the stated objectives, the projects studied identified different justifications for the causal relationship between employment and peace. Broadly, these rationales fit within the typology of drivers of violence triggered and/or fuelled by unemployment drawn from the International Security and Development Center's milestone 2016 report *Jobs aid peace*,<sup>10</sup> which reviewed the theory and practice of the impact of employment programmes on peace in fragile and conflict-affected countries. These are "lack of contact", "existence of grievance" and "lack of opportunity".<sup>11</sup> A *lack of opportunity* can lead individuals (and groups) to engage in violence due to the low opportunity cost and the lack of alternatives. Where this is the case, the rationale is such that increased employment offers alternatives and reduces incentives for engaging in conflict or joining violent groups. Most of the theories of change reviewed in this study draw on the opportunity driver, particularly in relation to youth-focused programming and programming focused on the prevention of violent extremism. These tend to assume within the theory of change that, if youth are employed, they will have less incentive to join violent groups that offer them income-generation opportunities. For example, a multi-donor stabilisation

P. Vernon, Redressing the balance: Why we need more peacebuilding in an increasingly uncertain world, London: International Alert, 2017
 Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> T. Brück, N. Ferguson, V. Izzi and W. Stojetz, Jobs aid peace: A review of the theory and practice of the impact of employment programmes on peace in fragile and conflict-affected countries, Berlin: International Security and Development Center (ISDC), 2016



A handcraft cooperative in Mombasa, Kenya

programme implemented in Somalia highlights that "lack of economic opportunities and exclusion from key decision-making processes renders many Somali young men and women at greater risk of being lured into illegal migration, piracy, and violent extremism".

*Grievances over actual or perceived inequalities and injustices* targeted towards other groups or the state are frequently identified as conflict drivers. Therefore, any employment programming that reduces these inequalities could diminish such grievances and increase trust in formal institutions. Frequently, this rationale was coupled with the lack of opportunity as part of the grievance created by economic exclusion. For example, a conflict-prevention project in Kenya highlighted that "decent jobs and livelihoods" for young people will lead to a decline in grievances contributing to "positive peace". In the context of statebuilding in Somalia, theories of change also highlight the potential for employment programming to create trust in the government, for example, through providing revenue for the state to provide public services, as well as a mechanism to create trust in the formal economy, thereby strengthening the political settlement for stability.

A *lack of contact* between groups (ethnic, clan, religious, among others) can lead to negative stereotypes or bias capable of exacerbating conflict. Thus, opportunities, spaces and processes, such as a workplace that brings groups or individuals together, can increase understanding of others and build trust through mutual endeavour. Some do use the justification that contact between groups improves social cohesion – for example, in one employment-promotion and -creation project in Somalia, working with cooperatives from different sub-clans led to the creation of a single cooperative, from which the programme infers a reduced risk of conflict.

		tact	Grievance	Opportunity	5	Ð	Conflict analysis?
		Contact	Grie	Opp	Other	None	Cont
SOMA	LIA			1			
1	Multi-donor stabilisation programme		x				
2	Market-development and employment-promotion programme	x		x	x		x
3	Value chain development programme			x			x
4 & 5	Employment-promotion and -creation programme (*2)	x		x			x
6	Youth-focused stability programme		x	х			х
7	Youth-focused livelihoods and vocational training			х			
KENYA	i de la companya de l		,	1			
8	Youth-focused peacebuilding programme, including income- generating activities			x			X
9	Conflict-prevention project		x	х			
10	Market-based livelihoods project with a focus on relationships of host communities/refugee communities					x	
11	PVE through livelihoods and employment-creation programme	x		х			
12	Youth- and women-focused employment-promotion and peacebuilding programme		x	x			X
13	Youth employment project in western Kenya		x				X
14	Employment-promotion and value chain development programme		x				

### Table 1: Overview of theories of change underlining the sampled projects

The *Jobs aid peace* report highlights several potential problems with the assumptions underpinning these rationales and, in the context of the Horn of Africa, these assumptions frequently appear untested. Many of the assumptions within the programmes reviewed remain at a high level within the theory of change, i.e. they are not integrated into the logical frameworks or evaluative frameworks and therefore not measured or tested as hypotheses. While at least four of the reviewed projects have undertaken political economy analysis or conflict analysis to inform their interventions, other cases draw their assumptions on the link between jobs and peace from global-level studies, such as the 2013 *World Development Report* on jobs, and import these assumptions to the Kenyan or Somali context.<sup>12</sup> This can also prevent project interventions' design from being grounded in an understanding of the conflict context, as well as undermining the

12 World Bank, 2012, Op. cit.

implementers' ability to measure their impact in this context. This is exacerbated by the limitations of working in fragile and conflict-affected contexts such as Somalia in terms of accessing data on the labour market<sup>13</sup> or conducting the necessary analysis due to security concerns. This raises the question of whether the appropriate analysis tools are available to design these kinds of programmes in conflict-affected contexts – for example, tools that combine understanding of the political economy and conflict context alongside a robust analysis of the labour market in the absence of official data on employment.

### Good practices among reviewed projects: Integrating peace into the theory of change

# GP1: Given the various assumptions around the connection between employment and peace, it is important to build mechanisms within project design that allow implementers to determine whether the logic within their theories of change holds

A positive example of this is the USAID-funded *Somali Youth Leaders Initiative* carried out by Mercy Corps, a youth empowerment and employment programme implemented across Somalia and Somaliland.<sup>14</sup> This programme undertook research to test the hypotheses underpinning their theories of change – one of which was whether having "meaningful employment" meant youth were "less likely to participate in or support political violence". They compared this to three other hypotheses on factors influencing youth participation in political violence. They found that "Employment status was not found to be related to youth engagement in or attitudes about political violence". The research also enabled them to unpick some of the assumptions around employment – for example, around heightening expectations from skills training leading to grievances. This research was to be used for adjusting the programme design – for example, to ensure that training was matched to job market demand.

Further to the potential limitations of the context analysis, the review showed limitations in the empirical justification of the relationship between peace and employment, beyond assumptions based on correlation, for example, between high levels of youth unemployment and levels of violent conflict. This lends itself to an overly simplistic understanding of the link between employment levels and peace. This is highlighted in the global literature and increasingly recognised in studies in the Horn of Africa region. For example, research on drivers of violent extremism demonstrates that, while lack of employment is often a structural factor in pushing individuals to join violent extremist groups, there is increasing evidence that the link is simplistic<sup>15</sup> and multiple other factors play a part. This suggests that merely assuming that increasing employment will impact levels of engagement in violent extremist groups does not necessarily hold. In some cases, it can be inferred that making the link is merely box-ticking to ensure programmes are greenlit, e.g. connecting the proposed intervention to the development partner's national security priorities.

### **Disconnect between analysis and design**

Within the projects reviewed, design processes tended to be disconnected from context analysis. This is most clearly observed in the assumptions around 'youth bulge', where a statistical association is made between the proportion of a population who are young and unemployed and levels of conflict. However, beyond the question of causality, this association tells us little about the types of employment, levels of income and other factors that could underpin effective interventions. Furthermore, theories of change frequently assume that individual motivations to engage in conflict or to join violent armed groups are strongly influenced by financial incentive. The rationale follows that employment programmes will therefore disrupt individuals' decisions to engage in

<sup>13</sup> F. Stewart, Employment in conflict and post-conflict situations, New York: United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 2015

<sup>14</sup> Mercy Corps, Examining the links between youth economic opportunity, civic engagement, and conflict: Evidence from Mercy Corps' Somali Youth Leaders Initiative, Portland: Mercy Corps, 2013, https://www.mercycorps.org.uk/sites/default/files/somaliabrief\_2\_13\_13.pdf

<sup>15</sup> A. Saldinger, 2015, Op. cit.; Mercy Corps, 2015, Op. cit.

violence. This ignores group dynamics at play in driving conflict. For example, the evaluation of an employmentpromotion programme in south central Somalia found that decisions around joining al Shabaab are often made by elders within the clan structures on behalf of a group. While focusing on individual motivations to violence can lend itself to the 'employment for peace' approach – i.e. if a vulnerable individual has a job, they will be less likely to engage in violence – the opportunity cost of engaging in violence needs to factor in other drivers and social pressures. Furthermore, group competition over jobs (e.g. between clans or sub-clans) can be a conflict driver, particularly in a context like Somalia where jobs can be perceived as a communal resource.

There is a welcome emphasis within several projects on integrating political economy analysis into project design and implementation to provide more insight on critical factors, such as the structural marginalisation of certain groups and clans, to ensure that projects do not become isolated from wider political economy factors – a conflict-sensitivity risk itself. For that reason, political economy analysis should be complemented by, or be integrated with, conflict analysis as the conflict analysis is being developed and updated.

### M&E for 'employment for peace' programmes

Whereas the link between peace and employment is often a rationale for development partners to commit funds in support of economic development programming in fragile and conflict-affected contexts, this link does not necessarily translate to specific objectives and interventions. For example, the rationale merely resides at the level of the theory of change, but the programmes have no objectives or indicators on reducing levels of conflict within the logical framework. This makes it difficult for programmes to test the rationales. For example, in the case of an employment-promotion and -creation programme in Somalia where 'stability' was included as an objective, there were no indicators included to enable the programme to measure the impact.

When indicators are included on peace and/or stability, they are often siloed from the other indicators (e.g. on livelihoods or employment creation). As a result, there is little articulation of how they are linked to one another. This suggests a need for a more robust theory of change to demonstrate, if relevant, that the correlation is a causation. This failure to integrate conflict, peace or stability indicators into programming undermines the capacity of the programmes to measure and better understand the link between employment and peace. In Somalia, for example, a programme evaluation highlighted a lack of analysis on the impact of stability by the type of employment (e.g. in terms of income levels or sustainability of the job itself). This reflects the findings of global studies showing a lack of adequate methodologies to measure the impact of peace or stability on employment programming.<sup>16</sup>

This lack of objectives and indicators at 'lower levels' of programme design is then reflected in the intervention approaches. In terms of programme implementation for increasing employment, targeting programme beneficiaries is one of the main challenges (and means) for linking employment programming to peace outcomes. However, overall targeting is not thought through for stability. For example, at least one programme was based on a pro-poor targeting criterion and therefore at evaluation found that they were unable to demonstrate their impact on conflict. They did not consider the inter-clan conflict dynamics of the groups of beneficiaries. Other targeting methods, such as value chain selection or a focus on 'women and youth' as vulnerable groups, are legitimate for economic development programming. Yet, there is a risk, in a fragile and conflict-affected context, that interventions will have little impact on conflict if such methodologies lack a focus on the conflict dynamics in the context. Worse still, such interventions could exacerbate conflict dynamics between groups.

### Good practices among reviewed projects: Methodologies for measuring the impact on peace

#### GP2: Developing innovative and robust methodologies

Two of the reviewed projects highlighted interesting methodologies as a means for measuring the impact of interventions on peace factors. An employment-promotion and -creation programme in south central Somalia proposed the use of a 'stability index' as a quantitative measure with nine components – levels of violence, economic activity, freedom of movement, perceptions of security conditions, marginalised groups, rights to access and use resources, harmonious coexistence among clans, predicted effect of interventions and local perceptions of government.<sup>17</sup> The project undertook a baseline survey of perception of each component against a simple five-point scale or yes/no response. An external case study highlighted some of the shortcomings of this approach in terms of the relatively small sample size and the appropriateness of the questions – particularly relating to government and governance in the Somali context. Another example is a youth-focused livelihoods and vocational training project in Somalia that used Knowledge, Attitudes and Perception (KAP) surveys to measure social cohesion and resilience indicators with sub-indicators including "constructive dispute resolution, vulnerability, coping strategies for dispute resolution".<sup>18</sup> In Somalia, and given the context, both these projects highlighted challenges in adequate data collection.

The evidence from the Horn of Africa tends to reflect the findings from other global studies. Whereas employment programmes purport to link job creation with peace and/or stability objectives, they lack a strong evidence base and are rarely grounded in robust conflict analyses. This is also undermined by a lack of commitment to integrate peace and/or stability objectives into job-creation programming, as opposed to merely using assumptions. The UK Department for International Development (DFID) itself acknowledges the lack of a coherent theory of change linking job creation and economic development to peace and/or stability. While the data reviewed was limited, no evidence was presented to substantively demonstrate how employment interventions have impacted peace and/or stability. In other words, owing to the lack of a theory of change and lack of robust M&E systems, including peace or conflict indicators, none of the projects reviewed could demonstrate a link between activities implemented and contribution to peace. This does not mean that there is no such link, but that the evidence regarding reduction of conflict through employment creation remains uncertain and demonstrating that 'investment' or funding has impacted on conflict remains difficult.

<sup>17</sup> A. Kessler/MarketShare Associates, Measuring results of private sector development in conflict-affected environments: A case study of the Sustainable Employment and Economic Development (SEED) programme in Somalia, London: The Donor Committee for Enterprise Development (DCED), 2013, https://www.enterprise-development.org/wp-content/uploads/SEEDCaseStudyFinal\_2August2013.pdf

<sup>18</sup> Samuel Hall, Evaluation of the Youth Education Pack (YEP) programme in Somalia, Nairobi: Samuel Hall, 2016, https://www.unicef.org/ evaldatabase/files/YEP\_Evaluation\_in\_Somalia\_-\_Final\_Report\_2016-002.pdf

# 3. Working *in* fragility

Based on the observation above, donors and interventions should prioritise integrating conflict sensitivity throughout the interventions, rather than claiming an unevidenced and untested peace and/or stability objective. International Alert approaches conflict sensitivity as the ability of an organisation to understand the context in which it operates; to understand the interaction between its intervention and the context; and to act upon this understanding to minimise negative impacts and maximise positive impacts on conflict (beyond 'doing no harm').<sup>19</sup> Conflict-sensitive programme implementation is based on a robust, comprehensive and regularly updated conflict analysis, which informs a participatory programme design. Flexible and adaptive programming, as well as effective M&E systems, are also key building blocks to conflict sensitivity.<sup>20</sup> Integrating conflict sensitivity therefore implies a set of systematic steps to ensure the intervention, regardless of the objectives or sector, does not exacerbate/trigger/sustain conflict dynamics and contributes to bringing about positive change in the conflict context.

This review sheds light on a set of practical factors specific to employment interventions that need to be taken into consideration to effectively integrate conflict sensitivity. Building on findings from the 14 projects reviewed, this section explores the factors and identifies how they manifest in Kenya and Somalia.

The study specifically identified five key practical considerations to integrate conflict sensitivity in employment programming in conflict-affected settings. These include:

- clearing the conceptual and practical confusion between conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding;
- bridging the gap between conflict-sensitive rhetoric and practice;
- targeting (in terms of project participants and geographical area);
- managing short-term/long-term tensions, including managing expectations within and beyond the project; and
- evidencing whether different types of approaches to employment promotion and creation result in different levels of conduciveness for integrating conflict sensitivity.

All five tensions emerged in one or more of the 14 reviewed projects. Around a third of the 14 projects reviewed underscored a set of key elements, resources and capacities necessary to ensure that employment interventions implemented in Kenya and Somalia are conflict sensitive. These good practices and lessons learned are highlighted under each factor.

<sup>19</sup> Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, How to guide to conflict sensitivity, 2012, p.2, http://conflictsensitivity.org/wp-content/ uploads/2015/04/6602\_HowToGuide\_CSF\_WEB\_3.pdf

<sup>20</sup> UNDP and International Alert, Conflict sensitivity: Experiences from local and community development practice in Myanmar, Myanmar: UNDP, 2017, p.9



Fishers prepare their boat in the port of Berbera, Somalia

### Clearing the conceptual and practical confusion between conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding

This study found a commonly observed confusion between integrating conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding activities. Conflict sensitivity is an approach integrated throughout the project cycle. The approach builds on an understanding of the interaction between the intervention and the context to avoid negative impact and maximise positive impact on conflict.

Peacebuilding is a long-term process based on a broad range of activities aimed at preventing the outbreak, escalation, continuation and recurrence of conflicts by dealing with the causes of violence and supporting societies to manage their differences and conflicts without resorting to violence.<sup>21</sup>

Peacebuilding has been at the forefront of the conversation on conflict sensitivity yet implementing specific peacebuilding activities does not mean integrating conflict sensitivity. For example, the external summative evaluation of an employment-creation and -promotion programme in south central Somalia – with an explicit stability outcome – recommended that the project strengthens its efforts to integrate conflict sensitivity by promoting social cohesion activities. However, implementing social cohesion activities is not integrating conflict sensitivity as social cohesion activities could themselves be implemented in a conflict-insensitive way. Similarly, when asked how conflict sensitivity was integrated, project staff working on a youth employment project in western Kenya instinctively listed the peacebuilding activities implemented as part of the project, rather than explaining efforts deployed to ensure that the intervention was not negatively affecting the context and/or fuelling underlying conflict drivers.

<sup>21</sup> What is peacebuilding, International Alert, https://www.international-alert.org/what-we-do/what-is-peacebuilding, accessed 8 November 2019

#### Good practices among reviewed projects: Ensuring a common understanding of conflict sensitivity among project staff, partners and project participants

#### GP3: Enhancing capacities of project staff, partners and project participants in conflict sensitivity

At least one of the reviewed projects, the youth employment project in western Kenya, did include a 'do no harm' training for local partners and direct project participants during the inception phase. Interestingly, one of this project's staff mentioned that trainings were not the most suitable capacity-enhancing activity: project participants could not spend an entire day in the training, as they needed to fulfil their other daily obligations. Besides, 'do no harm' did not appear as strategic and critical to them as other more practical trainings. Other capacity-enhancing methods could then be considered, such as accompaniment, awareness-raising activities and embedding reflection sessions as part of the project's main activities. They would ensure not only that the stakeholders involved have the capacities to integrate conflict sensitivity, but also more importantly that they are aware of and buy into the rationale for conflict sensitivity.

# Bridging the gap between conflict-sensitive rhetoric and practice

At least half of the projects reviewed did commit to integrating conflict sensitivity, with at least three out of 14 projects defining conflict sensitivity as one of their guiding principles (all three implemented in Somalia). However, a review of these projects' evaluations as well as interviews with key project staff revealed that this commitment was/has been more rhetorical than concretely applied. In many cases, conflict sensitivity was approached as an add-on, a box-ticking exercise during the design, proposal writing and inception phase, mostly to comply with donor requirements or the implementing organisations' principles. It was never an ongoing critical effort between all the stakeholders involved.

Projects did not include robust and contextually relevant systems to ensure conflict-sensitivity mainstreaming throughout the project cycle. As a result, there remains a gap in conceptual as well as practical understanding on how to practically and concretely mainstream conflict sensitivity in employment interventions.

When asked if/how conflict sensitivity was integrated in their intervention, a staff member working on a youth employment project in Kenya explained that the 'do no harm' methodological tools and frameworks developed by their organisation were used during the inception phase of a project – which as mentioned above is a partial integration of conflict sensitivity. The person also questioned the relevance, applicability in the implemented context and their suitability for employment interventions. The terminology itself was described as confusing for the staff and project participants. This calls for further efforts and investments in contextualising these principles and methodologies and enhancing capacities to systematically integrate them.

# Good practices among reviewed projects: Laying the foundations for conflict-sensitive employment programming in Kenya and Somalia

GP4: Combining conflict analysis, private sector-focused conflict assessment and political economy analysis is necessary to inform the design of employment interventions in fragile and conflict-affected settings

In practice, this means structuring the analyses around guiding questions on the link between market and conflict, such as *How is the market affected by, and how does it affect, the conflict? Who benefits from growth in a particular sector, market or region and who doesn't? How are benefits distributed? To what extent do social grievances and inequality prevail in a certain sector, market or region? Does the market promote or create links between adversarial groups or does it fuel divisions further? Does it reinforce existing inequalities?* 

At least four of the 14 reviewed projects, including three with a stability objective, had initially developed a conflict analysis and/or a market analysis. For instance, a (non-published) feasibility study was developed to inform the design of a market-development/employment-promotion programme in south central Somalia. It specifically included findings on customary taxation and formal governance in the target areas, as well as findings and observations on related clan dynamics, which were then taken into consideration in the final design of the project. During the inception of an employment-creation and -promotion programme in Somalia, a conflict analysis conducted in Somaliland and Puntland in 2011 highlighted four potential sources of conflict that informed the development of conflict sensitivity/early warning indicators.<sup>22</sup> Key project staff from a value chain development programme in south central Somalia mentioned that a context analysis had been carried out to inform the design of the programme, but it mostly focused on understanding the value chain and overlooked its interactions with the conflict.<sup>23</sup>

#### GP5: Regularly updating the initial conflict analysis

Carrying out a conflict analysis is the starting point of any conflict-sensitive programming, and mechanisms need to be developed for regular update and adaptation of the programme. For instance, a youth employment project in western Kenya plans for quarterly learning and reflection sessions bringing together the project staff and the local partners, with the objective of discussing not only progress towards results but also changes in the context and whether the project has led or contributed to any changes in the context, as reported by project participants.<sup>24</sup> Project staff from a value chain development programme in south central Somalia reported having adapted the project to a change in context (drought) with the primary aim of ensuring that the project would still achieve its objectives, but also to mitigate any potential risks on the project and the context.<sup>25</sup>

Out of the 14 reviewed projects, at least one (i.e. the employment-creation and -promotion programme in south central Somalia) did hire a conflict analyst as part of the implementing team. Allocating specific resources to conflict analysis – for internal support in this case, as well as for external support – helped ensure that context analyses were regularly and systematically updated to effectively inform the project.

<sup>22</sup> Adam Kessler/MarketShare Associates, 2013, Op. cit.

<sup>23</sup> Key informant interview with project staff member, 28 February 2019

<sup>24</sup> Key informant interview with project staff member, 2 April 2019

<sup>25</sup> Key informant interview with project staff member, 28 February 2019

### Targeting

Targeting, i.e. the identification and selection of direct and indirect project participants or 'beneficiaries', is a specific area to consider while integrating conflict sensitivity. In the case of employment interventions in fragile and conflict-affected settings, common approaches to targeting may carry a whole set of risks in the context.

Projects implemented in rural or remote areas tend to target people from the same group, be it ethnic group or clan or livelihood. In at least two projects, a youth employment project in western Kenya and a market-development project in south central Somalia, ensuring diversity of project participants' ethnic or clan belonging was not defined as a primary selection criterion. Similarly, an employment-creation and -promotion programme in south central Somalia exclusively targeted farmers who belonged mostly to the Bantu community (a historically marginalised Somali group) in the selected target area. The evaluation of the same programme questioned how the selection process had influenced or been influenced by local conflicts. This means that no risk-mitigation measures had been taken to ensure that specific targeting would not raise frustrations among other groups, exacerbate divisions and/or put project participants at risk. The further implication is that it is quite unlikely that these projects could have a positive impact on peace in their areas of intervention.

Market or value chain development projects tended to target project participants or partners from the private sector among a pool of groups and individuals already known, familiar with the ways of working or those previously exposed to similar projects. This bias was often explained by the time and budget constraints that define projects' inception phases. Selecting stakeholders who have already received training or support from other programmes appears a more efficient option as opposed to identifying stakeholders from the private sector who represent relevant communities as identified during the conflict analysis. This carries a set of risks in both the short and the long term. Not only does it present risks for the project and how it is perceived by community members, but also, more importantly, it may lead to increased feelings of marginalisation among communities where the projects are implemented. This has the potential to exacerbate divisions within and between groups, especially in contexts like Kenya and Somalia where ethnic/clan identity is a critical factor in understanding the business sector. Ultimately, these shortcomings in the definition of targeting prevent the intervention from having a positive impact on peace and/or stability.

At least half of the projects reviewed had an explicit focus on 'women and youth'. While the following challenges are not proper to employment interventions, they are worth emphasising, considering the substantial number of employment interventions focusing on youth, including in the reviewed sample. In most cases, 'women and youth' were selected through the deficit approach, i.e. what they do not have or do not do. This carries the risk of stigmatising these heterogeneous groups further or overlooking their positive constructive roles. Another challenge is the fact that youth are rarely explicitly gendered, but implicitly understood as young men, therefore overlooking young women. This is most likely to be related to the absence of gender analyses informing the design of the projects.<sup>26</sup> For instance, the feasibility study mentioned above that informed a market-development programme was gender-blind in that it overlooked the gender dimensions of the taxation system it explored, such as women's and men's different perceptions of and experiences with the formal and traditional institutions. A market-development project implemented in south central Somalia explicitly targeted women and youth but did not carry out any gender analyses, thus overlooking gender relationships, roles and norms and how they translate into the targeted market sectors. This approach carries several risks, including overlooking the role of women and young women in conflict and potentially risking an increase in domestic or intimate partner violence in the short term.<sup>27</sup> Gender balance and dynamics are often challenged when women become more economically independent and empowered.

<sup>26</sup> Overall, the reviewed sample of projects and their internal documentation and evaluations demonstrated a lack of gender sensitivity and mainstreaming throughout the project cycle. Exploring the extent to which employment interventions in Kenya and Somalia did mainstream gender was part of the initial research questions, yet the lack of information in the available documentation prevented the research team from formulating informed findings. One way of interpreting the lack of reference to gender sensitivity or mainstreaming is to assume the lack of specific gender sensitivity and mainstreaming efforts themselves.

<sup>27</sup> DFID, Internal review of Economic Development Interventions, London: DFID, 2018 (not publicly available)

In terms of geographical targeting, many of the reviewed projects were implemented in the most stable/ accessible regions of south central Somalia – including urban areas and SFG-controlled areas, which may risk exacerbating inequality relative to the more peripherical or marginalised areas.

#### Good practices among reviewed projects: Informed targeting

#### GP6: Defining selection criteria based on a good understanding of conflict dynamics

Participants should be identified based on clear, transparent and consistent criteria informed both by the conflict analysis and a private sector-focused assessment.

For instance, one of the 14 reviewed projects did develop clear guidance to inform project participants' selection with the intention of ensuring inclusion. Specifically, this market-development project in south central Somalia explicitly planned for mechanisms to be in place to ensure that each clan in the area is represented and to adapt the approach to any potential tension emerging in the area. Similarly, the project planned for a gender and social inclusion marker in the criteria for scoring productive infrastructures to benefit from the project.

### Managing short-term/long-term tensions, including managing expectations within and beyond the project

Employment-promotion and -creation interventions are often designed as a quick short-term solution to promote economic development. However, it is still unclear to what extent their positive short-term effects may translate into the longer term. Evaluation reports accessed for this study rarely interrogated the sustainability of the short-term results, despite the fact that it appears challenging to ensure. A majority of the projects with a stability and/ or peace objective did not aim to address the structural and deeply seeded causes or drivers of violence (or to coordinate with other implementing actors to foster a cumulative impact).<sup>28</sup>

Another key challenge in managing the tension between short-term results and long-term impact in employmentpromotion and -creation programmes is related to the management of expectations within the project and beyond. All 14 sampled projects approached economic development/employment promotion and creation from the supply (of labour) side – except for two projects in south central Somalia that combined supply-side and demand-side-focused approaches. If 'employability-boosting' activities, such as vocational trainings and apprenticeship, do not match local market demands, there is a high risk that they will increase frustrations and grievances among project participants. For instance, the evaluation of a project focused on vocational training for young women and men in south central Somalia revealed participants had expressed doubts regarding their future employability based on a (real or perceived) clan bias in determining employment opportunities in the target areas. In other words, despite efforts to enhance their skills and knowledge, these young women's and men's employability was still limited owing to structural obstacles to accessing the job market. This leads to increased frustrations and exacerbates feelings of marginalisation.

Weakly managed expectations beyond the project, i.e. among non-beneficiaries, also carry substantial risks of exacerbating or triggering tensions within and between communities. The study highlighted that households whose youngest members had not been able to register for vocational training courses were told that they would be prioritised in the next phase of the project. There were also no guarantees that a next phase would

actually be implemented. This has led to increased tensions between households of non-project participants and project participants. The evaluation consequently recommended that the programme thoroughly assesses its implications on community stability and cohesion when it comes to an end.

While this example epitomises the risks of not effectively managing the expectations of project participants and community members, it also underlines the risks of a reactive rather than proactive approach to emerging challenges and unintended consequences. Finally, it highlights the ethical questions around transparency and communication that must be considered.

### General good practice: Managing the short-term/long-term tensions of employment interventions

The project documentation accessed did not allow the research team to draw any conclusions on the extent to which reviewed projects had managed expectations among the project participants and beyond, nor how they had approached the challenge of ensuring sustainability of short-term results. A review of the general literature shed light on the following good practices to do so (non-exhaustive):

- It is critical to combine from the onset and the initial analysis a quantitative approach to job creation (numbers of jobs created) and a qualitative approach focusing on job characteristics (in terms of status in the community/society for instance); opportunities to access particular jobs; distribution of skills and jobs within society; and labour policies/practices that exclude/include different groups.
- Reliable, realistic and regularly updated information about employment prospects needs to be collected by the project to help manage expectations and potentially adapt the activities.
- Short-term employment-promotion and -creation interventions need to be coordinated with longerterm development opportunities to manage expectations and ensure sustainability of results.

### Evidencing whether different types of approaches to employment promotion and creation result in different levels of conduciveness for integrating conflict sensitivity

It is worth noting that different activities and approaches have different degrees of suitability in terms of impact and conflict sensitivity. This suitability may depend on the contexts, the conflict dynamics, the stage of conflict and the stakeholders, among other factors. In this regard, two observations emerged from the findings:

 Two projects implemented in south central Somalia included a public-private partnership (PPP) component. The evaluation of one of these projects highlighted that PPP carries specific challenges in Somalia. First, PPP was rarely understood by communities targeted by the project. Members of the community saw it as the private sector benefiting from projects at their expense. In addition, as federalisation and political decentralisation processes were being carried out in Somalia, questions were raised as to who among public actors would have control over resources. At least a third of all projects included formal job market-based activities. These carried the risk of
overlooking a substantial proportion of an active population and failed to consider the fact that project
participants may already have a livelihood. It is unclear whether nuances between unemployment and
underemployment/informal jobs were sufficiently grasped prior to promoting formal job market-related job
creation or vocational training activities in these projects. Therefore, there is a risk that job creation attracts
already employed individuals and deprives local businesses of labour resources.

# Zoom-in: M&E for conflict-sensitive employment programmes in Kenya and Somalia

Monitoring and evaluating conflict sensitivity is different from monitoring and evaluating the project's progress towards results. This is mainly because it focuses on monitoring the interaction between the intervention and the context (and vice versa). It includes assessing whether a project's M&E methods, tools and practice have been conflict sensitive. With M&E for conflict sensitivity, monitoring the inclusivity and context sensitivity of an employment intervention, and how it is perceived across different groups, is as important as recording the intervention's actual results, "with quality and distribution of employment being as important as the number of jobs created".<sup>29</sup>

M&E for conflict sensitivity includes monitoring the context/conflict; monitoring/assessing whether riskmitigation measures to minimise negative effects on the context have been effective; monitoring effects of the intervention on conflict; and monitoring effects of the conflict on the intervention.<sup>30</sup>

Of the 14 projects reviewed, only a market-development project in south central Somalia integrated conflict sensitivity as part of its M&E plan. Conflict-sensitivity objectives were not made explicit into M&E frameworks or programme assessments. Some projects did ensure regular review meetings between staff and local partners and mentioned allocating time to assess the impact of the project on the context. However, questions remain on the rigorousness, effectiveness and relevance of these more or less systematised monitoring practices.

In terms of evaluating conflict sensitivity, none of the evaluation reports reviewed explicitly referred to conflictsensitivity indicators or specific efforts to monitor the conflict sensitivity of the projects. Interestingly, the evaluations themselves lacked a focus on conflict sensitivity – both in the evaluation process itself (was the evaluation process conflict sensitive?) and in the lines of enquiry (were efforts to integrate conflict sensitivity in the evaluated project specifically assessed?).

For instance, the summative evaluation of an integrated youth economic empowerment/stability programming implemented in central Kenya did not assess the extent to which the project had been conflict sensitive, nor did it even mention the term 'conflict sensitivity'. More problematic was the fact that, even after respondents' interview data had been disaggregated per ethnic group, the evaluation findings were formulated in a generalised way without providing nuanced and sensitive language on the role of certain groups as opposed to others.

These gaps are not specific only to employment programming. Conflict is often approached as a secondary consideration to programme design, implementation and M&E, when conflict sensitivity should systematically be part of employment programming in any fragile and conflict-affected context in order to ensure the programme is maximising the opportunities for a positive impact and minimising harm.

<sup>29</sup> GIZ, Employment promotion in contexts of conflict, fragility and violence opportunities and challenges for peacebuilding, Bonn and Eschborn: GIZ, 2015

<sup>30</sup> R. Goldwyn and D. Chigas, Monitoring and evaluating conflict sensitivity: Methodological challenges and practical solutions, London: Care International UK, CDA Collaborative Learning Projects and DFID, 2013



A vocational training workshop in the Kakuma refugee camp in Turkana, Kenya

## Good practice among reviewed projects: M&E for conflict sensitivity – Context and interaction indicators

### GP7: M&E for conflict sensitivity should measure changes against both context indicators and interaction indicators

Only one of the 14 projects reviewed did integrate conflict-sensitivity indicators into its M&E plan (mainly interaction indicators). Fourteen day-to-day management indicators for conflict sensitivity were developed as part of this employment-promotion and -creation project implemented in south central Somalia (completed) and informed by the project's initial conflict analysis. While these indicators were not integrated within the project's logframe, they were reported against internally on a regular basis as an early warning mechanism. An assessment of this system seemed to highlight its effectiveness, even though the project's summative evaluation stressed that efforts to mainstream conflict sensitivity were not systematically documented.

### 4. Conclusion

This report offers lessons from 14 employment-promotion and -creation projects implemented in Kenya and Somalia.

It identifies several common issues with the design of employment projects that aim to contribute to peace and/or stability in the Horn of Africa. Theories of change (whether explicit or implicit) underpinning employment programmes and that claim a peacebuilding purpose are too often lacking in identifying appropriate objectives and indicators to guide implementation and evaluation. The underlying logic of these interventions remains unquestioned and untested leading to a lack of empirical evidence on how employment promotion and creation can impact peace. A disconnect persists between the aim of employment-for-peacebuilding programmes and their proven impact. This is because monitoring frameworks are too often focused primarily on measuring the changes at the output level and limited to changes in terms of employment levels. Very rarely do these frameworks focus on peace and/or stability among programme beneficiaries and beyond. The study then identifies five common shortcomings and gaps in integrating conflict sensitivity in employment programming in Kenya and Somalia, including:

- Conceptual and practical confusion between conflict sensitivity and peacebuilding.
- Gap between conflict-sensitive rhetoric and practice.
- Targeting (in terms of project participants and geographical area) not directly informed by a conflict analysis.
- Challenge between managing short-term and long-term tensions, including managing expectations within and beyond the project.
- Little evidence on whether different types of approaches to employment promotion and creation mean different levels of conduciveness for integrating conflict sensitivity.

This review also highlights good practices – identifying some of what works and what does not work or could be improved – and makes recommendations to a range of peace and development actors and donors, in particular DFID, on the factors and approaches that can improve programming outcomes and ensure conflict sensitivity is integrated.

This report demonstrates the need to go beyond the dichotomy working *on*/working *in* fragility. Both the desk review and International Alert's broader experience show that being conflict sensitive entails maximising an intervention's positive impact on peace; working on the drivers and causes of violence, beyond 'doing no harm'. Implementing a development programme in a fragile and conflict-affected setting cannot therefore ignore peace and conflict dynamics. This challenges stability as an objective and promotes positive peace as the change any intervention should aim to bring about.

Finally, this desk review demonstrates a need for further in-depth research into the impact of employment programming on peace and conflict dynamics, particularly in analysing the impact of job-creation programming on peace dynamics. Such a study could look at the following questions:

- What are the effective methodologies and tools for analysing labour markets in fragile and conflict-affected contexts?
- What are the effective methodologies to measure the impact on peace and conflict of employment interventions?
- What type of intervention is most effective in the contexts of Kenya and Somalia?
- How should employment creation and promotion be sequenced within a statebuilding approach?
- How can project-level interventions be linked to national initiatives? And harmonised to other economic development processes?
- How is the employment question considered and approached in peace processes?
- How are gender relations affected by employment programming in fragile and conflict-affected contexts?

Exploring these questions by reviewing bigger portfolios, rather than individual projects, could help assess coherence and coordination and shed light on the cumulative impact on peace and conflict of multiple projects funded by the same donor or under a similar strategy.

### 5. Recommendations

Any project implemented in a fragile and conflict-affected context must integrate conflict sensitivity regardless of the objectives or sectors to minimise negative impact and maximise positive impact on the context.

The following recommendations are targeted at *donors and implementing international and national/local organisations* who are engaged in design and M&E of employment for peace programmes as well as those developing/implementing employment programming in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.

#### Recommendations for programme design and analysis

- Build peacebuilding into the design and theory of change of interventions, including by integrating conflict indicators in the M&E plan (e.g. by developing a Stability Index as a quantitative measure or using KAP surveys), in order to measure the potential contribution of the intervention to stability and peace.
- Ensure that programme design is informed by a robust analysis that combines political economy analysis and labour market analysis as well as conflict analysis to ensure that the programming meets the needs of the context. Given the complexity of these contexts, analysis should be iterative, draw on local knowledge and be updated throughout implementation.
- Promote a shift in programming from initiatives that promote job creation alone towards those that consider the distribution of employment, the targeting of jobs and the resulting impact on poverty and conflict reduction. To do so, conflict analyses should seek to examine the initial project hypothesis about employment and conflict. Implementing organisations should ensure that both demand-side (job market/ employers) and supply-side (employees/labour force) interventions are implemented, through programmatic coordination and harmonisation.

#### **Recommendations for M&E**

- Develop innovative methodologies to measure the impact of employment promotion and creation on conflict dynamics, for example, combining peacebuilding evaluation methodologies alongside quantitative measures for identifying and understanding the changes to which employment promotion and creation contribute. Conflict sensitivity should be integrated into M&E systems. It is possible to measure conflict sensitivity against both context and interaction indicators, as well as open-ended monitoring mechanisms to identify unintended consequences of the project, such as outcome mapping.
- Consider longer-term approaches to evaluating employment programming to determine the impact on conflict dynamics, e.g. avoiding evaluating programmes only at their close, which does not provide an understanding of the sustainability and impact of interventions, which can be critical to reducing conflict. Donors engaging third-party monitors have better scope for obtaining this kind of longitudinal perspective, e.g. to track perceptions of groups primarily benefiting from economic development interventions.

#### **Recommendations for integrating conflict sensitivity**

- Ensure that conflict sensitivity is a systematic approach throughout the project cycle. There are practical resources available that provide guidance on integrating conflict sensitivity across the programme cycle. For example, the Conflict Sensitivity Consortium (comprising of 35 humanitarian, development, peacebuilding and multi-mandate NGOs) developed a How to Guide to Conflict Sensitivity with support from DFID.<sup>31</sup> There are other guides available from the Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (Conflict Sensitivity: Topic Guide)<sup>32</sup> and USAID (Conflict Sensitivity Integration Review).<sup>33</sup>
- Implementing organisations should adopt systematic steps, including an initial conflict analysis and M&E systems that allow the project team to monitor the interaction between the intervention and the context, and systematically include conflict sensitivity in capacity-building of project staff and partners. Conflict analysis should inform the design of the project, be regularly updated and actually be used and owned by implementing teams. Implementing organisations, as well as donors, need to allow for relevant adaptations to programmes as a critical part of integrating a conflict-sensitive approach throughout the project's lifetime.

<sup>31</sup> Conflict Sensitivity Consortium, 2012, Op. cit.

<sup>32</sup> H. Haider, Conflict sensitivity: Topic guide, Birmingham, UK: Governance and Social Development Resource Centre (GSDRC), University of Birmingham, 2014

<sup>33</sup> R. Goldwyn, on behalf of Management Systems International, A Tetra Tech Company, and CDA Collaborative Learning Projects, Conflict Sensitivity Integration Review, Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 2016

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