New government - new policy (English)

Ivlian Haindrava

(Russian/Pусский [1])

The parliamentary elections of 1 October 2012 have resulted in a change of government in Georgia. Despite the fact that President Saakashvili has formally retained certain powers until the expiration of his second term in October 2013, the implementation of domestic and foreign policies has de facto passed to the "Georgian Dream" coalition headed by the Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili. The first months of the Coalition’s "reign" have allowed us to identify the key emerging trends, in particular, in regard to the transformation of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and Georgia's relationship with Russia. Among the many challenges facing the Coalition, positive changes in these two closely intertwined areas constitute the most intriguing challenge of all, given that the situation had come to a standstill under the previous leadership.  It is virtually impossible to make the situation worse; it can only get better. Still, one should not anticipate quick and decisive breakthroughs in either of these areas.

Novel signs

The first sign of fundamental policy changes in relation to Sukhumi (and Tskhinvali) was the appointment of Paata Zakareishvili to the post of the State Minister for Reintegration. An expert on the conflicts and a civil activist, Zakareishvili has been involved in efforts to tackle these problems in a number of ways and has maintained contacts with colleagues from Abkhazia for over twenty years. His appointment was also a sign that the new leadership in Tbilisi rejected the essential premise of the previous government, which was that the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict was not a separate phenomenon, but was a result or a spin-off of the Russian-Georgian conflict.

From the beginning of the new minister’s appointment he put forward a number of initiatives which demonstrated goodwill and willingness to make a number of unilateral steps aimed at improving the climate in bi-lateral and multilateral relations, and encouraging the emergence of elements of confidence between the conflicting parties. Of note, amongst others, are the following:

• The Ministry has made the decision to change its name (the president is holding up the final decision), since the term "reintegration", for obvious reasons, alienates the Abkhaz and is perceived as an obstacle to direct contacts between Tbilisi and Sukhumi.
• Work has begun on “softening” of the Law on Occupied Territories and the implementing regulations which would facilitate access to Abkhazia (and South Ossetia) for international organisations and their representatives.
• Similarly, a potential revision of the State Strategy on Occupied Territories and its Action Plan.
• It is proposed to legalise identity documents issued in Abkhazia (and South Ossetia) which would make it possible for their owners not only to move freely throughout the territory of Georgia, but also to receive medical care, education, etc.
• Finally, on the 7 March 2013, the Georgian parliament in its resolution on “Basic Directions of Georgia’s Foreign Policy”[1] [2] confirmed its commitment to non-use of force in relation to de-occupation and restoration of territorial integrity as pledged by the President Saakashvili in his address to the international community in the European Parliament in Strasburg on 23 November 2010.[2] [3] In doing so, this declaration by the head of state “was put on paper and became legally binding” (using the language of the Russian Foreign Ministry[3] [4]), after which the pressure being put on Georgia in Geneva on this matter begins to resemble an attempt to break down an open door.

At the same time the new government sent a number of other messages that appear to be addressed not only - or not so much - to Sukhumi as to Moscow:

• The new leadership in Georgia has announced a U-turn in their approach to the Winter Olympics in Sochi (in February 2014) and are not only planning to send their national team to the Games, but to do their best to contribute to a peaceful and secure passage of the Games. As the Olympic venue directly borders Abkhazia this gesture removes the apprehension (albeit, clearly exaggerated) in Moscow and Sukhumi regarding the intentions of the previous Georgian leadership. The change in Tbilisi's official position on this matter also testifies to their willingness not to stir further the century-and-a-half old Circassian issue, a sore issue for both Moscow and Sukhumi[4] [5].

• Tbilisi's initiative regarding the restoration of transit rail traffic through Abkhazia has had the greatest resonance and caused quite a stir, although not so much in Moscow and Sukhumi as in Yerevan and Baku. However, after the initial categorical refusal by the Abkhaz authorities to even consider the project, they quickly relented when Ankvab spoke about the possibility of a "collective" discussion of this proposal.

Perception of novelty

The enterprise and initiative of the new Georgian leadership seem to have literally caught all the interested parties off guard. The reason was, first of all, the disbelief and the reluctance of all actors to contemplate the possibility of a change of power in Georgia by means of elections. This explains the lack of due attention paid to the Coalition's intentions. The previous leadership struck out at the new government as though they themselves had followed the right and irreversible path to the settlement of the conflicts, although, as already noted above, the reality was quite the opposite. The expert community in Georgia, on the contrary, has welcomed the fact that their alternative approaches to conflict issues, developed over many years, finally found resonance in the practical policies of the new government.

Sukhumi is yet to find its bearings and decide how to react to Tbilisi's initiatives expressed by the formula “everything, except recognition”. Sukhumi's approach consists in continuing with its customary application of the formula “nothing but recognition”, although the political and propaganda vulnerability of this approach in the new situation are obvious, as reflected in the remarkable article by Anton Krivenyuk “Paata and his games”[5] [6]. The abovementioned mitigation by Sukhumi of its approach to the restoration of the railway could in fact mean that they are beginning to understand that they might be losing out by repeatedly rejecting any proposal from Tbilisi.  In the particular case of the railway it might be that Sukhumi thinks that the attempt to restore the railway would fail anyway, and that therefore there is no need to reject it outright. You can also assume that this softness, so atypical of Ankvab, is to some extent due to Moscow’s interest in the project which Moscow does not want to officially reveal until the right time.

While the Kremlin’s aims are to preserve the “military-political realities” post 2008, it also has to respond to the change of power in Georgia and a situation where Saakashvili, previously declared by official Moscow as “non-negotiable” is no longer relevant while the new Tbilisi leadership has declared the improvement of relations with Russia to be one of its priorities. Despite the fact that both Tbilisi and Moscow have tirelessly reiterated that their polar positions on Abkhazia and South Ossetia are non-negotiable, the same as Georgia’s foreign policy is not up for review, one can distinguish faint hint of an approach that could improve relations under the existing realities, putting notoriously intractable political problems aside until better times by mutual default. And if relations develop, Sukhumi’s “nothing but recognition” appears somewhat lonesome.

Finally, as observed from the outside, Brussels also appeared to have been caught unawares by Tbilisi’s unfamiliar relaxation towards Abkhazia (and South Ossetia). Otherwise it is difficult to explain the absence of any reaction (or at least, of any overt reaction) to Tbilisi's initiatives which, essentially, aim to de-isolate Abkhazia, i.e. an attempt to bring Georgia's official policy in line with the European policy of engagement (the congruence with “non-recognition” - the first component of the European “non-recognition with engagement” policy - has always been there).

Conclusion

The sleepy state of the postwar status quo has been disrupted by the initiative and enterprise of the new Georgian leadership on Russian, Abkhaz and Ossetian issues. This is quite understandable: it is in Georgia’s interests to do something else than just ensuring – via its western partners – the adoption of resolutions in different international organisations, confirming yet again the fact of the occupation of Abkhazia (and South Ossetia) and condemning their recognition by the Russian Federation in contravention of the international law[6] [7]. This is exactly what the Saakashvili government limited their actions to throughout the postwar years. However, the constructive and purely peaceful initiatives proposed by the new Georgian authorities, which are usually so warmly welcomed everywhere and by everyone, have so far met with silence. Yet they deserve not only words of welcome (one could do without such words) but also support in deeds. There is a vast space between the two poles of non-recognition and recognition; this space is populated with people who need help to continue with their lives. This should not and cannot be in the interests of Georgia alone.

Ivlian Haindrava, Director of the South Caucasus Studies Program at the Tbilisi-based Republican Institute