The role of the Church in the Georgian-Russian relations (English)

Russian-Georgian relations and the Abkhaz issue as seen through the prism of the Church

Jemal Gamakharia

(Russian/Pусский)

Stating the problem

There are ongoing reverberations of the visit to Moscow by his Holiness and Beatitude Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia, Archbishop of Mtskheta and Tbilisi, Metropolitan of Pitsunda and Sukhumi-Abkhazia Ilia II, which took place on 20th to 26th January 2013. The head of the Georgian Orthodox Church (GOC) had visited the Russian capital on several occasions in the past to hold talks with the head of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). However, his latest visit stands out from the rest in its form, content and preliminary results. This difference is due, above all, to the changes in the political situation in Georgia, which have opened up the prospect of a thaw in relations between Tbilisi and Moscow. A touch of solemnity was added to the visit by the recent 35th anniversary of his Holiness’ enthronement and his 80th birthday, as well as by the main reason for the visit – the presentation of the International Foundation for the Unity of Orthodox Christian Nations Award to the Primate of the GOC. Both the Georgian and Russian people expected that the visit would at least slow down the escalation of reckless confrontation and create preconditions for negotiations on issues beyond economic and cultural relations.

The visit was largely political in nature. On 21st January 2013, while hosting the important guests from Tbilisi, Patriarch of Moscow and All Russia Kirill repeatedly stressed the enormous contribution of Ilia II not only to the GOC and the entire Orthodox world, but also to the political sphere. In particular, he highlighted his contribution to the emergence of Georgia as an independent state, the achievement of mutual understanding and cooperation between people of different political persuasions, the promotion of free elections and a peaceful transfer of power, and the development of bilateral relations between Russia and Georgia and many others. President Vladimir Putin extended a particularly warm welcome to Georgia’s Catholicos-Patriarch and thanked him profusely for his ongoing efforts to maintain human, spiritual and cultural contacts between the two countries and nations.

His Holiness Ilia II used his many speeches and statements in the course of the visit to draw particular attention to the need to resolve the key problem in Georgian-Russian relations – that of the conflict regions. Replying to a question from a journalist on the eve of his meeting with Vladimir Putin on 23rd January, the Catholicos-Patriarch of Georgia stated that Abkhazia and the Tskhinvali region would form the main topic of discussion during his meeting with the Russian President. His Holiness Ilia II stated: ‘Of course, we will discuss other issues as well: those of the visa regime and trade. But these are all preliminary talks, and our Prime Minister Bidzina Ivanishvili is planning to have a serious dialogue about these issues in the future.’[1] One of the important objectives of Ilia II’s visit was to convey to President Putin greetings and a letter from the Georgian prime minister.

There is no doubt that following the will of the two countries’ political leaders, the Georgian and Russian Orthodox Churches took it upon themselves to engage in a difficult mission of clearing a space for future difficult formal negotiations.

Influencing the situation

None of the issues discussed in the course of the visit to Moscow by Georgia’s spiritual leader was resolved in full. The participants failed to agree on even the relatively easy matter of the potential reburial of the Georgian kings Vakhtang VI (1675–1737) and Teimuraz II (1700–1762), buried in the Dormition Cathedral in the city of Astrakhan. This will now form the remit of a joint commission. The sides used the meeting to reiterate their common approach to the forthcoming Ecumenical Church Cathedral. Primates of the GOC and ROC do not share the view of the Ecumenical Patriarch that the granting of autocephaly must be decided by him personally or the Ecumenical Church Synod. It is only natural that the GOC, which faces the problem of Abkhazia, and the Russian Orthodox Church, which is experiencing problems with Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova, should have a common interest in this matter, as was recorded in Moscow. In the opinion of the ROC, shared by the Georgian, Bulgarian and Serbian Churches, the issue of autocephaly has to be resolved by the parent Church itself. However, common requirements for the adoption of an equitable solution in such cases have not been elaborated or agreed. In addition, the Constantinople Patriarchate has no generally accepted criteria that could rule out the adoption of subjective decisions. It is clear that without regulating the canonical basis, it is impossible to achieve peace and harmony within the Orthodox world.

The talks in Moscow showed that conflict regions continue to be a stumbling block in both inter-church and inter-state relations. We can only speculate what decisions had been arrived at on this matter from the meagre amount of published information. For example, Patriarch Kirill simply expressed hope for a joint resolution of the Sukhumi and Tskhinvali problems. Ilia II repeatedly stressed that Georgia would restore its territorial integrity and that ‘Russia needs a unified Georgia, while Georgia needs a united and strong Russia’.[2] Ilia II’s speech made during the meeting with the Moscow Georgian diaspora on 26th January 2013 helps to shed some light on the agreements reached in Moscow. The Catholicos-Patriarch noted that as a result of his talks with His Holiness Kirill, they ‘put together a plan of how to help our brothers, the Abkhaz and the Ossetians. His Holiness Patriarch Kirill is doing everything in his power to help us restore our unity, the unity of Georgia’.[3] In the same speech, Ilia II described his conversation with President Putin as ‘truly special and encouraging’ and added: ‘I think that Vladimir Putin is the wise leader who will be able to help turn the tide so that Georgia will be unified again.’[4]

It should come as no surprise that such an encouraging assessment of the Moscow visit’s outcome provoked fear and even anger in Abkhazia. The ROC with its experience of dealing with the Abkhaz clergy and Abkhaz authorities adopted some “preventative measures” in advance with a view to their appeasement. For example, despite the warm welcome and special respect extended to the Catholicos-Patriarch of Georgia and his entourage, no one referred to him by his full title, which was no coincidence. Five days before the start of Ilia II’s visit to Moscow, the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia, not without the knowledge and consent of the ROC, decorated Abkhazia’s President Alexander Ankvab with the Order of Tsar Nicholas the Passion Bearer. On 24th January 2013, in other words during the visit of the GOC delegation to Moscow, the acting head of the Apocryphal Abkhaz Orthodox Church, Vissarion Aplia, agreed to a meeting with Patriarch Kirill and the ROC Department for External Church Relations. The meeting did in fact take place on 1st February 2013 in the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour in Moscow. The ROC Department for External Church Relations and Vissarion along with his supporters discussed the issue of a potential canonical solution of the Abkhaz Orthodox Church problem and agreed to continue consultations in the future. On his return to Abkhazia, Vissarion Aplia said that the ROC would continue to support the Abkhaz Orthodox community. It is very unlikely that Vissarion made a mistake by saying that the ROC would continue to support the Orthodox community – and not the Abkhaz Church.

Despite the adopted “measures”, the Abkhaz Public Chamber spoke on 25th January 2013 against the alleged decision by the ROC and the GOC to jointly care for the faithful of Abkhazia. This meeting was followed by the Abkhaz National Unity Forum on 27th January and by the roundtable with the representatives of the general public on 7th February. The openly negative reaction of the Abkhaz side (we have decided to pay no attention to the inappropriate, unfair and at times insulting remarks against Ilia II that do no credit to their authors) leads us to conclude that the Moscow agreements, at this point in time, have further complicated the situation in Abkhazia, exacerbating the inter-church confrontation. The credibility of the ROC and its appointee Vissarion Aplia has plummeted. As demonstrated by the roundtable on 7th February 2013, the majority of Abkhaz society, including its authorities, is deeply disappointed by the outcome of the Moscow meetings.[5]

Conclusion

The visit by head of the GOC, Ilia II, to Moscow has paid off. The talks in Moscow focused, first and foremost, on the normalisation of relations with Russia. It is quite symbolic that the first steps in this direction were consecrated by the spiritual leaders of both nations. The GOC and the ROC have a moral right to do so, because in the most difficult periods of military confrontation they rose to the occasion and succeeded in preserving the ties between the two countries. Today, they are attempting to use these ties to help resolve the conflict and to establish a civilised relationship.

In Russia and in Georgia, where the vast majority of people are Orthodox Christian, it is impossible to completely separate church and state (political) functions. They often overlap, as both the Church and the state speak on behalf of and in the name of the same people. The interests of the public are a direct responsibility of the Church and, at the same time, its care for the public often acquires political overtones. This is why the Moscow meetings between representatives of the GOC and the ROC, along with their efforts to resolve both the inter-church and especially inter-state relations, cannot be regarded as interference in politics or “meddling in the affairs of others”.

Representatives of the two Churches were in fact “minding their own business” at the Moscow talks. The Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia Ilia II appeared before the Russians not only as an outstanding spiritual leader, but also as a skilled diplomat. The Patriarch’s words of Christian love and goodness added further credibility to his fair claims, set out in a highly professional diplomatic manner. This allowed even “very difficult” interlocutors an opportunity to quietly listen to and accept uncomfortable and unpalatable issues, without resolving the intractable Russo-Georgian relations. The Georgian Patriarch was so sincere and convincing that no one had the courage to argue with him. From the scant information on the progress of the Moscow talks, we can only deduce that the Russian side listened carefully to the Georgian Patriarch and that Ilia II was full of hope. The future will test the robustness of these hopes.

As already mentioned, the visit by the Catholicos-Patriarch of All Georgia to Moscow and his successful talks with Patriarch Kirill and President Putin met with a markedly negative reaction in Abkhazia. It showed that the existing problems, according to our observations, in 2011, did not go away or diminish; on the contrary, they have become more acute. For example, there are still two extracanonical church organisations opposing each other; there is a growing criticism and open discontent in society towards Russia and the ROC; and the church issue has become excessively politicised. Moreover, there are growing passions around the New Aphon Monastery; a group of young and educated monks headed by Archimandrite Dorofei, who is at the moment the Orthodox Abkhaz’ only hope, have been declared schismatic dissidents by the ROC, without any foundation for this accusation, and they have been unreasonably banned from administering religion for a number of years. Meanwhile, no one gave or is giving much thought to the care of a mainly large Orthodox population of Abkhazia – its Gali residents; nothing is being said about the hundreds of thousands of Orthodox refugees from Abkhazia and so on.

It is unlikely that a sound solution for getting out of the impasse was suggested at the meeting of the two Patriarchs. One would imagine that the anticanonical rhetoric is not going to be abandoned any time soon, given the situation, and that Orthodox Christianity will therefore remain in the same position for some time. Despite the existing realities, one can and should explore new ways and means to remedy the situation. I completely agree with the idea of Archimandrite Dorofei – borne out by the Moscow meeting of the two Patriarchs – that one cannot count on the recognition of the autocephaly of the defunct Abkhaz Church by the ROC; a different way, proposed by the Archimandrite himself (to pursue the objective of using the Constantinople Patriarchate), when thoroughly considered and bearing in mind all the factors, is not encouraging either. Hence the urgent need for a joint search for a “third”, historically informed and realistic way, although there might also be room for some temporary options in the interim.

The talks with his Holiness and Beatitude Ilia II in Russia’s capital served as a kind of stimulus for bringing to the fore several topics which have been left simmering but are of a rather sensitive nature. They have exposed the existing contradictions, those real issues which cannot be dealt with unilaterally without a dialogue between equal stakeholders.

Jemal Gamakharia

Read the Abkhaz perspective on the same issue by Nadezhda Venediktova, writer and columnist for "asarkia.info".