Georgia’s recognition of the Circassian genocide in the context of Georgian-Abkhaz-Russian relations

Ivlian Haindrava

Director of the South Caucasus Studies Program at the Tbilisi-based Republican Institute.

On 20th May 2011, the Georgian parliament passed a Resolution on the recognition of genocide of Circassians by the Russian Empire which contained the following wording (the preamble omitted)[1].

‘The Parliament of Georgia:

1.     Recognises the mass murder of Circassians (Adyghes) during the Russo-Caucasus War, and their forceful eviction from their historic homeland, as an act of genocide in accordance with Section IV of the Hague Convention on Laws and Customs of War on Land of 18th October 1907 and the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 9th December 1948.

2.     Recognises the Circassians, forcefully deported during and after the period of the Russo-Caucasus war, as refugees, in line with the UN Convention on the Status of Refugees of 28th July 1951.’

Georgia is thus the first sovereign state to recognise the genocide of the Circassians (Adyghes). This has naturally attracted attention from politicians and analysts far beyond the Caucasus itself.

Current status of the problem

Whatever the historical, legal and moral aspects of this event, it also has a contemporary political dimension. On 7th February 1992, the Supreme Council of Kabardino-Balkaria passed a Resolution condemning the genocide of the Adyghes (Circassians) during the Russo-Caucasus War[2], stating the following: ‘The century-long colonial Russo-Caucasus War (1760–1864), which visited untold deprivations and suffering on the Adyghes (Circassians), is unsurpassed in modern history. The majority of the ethnic Adyghe population, including over 90 percent of the population of Kabarda, was physically annihilated, over 500,000 Adyghes were forcibly expelled by the Tsarist autocracy to the Ottoman Empire.’

The Supreme Council also provided a political and legal assessment of these events, recommending:

1.     That the mass murder of the Adyghes (Circassians) during the Russo-Caucasus War and their forced deportation from their historical homeland to the Ottoman Empire be considered an act of genocide, the gravest crime against humanity.

2.     That a proposal be submitted to the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation for the recognition of the genocide of the Adyghes (Circassians) during the Russo-Caucasus War and for the issuing of dual citizenship to their fellow nationals living abroad.

On 18th May 1994, the then President of the Russian Federation, Boris Yeltsin, also issued a special message to the peoples of the Caucasus, stating that: ‘The Caucasian War, which brought with it huge loss of life and material, echoes painfully to this day in the hearts of many Russians.’ He added: ‘In the present day, when Russia is constructing a state based on the rule of law and recognises the primacy of universal human values, it is becoming possible to interpret the events of the Caucasian War objectively as the valiant struggle of the peoples of the Caucasus not only for survival in their native land but also for the preservation of a distinctive culture, the best features of the national character.’ However, this message did not have any consequences in terms of the law.

In April 1996, the President and the State Council of the Republic of Adygheya sent an appeal to the State Duma of the Russian Federation stating that: ‘the tragic events of the 19th century have not in our view received due recognition in terms of the true nature of the actions of the Tsarist autocracy, which can only be characterised as genocide … The people’s tragedy was not limited to the horrors of war. The deportation of 90 percent of the Adyghe (Circassian) population that followed the cessation of hostilities itself constituted a form of and a continuation of genocide, since depriving that people of its natural habitat, resettlement to the Ottoman Empire and the living conditions it faced there caused many more victims among those forced to emigrate …’

In October 2006, 20 Adyghe civic organisations from a number of countries submitted a request to the European Parliament to recognise the genocide. A month later, organisations from Adygheya, Karachaevo-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria submitted a request to the President of Russia, Vladimir Putin, to recognise the Circassian genocide. Subsequently, in 2011, they submitted a similar request to Georgia, which was acceded to in May 2011.

Impact on the situation in the region

Georgia’s decision to raise recognition of the Circassian genocide to a new level begs a number of questions, such as how far back we can and should go in designating tragic historical events as genocide. It is also fraught with additional problems for each member of the Tbilisi-Moscow-Sukhumi ‘triangle’.

Moscow tends to view this resolution by the official administration in Tbilisi as revenge for the 2008 war and its own recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In fact, a number of actions taken by Georgia since then demonstrate that Tbilisi is attempting to re-open Moscow’s most painful wound – the North Caucasus – where Russia is accumulating almost insurmountable problems. The Circassian issue is also particularly sensitive because 2014 marks the 150th anniversary of the tragedy, and the Winter Olympics in Sochi are to be held not only in the very same year but in the very places where the Circassians were annihilated and from where they were deported. Since it is difficult for Moscow to question the moral authority behind the resolution by the Georgian authorities (see the documents listed above) – setting aside for the moment the political wisdom of the action, which we discuss below – its only remaining option is to accuse Georgia of a hidden agenda and to look for an opportunity of landing a ‘return blow’ on the Georgians in some vulnerable area. That is hardly likely to change attitudes in the North Caucasus and the Circassian community as a whole (whether inside or outside the Russian Federation).

For their part, the Abkhaz face some difficulty in positioning themselves on this historical issue, since they received substantial support from the Circassians during the Georgian-Abkhaz armed conflict in 1992–1993. In October 1997, the Abkhaz parliament passed a Resolution, which opens as follows: ‘That the mass murder and deportation of the Abkhaz (Abaza) to the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century be recognised as genocide, the gravest crime against humanity.’ The position adopted by the authorities in Sukhumi on the Circassian tragedy is far milder. The Abkhaz interpretation looks as if what they suffered was genocide whereas what the Circassians suffered was not. Given this, it is difficult to see how the Abkhaz can achieve a balanced relationship with their Circassian cousins on the one hand and their principal, indeed only, sponsor and patron – Russia – on the other. Their dual stance on the Circassian question (particularly now that Abkhazia has attained the status of a ‘partially recognised state’) threatens a further cooling of relations with most parts of the North Caucasus, which are cautiously watching Russia’s domination in Abkhazia.

One more aspect of the position adopted by Moscow and (particularly) Sukhumi cannot fail to be noticed. Since it is impossible to deny the facts – there are simply too many Russian sources that support the Circassians’ view of the outcome of the Russo-Caucasus War, which even the Russians called ‘the Subjugation of the Caucasus’ – they object to the fact that it is Georgia that has recognised the genocide. Would they, then, have accepted recognition of the genocide by, say, Nicaragua?

Nevertheless, Georgia’s President, Mikheil Saakashvili, is playing a dangerous game. Even before Georgia recognised the Circassian genocide, James Clapper, US Director of National Intelligence, was already commenting that alongside the presence of Russian troops in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Georgia’s recent actions in relation to Russia’s North Caucasian republics were also contributing towards increased tension in the region[3]. ‘Rocking the boat’ in the North Caucasus is just as risky a strategy for Georgia as Russia and is unlikely to produce any immediate benefit. Hopes that Russia will simply abandon (or be forced to abandon) the North Caucasus in the face of insurmountable problems seem naïve, given, for example, that Russia is clearly in no hurry to part with the Kuril Islands. The Georgian-Abkhaz (and Georgian-Ossetian) conflict is not running out of steam and the North Caucasus peoples are certainly in no hurry to come under Georgia’s wing, economically or otherwise; in any case, Georgia simply does not have the resources required for this. Indeed, if the ‘Circassian project’ were to succeed (proceeding from recognition of the genocide to reunification and ultimately to independence), a new claimant to Abkhazia might well emerge – an Abkhaz-Adygheyan entity with a huge potential population from the enormous diaspora. It is also unclear what position Tbilisi would now adopt if its close neighbours start to request recognition of other genocides.

Conclusion

The already complex situation in the Caucasus as a whole was merely aggravated by the Georgian Parliament’s Resolution of 20th May 2011. One indirect positive political outcome may be that recognition of the genocide will distract the Circassians from pursuing the idea of a Caucasian Emirate (in which they did not, in fact, play a major role so far), by diverting their attention to other political objectives.

Georgia’s recognition of the Circassian genocide and the response to it demonstrate once again that the zero-sum game approach adopted by all official sides without exception in all conflicts in the Caucasus without exception is counter-productive – for all as a whole and for each individual party. The need for some new thinking and approaches for the region is clearly long overdue – without these, it is likely to continue to get bogged down in obsolete issues.

Ivlian Haindrava

The Abkhaz perspective on the same issue from Inal Khashig, editor of the independent newspaper ‘Chegemskaya Pravda’