The Georgian State Concept on Relations with the Peoples of the North Caucasus (English)

George Gvimradze

(Russian/Pусский [1])

Preamble

One of the consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union for Georgia was the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Georgia claims that these conflicts were, in many respects, a result of the position adopted by Russia and Russian direct intervention, since Russia was attempting to retain its foothold within the former USSR and did not want to relinquish its leverage over the already independent Georgian state. Georgia’s charges are not, it should be said, entirely groundless. In 1997, Andranik Migranyan and Konstantin Zatulin published their famous article, ‘The CIS: the beginning or the end of history. Towards a new era’.[1] In the article, the authors recommended that Russia adopt the very mechanisms for maintaining its sphere of influence in the post-Soviet space which those post-Soviet states and others have frequently accused Russia of (i.e. in the case of Georgia, making use of internal conflicts and the North Caucasus factor). The authors’ status, and the fact that the article had been written at the indirect behest of the Russian Foreign Ministry, led to the Foreign Minister having to explain himself to his colleagues at the summit of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

The events of the 1990s provide clear evidence that Russia used the North Caucasus factor for its own political purposes against Georgia. One recalls the creation of the Confederation of Mountain Peoples and the active participation of North Caucasian mercenaries against Georgia during the conflicts. On the other hand, in its first years of independence, Georgia itself also attempted to establish relations with individual representatives of the North Caucasus in order to join efforts to defend themselves against Russian claims. The relations between Georgia’s Zviad Gamsakhurdia and the Chechen leader Dzhokhar Dudayev are evidence of that. However, Georgia did not really have sufficient resources to influence the situation in the North Caucasus, not to mention Russia as a whole. Even today, some Georgian analysts assert that Georgia does not have the capacity to have a negative influence on the situation in the North Caucasus, explaining the Georgian government’s latest actions as intended to establish relations with the peoples of the North Caucasus for ‘preventative purposes’. A more appropriate question is not whether Georgia has the capacity to destabilise the situation in the North Caucasus, but whether it wishes to use this factor against the Russian Federation. The logic of rapprochement for preventive purposes is plausible. However, the question remains to what extent will Georgia’s actions achieve this aim in the long term and – no less importantly – to what extent is rapprochement the only aim of the current government? This is the context within which the Georgian State Concept on Relations with the Peoples of the North Caucasus should be understood.

It should also be said that the current concept is not the first, but rather the latest step by the Georgian authorities in relation to the North Caucasus. Strange as it may seem, until now there has been no conceptual backing for the policies which Georgia has pursued with enviable consistency since 2009 directly as a result of the 2008 war. There has not been a single document that could be identified as a programmatic rationale for any specific individual action. However that may be, we now have the Georgian State Concept on Relations with the Peoples of the North Caucasus[2] approved by the Georgian parliament.

Key features of the concept

The concept notes that this is the first – and very important – conceptual document to be approved in Georgia aimed at restoring its historical relations with the peoples of the North Caucasus. And there is nothing objectionable in a country’s desire to be on good terms with the neighbours with which it has a centuries’ long history. Thus, as we mentioned earlier, the preventive logic is plausible.

Indeed, the concept makes a number of positive proposals for people living in the North Caucasus. They are offered the possibility to obtain an education, to work or to receive healthcare in Georgia; to trade and develop economic links even on an individual level; and to use Georgian territory as a transit corridor for onward travel to Turkey or the Arab countries for the purposes of pilgrimage, tourism or trade. Georgia outlines its desire to support the development of civil society and to bring to the attention of the international community what is actually happening in the North Caucasus. All these proposals, if they are actually put into practice, could play a very positive role for both Georgia and the North Caucasus, and even – dare one say it – for Russia itself.

Of the nine sections in the document, we would single out as the most important those which deal with human rights, freedom of the press, civil society, historical justice and relations with the North Caucasian diasporas.

There is nothing intrinsically objectionable about the aspiration to support human rights, freedom of the press, or a just judiciary in another country. However, the question remains whether a country can do this if it has itself on more than one occasion been criticised by international human rights and political organisations for its own lack of freedom of expression, impartiality of the judiciary and human rights violations, particularly of prisoners. Georgia should not forget that alongside its welcome desire to convey objective information to the international community about what is happening in the North Caucasus, the residents of Georgia and the international community are in need of objective information about what is happening in Georgia itself.

The section on historical justice is just as important. Even if we disregard the fact that Georgia itself needs an objective examination of the events of the early 1990s, one gets the impression that there is a political motivation behind the assessment of such sensitive facts in relation to what has been going on in the North Caucasus over a period lasting more than two centuries. The impression given that recognition of the Circassian genocide was not for the benefit of the Circassians but conceived as an attack on Russia was confirmed by a statement issued by a Georgian member of parliament (MP). When asked why Georgia does not also recognise the Armenian genocide, the MP explained that Georgia has good relations with Turkey, which could not be said of Russia. In this light, another important aspect of the concept is the quasi-official recognition of the “ethnic cleansing” of the Ingush people in relation to the Ingush-Ossetian conflict of 1992, which has angered the Ossetians. One might suspect that, by recognising the Circassian genocide, Georgia is attempting to damage Circassian-Russian and Circassian-Abkhaz relations, and also that by actively raising the Ingush question, it is attempting to use the Ingush-Ossetian conflict for its own ends. This forms an impression that the aim is not “objectivity” or “historical justice”, but instead to achieve certain political interests of the current Georgian authorities.

An important aspect of the concept deals with relations with the North Caucasian diasporas. The document, of course, talks only of cultural and humanitarian links and does not speak about the mandatory repatriation of forcibly displaced persons; however, relations with the diasporas have to take that context into account. The recognition of the Circassian genocide by the Georgian parliament was a result of active collaboration between the Georgian government and the Circassian diaspora. The Circassian diaspora is well known for actively sponsoring the idea of an independent Circassian state. In this respect, it ascribes a very important role to the recognition of the genocide and the subsequent repatriation of the Circassian people in achieving its declared aim of an independent Circassia. The extent to which this goal is achievable is another question. The main point here is that by officially recognising the Circassian tragedy, Georgia whether it intends to or not is supporting Circassian separatism.

Interestingly, nowhere in the concept does it acknowledge that the North Caucasus is a part of the Russian Federation. There is merely some reference to the Georgian National Security Strategy, in particular to the paragraph dealing with relations with the Russian Federation. The fact that Georgia does not target partnership with the authorities within its concept seems to make the strategy unrealisable. 

Finally, the concept cannot deliver its potential, unless it takes into account the region’s diversity. The concept requires elaboration as to how it is to be implemented, and how individual elements are to be taken into account. However, there is currently no indication of Georgia’s intention to draft a supplementary document to address these shortcomings.

Conclusion

Although the concept has many positive aspects, these will remain merely good intentions given the absence of any real resources and instruments.

At the same time, there is a risk that the concept might inadvertently lead to further destabilisation in the Caucasus. Given Russia’s own historical refusal to be bound by strict regard for the law in this region, there is a risk that Russia could use force to block Georgia’s actions. In that case, despite the fact that stability in this region is in the interests of both states, the region still remains an instrument for achieving their dubious subjective interests. The recent events in the Lopota Gorge[3] provided yet another occasion for mutual recriminations by Georgia and Russia, strengthening the “image of the enemy”. Despite this, experts with an interest in the region have long argued (with reason) that the North Caucasus could be the subject of collaboration by all parties interested in stabilising the situation in the region.

George Gvimradze

Read the Abkhaz perspective on the same issue from Spartak Zhidkov, Abkhaz political analyst. [2]

For more analysis on this topic by the same author along with other Georgian and Abkhaz experts, see ‘The North Caucasus Factor in the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict Context [3]’.