European and US Approaches to the Georgian-Abkhaz Conflict (English)

Ketevan Tsikhelashvili

(Russian/Pусский)

Background

Four years have passed since the August 2008 crisis reshaped the conflict landscape and further marred prospects for conflict resolution in Georgia. The western community found itself faced with new challenges and needing to adjust its approach. Immediate actions in response to the crisis were reactive, aimed at brokering a ceasefire and emergency peace. The next step was to “reassess, readjust and reinforce” the positions, as formulated in the “Tagliavini report”.¹ The EU and US approaches are based on a shared set of principles, and use terms and formulations largely along the same lines. Some differences, though, may be observed in tone, wording and timing due to nuances in policy traditions and roles performed on the ground. The EU took the lead in the conflict settlement process by mediating the six-point agreement of 12th August 2008 under its French presidency, steering the Geneva discussions and deploying EU monitors.² The US is a participant in the Geneva discussions and remains supportive of confidence-building and conflict-settlement endeavours, but with less direct action on the ground. Notably, the EU approach has its own hues due to its multi-layered institutional anatomy³ and multiplicity of voices on external affairs.

Areas where US and EU policy converge

The EU and the US share the same policy tenets in common, as the following points illustrate. This unanimity is further displayed through various joint configurations of the wider international context, such as via NATO, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) or the UN.

• Unwavering support to Georgia’s sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity within internationally recognised borders is pledged at all levels by the EU and the US, along with other international actors. This is evidenced in their respective statements, resolutions or communiqués.
• Non-recognition of Georgia’s breakaway regions is another steadfast policy line. Russia has been slammed for what the US president described ‘an irresponsible decision’⁴ and called on to ‘reverse the recognition’.⁵ No other state but an odd club of five Russian-won allies (Latin American Venezuela and Nicaragua and the small Pacific islands of Tuvalu, Nauru and Vanuatu) has followed this course. 
• The “international nature” of the conflict is recognised in respect to its Russian dimension.⁶ Russia’s actions and presence on the ground are increasingly qualified as “occupation” of Georgia’s territories. The US administration is straightforward in describing the situation as “continued occupation”⁷ by the Russian Federation. The EU, which is traditionally more delicate in its wording, vocalises the term “occupation” and “occupied territories” through a number of its institutions,⁸ some member states and its voices at international organisations (OSCE, NATO, Council of Europe).
• Both the US and the EU urge Russia to live up to the six-point agreement and support the still half-fledged EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM) to gain access across the administrative boundary lines. Sukhumi’s rebuff to allow in EU monitors and its harsh stance towards the current Head of Mission are met with concern by both actors. Similarly, the suspension of the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism, initiated at the Geneva discussions to address imminent security challenges on the ground, add to those concerns in the West and seem ‘very alarming’⁹ to Tbilisi. 
• A commitment to solely peaceful means of conflict settlement is another common denominator. Hope is invested in the Geneva framework to deliver on key political, security and humanitarian dimensions of conflict settlement, despite struggling with this task over 20 rounds to date. Georgia’s unilateral pledge on the non-use of force¹⁰ was hailed internationally. However, as long as it remains unreciprocated by Russia, concerns remain high in the west – especially in light of Russia’s growing military concentration and heavy build-up in the breakaway regions.
• Both the US and EU along with the wider international community¹¹ acknowledge the humanitarian and legal underpinnings asserting the right for the dignified and safe return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees as well as the non-acceptance of “forcible demographic changes”. Some resolutions, on the other hand, are more sharp-termed in describing the context.¹² Putting the sensitive terms aside, the “denial of the right of refugees to return to their places of living” in Abkhazia, presents perhaps the most compromising aspect of secessionist claims and attempts to “legitimise” them from any legal or humanitarian perspective.
• Last but not least, the EU and the US promote an engagement strategy as non-recognition is pursued. Interestingly, “engagement” is a term used by nearly all stakeholders, including Georgians and Abkhaz. Moreover, there seems to be a shared consensus over the need for engagement to address humanitarian and social aspects of people’s livelihoods in the breakaway regions. Yet, different contextual readings and over-politicised references often act as a hindrance to practical application.

The “engagement” strategies

The Georgian government made it a part of its State Strategy to engage with populations across administrative boundary lines. Its aim was ‘to reduce their isolation and to improve their welfare, in the interest of human and regional security’, and to promote people-to-people contacts and confidence-building.¹³ The strategy enjoys the support of the EU and the US, and finds itself well fine-tuned with the spirit and wording of each of their respective engagement strategies.

The Abkhaz side also seeks engagement, particularly that of the EU. Moreover, in relation to actions targeting the Abkhazia region per se, it seeks to alleviate what is commonly referred to as “isolation” and is in fact the current status quo of being exposed exclusively to Russia.

The EU promotes its “Non-Recognition and Engagement” strategy,¹⁴ which embeds humanitarian and strategic intentions with the improvement of people’s livelihoods and confidence-building as the main goal. At the same time, the EU is driven by its peace and security agenda, expressed as non-acceptance of ‘white spots or black holes on the map of its immediate neighbourhood’ and against attempts to draw ‘new dividing lines in Europe’¹⁵ in response to Russia’s tight-grip over the area of “privileged interests”. It is also hoped that through engagement, ‘the EU can open up these territories, increase its footprint and leverage, provide alternative perspective to predominant Russian one, and ultimately, move closer towards a resolution of the conflicts’.¹⁶

The concept of “Engagement without Recognition” has become a part of scholarly discourse in the US, where it is cited as the only feasible approach to longer-term conflict settlement.¹⁷ The Washington administration has the non-recognition pillar as a policy line, supports the engagement policies of Georgia and the EU, and tops it up with its own contribution to humanitarian assistance projects (such as healthcare, education, safe environment) and peaceful settlement of conflict. The US actions on the ground – which unlike that of the EU’s, remain highly unwelcome by Russia and Abkhaz de facto authorities, largely due to their conventional understanding of “hard” and “soft” powers and respective interpretations of what the US and the EU are about – are somewhat limited or channelled by other organisations.

Notably, the engagement strategies of both actors target the societies and populations in the breakaway regions and draw a clear line with the de facto authorities. There is some interaction with the latter, such as meetings during the visits of the EU and the US representatives to the breakaway region or within the Geneva process. Nonetheless, official policy is clear and “de facto elections” are internationally unrecognised.

Despite the fact that many points converge in the engagement visions of the different stakeholders, the overall political framing and terminology spark concerns and fears of the parties to the conflict. Sukhumi “by default” abstains from any initiatives undertaken through Georgia’s State Strategy. Tbilisi reads Abkhaz persistence to evade joint frameworks and directly engage with the EU as an attempt to falsely portray it as a step towards “recognition”.

Divergences in approaches

While both the EU and the US render support to the Georgian engagement strategy and pursue their own engagement policies built on the non-recognition pledge, there are some intrinsic tensions between the two pillars that become evident in implementation. Finding flexible solutions and rounding the edges is not an easy task. In this regard, US and EU approaches somewhat vary in tone from quite clear-cut to more cautious approaches respectively. Despite being perfectly in line with domestic and international law, the EU’s recent European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) Progress Report noted ‘the continued application of [Georgia’s] “Law on Occupied Territories”¹⁸ remained a concern for the effectiveness of engagement strategy’. However, the same EU report compliments ‘several measures… taken in line with the State Strategy for engagement particularly addressing a range of social and humanitarian issues’ as a constructive step. Tbilisi confirms there is a record of successful engagement activities through the State Strategy and there are no hindrances to internationally sponsored projects.¹⁹

The issue of international travel by residents of the breakaway regions illustrates those in-built tensions. As Georgian passports are rejected by Sukhumi, the so-called “Abkhaz passports” are unrecognised and illegally issued Russian passports²⁰ are not allowed internationally, the introduction of “laissez-passer”, Status Neutral Identification Cards and Status Neutral Travel Documents (SNTD) by Georgia²¹ were welcomed by both the US and the EU, albeit with some nuanced differences.

The EU recognises the Status Neutral Documents as ‘an important step forward in Georgia’s engagement strategy’. But considering the anxiety of de facto authorities ‘thus far’, it noted that ‘it is important that they exist as a de-isolation option, not as an exclusive means for travel of Abkhaz and Ossetians, so that confidence building and dialogue initiatives are not hindered’.²²

The US hailed the initiative as ‘a strong step towards reconciliation’ which ‘supports a peaceful and just resolution of the conflict’ and, more importantly, recognised the SNTDs.²³

Notably, for the moment, eight other states, including six EU member states, have allowed the SNTDs.²⁴ The analysis of the EU’s position on this shall consider that the foreign policy and migration policy remain mostly the sovereign domain of individual EU member states.

The Status Neutral Documents are rejected by Moscow and Sukhumi. This is a part of political game-play which holds this and other engagement actions a hostage. The success of any engagement strategy depends largely on the genuine nature of human-centric interests, pragmatism, de-politicisation and compromise to be sought by the Georgians and the Abkhaz for the sake of the interests of individuals and mutually beneficial results. “Unilateral constructivism”²⁵ offers fewer prospects. The EU may need to mitigate a smart trade-off between polarised positions: if Tbilisi takes a step to not insist on freshly introduced SNTDs as “sole means of travel” “thus far”, a sensible step from Sukhumi could be not to bar or punish the choice of individuals who take them as an opportunity. Shedding unrealistic expectations which might be counterproductively linked to “engagement”, particularly that of the west, seems to be necessary: no recognition can be achieved by Sukhumi; and no conflict resolution can be achieved by Tbilisi in the short term. Such unrealistic expectations may result in a lose-lose game for Georgians and Abkhaz, and only Russia may find its agenda complemented by its overwhelming presence and influence unchallenged in the region. Better prospects are offered by an efficient accommodation of the humanitarian interests of the sides, increased engagement of civil actors, business communities and individuals in confidence-building, and people-to-people contacts. The EU could indeed play a lead role in this and may flesh out its Non-Recognition and Engagement strategy accordingly.

Ketevan Tsikhelashvili

Read the Abkhaz perspective on the same issue from Arda Inal-Ipa from Centre for Humanitarian Programmes (CHP).