Nation building (English)

Prospects of nation-building in Georgia: Outlook for the next seven years

George Tarkhan-Mouravi*

(Russian/Pусский)

Introduction

Every important political event has the potential to resolve some uncertainties, but also brings others with it. Such a pattern describes the current situation in Georgia following the historical October 2012 parliamentary elections. These elections were marked by a peaceful transfer of power to the former opposition, a rarity for much of the post-Soviet space. This represented an important point of political bifurcation, and it bears great significance for Georgia’s nation-building – the main topic of this paper.

But what does the notion of “nation-building” actually mean? It is understood here as creating or strengthening state institutions, which constitutes “state-building”. However, it also means consolidating the population within the state into a “civic” nation – an imagined and internalised community[1] with a strong common identity and basic values, integrated minorities, and a strong sense of belonging. All of this is necessary for a state to remain politically stable and sustainable in the long term, securing social harmony and steady economic growth.

As it has been observed: ‘Post-Soviet states have been confronted with the immediacy and simultaneity of two contradictory challenges: they are engaged in a process of nation- and state-building and consolidating the new central “national” authority, while concurrently grappling with challenges to the centre posed by “sub-national” ethnic or regional political mobilisation and demands for autonomy or secession.’[2]

However, there is still a further task of building a democratic nation, another claimed goal of Georgia’s nation-building endeavour. It was prioritising state-building at the expense of building democracy that became one of the reasons why the ruling National Movement lost the recent elections. Democratic nation-building needs employment of a number of instruments aimed at changing attitudes and values, such as educational curricula or focused media work – in addition to good legislation, rule of law and social equity. None of these instruments has worked properly and effectively in the past. Now a new hope has emerged that Georgia will perhaps finally appear to advance with building both the civic nation and the democratic state.

Building a civic nation

The tasks ahead are formidable. Admittedly, immediately after the “Rose Revolution”, between 2004 and 2006, state-building in Georgia achieved notable results: it essentially moved from a weak state, with poorly functioning institutions and massive corruption, to a much stronger centralised country, with dramatically reduced corruption, a quadrupled economy, and re-established state authority over most of Georgia’s territory. Nonetheless, this transition was not without significant drawbacks – rooted in the overwhelming dominance of a single political party and an over-centralised governance system. In fact, a rather disfigured state emerged as a result, with total supremacy of the presidential power over servile legislature and courts, weakened local governments, reduced freedom of the press, regular human rights abuse, and the suppression of any resistance to speedy reforms by repressing opponents and instilling fear.

One of the eternal problems haunting the policy process in Georgia was the lack of well-elaborated, long-term development plans. Even when such plans existed, they were immediately forgotten after being published and presented  to international partners and experts. This pattern of “Potyomkinese” – the false pretence of real change – is the grave legacy of the Soviet regime. Under this regime, many actions were only imitating some claimed functions: as seen in the Soviet elections, which had only a single candidate, making it a parody of real elections; or when the government or elected parliament merely acted as a façade, while all the decisions were made by the Communist party leadership. This resulted in constantly changing plans: for example, one day inviting the Boers from South Africa to revive agriculture; the next day suddenly building a new city, Lazika, in a location totally inappropriate – the swamps of the Black Sea shore – and without any clear plan or need for such a city; prioritising tourism and then changing the priority to agriculture; or suddenly deciding to move the parliament from the capital to a remote town – Kutaisi. Another grave problem was the lack of dialogue with the population and civil society, with important decisions rarely being debated in consultation with opponents or independent experts. The lack of effective feedback mechanisms eventually led to the loss of a sense of reality among the tiny circle of leadership: in extreme cases, this resulted in voluntary decisions and actions that led to the catastrophic war with Russia; in milder cases, it resulted in far-reaching but expensive plans like those described above.

Thus, the new government, which is supposed to lead the country for the next few years, is facing the same old task of building an effective and fair system of governance, but without side-lining participatory democracy, rule of law and human rights. The formation of a civic nation takes much time and effort, as it has to compete with the lack of democratic skills and civic responsibility as well as social divisions. It also has to deal with the ethnic nationalist ideologies and stereotypes that have taken root among various groups and layers of the population and elites, as it was ethnic nationalism during the previous centuries that helped nations to survive under the Russian and then Soviet empires. Nevertheless, forming a civic nation is not an impossible task and does not necessarily need a crisis, as described by historian Ronald Suny some years ago when he observed that: ‘... national identities and conceptualisations of interest can change rapidly in politically fluid moments. In Georgia, for example, within a few years (1989–1993) exclusivist nationalism gave way to a more pragmatic, inclusive idea of the nation that opened discussion of the possible restructuring of the state along federalist lines. But it took defeat and state collapse for this shift to occur.’[3]

Current trends and challenges

The parliamentary elections of 1st October 2012 dramatically transformed the political situation in Georgia, and possibly the direction of the nation-building process. The whole pre-electoral atmosphere changed overnight, as the abominable practices of the government, which had previously resulted in little public action, finally turned the scales against the authorities. Such practices – the governmental policy of inducing fear and intimidating any potential opponents, widespread human rights abuse, and the arrogant neglect of public opinion by a small elite of key decision-makers – were highlighted when videos of dreadful abuse of prisoners in one of the capital’s prisons were finally revealed.

The new leadership is now setting out to re-start the nation-building project, applying  that is promised to be more humane and more democratic. However, already the first steps made by the new government demonstrated some flaws and drawbacks, and it is obvious more errors and missteps will be coming, in addition to the multitude of internal and external challenges that need to be handled.

Probably the biggest challenge is related to the danger of a single-party dominance being re-established, which carries the constant threat of reduced pluralism and weakened public control over the government’s actions, once again directed by a small circle of authoritarian leaders. Indeed, there are currently only two political forces represented in parliament. Moreover, while the former ruling party – the National Movement – held 65 seats out of 150, with the Georgian Dream coalition taking the rest, a wave of defections has already started, and now there is a real possibility of the ruling coalition gaining a constitutional majority of 100 seats. This may lead to a further reduction in the authority of the incumbent president, who already lacks control over many of his constitutional powers. It may also lead to unchecked changes in the constitution – which had already become a tactical weapon in the hands of the previous government. What is at stake is not whether President Saakashvili deserves to get or actually becomes impeached (the new leadership has already announced that it will not pursue such an objective); rather it is the risk of weakened checks and balances against the revolutionary zeal of the victors, and the probable dissolution of the now opposition party. The latter has already lost much of the initial public support and attraction for conformists that it held when in power; at the same time, it lacks an established ideology, agenda or values that could appeal to potential followers.

The second challenge is related to the personnel policies of the new government, created by the conglomerate of groups constituting the ruling coalition. It appeared that neither the National Movement nor the Georgian Dream was well prepared for how events unfolded during the elections. As a result, the new government was formed under great time pressure, and not all ministers or other officials seem fit to meet the new administrative duties and responsibilities of their new positions.

The new government, apart from lacking experience and governance skills, is also facing the challenge of streamlining the functioning of agencies and local governments that are still occupied by the same old cadre. This is particularly evident in the case of the courts, well known for their dependency on the executive, but which are now urgently needed to reconsider the erroneous criminal cases uncovered in Georgia’s prisons. A further challenge is the task of replacing Georgia’s investigative or riot police, which played a huge role in human rights violations. The government is also expected to fulfil at least some of its generous promises, which may turn out to be populist actions that could harm the country’s economy and growth prospects. The same is true in relation to the task of improving relations with Russia, although this is unlikely to be possible without a dramatic and politically dangerous re-orientation of Georgia’s foreign policy.

One may expect that by the next parliamentary elections, due to be held in 2016, there will be some public disappointments and frustrations. However, these are unlikely to be significant enough to generate any alternative political force by the next political cycle, as this would need more time to develop. The National Movement, the current loser, in spite of its attempts to resist change and remain consolidated, possesses minimal chances of rebuilding its strength. Therefore, it will most likely be this government who will be responsible for nation-building during the next seven years, although there is still a good chance that the ruling coalition may split into smaller factions. Even if there is no external action endangering the country’s security, and the government can avoid economic collapse, nevertheless, the aforementioned challenges to nation-building are likely to be further compounded by the task of building a civic nation out of the current set of ethnic groups. Furthermore, though the hopes for resolution of  the conflicts in South Ossetia and Abkhazia in the short term are minimal,  at the very least, the government will need to set about improving intercommunity relationships and rebuilding some mutual trust.

Policy dilemmas and choices

It is already clear that some of the new uncertainties that have emerged may only be partly resolved during the next seven years. How this happens will depend on some general social processes and the changes in Georgia’s geopolitical and geo-economic environment, although it will still mainly depend on the government’s policy choices. In almost every policy area, there are difficult policy dilemmas and choices, some of which are worth considering here in more detail.

One of the biggest obstacles to Georgia’s development and prosperity is widespread poverty. While the Georgian economy demonstrated significant growth during the last decade, this growth has not significantly benefited about half of the population, who remain poor. The government set out to change social statistics and ways of measuring poverty, thus creating the impression of reduced poverty. However, this is of little relief to the hundreds of thousands of people living below the poverty line. It is also clear that the social assistance (which has already been almost doubled by the new government) given out to similar numbers of people is an enormous burden for the budget; moreover, it is no cure for the main ailment – namely, unemployment and a lack of adequate income.

Poverty levels are particularly alarming in rural areas, owing to the catastrophically low productivity of agriculture, with more than half of the population (i.e. the proportion of the population engaged in agriculture) contributing to less than one tenth of gross domestic product (GDP). Increasing productivity in agriculture is of course possible, with some investment, technological innovation, better access to markets, and aggregation of land. However, the question remains as to what will happen to those who are left without land, which had at least offered subsistence in the past, and who have no prospect of finding a job locally. Even if these people migrate to the cities, the cities are currently incapable of absorbing mass migration, thus compounding the problem of the urban poor and unemployment. A similar problem emerged when internally displaced persons (IDPs) from Abkhazia and especially South Ossetia (post-August 2008) were settled in rural ghettos without any prospect of earning a livelihood other than miniscule social assistance; their only alternative was to either go back and forth across the administrative border to work on their own land or to move to the city. It seems that the current situation – whereby more than half of Georgia’s population are engaged in subsistence agriculture, notorious for its low productivity – is not sustainable. Therefore, approaches to encourage non-farming activities should be promoted in order to diversify local economies and preserve communities. At the same time, the country should prepare for mass rural-to-urban migration. This will require not only resolving the issues of proper dwellings and infrastructure, but also creating and forming a flexible labour market along with a continuous and professional education system that will help migrants to quickly adapt to their new conditions.

Another policy dilemma is dealing with areas with a minority population. In order to escape poverty, it is crucial that local economies are opened up; this will encourage migration and oblige minority representatives to learn the Georgian language and to compete in the labour market, despite lack of experience or skills. However, this may also be (and often is) perceived as a threat to preserving ethnic identity, tradition and language, as integration is commonly equated with assimilation. In the case of some of the smaller minorities (e.g. the Udins, the last heirs of ancient Caucasian Albanian culture), the danger of assimilation is quite real, as their language has lost its functionality and education in their own language is often impossible. Moreover, the economic pressure on young people to move to urban settlements in search of employment and livelihoods is alienating them even further from their own cultural tradition. In addition, many small schools teaching in minority languages have been closed down with the aim of “optimisation”, sometimes oblivious to the exceptional cultural role of rural schools. While focusing on the integration of bigger minority groups is prudent from the perspective of political stability, the important task of helping smaller minorities to preserve their identity, language and culture still needs to be addressed, while also promoting their social integration within the civic nation. After all, it is cultural pluralism that is among Georgia’s biggest assets, alongside its population, rich cultural heritage and beautiful nature.

There is no single remedy for these or any other problems, which will need to be resolved if a healthy, prosperous and consolidated civic nation is to be built in Georgia. However, one possible recommendation could be to develop a long-term plan in every key policy area, based on thorough research and solid evidence. This should be followed by a flexible readjustment of plans based on in-built monitoring, public consultation, along with feedback and adaptation mechanisms. Such an approach is needed not only for economic development, but also for handling the delicate problem of inter-ethnic relations, balancing the need to integrate minority groups with efforts to help them preserve their cultural identity. Proper planning is particularly needed in attempts to improve inter-community relationships in the cases of Abkhazia and South Ossetia; this planning should replace the haphazard approaches and strategy documents that were prepared as public relations efforts rather than real guidelines for action.

Another important area for action is decentralising powers and authority wherever it is appropriate and prudent – for instance, in the areas of education and healthcare, in the provision of social services, and in maintaining and developing social and physical infrastructure. It seems that the previous government’s decision to abolish the lowest level of elected local governments was a mistake and damaging for the development of civic culture among the population. The current territorial arrangement and system of governance is both poorly reflected in the constitution and ineffective. Initiating a broad public debate on the preferred system of territorial arrangement and governance should precede any decisions in this area that directly influence people’s lives.

Finally, it should be remembered that developing a civic nation and a stable democratic society in the contemporary world requires not simply a strong state and economic prosperity. It also requires a highly educated and dynamic population who can easily adapt to global changes as well as the advent of the globalised knowledge-based economy. Educational reform has failed until now to radically improve the quality of mass education. Moreover, as many international tests have shown, Georgia’s educational system at all levels needs much attention, better planning and proper funding. Unless the right and prompt steps are taken, the nation may risk losing some of its best assets – an educated population, the tradition of respect for education and knowledge, a large pool of good scientists and engineers, and the system for sustaining this pool. By 2020, seven years from now, it will probably be clear which route the Georgian nation has taken for building its future: one of short-sighted economic gain resulting in the sale of existing resources, a devastating “brain drain” and an anachronistic education system; or the route of long-term development based on innovation, creativity and knowledge.

Discussion questions

In relation to all of the aforementioned challenges, there are many questions regarding “what” should be done, but equally important “how” it should be done.

• How can mass poverty be eradicated when there is little investment in manufacturing, virtually no industrial production, and few local initiatives for innovative endeavours?
• How can minority groups be fully integrated into Georgian society, and motivated to do so, without antagonising them with fears of assimilation?
• How can agricultural productivity be dramatically increased without massive investment, how can the land market be activated and plots aggregated without disastrous consequences for families, and how can the newly available workforce be engaged in industry?
• How can the educational system be radically improved when there are insufficient funds to significantly increase schoolteachers’ pay and a limited pool of qualified teachers, and when many university graduates cannot find jobs to match their skills and knowledge set?

These along with other policy-related questions need a rapid but solid, evidence-based response if the country wants to develop along the lines of that promised by its leaders. Once again, extensive efforts will need to be made to assess problems, prioritise objectives and identify solutions within the framework of existing and emerging constraints. Undoubtedly, this will not be an easy task. However, the alternative outlook is not a pleasant one – political and economic stagnation, reduced quality of life, the continuing exodus of a disenchanted population, fragmentation and further stratification of society, and the gradual radicalisation of the ruling elites.