Ankvab’s Revenge: A perspective from Tbilisi

Paata Zakareishvili

Institute for the Study of Nationalism & Conflict, Tbilisi.

On 26th August 2011, extraordinary “presidential elections” were held in Abkhazia and won convincingly by the incumbent “vice-president of Abkhazia”, Aleksandr Ankvab. According to the Central Election Commission of Abkhazia, Ankvab received 54.9 percent of the votes; Shamba received 21.02 percent; and Khadjimba received 19.82 percent.[i]

Since these elections took place outside of the Georgian constitutional framework, law and international law, the Georgian government[ii] and leading international organisations along with some states refused to recognise the legitimacy of the election results. A US State Department spokeswoman, Victoria Nuland, declared that:

‘The United States does not recognise the legitimacy or the results of the 26th August so-called elections in the Abkhazia region of Georgia. We reiterate our support for Georgia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders.’[iii]

Similar statements were made by Catherine Ashton, the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,[iv] Jerzy Buzek, the President of the European Parliament,[v] and Anders Fogh Rasmussen, the Secretary General of NATO.[vi]

In contrast to western states and organisations, the Russian political elite wasted no time in congratulating Ankvab on his convincing victory. In his message, the Russian President, Dmitri Medvedev, stated:

‘The trust placed in you by your compatriots testifies to the Abkhaz people’s support of the policy to build an independent, democratic, modern state capable of ensuring a peaceful and prosperous life for its citizens,’ assuring that ‘Abkhazia can count on the continued full support of the Russian Federation.’[vii]

Similar messages were issued by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs[viii] and the Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and all Russia.[ix]

International organisations such as the United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe, of which both Georgia and Russia are members, preferred to withhold comment on the 26th August “elections”. This was despite the fact that, in both March 2007[x] and December 2009,[xi] the UN, OSCE and Council of Europe declared that such elections were unlawful.

The Triumvirate

In any case, the results of the “presidential elections” are fully in line with the current situation in Abkhazia. One can say with confidence that, with Ankvab’s victory, we are witnessing the end of the transition from Vladislav Ardzinba (the first Abkhaz President from 1994–2005) to Ankvab – essentially marking a new period in Abkhazia’ history. Ankvab’s perseverance and patience have culminated in a convincing revenge against those forces that managed to thwart his chances in the presidential elections in 2004. Prevented from running for president himself, Ankvab put his support behind Bagapsh in 2004 and was rewarded with the position of Prime Minister. However, over five years, those same anti-Ankvab forces managed to relatively neutralise the Bagapsh-Ankvab tandem, by “strapping” Raul Khadjimba to it in the form of Vice-President, thus forming a lifeless triumvirate. This triumvirate fell apart only in December 2009, when Bagapsh defeated Khadjimba for the second time at the ballot box and Ankvab was made Vice-President, thus strengthening Ankvab’s position ahead of the next “presidential elections” due in 2014. However, fate would have it that on 26th August, owing to a well-prepared strategy, Ankvab succeeded in becoming the sole ruler of Abkhazia, leaving far behind all other likely opponents, most likely for many years to come. It is unlikely that even Ankvab could have foreseen such a turn of events in May of this year.

Her Majesty ‘Surprise’

Analysing the situation, there are two reasons for the sense of “surprise”. The main surprise, of course, was the untimely death of President Bagapsh. His passing caught everyone unaware, both friends and enemies. Of course, many were anticipating a political future without Bagapsh towards the end of his second term in 2014, although he would have still remained in the background with his networks and influence. His unexpected death overturned that scenario, leaving the political throne of Abkhazia empty. As it turned out, it was Ankvab who coped better than the rest with such an unexpected turn of events. With more than 25 years’ experience of political struggle, he must have known on an intuitive level that this situation presented a premature opportunity for his ascent to power – a chance which he should not let slip through his fingers.

Personally, Ankvab’s victory did not surprise me for one moment. He was victorious on all accounts, although one would have thought that such a victory could only have been achieved through a hard-fought campaign. But this is where the second “surprise” emerged – the sensationally poor result of Ankvab’s main rival, Sergei Shamba. It appears that Shamba did not adequately assess the sudden change in the situation and ended up trailing behind Ankvab. Shamba’s result reflects the mood in Abkhaz society. Why didn’t people vote for Shamba? In my opinion, the main reason for his defeat was his poor and unconvincing election campaign: even his slogans were incomprehensible to voters, not to mention his policy platform. Moreover, one got the impression that his supporters, indeed not even he himself, truly believed in his promises. Primarily, the voters rejected the type of democracy, liberalism and openness which Shamba stood for, but failed to articulate. One can only conclude that at this moment in time, Abkhaz society, as represented by Shamba, does not see a way forward through democratisation, liberalisation and openness. Furthermore, beyond such democratisation and openness lies the not-so-reliable Europe, with hostile Georgia in the offing behind its back.

However, viewing the situation from Tbilisi, it seems there is one more reason for the voters’ rejection of Shamba – that is, his poorly hidden pro-Russian orientation. This became clear when Shamba, without thinking about the implications, openly supported the pro-Russian wing of the church in Abkhazia.[xii] This episode made even Shamba’s staunchest supporters of democratic reform wary of him. The schism in the Church in May this year clearly showed just how unacceptable to Abkhaz society is Russia’s total presence in Abkhazia. While Shamba attempted to distance himself from the Abkhaz patriots in the church, Ankvab’s team, in the person of Stanislav Lakoba, clearly positioned itself on the side of the “schismatics”. In doing so, it emphasised even more the difference between Shamba’s and Ankvab’s positions.

I am convinced that the exploitation of Tengiz Kitovani’s (Georgian Minister of Defence during the Georgian-Abkhaz war of 1992–1993) scandalous accusations against Ankvab inadvertently revealed a much closer link between Shamba and Russia than had been earlier understood. It is unlikely that anyone in Abkhazia was in any doubt that this was the work of the Georgian authorities. Meanwhile, even if few commented on Russia’s role in this scandal, the silence on the matter could be interpreted as a confirmation, difficult to refute, that Russia’s poorly hidden hand was behind all this.

The third factor behind Shamba’s defeat was the lack of confidence among the electorate that Shamba would be able to implement the reforms needed to fight crime and corruption. The best case scenario would be that everything would remain as it had under Bagapsh. However, the population, notwithstanding the high levels of respect for Bagapsh, wanted serious changes in the spheres of security and law and order.

Immediately after the results were announced, Shamba declared that he was leaving politics. I consider this a brash move on his part, since in doing so he has left exposed the entire democratic wing of Abkhaz society, abandoning it to fate. Shamba has a duty to learn the lessons of his defeat and to remain in politics, posing a serious opposition to Ankvab in the name of strengthening democratic and civil institutions. Shamba should only have allowed himself to retire after a new generation of young leaders has emerged with democratic and civil values.

Another surprise, although to a lesser extent, was the rather good turnout for Raul Khadjimba. Considering that at the previous elections in December 2009, Khadjimba gained 15.4 percent of the votes, winning 19.82 percent of the votes this time can be considered a success. It shows just what a tenacious and experienced political fighter Khadjimba has become. Most likely, his candidature worked against Shamba, in that he took the pro-Russian and ethnic minority (mainly Armenian and Russian) votes away from him. Furthermore, he has a loyal electorate, who do not particularly like and even fear Ankvab, and who do not trust Shamba as well as the old guard of Ardzinba supporters, who are also anti-Ankvab.

Most likely, Khadjimba counted on the likelihood of a second round. In my opinion, his strategy was built on a complex formula: in the event of him getting through to the second round against Ankvab (least likely scenario), he could count on the Shamba voters to support him. In the event of him failing to get through to the second round (more likely), he could covertly call his supporters to back Ankvab in the second round, in doing so making Ankvab hostage to Khadjimba’s voters. In such a scenario, Khadjimba could count on some kind of position within an Ankvab government. However, Ankvab’s convincing and indisputable victory in the first round must have messed up Khadjimba’s strategy. It looks like he is destined to be in eternal opposition, since Ankvab will completely sideline any remaining traces of the Ardzinba era.

And the next station is - parliamentary elections

In the end, it was a totally predictable victory for Ankvab. Most likely, Ankvab and Khadjimba gained votes from disappointed Shamba supporters, ensuring an indisputable victory in the first round. However, above all, Ankvab won support from people who were tired of unbridled corruption and criminality. The demand for strong and fair leadership had long matured within Abkhaz society. Notwithstanding the high level of respect for Bagapsh, his politics of deterrence and balances could no longer deter corruption and criminality. In this respect, even while in the background, Ankvab had always drawn a certain level of sympathy and expectations. Now the electorate has expectations of Ankvab not only to contain corruption, but to eradicate it entirely.  

Alongside the expected fight against corruption and criminality, Ankvab’s electors are the sort of people who do not expect anything positive to come from the outside world. They refused to vote for a policy of openness to the outside world, which is what Shamba stood for. Now it remains to be seen if Ankvab can withstand any external threat with his iron hand. In Abkhazia, they believe that, thanks to the support for the realisation of Russian interests in the Caucasus, the threat from Georgia has been neutralised. Georgia is still recognised as a hostile state, but no longer generates fear – all is resolved. Now the threat could come from non-hostile or even friendly countries – from Russia, European countries or Turkey. Accordingly, relations with them must be built in such a way that their engagement in Abkhaz affairs is in line with Abkhaz interests. A clear example of this is Ankvab’s declaration on the sale of land in Abkhazia during the first press conference after his victory.

‘Abkhazia’s Civil Code does not prohibit the purchase of property by foreigners. But as regards land, then it is state property and is not for sale.’[xiii]

This statement is unequivocally directed at Russia primarily, although also at Turkey.

In the run-up to the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, it is unlikely that Russian-Abkhaz relations will deteriorate. For Russia, it is essential to maintain a peaceful and safe image in the region where the Olympics will take place. The Abkhaz have similar objectives, although not only in the short term but also in the long term. Thus, time is working in Ankvab’s favour and he will most likely gain the necessary political strength to be ready for any serious challenges that might arise after the Olympic Games and ahead of the next ballot for a second presidential term.

Regarding relations with the European Union, one can most likely expect a hardening of positions, as long as the EU does not establish direct contacts with Abkhazia. The new Abkhaz authorities will ignore the EU’s policy of “non-recognition and engagement” until the concept of “engagement” acquires some concrete substance. 

However, all of the above expectations and prospects for a new politics might be broken by Ankvab’s authoritarianism. He has not even tried to hide his preference for the Soviet authoritarian style of command. Just a few days before the elections, he announced that:

‘In Abkhaz conditions, it is possible to get by without the position of Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister or Vice-President and establish a normal vertical power. That would ensure fewer curators, offices and corridors down which one needs to go to approach the executive ministries, and avoid duplication. The leader of the executive is the President.’[xiv]

From this, one can conclude that Ankvab has a very high opinion of himself and thus democratic institutions such as collective decision making would be alien to him. It is unlikely that we will see a close partnership between Ankvab and the parliament. More likely, we will see a complete reclamation of power after the parliamentary elections due next year. After the parliamentary elections, it will become absolutely clear what type of governance contemporary Abkhaz society prefers – more authoritarian or more democratic. After the next parliamentary elections, the “Ankvab era” will begin for real.

During this latest election campaign, hardly anyone has remembered the four terrorist acts against Ankvab. Not one terrorist was arrested and it is unlikely that his attackers or those behind them have given up their intents. Thus, if these forces still intend to teach Ankvab a lesson, the damage and repercussions of such acts could take on a wider Caucasian scale. This raises a further question: can the concentration of power in the hands of one person guarantee the gradual and sustainable implementation of the reforms that are needed?

Paata Zakareishvili

The Abkhaz perspective [1] on the same issue from Iraklii Khintba, lecturer in political science at the Abkhazian State University