

MONITORING THE IMPLEMENTATION
OF SMALL ARMS CONTROLS (MISAC)

Small Arms Control in

Turkey

Turkey

1.1 Background and Overview

A long-term member of NATO, Turkey is a largely Islamic but secular republic with a history of authoritarian rule, as well as of the military intervening in government's affairs. Following strained relations with the United States and its allies in the 1960s and 1970s regarding Cyprus, Turkey attempted to decrease its reliance on Western suppliers,¹ thus pursuing self-sufficiency in the production of military hardware. Today, Turkey has a substantial Military Industrial Complex (MIC) with significant numbers of companies producing many kinds of weapons systems, including SALW.² Regular legal production of small arms in Turkey is concentrated in the state-owned Machinery and Chemical Industry Establishment (Makina ve Kimya Endustrisi Kurumu, MKEK). Until the early 1990s, MKEK was the sole company entitled to produce small arms in Turkey, though to date there are approximately 14 enterprises in Turkey manufacture various kinds of SALW, from pistols, shotguns, rifles and machine guns to grenades and grenade-launchers, rocket projectiles, mortars, landmines, and ammunition.³

The Under-Secretariat of Defence Industry (known as SSM), housed in the Ministry of National Defence (MND), serves as the agency controlling weapons production.⁴ SSM is responsible for weapons procurement, production, and transfers in Turkey. A SSM publication that advertises its products indicates, that the produced SALW are primarily for domestic military and police consumption – and that less than one per cent of arms trade revenue is generated by the sale of SALW.⁵

SALW are reportedly widespread and easily accessible across Turkey, particularly in the southeastern part of the country where martial law was declared a number of years ago due to the conflict with Kurdish separatists.⁶ Craft production of weaponry is on the increase in Turkey following recent efforts by the Turkish government to tighten rules for obtaining gun permits. They are increasingly being bought by local people, generally the farming community, but also criminals, but there have been reports that craft weapons have also been illicitly supplied to Iran and Syria.⁷ Craft production of small arms is primarily concentrated in the north east of Turkey on the Black Sea coast, an area renowned for its age old expertise in the field. Though there is no official data on the number of craft weapons being produced or in circulation, police data shows that between 1995 and 1999, 20 per cent of siezed illicit arms were home made.⁸ Government attempts to address this problem have been largely unsuccessful. The north eastern Black Sea Region Arms Project, initiated by the then Prime Minister in the mid-1990s, attempted to foster greater government control over arms production by bringing craft producers into government authorized factories. However the quality of these new factory produced weapons was low and coupled with tighter laws on gun permits, the project did little to shift demand for illicit craft produced weapons.⁹

Furthermore, allegedly, the Turkish military distributed numerous weapons, mainly SALW, among the civilian population in the region for their self-protection.¹⁰ Some officials claim that these weapons were later collected and returned to the military, but others cast doubt on that. However, it is clear that some SALW remain in the hands of population, not only in the southeast, but in other regions of the country as well.¹¹

In addition to producing its own weaponry, Turkey continues to import large numbers of SALW. In recent years, Turkey has imported from the United States more than USD 5 million worth of pistols, carbines, and ammunition for police and paramilitary forces.¹² Countries such as Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have also exported SALW to Turkey.¹³

Stockpiles and surplus SALW

There is little information available on the security of existing weapons stockpiles in Turkey. The General Staff of the MND is responsible for managing surplus arms, but knowledge about the status of their security procedure and methods of collection, destruction, or disposal is not readily available. According to Turkey's 2003 report to the UN DDA, the marking of any unmarked seized or confiscated weapons is undertaken by the government agency which seized or confiscated the weapons. Thus data on seized weapons stockpiles should be available from these agencies. However, Turkish officials responsible for such activities do not share much if any information about their activities.¹⁴ Having signed up to the OSCE Document on SALW in October 2000, Turkey acknowledges that it is obliged to destroy all unmarked small arms in its stockpiles, or to mark them if they are to be used or exported. This measure is reportedly carried out by the Ministry of National Defence according to specifications in the Directive on Confiscation and Personal Arms. Records on destroyed SALW are reportedly kept by the military plant where the destruction was carried out.

Accusations of illegal SALW transfers

Geographically at the crossroads of three regions – Europe, Asia and the Middle-East – Turkey is at the heart of a network that has served for centuries as a centre for the transit and transshipment of people and goods of all kinds. Weapons are no exception. Turkey's borders are very porous and lack sufficient controls, especially in the southeastern part of the country, providing fertile terrain for smuggling activities.¹⁵ The country's seaports also provide a tremendous potential for illicit activity.¹⁶ Weapons have reportedly entered into and trafficked through Turkey from and to all regions of the world, supplying individual terrorists, terrorist organisations, guerrilla movements, insurgencies and intra- and inter-state conflicts.¹⁷ Although Turkey claims that its arms export policy is to 'observe the international norms set forth by the UN and other international organisations',¹⁸ Turkey has an history of trade with countries known to perpetrate gross violations of human rights. In 1998, Turkey exported USD 0.4mil of arms, mainly military weapons, to Indonesia, and USD 0.4mil of ammunition to Pakistan. In 2002, it sold USD 37,500 of ammunition to Rwanda.¹⁹ Turkish-made weaponry has also been sold to Algeria, Burundi, Iraq, Albania, Angola, Lebanon, Libya, and a host of other Middle Eastern countries.²⁰ They have also been seized in Bulgaria en route to Kosovo and confiscated in Greece and Poland in connection with various criminal activities such as drug-smuggling and terrorist plots.²¹

1.2 Elements of the Turkish SALW Control System

Legislative basis

Law no. 3763 on the Control of Private Industrial Enterprises Producing War Weapons, Vehicles, Equipment and Ammunition, which was adopted in 1940, governs Turkey's production and export of military goods, but not their import, transit, or transshipment. The

Turkish Government has also adopted a number of other decrees that address the export of specific products or technologies such as dual-use items. Provisions of the arms control law are outlined in a 'Notification Regarding the Goods the Export of which is Prohibited or Subject to Licence,' issued each year in the Official Gazette of the MND.

Brokering, export criteria and licensing

Together, the weapons control law and its accompanying decrees establish a two-tiered export regulatory process. First, companies that produce and wish to export sensitive goods must be registered with the Istanbul Metals and Minerals Exporters Union (IMMIB). This union serves as a central clearinghouse for the control of sensitive exports. Once registered, exporters may then submit licence applications for specific transactions. The IMMIB receives such applications and determines whether the items to be exported are subject to the export control process. If the export requires a licence, the application is then submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and MND for their consideration. A broader interagency review process involving other ministries or agencies does not exist in Turkey. The Under-secretariat for Foreign Trade becomes involved in the licensing decision of dual-use items. The applications are reportedly considered on a case-by-case basis as no recipient country or end-user is automatically blacklisted.²²

During the licensing process, Turkish officials claim that when considering the appropriateness of a particular sensitive export they employ various criteria. These include the export's impact on Turkish foreign and security policies, compliance with the country's international commitments and membership of multilateral arms control regimes, potential impact on violent intra- and inter-state conflict, and contribution to terrorist organisations and activities. Neither the democratic nature of the recipient nor its human rights record are explicitly and routinely considered when reviewing export licence applications.²³

Regarding the licensing of brokers and transport companies, Turkish officials claim that intermediary and transit activities are addressed during the licensing process, but there are no legal instruments to specifically govern sensitive goods. Domestic shipping companies are reportedly investigated in the course of normal business operations, but foreign companies are assumed to have gone through the appropriate channels within their own countries.²⁴ Brokers and transporters of weapons, therefore, may operate on the margins of the law given that the Turkish Government does not officially register or licence them and places a significant amount of faith in the role of other countries to have appropriately controlled the activities of their companies and individuals operating internationally. It is clear that intermediaries and individuals specialising in the movement of weapons do operate in Turkey. One such individual reported that he can turn to various independent consultants and experts for help with weapons deliveries.²⁵

Border control

Turkey's borders remain porous and susceptible to smuggling. Independent experts in Turkey, officials from other countries, and Turkish individuals running guns in and out of the country all allude that Turkey remains an ideal place for smuggling.²⁶ Moving contraband of all kinds, be that weapons, cigarettes or illegal immigrants, is far too simple, especially in the eastern part of the country. Even in the more controlled parts of Turkey, points of entry and exit on land

or sea are not well protected.²⁷ Turkish officials report that when an export licence is granted, it is presented to customs authorities that have electronic access to control lists and databases to verify the authenticity of documents. In fact, at least 90 per cent of entry and exit points in the country are reportedly equipped with automated customs procedures. However, the customs authorities allegedly operate on the honour system, as they believe other countries importing or transiting military goods have performed appropriate checks. Physical examinations of shipments are therefore only performed on the basis of suspicion or existing intelligence, typically provided by a third party. Ultimately, Turkish officials suggest that their customs and border controls are insufficient largely due to a lack of resources.²⁸ The United States have been assisting Turkey in its efforts to enhance border controls, namely with the provision of USD 11 million in radiation detectors. The World Bank has also provided loans to Turkey to update border controls in the eastern part of the country.²⁹ Nevertheless, Turkish officials report that additional assistance in the form of trained personnel and relevant equipment is required to enhance security at their borders.³⁰ Without it, arms transfers will continue to go undetected and uncontrolled.

Civilian possession

Civilian weapons must be licensed and registered.³¹ Despite the legal requirements, guns and gun licences are reportedly easy to obtain.³² This is contested by some of the officials who assert that arms are very difficult to obtain and own in Turkey. However, when asked for specific data on the availability and the numbers of civilian-owned weaponry, they were either unwilling or unable to provide it.³³

Enforcement and penalties

The enforcement of Turkey's arms control legislation is the responsibility of, depending on the specific violation or activity, the Ministry of Interior, police or customs authorities. The Ministry of Interior's police force deals with trans-border crime, including smuggling, while the customs authorities focus on the legality of sensitive exports. The penalty for arms smuggling according to the provisions of Law 3763 are up to 8 years imprisonment for individuals, and up to 12 years for cases of organised violation of the law. Law 1918 on 'Combating Trafficking' also outlines penalties in the form of fines and imprisonment for those engaging in the trafficking of SALW. Since 1999, Turkish officials have attempted to enhance the enforcement of arms control provisions, but admittedly continue to suffer from implementation and resource problems.³⁴ It appears that enforcement efforts focus largely on the weapons activities of the Kurdish separatists.³⁵ Nonetheless, Turkish authorities have successfully seized numerous caches of weapons and munitions as well as arresting the occasional international arms trafficker.³⁶ Ultimately, weapons valued in the millions of dollars from various countries, such as Bulgaria, Iraq, China and the United States, have been seized and confiscated in Turkey.³⁷

The 1940 law on the control of military items prescribes minor penalties for both civil and criminal violations although no officials consulted during the preparation of this report could state exactly what those penalties are. Turkish officials admit that the law has many loopholes and insufficient legal consequences for violators, and therefore a strong deterrent specific to improper weapons transfers is needed. Accordingly, the MND is apparently working on a draft legislation to update the 1940 law regarding violation and penalty.³⁸

International cooperation

The Turkish Government has been cooperating with other countries, bilaterally and multilaterally, as well as working with international organisations and regimes regarding SALW control. It has signed agreements with neighbouring and other states, such as Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, China, Georgia, Romania and Russia, addressing trans-border crime and smuggling.³⁹ As a member of all international arms control regimes, Turkey has been active in establishing SALW control measures as a priority within the organisations, especially within the Wassenaar Arrangement.⁴⁰ Moreover, Turkish officials claim that they were also the first Government to propose to the OSCE that it should establish a SALW programme.⁴¹ Officials also say that they would like to see SALW included in the UN registry of arms sales.⁴² Finally, Turkey has been substantially involved in establishing small arms activities within the Stability Pact.⁴³ Turkey's international action on SALW control is therefore well documented, and its officials affirm the country's commitment to international efforts and arrangements to control the SALW proliferation.⁴⁴ However it is translating that commitment into effective implementation that remains a key concern. In February 2000 Turkey signed an 'Agreement for Cooperation for combating cross-border crimes' with China. The agreement entailed exchange of information and experience, education and technical support, and cooperation in combating, *inter alia*, illicit arms trafficking. Turkey also made an agreement with Georgia in 2002 to cooperate in efforts against organised crime and drug smuggling, and signed an accord with Russia in February 2001 to work together to combat Black Sea smuggling.⁴⁵

Transparency and accountability

Turkey has recently increased its efforts with regard to transparency of its SALW dealings. Turkey reportedly provides detailed import data to international databases,⁴⁶ submits information on exports to the UN Register of Conventional Weapons, and submitted a report to the UN Department of Disarmament Affairs in 2003 on its implementation of the UN Programme of Action. In practice however, although Government officials in Turkey are quite willing to discuss their country's arms control efforts and perspectives, they are not particularly willing to discuss their country's weapons sales. In fact, governmental officials from other countries residing in Turkey and independent Turkish NGOs, researchers, experts, and analysts suggest that the Turkish Government, specifically the MND, is very secretive when it comes to providing information about arms imports and exports.⁴⁷ Although the Government is not required to report the kinds and volume of weapons they have procured or the types and numbers of arms they have transferred, the officials report that they do share information about arms sales to relevant international organisations such as the United Nations. According to these officials, additional reporting is not required, and therefore is not a priority.⁴⁸

Turkey has a well-established NGO community that focuses on foreign and security policy issues. Many academics and interested individuals are also active in the area of national and international security. The issue of weapons proliferation does not, however, receive much attention from non-governmental actors. There is one academic in Turkey working on the spread of nuclear weapons, material and equipment, but no one in Turkey is concentrating on SALW. Government officials and semi-governmental researchers report, in fact, that the Government has not been faced with civil society requests for information on SALW, and are certainly not facing any pressure or targeted campaigns on the issue.⁴⁹

Nonetheless, many Turkish NGOs and independent actors having interests in foreign and security policies appear to be quite open to engaging in SALW work.⁵⁰

1.3 Turkish SALW Perspectives and Realities

Turkey's interest in joining the European Union enhances its motivation in SALW control. Turkish officials and individuals consider their country to be part of Europe and share European values. They assert their willingness to play by the EU rules and do what is required of them to be admitted, responsible arms control policies being one of the aspects of this. Recent years have shown positive steps towards harmonisation with international norms, such as marking and tracing practicing as set out by the OSCE document on SALW and greater steps towards transparency, though there is still much room for improvement.

SALW proliferation is often referred to as a serious security problem in Turkey. Officials and citizens suggest that their country has been victimised by SALW proliferation, and that weapons availability increases terrorist activity. Some of the Turkish individuals interviewed for this report, elaborating on their decades-long experience with terrorism (referring to the Kurdish separatists), argue that fewer weapons in society would decrease the scope of terrorist incidents and activities. Although nonproliferation principles have been slow to emerge, and even slower to affect behaviour, these principles have already become part of the governmental decision-making structure and are now affecting Turkish actions regarding SALW.

1.4 Recommendations

- **Transparency:** Turkey allegedly provides detailed import data to international customs databases, however its' transparency record with regard to exports is patchy at best. For example, despite voluntarily submitting to the UN Register of Conventional Weapons, in 2003, Turkey made no mention in its report of an export transaction it made of 211 AVCs to Malaysia. There is also very little information available on stockpile numbers, domestic arms sales and civilian possession. This means that Turkey's progress on responsible stockpile management, and effective implementation of its licensing laws cannot be assessed. Turkey must take significant steps towards sharing more comprehensive information on SALW with the international community and with civil society to ensure greater transparency and accountability.
- **Amend Export Criteria:** Turkey's current export legislation means that license applications are considered on a case-by-case basis. This means that despite aligning with the EU Code of Conduct on Arms Exports in 2001, Turkey can, and in fact does⁵¹ export to countries under UN, OSCE and EU embargoes, contrary to the criteria stipulated in the EU Code of Conduct. Turkey must integrate export criteria into national legislation to bring its arms procedures in line with international law.
- **Uphold Embargoes:** If Turkey is to be seen to be serious about improving its human rights practice, it must work on eradicating its reputation for violations of international arms embargoes. The government needs to enact national laws that implement UN, EU

and OSCE arms embargoes, by consistently and thoroughly investigating suspected violations of embargoes, and by putting in place and implementing legal instruments to prosecute and punish violators.

- **Border Control:** Turkey's borders are notoriously porous, and border policing personnel are under-equipped in terms of relevant skills and equipment. Police, customs and other border control officials should receive greater training and increased funding for technical equipment to enhance their ability to effectively prevent illicit arms transfers across borders.

Table 1. Turkey's participation in Regional SALW Regimes and Regional Security Organisations

SALW Control Agreement/ Regional Security Organisation	Turkey's Commitment
Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council	Yes
EU Code of Conduct on SALW	Aligned, 2001
EU Joint Action on SALW	Aligned 2002
OSCE SALW Document	October 2000
OSCE Document on Stockpiles of Conventional Ammunition	Yes
Ottawa Convention	March 2004
Nato	Yes
Partnership for Peace	No
Stability Pact Regional Implementation Plan	Yes
UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime	Signed, December 2000. Ratified October 2003
UN Firearms Protocol	Signed 28 June 2002. Ratified, May 2004
UN Program of Action	National Report (2002, 2003, 2004)
Wassenaar Arrangement	Signed 1996

Endnotes

1. Author's interview with military historian and other experts in Ankara, Turkey, January 2003.
2. For historical accounts of the Turkish military, see Gordon, M. S. *The Breaking of a Thousand Swords: A History of the Turkish Military*, State University of New York Press, New York, 2001; and Jenkins, G. *Context and Circumstance: The Turkish Military and Politics*, Oxford University Press, 2001. For specifics on the organisation and military capabilities of the Turkish army, air force, and navy see a detailed discussion at <http://www.hri.org/docs/bmf/turkey.html>.
3. For specifics on SALW production in and SALW exports to Turkey, see Turkey's country profile at <http://www.nisat.org>.
4. Author's interviews with Turkish government officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with non-governmental analysts and experts, Ankara, Turkey, January 2003.
5. Republic of Turkey, Ministry of National Defense, Undersecretariat for Defense Industry, found at <http://www.ssm.gov.tr>.
6. Author's interviews with non-governmental experts, analysts, and individuals in Istanbul and Ankara, Turkey, January 2003.
7. *Small Arms Survey 2003, Development Denied*, Oxford, 2003, p 31.
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Ibid.*
10. Author's interview with former government official in Ankara, Turkey, January 2003.
11. Author's interviews with government officials at the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with non-governmental experts and analysts, Ankara, Turkey, January 2003.
12. Lumpe, L. "The Legal Side of a Dirty Business", *Washington Post*, 24 January 1999, p. B3, found at http://www.iansa.org/news/1999/jan_99/news14.htm; also see Gabelnick, T., W. D. Hartung, and J. Washburn, *Arming Repression: U.S. Arms Sales to Turkey During the Clinton Administration*, a Joint Report of the World Policy Institute and the Federation of American Scientists, October 1999, found at <http://www.fas.org/asmp/library/reports/turkeyrep.htm>.
13. See Turkey's country profile at <http://www.nisat.org>.
14. Author's interview with non-governmental experts and analysts in Istanbul and Ankara, and with government officials from the United States, Istanbul and Ankara, Turkey, January 2003.
15. Author's interview with non-governmental experts and analysts in Istanbul and Ankara, and with government officials from the United States, Istanbul and Ankara, Turkey, January 2003.
16. *Ibid.*
17. See, for example, "Report Details Smuggling from Northern Iraq", *Anatolia*, 25 June 2001, in FBIS-NES-2001-0625; "Turkish Truck Drivers Reported Smuggling Pen-Type Firearms", *Sabah*, 1 November 2000, in FBIS-NES-2000-1104; and "State-Owned Arms Seized in Hizbullah Hearths", *Milleyet*, 7 May 2001, in FBIS-WEU-2001-0507.
18. Turkey's National Report on the Implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in all its Aspects, available at <http://disarmament.un.org>.
19. *Small Arms Survey 2004, Rights at Risk*, Oxford, 2004.
20. See Turkey: European Companies to Help Construct Arms Factory, Amnesty International, June 2001, found at <http://web.amnesty.org/web/ttt.nsf/june2001/turkey>. For a rather transparent reporting of weapons exports by Turkish companies, see the Turkish government's foreign trade website at <http://www.foreigntrade.gov.tr>. On this website one can find a list of companies that engage in arms sales and a fairly comprehensive listing of the countries to which they sell weapons and munitions.
21. "Guns for Kosovo Seized at Bulgarian-Turkish Border", *StandartNews*, 11 September 2000, p. 3, in FBIS-EEU-2000-0911; Sombolos, Y. "2.5 Billion Drachmas Annual Turnover from Arms", *Athens Imerisia*, 22 December 2001, found at <http://www.nisat.org>; and "Poland Daily Views Recent Heroin Interception, Turkish Smuggling", *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 8 August 1997, found at <http://www.nisat.org>.
22. Author's interview with Turkish government officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and printed materials provided by them, Ankara, Turkey, January 2003. Also see author's interviews with semigovernmental researchers at the Center for Strategic Research, Ankara, Turkey, January 2003.
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Ibid.*
25. Author's interview with private gun traders/transporters, Istanbul, Turkey, January 2003.
26. Author's interviews with non-governmental experts and analysts and U.S. government officials in Ankara, Turkey and with private gun exporters in Istanbul, Turkey, January 2003.
27. *Ibid.*
28. Author's interviews with Turkish officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and printed materials provided by them, Ankara, Turkey, January 2003. Also see author's interviews with semi-governmental researchers at the Center for Strategic Research, Ankara, Turkey, January 2003.
29. Author's interviews with U.S. government officials, Ankara, Turkey, January 2003. Also see "Tighter Controls Urged at

- Narcotics Gateway”, *Jane’s International Police Issues*, 10 June 1998, found at http://www.janes.com/security/law_enforcement/news/ipi/ipi0040.shtml.
30. Author’s interviews with Turkish officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara, Turkey, January 2003.
31. Author’s interviews with Turkish government officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and (via telephone) official at the Turkish Ministry of Interior, Ankara, Turkey, January 2003.
32. *Ibid.*
33. Author’s interview with official at the Turkish Ministry of Interior, Ankara, Turkey, January 2003.
34. Author’s interviews with Turkish officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and interview with official at the Ministry of Interior, Ankara, Turkey, January 2003.
35. See “Details of Seizure of PKK Group, Arms Cache”, *Milliyet*, 26 June 1996; “Arms, Ammunition Seized; PKK Hideouts Discovered”, *Milliyet*, 26 February 1995; “Gendarmerie Units Seize Drugs, Arms at Farmhouse”, *Sabah*, 28 October 1996; “Arms, Hashish Seized; 28 PKK Members Killed in Southeast”, *Sabah*, 2 June 1996, all four found at <http://www.nisat.org>; and “Turkish Security Forces Seize PKK Weapons, Ammunition in Hakka”, *Anatolia*, 15 June 2001, in FBISWEU-2001-0615.
36. See “Turkish Paper Lists Seized Gaziantep Arms”, *Hurriyet*, 11 February 2000, in FBIS-WEU-2000-0212; “Belgian Arms Trafficker Jacques Monsieur Arrested in Turkey”, Center for Public Integrity, 14 May 2002, found at <http://www.publicintegrity.org/dtaweb/home.asp>; and “Customs Officials Seize Weapons in Truck at Habur Border Gate”, *Anatolia*, 2 February 2001, in FBIS-WEU-2001-0202.
37. See “Bulgarian Arms Found in Hizbullah Arms Cache in Turkey”, *Trud*, 11 February 2000, pp. 1, 23, in FBIS-EEU-2000-0211 (which also discusses weapons from China and the United States); “Weapons Seized in Truck Arriving from Iraq”, *Anatolia*, 29 January 2001, FBISWEU- 2001-0129; “Report Details Weapons Smuggling from Northern Iraq”, *Anatolia*, 25 June 2001, in FBIS-NES-2001-0625; and “Arms, Munitions Seized in Istanbul Police Operations”, *Hurriyet*, 21 March 1999, found at <http://www.nisat.org>.
38. Author’s interviews with Turkish officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and interview with official at the Ministry of Interior, Ankara, Turkey, January 2003.
39. “Azeri, Turkish Interior Ministries Sign Crime Protocol”, *ITAR-TASS*, 4 November 1997, found at <http://www.nisat.org>; “Stozanov, Constantinescu, Demirel Issue Joint Declaration”, *Bucharest Radio Network*, 3 October 1997, found at <http://www.nisat.org>; “Turkey, China Sign Security Cooperation Agreement”, *Anatolia*, 14 February 2000, in FBIS-CHI-2000-0215; “Turkey, Georgia to Cooperate Against Terror, Other Crimes”, *Anatolia* 23 February 2000, FBIS-WEU-2000-0223; “Russia, Turkey Sign Accord to Combat Black Sea Smuggling”, *ITAR-TASS*, 12 April 2000, in FBIS-SOV-2000-0412; and “Turkey, Russia to Jointly Fight Drug, Arms Trafficking”, *Anatolia*, 29 July 2000, FBISSOV- 2000-0729.
40. Author’s interviews with Turkish government officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara, Turkey, January 2003; and with independent expert on and consultant for the Wassenaar Arrangement, February 2003.
41. Author’s interviews with Turkish government officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara, Turkey, January 2003. Also see Turkey’s statement at the UN Conference on SALW found at <http://disarmament.un.org/cab/smallarms/docs/260.tur.htm>.
42. *Ibid.*
43. Author’s interviews with Turkish government officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ankara, Turkey, January 2003; and Klare, M. *Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe Includes Focus on Small Arms Control*, found at http://www.iansa.org/documents/regional/dec_99/stabilitypact.htm.
44. Author’s interviews with Turkish government officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with semi-governmental researchers at the Center for Strategic Research, Ankara, Turkey, January 2003.
45. See www.nisat.org
46. *Op cit.* Turkey’s National Report on the Implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action, available at <http://disarmament.un.org>
47. Author’s interviews with non-governmental experts and analysts and with U.S. governmental officials, Istanbul and Ankara, Turkey, January 2003.
48. Author’s interviews with Turkish officials at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with semi-governmental researchers at the Center for Strategic Research, Ankara, Turkey, January 2003.
49. *Ibid.*
50. Author’s interviews with Turkish non-governmental experts, analysts, and academics, Ankara, Turkey, January 2003.
51. In 2002, Turkey sold \$37,500 of ammunition to Rwanda, and has also been alleged to have supplied arms to Angola, Lebanon, Libya and Iraq.