The Georgian State Concept on Relations with the Peoples of the North Caucasus (English)

Spartak Zhidkov

(Russian/Pусский)

Tbilisi continues on the same course

The entry into force of Georgia’s State Concept on Relations with the Peoples of the North Caucasus,[1] approved by the Georgian parliament on 29th June 2012, could have far-reaching consequences. If the programme goes ahead, the scale of cultural and ideological expansion it envisages is extraordinary.

For the last few years (2009–2012), Georgia has been making strenuous efforts to strengthen relations with all the North Caucasus nations. All initiatives by the Georgian side are clearly aimed at remedying the situation of the 1990s, when Tbilisi came into conflict with the North Caucasus over the wars in South Ossetia and Abkhazia. Although it was inevitable that these wars would turn the North Caucasus against Georgia, Tbilisi thought for a long time that it could ignore this fact. However, after 2008, when it became clear that there were no longer any prospects for a military settlement of the conflicts (at least in the short term and without any change in the current geopolitical situation in the Caucasus), the Georgian government started to change its position.

The Georgian army, despite its successful modernisation, proved to be powerless against the military might of Russia. This has apparently led Tbilisi to shelve any plans for the use of force for the time being. Georgia now intends to carry the struggle to another level, where its weakness in relation to Russia is nowhere near as obvious as on the field of battle.

There can be no doubt today that Moscow is firmly in control of the situation in the North Caucasus. However, the Russian administration does have reason to be concerned about the future. Following its victory in the two Chechen wars, Moscow no longer faces any serious opponent (in military terms) in the region. But its position is weaker on the ideological front.

Anti-Russian feeling, already present in the North Caucasus during the Soviet era, increased during the Chechen wars of the 1990s. However, Russia’s territorial integrity was never questioned by the international community. The great powers did not support the Caucasian nations in their fight against Moscow. For their part, the Georgians, although they in fact provided assistance to the Chechen insurgents, made no attempt to contest Russia’s right to the North Caucasus. Now, however, Georgia is in fact offering official assistance to all who want to strengthen North Caucasian national identity. Moscow has no formal reason to contest Georgia on this, but makes no attempt to hide its irritation either.

The concept – a comprehensive programme of ideological expansion

A detailed examination of the state concept approved by the Georgian parliament quickly reveals that ideology is at the centre of the strategy. The authors imply that cooperation on information, science and culture together should bring about a rapprochement over ideology, as is clear from a number of clauses in the document. 

The introduction refers directly to the Georgian side’s interest in the stability, security and successful economic development of the North Caucasus. At the same time, the authors express concern at ‘instability in the North Caucasus, which primarily impinges on basic human rights.’ The document later states that there is much happening in the North Caucasus (in other words, on Russian territory) that is deplorable and follows this immediately without further qualification with the promise that ‘Georgia will assist the peoples of the North Caucasus to defend their rights, particularly by informing the international community of their real situation.’ Thus, the different Caucasian people – at least those who are willing to accept assistance from Georgia, which 10–15 years ago the vast majority of Caucasians would have rejected – are promised quite serious informational support on an ongoing basis.

Georgia’s aim in promoting such a wide-ranging programme of assistance is not just to turn the North Caucasus from a longstanding opponent into a permanent ally. Taking the wider view, it is trying to bring the whole of this region into Georgia’s sphere of influence.

The authors of the concept are putting the emphasis on people-to-people relations, or personal contacts, bypassing state relations. The Georgians’ intention is to win over the people rather than the governments of the republics of the North Caucasus within the Russian Federation; to put it another way, this is ideological expansionism. Compared with this aim, the economic component of the document appears far more modest.

A great deal of attention is paid to the youth: setting up youth camps and summer schools on Georgian territory – outside Russia’s borders – provides an excellent opportunity to win the hearts and minds of the younger generation through traditional Georgian hospitality. Other measures are, apparently, aimed at young journalists, namely: ‘Exchanging information through symposiums for journalists, training courses, internet conferences for bloggers, teleconferences, debates and other types of discussions on the Caucasus to exchange information.’ However, it is Georgia’s plans to attract students from the North Caucasus to study in Georgia that are particularly revealing.

The following sentence may sound very pretentious: ‘Georgia has set itself the objective of becoming a significant centre of higher education for the youth of the North Caucasus.’ However, if this project is actually implemented, Georgia will gain considerable control over the formation of the new generation of the North Caucasian intellectual elite. These students will be indebted to the Georgians not just for their diplomas, but also for an education to the highest world standards based on Western values. Moreover, Georgia is promising ‘to enable students from the North Caucasus to continue their education in the world’s leading universities’. This is a tempting offer that even Russia, with its enormous revenues from fuel exports, would be hard pressed to make to the youth of the North Caucasus. It remains to be seen whether Georgia will be able to meet its promises.

Claims and capacity

This question can also be put another way: will Georgia, with its limited political and economic potential, be capable of becoming the predominant influence on the North Caucasus? Does it have the strength and capacity to do this?

Today, Georgia appears to have exhausted all options for a military resolution of the conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. As long as there are Russian troops on the Georgian-Abkhaz and Georgian-South Ossetian borders, the current Georgian administration will not resort to the use of force. This is natural, since starting a new war whilst at the same time developing cultural and scientific links with the closest allies of the Abkhaz and Ossetians would be absurd, and something Tbilisi is unlikely to undertake. Tbilisi has a different objective: to create a cross-section of people dissatisfied with Moscow’s policy and inspired by Georgia’s successes.

It is no secret that there are many today in the North Caucasus who see Mikheil Saakashvili’s Georgia as a model country that has withstood economic collapse and criminal chaos as well as maintaining liberal values despite the lack of real democracy. For them, contemporary Georgia is an example to follow. Can you fight against a country that personifies your dreams of the future? Can you support a war with a state in which your children are receiving their education? And, of course, you cannot justify military action against a people who have paid particular attention to your own grievances and problems.

One striking aspect of all this is that Georgia does not appear to expect its programme to appeal to the Ossetian people, the most loyal to Russia of all the peoples of the North Caucasus. It states that ‘after the collapse of the Soviet Union, ethnic cleansing took place in Ingushetia in 1992.’ It then goes on to refer to the victims of the two Chechen wars, clearly implying the blame for these wars lies with Russia. The reference to Ingushetia pertains to the Ossetian-Ingush conflict, thus assigning guilt to the Ossetian side.

Overall, the Georgian side understands that its sudden generosity in relation to the North Caucasus looks a little odd in light of a much longer period of opposition. Therefore, the authors are careful to articulate that ‘the situation in Georgia in 1991, immediately after the restoration of the country’s independence, did not allow for this kind of approach.’ The Georgian side thus accepts some of the responsibility for earlier misunderstandings.

Today, however, the Georgians do have something to offer. Georgia is hoping that its programme will attract those in the Caucasus who do not reject globalisation, who do not have a direct interest in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and who are prepared to accept the thesis of genocide during the Caucasian War in the 19th century. And there may well be quite a few such people.

Georgia’s new State Concept on Relations with the Peoples of the North Caucasus is thus a document of crucial significance for Georgia, as the document is clear to point out. This is the best that Tbilisi can currently offer in the international arena: a project which appears to consist entirely of good intentions and of initiatives which have no downside. But, in fact, these initiatives have one quite specific aim: to normalise Georgia’s relations with its close neighbours, with whom it shares so much in common. If Georgia can improve its image – in particular, with the younger generation of North Caucasians – then this outcome would more than justify the investment.

Spartak Zhidkov

Read the Georgian perspective on the same issue from George Gvimradze, from the Strategic Research Centre in Tbilisi.

For more analysis on this topic by other Georgian and Abkhaz experts, see ‘The North Caucasus Factor in the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict Context’.

[1] The concept consists of nine sections: introduction; people-to-people contacts; human rights, free media and civil society; education and science; economy and trade; historical justice; traditions, culture and sport; diaspora relations; and healthcare. It is available in Georgian at http://www.parliament.ge/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1765:resolution-6619-rs&catid=54:statements-appeals-and-resolutions&Itemid=88&lang=ge.