Georgia in a changing world: Foreign policy challenges and medium-term priorities
Archil Gegeshidze*
(Russian/Pусский [1])
Georgia’s foreign policy: The evolution of priorities between 1992 and 2012
External relations have always played an important part in the emergence of Georgia’s statehood. This was particularly the case after Georgia gained independence and set about defining its place and role in the region and in the world in general. Initially, Georgia’s foreign policy objective was simply to survive. The collapse of the Soviet economic system and the ensuing economic dislocation, combined with the political instability caused by fratricidal wars in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, forced Georgia to find instant solutions to preserve the country’s integrity and to feed the population, which had become impoverished virtually overnight. In the early 1990s, the aim of foreign policy was thus to restrain the post-imperial inertia of Russia, as it backed the secessionist aspirations of Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, through the use of international platforms and in order to attract donor aid to resolve pressing humanitarian problems.
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the shift in foreign policy emphasis towards deepening relations with international organisations (United Nations, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, European Union, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, etc.) and with leading Western countries ultimately led to Georgia making a strategic choice at the turn of the century to be the most pro-Western state in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Despite remaining a recipient of post-conflict humanitarian aid and political support from the international community, the Russian military presence began to be wound down. This involved the removal of Russian border guards on state borders and the closure of Russian military bases on Georgian territory. Crucially, the very same period saw the beginning of the construction of a trans-regional energy corridor in close coordination with Georgia’s neighbours, Azerbaijan and Turkey, and the commissioning of the first oil pipeline to circumvent Russia. Other larger pipeline systems also began to be built. Georgia also joined the Council of Europe and the World Trade Organization (WTO), as well as signing a partnership and cooperation agreement with the EU. At the same time, American military instructors began to train Georgian officers and soldiers, and the government soon officially announced its intention to become a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Thus, new objectives began to dominate the foreign policy agenda: to identify and consolidate its strategic niche.
Meanwhile, systemic problems with the country’s administration led to irreversible economic and social stagnation as well as a revolutionary change of power in 2003. However, this did not affect the course of foreign policy, to which the new government remained committed. In fact, it pursued its foreign policy with redoubled enthusiasm as part of an ambitious programme to rapidly transform the country. Georgia stepped up its overtures to NATO and deepened collaboration with the United States and other states over security. It simultaneously launched reforms intended to modernise the administration and certain state institutions. The authorities increasingly trumpeted their successes in this regard and in attracting investment into the economy, another foreign policy priority. Development objectives were given priority. However, the administration’s failure to duly take into account the transformation of the “Russian factor” – together with the Western community’s unwillingness to oppose moves by the Kremlin within the post-Soviet space – led to the misguided prioritisation of strategic objectives and timescales for their implementation. This, in turn, led to war with Russia. The fateful events of 2008 radically altered Georgia’s relations with the outside world. Relations with its northern neighbour were also strained almost to breaking point by Russian recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as well as the de facto occupation of those territories. Containing the recognition of independence of Georgia’s breakaway regions and maintaining the country’s integrity was again Georgia’s top foreign policy priority – although it continued to devote the same levels of political and diplomatic resources to Euro-Atlantic integration.
New realities, likely challenges
Despite initial scepticism from some in the international community, the new ruling elite that gained power in Georgia following the 2012 parliamentary elections has remained true to the same strategic choice. In fact, its objective is now to boost Georgia’s levels of democracy by securing its deserved place within the cherished European family. Foreign policy targets and milestones are being developed in line with this aim.
However, although power formally changed hands following these elections, the process is not complete. It continues against a complex background of political and legal obstacles, and is in danger of stalling. “Tinkering” with Georgia’s constitution in recent years led to a highly unusual political situation emerging immediately after the elections. The ruling party did significantly admit defeat and the president promised not to stand in the way of the victorious coalition taking power. Nevertheless, until the next presidential elections are held, politics will continue to be dominated by two adversarial political forces. After just two weeks, this process of “cohabitation” came to a standstill, bogged down among other things by the dismissal of “politically engaged” ambassadors in the capitals of leading Western countries. This deprived the new government of a significant resource in the form of loyal embassies to promote its foreign policy interests in major partner countries. It meant that the new government has had to work extra hard to rid itself of the stigma of a “Russian project”, as it was labelled by its former main rival during the election campaign, the United National Movement (UNM). During the election campaign, the former ruling party under the leadership of the Georgian president unlawfully used all available state resources to demonise its rival – and it appears to have partially achieved its aim. It managed, in particular, to persuade some of the political establishment and much of the Western media that the “Georgian Dream” was a pro-Russian political force and that it would definitely abandon the country’s Western orientation when it came to power. As a result, the new authorities, unlike Saakashvili’s team during the “Rose Revolution”, have not enjoyed the confidence of the Western powers as they take office. Such support is highly essential for any government as it starts out, particularly one that is in some respects relatively inexperienced.
This lack of confidence has meant that the Ivanishvili government has faced, among other things, open suspicion and even protest from the West over the criminal prosecution of members of the former authorities. The president and leaders of the UNM have used sophisticated public relations techniques and their connections to present these moves as politicised, convincing a significant section of the international public that this is the case. Although almost no one inside Georgia questions the decision to bring criminal prosecutions against these former civil servants, this issue has turned into a problem in the international arena. In particular, it has weakened the position of the Ivanishvili government and complicated its prospects of mounting an effective response to other challenges in the short and medium term. In the short term especially, this situation could be exploited in negotiations by some difficult partners. For example, Russia’s initial responses to Tbilisi’s proposals to establish relations were restricted to a desire for ‘more specific action’ followed later by a demand that the Georgian government ‘recognise the new realities of an independent Abkhazia and South Ossetia’. Regardless of the fact that Moscow subsequently agreed to start direct consultations without pre-conditions, one cannot expect the process to be easy because the political “red lines” which each side declared prior to the first round of talks limit the scope for significant rapprochement. For their part, the Abkhaz and South Ossetian sides “responded” to the initiatives of the new Minister for conflict resolution issues by hardening their positions, even in relation to the Geneva talks. These and other examples clearly demonstrate that these partners intend to wait for a more favourable moment when the Georgian authorities will, supposedly, be more vulnerable. Given this, it will be of crucial importance how “cohabitation” plays out: will the process end peacefully or will it break down and lead to a political crisis? Another crucial factor will be the extent to which the new authorities manage to achieve initial successes in fulfilling their promises to restore justice and improve the socio-economic conditions. Success here would certainly strengthen the starting positions of the new authorities in their foreign policy endeavours and vice versa.
In the medium term, the principal challenges relate to external factors which are outside Georgia’s control. Much will be determined by the balance of power between the West and Russia and the quality of their relations. This will determine Georgia’s ability to accommodate two different foreign policy objectives: membership of the Euro-Atlantic institutions and the normalisation of relations with Russia. This is the most serious challenge, to which the Georgian government will have to direct its efforts in the next few years.
An escalation of tension in the region over the same period cannot be ruled out, in particular an exacerbation of the situation around Nagorny Karabakh. Moreover, the possible resumption of war between Azerbaijan and Armenia would cause irreversible damage to the geo-economy of the entire region, including the transit systems crossing Georgian territory, although this is unlikely. Furthermore, it is not known how Russia would act in such a situation and whether it would resort to aggressive action in relation to Georgia’s national interests.
Another event which could pose a challenge for Georgia’s security in the medium term is instability resulting from a potential conflict between the West and Iran. Depending on the specific geography of the conflict and how the Iranian authorities interpret Tbilisi’s role in it, Georgia could be subject to various types of threats. Georgia would therefore have to find a “golden mean” in the crisis which could well be difficult. Russia might conceivably exploit such a situation to attempt to make gains that are not in Georgia’s national interest.
Another challenge for Georgia could be a periodic “conflict spillover” from the North Caucasus. This would involve impromptu infiltration into Georgian territory by informal military groups, each one causing difficulties of varying degrees of severity in border areas and friction in relations with the Kremlin.
Meanwhile, the Georgian authorities need not be overly concerned about the sustainability of its policy of non-recognition of its breakaway regions, although the foreign ministry needs to remain alert and proactive in this regard.
Conclusion
The new authorities in Georgia have inherited a complex situation. Georgia enjoys strong political support from the Western community. On the other hand, the crisis in relations with Russia threatens the security and stable development of the country. The new authorities are facing a further dilemma: whether to continue to prosecute former civil servants and thereby risk their reputation in the eyes of Western partners; or to end the process of restoring justice and thereby risk losing the sympathy of its own electorate. The only way to resolve this dilemma is to comply with the letter and spirit of the rule of law, all the more since the international community’s demands of the new authorities are extremely high. Clearly, provided the new authorities can deal with what is certainly an unusual challenge, they will be able to count on greater support from their partners on other foreign policy issues.
Topics for discussion
The change of government following the parliamentary elections has opened a small window of opportunity to resolve some key difficulties over Georgia’s external relations. However, it is not possible to make firm predictions, since there are a large number of variables that could affect future developments. New issues may arise for which reliable and clear solutions are hard to find. Topics for discussion over particular issues that require urgent attention in the short term and medium term are listed below. The responses given are necessarily restricted to hypotheses of likely scenarios.
- How will the current nature of “cohabitation” affect the prospects of Georgia joining Euro-Atlanticist organisations?
Hypothesis: criticism of the Georgian authorities by Western governments and the media over continuing arrests of civil servants from the former regime appears to be reaching a critical stage. Given NATO’s reluctance for geopolitical reasons to accept Georgia as a member, speculation around the events within the country may be seized on as an additional excuse to “postpone” decisions. With regard to the Association Agreement between Georgia and the EU, this is likely to be signed in 2013.
- To what extent are the initiatives/signals of the Georgian government sufficient for normalisation of bilateral relations with Russia?
Hypothesis: although Russia has less interest than Georgia in extricating bilateral relations from their current stalemate, it is still in its interests to maintain the appearance of good relations, providing this does not damage its own political interests. It will therefore enter into mutually advantageous agreements, particularly since the democratic change in Georgia’s government will make it difficult for it to reject initiatives and proposals emanating from Tbilisi.
- To what extent are the initiatives/signals of the Georgian government sufficient for launching direct dialogue with the authorities of Abkhazia and South Ossetia?
Hypothesis: since the government of Georgia now consists of people with liberal views on the conflict, this opens up an opportunity for the restoration of direct contacts between Tbilisi and Sukhumi/Tskhinvali. At the same time, unrealistic expectations in Sukhumi and Tskhinvali that Tbilisi will make “unilateral concessions” may result in disillusionment among local elites and a corresponding fall in enthusiasm for bilateral dialogue. If the current “window of opportunity” closes, however, it is unlikely that any better prospects for establishing dialogue will arise in the foreseeable future.
- How will Russia respond to the realistic prospect of Georgia (and other post-Soviet countries) joining the EU?
Hypothesis: as things stand, Russia need not be concerned about Georgia joining NATO. Moreover, it is not particularly worried about the rapprochement between Georgia and other post-Soviet countries with the EU, since the EU’s strict membership requirements mean that accession is still some way off. Nevertheless, the process of rapprochement could accelerate, particularly after the signing of Association Agreements with Georgia and Moldova, and potentially Ukraine and Armenia. This would at least threaten the Kremlin’s plans to create a Eurasian Union based on a common economic area. As soon as it becomes apparent that this is a realistic prospect, Moscow will begin a series of measures to prevent such rapprochement.
*Dr Archil M Gegeshidze, Senior fellow at the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies (GFSIS)