The Ecclesiastical Conflict in Abkhazia: Evidence of the Democratisation of Society

Nadezhda Venediktova

Writer and columnist for "asarkia.info"

Background

As the third millennium dawned, the emergence of a new generation of monks in Abkhazia – formed already after the breakup of the USSR and the Georgian-Abkhaz war of 1992–1993 – reinvigorated the country’s ecclesiastical life. A seminary was opened, a church choir was established, books were published on the history of Christianity in Abkhazia and there were regular editions of the newspaper Christian Abkhazia. This led to a steady increase in the number of Abkhaz clergy and believers.

However, dissent was gradually voiced by a group of young monks, headed by Fr Andrey Ampar (Father Superior of the New Athos Monastery) and Fr Dorofey Dbar (Father Superior of the Monastery of St John Chrysostom and rector of the New Athos seminary), with Fr Vissarion Aplia as the de facto head of the Abkhaz church in the post-war period.

Following the breakup of the USSR and Abkhazia’s de facto independence from Georgia, ecclesiastical life in Abkhazia was slow to settle down. There were virtually no domestic clergy to provide a viable ecclesiastical structure, and under canonical law Abkhazia remained part of the Georgian Orthodox Church. The Abkhaz church had been forcibly dissolved centuries earlier and had no experience of operating independently. It was under these conditions that Fr Aplia emerged as being virtually synonymous with the Abkhaz church.

Nevertheless, with the arrival of the young monks who had trained at Russian seminaries, Fr Aplia’s dominance of the church faced real competition. The first conflict between him and the young monks was settled in May 2005, when the Bishop of the Maikop Panteleimon brokered a decision to share control of the Sukhum-Abkhaz eparchy. Accordingly, Fr Aplia and Fr Ampar were declared co-presidents of the Council of Bishops with equal rights.

However, the young monks claimed that Fr Aplia soon began violating the agreements reached. By January 2007, Fr Dbar left in protest to study at the University of Thessaloniki in Greece. The same year saw the closure of the New Athos seminary and the Regent School, both founded by Fr Dbar. Meanwhile, Fr Ampar resigned as co-president of the Council of Bishops to avoid further confrontation. In March 2007, a new Constitution of the Sukhum-Abkhaz eparchy was approved, giving Fr Aplia full power over its affairs.

In August 2008, Russia recognised Abkhaz independence and, at the instigation of the secular authorities, the Abkhaz church began a more active struggle for autonomy. This required all available ecclesiastical forces to be mustered. In July 2009, at the suggestion of Fr Aplia, Fr Ampar was elected as secretary of the Sukhum-Abkhaz eparchy. Outward unity was restored and on 15th September of the same year, key resolutions were passed at an extraordinary Eparchial Congress of all clergy:

• To announce the curtailment of the activity of the Sukhum-Abkhaz eparchy of the Georgian Orthodox Church on the territory of the Republic of Abkhazia;
• To announce the creation of the Pitsunda and Sukhum Eparchy of the Abkhaz Orthodox Church;
• To make the corresponding amendments to the Charter of the Eparchy;
• To prepare relevant petitions to all Orthodox local churches, in particular to Kirill, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church – the petitions included a prayerful request for the restoration of the Abkhaz Orthodox Church, which had been dissolved in 1795.

On the same day, all clergy in Abkhazia signed a declaration creating the Abkhaz Orthodox Church. At the same time, the Eparchial Congress approved the Constitution of the Pitsunda and Sukhum Eparchy of the Abkhaz Orthodox Church.

This came as no surprise to the Russian Orthodox Church, which hastily attempted to give the proceedings at least a semblance of official approval. On 24th October 2009, Archbishop Illarion (Alfeyev), Chairman of the Moscow Patriarchate Department for external church relations, stated diplomatically:

‘Despite the change in political borders, we continue to regard Abkhazia as a part of the canonical territory of the Georgian Orthodox Church. However, we recognise that at present it is impossible for the Georgian Orthodox Church to have a presence there: no Georgian bishop or priest is able to travel to Abkhazia to provide leadership for the faithful. We must therefore assist those canonically ordained Abkhaz clerics in holy orders who are in Abkhazia in their pastoral duties. We must help them to attain canonical status, if only temporarily.’[i]

Even before Archbishop Illarion’s speech, the Catholicos Patriarch of all Georgia, Ilya II, gave a speech in response to the resolutions of the Abkhaz Eparchial Congress, stating that: ‘We need not take this statement seriously since no one has the right to declare independence from the Mother Church.’

However, the Abkhaz ecclesiastical structures remained in place and, on 24th December 2010, the Constitution of the Abkhaz Orthodox Church was formally registered with the Ministry of Justice. This prompted the state to transfer to it all Orthodox churches and monasteries on the territory of Abkhazia, making the Abkhaz Orthodox Church the largest landowner in the country.

The Abkhaz Orthodox Church’s acquisition of legal status coincided with rising numbers of tourists and pilgrims coming from the Russian Federation, swelling the coffers of the Abkhaz church. The most popular destination was the New Athos Monastery, which was also the base for the young monks under the monastery’s Father Superior, Fr Ampar.

In April 2011, Patriarch Kirill, in response to repeated requests by Fr Aplia, sent a new Prior [hegumen or ‘igumen’], Fr Yefrem Vinogradov, to the New Athos Monastery. Officially, his appointment was agreed with all local clerics, including Fr Ampar, whose control over the monastery passed to Fr Vinogradov.

The hidden conflict immediately entered an acute phase with the return from Greece of Fr Dbar, on whom the Greek Orthodox Church had conferred the rank of Archimandrite. On 15th May, an Ecclesiastical-Lay Congress was convened at the New Athos Monastery. The congress was attended by around 1,300 people, including 1,116 lay members [believers] who were entitled to vote. A new ecclesiastical structure was created – the Holy Metropole of Abkhazia, with its seat in New Athos. At the same time, a Metropolitan Council was elected as the interim governing body for the new structure until the canonical status of the Orthodox Church in Abkhazia was resolved and viable structures were in place to govern it. Fr Dbar was appointed president of the Council and a candidate for the bishopric of the Metropole.

In response, the Ecclesiastical Council of the Abkhaz Orthodox Church, under the authority of Fr Aplia, announced the excommunication of Fr Dbar, Fr Ampar and the Archdeacon David Sarsaniya. Fr Aplia also refused to give his blessing to congregations participating in sacraments and church services celebrated by these three clerics.

Following this congress, the situation became even more acute: on 26th May, Bishop Tikhon of Maikop and Adigeya forbade Fr Dbar and Fr Ampar, as clerics of the Russian Orthodox Church, from conducting church services for a year. On 28th May, Fr Dbar wrote an open letter to Bishop Tikhon, making the following statement: ‘But if other interests, rather than those of the Orthodox Church in Abkhazia, are given priority, we, Archimandrite Dorofey (Dbar) and Father Andrey (Ampar), will shortly give notice to Kirill, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia, and the Holy Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church of our withdrawal from the Russian Orthodox Church.’ The letter was not sent to the addressee but was circulated widely among the Abkhaz public.

On 16th June, representatives of the public [laity] and intellectuals in Abkhazia sent Patriarch Kirill a petition. In the petition, they expressed their concern at the current situation and requested that Patriarch Kirill give a private audience to Archimandrite Dbar and Fr Ampar. However, in Moscow they were received not by Patriarch Kirill but by a senior dignitary of the Russian Orthodox Church. The dignitary confirmed that the Russian Orthodox Church was not opposed to the new ecclesiastical structure and promised that the ban on the three monks conducting services would be lifted. However, this promise was not met and, later, Russian Orthodox Church texts on this subject referred to the New Athos monks as “schismatics”.

Currently, neither party to the conflict is taking any overt action, due to the extraordinary presidential elections.

Consequences

In Abkhazia itself, the ecclesiastical conflict met with a relatively wide-ranging response. Abkhazia’s late President, Sergei Bagapsh, and the then Vice-President, Aleksandr Ankvab, stated that they would not intervene in the conflict and recommended that the parties agree on a compromise. However, Prime Minister Sergey Shamba openly sided with Fr Aplia. Moreover, he threatened the monks of New Athos with forcible expulsion from the monastery unless they came to an agreement with Fr Aplia.

In an interview with a Russian journalist, Prime Minister Shamba said that – in negotiations with the leadership of the Moscow Patriarchate of the Russian Orthodox Church and representatives of the Russian Interior Ministry – he had been told that a New Athos schism would have serious consequences, not only for ecumenical relations.[ii]

Clearly, neither the Russian Orthodox Church nor the Russian authorities had been expecting such a resolute turn of events and were now awaiting the results of the presidential elections. Nonetheless, we can assess the Russian Orthodox Church’s attitude to the Abkhaz ecclesiastical conflict, at least according to a recently expressed view of Deacon Andrey Kurayev – a Russian theologian and ecclesiastical polemicist who is well known in ecclesiastical circles in the Russian Federation. Last year, Deacon Kurayev took up permanent residence in Abkhazia and closely follows events there. According to Kurayev:

‘The information we are receiving from various countries suggests that there is evidence of a concerted international attempt to prevent the resurgence of faith in Abkhazia. Just like modern “revolutionary” techniques of ushering people into a new kind of slavery under slogans of freedom and independence, here too it is clear that groupings connected with ecclesiastical politics and finance in Georgia, Greece and Constantinople have united to subject Abkhazia to their jurisdiction.

Even if the Patriarch of Constantinople supports Father Dorofey, and in disregard of the views of the other Orthodox Churches and against the express will of the Patriarch of Moscow ordains him as bishop, so that Abkhazia will not attain an independent Church, it is quite clear that Constantinople would then say that since the monasteries of Old Athos (in Greece) submit to its jurisdiction, the monastery of New Athos in Abkhazia must also submit to its jurisdiction. This would then mean that authority over our monastery had passed to those who had no part in its construction or the life of the monastery. It is no coincidence that the schismatics call their eparchy by the Greek name “Anakopia”.’[iii]

Kurayev’s comments are couched mainly in political terms and are overtly anti-western. Clearly, the Russian Orthodox Church leaders are also “raising the bar” significantly and are viewing the local conflict from the perspective of their relations with other churches, also paying homage to Russian foreign policy considerations. The Russian press regularly reports on actions by the Patriarchate of Constantinople that are seen as hostile to the Russian Orthodox Church. Its attempt to increase its influence – hence the conferral of the rank of Archimandrite on Fr Dbar – is seen as one more hostile act.

In my view, the attempt to politicise the creation of a new ecclesiastical structure in Abkhazia is untenable, since this is just another generational conflict within the Abkhaz church. On the one hand, Fr Aplia inclines to the status quo (in 2011 in Abkhazia, there were just 20 clerics and 20 monks; many monasteries do not even have a Father Superior; there is no Abkhaz seminary system, etc.). On the other hand, young people active in the church have more ambitious aims in terms of creating a national church.

Interestingly, they are attempting to build it using democratic methods. For example, by announcing at the Ecclesiastical-Lay Congress the creation of an Elected Council of the Metropole, half composed of members of the congregation, Fr Dbar virtually apologised that, under the terms of the Church’s constitution, women could not be elected. Their opponents have seized on this, objecting that the church is a hierarchical institution – not a democratic one – and that all clerics must adhere strictly to their vow of obedience. 

In fact, it is this very principle that divides the factions. The young monks are supported by the more progressive sections of Abkhaz society who are keen on the development of democracy in the country. On the other hand, Fr Aplia is supported by the majority of regular churchgoers, who are appalled by the New Athos monks’ actions of breaking their vow of obedience and separating from the Russian Orthodox Church.

On the whole, the energy with which the young monks have organised and conducted the Ecclesiastical-Lay Congress – and with which they are creating a new ecclesiastical structure – gives their supporters some grounds for hope that they are the future of Abkhaz Orthodoxy.

Conclusions

1.      The group of young monks have shown that they not afraid – not only of speaking out against their own church leaders who are holding back the development of ecclesiastical life – but also of actively defending their position in a complex dialogue with senior figures in the Russian Orthodox Church. Their emergence is a sign that real democratic processes are at work in Abkhazia, despite all the setbacks in the post-war development process. In essence, as they construct a new ecclesiastical structure, the New Athos monks are not drawing on ecclesiastical canons but on the nation’s right to self-determination.

In this sense, Abkhazia is an enviable example for the peoples of the North Caucasus – it has not only retained its statehood, but has also improved it by obtaining recognition of its independence from a number of countries. The struggle to revive ecclesiastical life is quietly continuing across the entire post-Soviet space independently of denominations; however, it is only in Abkhazia that it has had such a clear form and is supported by a significant proportion of the society.

2.      By giving its unequivocal support to the old church administration and disregarding the positive results of the young monks’ actions, the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church has exacerbated ecclesiastical conflict in Abkhazia. This in turn has ultimately propelled it into the realm of politics.

3.      It is nevertheless unlikely that the ecclesiastical conflict will have any real effect on relations between Abkhazia and Russia. It is more probable that a compromise will be reached with the help of the Abkhaz authorities and with minor shifts in the position of the Russian Orthodox Church, giving the New Athos monks the leeway they clearly want.

Nadezhda Venediktova

The Georgian perspective [1] on the same issue from Professor Jemal Gamakharia