Governance and modernisation: Experience and challenges
Ivlian Haindrava*
(Russian/Pусский [1])
The outlook
Georgia’s November 2003 “Rose Revolution” can be viewed as a modernisation project. Three major components necessary, albeit not sufficient, for the success of such a project were clearly in place:
- The demand for a fundamental renewal of the country (under the watchwords “Georgia without corruption”, “Georgia without Shevardnadze and Abashidze”) – although this in itself did not necessarily lead directly to modernisation, it was nevertheless an indication of the “modernisation potential” that had accumulated in society;
- The political will – as represented by the intellectuals at the core of the revolution, who realised that there was an urgent need to modernise the country and who were prepared to implement deep-seated reforms, including some that would inevitably be painful for society;
- Resources – although initially the situation in Georgia appeared poor (the parlous state budget prior to the Rose Revolution was being cut year on year), the West provided the revolutionary authorities with ample resources, including financial, economic, political, diplomatic and expert assistance and cooperation.
In fact, no other president in any of the other post-Soviet states appeared to have enjoyed such systematic and consolidated support both inside and outside the country as Mikheil Saakashvili did at the start of his presidency. Under his leadership, Georgia far outstripped these states in terms of US assistance per capita. Even in 2005, US President George Bush was still keen to portray Georgia as “a beacon of democracy”. Looking back, the carte blanche support provided by the Bush administration ultimately proved to be a disservice to Saakashvili himself, his government and the country as a whole. Once Barack Obama took office at the White House, this rapture abated, and Europe’s “soft power” had always been muted.
Going up the “down escalator”
Saakashvili’s first term as president saw a number of policy successes, such as: the political and socio-economic return of Adjara to Georgian jurisdiction; administrative reform and increased efficiency in state agencies; positive changes in the fiscal sphere and a brief rise in state revenues; an effective fight against low-level corruption and the curbing of petty and organised crime; along with infrastructure and tourism projects. In practice, however, there was a flip side to every one of these achievements. Adjara’s autonomy was “reduced” to that of a town council; the ruling political elite was so closely intertwined with the state and state agencies were so politicised that they reminded people of Soviet-era “party-state bodies”; property rights were violated and there was endemic corruption among the elite; and Georgia had the highest number of prisoners in Europe relative to its population, while the percentage of acquittals was well below the figures during Soviet “due process”, and so on.
Despite George Bush’s praise, the situation was particularly alarming with respect to Georgia’s human rights and freedoms, the development of democracy, the rule of law, pluralism and competition (in both politics and business). Changes to the country’s constitution in early 2004 concentrated all power in the hands of the president. The parliament now only had a residual function as a pseudo-democratic façade, while the judicial system was reduced to slavishly implementing the will of those in power. One by one, all three national television channels – the source of political news and information for 90% of the country’s population – came under the government’s control, giving the authorities a monopoly in this crucial sphere too. The United National Movement of Georgia (UNM) dominated local as much as central government. At the same time, the all-powerful, uncontrolled and unaccountable but all-controlling (listening and watching) Ministry of the Interior ensured that the hierarchy of power was retained and given complete freedom of action. The country was run not on the basis of the constitutional and legal framework, but at the discretion of an unofficial group within the president’s entourage. As a result, the Freedom House democracy rating for Georgia remained virtually unchanged from 2003 to 2012, confining it to the list of countries with “hybrid regimes”. “Authoritarian modernisation” was therefore an accurate description of what was occurring in Georgia, even during Saakashvili’s first term as president – although the operative word varied according to observers’ political tastes and biases (“modernisation” or “authoritarianism”).
For the sake of balance, we should add that there were some serious obstacles preventing Georgia from making progress with its modernisation project. Georgian society, already fundamentally patriarchal, was further burdened by the Soviet legacy of restricted freedom, totalitarian state interventionism in society and among individuals, clientelist attitudes, and a lack of individual initiative and responsibility. There was a poor work ethic and the discord and collapse of the early 1990s were followed by further de-skilling of workers in all sectors of the economy. Modern technology was underdeveloped and access to the internet remains to this day far below European standards, although this is improving. The bankruptcy of the secular authorities also led to a situation where the highest levels of public confidence were enjoyed by the Catholicos-Patriarch (personally) and the Georgian Orthodox Church (institutionally); these institutions were certainly not in the vanguard of modernising ideas and often even refused to go along with the processes of modernisation. At the same time, urbanisation rates remained low, with the rural population outnumbering that of the cities; although the percentage of city-dwellers was increasing, this was not the result of state programmes and reforms, but of the movement of the rural unemployed to the capital in search of work. Finally, the immediate political and geographical environment was hardly fertile ground for rapid and successful modernisation. Of all the neighbouring countries, Turkey alone – even there not without serious reservations – could serve as an example of modernisation. Conversely, the internal conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, along with the steadily deteriorating relations with Russia, limited opportunities and diverted resources that could have been used for modernisation projects.
Not that the Saakashvili regime’s approach to budgeting could be described in any way as prudent: exorbitant sums were spent on questionable projects, propaganda, self-promotion inside and outside the country, ostentatious entertainment, the services of Western lobbyists and PR experts, etc. There was also the extensive rise in military expenditure, which by 2008 had reached almost a quarter of the total budget and over 8% of gross domestic product (GDP); from late 2006, it was not just the budget, but also the political climate that became militarised. This resulted in a distinct mismatch in perceptions: a few years after the Rose Revolution, life in Georgia looked much better from the outside than it actually was inside. The public euphoria following the peaceful (although still not entirely constitutional) transfer of power in late 2003 turned increasingly into a mood of protest. The disparity between the pictures on television and the daily grind, the deepening gulf between the authorities and the overwhelming majority of the population, the stifling feeling of deception and injustice all came to the surface by the fourth anniversary of the Rose Revolution.
The Saakashvili regime eventually turned to self-preservation following a number of events, namely: the brutal suppression of demonstrations in November 2007; the crushing of the “Imedi” private television company, which was then transferred to the government’s protégés; the declaration of a state of emergency in the country; the falsified presidential elections in January 2008; and the lack of transparency in the May 2008 parliamentary elections, culminating in the August war with Russia. There was increasingly less modernisation and more authoritarianism; remaining in power at any price became the sole objective. Following nine years of rule by Saakashvili and the UNM, Georgia did not even have a stable economy or stable democracy. Unemployment rates and the number of families living below the breadline had barely changed compared with the period before the revolution. Moreover, Georgia’s per capita GDP was below that of Armenia, whose economy had contracted by 14.5% during the global financial crisis, even though Georgia had received around US$4.5 billion in aid for post-war rehabilitation during the same period. Extravagant projects that had no political or technical justification – such as transforming the country into a regional financial centre or the “Singaporisation” of Georgia – turned into a fiasco. Another project in the air at the time was the construction of a new city for a population of half a million on the marshes of the Black Sea coast. Meanwhile, agriculture was in a steep decline and the real economy showed no signs of growth. The crisis of power (including the crisis of new ideas and approaches) reached a point where the outcome of the parliamentary elections on 1st October 2012 was not surprising. Indeed, the UNM only managed to hang on to around 40% of its seats in parliament by openly hounding the opposition politically and financially, as well as intimidating and repressing its supporters. The Saakashvili-UNM defeat only came as a surprise to those outside the country: people outside Georgia simply could not (or would not) trace and analyse domestic politics within the country; instead, they continued to turn a blind eye to the authoritarian rule of the leader whom they saw as a “bulwark of pro-Western policies” in a complex and important region, or a “bearer of liberal and democratic values”. Fortunately, the penny finally dropped for those in the West with levers of influence over decision-making in Georgia during the events of 1st to 2nd October, when it became clear that Saakashvili either had to accept the results of the election or again declare a state of emergency and deploy tanks on the streets of Tbilisi.
Therefore, during the rule of Saakashvili and the UNM, the engine of modernisation took the country only part of the way before stalling and coming to a complete standstill. Georgia’s “modernisation without democratisation” project had exhausted itself. Huge, perhaps unique, opportunities were frittered away, leaving Georgia to continue facing many old and new challenges, both internal and external. As the West’s ability to supply direct financial and economic aid to the country began to decline for a number of reasons, domestic resources gained a particular significance. Nevertheless, the fact that power was transferred constitutionally on the basis of elections has been viewed positively by virtually all political players who maintain an interest in Georgia. This will help to ensure that it has at least a chance of continuing to play a high-profile or perhaps even exemplary role across the region as part of the six-country Eastern Partnership.
New realities
The depressingly primitive “black and white” politics consisting of two camps – “Long live Misha” (whose domestic support is steadily declining, despite solid support outside the country) and “Down with Misha” (whose domestic support is increasing, despite relatively meagre support outside the country) – has been replaced since the parliamentary elections of 1st October by a more colourful palette of interests. Top of the agenda for the more progressive segment of (civil) society is democratisation and decentralisation, consolidating and building on the achievements of the modernisation project. The priority for most ordinary people is to see rapid, fundamental improvements in their socio-economic conditions. The revanchist agenda of the damaged and declining, but still powerful, UNM (headed by the “president in opposition”) is to return to power as quickly as possible. The new political force currently in power not only needs to combine the first two agendas, but also to neutralise the third. However, if it manages to combine the first and second agendas, the third will no longer pose a threat.
The task is made more difficult by the fact that both the new parliamentary majority and the government in Georgia are formally and essentially constructed on a coalition basis. This is a novel situation (we can discount Gamsakhurdia’s “Round Table” here and it should be remembered that Saakashvili’s pre-election coalition in 2003, “National Movement – Democratic Front”, quickly degenerated into a centralised ruling organisation that did not tolerate dissent). The situation is both inherently risky as well as positive. The risk arises from the lack of ideological unity within the Georgian Dream coalition, making it inevitable that there will be disagreements on issues both within parliament and the government. These are in fact the issues on which the government will have to surrender the lion’s share of its posts and competences, as the constitutional process towards the transition from a presidential to a parliamentary model unfolds. In this context, the coalition leader, Bidzina Ivanishvili (himself the mainstay of the coalition), seems overly optimistic when he states that within 18 months to two years he will establish complete order in the country, set it on the route to success and prosperity, and withdraw himself from public life. Then again, the very fact that this is a coalition as such significantly reduces the risk of a new authoritarianism and abuse of power arising – at the very least, there are strong reasons to believe this to be the case for some if not all of its members. However, public euphoria over the dissolution of an unwelcome government is unlikely to last for long. Finally, if a viable party can be created from the ruins of the UNM, with a clear ideology and willingness to compete in a pluralistic environment, there are no obvious or insurmountable obstacles to the country achieving a reasonable balance of power in parliament and to the prospect of a more European-style political set-up. Any subsequent elections would then be an act of accountability by the authorities to the people – essential for the progress and consolidation of democracy.
New challenges – topics for discussion
The key question arising from the new realities of domestic politics in Georgia can thus be summarised as follows: to what extent can the coalition combine the need for democratisation with a quick but perceptible and dynamic improvement in socio-economic conditions for society in Georgia (which few people would in fact expect)? Success in this strategic direction, call it “modernisation plus democratisation”, is closely related to a number of key considerations:
- Will the members of the coalition have the political maturity required to ensure that shared strategic aims prevail regarding issues likely to lead to disagreements?
- How strong will the coalition leader’s political discipline be, so that he may resist the temptation to circumvent democratic procedures and the rule of law?
- To what extent has society learnt from the lessons of the Rose Revolution, acknowledging that creeping authoritarianism needs to be opposed in its embryonic state and not once it has become deep-rooted?
- Will the population be able to make the transition from having high expectations of a billionaire benefactor to the unrelenting daily work required, including the need for post-Soviet skill sets?
- How prepared are voters to take responsibility for local governance by dealing with issues on which they have better ideas than the central authorities?
- How ready are Georgia’s Western partners and allies to learn from the lessons of the Rose Revolution and continue their support for the country on the basis of their own declarations – such as ‘we support the people and not the leader’ and ‘more for more’?
Addressing these questions can help to point the way forward for the principal actors on whom Georgia’s future trajectory will depend.
*Ivlian Haindrava, Director of the South Caucasus Studies Program at the Tbilisi-based Republican Institute