Conflicts and external relations (English)

Tbilisi’s approach to the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict

Margarita Akhvlediani*

(Russian/Pусский)

Negative and positive consequences of the August war

The policy pursued by the Georgian government from the very start of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict in the 1990s – that of sanctions and the isolation of Abkhazia – forced Abkhazia to turn to the protection of a patron instead of searching for a way out of the complex state of affairs. Of course, the only real contender for the role of patron was Russia. Nevertheless, the obscurity of the positions, hopes and demands of all parties to the Abkhaz-Georgian-Russian conflict always left the field open for a number of tendencies and prospects for development of the situation.

This situation changed radically after the August 2008 war over South Ossetia. The range of options for resolving the conflict was severely reduced, while the new situation failed to resolve the problems of either the Georgians or the Abkhaz. Georgia’s hopes of regaining territory were now at an all-time low. Meanwhile, Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia’s independence left the Abkhaz without the slightest freedom, even hypothetically, to choose their own model of development. The entire South Caucasus region realised its insecurity and helplessness. The fear and disillusion that gripped civil society and society as a whole helped to strengthen dictatorial tendencies across the region, including in Georgia itself. Despite the high price paid, the war did not even achieve the main objective: peace was not established.

Despite its tragic results, however, the August war did in a political sense also have one positive outcome. The clarification of the positions of all the parties involved made one crucial factor finally crystal clear: the Abkhaz and the Georgians have (and have always had) a common aim – to prevent Abkhazia being absorbed into Russia.

It is this prospect, rather than Georgia’s territorial integrity or the recognition of Abkhaz independence, that inspires the greatest concern in both parties. Thus, removing this threat or at least mitigating it must be the principal objective of any programme aimed at resolving the situation in the near future. The very fact that the two parties do have a shared goal could also be very important for the overall conflict resolution process – considering that this goal could provide a common purpose, act as a stimulus for joint action and identify areas for mutual compromise.  

While there are no ideal plans or solutions in complex situations such as these, there are plans that are more and less productive in terms of results.

Sukhumi and Tbilisi share the same main threat and aim

The status of Abkhazia – as an independent republic or integrated within Georgia – is considered by both parties to the conflict to be the main issue of dispute. Russia’s recognition of Abkhaz independence in 2008 created the illusion that this issue had been resolved, albeit in a way that was painful for the Georgian side. This view is illusory, since Abkhazia’s sovereignty is directly linked to the settlement of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict and the former cannot be resolved without the latter. The two societies are in fact stuck in an impasse – like two passengers stuck on the same unending journey and trying to avoid contact with each other.

The unresolved conflict with Tbilisi means there is a constant threat of a resumption of hostilities on Abkhaz territory. Until the conflict is resolved, Abkhazia will need security guarantees from Russia. This leaves Abkhazia isolated from the Western community and wholly dependent on Moscow in terms of decision making on all issues, from political to social. In other words, Abkhazia is unable to build the state it wants. Abkhazia’s dependence on Russia has already brought about an unusual state of affairs: today’s Georgia, which has for the first time in the entire history of the conflict proposed direct dialogue, is viewed in Sukhumi as more dangerous than a belligerent Georgia, which denied Abkhazia any right to determine its own fate.

The tragedy of Georgian-Abkhaz relations is that despite both sides always being aware of the Russian threat to their identity and freedom and aspiring to a close partnership with the Western world, they have not been able to come to a compromise even on these grounds. With the departure of UN observers in 2009, the curtain was finally lowered on Abkhazia and the small, weak republic was left face to face with the mighty Russia. Sukhumi is struggling all alone to restrain Moscow from buying up and controlling everything in Abkhazia and to prevent their relations from going too far.

Tbilisi and Sukhumi have nowhere to go. However, each side must sooner or later concede to the fact that they are like two passengers on the same journey, albeit  becoming increasingly irritated with each other. Political forces on both sides and civil society must eventually begin practical discussions and agree rational steps to resolve the conflict. Moreover, it is critically important that these discussions begin on entirely new terms, based on respect for the opponent’s demands.

Tbilisi must reshape its understanding of what constitutes “Georgia’s interests”

Georgia faces a choice: either to continue or to halt a process that has lasted almost 20 years, and that is literally pushing Abkhazia into Russia.

Georgia’s tactic for many years – attempting to achieve its aim through coercion and constantly setting conditions – was severe. Georgia should have sought to resolve its problems with Abkhazia, not to deepen them. Each new threat from Tbilisi has merely strengthened pro-Russian sentiment in Abkhazia. For Georgia, the direct opposite should be the priority – that is, supporting pro-Western ideas in Sukhumi. It would have been more pragmatic to end Abkhazia’s isolation and support its inclusion on an independent basis in international programmes. Abkhazia has for many years been like a ball suspended in the air that can be sent anywhere with the next impetus. While there are still people in Abkhazia who continue to aspire to independence and not to become part of Russia, the country could go in any direction. 

Therefore, it is in the interests of both Tbilisi and Sukhumi to set aside the question of status and deal with what can be resolved. They should acknowledge that Russia will never disappear from the Caucasus, just as the United States will never leave Mexico alone. The main task for countries bordering world powers is to avoid a situation where everything within their territory is decided by the big players. It is important that propaganda aimed at the total elimination of Russia from the Caucasus be replaced by a rational discussion of what place Russia can be assigned in the region, including in Abkhazia. This would be much more productive. The Caucasus could profit if it united over this issue – not against Russia, but rather in its stance regarding Russia.

Georgian society needs to face up to reality and realise that instead of focusing on territorial claims, it would be better off engaging in an intensive exchange with Abkhazia. This could help to create prospects for future relations, when the whole region could achieve its full economic development potential. Perhaps then, a time will come when the right social and political conditions will be in place for refugees to return home.  

Abkhazia needs to be opened up so that its people can travel to and trade with the rest of the world on their own terms – not only through Russia. As many Europeans as possible should be able to travel to Abkhazia and bring their ideas and values. This has always been important, but now more than ever given that Russia’s monopoly in Abkhazia has increased significantly since recognition.

There is still some time left – although not much – for Tbilisi to reconsider its essential understanding of “Georgia’s interest” in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. Two events – Russia’s recognition of Abkhazia’s independence in 2008 and the 2012 change of power in Tbilisi – have reshaped the context, giving grounds for cautious optimism for a gradual resolution of the conflict. There are many challenges of extreme importance to both societies which have nothing to do with political status and which can thus be met. Provided that the parties adopt a reasonable approach, transport communications could be restored as early as next year. This would contribute towards the development of trade and favourable business conditions – including for Russian business – as well as an investment boom not only in Abkhazia, but also in Samegrelo in western Georgia.

Russia is the most influential factor in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict and it has quite comfortably retained this position all these years – thanks to the Georgian government’s refusal to have any direct contact with the Abkhaz. Georgia should use real economic and then political instruments rather than ideological mantras. In other words, it should recognise Abkhazia as a reality. When this happens, Russia will no longer be able to control the conflict single-handedly as it does now.

Settling economic issues first and shelving political ones for later is a fairly widespread approach used to resolve conflicts in other parts of the world. In the case of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, it also promises real positive results, mainly dynamic and diverse economic growth in Abkhazia. This would pave the way for the fulfilment of a goal that is of crucial importance to both sides: the integration of Abkhazia into the international and not just Russian space and the progression of the conflict from the stand-off stage to the dispute stage. The hypothesis could run as follows: increasing the number of economic projects implemented in Abkhazia, with or without Georgian involvement, improves the chances of resolving the conflict proportionately. 

In order for this to become a reality, of course, both sides must be willing to cooperate with each other. Today, Abkhazia’s political fears still outweigh rational considerations. Frightened at the prospect of becoming more dependent on Tbilisi as a result of the lifting of the “iron curtain”, Sukhumi has begun to act against its own interests. In particular, the Abkhaz insist that any informal contacts and exchanges be made within a Caucasian and not bilateral format. However, this is obviously detrimental for them, since Abkhaz interests always tend to take a back seat when considered alongside other problems in the Caucasus. These and other fears on the Abkhaz and Georgian sides are quite understandable. Bearing in mind their complex past, any constructive plans will require as a minimum strong support from some international bodies, which can take responsibility for ensuring that neither side has any “hidden agenda”.

Of course, having multiple options offers the best prospect for resolving any complex problem. However, the status of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict today leaves only one possible alternative to the scenario described: one in which both the Abkhaz and the Georgians lose Abkhazia to Russia.

Resolving the problem involves respecting each other’s rights

Georgian-Abkhaz relations are currently but mistakenly based on the illusion that the conflict has a beginning. However, a circle has no beginning or end, and if we view Georgian-Abkhaz relations as a circular system, then we may avoid driving them into a dead-end. There would no longer be any pointless arguments along the lines that event “A” happened first and event “B” was a response to event “A”, or vice versa. Where conflict is involved, decisions on what constitutes “cause” and “consequence” depend entirely on the place from which an authoritarian decision is made to break the continuity of the circle. But this faulty logic is regularly used by parties to conflicts in which everyone is certain that it is the other side’s behaviour that has exerted influence on them, without realising that they in turn influence the other by their response. This kind of logic leads to a dead-end. Is a specific communication between conflicting groups pathological because the parties are unwilling to make concessions, or are the parties unwilling to make concessions because the communication itself is pathological?

Another dead-end situation is the tactic (on both sides) of ignoring the needs of the opponent. The opposite approach – whereby each side starts to think about what they can do for the other side rather than what they want to get from the other side – will not, admittedly, give either side immediately everything they want. However, the other route – mutual recriminations, suspicions and threats – has already been tried and has proven disastrous. 

The sides in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict are facing a “prisoner’s dilemma”, whereby the opponents do not cooperate even though this is the only way to meet their interests. Each one is afraid that the other will break the agreed tactic of “think what you can do for the other”.

The security system of any society consists of a number of interconnected elements, whereby even if one of them fails, the entire system stops working properly. This is why the classic approach of “everyone for himself” is not optimal in a conflict situation. More optimal strategies are where everyone tries to do the best for themselves by doing the best for others.

It might be useful to conduct a sociological or even psychological analysis of past disappointments regarding peace talks. It might be possible to identify specific modules where a certain behavioural pattern by one of the sides results in a similar response by the other and prevents a more desirable course of communication. As a solution, a communication framework could be developed which would allow the sides to move to another level of communication and avoid the same pitfalls. We might compare this possible solution to a star, the existence of which has been proven by astronomical calculations, even though the star has not yet been discovered.

Contacts are crucial

Communication influences behaviour in a significant way. In efforts to resolve a conflict, close bilateral communication is required – based on the widest possible contacts, both political and person-to-person. Otherwise, in the absence of permanent dialogue, self-serving narratives become arguments of the sides. Such arguments are usually based on selective facts and myths, and actively prevent a settlement.  

In the case of the Georgians and the Abkhaz, they should enter into dialogue as equally responsible sides. However, the definition of equal responsibility itself requires a separate discussion. For example, when the time comes for discussion of political questions, let’s suppose that the Georgian side agrees to Sukhumi’s main requirement and recognises Abkhazia’s independence. What would Georgia get in return? Apart from Abkhazia’s status within Georgia, the vital questions for Tbilisi include the following: the return of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and the restoration of their property rights; the status of the Georgian language; and the withdrawal of Russian armed forces from Abkhazia. Should a real conflict settlement process begin, developing responses to these and other issues will be a priority for the Sukhumi administration.

The lack of any practical solutions is in a way a positive factor, since it allows for negotiations to start with a clean slate – provided that the “prisoner’s dilemma” has been dealt with.

Resolving this conflict is vitally important for Georgia, since it is preventing progress in economic, political and also ethical terms. But a pragmatic and mutually respectful discussion of the range of potential solutions is even more in the interests of Abkhazia. It is important for the Abkhaz to get their arguments across to Georgia, as the West will not recognise their arguments unless they are recognised by Georgia.

After 20 years, Georgia has finally turned towards Abkhazia and for the first time intends to propose a dialogue instead of trading statements through mediators. If Georgia can maintain its intention of dialogue, and fears subside among the Abkhaz that Russia may “cede” them to Georgia, then a real solution to the conflict may become possible. Many in Abkhazia do not want a Russian monopoly. Although they do not share the idea of reintegration into Georgia, they want Abkhazia to be able to make political choices, particularly since these people are now much more vulnerable than before. 

Topics for discussion

1. What opportunities can be created for the inclusion of Abkhazia on an independent basis in existing international education and economic programmes? Moreover, will the ensuing de-isolation of Abkhazia help towards progress on conflict resolution?

Hypothesis: From the outset of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, it was a big mistake on the part of the official administration in Tbilisi to pursue a policy of sanctions against and isolation of Abkhazia. Each new threat from Tbilisi merely strengthens pro-Russian sentiment in Abkhazia, while the direct opposite is needed – that is, supporting more progressive, democratic ideas in Sukhumi. Abkhazia needs to be opened up so that its people can travel freely around the world and that as many Europeans as possible can come to Abkhazia and bring their ideas and values. This has always been important. However, with Russia’s monopoly in Abkhazia increasing as a result of recognition, it is now more important than ever.

2. Should the parties and mediators give priority to a joint, reasoned evaluation of their shared aims and interests and then draw up a special plan with concrete implementation mechanisms?

Hypothesis: Acknowledging shared goals is important for the settlement process, as this would set a common direction, stimulate joint action and identify where mutual compromises can be made. There are many issues that are extremely important for both societies but that have nothing to do with political status. This means that they can be settled.

3. What compromises on both sides are needed and possible? Should the failed tactic of ignoring the needs of the opponent be replaced by the opposite approach of “do better for yourself by doing better for the other”?

Hypothesis: The sides in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict are facing a “prisoner’s dilemma”, whereby the opponents do not cooperate even though this is the only way they can achieve their interests. The classic approach of “everyone for himself” has already proved (once again) unsuccessful, merely leading the sides down a route of mutual recriminations, suspicions and threats. At the same time, the sides must understand that such an approach is unlikely to give them everything they want immediately and that this approach frequently involves painful compromises. On the Georgian side, this could involve ending the blockade on Abkhazia’s direct trade and other relations with the world, as well as abandoning the idea of NATO membership. On the Abkhaz side, it could entail the withdrawal of Russian armed forces and the restoration of the refugees’ property rights. Of course, there are many more potential compromises that could and should be discussed.

4. Can the widest possible bilateral contacts, both political and person-to-person, seriously extricate the resolution process from its current deadlock?

Hypothesis: Communication influences behaviour in a significant way. Resolving disputes is only possible with good communication about the situation and awareness of each other’s views.

5. What other action needs to be taken by the parties and the international community to remove or prevent the most serious threat in the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict: the loss of Abkhazia as a territorial unit and its absorption into Russia?

Hypothesis: Both sides have always been aware of the Russian threat to their identity and freedom, and both have aspired to a close partnership with the West. However, they have not been able to come to a compromise even on these grounds. The tendencies since the 2008 war – the significant reinforcement of Russia’s positions in Abkhazia and the reduction not just of the influence of Western institutions, but even their presence in Sukhumi – have brought to the fore the threat looming over the very existence of Abkhazia as a territorial unit. Sukhumi has been left alone with Moscow, struggling to resist its intention to buy up and control everything in Abkhazia. The prospect of both the Abkhaz and the Georgians losing Abkhazia to Russia is now the greatest danger for both sides.

*Margarita Akhvlediani, Director and Editor-in-Chief of "GO Group/Eyewitness Studio"

Read the Abkhaz perspective on the same issue from Liana Kvarchelia, Deputy Director of the Center for Humanitarian Programs in Abkhazia