Georgian Parliamentary Elections and Prospects for Georgian-Abkhaz Relations (English)

Post-electoral hiatus and expectations for Georgian-Abkhaz reconciliation

George Tarkhan-Mouravi*

(Russian/Pусский) [1]

Bad cop – better cop?

As Inal Khashig, the editor of the Sukhumi newspaper Chegemskaya Pravda, stated immediately after the parliamentary elections in Georgia: ‘It is paradoxical but true that most of the people were inclined to think that Saakashvili was better, because he was predictable; on the other hand, his relations with Moscow were so bad that there was a 100 per cent guarantee that relations will never be improved as long as he is in power. While with Ivanishvili – it is not very clear, he had earned his millions in Russia, so maybe he will be able to negotiate with Moscow and maybe somehow influence relations between Moscow and Abkhazia and so on.’[1]

The above statement illustrates certain mistrust towards Russia, but also mainly the attitude that many Abkhaz share towards developments in Georgia: on the one hand, they claim not to be interested in what happens there; however, the worse things are there, the better it is for Abkhazia’s future. Markedly, a similar opinion was expressed on the radio station Echo Moskvy by the notorious Russian politician Vladimir Zhirinovsky. He declared that an ‘open enemy such as Saakashvili’ is a much more convenient counterpart for Russia, while Ivanishvili’s victory may threaten its geopolitical interests.[2]

In the meantime, the situation has dramatically changed in Tbilisi. President Saakashvili’s party lost the parliamentary elections, and the former opposition is forming the new government, led by billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili. Although Saakashvili retains his post for one more year – notwithstanding impressive constitutional prerogatives – his lame duck status and the plummet in public support mean that things have indeed changed. Still, the new leadership claims to continue Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations, although at the same time trying to improve relations with Russia (it should be noted the same desire was announced by a newly-elected Saakashvili back in 2004, only to be replaced too soon by fervently anti-Russian rhetoric). 

Understanding the logic

Khashig’s position has its reasons and is rooted in the history and logic of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. As in many other conflicts, especially those that followed the disintegration of the Soviet Union, there were three main drivers: the fear of things getting worse unless some action was taken; the hope that if certain action was taken, it could lead to a better future; and the feeling that the window of opportunity was narrow and could close if action was not taken. Such was the situation in 1990–1993 and again in 2008. The Abkhaz appeared able to use both “windows” due to Georgia’s errors of judgement, and not without the assistance of an external party – Russia.

The conflict in Abkhazia is unique mainly due to the demographic profile of the region, as the pre-war ethnic Abkhaz made up less than one fifth of the population of Abkhazia, while Georgians constituted almost a half. Hence, one fear was the threat to the survival of the people who felt endangered by Georgian demographic and political domination as well as assimilation. There was also a fear of the threat of losing the influence and control that titular nations enjoyed due to Soviet national policies. In their turn, Georgians feared that due to Russian involvement, while minorities were seen as a “fifth column” of the former metropolis, their own control over the territory may erode unless action was taken.

The conflict dramatically changed the demographic profile of Abkhazia. The absolute majority of ethnic Georgians were either driven out of Abkhazia or left it fearing for their lives. The current ethnic breakdown or even the total population number is difficult to estimate, as the censuses which have been conducted are hardly trustworthy. Still, it seems that once again the proportion of ethnic Abkhaz is declining, constituting just a relative majority in Abkhazia. Some experts claim that the Abkhaz are no longer more numerous than the second largest group, the Armenians; at the same time, the number of Georgians is also growing due to higher fertility rates. Therefore, the current balance of influence and power can only be maintained for a while through: keeping the ethnic Georgian forced migrants out of Abkhazia; manipulating demographic data; and maintaining what can be called an ethnocracy, whether in legislation (e.g. only an ethnic Abkhaz can be elected as Abkhazia’s president) or through informal measures. However, all these approaches seem inconsistent with building a democratic state – the declared goal of nation-building.

Pyrrhic victory in 2008

After the Georgian-Russian war of August 2008 – having used the new window of opportunity to capture Kodori Gorge, previously controlled by Tbilisi – Sukhumi finally gained control of all Abkhazia’s territory. It also achieved another long-sought goal: its sovereignty was recognised by Russia, and later by several remote nations either dependent on or bribed by Russia. Moreover, Abkhazia’s security was now guaranteed by the open presence of Russian military bases and border guards.

To some extent, this victory appeared pyrrhic, with some hopes becoming frustrated. While Russia did provide security guarantees along with significant economic aid, and initially helped with international recognition, these achievements left a bitter taste. The initial wave of recognitions swiftly ended, with little prospect for more, as the Russian leadership seemed disinterested in too much international recognition of Abkhazia endangering its grip on Sukhumi. Russia increasingly controls or demands key economic assets and even territories in Abkhazia, and its appetite seems unabated. Moreover, the much coveted demographic dominance of the Abkhaz is eroding, while other ethnicities will eventually demand more equal opportunities and a share in politics and the economy. Attempts to compensate for a low birth rate and emigration by bringing in descendants of the muhajirs from former Ottoman territories showed modest success. Rapid urbanisation endangers both the preservation of traditional culture and the actual status of the Abkhaz language, further accelerating emigration.

Another dead end?

In such circumstances, Georgia’s failure to build a democratic state, strained relations with Russia, and policies that helped strengthen their “enemy image” served to consolidate Abkhazia’s population around incumbent political elites and to justify policies of keeping ethnic Georgians either out of Abkhazia or discriminated within it. It also helped to present Russia – which just a century ago occupied the same emotional niche of an ethnic enemy due to ethnic cleansing and atrocities committed during the military conquest of the region – as a now benevolent friend and the only guarantor of the nation’s safety and prosperity.

The highly controversial personality of Saakashvili, his rhetoric and policies helped to demonstrate the unacceptability of reconciliation with Tbilisi. This served best the task of demonising Georgia and the Georgians, justifying the general policy of blocking any possible constructive initiative offered by Tbilisi – either by outright rejection or through replacing it with symbolic actions that were a priori unacceptable to Tbilisi, such as offering to sign an agreement between equal states that would underscore Abkhazia’s symbolic sovereignty. Hence, the recent statement by Abkhazia’s leader Alexander Ankvab at a recent press conference in Sukhumi: ‘The key question which Abkhazia is ready to discuss with Georgia is a peace treaty. All other questions, including that of refugees, we have discussed with the Georgians on numerous occasions – from the Gali meetings to the Geneva consultations on security issues – not to much avail. But we are ready to discuss the key question.’[3]

Old challenges for the new leadership

The new Georgian leadership is not against signing a peace agreement with Abkhazia. It is the format of such an agreement that will inadvertently cause discord. As the incoming minister for conflict resolution Paata Zakareishvili has stated after his nomination: ‘the signing of a [peace] agreement with the Abkhaz side is possible, but only if the two sides are considered parties to the conflict, not two independent states.’[4] Nevertheless, Zakareishvili is optimistic that small steps towards reconciliation are possible: for instance, a softening (though preservation) of Georgian legislation on “occupied territories” (a term unacceptable to the Abkhaz), or promoting direct negotiations and economic ties. He is also optimistic that if Georgia continues to move towards democracy and economic prosperity, public attitudes towards reconciliation may change in Abkhazia (whatever Russia’s counteractions), eventually leading to reintegration into the Georgian state.[5]

It remains to be seen the extent to which the optimism of Zakareishvili, a veteran civil society activist with many connections in Abkhazia, will be justified by future developments. One thing is clear – it is time to pursue a more constructive path in Georgian-Abkhaz relations. Even if key dividing issues are unlikely to be resolved anytime soon, this may lead to a better life for the people on both sides of the dividing line.

*George Tarkhan-Mouravi is co-director of the Institute for Policy Studies in Tbilisi, Georgia.

Read the Abkhaz perspective on the same issue from Liana Kvarchelia, Deputy Director of the Center for Humanitarian Programs in Abkhazia. [2]