

MONITORING THE IMPLEMENTATION  
OF SMALL ARMS CONTROLS (MISAC)

Small Arms Control in  
**The Slovak  
Republic**

## The Slovak Republic

### 1.1 Small Arms and Light Weapons in the Slovak Republic

The Slovak Republic's defence industry has undergone significant crises and restructuring since the end of the Cold War.<sup>1</sup> While Czechoslovakia was the second largest weapons producer within the Warsaw Pact, most of that production was located in Slovak territory. Once Czechoslovakia dissolved in 1993 and the Slovak Republic gained its independence, the country inherited the largest segment of the former Czechoslovakia's weapons complex – and the largest portion of the social and economic hardship that accompanied it. President Havel had ordered at Czechoslovakia's independence in 1989 that the new country would move substantially away from arms production and sales. This action had a tremendously negative economic and social effect on the Slovak Republic, as most of the heavy arms production was located there. After the 'velvet divorce', the new Slovak Government vowed to make the arms sector a priority, and arms sales were seen as the fastest way to gain hard currency. Despite dissenting views, President Meciar sought to facilitate and subsidise the weapons complex and 'presented [it] as a guarantee of internal security since it offered the only means of economic survival for thousands of people.'<sup>2</sup> Nonetheless, defence production in the country floundered and continued to suffer from severe economic and other problems.

Today, approximately 140 defence companies remain in the Slovak Republic, all of them primarily state owned. Only about 2,000 people are employed in the industry: a drop from approximately 40,000 in the 1980s.<sup>3</sup> Of the arms producers operating in the Slovak Republic today, only eight manufacture small arms and light weapons – mainly pistols, machine guns, sub-machine guns, grenades, grenade launchers, mortars, ammunition, and explosives.<sup>4</sup> Moreover, compared to its potential for large weapons sales, the Slovak Republic reportedly exports less than USD 1 million of SALW annually.<sup>5</sup>

Surplus weaponry, on the other hand, is of greater concern. Officials report that most of the arms exported from the Slovak Republic are considered surplus.<sup>6</sup> Excess weapons are sold to Slovak defence companies so that they may be re-sold on the global market. Moreover, the status of weapons stockpiles – their security, management, control, and accounting – is difficult to determine. Information about surpluses is not publicly available, and government officials say they do not have adequate information either.<sup>7</sup> A lack of knowledge and information about this issue may indicate that surplus stockpiles are not as secure as they should be.<sup>8</sup>

### 1.2 SALW Problems, Allegations, and Misconduct in the Slovak Republic

Throughout the 1990s and early 2000s, various reports and allegations have emerged highlighting improper Slovak arms transfers. Reports suggest the main airport in Bratislava serves as a 'hub for illicit ... arms trafficking'.<sup>9</sup> With government support, the Slovakian arms industry has traded with 'dubious clients' all over the world, including serious human rights abusers, and has also been linked to illegal arms deals that violate international embargoes.<sup>10</sup> In 1996, the Slovak Republic was accused of shipping huge amounts of ammunition to Afghanistan.<sup>11</sup> In 1998, Slovak arms, ammunition, and explosives destined for Chad were reportedly diverted to Sudan.<sup>12</sup> Slovak weapons have also allegedly made their way to Sierra Leone, Angola, and Algeria.<sup>13</sup> In the most

publicised report of questionable Slovak arms deals, a United Nations 2001 publication implicated the country in arms transfers to Liberia, via Uganda and Guinea, in violation of a UN arms embargo.<sup>14</sup>

Attention to terrorist concerns following 11 September 2001 put a spotlight on Slovakia's illegal dealings with such parties. In July 2001, three members of the Real IRA were arrested in Slovakia and convicted for illegal attempts to purchase large quantities of weapons and explosives in Slovakia for use in terrorist attacks.<sup>15</sup> In a home raid in August 2002, Slovakian authorities uncovered evidence of an arms brokering deal from North Korea to the Middle East. Further, in December 2002, Slovak officials opened an investigation into allegations that the rocket launcher used in an attempted terrorist attack on an Israeli plane in Kenya originated in Slovakia.<sup>16</sup> Alarming, some of these shipments were authorised and therefore considered legal under Slovak law, despite contravening Slovakia's international commitments not to supply arms in circumstances where the recipient party is known as a human rights abuser, terrorist organisation or country in conflict.

Slovakia's troubling record in arms control was a major obstacle to its membership bid to the EU and NATO. Some in Slovakia's Government recognized this as a major problem and spoke out publicly about the situation.<sup>17</sup> One official, the head of the National Security Office, acknowledged that 'the world looks very negatively on the fact that our arms traders falsify licences and end-user certificates and are supplying global terrorist organisations with weapons and systems'. He added that Slovakia should make it a priority to adopt a radical solution to this problem.<sup>18</sup> However, despite tightening up some of its national legislation, signing up to some international legislation and its admission to the EU and NATO, Slovakia has not rid itself of its disreputable standing on arms trading. Even on the eve of its admission, Slovakia stood culpable of illicit arms trafficking from the country and failure to fully commit to EU guidelines on arms exports.<sup>19</sup>

### 1.3 Elements of the Slovak SALW Control System

Not until 1998 did the Slovak Government establish the legal basis that directly addressed the weapons trade. Act 179 of 15 May 1998 outlines the appropriate licensing measures required for engaging in the arms business. In a two-step process, licences are granted to: (1) engage in arms deals; and (2) export, import, or re-export specific military items.<sup>20</sup> Munitions that transit the Slovak territory or that enter and remain in the country for less than seven days do not require governmental approval in the form of a licence. Moreover, arms brokers are not sufficiently addressed in the 1998 law. In February 2002, an emergency amendment came into force to close a loophole which previously allowed arms traffickers to exploit a vaguely worded provision. This meant 'active improvement relations under conditional system or the passive improvement relations' were excluded from licensing requirements. This particular loophole, allowed combat helicopters to be repaired in Slovakia before being exported to embargoed Liberia. In an attempt to tighten further obvious loopholes in the Slovak arms control system, the Government passed Decree 45 in April of 2002, 'On Trading with Military Equipment'. The amendments offered in Decree 45, adopted in July 2002, address a number of weaknesses in the Slovak weapons control law. Significantly, the new legislation limits and controls the activities of

brokers. Under the amended law, only Slovak companies and individuals, both inside and outside the Slovak territory, may be licensed to engage in the country's arms trade. The amended law also clarifies current licensing practices, stresses the importance of Slovak international obligations regarding arms sales, and gives greater authority to customs operations to investigate, scrutinise, audit, and confiscate shipments of arms that are suspected of being illicit. The new law does not, however, address the issues of: (1) control over weapons in transit, (2) greater transparency in reporting arms deals, (3) stricter penalties for violations of the law; and (4) transport companies operating without licences. There is still much room, therefore, for legal improvements in the Slovak arms control system.<sup>21</sup>

Regarding export criteria that guide the arms-licensing process in the Slovak Republic, government officials stress that they adhere to the EU Code of Conduct on SALW. These criteria, however, do not appear in the country's arms trade law and were not added to the recent amendments being considered by the parliament. Act 179 does, however, include a list of controlled arms.

An interagency process facilitates licensing procedures in the Slovak Republic. According to Act 179, representatives from the Ministries of the Economy, Foreign Affairs, Defence, and the Interior compose the licensing commission that meets once a month to consider, on a case-by-case basis, licence applications for arms export, import, or re-export. These officials report that they are very serious about controlling the trade of sensitive military items and that they work closely with defence companies to make sure that the arms trade law is being followed. Nonetheless, serious problems have emerged regarding the licensing commission. Officials and experts report, for example, that there continues to be a great deal of debate within the commission about what exactly does or does not constitute a legal arms sale. There is also substantial disagreement, according to officials, about which destinations and what kinds of end-users are or are not appropriate for receipt of Slovak weapons.<sup>22</sup> More serious, perhaps, is the report that nine members of the licensing commission were arrested and charged with 'abuse of public powers and legalisation of income from criminal activity'.<sup>23</sup> These officials are also suspected of money laundering.<sup>24</sup> Some government officials have, however, defended the actions of the nine commission members, five of whom remain in their posts.<sup>25</sup> One particular official also stated, when asked about the number of licences the commission handles in a year, that 'the more business we do, the more money we will have'.<sup>26</sup> Such sentiments are worrying when, at the same time, in the wake of the license commission arrests, a Slovak police official was quoted as saying that 'the licensing commission only has about ten per cent of the total arms trade under control'.<sup>27</sup> In an apparent attempt to rein in the activities of the licensing commission, therefore, the National Security Office will reportedly now screen its members.<sup>28</sup>

The issue of verification deserves attention in the Slovak Republic, as it is apparent that this activity is rather weak. The Ministry of the Economy is responsible for checking, investigating, inspecting, and verifying arms transfers – their comings and goings as well as their supporting documentation.<sup>29</sup> What authority does exist in this area, however, often does not translate into action, as officials report that a lack of resources hampers their work. Verification of weapons deliveries, for example, is rarely if ever conducted, as Slovak

embassies abroad are not necessarily always in existence in the right locations – and when they are, they too are subject to poor resources. The Slovak Government, therefore, has to rely heavily on the assistance of others to become aware of potential and actual problems with arms sales or diversions. This fact, according to officials, will not change even when the legislation provides officials with greater power and authority. Their ability to use their authority more fully is, they argue, the missing key.<sup>30</sup>

Despite the reported problems associated with verification in the Slovak Republic, a number of cases have emerged that highlight the country's enforcement of the arms trade law. Weapons have been seized at various locations throughout Slovak territory, as well as at the airport in Bratislava.<sup>31</sup> Other shipments have been detained while authorities confirmed the validity of the transaction.<sup>32</sup> Ultimately, however, few of the cases have involved arrests and prosecutions. Officials indicate that they are unaware of any incident where individuals or companies have been prosecuted for illegal arms deals – largely, they believe, because the arms trade law does not specify any criminal penalties.<sup>33</sup> Instead, Act 179 exclusively provides for fines (from 10,000 to 10,000,000 koruna – approximately USD 250 to USD 250,000) as penalties for violating the law.<sup>34</sup> Despite most officials believe that the possible punishments for breaking the arms trade law are too low and, therefore, not much of a deterrent, the amendments to Act 179 reportedly do not make the costs associated with illegal weapons deals any higher.<sup>35</sup>

Unfortunately, the heritage of state secrecy in the Slovak Republic reportedly works against the full and open disclosure of information regarding the arms trade.<sup>36</sup> The Slovak Government does share data about its weapons sales with the EU and UN, but these reports are often one simple line that states the global value of Slovak arms exports and number of licences granted for a given year.<sup>37</sup> The Government will supposedly provide upon request a report giving details about its 'total arms exports by destination country'.<sup>38</sup> In a positive step, the Slovak Foreign Policy Association (SFPA) is said to be working with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to develop an appropriate method for reporting on arms sales every year.<sup>39</sup> Currently, however, there remains much room for improvement regarding transparency on Slovak arms exports.

Similar to other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, the Slovak Republic has been involved in and supportive of various regional and international SALW efforts. Officials report that they adhere to the EU Code of Conduct and implement EU embargoes. They also express complete support for the OSCE document on SALW and the UN Programme of Action. Moreover, the Slovak National Council made explicit its interest in international non-proliferation and weapons control efforts when it included in its new defence strategy a promise to 'contribute to the preparation and realisation of agreements on armament control, disarmament and nonproliferation'. It continued, '[t]he Slovak Republic will be participating in asserting a broader, more complex and better-verified process for international controls. National arms export control is a component of this effort and the Slovak Republic will strictly harmonise it with its own integration interests'.<sup>40</sup>

Although only one Slovak NGO (the Slovakian branch of Amnesty International) is registered with IANSA, several independent and non-governmental actors have been quite active in the area of SALW control in the country. There has reportedly been a growing civil

society in the Slovak Republic since the early 1990s, due to the adverse political realities that Slovak citizens had to face before the end of the Meciar regime in 1998.<sup>41</sup> Citizen groups supposedly began forming in the country's early days of independence to debate and facilitate democratic reform in the Slovak Republic. This activity led to the development of a number of NGOs in the country, some of which are involved in SALW issues. The SFPA, for example, has been incredibly active in the small arms area. It worked with the international NGO Saferworld to sponsor, in October 2000, the first meeting of NGOs and research institutes on SALW in Central and Eastern Europe.<sup>42</sup> Attempts to coordinate a regional network on SALW resulted from that meeting. The SFPA also organised a meeting in February 2001 that brought together government officials and NGOs from 17 different countries to discuss the problems of and potential solutions for SALW proliferation.<sup>43</sup> All of these activities have led to the development of a Slovak NGO working group that is composed of the SFPA, Citizen Eye Foundation, Amnesty International, and People in Peril Foundation. Ultimately, they seek to facilitate civil society and Government action on SALW.<sup>44</sup>

In addition to civil society actors that are working to control the arms trade in the country, an arms lobby has emerged. The Association of Defence Industries of the Slovak Republic was founded 'to facilitate research, production and the modernisation of the defence industry'.<sup>45</sup>

## 1.4 Slovak SALW Perspectives and Realities

Since 1998, the Slovak Republic has focused its political, economic, social, and military efforts on becoming a member of NATO and the EU. Feeling rather slighted by its failure to enter NATO in 1999 along with its Visegrad neighbours (the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland), the country concentrated on the steps it must take to ensure membership as soon as possible from 2000 onwards. A centre-right lead coalition Government that ruled from 1998 to 2002 oversaw most of these changes. Elections in 2002 returned several of the same parties to power, fuelling expectations that the new government would continue with further legislative changes in the area of arms trade. As of June 2003, the government confirmed these predictions by taking steps towards study of the issue.

The Slovak Government appears to be very receptive to the rules, standards, norms, and principles of the Western, democratic community into which it sought inclusion. Aware that its arms trade record was a principal concern of both NATO and the EU, Slovak officials stressed that improper weapons activities are inconsistent with their interests in Western integration<sup>46</sup> and signed all the relevant regional and international agreements prior to its proposed accession in 2004. Slovakia has even taken a lead compared to most of its CEE neighbours by ratifying the UN Firearms Protocol in September 2004. Officials assert that they believe their country exists in a complex security environment and they are, therefore, quite concerned about SALW proliferation and the instability they believe it brings. Officials do, however, focus mostly on SALW availability in their own region and express less concern about arms accessibility in other parts of the world.<sup>47</sup> Ultimately, the Slovak Government brings both its security and normative perspectives together regarding the possibility of terrorist activity and the need to control it. Officials report that the attacks

of 11th September 2001 and subsequent terrorist confessions regarding weapons availability made the issues of arms transfers and controls much more salient.<sup>48</sup> In making this point, the Director of the Slovak National Security Office said arms control 'is a matter of basic values and the attitude one has toward security. Tolerating arms supplies to the countries threatening democracy goes against the democratic countries' own security.'

The key arms related challenges Slovakia faces today are: illegal arms deals being disguised as legitimate transactions, the use of deceptive practices by arms brokers and transport agents, and inadequate licensing controls. There have admittedly been constructive steps taken by the Government to address some of these problems; but further reforms must be undertaken by the Slovak authorities to ensure not only that the necessary legal controls exist but also that they are strictly implemented and enforced.

## 1.5 Recommendations

- **Transparency:** Slovakia has begun to submit regular reports to the UN Register of Conventional Arms, but at present they disclose minimal information, and are not publicly available. More detailed and more widely promulgated reporting on arms sales would promote openness and enhance parliamentary oversight.
- **Licensing:** The Slovakian Government has taken some steps towards rectifying the discrepancy between the authority for licensing decisions. It has formalised consultation procedures and established new advisory bodies on licensing. However, these procedures are not codified in the states' arms trade law and the advisory bodies do not have statutory authority. Unlike the newly formalised process of inter-ministerial review of licence applications, the decision-making authority for granting licences lies within one ministry. To avoid conflicts of interests, an inter-agency body or an independent agency should be established to administer licensing decisions.
- **Close loopholes in legislation:** Slovakian licensing legislation still does not address transit and re-entry of weapons. Currently, weapons shipments that transit Slovakia bypass any licensing laws, making it open to abuse as a thoroughfare for illegal arms smuggling. Amend the existing law to close this loophole. Furthermore, licensing requirements for re-exported weapons should also be brought into line with those for new weapons.
- **Tighten End-User Controls:** Slovakia's lax end-user controls are susceptible to abuse and exploitation. Weak levels of scrutiny of end-users and authentication of documentation means that in theory (and indeed, frequently in practice) firms can obtain a Slovakian end-user certificate, use it to acquire arms abroad, and then sell them on to a third party. In June 2003, two senior board members of Armex, a large Slovak arms company, were charged with using fraudulent Slovak end-user certificates to transfer military equipment bought in the Ukraine for stakeholders in North Korea.<sup>49</sup> In July 2002, legislation was amended to strengthen end-user controls, introducing a non re-export clause, the requirement that all documentation submitted be original and authenticated, and the enforcement of post-shipment verification of delivery. However, these new reforms must be implemented diligently. Statutory follow-up checks must be

established to ensure that authorised arms exports are not diverted or re-exported to unfavourable parties.

- **Tighten control of arms traders:** There is little oversight by Slovakian officials of the 100 plus firms currently registered to trade in arms and very few cases of misconduct, when detected, lead to a criminal conviction. Moreover, Slovakian law actually inhibits the criminal prosecution of companies found to be acting illegally as the conviction is predicated on proof of criminal intent, which is not relevant to a corporate body.<sup>50</sup> This requirement must be amended to allow for the prosecution of companies trading in arms illegally under the Slovakian criminal law. Furthermore, penalties for violations should be increased to present a significant disincentive to large companies. Currently, a violation as serious as submitting false documents to export control authorities entails a fine of only 100,000 SKK (less than USD 2,500).
- **Enforcement of embargoes:** Slovakia has committed to observe the arms embargoes set out by the UN and the EU, however the credibility with which it upholds these commitments is inconsistent. A new sanctions law was adopted in 2002, which means that those now prosecuted for violating international embargoes will be subject to a greater penalty than the previous sentence of three to eight years imprisonment for 'handling of controlled goods requiring special handling' under the Slovak criminal law. However, although the law deals with violation of embargoes more effectively, oversight of and criminal investigations into the matter remain weak. The capacity of law enforcement officers to carry out thorough investigations must be strengthened and information on suspected illegal arms movements should be shared amongst relevant agencies and foreign governments to prevent violations of embargoes.
- **Surplus weapons disposal:** Slovakia has a history of selling its surplus weapons to undisciplined government forces such as countries in Africa. Although in November 2000, Slovakia reached an OSCE small arms agreement which entailed destruction of its surplus weapons rather than selling them,<sup>51</sup> Slovakia continued selling surplus weapons to Angola until 2002.<sup>52</sup> The Slovak Government must prioritise its OSCE commitment over the military's wish to use revenue from surplus weapon sales to finance its own improvement and halt all sales of surplus weapons and authorisations for the re-export of these weapons to other countries. The Slovak Government should also increase security of stockpiles to ensure they are not stolen and sold on the black market.

**Table 1. Participation of the Slovak Republic in Regional SALW Regimes and Regional Security Organisations**

SALW Control Agreement/ Regional Security Organisation	Slovak Republic's Commitment
EAPC	yes
EU Code of Conduct on SALW	Aligned 1998
EU Joint Action	Aligned 1998
Ottawa Convention	Signed 12/3/97; Ratified 1999
OSCE SALW Document	Signed 2000
OSCE Principle	Signed 1993
NATO	Joined May 2004
Partnership for Peace	Signed 1994
Stability Pact Regional Implementation Plan	Yes
UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime	Signed 14/12/2000; Ratified 03/11/2003
UN Firearms Protocol	Signed 26/08/2002; Ratified, 21/09/04
Wassenaar Arrangement	Signed 1996

## Endnotes

1. For a detailed discussion of the defence industry in the Slovak Republic, see Kiss, *op. cit.*, pp. 56–76.
2. *ibid.*, p. 62
3. Author's interviews with Slovak government officials at the Ministries of the Economy and Defence, and with representatives of the arms industry in Bratislava, Slovak Republic, December 2001.
4. For a list of the companies that produce SALW in the Slovak Republic, see the country's profile at <http://www.nisat.org>.
5. Saferworld report on the Slovak Republic, at [http://www.saferworld.co.uk/The Slovak Republic.pdf](http://www.saferworld.co.uk/The_Slovak_Republic.pdf), p. 8.
6. Author's interviews with officials at the Ministries of the Economy and Defence, December 2001.
7. *ibid.*
8. For a report of past problems with surplus arms, see 'Thief makes off with 25 submachine guns', Bratislava Pravda, 30 August 1996, p. 1, at <http://www.nisat.org>.
9. Saferworld report, p. 10.
10. 'Ripe for Reform', a Human Rights Watch Report on Slovakia's Arms Trade with Human Rights Abusers', 2004, available at <http://hrw.org.reports/2004/slovakia>
11. Saferworld report, p. 10.
12. *Ibid.*; and Small Arms Survey 2001, p. 176.
13. *Ibid.*; 'Slovak firm allegedly involved in arms exports to Angola', Bratislava Pravda, 12 January 2001, pp. 1, 3, in FBIS-AFR-2001-0114, at <http://www.nisat.org>; 'Czech and Slovak firms allegedly involved in Angolagate affair', Lidove Noviny, 23 January 2001, p. 8, in FBIS-AFR-2001-0125, at <http://www.nisat.org>; and 'Arms smuggling networks detailed', Al-Watan Al-Arabi, 12 August 1994, pp. 26–9, at <http://www.nisat.org>.
14. Mark Doyle, 'Liberia illegally importing arms', BBC, 5 November 2001, at <http://www.nisat.org>; and 'Liberia: U.N. arms embargo failing, weak export controls largely to blame', Human Rights Watch press release, 5 November 2001, at [http://www.iansa.org/news/2001/nov\\_01/arms\\_emb.htm](http://www.iansa.org/news/2001/nov_01/arms_emb.htm).
15. '30 years in jail for IRA trio', Richard Norton-Taylor, Guardian (London), 8 May 2002.
16. 'Slovakia fingered in Kenya terror attempt', Martina Pizarova, Slovak Spectator, 9 December 2002.
17. 'Ripe for Reform', a Human Rights Watch Report on Slovakia's Arms Trade with Human Rights Abusers', 2004, available at <http://hrw.org.reports/2004/slovakia>.
18. 'Officials React to UN Report on Slovak Firm's Involvement in Illegal Arms Deals' SME (Bratislava), 20 November 2001.
19. 'Ripe for Reform', a Human Rights Watch Report on Slovakia's Arms Trade with Human Rights Abusers', 2004, available at <http://hrw.org.reports/2004/slovakia>.
20. For an English translation of Act 179, see Appendix 1 of the Saferworld report, and the Slovak Republic database at <http://www.projects.sipri.se/expcon/natexpcon/Slovakia/stk179.htm>.
21. *Ibid.*; and 'Slovakia: Proposed weapons reforms fall short', Human Rights Watch press release, 2 July 2002, at <http://www.hrw.org/press/2002/07/slovakarms.htm>.
22. Author's interviews with officials at the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, the Economy, and the Interior, and with experts at a Slovak research institute, December 2001.
23. 'Criminal charges filed against members of Slovak body licensing arms exports', TA3 Television, 5 March 2002, from David Isenberg's e-mail arms trade list.
24. *Ibid.*
25. 'Slovak ministry reacts to charges filed against arms export licensing commission', Bratislava SMEI, 9 March 2002, p. 2, from David Isenberg's e-mail arms trade list.
26. *Ibid.*
27. 'More details on criminal charges against Slovak arms export licensing commission', Bratislava SMEI, 6 March 2002, p. 3, from David Isenberg's e-mail arms trade list.
28. Richard Filipko, 'Officials react to UN report on Slovak firm's involvement in illegal arms deals', Bratislava SMEI, 20 November 2001, at [http://www.iansa.org/news/2001/nov\\_01/slovak.htm](http://www.iansa.org/news/2001/nov_01/slovak.htm).
29. See Paragraph 23 of Act 179.
30. Author's interviews with officials at the Ministry of the Economy, December 2001.
31. 'Police discover arms caches in Central Slovakia', Bratislava Pravda, 22 November 2000, p. 3, in FBIS-EEU-2000-1123, at <http://www.nisat.org>; 'Police seize weapons arsenal in East Slovakia operation', TASR, 7 September 1998, at <http://www.nisat.org>; and 'Slovak police seize weapons', ISN, 3 October 2001, at [http://www.iansa.org/news/2001/oct\\_01/slovak.htm](http://www.iansa.org/news/2001/oct_01/slovak.htm).
32. Toby Joyce, 'Daily examines circumstances of Iranian weapons detained at Bratislava Airport', Bratislava Pravda, 2 October 2001, at [http://www.iansa.org/news/2001/oct\\_01/daily\\_examine.htm](http://www.iansa.org/news/2001/oct_01/daily_examine.htm).
33. Author's interviews with officials at the Ministries of the Economy, Foreign Affairs, and Defence, December 2001.
34. See Paragraph 25 of Act 179.
35. Author's interviews with officials at the Ministries of the Economy, Foreign Affairs, and Defence, December 2001.

36. Author's interviews with officials at the Ministry of the Economy, December 2001.
37. Korba, op. cit., p. 14.
38. Small Arms Survey, op. cit., p. 120.
39. Korba, op. cit., p. 6.
40. See 'Security Strategy of the Slovak Republic', Slovak National Council, No. 1312, Article 44, 27 March 2001. Also see the Saferworld report, p. 3.
41. Author's interview with member of a Slovak NGO and independent researcher, December 2001.
42. Ibid.
43. Korba, op. cit., p. 6.
44. Ibid.
45. Saferworld report, p. 2.
46. Author's interviews with officials at the Ministries of the Economy, Foreign Affairs, and Defence, December 2001.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid. For a report on terrorist access to sensitive items in the Slovak Republic, see Rick Jervis, 'Terrorist hunters turn to Czech and Slovak arms traders', *The Wall Street Journal*, 12 November 2001.
49. 'Ripe for Reform', a Human Rights Watch Report on Slovakia's Arms Trade with Human Rights Abusers', 2004,
50. Ibid
51. OSCE Document on Small Arms and Light Weapons, 24 November 2000.
52. UN Register of Conventional Arms, 1999-2002