On 1st October 2012, Georgians went to the polls to elect a new parliament, the results of which surprised even the most experienced of commentators on Georgian issues.
The opposition coalition “Georgian Dream”, headed by relative political newcomer Bidzina Ivanishvili, swept to victory only 15 seats short of a constitutional majority, winning 85 seats in parliament compared to the incumbent United National Movement with only 65. President Saakashvili defied expectations by gracefully ceding defeat on the day of the elections, announcing that he would go into opposition for the remainder of his term.
The coalition lost no time in forming a new cabinet, nominating a number of people to high level positions who have in one form or another played a prominent role in promoting Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-Ossetian relations, and who had been rather critical of the Saakashvili regime.
During the first euphoric days after the elections, representatives of the winning coalition hurried to give press interviews, promising a change in approach and giving cause for optimism for the future. Rather cooler and cautious responses followed from Abkhaz and South Ossetian quarters, restating their positions, in case anyone was under the mistaken impression that they might be willing to compromise on the fundamental issue of independence.
It is clear that the road ahead is full of challenges and we should not be unrealistic in our expectations of any major breakthrough in relations. In order to assess the implications of the election results for peace and security in the region, International Alert invited George Tarkhan-Mouravi, of the Institute for Policy Studies in Tbilisi, and Liana Kvarchelia, Abkhaz political analyst from the Center for Humanitarian Programs, to comment. You can read their articles here:
An interesting aspect of the post-election discourse in relation to the conflicts has been around the issue of a bilateral agreement on the non-use of force between Georgia and Abkhazia (and between Georgia and South Ossetia). Both Kvarchelia and Tarkhan-Mouravi touch on this theme, Kvarchelia calling such an agreement a “litmus test” which ‘would certainly create a more favourable and constructive environment for relations between the two states’, while Tarkhan-Mouravi highlights that the new Georgian government is not against such an agreement, though ‘only if the two sides are considered parties to the conflict, not two independent states’ (quoting the incoming minister dealing with conflict issues, Paata Zakareishvili).
Having failed to reach such an agreement over four years and 21 rounds of Geneva discussions, there is renewed optimism that a breakthrough might be achieved. This is because of an apparent willingness of the new Georgian leadership to treat the Abkhaz and South Ossetians as parties to the conflicts, which the previous administration had refused to do since 2008 and the Georgian-Russian August war. It was adamant that such an agreement could only be signed between Georgia and Russia. Russia was equally adamant in refusing to sign an agreement – though there are signs of progress in that area as well after the latest round of talks.
[9]As this topic receives a new lease of life, we invite you to revisit the first publication from our ‘Dialogue through research’ project: Security guarantees in the context of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict [9], originally published in September 2009.
When the dialogue participants agreed this theme in May 2008, the issue of an agreement on non-use of force was topical. Irakli Alasania – then Georgia’s representative at the UN and now confirmed as Minister of Defense in the new government – and Sergei Shamba – then Foreign Minister of Abkhazia – were negotiating such an agreement, and even managed to agree the text. However, the agreement was not signed, and some Georgian experts interviewed later for this research drew a strong correlation between the failure to sign and the advent of the August 2008 war.
After the August war, the focus of the research was expanded to include an examination of events before and after August 2008, and a widening of the theme away from an agreement on “non-use of force” towards broader “security guarantees”.
The final publication presents analyses of Georgian and Abkhaz experts on: the relevance of an agreement on non-resumption of hostilities; the reasons why the sides had been unable to agree at different stages in the negotiation process; international experience of guarantees for such agreements; the role of external factors; opportunities lost and lessons learned; and possible outlooks for the future.
While the sticking point in the expert dialogue was always the nature of wider security guarantees – i.e. from Russia and the West as respective allies of the Abkhaz and Georgians – it is interesting to note that the dialogue participants saw the importance of a bilateral agreement on non-resumption of hostilities not only as a political agreement, but also as a mechanism through which political and public dialogue between the opposing sides and within different levels of society could be constructed. An agreement on non-use of force would not only crucially help in establishing trust and confidence, but could also be a foundation upon which further talks on bilateral relations could be built.
A great deal of water has passed under the bridge since this research was published, but it was written to take the long view, to be of value to scholars and analysts interested in the conflict as the political conjuncture changes. Now is therefore as good a moment as any to reflect on this analysis.
To read this and other analyses on Georgian-Abkhaz relations by local experts, please visit our website here [10].