

MONITORING THE IMPLEMENTATION  
OF SMALL ARMS CONTROLS (MISAC)

Small Arms Control in  
**Ghana**

# 1. Ghana

## 1.1 Small Arms and Light Weapons in Ghana

Ghana became the first African country to gain independence in 1957, becoming a republic in 1960. Since the first post-colonial government of the Convention People's Party, Ghana's political economy has witnessed several traumatic transformations and transitions, in which SALW have featured in various respects and to various degrees. The first military coup of 24 February 1966 marked the beginning of a turbulent political history. The political see-saw between military and civil rule ended in 1992 with the adoption of a democratic constitution, allowing for multiparty politics. With a population of over 20 million, Ghana is the second (after Nigeria) most populated country in West Africa.

Ghana has enjoyed relative peace and largely escaped civil strife in comparison to most of its regional counterparts, but the country has witnessed a marked increase in firearms-related violence in the last five years.<sup>1</sup> The intensification of SALW-related violence is located within the context of a militarised national psyche, combined with socio-economic deprivation and decline. Moreover, Ghana's relative tranquility exists in the midst of a restless sub-region with several states either in conflict or in transition from conflict. Ghana's immediate neighbours, Côte d'Ivoire and Togo, are characterised by deep antagonistic political contradictions which threaten the very stability and credibility of the state. Economically speaking, Ghana is the most successful West African state. In addition, in comparison to the other West African countries, Ghana has the highest human development indicator ranking and the highest life expectancy, coupled with the highest adult literacy rate. Nevertheless, it remains one of the poorest countries in the world, with 44.8 per cent of the population living below the poverty line.<sup>2</sup>

## 1.2 SALW Problems, Allegations and Misconduct in Ghana

A distinctive element of SALW proliferation in Ghana compared to other West African countries is the existence of an important illegal local production. In addition, illegal SALW are also trafficked into the country, as most of its neighbours are or have recently been affected by conflicts. One of the main consequences of the availability of weapons is the high rate of criminal activities, in particular armed robberies.

### Local Production

Local production is central to any attempt to account for, and explain the proliferation of illicit SALW in Ghana. It represents the main source of proliferation of SALW in the country, in particular for pistols, shotguns and single-barrel guns.<sup>3</sup> Each of Ghana's ten regions houses gun-manufacturing workshops. Although many of these workshops also engage in the manufacture of other goods such as farming hardware, arms production is their most lucrative activity.

It has been noted that there is indeed a gun culture in rural Ghana. Eight Locally made guns have featured prominently in Ghana's socio-political history and have been used in hunting, farming, chieftaincy rites, funerals and festivals. In addition, Ghana's kingdoms have historically been characterised by a strong military sector.<sup>4</sup> It has also been noted that:

*While blacksmiths and locksmiths have been at work for thousands of years since working iron was discovered in Ghana, it was only in the early twentieth century that the capacity of smiths to manufacture cap guns became a problem for the authorities, when such guns could be used to oppose colonialism and the expansion of British influence into the hinterland of Ghana. Then legislation was passed to criminalise certain types of smiting, namely, gun manufacture.<sup>5</sup>*

Local manufacturing of guns was consequently driven underground and became more profitable. One striking feature of local gun production in Ghana is its relative sophistication; recent research has shown that gun-making, far from being obsolete, is increasingly elaborated and remains competitive in comparison to those circulating in the region.<sup>6</sup> As well as widespread craft production of pistols, single barrel guns, double-barrel shotguns and pump-action shot-guns in well developed cottage industries, many local Ghanaian gunsmiths are skilled in the process of 'reverse engineering' by which they can replicate original automatic weapons such as the AK 47 rifle.<sup>7</sup> Although self-defence, hunting and sport shooting are strong factors behind the demand for guns in Ghana, the trend of reverse engineering is of particular concern as the quality, accessibility and competitive prices of Ghanaian made guns makes them increasingly desirable to armed groups.

Furthermore, the relative low value of the Ghanaian currency (the cedi) means that Ghana enjoys a 'comparative advantage' of sorts in the local manufacture of guns. Ghana has therefore become a net supplier of guns to other parts of the West African sub-region, feeding a criminal sub-regional network. What has indeed minimised local production is the lack of resources to procure the necessary equipment.<sup>8</sup> There are thriving intermediaries who export these guns to other parts of West Africa – Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire and Togo. As with most illicit goods, the prices of locally manufactured guns vary depending on the location of purchase, the history of illicit transactions between the parties, the number of intermediaries involved, and the specific circumstances surrounding the transaction in question.

**Table 1: Estimated Price of Locally Manufactured Guns in Ghana as of May, 2003<sup>9</sup>**

Gun Type	Estimated Price (Cedis)
Pistol	200,000
Single-barrel	500,000
Double-barrel	700,000
8,500 cedis= US \$1	

Ghana is composed of 10 regions. In the region of Brong-Ahafo, there are some 2,500 blacksmiths and locksmiths with the capacity to produce firearms. On average, each blacksmith has the capacity to produce 1.5 guns per week, without counting the 3 or 4 apprentices which are usually attached to each master blacksmith/locksmith who also have the capacity to make guns under supervision.<sup>10</sup> Thus, the widely held notion that there are between 35,000 and 40,000 illegally produced guns in Ghana turns out to be a gross under-estimation. There is little doubt that Ghana's sophisticated local arms production capacity has implications for illicit arms proliferation at the national and sub-regional

levels. It is important to note that Ghana's relative economic poverty curbs the actual production of SALW, as local producers do not possess the means to produce on an industrial scale. However, although the scale of production is limited, the sub-regional implications of Ghanaian production are evident in both the price inflation of Ghana-made guns caused by increased demand from instability in neighbouring Togo, Nigeria and Côte d'Ivoire, as well as the cross border networks and mechanisms for evading law enforcement agencies. For example, Ghanaian gunsmiths have been allegedly tendered to transfer their skills to producers in neighbour states to get around the problems of smuggling guns across the borders.

Aside from the direct threat posed to lives and property from local production, the agricultural sector has also been negatively affected. The redirection of fabrication skills from productive agricultural implements has resulted in increased prices of agricultural inputs and stalled the development of local skills in the fabrication of these tools. Local technical capacity in Ghana extends beyond the fabrication of basic implements such as hoes, cutlasses, forks and pickaxes. Ghanaian blacksmiths are known to have also fabricated ploughs and tractor parts, and at much lower costs than the market rates. They are also known to have constructed spare parts for the Electricity Company of Ghana (ECG).<sup>11</sup>

#### *Approaches to control craft production and proliferation*

Since local production of firearms falls outside the law, some controls and punishment mechanisms are administered by members of the gunsmith fraternity. Penalties include exclusion from the village or from credit schemes. However, such controls are limited, and rely on adherence to a voluntary code of conduct. Furthermore, since gunsmith networks are very closed, with membership frequently dependent on family ties, and shrouded in secrecy, it is impossible to quantify the actual extent of these controls.

The Ghanaian Government, increasingly concerned about the extent of illicit SALW proliferation, has been taking steps to address the problems of proliferation and production. In 1999, the Government suspended the importation of all categories of SALW and ammunition, including by licensed arms dealers. There was a freeze on all existing stocks, pending an inventory. In September 2000, the ban on the sale of existing stocks was lifted.<sup>12</sup> A Weapons-Buy-Back programme was introduced in February 2001, to retrieve a declared 40,000 illicit SALW. This joint police-military exercise only succeeded in retrieving 1,000 weapons.<sup>13</sup> With specific regard to local arms production, it is becoming increasingly evident that the control regime would need to be liberalised, so as to make the blacksmiths and locksmiths available for identification, registration, and assistance. A Weapons for-Development programme is imperative to redirect skills towards alternative economic inputs, generate employment and sustain Ghana's rich blacksmithing heritage.

#### **Other Sources of SALW Proliferation:**

Sources of proliferation of illicit SALW in Ghana also include returning peacekeepers, leakages from official armouries, and illicit flows from, but not limited to, neighbours at war, such as Côte d'Ivoire and the Mano River Union. In these conflicts, peacekeeping forces, refugees, mercenaries are all, to some extent, sources of illicit trafficking into Ghana. Ethnic groups established across Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire are also anonymous vectors of SALW.

SALW are not only illegally trafficked by blacksmiths but also by security agencies personnel stealing arms from the state armoury and selling them to the black market. Developing effective stockpile management and ensuring the security of these stocks is therefore a key element to improving SALW controls in Ghana.

In addition, the actual situation of the operations on licensed armourers in Ghana is not clear and it is problematic to classify any of these as dormant or active importers. Ghana is currently served by 5 major licensed importers: Game Marketing Ltd, Yadco Enterprise, Globart Teslria Enterprise, Bradco Trading and Associates, and Ampoma Ahwene Enterprise. These companies collectively account for the 20,000 firearms which, on average, are imported annually into Ghana.<sup>14</sup>

As with other West African states, illicit SALW proliferation is also the direct result of protracted military rule. During the years of the Provisional National Defence Council in the 1980s, the regime liberally armed its civilian cadres and functionaries.<sup>15</sup> The militias of the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution often carried arms and there has been no substantial programme to disarm them since the end of the revolution. Many of these arms have illegally filtered into criminal hands and have been recycled for use in criminal networks.

### **Manifestations of SALW violence**

#### *Armed robberies and criminality*

Armed robberies have been consistently increasing in Ghana, arguably a consequence of increasingly harsh socio-economic conditions, within the context of the inability of the State to provide basic human needs, including employment and qualitative and affordable health and education services. There is a mutually reinforcing relationship between SALW availability and armed robbery in Ghana. While social deprivation and poverty may have directly led to armed criminality, the easy availability of SALW has also facilitated the process of transforming frustration into crime.

#### *Ethnic conflicts*

In addition, despite its overall peaceful existence, Ghana, like many of its regional counterparts, has been affected by violent ethnic conflicts. Land disputes in the north resulted in ethnic violence during 1994 and 1995. Over 1,000 people were killed and over 150,000 were internally displaced. In April 2002, a state of emergency was declared in the north when a tribal chief and 30 others were killed as clan violence increased. The Northern Region is currently in the grip of the Dagbon crisis which has resulted in the loss of several lives and property. Consequently, a dusk to dawn curfew has been put in place in the region. Various SALW, both imported and locally-produced, are reported to have been used in most of these ethnic and identity conflicts.<sup>16</sup>

#### *Land guards*

Finally, the prevalence of multiple claims to land in Ghana has resulted in the phenomenon of land guards, youngsters whose function is to enforce the land claim(s) of their employer(s) against all rival claimants. For example, in October 2001, a group of armed civilians led by a police sergeant stormed a building site and, without provocation, started firing indiscriminately ostensibly to scare people and force them to flee from the land. In

May 2003, nine people took refuge at the palace of a local chief near Accra (Anyaa), following an attack on the residents of the town by suspected armed land guards and thugs wielding AK-47s and machetes.<sup>17</sup>

There is a need to recognise the existence and consequences of the phenomenon of land guards, and develop strategies for its containment and management, in particular through the registration of land guards and the articulation of operational guidelines which prohibits them from using SALW. Further steps should be taken to address the reasons for multiple claims to land in Ghana, and other related factors which have given rise to the phenomenon of land guards. Law enforcement officials who engage in, or facilitate the illegal use of firearms should be held accountable and punished for their crimes.

### 1.3 Elements of the Ghanaian SALW Control System

Ghana has been relatively active at the national level regarding SALW control policies and initiatives. It has recently renewed its national legislation on SALW and has been involved in all the main international conferences and initiatives on SALW. However, there remains difficulties, in particular with regard to the control of underground production, one of the main sources of SALW proliferation in the country. In addition, there are significant implementation and enforcement challenges, in particular due to the lack of adequate resources.

**Table 2: Reported Armed Robbery Cases in Ghana 1999-August, 2002<sup>18</sup>**

	1999	2000	2001	Jan-Aug 2002
No. of Cases	311	396	777	447
Percentage increase	27%	49%		

#### Ghanaian laws and regulations

##### *Current legislation*

Ghana's firearms law is composed of the Arms & Ammunition Act 1962 (Act 118) (Annex 1), as amended by the Arms & Ammunition Decree 1972 (NRCD 9) and the Arms & Ammunition Amendment Act of 1996. According to the provisions of Act 118 of 1962, owners of firearms must have them registered at the nearest police station (Section 1.1). Section 16 of the same Act bans the manufacture and assembling of arms and munitions, except by the Government, while Section 17 stipulates that a licence is required to repair firearms. The 1996 Act raises the stipulated fine from 10,000 cedis to 5 million cedis and/or five years imprisonment and classifies arms dealers into first class and second class.<sup>19</sup> First class arms and ammunitions dealer refers to a person/business whose annual importation of shot guns and ammunition is more than 1,000 pieces but not more than 2,000 pieces. Second class arms and ammunition dealer is a person or business whose annual importation of arms and ammunition is less than 1,000 pieces. Act 480 of 1996 also requires local craftsmen to apply for a licence authorising the manufacture of arms, but due to the culture of underground production, no one has applied. Added to the increasing visibility of the scourge of illicit SALW proliferation in Ghana, the 2001 SALW Conference

further encouraged the Ghanaian Government to review existing laws and administrative regulations. In January 2003, the President announced that a new draft law had been presented to Parliament.<sup>20</sup> The new law, the Arms and Ammunitions Act, was promulgated in August 2003, but is reported not to differ from the previous firearms laws 'in any substantive way'.<sup>21</sup>

#### *Implementation and enforcement challenges*

There seems to be an on-going debate on the legislation of local arms production. Many security personnel privately agree to the liberalisation of legislation, to allow the local arms producers to emerge from the 'underworld' to which they have been led to by the criminalisation which the current legislation sustains. Institutionally, however, the security agencies seek to maintain the prohibition of local arms production, as a means of fighting crime. Many Ghanaians believe that liberalisation would make it easier to control local arms production, and draw analogy from the country's experience with the criminalisation of locally produced gin, popularly known as akpeteshie.

Government firearms policy is unclear. It has been observed that Ghana has not yet established its realistic national needs for SALW as well as the maximum number of guns potentially allowed to circulate in the country.<sup>22</sup> This position is further corroborated by other sources:

*Although the problem has been highlighted for several years now, the government has been slow to act decisively. Efforts on the part of the government have been disjointed...Currently the policy framework for government is the ECOWAS Moratorium and UN Programme of Action. The extension of this policy is in the form of the draft legislation, which was submitted to Parliament in January 2003.*<sup>23</sup>

*There can be little doubt however that the Government is increasingly concerned about the extent of illicit SALW proliferation. Within the government, issues relating to SALW come under the office of the National Security Coordinator. In 1999, the Government suspended the importation of all categories of SALW and ammunition, including by licensed arms dealers. There was a freeze on all existing stocks, pending an inventory. In September 2000, the ban on the sale of existing stocks was lifted.<sup>24</sup> A Weapons-Buy-Back programme was introduced in February 2001, to retrieve a declared 40,000 illicit SALW. This joint police-military exercise is known to have succeeded in retrieving only 1,000 weapons.*<sup>25</sup>

#### *Other implementation structures*

The Arms and Ammunition Inventory Committee is responsible for parliamentary oversight of SALW issues, though its institutional capacity to play this role is in need of enhancement. The scale of proliferation and the increasing sophistication and transnationalisation of firearms-related criminality impose challenges on the Committee which are far beyond its present capabilities. The National Firearms Vocational Licensing Authority is responsible for the monitoring of the proliferation, trading and licensing of SALW in Ghana. Regardless, problems persist relating to non-adherence to established procedures for the importation, storage, supervision and distribution of SALW and ammunition.<sup>26</sup>

### Implementation of SALW controls

#### *Ghanaian National Commission on Small Arms (GNCSA)*

Following a visit by a UNDP team in August 2003 as part of its 'Armed Violence and Small Arms Reduction in Ghana Preparatory Assistance Project'. Ghana has recently established its proposed National Commission on Small Arms. In August 2004, the Ghanaian National Commission on Small Arms (GNCSA) began a survey and monitoring project on small arms manufacture to control proliferation. Furthermore, assisted by the UNDP, the new National Commission commenced an initiative to establish a central coordination unit to take inventory of weapons to establish effective mechanisms for retrieval and destruction. The launch of this initiative saw a landmark measure of the retrieval and destruction of 1,320 illegally held private weapons.<sup>27</sup> In November 2004, the GNCSA oversaw the review and consolidation of Ghana's previously disparate SALW legislation into one enactment.<sup>28</sup>

Also in November 2004, the Ghanaian government held a public bonfire of seized weapons to launch a national campaign against small arms proliferation. This campaign, funded by the UNDP and the UK government, is to strengthen efforts to implement all aspects of the UN Programme of Action and related regional agreements such as the ECOWAS Moratorium on the Importation, Exportation and Manufacture of Small Arms and Light Weapons.<sup>29</sup>

At the time of writing, the Ghana National Commission on Small Arms began a public education campaign on guns and light weapons. As part of it, the commission has focussed on Kumasi, in the Ashanti, where local manufacturers produce small arms. The project has the backing of the King of Ashanti who urged blacksmiths and traditional arms' manufacturers to ensure their guns are properly registered to stop them getting into the hands of criminals.<sup>30</sup>

However, the efficacy of the National Commission is allegedly highly limited since from June 2003, it had no operational budget nor any designated secretariat space.<sup>31</sup> Furthermore, it is felt by some that National Commission sponsored SALW control initiatives should move away from one-off ceremonial gestures to more long term plans.

## 1.4 Civil Society Role and Participation

The main actors working and engaging with SALW issues are civil society organisations. The main civil society groups involved in SALW work in Ghana include the Foundation for Security and Development in Africa (FOSDA), the African Security Dialogue and Research (ASDR), the Federation of Council of Churches in West Africa (FECCIWA), and the Christian Council of Ghana. Their activities revolve around public campaigns, write-ups, collaboration with government agencies, and recently, collaboration with local arms producers to raise awareness of the dangers of arms production. They are also launching campaigns and activities on the importance of conflict prevention, in particular in situations of political and economic transition. There has also been effective and encouraging collaboration between the Ministries of Interior, Justice and Defence and civil society organisations involved in the campaign against illicit SALW proliferation.

On 13 May 2003, the Accra-based ASDR organised a meeting with local producers of arms, senior police officers, the Armed Forces, Members of Parliament, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Justice, civil society groups, and members of the diplomatic corps. The meeting was the result of sustained and painstaking attempts by ASDR to gain the trust of the local producers and could be the start of a process of building mutual trust and confidence between the various stakeholders. The local producers admitted to having the capacity to re-focus their skills into the fabrication of agricultural implements but sought government guarantee of ready markets for these peaceful alternatives. The Ghana Action Network on Small Arms (GHANSA) was established in March 2002 to coordinate civil society action within the country and to link civil society actors with their regional counterparts. GHANSA has established a national network of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), community-based organisations, and religious organisations to support the work against illicit SALW proliferation. FOSDA, ASDR, the West African Network for Peace (WANEP), the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CENCOR), and Abantu for Development were the cardinal NGOs instrumental to the foundation of GHANSA.

Ghanaian civil society groups have been at the forefront of global and regional attempts to address SALW issues. FOSDA and ASDR jointly organised the Civil Society Consultation on the ECOWAS Moratorium, held in Accra in June 2001. In May 2002, FOSDA hosted the Foundation Conference of the West African Action Network on Small Arms (WAANSA). In addition, during the 2003 Small Arms Week of Action, a prelude to the Biennial Meeting of States held in New York in July 2003, FOSDA was extremely active in awareness-raising activities. Most recently, in February 2005 FOSDA, in collaboration with Ghana Action Network on Small Arms, launched the Northern Regional Week of Action against the illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons, with the aim of sensitising the Ghanaian public on the dangers of possessing illegal firearms.

Civil society work in Ghana is mainly supported by UNDP, the UN Children's Fund, the Ford Foundation, and the Open Society Initiative for West Africa (OSIWA). These are typically in the form of funds to organise advocacy programmes such as seminars and other one-off events. However, there is a lack of long-term assistance programmes. To a large extent, the ad hoc nature of external assistance to civil society is perhaps due to a lack of clearly articulated medium term plans by many NGOs in this sector. It is necessary in this regard to expand and direct external financial and technical assistance towards the preparation of well-articulated and viable three year plans which would comprise a series of intervention programmes and projects, informed by the mandate of each organisation, and which can form the basis for discussions with donors and a series of benchmarks for assessing organisational performance.

Civil society organisations operating in Ghana are also constrained by the lack of basic equipment, such as computers, vehicles and conferencing facilities. There is also a need for training with regard to technical equipment and Information Technology systems. In addition, staff knowledge should be enhanced on 'best practices' by exchanging experiences with other civil society organisations from other parts of the world.

Analytic and empirical research combined with the development of an information and data structure should be strongly supported in order to provide up-to-date reliable

information on the dimensions and character of illicit SALW proliferation in the country. Currently, SALW-specific epidemiological data are, where available, unreliable. Hospitals do not have data systems recording firearms-related injuries and deaths.

## 1.5 Ghanaian SALW Perspectives and Realities

Ghana has enjoyed relative peace, compared to many of its West African counterparts. However, the country has suffered from the consequences of protracted military rule and economic decline which have resulted in fractured social relations and an upsurge in crime. SALW proliferation manifests itself through armed robbery, ethnic and identity conflicts, and armed disputes featuring land guards. Local arms production is relatively sophisticated, making Ghana an attractive market for criminal networks in the West African sub-region. However, current legislation prohibits local arms production, and the criminalisation of this offence has driven the activity underground, making it difficult to control. There is a clear demonstration of the government's political will to address this issue, as demonstrated through the fulfillment of its pledge to establish a National Commission on Small Arms, and the launch of a campaign against small arms proliferation in November 2004. The Government has opened up dialogue with civil society organisations, encouraging and ensuring civil society involvement in preparations for the National Commission, and shows encouraging signs of cooperation and collaboration, even though it has not offered direct financial assistance to these organisations. For example, the Ministry of Justice is an active member of GHANSA. In addition, ADSR initiated a meeting between local arms manufacturers and other stakeholders. However, the lack of resources continues to hamper the development of a strong civil society and government's actions to control SALW proliferation.

## 1.6 Recommendations

- Financial and technical support should be provided to enable the present collaboration between the government and civil society regarding the control of local arms production to evolve into a sustainable programme for turning guns into ploughshares and to articulate a national action plan on illicit SALW control. Prior to this, a detailed national mapping exercise should be conducted to establish the number and types of illicit weapons in circulation, their sources, and possible location.
- Ghana's National Commission must be reinforced with financial independence and sufficient capacity, namely office space and technical resources, so that it can oversee and legislate on small arms issues in more than just name.
- GHANSA should be provided with technical and financial assistance in the preparation of a medium-term (three year) plan. Such a plan would include training of personnel in research and advocacy, as well as training of trainers workshops. This would enable civil society groups to assist the Ghana Police and other security agencies in methods of weapons control. Steps should be taken to strengthen government and civil society efforts to disseminate the knowledge acquired through these regional programmes and

to develop such programmes at the national level which would be adapted to the country-specific situation.

- An outreach strategy should be developed in order to extend the projects and activities of civil society and government beyond Accra and into the regions where they are urgently needed. This would necessitate the opening of regional offices and the initiation of intervention programmes and projects which address local realities and conditions.
- National Commission members should be exposed to global and regional issues of illicit SALW so that they adopt a broader, not just state-centred approach to SALW controls. This should be further enhanced by supporting their attendance and participation at international meetings.
- Both the UNPoA and the ECOWAS Moratorium remain little known to the citizens of the sub-region. Consequently, awareness-raising strategies and programmes by both the government and civil society should be strengthened. Such campaigns could for example focus on the effects of SALW proliferation and control measures, including the role and rationale of the ECOWAS Moratorium and the UNPoA, and on the role that individuals and communities can play in tackling this issue.
- The ECOWAS moratorium includes no provisions to address local production of small arms. This is a significant cause of supply and proliferation in Ghana and consequently in neighbouring states. Since Ghanaian national law on SALW is largely based on the Moratorium, this omission should be redressed with an amendment to the document. Rather than imposing a blanket clause which outlaws all manufacture, which would drive production further underground and thus render it harder to control, any amendment should attempt to bring the trade into the realm of official oversight and control.
- Efforts at addressing local production of SALW should be expanded and institutionalised to include intervention and conversion programmes which would involve a system of incentives to encourage a reorientation of blacksmiths away from arms production and towards 'peaceful' implements for agriculture and other sectors.

## Endnotes

1. Biting the Bullet/International Action Network on Small Arms, 'Implementing the Programme of Action 2003: Report of Action States and Civil Society', July 2003. p.59.
2. UNDP, 2002 Human Development Report, Geneva, 2002.
3. Wisdom Awuku, as cited in Nnamdi Obasi, 2002, Small Arms Proliferation and Disarmament in West Africa, Apophyl Productions, Abuja. P.66.
4. Interview with Emmanuel Sowatey, Accra, 20 May, 2003.
5. Kwesi Aning, "'Home Made and Imported Guns' West Africa, 7-13 July, 2003, p17, London.
6. Ibid.
7. Alhaji Ms Bah, 'Micro-disarmament in West Africa, The ECOAS Moratorium on small arms and light weapons', African Security Review 13 (3), 2004
8. Interview with Dr Kwesi Aning, Accra, 20 May, 2003.
9. It is possible to obtain an estimated average, calculated from interviews with individuals within the civil society familiar with and conducting research on SALW (Interviews with anonymous respondents).
10. Interview with Dr Kwesi Aning, Accra, 20 May, 2003.
11. Interview with Emmanuel Sowatey, Accra, 20 May, 2003.
12. Nnamdi Obasi, op cit. pp. 67-68.
13. Email response from Dr Kwesi Aning, 18 August, 2003.
14. Kwesi Aning, "'Home Made and Imported Guns' West Africa, 7-13 July, 2003, p18, London.
15. Nnamdi Obasi, op cit, p. 66.
16. Email response from FOSDA, 14 August, 2003.
17. See (respectively), Arthur Edwin, The Independent, 4 October, 2001, 'Shooting Scare at Pokuase: Cop leads landguards' and Edmund Mingle, Ghanaian Times, 15 May 2001, p.3 'Anyaa Residents attacked by Thugs'.
18. Meeting between Inspector-General of Police and the UN Conflict Resolution Team, Sept 2002. Courtesy of Dr Kwesi Aning.
19. Section 3 of the 1996 Arms & Ammunition Amendment Act of 1996.
20. Biting the Bullet/International Action Network on Small Arms, 'Implementing the Programme of Action 2003: Report of Action States and Civil Society', July 2003. p. 60.
21. SMS message from Dr Kwesi Aning, at 21.05 hrs, 22 August, 2003.
22. Kwesi Aning, 'Small Arms and Crime in Africa: The Ghana Case', forthcoming paper being prepared for Small Arms Survey, Geneva. Draft is cited here with the permission of the author.
23. Email response from FOSDA, 14 August, 2003.
24. Nnamdi Obasi, op cit. pp. 67-68.
25. Email response from Dr Kwesi Aning, 18 August, 2003.
26. Biting the Bullet/International Action Network on Small Arms, 'Implementing the Programme of Action 2003: Report of Action States and Civil Society', July 2003. p. 60.
27. Press conference statement by Minister of the Interior, Mr Hackman Owusu-Agyemang, 27 August 2004 available at [www.nisat.org](http://www.nisat.org)
28. 'Judiciary will tackle issues of illegal weapons', Accra Mail, 1 November 2004, available at [www.nisat.org](http://www.nisat.org)
29. Ibid.
30. Message from IANSA Director, 21 January 2005. Available at [http://www.iansa.org/regions/wafrica/ghana\\_get\\_tough2.htm](http://www.iansa.org/regions/wafrica/ghana_get_tough2.htm).
31. Op. cit. Alhaji Ms Bah, 'Micro-disarmament in West Africa, The ECOAS Moratorium on small arms and light weapons', African Security Review 13 (3), 2004.